1. Roberts. Mcnamara, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy', Speech of I8 Sep I967, Reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, LVII (9 Oct I967) P
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Notes INTRODUCTION 1. RobertS. McNamara, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy', speech of I8 Sep I967, reprinted in The Department of State Bulletin, LVII (9 Oct I967) p. 446. 2. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program Ig6I-Ig6g (New York: Harper & Row, I97I) p. I79· 3· George Rathjens, The Future of the Strategic Arms Race; Options for the 197o's (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I969) p. 24. 4· McNamara, in Dept of State Bulletin LVII 446. 5· For examples see Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden (eds.), American Militarism 1970 (New York: The Viking Press, I969); Leonard S. Rod berg and Derek Shearer (eds.), The Pentagon Watchers: Students Report on the National Security State (New York: Doubleday, I970). 6. Albert \Vohlstetter, 'Is There a Strategic Arms Race?' and 'Rivals But No Race' in Foreign Policy, I 5 and I6 (Summer and Fall I974). He replied to his critics in 'Optimal Ways To Confuse Ourselves', Foreign Policy, 20 (Fall I975). 7· Immediate reactions to \Vohlstetter's first article can be found from Paul Nitze,Joe Alsop, Morton Halperin andj erome Stone in Foreign Policy, I6 (Fall I974). The main critique is that of Michael Nacht, 'The Delicate Balance of Error', Foreign Policy, I9 (Summer I975)· The debate is reviewed by Johan Jorgen Holst in 'What Is Really Going On?', an article in the same issue. 8. David Baldwin, 'Thinking About Threats', Journal of Conflict Resolution, xv (March I97 I). There is a third meaning in which 'A threatens B' can be taken as a straightforward statement of fact. 9· Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, I963) pp. 9-- IO. 10. J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National Security Policy (Ohio State University Press, 1962) p. I 72. 1 I Ronald L. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation ofDefense Strategy (New York: Praeger, I973) P· '4· I2. Colin S. Gray, 'The Arms Race Phenomenon', World Politics, XXIV (October I97I) P· 74· 2 THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY I. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton Paperback Ed. I966) p. 40. This book was first published in I949· 2. On intelligence failures see Abraham Ben-Zvi, 'Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks', World Politics, xxvm (Apr I976); Klaus Knorr, 'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: 200 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT The Case of the Cuban Missiles', World Politics, XVI (Apr 1964): Benno Wasserman, 'The Failure oflntelligence Prediction', Political Studies, vm Uune I g6o); Barton \Vhaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, I973); Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press, I g62). 3· Sherman Kent, 'Estimates and Influence', Foreign Service Journal (Apr I g6g) p. I 7· 4· Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, pp. 390-7 5· Knorr, Failures, pp. 461-2. 6. Ibid., p. 46I 7· Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, p. 395· To some extent the concentration on failure in the analysis of intelligence is misleading. The failures identified tend to be when unexpected things happened (Pearl Harbor, deployment of missiles in Cuba) rather than when expected things did not happen (military intelligence was regularly predicting a Soviet invasion of Europe during the 1948-50 period). This makes caution rather than recklessness appear to be a greater danger to successful intelligence work. 8. Kent, 'Estimates and Influence', p. 18. g. Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Harvard University Press, I97o) PP· 54-5, 61. 10. US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book IV, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence (Washington DC: GPO, I976). 'History of the Central Intelligence Agency', p. 5· This invaluable study, prepared by Anne Karalekas, is hereinafter referred to as Karalekas, History. I I. Letter from President Truman to the Secretary of State. Quoted by Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, p. I 36. I 2. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp. 94-6, 10 I. I3· US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, (Washington DC: GPO, I976), hereinafter referred to as Church Committee Report, p. 257· I4. On this see Vincent Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred Knopt: I974l· I 5· Karalekas, History, p. I 2. I6. See, for example, 'An Appalling Choice to Head the CIA', I. F. Stone's Weekry, g Oct Ig61. I 7. So described by Ray Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence under McCone, New York Times, 26 Dec I974· I8. Karalekas, History, p. 62. I g. For example Newsweek, 27 Dec I965, which spoke of insiders complaining that Raborn was 'a greenhorn at the spy game; he was insensitive to the professional pride of his staffers; inept at dealing in nuances; so unlettered in international politics, indeed, that he could not pronounce or even remember the name of some foreign capitals and chiefs of state'. 