MASARYK UNIVERSITY BRNO

Faculty of Education

Department of English Language and Literature

The Falklands War and its impact on Margaret Thatcher’s politics

Bachelor Thesis

Brno 2016

Supervisor: Author:

Mgr. Zdeněk Janík, M.A., Ph.D. Josef Dastych

Declaration

I declare that I worked on this thesis on my own and that all information gathered for its compilation are from the sources which are cited in the references.

Brno, 30th November 2016 Josef Dastych

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Mgr. Zdeněk Janík, M.A., PhD. For his helpful advice and valuable comments. I am very grateful for his useful guidance.

Annotation The Falklands war was fought between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982. Despite the fact that the war was relatively short, it had an underlying impact on the politics of both countries. Before the war, Argentina and Great Britain were in a state of turmoil and political and economic decline. Britain’s victory propelled unpopular Margaret Thatcher to widespread popularity while Argentine’s defeat ended the dictatorial regime and enabled to restore democracy.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse historical aspects of dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands and the impact of the conflict on the politics of Margaret Thatcher and her leadership. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter analyses the origin of the dispute, its historical background and diplomatic negotiations to preclude the war. The second chapter focuses on the war process and reactions of the British public. The third chapter examines the impact of the war on the politics of Great Britain particularly on Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister.

Key words:

Falklands War, Falkland Islands, Margaret Thatcher, Argentina, General Galtieri

Table of contents

General introduction ...... 1 1. Background of the Falkland Islands and the Argentine Invasion ...... 3 1.1. Introduction ...... 3 1.2. Geography of the Falkland Islands ...... 3 1.3. Historical background of Falkland Islands until 1833 ...... 3 1.3.1. The British perspective ...... 4 1.3.2. Argentine perspective ...... 5 1.4. The dispute leading to the war ...... 9 1.5. The reasons and pretexts to fight the war ...... 13 1.5.1. Argentine reasons to reclaim the Falkland Islands ...... 13 1.5.2. British reasons to reclaim the Falkland Islands ...... 14 2. The Falklands War ...... 17 2.1. Introduction ...... 17 2.2. The South Georgia incident ...... 17 2.3. The British diplomatic responses ...... 18 2.4. The invasion of the Falkland Islands ...... 19 2.4.1. Battle for Grytviken ...... 21 2.4.2. The British reaction to the invasion ...... 21 2.4.3. Supports for Britain ...... 22 2.5. The British counterattack ...... 24 2.5.1. The Recapture of South Georgia ...... 24 2.5.2. The British public opinion ...... 25 2.5.3. The first strike ...... 26 2.5.4. Sinking of the General Belgrano ...... 27 2.5.5. Sinking of HMS Sheffield ...... 28 2.5.6. Landing at San Carlos ...... 28 2.5.7. Goose Green ...... 30 2.5.8. The Fall of Port Stanley...... 30 2.5.9. Falkland victory ...... 31 3. The impact of the Falklands war on Margaret Thatcher’ politics ...... 32 3.1. Before the war ...... 32 3.2. During the war ...... 35 3.3. The aftermath ...... 37 Conclusion ...... 40 References ...... 42 Appendices ...... 46

General introduction It seems unbelievable that so remote islands would gain such importance to any other nation than the United Kingdom. Before 1982, hardly anyone in Great Britain knew or was concerned about a distant archipelago called the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean. On the other hand, practically all Argentines were confident that the Islands, known as Islas Malvinas, rightfully belong to them. Argentina's rhetoric for the return of the Islands escalated to physical action on 2 April 1982 when Argentine government, ruled by a military junta, shocked the international community by invading them after 149 years of British possession and administration. It was a culmination of a long-standing dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands caused by miscommunication and lack of diplomatic negotiations. The British quick response to defend and recapture their territory was a success after just 74 days of heavy fighting. However, the cost to both sides was enormous. Besides high economic expenditures, the death toll was not. Although the war fought over rather small and, at that time, economically unimportant archipelago, it had a considerable impact on domestic politics not only in both participating countries, but also introduced significant changes in international politics and dramatically changed the lives of the islanders. Prior to the war, Britain was suffering from political decline and industrial and economic recession followed by high unemployment. Margaret Thatcher, Britain's first Prime Minister, was losing her popularity and was about to lose the upcoming general elections. Despite the problems, she decided to retake the Falkland Islands by force. The victory of the war had a substantial impact on Thatcher's domestic politics. It helped her regain the public support and assured her a second term in office by winning the 1983 general elections. Argentina was in a comparable political situation to Great Britain. Leopoldo Galtieri, the president and the head of the military junta, and the Argentine government were increasingly unpopular. During the late 1980's Argentina was facing economic decline and the junta was widely criticized for human rights abuses, economic mismanagement and high inflation. General Galtieri thought that the invasion of the Falkland Islands would strengthen his fading popularity. The Falkland Islands have remained of the British possession, albeit a matter of dispute over them has not been resolved and still persists. In the past decade the question of who the Islands belong to has been tackled as the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands have become attractive to oil companies searching new oil and gas reserves. 1

The aim of this thesis is to compare reasons of both countries to fight a short but bloody war and its impact on the domestic politics of Margaret Thatcher. The thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter analyses the historical background of the dispute from the perspective of both respective countries from the discovery of the archipelago to the outbreak of the war. The second chapter provides a description of the Falkland War and some important battles fought in the South Atlantic. The third chapter examines the impact of the war on the politics of Margaret Thatcher.

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1. Background of the Falkland Islands and the Argentine Invasion

1.1. Introduction This chapter is divided into four subchapters. The first chapter describes the geographical features and location of the Falkland Islands. The second subchapter deals with the historical background of the dispute from the discovery of the Falklands until 1833 between Great Britain and Argentina from their viewpoints. The third subchapter contains an account of events and negotiation that lead to the outbreak of the war and the last subchapter examines the reasons and rationale that both countries used to fight the war

1.2. Geography of the Falkland Islands The Falkland Islands are an island group and United Kingdom overseas territory in the South Atlantic Ocean that consists of approximately eight hundred small islands and inlets. The main islands of the group are East and West Falkland and they represent approximately 4,700 sq. miles of land (Figure 1). The largest city and capital is Port Stanley which lies just under 7,800 miles from the United Kingdom and 1,140 miles from Buenos Aires. About 800 miles south of the Falklands is South Georgia and a further 500 miles are the South Sandwich Islands. With rugged terrain and cliff-lined coastline, it is home to sheep farms and abundant bird life (Isaacs, 2000, p. 443). The climate of the Islands is cool. The average monthly temperature is about 48F (9C) in January and February and about 36F (2C) in June and July (Bingham, 2016). The highest point is Mount Usborne at 2,313ft (705m) above sea level on East Falkland. The population of 2,563 (2012) with over two thousand living in Stanley, is almost entirely of British origin. Fishing is a major source of revenue and sheep farming produces wool for export chiefly to the UK (Our History, n.d.).

1.3. Historical background of Falkland Islands until 1833 The dispute over the Falkland Islands has a long and complicated history that goes back to the discovery of the Islands almost two hundred years ago. This subchapter is composed of two parts where origins of the dispute are explained.

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1.3.1. The British perspective To address the question of the different perspectives, it is important to discuss both the British and Argentinean viewpoints. In this section the British world view will be examined. Although it is not clear who first discovered the Islands most Britons believe that they were first seen by English Sea Captain John Davis in the ship Desire in 1592. He might have even landed there, but it is resolutely refused by Argentinians. According to their version the Malvinas was discovered by the ship Incognita, which belonged to Bishop Plasencia's expedition in 1540 (Hrbek, 1999, p. 8). Nevertheless, no one disputes that the first recorded landing was made by English Capt. John Strong in 1690 in his ship Welfare, en route to Peru and Chile, when he had to land on the islands due to bad weather. He named the strait dividing the archipelago of two main islands 'Falkland Sound' after Viscount Falkland, the Treasurer of the Navy (Hastings and Jerkins, 1983, p. 1). Over several years the islands were visited only by French fishermen, which they called Les Iles Malouines (the Malvinas) after the port of Saint- Malo in Brittany. In 1764 Louis Antoine de Bougainville, the French explorer and diplomat, founded the first settlement at Port Louis on East Falkland. In 1765 British Commodore John Byron landed on West Falkland where he established a British settlement at Port Egmont and claimed the Islands for George III. When Captain John MacBride returned to East Falkland the following year he discovered a French colony at Port Saint Louis numbering 250 people. The French refused neither to leave nor swear allegiance to George III, which initiated the first dispute over the archipelago (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 36). By 1770 French and British were forced to leave the Islands by the Spanish government who rename Port Louis to Puerto Soledad. After serious diplomatic negotiations with Spain, France and Britain, Port Egmont was restored back to the British Crown. However, in 1774 Britain withdrew from Port Egmont for economic reasons due to unrest in the American colonies, which ultimately led into the American War of Independence, leaving behind a plaque claiming the Falklands for King George III. The inscription stated:

Be it known to all nations that the Falkland Islands, with this fort, the storehouses, wharfs, harbours, bays, and creeks thereunto belonging are the sole right and property of His Most Sacred Majesty George the Third, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc. In witness whereof this plaque is set up, and His Britannic Majesty’s colours left flying as a mark of possession. By S. W. Clayton, Commanding Officer at Falkland Islands, AD 1774 (Freedman, 2005, p. 5). 4

The Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 followed a dispute over the seizure of British vessels by Spain at Nootka Sound, an inlet of the Pacific Ocean on the west coast of Vancouver Island, which nearly led to a war. Most importantly, this act restricted the Spanish control of the northwest coast (Gough, 2006). When the Spanish left in 1811 the Falklands remained abandoned. In 1820, Colonel David Jewett visited Puerto Soledad where he raised the flag of the United Provinces of the River Plate. However, he only stayed there for not more than six months, leaving the Islands without effective government (Weddel, 1825, pp. 111-112). In 1826 a Buenos Aires citizen and merchant Louis Vernet settled in Puerto Soledad who was later in 1829 named a military and civil commander. In 1831 Vernet seized three American ships as an attempt to control fishing and hunting rights in the area. As a result, Americans sent the frigate USS Lexington, under the command of Silas Duncan to destroy Puerto Soledad and proclaimed the Falkland Islands free of government. Consequently, relations between America and Argentina were damaged. In the aftermath of the incident, Major Esteban Mestivier was appointed a Commander to set up a penal colony and retain influence over the Falklands. The Argentine military garrison arrived in October 1832 but soon afterwards, the Commander Mestivier was murdered by his own men (Hrbek, 1999, pp 10-11). Three months later in January 1833 the Royal Navy invaded the Islands by HMS Tyne and HMS Clio under the command of Captain James Oslow who forced out the Argentine military garrison along with the prisoners and a part of the settlers and raised the British flag over the Islands which has been flying there ever since, except during the Argentine occupation in 1982. The year 1833 was a turning point in the Islands’ history (Gibran, 1998 p. 29). From that year, British rule was stable for 149 years despite Argentina's continuous protests over its claims to sovereignty who owns the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 39).

