STUDIA HUMANISTYCZNO-SPOŁECZNE (HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL STUDIES) 13 Edited by Radosław Kubicki and Wojciech Saletra 2016 Adrian Mitręga Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland THE ISSUE OF THE POLISH ENERGY SECURITY IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21st CENTURY At the beginning of the21st century, on the 15th of April, 1999, the Democratic Left Alliance was established, focusing leftists functioning so far in the Social Democracy of the Republic of Polish. SDPR originated from the Polish United Workers' Party, and it was on the Polish political scene between 1990 and 1999. Currently, the Alliance referring to the socialist tradition belongs to the community of parties united under the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists.1 At the beginning of the 21st century, the social democratic parties, despite the crisis of the identity politics and in the lack of public support, performs one of the leading roles in European politics2 and attempts to change the political, economic and social reality. After the collapse of the communist system, the social-democratic trendalso found its place in Poland, refer- ring to the tradition of the Polish Socialist Party acting on the Polish territory before World War II.3 The current changes taking place in the contemporary geopolitical arena forced the left-wing parties to go beyond the paradigms of thinking about the economy and so- ciety dominant in the last decade4. Moreover, the issue of the energy security at the beginning of the 21st century has become one of the priorities of the long list of chal- lenges that Poland will have to face in the near future. These challenges require deci- 1 Statut Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej. W brzmieniu uchwalonym na V Kongresie SLD, http://www.sld.org.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Statut_2012.pdf [March 24, 2015]. 2 J. Jaskiernia, Socjaldemokracja w procesie transformacji systemowej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, [in:] Ruch socjaldemokratyczny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1989–2010, eds. K. Leszczyńska, E. Olszewski, Lublin 2011, p. 14. 3 J. Kornaś, Emergencja, konsolidacja i dekompozycja głównego nurtu socjaldemokracji polskiej po 1989 roku, [w:] Lewica w III RP. Instytucjonalizacja i otoczenie, eds. K. Janik, Toruń 2010, p. 34. 4 M. Syska, Wprowadzenie: Jak odzyskać „stracone pokolenie”? [in:] Bez obaw o doro- słość Socjaldemokratyczny program dla młodego pokolenia, eds. M. Syska, Wrocław– Warszawa 2011, p. 13. 174 ADRIAN MITRĘGA sive measures in order to develop a rational and as efficient as possible program, exploiting the potential of energy resources of our country.5 Energy security of Poland is one of the main areas of political activity of the politi- cians from the Democratic Left Alliance. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, SLD along with the coalition government, shaped the Polish attitude towards the energy independence for almost half of the decade. In the electoral program of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Labour Union from 2001, we can read the following postulates on how to the establish energy security in Poland: support measures for the development of renewable energy sources; expansion of energy infrastructure (energy networks, gas network) in the coun- tryside and in areas with particularly low level of development; start a nationwide recycling program of industrial and municipal waste by using them in the production of renewable electricity; creating energy groups (mines, power stations and power plants), and the pri- vatization of the power distribution sector in conjunction with the productive sector; preservation of the state ownership of the infrastructure companies, including power grids, gas pipelines and oil pipelines.6 In the parliamentary elections in 2001, SLD-UP coalition won with a score of 41.04%, and gained together with the Labour Union 216 mandates and 75 senators.7 In total, the SLD-UP coalition received the support of 5.3 million voters, thanks to which the parliamentary coalition SLD-UP-PSL was formed.8 The period of ruling of the coalition was marked mainly by breaking the contract for the delivery of Norwegian gas, the outbreak of the so-called “Orlengate” or construction of ,,Pieremyczki” by- passing Ukraine. Poland and Norway signed energy agreements as part of a major Norwegian con- tract in September 2001. According to preliminary assumptions, Poland was supposed to receive in the years 2008–2024 approx. 74 billion m3 of natural gas. Two months earlier, Poland signed a contract with the Danish company DanskOlie & Naturgas AS (DONG) for the supply of 16 billion m3 of gas in eight years (2003–2010) as a part of a small Norwegian contract. However, these contracts were rejected by the govern- ment elected by Leszek Miller, as the new authorities feared that too much of the im- ported (and more expensive) gas from Scandinavia would lead to a reduction in do- mestic extraction. The most important argument against the finalization of the contract was the price of gas, because the purchase of gas from Scandinavia was much more 5 Uchwała nr 4 IV Kongresu SLD – główne zadania polskiej polityki zagranicznej, http://www.sld.org.pl/strony/100-polityka_zagraniczna_okiem_sld.html [March 24, 2015]. 