Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. RobertS. McNamara, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy', speech of I8 Sep I967, reprinted in The Department of State Bulletin, LVII (9 Oct I967) p. 446. 2. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program Ig6I-Ig6g (New York: Harper & Row, I97I) p. I79· 3· George Rathjens, The Future of the Strategic Arms Race; Options for the 197o's (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I969) p. 24. 4· McNamara, in Dept of State Bulletin LVII 446. 5· For examples see Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden (eds.), American Militarism 1970 (New York: The Viking Press, I969); Leonard S. Rod berg and Derek Shearer (eds.), The Pentagon Watchers: Students Report on the National Security State (New York: Doubleday, I970). 6. Albert \Vohlstetter, 'Is There a Strategic Arms Race?' and 'Rivals But No Race' in Foreign Policy, I 5 and I6 (Summer and Fall I974). He replied to his critics in 'Optimal Ways To Confuse Ourselves', Foreign Policy, 20 (Fall I975). 7· Immediate reactions to \Vohlstetter's first article can be found from Paul Nitze,Joe Alsop, Morton Halperin andj erome Stone in Foreign Policy, I6 (Fall I974). The main critique is that of Michael Nacht, 'The Delicate Balance of Error', Foreign Policy, I9 (Summer I975)· The debate is reviewed by Johan Jorgen Holst in 'What Is Really Going On?', an article in the same issue. 8. David Baldwin, 'Thinking About Threats', Journal of Conflict Resolution, xv (March I97 I). There is a third meaning in which 'A threatens B' can be taken as a straightforward statement of fact. 9· Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, I963) pp. 9-- IO. 10. J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National Security Policy (Ohio State University Press, 1962) p. I 72. 1 I Ronald L. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation ofDefense Strategy (New York: Praeger, I973) P· '4· I2. Colin S. Gray, 'The Arms Race Phenomenon', World Politics, XXIV (October I97I) P· 74·

2 THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

I. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton Paperback Ed. I966) p. 40. This book was first published in I949· 2. On intelligence failures see Abraham Ben-Zvi, 'Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks', World Politics, xxvm (Apr I976); Klaus Knorr, 'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: 200 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

The Case of the Cuban Missiles', World Politics, XVI (Apr 1964): Benno Wasserman, 'The Failure oflntelligence Prediction', Political Studies, vm Uune I g6o); Barton \Vhaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, I973); Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press, I g62). 3· Sherman Kent, 'Estimates and Influence', Foreign Service Journal (Apr I g6g) p. I 7· 4· Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, pp. 390-7 5· Knorr, Failures, pp. 461-2. 6. Ibid., p. 46I 7· Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, p. 395· To some extent the concentration on failure in the analysis of intelligence is misleading. The failures identified tend to be when unexpected things happened (Pearl Harbor, deployment of missiles in Cuba) rather than when expected things did not happen (military intelligence was regularly predicting a Soviet invasion of Europe during the 1948-50 period). This makes caution rather than recklessness appear to be a greater danger to successful intelligence work. 8. Kent, 'Estimates and Influence', p. 18. g. Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Harvard University Press, I97o) PP· 54-5, 61. 10. US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book IV, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence (Washington DC: GPO, I976). 'History of the Central Intelligence Agency', p. 5· This invaluable study, prepared by Anne Karalekas, is hereinafter referred to as Karalekas, History. I I. Letter from President Truman to the Secretary of State. Quoted by Ransom, Intelligence Establishment, p. I 36. I 2. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp. 94-6, 10 I. I3· US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, (Washington DC: GPO, I976), hereinafter referred to as Church Committee Report, p. 257· I4. On this see Vincent Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred Knopt: I974l· I 5· Karalekas, History, p. I 2. I6. See, for example, 'An Appalling Choice to Head the CIA', I. F. Stone's Weekry, g Oct Ig61. I 7. So described by Ray Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence under McCone, New York Times, 26 Dec I974· I8. Karalekas, History, p. 62. I g. For example Newsweek, 27 Dec I965, which spoke of insiders complaining that Raborn was 'a greenhorn at the spy game; he was insensitive to the professional pride of his staffers; inept at dealing in nuances; so unlettered in international politics, indeed, that he could not pronounce or even remember the name of some foreign capitals and chiefs of state'. 20. CIA veterans quoted by David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Espionage Establishment (New York: Random House, I967) p. I33· 21. Stewart Alsop, The Center, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ig68), p. 249· NOTES 201

22. Patrick]. McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972) p. 202. 23. Church Committee Report, p. 89, quotes Schlesinger on the determinants of the DCI's influence: 'To the extent that it is believed that he has the President's ear, he will find that the agencies or departments will be responsive, and if it is believed that he does not have the President's ear, they will be unresponsive.' 24. New York Times, 2 I Mar I 973· In the past there had been a reluctance to discharge employees for fear they would become 'security risks'. 25. Paul Blackstock, 'The Intelligence Community under the Nixon Adminis- tration', Armed Forces and Society, I (Winter I975) p. 237. 26. Wall Street Journal, I I Feb I975; Newsweek, 3 Mar I975· 27. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, I968) p. 224. 28. Patrick]. McGarvey, 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown & Co., I973) p. 320. 29. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, I964) P· 52. 30. Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Difense by Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, known as the Fitzhugh Report, (Washington DC: GPO, July I972) pp. 45-6. 31. Laird Posture Statement for Fr 1971, Feb I97I, pp. 83-4. As an influential member of the House Committee on Defense Appropriations Laird had been privy to a scathing report on the DIA prepared in I968 by a group of committee staff investigators. Armed Forces Management, Oct I 969. 32. Ibid. 33· The Pike Committee report was leaked to the Village Voice where it appeared under the heading 'The CIA Report The President Doesn't Want You To Read' on I6 Feb I976. This quote was on p. 83. 34· Tad Szulc, 'The Ascendant Pentagon: Freezing Out the CIA', New Republic, 24 july Ig]6; Edgar Ulsamer, 'Military Intelligence: Streamlined, Centra• lized, Civilianized', Air Force Magazine (Aug I976) in which it is noted that the Director of Defense Intelligence, formerly the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence, will '"coordinate but not direct" intelligence operations of the military services because much of this activity is at a tactical level and under the direction of specific commanders or the services' staffs' (p. 29). 35· John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, I97I) p. I98; Major General Daniel Graham, 'Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job', Army (Apr I973) p. I 7; McGarvey, 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', p. 324. 36. Graham, 'Estimating the Threat', p. I5. 37· Ibid., p. I5. 38. Pike Committee Report, p. 83. 39 On NSA see Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, pp. I 25-33; David Kahn, The Code-Breakers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973); 'US Electronic Espionage: A Memoir', Ramparts (Aug I972); series by Douglas Watson in Washington Post, 2-6 Mar 1975· 40. Washington Star, 4 Oct I974· 41. See RayS. Cline, 'Policy Without Intelligence', Foreign Policy, I7 (Winter I974)· 202 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

42. See Marchetti and Marks, The Cult of Intelligence, p. 335; Lyman Kirkpatrick, The US Intelligence Community (New York: Hill & Wang, 1973) p. 51; Church Committee Report, p. 63.