1.3.2. Argentine perspective The Argentina's point of view on their right to stake a claim to the Islands will be analysed in this chapter. From the perspective of Argentina, the sovereignty over the Malvinas was declared as the inheritance from Spain based on the Papal bull, Inter caetera, issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 defining and delineating Spanish and Portuguese zones of the newly discovered lands outside Europe (Verzijl, 1979, pp 230-234). 5

The presumed discovery of the Malvinas has been attributed to Fernando de Magellan's expedition in 1520 on their voyage around the world and since then they remained under Spanish control whereas the British assert that the claim is based on insufficient evidence, France was the first country to found a settlement on the Falklands. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 confirmed that Spain retains its possessions in the Americas including nearby islands. In the Spanish view, the British renounced sovereignty of the Islands by signing the Treaty (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 38), which stated:

Britain refuted the Spanish claim, asserting that it could not ‘in any respect give in to the reasonings of the Spanish ministers.’ The right ‘to send out ships for the discovery of the unknown and unsettled parts of the world must indubitably be allowed by everybody.’ Nevertheless, this was a time of important commercial treaty negotiations with Spain and so while denying the Spanish claim the British did not pursue the expedition (Freedman, 2005, p. 4).

When Spain learnt that the French and then the British had colonized the islands, France agreed to leave in exchange for substantial compensation that Spain paid for the settlement in Port Louis. Above that, France insisted that Spain controls the colony of Port Egmont in order to limit Britain (Watts, 2003, p. 297). Spain and Great Britain had a poor relationship and thus no agreement was reached. Consequently, the small British garrison was expelled from Port Egmont in June 1770 when the Spanish government dispatched 1400 soldiers to gain control of the archipelago. Spain and Great Britain were close to an armed conflict. However, Spanish King Charles III feared that he could not defeat Britain and thus he finalized a treaty with Britain in January 1771 instead, allowing the British to return without claiming sovereignty over the Malvinas. The British returned the same year, but abandoned Port Egmont in 1774, leaving Spain the exclusive possessors of the Falkland Islands (Cawkell, 1983, p. 25). From 1774 the Malvinas was ruled by a governor appointed by Buenos Aires as a part of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. Spain retained the possession of the Falkland Islands until the collapse of the Spanish Empire with no evidence of any British interest in the Falklands for the next sixty years. Moreover, when Britain recognized Argentina's independence in 1825 it made no claim to the Islands, which were governed by Argentina as well. In 1777, the remains of Port Egmont were destroyed and the British plaque was sent to Buenos Aires (Watts, 2003, p. 297). The Spanish garrison remained in Puerto Soledad, renamed Port Louis, until 1811 when they were withdrawn due to the Argentine war for independence, leaving behind a plaque 6 claiming sovereignty for Spain (Hoffmann, 1984, p. 65). In 1790, Great Britain and Spain signed a treaty known as the Nootka Sound Convention that ended the Spanish monopoly in the Pacific Northwest based on the Papal Bull of 1493. Adrián Hope describes that this treaty contained the further concession of free navigation and fishing in the Pacific or the South Seas but this should not be a reason for illegal trade with Spanish settlements and the British should not navigate nor fish within a distance of ten maritime leagues off the coast occupied by Spain. Additionally, it agreed that the respective subjects would not occupy any part of the coast or islands adjacent already occupied by Spain (Hope, 1983). The Argentinians claim that the Nootka Sound Convention acknowledged Spanish sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and that this supported their claim that they inherited the Falklands (Gough, 2006). Additionally, by this convention Great Britain relinquished its aims to control any territory in South America (Muschietti, 1988, p. 15). On the contrary, the British strongly object to this argument as the Convention refers to adjacent islands and the Falklands being 300 nautical miles off the coast of Patagonia are not adjacent to Argentina. In addition, they deny that they renounced their claim to the Islands when they withdrew from Port Egmont in 1774. They attempted to assert it by leaving behind the plaque which asserted their sovereignty (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 38). Conversely, the Argentines oppose claim it only refers to the island on which Port Egmont was established. When, in 1806, Spain was threatened by the Napoleonic Wars in Europe the Governor in Puerto Soledad fled the Malvinas. As Freedman describes, the Spanish finally withdrew from the Falkland Islands in 1811, leaving behind several fishermen, and a plate proclaiming Spanish rights on a church door at Puerto de Soledad,’’The island, with its ports, buildings, dependencies…belongs to the sovereignty of His Majesty Fernando VII… King of Spain and the Indies’. For the next ten years the Islands were uninhabited, used only by whalers and sealers, and it could be argued that they had become terra nullius1’’ (2005, p. 5). In 1816 the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata declared independence from Spain and became what is today Argentina enjoying sovereignty over the Malvinas until 1833 (Our History n.d.). The new government declared sovereignty over the Islands as its inheritance of the territorial right from Spain. Buenos Aires sent Colonel Daniel Jewett, an American commanding the Argentine Frigate Heroína, to officially assert claim to the Islands and raise

1 Latin expression deriving from Roman law meaning ''nobody's land''. 7 the flag for the United Provinces. He founded the crews of about fifty vessels embedded at Puerto Soledad and ordered them to stop fishing and abandon the Malvinas. No protest was lodged by Great Britain that time. In 1823, the first governor was appointed by the Buenos Aires government. Three years later an entrepreneur Louis Vernet was granted permission not only to settle in East Falkland but also to commercial development of the territory in and around the Islands along with an exploration of the wildlife and sea life. In 1826 he founded a colony numbering 90 settlers (Geobel and Metford, 1982, p. xix; Eddy et al., 1982, p. 38). In 1829, Vernet was appointed a governor who awaken British interest (Hastings & Jenkins, 1983, p.5). As Freedman mentions:

A formal protest was issued by the British Chargé d'Affairs delivered on November 19, 1829 noting that, ’’the Argentine Republic, in issuing this Decree, [has] assumed authority incompatible with His Britannic Majesty's rights of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands', citing as he did so, British rights from discovery and the restoration of occupation in 1771. At this time the British Government, with the Duke of Wellington Prime Minister, considered reoccupation of the Islands but decided against it'' (2005, p. 6).

Growing confident, Vernet seized three American ships on the ground that they were illegally fishing in the area and confiscated their sealskins (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 39). However, the US dispatched a warship USS Lexington commanded by Captain Silas Duncan, who not only retrieved the sealskins and destroyed the settlement but also arrested several Argentines and proclaimed the Islands free of government. Vernet never returned (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 39). Subsequently the Argentinian government established a penal colony there, but only for a short period of time as the new governor was murdered on his arrival by mutinous soldiers. As a consequence, Commander Jose Maria Pinedo was sent to take charge of the settlement on 30 December 1832. Three days later, Pinedo was surprised by Captain James Oslow who came to take control of the Islands (Hastings & Jerkins, 1983 pp. 5-6). Pinedo was forced by Oslow to leave the Islands without a fight as he was outnumbered by the British. Argentina claims that Vernet's colony was also removed, though England denies this (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 39). The Falkland Islands would remain under the British crown until 4th April 1982.

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1.4. The dispute leading to the war This chapter provides a necessary political context and a sequence of events from taking control of the Falkland Islands in 1833 to the invasion in 1982. As stated by Hastings and Jerkins, the Falkland Island have never been of any significant importance, yet,’’from the moment of their discovery they seem to have embodied the national pride of whoever held them’’ (Hasting & Jerkins, 1983, p. 6). Generations of Argentine pupils had been taught that the Malvinas was theirs. Even postage stamps declared that the Islands were a part of their country, but also Argentine maps defined the Islands as an ''occupied territory'' (Naughton, 1983, p. 6). From 1833 onwards, the Argentines have believed that the Malvinas belong to their nation and were taken by the British by force. They considered themselves eligible to claim the Islands as the legitimate heir of the Spanish since the Falkland Islands used to be a Spanish territory. Furthermore, the Falkland Islands are located only 300 miles off the Patagonian's coast, whereas Great Britain is nearly 8000 miles away. Also Argentina has never accepted the name of the Falkland Islands and instead call them the Malvinas (Calvert, 1982, p. 411). The majority of Britons are as confident about the sovereignty of the Falklands as are the islanders themselves. The majority of them are of British origin and they wish to remain British. During the war Margaret Thatcher declared:

Argentina has, of course, long disputed British sovereignty over the islands. We have absolutely no doubts about our sovereignty, which has been continuous since 1833. Nor have we any doubt about the unequivocal wishes of the Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock and tradition, and they wish to remain British in allegiance. We cannot allow the democratic rights of the islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina (Barnett, 1982, p. 28).