6Program Wyborczy Koalicji SLD i UP 2001, http://www.sld.org.pl/public/ckfin der/userfiles/files/Program_Wyborczy_SLDiUP_2001.txt [March2, 2015]. 7 K. A. Paszkiewicz, Partie i koalicje polityczne III Rzeczypospolitej, Wrocław 2004, p. 164. 8 P. Szałamacha, IV Rzeczpospolita. Pierwsza odsłona, Poznań 2009, p. 9. THE ISSUE OF POLISH ENERGY SECURITY 175 expensive than buying the Russian one.9 The contemporary opposition accused the government of Leszek Millerof withdrawal from the concept of construction of the Norwegian gas pipeline to help the Russians to withdraw from the plan for construc- tion of the Nord Stream pipeline.10Some critics pointed out also inability of SLD poli- ticians to oppose the interests of Russia . Some arguments took form of accusations of acting deliberately in favor of Russia for business reasons or as its agents. The oppo- nents of the Norwegian contract argued that there was no risk of suspension of supplies of Russian gas to Poland, and that there was a danger that the Norwegians would sell Poland the cheaper gas, bought earlier from the Russians.11 Leszek Miller himself summed up the Polish – Norwegian gas supply agreement: “the contract was cancelled after two years on the initiative of Norwegian companies, because the Norwegians did not find customers for 3 billion cubic meters of gas, which was a condition for the realization of the contract. The Polish side undertook to receive 5 billions of gas, which was also unrealistic due to the excess of contracted gas from Russia. An impor- tant factor in the negative evaluation of this project was the price of gas, which wasabout 30% higher than the Russian fuel. Contrary to the popular belief, the most expensive gas is not just the one we have run out of, but also the one which cannot be used because of its price.12 Poland suffered from the negative effects of the breach of the contract with Norway in the years 2005–2006, when Gazprom decided to tempo- rarily suspend gas supplies to Poland. Moreover, Poland was the victim of an aggres- sive policy of negotiating the prices of the natural gas sent to Poland from Russia. According to Paul Szałamacha Polish restoring credibility to the Scandinavian energy arena took Polish energy company two years, as in 2007, Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG) finalized an agreement to acquire gas fields Skarv and Snadd situated on the North Sea shelf.13 During its parliamentary term, SLD-UP-PSL coalition created two strategic docu- ments directly relating to the conduct of the state's energy policy. These documents 9 Z. Dura, Bezpieczeństwo – polityka energetyczna [in:] Podmiotowość geopolityczna. Studia nad polską polityką zagraniczną, eds. K. Szczerski, Warszawa 2009, p. 179. 10Nord Stream was received by the Polish political reality as a trojan horse, acting in the Rus- sian-German interest and increasing dependence of the Western countries on the Russian energy, and furthermore, strengthening the position of Germany in the economy and the Euro- pean politics. Among the voices opposing this project, one could hear arguments that Russia makes a conscious attempt at the removal of the “united EU” through the use of the energy policy. J. Zimny, R. H. Kozłowski, Gazociąg Bałtycki – niebezpieczeństwo energetyczne dla Europy i Polski. (W odpowiedzi Ministrowi Gospodarki i Pracy Niemiec Wolfgangowi Clemen- towi), Kraków 2005, p. 1. 11 A. Podolski, Europejska współpraca wywiadowcza – brakujące ogniwo europejskiej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa?, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, ,,Raporty i analiz”, no. 10, 2004, p. 5. 12 L. Miller, Panie Marszałku, proszę nie mówić głupstw, http://leszek-miller.blog. onet.pl/2007/11/22/panie-marszalku-prosze-nie-mowic-glupstw/ [March 24, 2015]. 13 P. Szałacha, IV Rzeczpospolita, s.137. 176 ADRIAN MITRĘGA are: Evaluation of implementation and amendments to the Polish Energy Policy Guidelines until 2020 of April 2002, with Diagnosis of the Energy Sector – Macroeco- nomic Data and Data on the Energy Sector14 and the Polish Energy Policy until 2025 of January 2005. The first document presents a negative assessment of the Polish En- ergy Policy Guidelines until 2020 of 2000, while according to “Polish Energy Policy until 2025”, the primarygoal of the state is the expediency of the continuing energy policy, which aims to: ensure energy security in the country, increase the competitiveness of the economy and its energy efficiency, protect the environment from the negative effects associated with generation of the energy, transmission and distribution of the energy and fuels.15 In 2002, just before the liquidation of the State Protection Office (UOP) and the es- tablishment of two intelligence agencies of the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Agency Interview (AW),16 UOP officers arrested Andrzej Modrzejewski, the President of PKN Orlen at that time.