3 THE ESTIMATING PROCESS

I. Harry s. Truman, Memoirs, u, rears rifTrial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1955) PP· 56-8. 2. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA, pp. 101-3 3· Karalekas, History, p. 16 4· Ibid. p. 16. 5· Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, p. 280; McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 189. 6. Karalekas, History, pp. 74-5· 7. Most of the following description of the estimating process is based on interviews. In addition I benefited enormously from an unpublished paper by Richard Kugler, Government Process for National Intelligence Estimates: Implications for Rationality in Defense and Foreign Policy Making, (MIT, Dec 1972), as well as discussions in Ronald Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1973) and Chester L. Cooper, 'The CIA and Decision-Making', Foreign Affairs, 1 (Jan 1972). 8. John Huizenga, 'Comments on "Intelligence and Policy-Making in an Institutional Context"', Appendices to the Report rif the Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy Volume vm, Appendix v, (Washington DC: GPO, 1975), p. 41. 9· Lt Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, 'The Intelligence Mythology of Washington', Strategic Review (Summer 1976) p. 64. 10. Church Committee Report, pp. 76-7. 11. Kugler, Government Process, p. 52-3. 12. Ibid., p. 71. 13. Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, p. 86. 14. One CIA man put it as: 'They stirred the pot a little'. When ONE was first formed, an outside panel of consultants was formed with it 'to bring their practical expertise to bear on draft estimates'. They were known as the 'Princeton Consultants', because of where they met, and originally included George F. Kennan, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Vannevar Bush (Kar• alekas, History, p. 19). Over the years ONE came to question the value of outside consultants. There was a panel of academics with expertise in relevant fields set up. Board and staff occasionally met with this panel to exchange ideas on matters of substantive interest. 15. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race, p. 16. 16. Quoted in Samuel C. Orr, 'National Strategy Network gives White House tight rein over SALT strategy', National Journal (24 Apr 1971) p. 88o. 17. Kent, Estimates and Influence, p. 18. 18. Karalekas, History, p. 57 19. Cooper, The CIA and Decision-Making, p. 226. 20. Alsop, The Center, p. 245· 21. Quoted in I. F. Stone's Weekry, 27 July 1970. NOTES

22. Graham, Estimating the Threat, p. I6 23. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, I973) p. I49· 24. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, I969) p. I8. 25. John P. Leacacos, 'Kissinger's Apparat', Foreign Policy, 5 (Winter I970) p. 22. 26. See for example, Wall Street Journal, 8 May I 973; Washington Post, 10 Sep I973; International Herald Tribune, I9 Apr I97 1. 27. New York Times, 7 June I974· 28. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. I6I. 29. Leacacos, 'Kissinger's Apparat', p. I9. 30. Some idea of the nature of this study can be gleaned from A. W. Marshall, Bureaucratic Behavior and the Strategic Arms Competition (Santa Monica, Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, Oct I97I). 31. Alsop, Washington Post, 23 Feb I973· 32. Washington Star, 30 Mar I973; Washington Post, IO Apr I973· 33· Washington Post, 10 Sep I973 34· Washington Star, I9 Aug I973· 35· US Congress, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975 (Washington DC: GPO, I976) p. 54· 36. Church Committee Report, p. 75· 37· Karalekas, History, p. 83. 38. Pike Committee Report, p. 92. 39· Cal McCrystal et al, Watergate: The Full Inside Story (London: Andre Deutsch, I973), P· 36. 40. Church Committee Report, p. 75· 41. Pike Committee Report, p. 92.

4 THE MISSILE GAP

1. Church Committee Report, pp. 2 74-5. 2. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, United States Objectives and Programs for National Securiry, (NSC-68) (Washington D.C., I4 Apr I950) p. 6. This document was declassified 4 Mar I975· 3· Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1939-1945 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, I970) pp. 52-3. 4· Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, History of the USAEC, vol I, The New World, 1939-1946 (Pennsylvania State University Press, I962) pp. 359-60. 5· Cited in Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952, vol. I, Policy-Making (London: Macmillan, I974) p. 221. 6. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals ofDavid E. Lilienthal, vol. u, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, I964) p. 376 Entry for 3oJune I948. 7· Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York: Doubleday, I962) 8. NSC-68, pp. I9-2o. 204 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

9· Charles Murphy, 'The US as a Bombing Target', Fortune (Nov 1953) 10. Karalekas, History, p. 56. 11. Charles Murphy, 'The New Air Situation', Fortune (Sep 1955) p. 87. I 2. Ibid., P· 22 I. 13. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, p. 149· '4· Charles Murphy, 'Khrushchev's Paper Bear', Fortune (Dec 1964) p. 224. Karalekas, History, p. 56 15. By 1 Jan 1956, 41 B-52s had been accepted by the USAF Strategic Air Command (though 57 had been completed). In the spring of 1955 the production rates of B-52 had been accelerated in response to 'bomber gap' fears to 12/ month and in May 1956 the rates were accelerated again to first 1 7j month and then 20/month. In the spring of 1957 the rate was reduced to 15/ month. See Colin S. Gray,' "Gap" Prediction and American Defense: Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years', Orbis, XVI (Spring 1972) p. 262. 16. Senator Stuart Symington, 'Where the Missile Gap Went', The Reporter, 15 Feb 1962, pp. 21-3. 17. Report to the President from the Security Resources Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age (The Gaither Report), (Washington DC, 7 Nov 1957), p. 15. This report was declassified in Jan '973· 18. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, p. 162. 19. See interview with Tokaty-Tokaev in Nicholas Daniloff, The Kremlin and the Cosmos (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972): 'I did not pass on what were regarded by the Soviets as secret. General discussions, yes, but not details', p. 228. 20. Philip Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (New York: Random House, 1971) p. 13. Murphy, 'Khruschev's Paper Bear', p. 224 21. New York Times, 3 Oct 1949· 22. Ernest E. Schwiebert, 'USAF's Ballistic Missile-1954-1964', Air Force/Space Digest (May 1964); 23. James C. Dick, 'The Strategic Arms Race 1957-61; Who Opened a Missile Gap?' Journal if Politics, XXXIV (Nov 1972), pp. 1067-8. Greenwood notes that there were limits to this radar surveillance. Russian rockets would only enter the radar's field of vision after they had risen above the horizon. They could only be tracked for several minutes, depending on their range, before their trajectory carried them out ofview. Ted Greenwood, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control (London: IISS, June 1972). 24. Quoted by Gray, '"Gap" Prediction', p. 268. 25. Murphy, 'Khrushchev's Paper Bear', p. 227. 26. Alsop, The Center, pp. 58-9. 27. Quoted by H. H. Ransom, in Christian Science Monitor, 1 Dec 1958. 28. Charles Murphy, 'The Embattled Mr. McElroy', Fortune (Apr 1959) p. 244. 29. Quoted in Everett S. Allen, 'Lack of Information led US to overestimate missile lag', St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 27 Jan 1965. 30. Murphy, 'The Embattled Mr. McElroy', p. 244. 31. Desmond Ball, The Strategic Missile Programme of the Kennedy Administration, Ifiji-I¢3 (Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, June 1972) P· 94· 32. Graham, 'The Intelligence Mythology of Washington p. 61; Murphy, 'Khrushchev's Paper Bear' p. 228, Gray,' "Gap" Prediction', pp. 268-9. NOTES