In 1840 the Falklands became a Crown colony and Lt Richard Moody was appointed as the first Lieutenant Governor (Hastings & Jerkins, 1983, pp 6-7). ’’By 1845 the capital had been moved to its present site and named Stanley, after the Colonial Secretary, Geoffrey Smith Stanley, 14th Earl of Derby'' (Falkland Island Holdings, n.d.). The colonization was carried out mainly by The Falkland Islands Company Limited that was granted its Royal Charter in 1852. The company engaged in agricultural and general trading activities including establishing a 9 shipping link with the UK (Falkland Island Holding, n.d.). Gradually, the Falklands became a prosperous colony which in addition to the export of wool also became a coaling depot supplying ships heading to Cape Horn (Hrbek, 1999, p.11). The Islands became a key point in the formation of empires for international geopolitical reasons. As K.E. Chehabi argues,’’In the era of classical imperialism the big powers had to possess as many islands as possible, so as to control the great shopping lanes and to supply routes of their fleets’’ (1985, p. 215). Before opening the Panama Canal, it was an essential port en route from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. When the Canal opened in 1914 the trade practically ended but became important for British interests in Antarctica (Landaburu, 1989, p. 45). Port Stanley was a strategically located naval base during both the WWI and WWII (Hrbek, 1999, p.11). In the post-war period the situation regarding claims over the Malvinas grew tense again. A nationalist Juan Domingo Perón won the presidential election in Argentina with his authoritarian fascist ideology (Hrbek, 1999, pp. 11-12). He attempted to buy the Malvinas from Britain in 1953 but was rejected as inconceivable by the British government (Peron in 1953 Tried To Buy the Falklands, 1984). The sovereignty dispute intensified during the 1960's when the Argentine government made several attempts to regain the islands. In 1964, a light plane landed at Port Stanley and the Argentine national flag was raised there. Four days later, Argentine nationalist carried out an attack on the British embassy in Buenos Aires (Calvert, 1982, p. 412). The same year, Buenos Aires demanded that the Falkland Islands should be decolonized. Consequently, the United Nation Committee on Decolonization added the Falklands to the list of territories that ought to be decolonized (Stephen, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 7). Furthermore, the committee agreed to add 'Malvinas' to the official description of the islands (Ibid 7). This led to the passing of Resolution 2065 in United Nations' General Assembly from 16 December 1965 (Freedman, 2005, p. 20). The Resolution invited:

the Government of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in the mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and

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the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (Rauschning, Wiesbrock and Lailach, 1997, p. 180).

The following negotiations over the resolution were rather ineffective for the next 17 years. From the Argentine perspective, major obstacle to the lack of negotiations was the reluctance of Great Britain to open a constructive dialogue. Secret meetings between representatives of the British Foreign Office and the Argentine Embassy were held in London in 1966 and 1967. Initially, the British were willing to relinquish sovereignty over the Islands, however, when the Islanders learnt about the mediations they expressed their concern about a possible impact of these negotiations and their desire to remain under British rule. In response to the concern caused by the sovereignty negotiations the Falkland Island Emergency Committee (FIEC), an unofficial body, was established to lobby on their behalf. British lobbying against the negotiations in 1968 was successful, so the British Foreign Office rejected the proposal to negotiate over sovereignty (Hrbek, 1999, p. 12). The key point for the British was the question of self-determination. They claimed that first and foremost it was the islanders' wishes that had to be acknowledged. For most of them the situation was content and they did not seek any change in status (Freedman, 2005, p. 21). The British position regarding self-determination has been based on the following statements. Firstly, self-determination is universally approved as a priority. Secondly, self-determination means ’’Let the people decide their destiny.’’ Thirdly, ’’the people’’ means the inhabitants. Fourthly, the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands have affirmed their strong wish to remain under British sovereignty. Lastly, the maintenance of British jurisdiction over the Islands should be widely acknowledged (Dunnett, 1983, pp. 416-418). From the Argentines’ perspective the apparent wishes of the islanders were not really in their long-term interest. The situation between Argentina and Britain improved in 1971 when an agreement on trade ties was reached. Argentina established direct air and sea links as well as postal and telephone service between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. In 1972 Argentina constructed an airstrip near Port Stanley. The air link between Comodoro Rivadavia and Port Stanley was operated by the Argentine Air Force. Nonetheless, considerable progress on the issue of sovereignty did not develop. The lack of action in negotiations led to further mediation from the United Nations by issuing another resolution 3160 in December 1973. The UN urged the countries to accelerate the progress and proceed without delay with negotiations (Freedman, 2005, p. 30).

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The relationship between Britain and Argentina began to sour in 1975. In October that year, the British government assigned Lord Shackleton to carry out economic survey of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine government strictly refused permission for Lord Shackleton to travel via Argentina. Later, an Argentine destroyer attacked an unarmed research vessel transporting Lord Shackleton. Argentine claimed that the incident occurred in Argentina’s territorial waters in violation of Argentine sovereignty, which was untrue (Calvert, 1982, p. 413) After a coup in 1976 a military junta2took control of Argentina. Subsequently, a military base was established on Southern Thule in Sandwich Islands by the Argentine Air Force without informing the British government. This act was seen by the British authorities as provocation violating British sovereignty. In November 1977, Prime Minister James Callaghan sent a naval task force consisting of a nuclear submarine and supporting units to the South Atlantic in order to deter any threat to the Falklands (Franks, 1983, pp. 20-24). The sovereignty issue was brought back on the bargaining table in 1978 suggesting new proposals such as joint sovereignty and administration of the Islands and leasing of the Islands for a predetermined period of time. Nevertheless, all the proposals were rejected (Hastings & Jerkins, 1983, pp. 33-34). In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister and Nicholas Ridley Minister of State. In June that year, Ridley visited Argentina and the Falkland Islands proposing leaseback solution. He managed to gain support from as much as fifty percent of Islanders but was refused by some members of Parliament. He warned,’’If we don’t do something, they will invade. And there is nothing we could do.’’ (Eddy et al., 1982, 53-54). Consequently, negotiation reverted to status quo. Argentina complained and sent the UN subtle hints of a possible invasion. However, the British government, regardless of these threats, underestimated the situation and ignored voices of the Kelpers3 and withdrew the HMS Endurance from service. It was wrongly interpreted by the Argentine government because they inferred that Britain had lost interest in the Islands (Hrbek, 1999, p. 13). On 2nd April 1982 president and commander of the Army Leopoldo Galtieri ordered the invasion of the Falkland Islands.

2 A military group that rules a country after taking power by force.

3 The residents of the Falkland Islands are nicknamed Kelpers. Kelp is a type of seaweed that grows around the Islands. 12

1.5. The reasons and pretexts to fight the war The conflict between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland Islands had a long history and the Falkland war had both historical and economic reason. This section is divided in two parts. The first is deals with events that affected Argentine to invade the Falkland Islands. The second section examines British justifications for retaking the Falklands.

1.5.1. Argentine reasons to reclaim the Falkland Islands From 1976 Argentina suffered under regime of military junta when General Jorge Videla, a member of the junta, seized power through a military coup. Immediately, the parliament was dissolved and the death penalty was to be re-established. The opponents of the regime were tortured and killed and thousands of people disappeared. The’’dirty war’’ or’’Guerra Suica’’ as it came to be known, continued until 1978. During that time, not only were human rights violated and the government became thoroughly corrupt, the country faced serious economic crisis with inflation reaching over hundred percent (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 59). In March 1980, Videla resigned and appointed General Roberto Viola as president. However, he was ousted by a new junta on 8 December 1981, led by Army General Leopoldo Galtieri joined by Navy Admiral Jorge Anaya and Air Force Brigadier General Arturo Dozo. In order to stabilize Argentine economic and social problems the military government designed economic reforms with savage cuts to service and benefits, stimulated investments and denationalized the economy. However, these new government measures were not welcomed and took people to streets. When demonstrations began to be out of control the Junta realized that it was losing popularity (Franks, 1983, pp. 73, 75). The recovery of the Malvinas Islands seemed to be a good opportunity to restore their credibility. In case of victory it would help divert attention from the country’s economic problems and also it would somehow legitimize the military government and rise notional feelings. Within weeks of seizing power, the junta issued National Strategy Directive 1/82:

The Military Committee, faced with the evident and repeated lack of progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to obtain recognition of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands; convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour, the full exercise of sovereignty and the exploration of resources; has resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain 13

the political objective. This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy and should be circulated only to the heads of the respective military departments (Stephen et al., 1991, pp. 12-13).

Galtieri believed that the United States would support Argentina in case of annexation or at least remain neutral regarding their extremely good relations. The Reagan Administration was in favour of Galtieri’s firm anti-communist stand. Furthermore, Galtieri enjoyed good relations with Moscow on the grounds that Argentina shipped grain to the USSR during the American grain embargo imposed by the Carter Administration (Hastings & Jerkins, 1983, p. 45; Freedman, 1982, p. 199). Additionally, the Argentine government wrongly assumed that Great Britain lost interest in the Falkland Islands. Firstly, Full British Citizenship of the Falkland inhabitants was denied under the British Nationality Act 1981. Secondly, HMS Endurance, which had maintained supplies to the Falklands, was withdrawn from service in January 1981.

1.5.2. British reasons to reclaim the Falkland Islands Following the General Election in May 1979 Margaret Thatcher, leader of Conservative Party, became Prime Minister. She had been preceded by James Callagham, leader of the Labour Party, whose government had been very unpopular and eventually led to general elections in 1979. When Thatcher took office, she was resolved to deal with unemployment, social unrest and inflation believing that’’the years of managed decline were the real testament to the ills of the British economy and the necessity to try a new approach’’ (Pearce & Stewart, 1992, p. 522). Furthermore, she wanted to establish a strong nation and regain the British power. The early 1980’s was a period of deep economic stress in Great Britain. Tax rates and inflation were high, productivity was low, and people endured ongoing brownouts working only three days a week. After the 1945 election, the Labour party proposed that the government would nationalize power and fuel industries, banks, inland transport, iron and steel industries, civil aviation and telecommunications. Thatcher believed that those changes had harmed Britain and that private money should pay for new technology (Bos, n.d.). In November 1981, Geoffrey Howe, Mrs. Thatcher’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that more government-operated industries would be privatized: ’’No industry should remain under State ownership unless there is a positive and overwhelming case for it so doing’’ (Wolfe, 1996, p. 74). 14

Besides, she also wanted flexible labour markets and a reduction of the budget of social services and education. All these measures caused a deep recession of the economy: ’’The tight fiscal policies and very high interest rates were maintained through the period 1979-1982 and Britain experienced its fiercest recession since 1931’’ (Pearce & Stewart, 1992, p. 523). As a consequence, high unemployment affected mainly the manufacturing and the mining industry generating social unrest and an outbreak of violence across the country. They wanted to change government. Margaret Thatcher inflamed the situation when she refused to deal with the complaints of the population and rather ordered police repression to supress public demonstrations. Consequently, the government became very unpopular and Margaret Thatcher was considered the weakest British Prime Minister (Floud & Johnson, 2004, p. 392). Due to the economic recession the government announced the closure of the British Antarctic Survey station at Grytviken in South Georgia and proposed 1981 White Paper which was a major review of the United Kingdom’s defence policy aiming to reduce military expenditure. John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence, announced reduction in the Royal Navy including the withdrawal of HMS Endurance from service by April 1982 without replacement (Bos, 2015). His decision was widely criticised by the Royal Navy chiefs. On 5 June 1981, Lord Carrington wrote to John Nott about the defence programme expressing his concern about the withdrawal of HMS Endurance. Due to the Falklands dispute it was important to maintain the British presence in the area because any reduction could be understood as decline in the interest over the Islands thus should be replaced by a similar vessel. However, the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance was confirmed in Parliament on 30 June 1981 (Franks, 1983, pp. 40-41). When the Falkland Island Council was informed about the decision a joint meeting was held and a following message was sent to Lord Carrington:

“The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service. They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of Islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision” (Franks, 1983, p. 41).