20. CIA veterans quoted by David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Espionage Establishment (New York: Random House, I967) p. I33· 21. Stewart Alsop, The Center, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ig68), p. 249· NOTES 201 22. Patrick]. McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972) p. 202. 23. Church Committee Report, p. 89, quotes Schlesinger on the determinants of the DCI's influence: 'To the extent that it is believed that he has the President's ear, he will find that the agencies or departments will be responsive, and if it is believed that he does not have the President's ear, they will be unresponsive.' 24. New York Times, 2 I Mar I 973· In the past there had been a reluctance to discharge employees for fear they would become 'security risks'. 25. Paul Blackstock, 'The Intelligence Community under the Nixon Adminis- tration', Armed Forces and Society, I (Winter I975) p. 237. 26. Wall Street Journal, I I Feb I975; Newsweek, 3 Mar I975· 27. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, I968) p. 224. 28. Patrick]. McGarvey, 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown & Co., I973) p. 320. 29. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, I964) P· 52. 30. Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Difense by Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, known as the Fitzhugh Report, (Washington DC: GPO, July I972) pp. 45-6. 31. Laird Posture Statement for Fr 1971, Feb I97I, pp. 83-4. As an influential member of the House Committee on Defense Appropriations Laird had been privy to a scathing report on the DIA prepared in I968 by a group of committee staff investigators. Armed Forces Management, Oct I 969. 32. Ibid. 33· The Pike Committee report was leaked to the Village Voice where it appeared under the heading 'The CIA Report The President Doesn't Want You To Read' on I6 Feb I976. This quote was on p. 83. 34· Tad Szulc, 'The Ascendant Pentagon: Freezing Out the CIA', New Republic, 24 july Ig]6; Edgar Ulsamer, 'Military Intelligence: Streamlined, Centra lized, Civilianized', Air Force Magazine (Aug I976) in which it is noted that the Director of Defense Intelligence, formerly the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence, will '"coordinate but not direct" intelligence operations of the military services because much of this activity is at a tactical level and under the direction of specific commanders or the services' staffs' (p. 29). 35· John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, I97I) p. I98; Major General Daniel Graham, 'Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job', Army (Apr I973) p. I 7; McGarvey, 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', p. 324. 36. Graham, 'Estimating the Threat', p. I5. 37· Ibid., p. I5. 38. Pike Committee Report, p. 83. 39 On NSA see Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, pp. I 25-33; David Kahn, The Code-Breakers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973); 'US Electronic Espionage: A Memoir', Ramparts (Aug I972); series by Douglas Watson in Washington Post, 2-6 Mar 1975· 40. Washington Star, 4 Oct I974· 41. See RayS. Cline, 'Policy Without Intelligence', Foreign Policy, I7 (Winter I974)· 202 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT 42. See Marchetti and Marks, The Cult of Intelligence, p. 335; Lyman Kirkpatrick, The US Intelligence Community (New York: Hill & Wang, 1973) p. 51; Church Committee Report, p. 63. 3 THE ESTIMATING PROCESS I. Harry s. Truman, Memoirs, u, rears rifTrial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1955) PP· 56-8. 2. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA, pp. 101-3 3· Karalekas, History, p. 16 4· Ibid. p. 16. 5· Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, p. 280; McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 189. 6. Karalekas, History, pp. 74-5· 7. Most of the following description of the estimating process is based on interviews. In addition I benefited enormously from an unpublished paper by Richard Kugler, Government Process for National Intelligence Estimates: Implications for Rationality in Defense and Foreign Policy Making, (MIT, Dec 1972), as well as discussions in Ronald Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1973) and Chester L. Cooper, 'The CIA and Decision-Making', Foreign Affairs, 1 (Jan 1972). 8. John Huizenga, 'Comments on "Intelligence and Policy-Making in an Institutional Context"', Appendices to the Report rif the Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy Volume vm, Appendix v, (Washington DC: GPO, 1975), p.