33· David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (London: Cape, I964) pp. 2II-2; Alsop, The Center, p. 220. 34· Klass, Secret Sentries in Space, p. 105. 35· Ball, The Strategic Missile Programme, p. I6I; Klass, ibid., pp. 103-4; Alsop, The Center, p. 2 I9· The launchings of Discoverers I 7 and I8 were on I 2 Nov and 7 Dec respectively. 36. Ball, ibid., pp. I5I -2; Alsop, 'Comments', Foreign Policy, I6 (Fall I974) p. 86. In Feb I96I Robert McNamara, the new Secretary of Defense who was more sceptical of the existence of a missile gap than the President, appeared to deny the existence of the missile gap in a backgrounder to journalists. Kennedy reaffirmed its existence two days later. New York Times, 7 Feb I96I. 37· Andrew Tully, The Super Spies (New York: Morrow, I969); Kirkpatrick, The Intelligence Communiry, p. 5· As Kirkpatrick was high up in the CIA when Penkovsky was reporting his down-playing of Penkosvsky's worth is significant. On the whole the CIA has attempted to get as much mileage from this spy as possible. They sponsored a book purporting to come from him, The Penkovsky Papers (London: Fontana, I965) of which only a small proportion is original 'Penkovsky'. 38. New York Times, I9June I958. 39· There are numerous figures in circulation. The figures used in the text are distilled from many sources including Gray, '"Gap" Prediction': Ball, The Strategic Missile Programme; Dick, 'The Strategic Arms Race'; Roy E. Licklider, 'The Missile Gap Controversy', Political Science Quarterly, LXXXV (Dec I97o); Edgar M. Bottome, The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy (Cranbury, NJ.: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, I97I); and interviews. Bottome provides a valuable study of the whole controversy. 40. Gaither Report, p. 10. On the background to the report see Morton Halperin, 'The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process, World Politics, xm (Apr I96I). 4I. Charles Murphy, 'Defense: The Converging Decisions', Fortune (Oct I958) p. 228. 42. Murphy, 'The Embattled Mr. McElroy', p. 244. 43. Senate Appropriations Committee, DOD Appropriations for 1g6o, 1 (I 960) p. 23. 44· Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee and As- tronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Missiles, Space and Other Difense Matters (I96o) pp. 293-4. 45· Joseph Alsop 'Comments', Foreign Policy (Fall I974) p. 86. 46. Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, I970) pp. 84-9; Andrew Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago University Press, I966). Marchetti and Marks suggest Soviet statements were important contributions in making US estimates assume the worst. They also relate that these estimates were passed to the Kremlin by a KGB spy, Colonel Whalen, who was supposedly working for US Army Intelligence. These estimates apparently convinced the Kremlin that the bluff was working and was worth continuing. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, pp. 2 I 7-9. 47· Cited in Bottome, The Missile Gap, p. 49· 48. Graham, 'The Intelligence Mythology of Washington', p. 61. 206 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

5 GREATER THAN EXPECTED THREATS

I. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1¢5 (February I964) p. 37. All references to posture statements will be presented in this form. Their full titles can be found in the bibliography. \Vhen, as in this case, the reference comes from the classified rather than the public version of the statement this will be denoted by (class.) 2. Gaither Report, pp. I6-7. 3· This point is examined further in Lawrence Freedman, 'The Persistence of Technological Enthusiasm: The Technological Input into US Strategic Arms Policy', Millennium, v (Autumn I976). 4· Interview in Saturday Evening Post, I Dec I962. 5· Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, p. I 74 6. McNamara, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy', p. 445· 7. Enthoven and Smith, ibid., p. I 78. 8. Testimony of Alain Enthoven, Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Status of US Strategic Power, I (Apr I 968) pp. I 42-3. Hereinafter referred to as Status of US Strategic Power. See also Enthoven and Smith, ibid., pp. I 78-9. 9· Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 72. 10. In addition to interview material I have made use of the following sources in putting this section together: Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race; Newhouse, Cold Dawn; Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision Making, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, I975); Edward Randolph Jayne, The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Securiry, MIT Center for In• ternational Studies, June I969); Lloyd Norman, 'Nike-X', Army (March I967)· I I. 'Danger: Anti-Missile Gap', US News & World Report, 14 Nov I960. I2. Quoted in Greenwood, Making the MIRV, p. I7I. I3. Jayne, ABM Debate, p. 2I5· I4. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1964 (class.), Feb 1963, pp. 29-30; McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1¢5 (class.), Feb I964, p. 38; McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1g66 (class.), Feb 1965, p. 52. IS. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1967 (class.), Mar I966, p. 6o. I6. Ibid., Newsweek, 9Jan 1967; Norman, 'Nike-X' p. 30; Richard Whalen, 'The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense', Fortune, I June I967; Washington Post, I8 Dec I966. I 7· US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1966. McNamara news conference, 10 Nov 1966, pp. 728-33. I8. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1g68 (class.), Jan I967, p. 51. I9. Greenwood, Making the MIRV, p. I73· 20. One estimate put the range of Galosh at 400 n.mi. \Vhalen mentions a 'minority opinion' that ascribed to the missile a longer range of 'perhaps as much as 2,ooo miles'. Norman, 'Nike-X,' p. 30; \Vhalen, 'Shifting Equation', P· I76. 21. Paul Nitze, 'Comments', Foreign Policy, I6 (Fall I974) p. 82. 22. Herbert Scoville Jr. 'Upgrading Soviet SAM', New Republic, 9 Oct I97 I, p. 20. 23. Charles Murphy, '\Vhat \Ve Gave Away in the Moscow Arms Agreements', Fortune, Sep I972, p. I 14; New York Times, 25 Apr I97I. NOTES 207

24. McNamara Posture Statementfor Fr 1969 (class.), Jan I968, p. 63. 25. TestimonyofGeneral Wheeler, Status rifUS Strategic Power, I (April I968) p. I6. 26. Clifford Posture Statement for Fr 1970, Jan I969, p. 44· 27. This is hinted at in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Intelligence and the ABM (June I969), p. 39· 28. Ibid., p. 40, testimony of Secretary Laird: '[T] here is no dispute as far as intelligence is concerned that they are going forward and improving that system and (deleted) and redirecting the (deleted) radar'. 29. Cited in Jayne, ABM Debate, p. 2I7. In order to convince the Senate that it ought to authorise procurement of ABMs during FY I964, Senator Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.) requested a secret session in Apr I963 (for the first time since I943) in which he presented intelligence data purporting to demonstrate that the Leningrad system was a complete and effective defensive system. 30. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race, p. 101. 3 I. Testimony of Dr Foster, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, (Aug I969), p. 277. 32. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1965 (class.), Feb I964, p. 38. 33· McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1966 (class.), Feb I965, p. 52. 34· McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1967 (class.), Mar I966, p. 6o 35· McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1968 (class.), Jan I967, p. 5I. For public references to debate see New rork Times, 8 Dec I966; 5 Feb I967. 36. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 196g (class.), Jan I968, p. 62. 37· Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. I2. 38. Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, p. 3 I6. 39· In his I969 congressional testimony John Foster noted that the Russians were 'conducting their development program in such a way that their surface-to-air missiles are confused with their ABM research (p. 248). 40. Marchetti and Marks, ibid., p. I37· 41 ."Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1g67; McNamara interview, IS Feb I966. 42. Text of McNamara Press Conference (US Information Service) 3 Apr I967.