15

H.E. Chehabi mentions Admiral Sir Edmund Irving who in January 1982 published an article titled ’’Does withdrawal of Endurance signal a Falkland Islands desertion?’’ in which he foresaw the risk of the operation. Chenabi also criticizes the British governments for years of neglect. Although the Falkland Islands repatriated a good profit to Britain so little was done for its development (Chehabi, 1985, p. 220).

On 30 October 1981, Thatcher's government passed the British Nationality Act, that redefined British Citizenship. The Act created three categories of British Citizenship, but only those born in Britain or children of at least one parent born in Britain possessed the right to be British citizens. This considerably reduced the legal rights of the inhabitants of the Islands as British subjects (Chehabi, 1985, pp. 219-220). The financial cuts in military spending and in the British Antarctic Survey, the announcement of the withdrawal of HMS Endurance and the refusal of British citizenship to habitants of the Falkland Islands sent mixed messages to the Argentinians. They perceived it as abandoning the protection of the Falklands and not as inevitable economic restrictions of Britain’s defence budget.

Geoffrey Regan is convinced that the war could have been avoided if the British government had sent unmistakable signals of a territorial commitment (Regan & Grasa, 1989, pp. 172-173)

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2. The Falklands War 2.1. Introduction This chapter is divided into four subchapters. The first subchapter provides details of the initial incident on South Georgia that subsequently led to the invasion of the Falklands. The second subchapter explains the British reaction to an imminent threat of war and necessary military action plans prepared by Thatcher's government. The third subchapter deals with the full Argentine invasion and seizure of Port Staley and the reaction of British and international authorities. The last subchapter, that is further divided into nine sections, and provides a detailed account of some battles fought in the South Atlantic by the Argentine and British forces.

2.2. The South Georgia incident South Georgia is approximately 150 miles long island located 800 miles southeast of Port Stanley. It is a harsh place with mountains permanently covered with snow and ice. On 19 March 1982, the Argentine flag was raised at South Georgia by Argentine workers contracted by a scrap metal merchant from Buenos Aires, Constantino Sergio Davidoff, who was attempting to dismantle a disused whaling station at Leith Harbour4. Davidoff was awarded a commercial contract in 1979. The incident was interpreted by the British as a provocation. The following day the British Foreign Office reacted with an ultimatum and sent an urgent request to Buenos Aires to take down the flag and leave the island. HMS Endurance with marines was secretly sent from the Falklands to expel the workers from the island in case the instruction had been ignored (Freedman, 2005, pp. 11-12). After the protest all but a dozen workers left Leith aboard Bahia Buen Suceso, an Argentine naval support vessel. On 23 March, Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez was informed that HMS Endurance was ordered to remove the remaining workers. Costa Mendez warned that such a grave action prior to exhaustion of diplomatic solutions would precipitate a harsh response. He also suggested that Bahia Buen Suceso might return to retrieve the group of workers. Instead, over one hundred Argentine troops under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz aboard Bahia Paraiso were ordered to protect the workmen (Hoffman, 1984, pp. 157- 158). Furthermore, Argentina deployed two missile carrying corvettes, ARA Drummond and

4 Leith Harbour was a whaling station on the northeast coast of South Georgia operating from 1909 until 1965. 17

ARA Granville, to stay in a position between the Malvinas and South Georgia in order to obstruct HMS Endurance in case hostilities would began (Luscombe, 2016). The situation was escalating. The Junta, confronted by anti-government protesters across the country and at the same time afraid of arriving British submarines, met on 26 March where they agreed to launch the invasion (Hastings & Jenkins, 1983, p. 60). Meanwhile, the British government did not expect the invasion of the Falkland Island that time but they thought they were still dealing with the ownership over South Georgia. When diplomatic negotiations between London and Buenos Aires failed to defuse the South Georgia crisis, the Prime Minister ordered RFA Fort Austin to support HMS Endurance to allow her to stay on station longer. (Franks, 1983, p.70) The British government were still convinced that a military action was not necessary and that Argentina was only testing Britain’s determination to defend sovereignty over South Georgia. They did not discover the intended plan to invade the Falkland Islands until 31 March. The British Intelligence analysed the position of Argentine naval ships and their unusual activities and predicted that the invasion of the Falkland Islands would occur on 2 April. Accordingly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher gave orders to deploy nuclear submarines, HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid, in the South Atlantic and warned Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Islands, of a possible invasion. Coincidentally, the old detachment 1981 of NP 8901, under command of Major Gary Noott, was waiting for its relief from the new team under command of Major Mike Norman. The old detachment was ordered to stay on the Falklands until the South Georgia is resolved. This increased the military strength that would not normally have been available.

2.3. The British diplomatic responses Until the day before the invasion the British did not expect a military aggression on the Falkland Islands and therefore there were virtually no preparations. They assumed that the whole South Georgie incident was just an attempt to test British sovereignty. The British did not want to escalate the situation, however, on 31 March they realised that the situation had gone beyond the point of peaceful solutions. The news caused a panic. The Prime Minister was advised by John Nott, the Minister of Defence, that any attempt to recover the Falklands would be impossible due to little military capability the British had after three years of cuts and it would therefore be hugely expensive. The Foreign Office 18 suggested that London should negotiate with Buenos Aires and try to share the expensive responsibility for the Islands (Thatcher, 1983, p. 179). In opposition to this view Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord, addressed Margaret Thatcher in the House of Commons, who was uncertain what to do about the invasion, had no doubts about a counter-invasion. He told her that the Falklands had to be recaptured:’’Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little’’ (Badsey, Havers & Grove, 2005, p. 70). He also explained that it would take three days to prepare a Task Force but three weeks to reach the South Atlantic. However, even with only two small carriers to provide air cover, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, the Falklands could be recaptured. Mrs Thatcher called President Ronald Reagan requesting his immediate intervention with General Galtieri. She explained that an Argentine invasion might be inevitable and said that Britain could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation (Thatcher, 1996, p. 130). They were friends who had cultivated a ’’special relationship’’ between Britain and the United States. The British Ambassador in Washington Sir Nicholas Henderson met the Secretary of State Alexander Haig to ensure quick response from the White House (Thatcher, 1996, p. 130). After President Galtieri refused to negotiate and was determined to continue with his actions, the British government ceased the diplomatic relations with Argentina and imposed economic sanctions. The Prime Minister created a War Cabinet to assist in planning and ordered the Chief of Naval Staff to form the Task Force named ’’Operation Corporate’’ regardless of whether it should sail or not (Figure 2).

2.4. The invasion of the Falkland Islands The aim of this subchapter is to provide a contextualization of the historical and political situation of the invasion shortly before and after the military assault. The Governor Rex Hunt did not receive the message about impending attack until 1 April at 3 pm local time. The Falkland garrison of Royal Marines, known as Naval Party 8901, consisted of just 68 Marines and 11 sailors from HMS Endurance. Nine members of the old detachment had been sent with Lieutenant Keith Mills on board HMS Endurance to South Georgia to observe Argentine soldiers based on the island. Major Mike Norman, senior commander of the British garrison, had had little time to organize an effective defence of Port Stanley with a small number of Marines at his disposal. He knew that he would be hopelessly outnumbered. However, they had done the best they could to give the Argentines ‘a bloody 19 nose’ (Eddy et al., pp. 8-9). According to instruction from London he expected the Argentines to land at Pembroke beach which proved to be a wrong decision. The Argentines arrived before midnight on 1 April. The destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad anchored three miles south of Port Stanley near Mullet Creek and disembarked special naval forces. Their task was to capture the British Marine Barracks and the Government House. Early in the morning, the submarine Santa Fe landed close to York Point disembarking the tactical divers group. They marked Orange beach for main landing of an amphibious force. At about 4.30 a.m. on 2 April 1982, Buzo Tactico, the Argentine Special Forces, landed at Mullet Creek. Operation Rosario (Figure 3), the Argentine code name for the invasion of the Falkland Islands, started (RAF – The Falkland Islands Campaign, n.d.). By 6am the Argentine Special Forces team attacked the Marine Barracks at Moody Creek, but the Royal Marines had already left. Another Special Force team went directly to Government House. Around 6.30am, the first some of 20 armoured amphibious landing vehicles LVTP-7 ‘Amtrack’ landed from Carbo San Antonio at York Bay and advanced towards Port Stanley. Norman ordered his troops to retreat to help the small team defending the headquarters at government House where was the Governor and his military advisor Major Gary Noott. They managed to repulse the initial Argentine attack. The Buzo Tactico repeatedly attempted to storm the building. During one attack three Argentinians were wounded and other three captured (RAF – The Falkland Islands Campaign, n.d.). By 8.30am the Argentines seized the airstrip and cleared it of vehicles that had been deliberately parked there by the British to obstruct the runway. Soon afterwards, Lockheed C- 130 Hercules transport aircrafts loaded with reinforcement started arriving (Watson & Dunn, 1984, p. 138). When Rex Hunt was informed that the armoured force was advancing and would be soon at the Government House it was suggested that Hunt negotiate with the Argentines. Governor Hunt met Admiral Busser, the Argentine commander, to discuss the situation. Admiral Busser warned that civilians might be hurt if the fighting continued. Therefore, Governor Hunt ordered a surrender. Shortly after, the Argentine flag flew over the Islands for the first time since 1833. There was no loss of British life (Freedman, 2007, pp. 8-9). Rex Hunt, civil servants and the Royal Marines were flown first to Montevideo, Uruguay, and then to Great Britain. The members of the NP 8901 were invited to join 42 Commando and later be able to fly back to the Islands.