6 AN INVULNERABLE DETERRENT

I. A.J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, Apr I954, 2nd printing June I962), p. viii. For background to this study see Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation (Harvard University Press, Ig66). 2. Wohlstetter, Hoffman, Rowen, Protecting US Power to Strike Back in the 1950's and 1g6o's, (RAND Corporation, Sep I956), pp. 2-3. 3· Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, pp. 166-7. 4· Ibid., p. I68. 5· On the nature of the relevant formulae and calculations see Lynn Davis and Warner Schilling, 'All You Ever Wanted to Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask', Journal rifCor!fiict Resolution, XVII (June I973)· '.208 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

6. Wohlstetter, Hoffman and Rowen, Protecting US Power, pp. 28, So. 7· The two Soviet ICBMs being deployed in the early I96os were the SS-7 and SS-8, with yields of gMT, and accuracies of I -2 n.mi. and I n.mi. respectively. 8. Earl Voss in Washington Star, quoted inJ. S. Butz, 'The Myth ofTechnological Stalemate', Aerospace International (Apr I967) p. I6. 9· One way the problem was brought home to the US was when EMP from a Soviet test crippled the electronics of a US satellite. IO. Of the effects that come after gamma rays, neutrons penetrating a warhead can cause a premature atomic reaction and render it dud, while X-rays can foul the warhead by melting wire and literally boiling certain materials. At the end of the electromagnetic spectrum even the radio-frequency signal propogated can carry enough energy to damage electronic circuits drastically. On concern over EMP see Frank Burnham, 'Minuteman: Case History of an ICBM', Armed Forces Management (May I970) pp. 46-7; Missiles & Rockets, 9 Sep I963. II. McNamara Posture Statementfor FY 1966 (class.), Feb I965, p. 50. I2. Burnham, ibid., p. 47; New York Times, 2I May I967; A. E. Fitzgerald recalls the Minuteman II missiles being justified in I963 'primarily by frightening intelligence assessments of the Soviet Union's capabilities and intentions'. The 'intelligence spooks' (presumably Air Force intelligence) were reporting deployments of'a large number of truly monstrous ballistic missiles', each with a 100 MT warhead. A. E. Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste (New York: Norton, I972) p. I I 1. I g. Testimony of Secretary McNamara to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Aug I963) pp. 102-3. I4. For citations see Ball, The Strategic Missile Programme rif the Kennet!J Adminis• tration, p. 98. In Robert Kennedy, The Cuban Missile Crisis: October 1!}62 (London: Pan Books, I969) p. 39, an estimate of75-8o ICBMs is indicated for the time of the crisis. I5. McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1965 (class.) Feb I964, p. 37· I6. McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1964 (class.) Feb I963, p. 22. I7. McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1968 (class.) Jan I967, p. 51. I8. Washington Star, I3 Dec I964. I9. 'Is Russia Slowing Down in Arms Race?', US News & World Report, I 7 Apr I965. 20. Philadelphia Inquirer, I Feb I965. 21. Washington Star, I3 Dec I964, 22. McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1¢5 (class.) Feb I964, p. 37· The Russians had become interested in missile silos as a means to 'hide our missile sites from enemy reconnaissance' rather than to harden targets. See 'Khruschev's Last Testament: Power and Peace', Time (6 May I974) p. 26. 23. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1965 (class.) Feb I964, p. 37· 24. New York Times, 10 July I964. 25. International Herald Tribune, I9 Sep I970. This article by George Wilson gives details of new SS-9 silo starts for each year up to I969. 26. In early I965 McNamara had not mentioned the imminence of the SS-1 I though he did speak of tests of an 'SS-10', a new system 'about which we have little information' (p. 50). The next year, in the Fr 1¢7 Posture Statement, McNamara said that the SS-10 was still testing and the US still had little information about it (p. 57). It appears to have been a competitive NOTES 209 development to the SS-g. 27. McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1g64 (class.) Feb 1963, p. 29. 28. Albert Wohlstetter, Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves, pp. 187-91. 29. McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1967 (class.) Mar 1966, p. 57· 30. One of the most forceful presentations of this view came in a July 1967 report by the American Security Council on The Changing Military Strategic Balance: USA v USSR, published under the imprimatur of the House Armed Services Committee. Megatonnage as a measure of strategic effectiveness suffers because of the rapidly diminishing marginal returns brought about by adding mega tonnage to a static number of weapons. 31. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975, p. 68. 32. Michael Getler, 'Arms Control and the SS-g', Space-Aeronautics (Nov 1969) 33· 'Technological Storm Warning or False Alarm?', Air Force Magazine (July 1965)· 34· Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975, p. 97. 35· Robert Nichols refers to an estimate of 'June 12 or thereabouts' made by 'Pentagon Intelligence', Los Angeles Times, 20 Nov 1966; Michael Getler refers to 'recent DOD estimates', Technology Week, 27 June 1966. 36. Getler, ibid.; in an article in the New York Times, 13 Nov 1966, a warhead range of 30-60 MT was mentioned. 37· McNamara Posture Statement for FY 1g68 (class.) Jan 1967, pp. 45-7. 38. US News & World Report, 6 Feb 1967. 39· After reviewing the intelligence estimates of this period David Packard reported that: 'The evidence on the Soviet ICBM effort indicated that that they would level off their force, particularly the SS-g'. He added later: 'There was a feeling that the SS-g was going to level off at a number somewhere below 200'. Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems ( 1g6g), Part 1, pp. 276, 284. 40. McNamara Posture Statementfor FY 1!)69 (class.) Jan Ig68, P· s8. 41. Business Week, 2 Mar 1968. 42. Status of US Strategic Power, pp. 3, 119. 43· New York Times, 7 May Ig68. 44· Technology Week, 7 Dec Ig66; US News & World Report, 6 Feb 1967; Whalen, 'The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense', Fortune, I June I967, p. 175; New York Times, 10 Sep I g67. 45· North Virginia Sun, I6 Nov I967; See also Aviation Week and Space Technology, I6 Oct I967; New York Times, 20 Aug 1967, The shots were Kosmos I39, 160, 16g, 170 and 171, launched on 25 Jan, 17 May, 17 July, 3I July and 8 Aug respectively. 46. There were no official confirmations of this evidence and reporters who had good contacts with the higher echelons of the military establishment appear to have been given backgrounders on a possible Soviet multiple warhead programme without being told about any tests. For example, a story by William Beecher in the New York Times, 7 May 1g68, contained the following: 'Officials say that American surveillance capabilities are good enough to monitor test firings of special small shapes required for multiple warhead technology and, so far, no such tests have been seen. They admit laboratory work may be under way, but if so, they feel it is well behind America's effort.' !:IIO US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT 47· Wohlstetter, Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves, p. 187. 4Q. US News & World Report, 15 July 1968. 49· Statement to the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint ' Committee on Atomic Energy, Scope, Magnitude and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program; Nov 1967, p. 48-9. Nitze was replying to an analysis provided by Rep. Craig Hosmer (R. Calif.) in which he had postulated a Soviet attack 'at numerical parity' with Soviet warheads of 10-30 MT yield and accuracies of 2000 feet CEP that would destroy '970 of our 1,054 land-based ICBMs' (p.4). Interestingly, Rep. Hosmer's alarming and fact• ually incorrect scenario did not include a Soviet MIRV!

7 l'HE SENTINEL DECISION

1, Two of his key aides have commented: '[f]he annual counting exercise, where it is pointed out that the United States has three or four times as much of this or that as the Soviet Union, is not a very penetrating analysis of military needs or ~apabilities'. Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, p. 205. 2. In explaining this cut McNamara gave three reasons. First, the reduction in US intelligence estimates of Soviet ICBM levels. Second 'and most impor• tantly', qualitative increases in the kill capability of the Minuteman forces. Third, studies of nuclear war scenarios had shown that 'an additional 200 missiles would not have any material effect in reducing the damage to our Nation'. Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Procurement Authorizations, Fr 1g66, p. 304. The second point is probaly a reference to MIRV. 3· Washington Post, 9 Apr 1967. See Enthoven's testimony in Status of US Strategic Power, p. 118. 4· Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy, p. 446. In fact intelligence information had been sufficiently accurate to allow for a more modest growth in US force levels without excessive risk. See Ball, The Strategic Missile Programme of the Kennedy Administration, pp. 252-272. 5· McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1g68, Jan 1967, p. 392. 6. McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1!fi9 (class.), Jan 1968, p. 57· 7. These citations were provided by Secretary Laird to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Intelligence and the ABM, June 1969, p. 10. 8. Greenwood, Malcilfp the MIRV, pp. 54-6. At the same time as the Golden Arrow study, ~~roup u~der Admiral Miller produced studies (dated Aug 1964 and Nov 1g65 a,nd k~own !.!~officially as Great Circle I and II) which argued for sea-based strategic f~r~es which could perform, if necessary, counterforce missions. Such a4vocacy was ~hwarted by the continual refusal of the Special Projects Office to come up witfl an accurate warhead, and the reluctance of most of the rest or' theNavy to 'expand the strategic role, especially given the general purpose requiremel!ts of the Vietnam War. 9· Status of US Strategic Power, p. 14$ Jayne, ABM Debate, pp. 287-9. 10. On Strat-X see Jayne, ibid., p. 319; John Steinbruner and Barry Carter, 'Organizational and Political Dimensions of the Strategic Posture: The Problems of Reform', Daedalus, CIV (Summer 1975) p. 136; Whalen, The Shifting Equation, p. 87, quotes a 'high ranking officer in the Pentagon' as saying: 'As recently as a year ago we didn't think the Soviets could get a NOTES 211 counterforce capability. Now we see the threat'. 11. Status of US Strategic Power, pp. 52-7, 12. Morton Halperin, 'The Decision to Deploy the ABM', World Politics, xxv (Oct 1972) p. 69; Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 8o. 13. James Trainor, 'DOD Says AICBM is Feasible', Missiles and Rockets, 24 Dec 1962. 14. House Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations for Fiscal Year Ig67, Part 5, p. 33· On development of hard point technology see Frederic A Morris, 'ABM', Appendices to tlu Report of tlu Murphy Commission, vol IV, Appendix K, (GPO, 1975). 15. Jayne, Tlu ABM Debate, pp. 378-82. 16. Newhouse quotes a former colleague of McNamara as saying that McNamara was 'peppered with memos' for weeks prior to the 18 September announce• ment urging him to come down in favour of hard point. Newhouse does not say where these memos came from. Cold Dawn, p. gB. 17. Dynamics of .Nuclear Strategy, p. 450. 18. 'Defense Fantasy Comes True', Life, 29 Sep 1967. In a letter to the .New York Times on 22 Oct 1967 Richard Garwin, then a member of the Defense Science Board wrote that: 'The very possibility of MIRV's and the long delay in building even more offensive forces or defense of our ICBM forces have compelled (if not persuaded) Secretary McNamara to initiate the deployment of a defense for Minuteman, to be effective against Soviet missiles by perhaps 1973'· 19. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 99· 20. Speech reprinted in Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, pp. 118-24. 21. Ibid., p. 37. 22. Status of US Strategic Power, pp. 52, 144. 23. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 129.

8 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION: PROTECTING MINUTEMAN THROUGH SAFEGUARD

1. Cited in Democratic Study Group, ABM (Washington DC; House of Representatives, May 1969), p. 16; I. F. Stone's Week{)', 24 Feb 1969. On the ABM Debate see Anne Hessing Cahn, Eggheads and Warluads: Scientists and tlu ABM, (MIT Center for International Studies, 1971); Benson Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: Elsevier, 1971); Morris, ABM; Newhouse, Cold Dawn. 2. Morris, ABM, p. 169. 3· Ibid., P· 169. 4· .New York Times, 15 Mar 196g 5· Clifford Posture Statementfor FY I97o,Jan 1969, pp. 41-6. 6. Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, 1, 27 Mar 1969, p. 239· 7· .New York Times, 24June 1969. The hearings were entitled Intelligence and tlu ABM. In a 1972 re-run of these arguments Senator Fulbright recalled being 'greatly concerned at the time that I might cause Mr. Helms to be relieved of 212 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

his responsibilities'. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements, 2I June I972, p. I IO. 8. Church Committee Report, p. 78. 9· Letter dated I july I969. Published in the preface to Intelligence and the ABM, p. x. IO. Washington Post, I2 July I969. II. Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s, I8 Feb I970, p. I22. I2. Intelligence and the ABM, p. x. I3. Clifford Posture Statement for Fr 1970 (class.), pp. 74-8. I4. Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, 22 May I969, p. 8. I5. Michael Getler, Arms Control and the SS-9, p. 43;John Foster claimed: 'People are suggesting they might acquire 500 of them, perhaps more'. House Armed Services Committee, Military Posture, I 7 Apr I 969, p. I 782. I6. The testimony of both Wohlstetter and Rathjens can be found in Subcom• mittee of National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Planning-Programming Budgeting, Defense Ana{ysis: Two Examples, Sep I969. I7. Clifford Posture Statement for Fr 1970 (class.) Jan I969, pp. 79-80. I8. Wohlstetter, Optimal WI!)IS to Confuse Ourselves, p. I87. I9. Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, p. 8. 20. Washington Post, 23 Apr 1969. 21. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1¢9, p. 225· 22. Intelligence and the ABM, p. 24. 23. Department of Defense News Release 184-69, I4 Mar I969. The footprint concept is mentioned in International Herald Tribune, 29 Mar I 969: 'Pentagon leaders say that Russia is working on multiple warheads for the SS-9 which could be sent against a Minuteman field in a hard to stop shotgun pattern'. 24. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. I6o; Burton R. Rosenthal, 'Formulating Negotiating Positions for SALT: I968, I969-72', Appendices to the Report of the Murphy Commission, vol IV, Appendix K, (GPO, I975), p. 334· 25. Laurence E. Lynn Jr., 'A New Role for the Intelligence Community', Appendices to the Report of the Murphy Commission, vol. 7, Appendix (GPO, I975), PP· 47-8. 26. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. I6I. 27. Church Committee Report, pp. 77-8. 28. This would seem to be the study referred to in this comment by Foster: 'I requested the analysis that is being performed by the organization on the West Coast. I haven't found anyone who disagrees with the findings (deleted)'. Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, 5 Aug I969, p. 28I. A study was also done for DDR & E by the Latter brothers, formerly ofRAND, who have their own research organisation on the West Coast. 29. Ibid., p. 244· 30. Ibid., p. 265 (my emphasis). 3 I. Ibid., P· 263. 32. George Rathjens,Jerome Wiesner, Steven Weinberg, A Commentry on Secretary Melvin Laird's May 22 Defense of Safeguard (unpublished paper, circulated amongst Congressmen, dated 27 June I969), p. 2. NOTES 213