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2.4.1. Battle for Grytviken This was not the end of the Argentine invasion because another force was heading for South Georgia, 800 miles southeast of Port Stanley. The Junta had decided about the invasion of South Georgia to happen together with the invasion of the Falklands on 26 March. However, due to bad weather conditions it had to be postponed until the next day. A small contingent of Royal Marines commanded by Lieutenant Keith Mills RM had arrived at South Georgia on 31 March. They were informed about the situation in Port Stanley and they were determined to defend the island against Argentine aggression. They prepared defensive position at King Edward Point overlooking Cumberland Bay. At 10:30 on 3 April the commander of ARA Bahio Paraiso called Lt. Mills to surrender. Not only did he refuse that but he warned the Argentines that any attempt to land would be strongly resisted. The Argentines started a firefight. During the two-hour Battle of Grytviken, the Marines damaged corvette ARA Guerrico and two helicopters but eventually outnumbered Lt Mills, decided to surrender to save the lives of his men (Hrbek, 1999, p. 59)

2.4.2. The British reaction to the invasion Back in London, after Margaret Thatcher received a telegram from Port Stanley that confirmed the Argentine invasion, an emergency meeting of the cabinet gave approval to form a Task Force to recover the Falklands. Leach, responsible for forming the Task Force, gave direct control of the fleet to Admiral John Fieldhouse (Thatcher, 1993, p. 179). Meanwhile in Buenos Aires, President Galtieri informed the Argentine nation of the success of the invasion in a short broadcast. Later in the day, he was greeted by a crowd of more than 200 000 in the Plaza de Mayo The next day, the United Nation’s Security Council adopted Resolution 502 demanded by Sir Anthony Parsons, the British Ambassador to the UN. The Resolution demanded immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, immediate cessation of hostilities and required both the Argentine and British governments to seek a diplomatic solution (Security Council Resolution, 1982, n.d.). On 10 of April, Great Britain also received political support from the Commonwealth of Nations and the European Economic Community. Although it was a significant victory it did very little to rectify the situation. In the week that followed both governments started to deploy large military forces to the area of the Falkland Islands. On 5 April, both aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible left Portsmouth in 21 the company of escort vessels. On 9 April the ocean liner SS Canberra left Southampton with 3 Commando Brigade aboard and on 12 April the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth 2 with 5th Infantry Brigade on board headed for the Falkland Islands. By the end of April, the whole Task Force consisted of more than 4,000 ground troops, 3 nuclear powered submarines and 65 ships: 43 Royal Navy vessels, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and 62 merchant ships (Hrbek, 1999, p.75). The first Argentine troops to join the invasion forces on the Islands were 8 Regiment that flew to Port Stanley on 6 April. By the end of the month, three brigades of front-line army troops and significant marine forces were deployed (Midlebrook, 2003, pp. 47-56). Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse was the Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief Fleet who was technically responsible for planning and direction of Operation ‘Corporate’ but in actuality the Flag Officer 1st Flotilla, Rear Admiral John ‘Sandy’ Woodward was the Task Group Commander at sea who led the Operation to recover the Falkland Islands. The Argentine forces were commanded by Brigadier General Mario Mendéz (Anderson, 2002, pp. 27, 29). Due to bad Britain’s preparations and plans to decommission HMS Endurance, the head of the diplomatic service was under pressure. On 5 April, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington and two junior Foreign Office ministers resigned. Francis Pym was appointed as a new Foreign Secretary. Max Hasting and Simon Jerkins mention that Mrs Thatcher was not happy about the choice as she had already fired him during her first year in office for his ’’indefinite point of view’’. However, he was the only candidate without a major reshuffle.

2.4.3. Supports for Britain First, Margaret Thatcher consolidated power within her cabinet and braced it for war and next, she focused on the international supporters. There she addressed the United Nations and the United States.

Margaret Thatcher had few allies in the Foreign Office. She strongly relied on two diplomats. Particularly, Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador to the United States and Sir Anthony Parson, Ambassador to the United Nations. Anthony Parsons arrived at the United Nation one day before the Argentine invasion with clear task to table the passage of a UN resolution that would utterly condemn the Argentine action and provide Great Britain with the legal justification for any military action that might follow. On 3 April, the Resolution 502 was adopted by the UN Security Council. Ten votes were in favour, one opposed (Panama) and four

22 against (China, Poland, Spain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) (Security Council Resolution, 1982, n.d.). All of this was achieved within only 48 hours.

Initial American attempts to convince General Galtieri to end the dispute peacefully and avoid the invasion failed. Reagan’s administration was reluctant to actively support the UK due to British colonial aspirations and also, more importantly, due to their relationship with Argentina as an ally keen to support anti-communist regimes in Latin America. Moreover, the United States feared of Soviet involvement in the conflict. On 7 April, Secretary of State Alexander Haig arrived in London to begin shuttle diplomacy5 between Buenos Aires and London. According to Sir Nicholas Henderson, ’’Mrs Thatcher was terrifically intolerant of it, she thought it was monstrous that anybody should be negotiating about something so outrageous as the occupation of the Falkland Islands, but it was essential to have America on our side’’ (Till, Freedman & Dorman, 2005, p. 83).

On 15 April, Haig scheduled a phone call of President Reagan with General Galtieri where Mr Reagan clearly stated that if war could not be avoided, the US would have difficulty remain neutral. On the other hand, General Galtieri warned the president that the US cannot afford to lose a valuable ally in the war against Communism in South America whet countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador were in a state of turmoil (Sultoun-Ebin & Chaipman, 2015)

Haig tried hard to keep the United States neutral in the war between two allies but by 19 April, still in Buenos Aires, he finally realized that any further negotiation with Argentina were useless. Eventually, President Reagan and his administration accepted the failure and begun to support Britain militarily (Hastings and Jerkins, 1982, 112).

France agreed to stop supplying Argentina with weapons such as Exocet missiles and Super Etendard aircraft and provided the British with strategic information and additional aircraft training so Harrier pilots could fight against French planes used by Argentina (Hrbek, 1999, p. 82). Great Britain also received support from the Commonwealth Nation and the European Economic Community. On 16 April, the EEC imposed economic sanctions on Argentina by the EC Regulation 877/82. On the other hand, Argentina was supported by majority of Latin America countries.

5 Political activity in which someone makes frequent journeys between two countries and talks to each government in order to end a disagreement or war. 23

2.5. The British counterattack The fourth subchapter is composed of nine sections that seek to provide a detailed account of some battles important to explain the outcome of the war. A comprehensive analysis of the deployed forces and conducted operations shows their advantages and disadvantages in the theatre of war as well as the process of negotiations While the British forces were heading for South Atlantic the new Argentine government authority changed Port Stanley’s name to Puerto Argentino and made Spanish the official language of the Falkland Islands. They also introduced driving on the right hand side in order to make driving easier for young Argentine conscripts. However, the command was widely ignored and most of the islanders continued to drive on the left. Moreover, the Argentines planted over twenty thousand landmines, as well as barbed wire along the beaches and pastureland and around the capital city.

2.5.1. The Recapture of South Georgia On 3 April, Argentina invaded South Georgia and the recapture of the island was seen by the British government as a necessary step in recovering all the British territories in the South Atlantic. Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse was ordered to plan the recapture. The assembly point for the Task Force was established on the British overseas territory of Ascension Island, a small volcanic island almost half way between the Falkland Islands and the United Kingdom in the Atlantic Ocean. During World War II the United States built an airbase called Wideawake on the Island and during the Cold War NASA established there a tracking station for the South Atlantic Ocean. On 4 April, the United States authorized Britain to use their airfield facilities as a staging post during the Falkland War. The Operation Paraquet, was a code name for the operation to recapture of South Georgia that was ordered on 12 April. Task Group 317.9 included the destroyers HMS Antrim and HMS Plymouth and the tanker RFA Tidespring that carried a troop of Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and M Company from 42 Commando Royal Marines under command of Captain Brian Young RN. (Captain Brian Young Telegraph). The whole force was under the tactical command of Major Guy Sheridan RM. On 12 April, Margaret Thatcher’s War Cabinet declared the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) of 200 nautical miles (230 miles) around the Falkland Islands which meant that any

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Argentine warship, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft could have been attacked by British forces. By 18 April the main Task Force set sail for South in order to clear the seas around the Falkland Islands of the Argentine forces and enabled the British invasion. The submarine HMS Conqueror had been already in the area on a reconnaissance. On 21 April, the SAS and SBS troops were landed on the Fortuna Glacier by Wessex helicopters. Their task was to proceed to Lieth and Grytviken. After the SAS troops were transferred to the northwest coast the weather worsened and had to be evacuated. Two of three Wessex helicopters crashed in adverse weather conditions on Fortuna Glacier and had to be rescued by Antrim’s Wessex helicopter, though there were no casualties (Rossiter, 2008, pp. 189-233). On 23 April, the operation was halted due to an enemy submarine that was reported entering the area. HMS Tidespring withdrew to deeper water and the rest of the British forces regrouped for the attack. The Argentines sent reinforcements to the island garrison aboard the ARA Santa Fe (Freedman, 2007, p. 239). On 25 April, a Wessex helicopter spotted the submarine on the surface near Grytviken leaving the port having landed her reinforcements. The Argentine submarine was attacked with depth charges, missiles and torpedoes and had to return back into port badly damaged. Major Sheridan decided to attack immediately. With HMS Tidespring 200 miles out to sea, he mustered only a force of 75 SAS, SBS and Marines to carry out the attack. However, after Major Sheridan’s party made their way along a steep hill and a naval bombardment demonstration by HMS Antrim and HMS Plymouth the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance (Hrbek, 1999, p. 107). The island had been retaken only 23 days after its invasion and not a single British soldier or sailor died.

2.5.2. The British public opinion After the recapture of South Georgia, the British could focus attention on the Falkland Islands. Diplomatic negotiations and attempts to reach a peaceful solution failed. Margaret Thatcher had committed to war and she needed to make it a popular one. Nonetheless, the public did not feel that Thatcher had handled the crisis well and seemed hesitant to support military action. According to polling conducted on 14 April, 34% Britons were satisfied with the government and 58% dissatisfied. Thatcher’s personal poll numbers were not satisfactory either, since she was supported by only 40% of voters. On 24 April, only 33% of Britons would have supported decision to:’’ Bomb Argentinian military and naval bases’’ (The Falkland War 25

– Panel Survey, n.d.). In order to win support for war she sent the Governor Rex Hunt and Royal Marines, who had been on the Falklands, on tour around Great Britain while she offered interviews to the BBC and the press that favoured her. All to convince the British public that the war was important and inevitable.