33· Laird Posture Statement for FY 1971, February 1970, p. 104. See pp. A-7-A-8 in the classified version: where the first quote appeared on p. A-3. 34· Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China -1975, p. 68. 35· Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, Department iif Difense Appropriations for 1971, Part 1, p. 385. 36. Washington Post, 18 Dec 1970; Newsweek, 27 Apr 1971; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 Oct 1970. 37· Laird Posture Statement for FY 1972 (class.) Mar 1971, pp. 64-5, 239· 38. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975, p. 68. 39· Washington Post, 17 June 1971. 40. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on United States Military Posture for FY 1973, 8 Feb 1972, pp. 7-8. 41. Cited in National Journal, 15 Nov 1969. 42. The CIA had considered the 3 x 5MT warhead configuration the most likely. The Pentagon had suggested, in 1969, an alternative of6-1ox 1 MTwarhead configuration and also one of some 20 re-entry vehicles of 200 K Teach, though this does not appear to have been given a high probability. This is suggested in Getler, Arms Control and the SS-9, p. 40. 43· The existence ofthis estimate may explain Laird's claim in Jan 1970 that in his 1969 testimony he 'had not taken the high side of the estimate'. Transcript iif Press Conference (USIS), 7 Jan 1970. 44· Ibid. This estimate was used by John Foster as late as November 1970, US News & World Report, 11 Nov 1970. 45· International Herald Tribune, 24 Mar 1972. Foster added that: 'Prudence requires that we take the most pessimistic projections seriously'. 46. New York Times, 15 Mar 1969. 47· Washington Star, 6July 1970; New York Times, 21 Mar 1971. 48. New York Times, 31 July 1969. The reports included Institute for Defense Analyses, Report of the Jason Panel on Hard Point Difense, 1967; Aerospace Corporation, Radars for Hard Point Difense, 1968. 49· Cahn, Eggheads and Warheads; Frank von Hippe! and Joel Primack, The Politics of Technology, (Stanford: Stanford Workshop on Political and Social Issues, Sep 1970). 50. Rathjens, Wiesner and Weinberg, A Commentary on Secretary Melvin Laird's May 22 Difense iif Safeguard, p. 11. 51. Laird Posture Statement for FY 1971, Feb 1970, p. 48. 52. Rosenthal, Formulating Negotiating Positions for SALT, p. 332 -3; Morris, ABM, PP· 169-70. 53· Laird Posture Statement for FY 1971, Feb 1970, pp. 48-9. 54· Senate Armed Services Committee, Report on Authorization for FY 1971, 14July 1970, p. 19. 55· In order to sway the Senate vote, key Senators were shown a telegram from Gerard Smith, head of the US SALT delegation urging that the US shall not assume a 'static' position on deployment. 56. See for example, Jerome Wiesner, 'Some First-Strike Scenarios', in Abram Chayes and Jerome Wiesner (ed.) ABM (New York: Signet, 1969) p. 77· It is not always clear whether launch-on-warning is being proposed as a policy or being pointed out as a possibility that Soviet planners could not leave out of their analyses- that is, that SS-9 warheads might hit empty silos. It is also the 214 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

case that many opponents of Safeguard came out equally strongly against launch-on-warning, as this places far too much reliance on the ability to detect a Soviet attack unambiguously. 57· Washington Star, 6July 1970.

9 PROTECTING MINUTEMAN THROUGH SALT

1. Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, p. 8. This analysis is helped by the knowledge that it is the Soviet practice to install SS-gs in sets of six. 2. Laird Posture Statement for Fr 1971 (class.) Mar 1970 pp. A-1 to A-5, A-8. 3· McNamara Posture Statement for Fr 1!}66 (class.) Jan 1965, p. 51. 4· Clifford Posture Statement for Fr 1970 (class.) Jan 1g6g, p. 81. 5· Laird Posture Statement for Fr 1971 (class.) Mar 1970, p. A-8. 6. Raymond Garthoff, 'SALT and the Soviet Military', Problems of Communism Oan-Feb 1975) p. 30. These were 'individual silos needed for filling out standard groups'. 7· Stewart Alsop in Newsweek, 27 Apr 1970: ' ... a hopeful fact that US intelligence has detected no new starts of the SS-g launch sites ... since last August'; Chalmers Roberts in Washington Post, 7 July 1970, reported that no new SS-gs had been deployed 'since before Salt began'. 8. Speech to Associated Press Luncheon, 20 Apr 1970, Department of Defense Press Release, 316-70. g. International Herald Tribune, 19 July 1970. Laird Press Coriferenee, 10 July 1970 (USIS). 10. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 198; Washington Post Ooseph Alsop}, 8 May 1971. 1 1. Garthoff, SALT and the Soviet Military, p. 30 12. Speech to Associated Press, 20 Apr 1970. 13. International Herald Tribune, 25 Apr 1970. 14. Laird Press Coriference, 10July 1970 (USIS). 15. Laird Posture Statement for Fr 1971 (class.) Mar 1970, p. A-1 1. New York Times, 11 Feb 1970; Garthoff, SALT and the Soviet Military, p. 31. 16. Laird Posture Statement for Fr 1972 (class.) pp. 63-4. In the unclassified version of this posture statement the only figure given was the 1,440 figure, including the SS-1 1 in M/IRBM fields. In President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to Congress, 25 Feb 1971, this was the figure employed. 17. In Air Force Magazine, Mar 1971, General Otto Glasser was quoted as saying that 'the survivability of the silo-based ICBM' is 'assured for this decade and into the next'. 18. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 27. 19. Air Force Magazine, Mar 1971. 20. International Herald Tribune, 3 Mar 1971. 21. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 201. 22. Ibid., pp. 239-40. 23. International Herald Tribune, 10 Mar 1971. 24. Newsweek, 1 oMay 1971. The main fault with Alsop's story is that it describes in the present tense a process that had yet to take place. The new evidence was also mentioned in Washington Post, 27 May 1971; Guardian, 27 May 1971. 25. Report of Laird Press Coriference of 27 Apr 1971, USIS. NOTES 215 26. New York Times, 27 Mar 1971, 23 Apr 1971 and 12 Aug 1971; Washington Post, 27 May 1971 and 8 Aug 1971. 27. Washington Post, 27 May 1971. 28. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 244-5. 29. Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on tlu! Limitations qf Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation qf Strategic Offensive Arms Ouly 1972) pp. 47, 169. 30. Ibid. (Quotation from President's remarks of29June 1972), p. 565. 31. Ibid., p. 566. 32· Ibid., PP· 367, 413, 470-3·

10 PREPARING FOR THE THREAT: 1972-6

1. Speech qf 13 November 1974, USIS. Dr Currie took over from John Foster as Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 1973. 2. Lawrence D. Weiler, 'The Status ofSALT: A Perspective', Arms Control Today, IV (Dec 1974). 3· Testimony of Secretary Laird before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Ouly /July 1972) p. 89. Lloyd Norman in Newsweek, 25 Apr 1972; Joseph Alsop in Baltimore Sun, 21 June 1972, spoke of 'liberals in the intelligence community' thinking the Soviet Union more than 'five years behind' the US in MIRV technology. On the 2o-MIRVed large missile see New York Times, 3 Aug 1972, and TV remarks of Senator Jackson reported in International Herald Tribune, 26 May 1972. 4· Baltimore Sun, 19 Oct 1972. Short-range tests of this new Mod 3 SS-11 began ih 1969 followed in 1970 by long-range tests. These first involved penetration aides and decoys, followed by tests of the multiple warhead system. Admiral Moorer noted in 1972 that the US believed: 'the improvements being tested are designed to enhance the penetration capabilities of the SS- I I against ABM defended urban/industrial and soft military targets'. Report of the Chairman oj theJointChiefsq[Sta.ff, Feb 1972, p. 8.; Washington Post, 1 Aug 1970;lntematiotial Herald Tribune, 27 Aug 1970. 5· New York Times, 1 Oct 1972 and 21 Mar 1973. 6. Report qfthe Chairman qfthe Joint Chiefs qfStaff, Feb 1974, p. 13. Washington Post, 22 June 1973. 7· Washington Post, 22 June 1973; Air Force Maga;:;ine, Mar 1973, quoted 'authoritative information' suggesting 'that the Soviets have not yet been able to develop the truly sophisticated and highly accurate guidance systems without which MIRVing makes little sense'. 8. International Herald Tribune, 26 July 1973 9· Washington Post, 15 Aug 1973. 10. James Schlesinger press conference qf 17 Aug 1973 (USIS). See report in Washington Post, 18 Aug 1973. A chart showing the Russian testing programme, with the flurry of mid-1973 activity, was provided by Schlesinger to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US- USSR Strategic Policies, 4 Mar 1973. 1 1. This missile was the first of the new generation that was tested-in April 1972-but has lagged behind the others because of problems with its solid 2I6 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

fuelling system. Although it does not appear to have been launched from anything other than a fixed silo, the presence of mobile launcher equipment at the test site has encouraged speculation that it might operate as a mobile missile. International Herald Tribune, 27-8 July I974· I2. Kissinger press conjerence,9 Dec 1975, State Department, p. 8. See testimony of James Schlesinger before Subcommittee on Arms Control of Senate Armed Services Committee, Soviet Compliance with Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements, Mar I975· It was reported that the Soviet Union had been able to use the SS-I I silos for the SS-I9S by means of a 'cold launch' technique, already in use by the US for its SLBMs. With a 'hot launch' a silo must be large enough to accommodate the exhaust of the hot rocket gases when the missile is ignited as it stands at the base of the silo. In the 'cold launch' or 'pop-up' technique, the missile is slowly pushed up the silo by means of hot gases, much like a piston being pushed up an engine cylinder. As the missile reaches the surface, its rocket engines are ignited. This method of launch makes fewer demands on silo space. However, though this technique has been adopted for the SS-I 7 and SS-I8 it has not been adopted for the SS-I9. New York Times, I9 Sep I973· Ig. US-USSR Strategic Policies, pp. 33-4. I4· Air Force Magazine, Aug I975 I5· Newsweek, 7 June I976. I6. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Sep I974; Time, I I Feb I974; Air Force Magazine, Mar I975· I 7. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Briifing on Counterforce Attacks, I I Sep I974; Currie speech of I3 Nov I974; International Herald Tribune, 27-8 July I974· It was reported that the new information had not changed the estimate. The very fact that the Russians had not volunteered the information was held to be more interesting than the information itself. r8. Schlesinger Posture Statement for FY 1975, Mar I975, p. 46; Schlesinger Posture Statement for FY 1976, pp. I I- I 2. I9. Schlesinger Posture Statement for FY 1975, p. 46. 20. Briifing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 10. 2 r. Newsweek, 6 Jan I975· 22. New York Times, 3 Dec I974; Washington Post, 28 Nov I974· 23. International Herald Tribune, I I Oct I97 r. 24. Soviet Compliance, p. 20.; Kissinger press conference, 9 Dec I975· See: Tad Szulc, 'Have We Been Had?', New Republic, 7 June I975· 25. Report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan I976, p. 32 Washington Star, 8 July I975· 26. US- USSR Strategic Policies, p. 44· 27. New York Times, 2I June I975; Statement by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Soviet Military Strength, 27 Sep I976, USIS. 28. Background briefing by Henry Kissinger, 3 Dec I974, reprinted in Survival, xvu, (July-Aug I975), p. I94· Washington Post, I4 Sep I974· 29. New York Times, I8 Aug I973· go. Production of Y-class submarines was completed in I974, with 34 units deployed carrying 540 launch-tubes for the SS-N-6 missile. A new submarine, NOTES 217

the Delta class, has been developed to carry the long-range (4,200 n.mi.) SS• N-8 SLBM. Each of these submarines carries 12 SLBMs. At the start of 1976 there were 11 operational, with another 12 under construction. In his statement on Soviet Military Strength of 27 Sep 1976, Rumsfeld spoke of two new missiles, the SS-NX-17 and SS-NX-18, under development to replace the SS• N-6 and SS-N-8 respectively. The SS-NX-18 is liquid-fuelled and, according to Rumsfeld, 'is the first Soviet SLBM to be MIRVed. We believe this missile may be capable of carrying as many as three reentry vehicles.' As the missile was still 'in the early phase of its flight test program' it was not expected to be deployed for 'several years'. On 24 Nov 1976 it was reported that the SS-NX-1 8 had been flight-tested with a MIRV and could be ready for deployment in 'about a year'. It would be carried on a new, advanced Delta-class submarine, with 16launch-tubes instead of only 12.lnternational Herald Tribune, 24 Nov 1976. 31. Background Britjing, p. 194· 32. Air Force Magazine, Mar 1971. 33· On fratricide see: Lt Col Joseph McGlinchey and Dr Jacob Seelig, 'Why ICBMs Can Survive a Nuclear Attack', Air Force Magazine, Sep 1974· One way around the problem of fratricide may be to have an attack consisting of a combination of small, fast warheads and large, slow ones. It was reported in Air Force Magazine, Jan 1976, that the Russians were experimenting with such a method. This report may be based on the appearance of a small warhead, with less than half the yield of the other warheads, during some july 1975 tests of the MIRVed SS-18. Aerospace Daily, 22 Sep 1975· 34· Washington Post, 15 Dec 1974. 35· Schlesinger Posture Statement for FY 1976, Feb 1975, p. 11-9. 36. Ibid. 37. Rumsfeld Posture Statement for FY 1977, Jan 1976, p. 6. 38. Christian Science Monitor, 10 May 1971. 39· On M-X see: Edgar Ulsamer, 'M-X: The Missile System for the Year 2,ooo', Air Force Magazine, Mar 1973; Lt Gen. Alton D. Slay, 'MX: A New Dimension in Strategic Deterrence', Ibid., Sep 1976; Brig. Gen. John W. Hepfer, 'M-X and the Land-Based ICBM', Astronautics and Aeronautics, Feb 1975. 40. International Herald Tribune, 2-3 Nov 1974. A film was released of the launch. 41. Slay, Ibid., p. 46. 42. Schlesinger Posture Statement for FY 1976, p. 11-28. 43· Air Force Magazine, Aug 1976: 'Analyses of even "worst case scenarios projected for the next decade indicate that a Soviet first strike could not destroy more than eighty-five percent of the US silo-based ICBM force.' 44· Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 May 1976.

II US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

1. Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, 'Security and Intelligence', National Defense Magazine, july-Aug 1974. 2. International Herald Tribune, 3]an 1977. 3· Ibid., 4]an 1977. 4· Daily Telegraph, 28 Feb 1976. 218 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

5· Daniel Graham, 'The Soviet Military Budget Controversy', Air Force Mag• azine, May 1976; Washington Star, 15 Feb 1976. 6. Guardian, 4Jan 1977; Sunday Times (London) 16Jan 1977; New rork Times, 21 Jan 1977. 7· The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked by Senator Proxmire (D-Wis) if they endorsed the alarming interpretations of Soviet intentions attributed to Team B and General Keegan. They responded by disagreeing with some specific assertions and denied that 'the USSR already has achieved military super• iority over the United States'. They did insist, however, that: 'The available evidence suggests the USSR is engaged in a program designed to achieve such superiority' .JCS Report on US-Soviet Military Strength (USIS Text), 3 Feb 1977. In Congressional testimony of March 1977, General Samuel Wilson, director of the DIA said: 'The development of Soviet offensive and defense forces appears to reflect an intention to maximise war-fighting and damage-limiting capabilities which would enable the USSR eventually to achieve the degree of military superiority over the West needed to wage an intercontinental war, should one occur, and survive it with resources sufficient to dominate the post• war period'. International Herald Tribune, 18 Mar 1977· 8. International Herald Tribune, 12 April 1977· 9· Ibid., 28 Dec 1976 and 12 Jan 1977. Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