2.5.3. The first strike On 30 April, the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) was declared around the Falkland Islands which was an extension of MEZ covering the same area in which any sea vessel or aircraft from any country could have been attacked without further warning. On 1 May Britain launched its first strike of the seven planned missions codenamed Operation Black Buck. A Vulcan B2, XM607, bomber fully loaded with high explosives flew a 9,200 miles round trip from Ascension Island to bomb the airfield at Port Stanley. Each mission required repeated refuelling by tankers, including tanker-to-tanker refuelling. The raid was a complete surprise. 21 bombs dropped by the Vulcan caused enough damage to the airfield to make it unusable to Argentine aircraft to land but did not destroyed it completely because the British would need the runway later (Hastings & Jenkins, 1983, pp. 143-144; RAF – The Falkland Islands Campaign, n.d.) According to Lawrence Freedman the missions did minimal damage to the airfield and damage to radars was quickly mended (2005, p. 296). Because of the distance from Ascension Island the British had to rely on the 20 Sea Harriers carried on HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes (Freedman, 1982 aftermath, p. 52). On the other hand, the Argentines had possession of approximately 65 American Skyhawks, 36 Israeli Daggers, 14 French Mirage III and 6 British Canberra bombers. Moreover, the Argentine Navy had 5 French Super Etendards able to carry the Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles (Freedman, 2007, p. 281). On 30 April, only 28 days from the first sailings, more than 70 British vessels were at sea, gradually approaching the 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands. Early in the morning of 1 May the Vulcan B2, XM607, bombed the airfield at Port Stanley. Soon after the bombing, HMS Hermes launched 12 Sea Harriers to attack radars and anti- aircraft defences at Port Stanley and Goose Green airports. Meanwhile, three ships, the destroyer HMS Glamorgan along with the frigates HMS Alacrity and Arrow approached the coast of East Falkland to bombard Argentine positions. Argentina responded by a force of around 40 aircraft. Because the runway at Port 26

Stanley only 4,700 ft. long it was insufficient to support high-performance aircraft. Thus the first major Argentine strike force was dispatched from the mainland. Two formations of Daggers and one Canberra managed to attack the three British ships but with minimal damage. During the attack a Mirage III, a Dagger and a Canberra were shot down by the Sea Harriers. After the air engagement on 1 May, the Argentine Air Force tried to avoid direct combat with the Sea Harrier. First, the manoeuvrability of the Sea Harrier was superior to the Mirage III. Second, the Argentine tactics were poor and British pilots were more skilled (Burden, 1986, pp. 145-146).

2.5.4. Sinking of the General Belgrano When Her Majesty’s Government announced Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands the statement made it clear that any warships, submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft caught inside the Exclusion Zone would be attacked. It also stated that any of these vessels or aircraft operating near the Exclusion Zone could be attacked. On 2 May, the Argentine battleship, ARA General Belgrano, was discovered by HMS Conqueror. The ship was escorted by two Exocet armed destroyers. Although the Belgrano remained some 40 miles outside the TEZ (Figure 4) and had not violated the British rules, it appeared that it could pose a great threat to the Task Force (Hasting & Jerkins, 1983, p. 148). The Captain of HMS Conqueror convinced that the Argentinians were developing a pincer movement sent a request for action to be taken. Prime Minister and her War Cabinet agreed to carry out the attack. The ship was still 35 miles south-west of the Exclusion Zone when HMS Conqueror launched Mark 8 torpedoes. Two out of three torpedoes hit the cruiser that started to sink (Figure 5). 323 members of the crew died immediately and over 772 were rescued by Argentine and Chilean ships from 3 to 5 May (Middlebrook, 2009, p. 114-115). The news devastated the Argentine people and also it was a great loss for the Argentine Navy. Consequently, the Argentine Navy withdrew nearly all of its ships to the safety of Argentina’s territorial waters where they were to spend the reminder of the war. There was a lot of criticism regarding the sinking of ARA General Belgrano because the Argentine cruiser was sunk while outside the Total Exclusion Zone. Anthony Barnett is convinced that the Belgrano was attacked ’’quite illegally’’ (1982, p. 24). However, the Royal Navy had no qualms about the attack. As Admiral Fieldhouse said, ’I have no doubt that it was the best thing we ever did. It cut the heart out of the Argentinian Navy and we only had their Air Force to deal with then. That was a very considerable advantage’’ (RAF – The Falkland 27

Islands Campaign, n.d.). After Haig’s shuttle diplomacy failed, he sought the support of UN General Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar and Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry to introduce ideas for seven-point peace plan (Cardoso, 1987, pp. 219-220). The plan was to be introduced on 2 May. Unfortunately, the sinking of the Belgrano caused the peace proposal to fail.

2.5.5. Sinking of HMS Sheffield Two days later, two Super Etendards equipped with the air-launched version of the Exocet anti-ship missile, took off from their base in Rio Grande on Tierra del Fuego. Their target was the British Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield. The ship was struck by one Exocet missile which failed to explode but caused an uncontrollable fire (Hrbek, 1999, p. 130). The destroyer finally sunk six days later. Twenty crew members were killed in the attack and twenty-four were injured. This was the first Royal Navy ship that was sunk in a battle since the Second World War. The attack on HMS Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public. Poll numbers from the beginning of May show an immense in support for Margaret Thatcher. While in April only a half of Britons were in favour of the war, by May 79% Britons supported the option to ’’sink Argentinian ships in Falkland waters’’ (The Falkland War – Panel Survey, n.d.). Exocet missiles were a real threat to the British Navy. Therefore, Rear Admiral John Woodward of the Combined Task Group 317.8 sent its two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, far to the east of the Falkland Islands to be out of range of Super Etendards and their Exocet missiles (Freedman, 2005, p. 469; Hobson, Noble & Munro, 2002, p. 57). About two hours after sinking the HMS Sheffield the first Sea Harrier was shot down in an attack on the airfield at Goose Green by Argentine antiaircraft fire.

2.5.6. Landing at San Carlos No action occurred for the next several days as the Royal Navy needed time to reassert itself after the difficult days. The Royal Navy prepared a plan to provoke the Argentinians to an action and destroy them before British landing ships and vulnerable troop ships arrived. On 9 May, a British patrol detected and attacked the Argentine trawler Narwal by two Sea Harriers. On 10 May, HMS Alacrity sailed through Falkland Sound to conduct reconnaissance when she detected the Argentine naval transport Isla de Los Estados carrying aviation fuel and military vehicles. The ship was destroyed by high explosive shells. 28

The British troops gradually moved towards the other islands. On 14 May, an SAS team landed on Pebble Island where the Argentine Navy had seized a grass airstrip. The Royal Navy was worried that the light ground-attack Pucará airplanes could disrupt their intended invasion of the Islands. The SAS team destroyed or damaged several aircraft. By 20 May, after weeks of preparation, the Task Force was finally ready to leave Ascension Island and launch the invasion of the Falkland Islands. The British decided on San Carlos, the North West coast of East Island, as the location of their landing (Hasting &Jenkins, 1983, p. 177). During the night on 21 May, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp began the operation codenamed Sutton (Figure 6). In total, 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore (RAF – The Falkland Islands Campaign, n.d.). By dawn, the first wave of British soldiers had landed and established a secure beachhead. However, the Argentine Air Force responded. The Super Etendards with their Exocet missiles mounted severe attacks against the British ships. HMS Ardent sunk after being struck by several 1,000lb bombs (Eddy et al., 1982, p. 212). The Sea Harriers were used to provide air cover. Although they fought against the much faster Argentine planes they achieved air superiority. French Mirages III were faster than Sea Harriers. In addition, they used French Exocet missiles that posed a major threat to the Task Force. When the British gained French support for the war, the Ministry of Defence organized training for the British pilots to learn the capabilities of the Mirage III and the Exocet. During the battle of San Carlos, the newly developed skills proved to be invaluable (Nott, 2002, p. 304). On 25 May, a Super Etendard struck the British merchant navy ship SS Atlantic Conveyor by an Exocet missile, causing a disastrous fire. The British lost three Chinook and six Wessex helicopters due to the fire which meant that the troops were forced to march from San Carlos Waters to Port Stanley. On the same day the destroyer HMS Coventry was bombed and sunk by two A-4 Seahawks (Freedman, 2007, pp. 559-560). Despite the British Air Force being outnumbered and bravery of the Argentine pilots, the damages to the Task Force were not as severe as they could have been. The Argentine jets flew at very low attitude in order to avoid British missiles and machine guns. Consequently, their bombs being dropped at too low a height failed to explode. Many ships that were hit were relieved to learn that the bombs had not exploded.

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2.5.7. Goose Green The following days air attacks continued but mainly aimed against the ships and away from the troops on the Island. The plan to transport the troops to Port Stanley by helicopters had to be changed due to the loss of the heavy-lift Chinook helicopters on HMS Atlantic Conveyor. Instead, the soldiers had to walk to their destination and carry much of their equipment with them. 2 Para, a battalion of the elite British Parachute Regiment, was sent to Goose Green and Darwin area to break through Argentine lines. On morning 27 May the BBC World Service announced that the British troops were advanced to Darwin. The commander of 2 Para, Lieutenant Colonel ’H’ Jones was shocked to hear the news. Hasting and Jerkins depicts how the Colonel Jones was enraged to hear the news bulletin disclosing the impending British attack. This leak about confidential and strategic military tactics meant that the Argentines were dug-in and awaiting the battalion fully prepared (Hastings & Jenkins, 1983, pp. 239-240). As a consequence, 600 British soldiers were to encounter a reinforced garrison of 1,400 men of the Argentine Force. The battle that followed lasted the day and night of 28 May. Besides bad weather the Paras had to face a number of problems. The Sea Harriers could not provide sufficient support due to fog and poor flying conditions and when HMS Arrow was supposed to provide covering fire its gun jammed. Regardless these complications, the Paras carried out the attack and the Argentinians surrendered. Ironically, it was Jones himself who was killed while charging into the well prepared Argentine positions (Luscombe, 2016).

2.5.8. The Fall of Port Stanley Meanwhile, the British forces started to move inland towards Port Stanley in three parts. First, 42 Commando were to fly by helicopter to Mount Kent. Mount Kent, the highest peak around Port Stanley, was a strategically important position. After a short firefight they defeated the Argentine force on 31 May. Second, 45 Commando and 3 Para yomped northwards across the island to Douglas and Teal Inlet areas. Third, 5 Commando Brigade by ships, RFA Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram, to Fitzroy. Unfortunately, both ships were bombed by the Argentinians killing over 50 soldiers and many more injured (Hrbek, 1999, p. 171; Luscombe, 2016). On 11 June, the assaults on Port Stanley began. 3 Commando Brigade supported by several Royal Navy ships launched attacks on Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon. The attacks lasted three nights and were some of the fiercest battles of the war. On 14 July, the British forces reached the outskirts of Port Stanley. Despite the Argentines forces still had nearly 30

8,000 troops and supplies their morale was low. Consequently, the Argentinians flew white flags from buildings in town and a ceasefire was declared. General Menendez formally surrendered to General Moore at the evening the same day (Regan & Grasa, 1989, pp. 172-173; Hastings & Jenkins, 1983, pp. 342-343). Margaret Thatcher made a speech to the House of Commons that Argentina had formally surrendered and that the Governor, Rex Hunt, would return to the Falklands as soon as was practicable (Hrbek, 1999, p. 200).

2.5.9. Falkland victory The main operation to retake the Falkland Islands was completed on 14 June after 74 days of fighting. The British forces lost thirty-five aircraft, nine vessels, 225 British personnel were killed and 777 injured. The Argentine forces lost117 aircraft, four ships, 649 personnel were killed and 1068 injured. Also, three Falkland Islanders died during the hostilities. (Moro, 1989, p. 323). On 14 June, the British Task Force began returning to Great Britain. As Hasting and Jenkins describe, this was an endless celebration of the welcoming of ships bringing the new heroes back home, with enthusiastic capacity crowds gathering in naval bases of Portsmouth, Southampton and Plymouth (1983, p. 315). The victory was a triumph for Margaret Thatcher. In the following days she was receiving congratulations from around the world. Her popularity rose to become one of the most popular British Prime Ministers and the Conservative Party won the following year’s general elections. The impact of the Falklands war on the domestic politics of Margaret Thatcher will be discussed in the next chapter. In 1983, Margaret Thatcher visited the Falkland Islands. Furthermore, the Falkland islanders had their full British Citizenship restored. The situation was different in Argentina. General Galtieri resigned as the president of Argentina on 17 June and was later, along with other members of the junta, arrested. After the 1983 general election, Argentina return to a democratic government.

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3. The impact of the Falklands war on Margaret Thatcher’ politics The aim of the last chapter is to discuss a process of bilateral negotiations and the impact of the Falklands war on the politics of Margaret Thatcher. The chapter is composed of three subchapters. The first subchapter deals with the political situation of Great Britain in late 1970's and Margaret Thatcher becoming Prime Minister to the outbreak of the Falkland war. The second subchapter provides political context throughout the war and the last subchapter explains the aftermath of the Falkland war.

3.1. Before the war Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party and known as the ''Iron Lady'', became Prime Minister after winning the 1979 general election was the first woman to hold office. The former Labour Party government led by James Callaghan had been extremely unpopular leading to the 1978 ‘Winter of Discontent’6 and causing union strikes due to high unemployment and the ongoing recession. As a new minister, she demanded greater independence of the individual form of state, a reduction in the government’s interference in the economy, flexible labour market, privatization of the state-owned companies, reductions in expenditures on social services, health care, education and housing and limited the power of trade unions. Within the government, she planned to cut nearly 100,000 civil-service jobs within five years (Campbell, 2003, p. 173) All these measures caused a severe recession of the economy. As Pearce and Stewart claim “the tight fiscal policies and very high interest rates were maintained through the period 1979-82 and Britain experienced its fiercest recession since 1931” (1992, p. 523). She later noted that in 1979’’the forces of error, doubt and despair were so firmly entrenched in British society …that overcoming them would not be possible without some measure of discord’’ (Thatcher, 1993, p. 19). The conservative policies, political philosophy, and leadership style of Margaret Thatcher later became known as Thatcherism.

Thatcher’s government experienced hard times. Unemployment rose by 4% from 6% to 10% within the first year, reaching 11% at the beginning of the Falklands war, and inflation hitting 13% leading to even higher unemployment (Rogers, 2013).

6 The Winter of Discontent refers to the winter of 1978-1979 in the United Kingdom during which there were widespread strike movements demanding larger pay rises (Hay, 2009, 545-552). 32

At the beginning of the term Thatcher's opinion poll showed that she had support from almost 50% of the British public. This figure was continuously falling. By the end of 1980, Thatcher's approval rating fell to 23% (Margaret Thatcher: Poll Rating Trends – SlideShare, n.d.) As Thatcher commented herself ''to turn from the euphoria of election victory to the problems of the British economy was to confront the morning after the night before'' (Thatcher, 1993, p. 38). As the matter of fact, the morning lasted for three years.

In order to reduce expenditure a major review of the United Kingdom's defence policy was introduced by Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott. The 1981 Defence White Paper proposed extensive cuts to the British Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.

At the 1980 Conservative Party conference Thatcher had to face criticism from the so- called ''wets''7 who were openly conspiring against her. By 1982, the public was losing faith in the Tory party and its leader. Many polls found Conservatives well behind the new Social Democratic Party and the Labour Party (Jenkins, 2013). It was believed that Margaret Thatcher might be a one-term prime minister.

Lengthy negotiations over the Falkland Islands between Argentina and Great Britain continued and became more intensive after General Galtieri succeeded to the Presidency of Argentina in December 1981. The possibility of a potential sale-and-leaseback of the Falklands to Argentina was led by Nicolas Ridley, one of Thatcher’s most trusted ministers.

For Britain, aiming to reduce country's expenses, leaseback was an acceptable solution. Argentina would be given nominal sovereignty but the British would maintain administration of the Island for 99 years until the final handover. Both sides agreed to it, however, some members of Parliament and a majority of the Islanders categorically refused. They considered themselves British and they wished to remain so. The Prime Minister reiterated that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount (Freedman, 2005, pp. 113-123).

As it was mentioned in the first and second chapter, before 1982, hardly anyone in Great Britain knew or was concerned about the archipelago in the South Atlantic. Ironically, Great Britain, the former colonial power was willing to engage in war in order to maintain the self-

7 Members of Conservative Party who opposed some of the strict policies of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher meaning weak or willing to compromise with the trade unions. 33 determination of the Islanders. Anthony Barnett is convinced that Margaret Thatcher intentionally used the wishes of the Islanders for her own benefit (Barnett, 1982, p. 280)

Thatcher could hardly be found solely responsible for the invasion but according to Simon Jenkins it was unquestionably the consequence of her style of rule and one-track approach to policy. She had failed to defend the Falklands when she ignored pleas from the Foreign Office to reinforce the defence of the Islands. In fact, HMS Endurance, the Royal Navy's icebreaker ship and only permanent presence in the South Atlantic, was to be withdrawn due to the White Paper (2013).

In addition, negotiation process faltered, the British Nationality Act 1981 depriving many Islanders of their rights to full British citizenship was announced along with the intended closure of the British Antarctic Survey base on South Georgia. All these steps assured Argentina that Britain lost interest in the Islands. Geoffrey Regan claims that the war could have been avoided if Thatcher's government had clearly demonstrated its commitment to the Falklands. Instead, it sent contradictory signals to Argentines (Regan, 1987, pp. 172-177). The summary from the Argentine point of view

The problem has no political importance for the United Kingdom. England does not know what to do with the Falklands. They find them expensive and far away. Those 1,800 inhabitants give them endless trouble. [Consequently,] there will be no British counterattack if the [Argentine] military action is carried out 'cleanly' (Cardoso, Kirschbaum & Kooy, 1987, pp. 31-32, 54)

When the Argentine invasion seemed inevitable, Margaret Thatcher relied on her most significant international relationship, with the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. They had a close personal relationship for several years. They both agreed on the philosophy of free market, low taxes, limited government, distrust of Communism and determination to win the Cold War with the Soviet Union (Smith, 1991, p. 68). On 31 March Mrs. Thatcher called President Reagan in order to find a diplomatic solution to end the dispute. Surprisingly, Regan's administration hesitated to actively support Britain in the conflict. Firstly, it was due to British colonial aspirations and secondly, President Reagan maintained a good relationship with Argentina due to Galtieri's strong anti-communist stand and principle of stemming the 34 expansion of Communism in South America. Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempted to mediate the dispute between London and Buenos Aires peacefully but failed (Smith, 2009, p. 20).

On the other hand, the American Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, confirmed ''We did provide assistance. To my mind it was a very, very clear and simple case.... You had a corrupt military dictatorship from Argentina on one side. You had our oldest and strongest ally and a member of NATO on the other side (Miller Center, 2005). Furthermore, John F. Lehman, the Secretary of Navy in Reagan's administration, interprets it as ''a textbook case of the special relationship in action. It was an example of Britain and America working side-by-side, epitomized by the close bond between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher'' (Lehman, 2012). However, Alexander Haig, Francis Pym and Ronald Reagan firmly deny any support existing before 31 April (Freedman, 2005, p. 71; Nott, Leach, Pym & Eagleburger, 1997).

Regarding to UN Resolution 2065 both countries were urged to proceed with negotiations bearing in mind the interest of Islanders (Rauschning et al., 1997, p. 180). The British government attached paramount importance to the wishes of the Islanders, however, the Argentine government explicitly stated that they placed no importance to the wishes since they considered the Falkland Islands an integral part of Argentina and therefore their wish was to remain Argentines. Besides, they claimed that minority groups in Argentina had enjoyed excellent conditions and assured the Islanders they had nothing to fear as their interests would be fully protected by the Argentine government. From the beginning, Argentines spoke about defending 'interests' while the British spoke about defending 'wishes' (Calvert, 1982, p.38)

President Galtieri categorically refused the British offers The long-standing sovereignty talks had begun back in the 1960's considering wishes of the Islanders.

3.2. During the war From the moment the invasion was imminent, Margaret Thatcher was fully aware that she might face humiliation and potential resignation if she failed. By coincidence, the cautious Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Terence Lewin, was out of the country and the first to assist the Prime Minister was First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, who was able to convince Mrs. Thatcher about the possibility and need to launch a counterattack. Henry Leach was critical of Nott's navy cuts and he saw the war as an opportunity to regain the credibility of the Royal

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Navy. The next day, the Prime Minister announced her intentions in the Commons and the Royal Navy started preparation ''to make ready to sail in 48 hours'' (Hastings & Jenkins, 1983, pp. 11, 106).

The Prime Minister created a War Cabinet to assist in planning. She found herself in a difficult situation. President Reagan hesitated to support Britain militarily due to US interests in Latin America. One day before the invasion, on 1 April, he urged Margaret Thatcher to reconsider any decision provoking war (Saltoun-Ebin & Chaipman, 2011). He explained, ''It's a very difficult situation for the United States because we are friends with both of the countries engaged in this depute'' (Smith, 1991, p.86). In order to avoid an armed conflict Alexander Haig began shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires. At the beginning of talks the British government firmly stated that any negotiations about the future of the Falklands could be entered only after the Argentine troops had been withdrawn but it was resolutely opposed by the junta (Henderson, 1987, p. 88; Haig, 1984, p. 272). After Haig’s shuttle diplomacy failed, Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry submitted a five-point plan for a peaceful solution at the beginning of May (Freedman, 2007, pp. 272-273). Unfortunately, the sinking of the Belgrano caused the peace proposal to fail.

Margaret Thatcher was convinced that only complete victory could protect her reputation. Paul Rogers explains that not only did Thatcher needed to win the war but also did the British army as they could not afford another failure like one in the Suez Crisis in 1956. To achieve this, she needed a war and it needed to be a popular one. As the crisis progressed poll numbers showed that the British public opinion of the Prime Minister went down by 27% and only 12% of Britons replied that their opinion went up (The Falklands War - Panel Survey, n.d.).

Regan's administration realised that Haig's shuttle diplomacy failed and eventually, on 30 April, decided to support Britain and stop arms sales to Argentina remaining open to further negotiations. Nonetheless, the British sinking of Argentine warship, General Belgrano, on 2 May ceased any further possibility for peaceful discussion as war began. The sinking of Belgrano outside of the Total Exclusion Zone with the loss of 368 soldiers was the most controversial decision of the Falklands war. Not only did the international community see it as unnecessary use of force but also the British public. Poll numbers from the end of April showed that 76% of Britons were satisfied with the way of the government was handling the situation in the Falkland Islands but after sinking of the Belgrano the number decreased to 71% (The Falklands War - Panel Survey, n.d.).

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As Paul Rogers explains, ''Thatcher's government had sought a military victory rather than a diplomatic settlement after Argentina had occupied the Falklands Islands'' (20007, p. 25) and Anthony Barnett is convinced that the Belgrano was attacked ''quite illegally'' (1982, p. 24). At a news conference held on 4 May, John Nott defended the attack, ''Our first duty is to protect our men, the General Belgrano was a threat to our men, and therefore it was quite correct that it was attacked''. However, he did not specify the threat (Apple, 1982). On the other hand, after the loss of Belgrano the Argentine Navy withdrew to the safety of Argentina’s territorial waters and relied entirely on its Air Force (Brown, 1987, p. 139).

Two days later, HMS Sheffield was struck by an Argentine Exocet missile killing 20 men. The sinking of HMS Sheffield was the first major loss for the British during the Falkland war and the first British warship to be lost in 37 years. As a result, the British public support began to raise from 59% up to 80% on 23 May (Worcester, 1991, p. 87).

The landing of the British Amphibious Task Group on the Falkland Islands began on 21 May advancing to Port Stanley. Regan's administration wanted to avoid humiliation of the junta.

On 31 May, President Reagan called the Prime Minister to Downing Street at 11.30 pm London time. According to John Coles, Thatcher's private secretary, he told her, '' The best chance for peace was before complete Argentine humiliation'' and he added, ''As the UK now had the upper hand militarily, it should strike a deal now.'' Thatcher interrupted the president, ''Britain had not lost precious live in battle and sent an enormous task force to hand over the Queen's islands to a contact group'' (Biles, n.d.).

On 14 June the Argentines 74 days after the Falkland Islands were invaded leaving 255 British, 649 Argentines and 3 civilian Islanders dead.

3.3. The aftermath The British victory in the Falklands war represented the most significant achievement for Margaret Thatcher. After decades of decline caused by crumbling of the British Empire, Great Britain regained its self-confidence, restored a national pride and earned respect. Nevertheless, Britain was still facing persistent problems. As Thatcher announced in her speech: Britain had been in war, ''but it is not yet at peace'' (Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham, n.d.).

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The impact of the war on Mrs Thatcher was enormous. Previously, she was unpopular and close to resignation. Afterwards, she became a global celebrity and a changed leader receiving messages of congratulations from around the world. As noted in the previous chapter, the polls from June showed rising public support of the British government which continued after the war ended. Opinion polls from 21-23 June revealed that the opinion of 45% Britons of Margaret Thatcher during the conflict had ''gone up'' (The Falklands War - Panel Survey, n.d.). Margaret Thatcher was able to use the victorious war to establish her public persona as well as secured her position within the Conservative Party and eventually win the 1983 general election. The Tories won the biggest landslide since 1945 with 397 seats to Labour’s 209 (1983 General election result summary, n.d.).

Margaret Thatcher was confident to use ''the Falklands spirit'' to continue with her political and economic measures.

When in 1984 the National Union of Mineworkers began a nationwide strike to preclude the closing of allegedly unproductive coal mines. She adamantly refused to satisfy the union's demands. Many British believed that Thatcher was to save the country as she did with the Argentine invasion. Eventually, the miners returned to work without reaching a single compromise (Lehmberg & Heyck, 2002, p. 300; Blundell, 2008, pp. 121-125).

After the war, Secretary Nott's White Paper review reducing the Royal Navy's expenditures was abandoned and replacements for many of the ships and helicopters were ordered. Margaret Thatcher presented the British Nuclear strategy to the United Nation and began developing the nuclear deterrent. The plans of conservative government were widely supported despite Labour's opposition (Thatcher, 1993, p. 100).

The victory also strengthened the relationship Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Their alliance remained strong throughout the 1980s and played a key role in opposition to the USSR in the Cold War and contributed to 'the warming of relations' and eventually led to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. On the other hand, a British defeat would have had a dramatic effect on the 'special relationship' between the Powers. (Till et al., 2005, 86).

In Argentina, the dictatorship of the military junta was overthrown, Leopoldo Galtieri was arrested and a democratically elected government was restored in 1983 which also contributed to the popularity of Margaret Thatcher.

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In 1982 the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Amendment Act was passed which enabled all Falkland Islanders to acquire full British citizenship and in1985 a new constitution guaranteeing self-government was agreed by the British (Watts, 2003, p. 10)

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Conclusion A long-standing dispute over the Falkland Islands originates in 16th century when it is unclear who discovered a remote archipelago with rugged terrain and cliff-lined coastline. Argentine claims were based on a Papal Bull from 1493 which divided the ’’New World’’ between Spain and Portugal. The amendment of this document, the Treaty of Tordesillas from 1494, granted the Malvinas to Spain. When Argentina achieved independence from Spain, the new government declared sovereignty over the Islands as its inheritance of the territorial right from Spain. The sovereignty dispute intensified during the 1960's as a consequence of decolonial politics and eventually escalated into a war conflict between Great Britain and Argentina. On 2 April 1982, Argentina launched an invasion of the Falkland Island in order to capture them by force.

For Argentina, the recovery of the Malvinas Islands was a good opportunity to restore junta’s credibility and, in case of victory, it would help divert attention from the country’s economic problems and also it would somehow legitimize the military government and rise notional feelings.

Great Britain was caught completely unprepared by the Argentine invasion which escalated after a crisis due to raising the Argentine flag and the unauthorised presence of Argentine workers on South Georgia. Prime Minister Thatcher was advised to dispatch a naval task force and retake the Falkland Islands despite being 8,000 miles from Britain which meant three weeks for the ships to arrive.

Prior to the war, Great Britain, once known as British Empire, was in economic and political decline. When Margaret Thatcher took office as a Prime Minister in 1979, she wanted to restore Britain’s position in the world. She introduced radical reforms to reduce inflation, reduce unemployment and privatize the state-own-businesses. However, her strict polices had an adverse effect. In other words, she was deeply unpopular even within the Conservative Party and faced possible resignation. When the threat of the invasion was imminent Mrs Thatcher called her friend President Reagan requesting his immediate intervention. Initially, Regan’s administration hesitated actively support Britain due to a good relationship with General Galtiery and US interests in Latin America. After attempts to reach a peaceful solution failed the US government confirmed their support for Britain. The most controversial decision of the Falklands war was sinking an Argentine battleship, the General Belgrano, while outside the

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Total Exclusion Zone. By 14 June the war ended after 74 days when the Argentine troops surrendered at Port Stanley.

Despite the fact the Falkland war was relatively short it was considered to be the most remarkable event of the 1980’s and had many effects on both participating countries. For Margaret Thatcher was the Falklands war a turning point in her carrier. She received overwhelming support from a majority of the British public which enabled her to win the 1983 general election and continue with her reforms. Great Britain gained its real position among the universal powers and Britain’s relationship with the US strengthened. Argentina had a democratic government restored and the Falkland Islanders benefited from full British Citizenship.

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Appendices

Figure 1. Falkland Islands. Retrieved from http://www.solarnavigator.net/geography/falkland_islands.htm

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Figure 2. Operation Corporate. Retrieved from https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/task-force.jpg

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Figure 3. Operation Rosario. Retrieved from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Operation_Azul.jpg

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Figure 4. ARA Belgrano sunk outside TEZ. Retrieved from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/25/ARA.Belgrano.sunk.svg/471px -ARA.B elgrano.sunk.svg.png

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Figure 5. Sinking ARA Belgrano. Retrieve from http://belgranoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Belgrano-Sunk-copy2.jpg

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Figure 6. Operation Sutton. Infantry deployment in East Falkland after landing in San Carlos. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Land.ops.2.en.svg

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