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terrence: Fiscal Year 1973 Defense Budget and Fiscal Year 1973-77 Program, I 5 Feb 1972. Statement of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson before the House Armed Services Committee, FY 1974 Defense Budget and FY 1974-78 Program, 10 Apr 1973. Report ofSecretary ofDefenseJames R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defeme Budget and FY 1975-79 Defense Program, 4 Mar 1974· Report of Secretary ofDefenseJames R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 D~fense Program, 5 Feb 1975. Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defeme Program, 27 Jan 1976. Statements by Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer USN, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, United States Military Posture for FY 1973, 8 Feb 1972. Statement by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer USN, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Military Posture for FY 1974, 28 Mar 1973. Statement by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer USN, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, United States Military Posture for FY 1975, 26 Feb 1974. Statement by General GeorgeS. Brown USAF, ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Military Posture for FY 1976. Statement by General GeorgeS. Brown USAF, ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff to the Congress on The Defeme Posture of the United States for FY 1977, 20 Jan 1976. Reports by President Nixon Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Report to Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace, 18 Feb 1970. Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Report to Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building the Peace, 25 Feb 1971. Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Report to Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, 9 Feb 1972. Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Report to Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace, 3 May 1972. Speeches and Press Conferences Dr Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Speech at Shreveport, Louisiana, 13 Nov 1974, USIS text. BIBLIOGRAPHY 221 Secretary ofState Henry Kissinger, Press Conference, g Dec 1974, USIS text. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Interview, Newsweek, 6 Jan 1975. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, background briefing of 3 Dec 1974 reprinted in Survival, XVII (July-Aug I 97 5). Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Press Conference, g Dec 1975, State Department text. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Press Conference, 7 Jan I 970, USIS text. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Speech to Associated Press Luncheon, 20 Apr 1970, USIS text. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Press Conference, 10 July 1970, USIS text. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Press Conference, 27 Apr 1971, USIS text. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Interview, US News & World Report, 1 1 Apr 1965. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Press Conference, 10 Nov 1966 in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1!}66. Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara, Interview, 15 Feb 1967, in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1¢7. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Press Conference, 3 Apr 1967, USIS text. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy', Department of State Bulletin, LVII (g Oct 1967). Secretary of Defense Robert MeNamara, Interview, Life, 29 Sep 1g67. President Richard Nixon, Speech of 14 March 1¢9, New York Times, 15 Mar 1969. President Richard Nixon, Press Conference ofJune 1969 in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1¢9. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Statement on Soviet Military Strength, 27 Sep 1976, USIS text. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Press Conference, 17 Aug 1973, USIS text.

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Books Adams, Benson, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: Elsevier, 1971). Alsop, Stewart, The Center (London; Hodder & Stoughton, 1968). American Security Council, The Changing Strategic Military Balance: USA v USSR (Washington, DC. House Armed Services Committee, July 1967)· Bottome, Edgar M., The Missile Gap (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1971). Cahn, Anne Hessing, Eggheads and Warheads: Scientists and the ABM (MIT Center for International Studies, I 97 I). Campbell, John Franklin, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971). Chayes, Abram and Wiesner, Jerome (eds.), ABM (New York: Signet, 1g6g). Daniloff, Nicholas, The Kremlin and the Cosmos (New York: Alfred A Knopf, I972). Dulles, Allen, The Craft of Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964)· Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, Wayne, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Difense Program 1!)61-1¢9 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Fitzgerald, A. Ernest, The High Priests of Waste (New York: Norton, 1972). Gowing, Margeret, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, vol. 1, Policy Making (London: Macmillan, 1974). Greenwood, Ted, Making the MIRV: A Study in Difense Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975). Greenwood, Ted, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control (London: IISS, June I972). Hewlett, Richard G., and Anderson, Oscar E., History of the USAEC, vo!I, The New World, 1939-1946 (Pennsylvania State University Press, I962). 224 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT Horelick, Arnold and Rush, Myron, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago University Press, 1966). Jayne, Edward Randolph, The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Securiry (MIT Center for International Studies, June 1969). Kahn, David, The Code-Breakers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973). Kennedy, Robert, The Cuban Missile Crisis: October 1g62 (London: Pan Books, 1969). Kent, Sherman, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton University Press, 1966). Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968). Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., The Intelligence Communiry (New York: Hill & Wang, 1973). Kissinger, Henry, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, (London: Weiden• feld & Nicolson, 1969). Klass, Philip, Secret Sentries in Space (New York: Random House, 1971). Knoll, Erwin and McFadden, Judith Nies, American Militarism 1970 (New York: Viking Press, 1969). Lilienthal, David E., The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol. n, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). Marchetti, Vincent and Marks, John D., The CIA and the Cult ifIntelligence (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1974). Marshall, Andrew, Bureaucratic Behavior and the Strategic Arms Competition (Santa Monica: Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, Oct 1971). Me Crystal, Cal et a!., Watergate: The Full Inside Story (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973). McGarvey, Patrick J., CIA: The Myth and the Madness (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972). Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story if SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973). The Penkovsky Papers (London: Fontana, 1965). Ransom, Harry Howe, The Intelligence Establishment (Harvard University Press, 1970). Rathjens, George, The Future if the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970s (Washington DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969). Rod berg, Leonard and Shearer, Derek (eds.), The Pentagon Watchers (New York: Doubleday, 1970). Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Coriflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Singer, J. David, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament (Ohio State University Press, 1962). Smith, Bruce L. R., The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonpriftt Advisory Corporation (Harvard University Press, 1966). Smith, Perry McCoy, The Air Force Plans for Peace: 1943-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970). BIBLIOGRAPHY 225 Strauss, Lewis, Men and Decisions (New York: Doubleday, I962) Tammen, Ronald, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1973). Truman, Harry s., Memoirs, vol II, rears of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, I955). Tully, Andrew, The Super-Spies (New York: Morrow, I969). Von Hippel, Frank and Primack, Joel, The Politics of Technology (Stanford: Stanford Workshop on Social and Political Issues, Sep I970). Whaley, Barton, Codeword Barbarossa (MIT Press, 1973). Wilensky, Harold, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, I967). Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B., The Invisible Government (London: Cape, I964)· Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B., The Espionage Establishment (New York: Random House, I967). Wohlstetter, A.J.,Hoffman, F. S., Lutz, R.J., and Rowen, H. S., Selection and Uses of Strategic Air Bases (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, Apr I954)· Wohlstetter, A. J., Hoffman, F. S., and Rowen, H. S., Protecting the US Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 196os (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, September I956). Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press, I962). Wolfe, Thomas, Soviet Power and Eastern Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, I97o).

Articles Allen, Everett S., 'Lack of Information Led US to Overestimate Missile Lag', StLouis Post-Dispatch, 27 Jan I965. Alsop, Joseph, 'Comments on an article by Albert Wohlstetter', Foreign Policy, 16 (Fall I974). Alsop, Stewart, 'Our New Strategy', Saturday Evening Post (I Dec I962). Baldwin, David, 'Thinking about Threats', Journal ofCoriflict Resolution, VI (Mar I97I). Ben-Zvi, Abraham, 'Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks', World Politics, xxvm (Apr 1976). Blackstock, Paul, 'The Intelligence Community under the Nixon Admin• istration', Armed Forces and Sociery, I (Winter 1975). Burnham, Frank, 'Minuteman: Case History of an ICBM', Armed Forces Management (May 1970) Cooper, Chester L., 'The CIA and Decision-Making', Foreign Affairs, I (Jan 1972). Cline, Ray S., 'Policy Without Intelligence', Foreign Policy, 17 (Winter 1974)· Davis, Lynn and Schilling, Warner, 'All You Ever Wanted To Know 226 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT About MIRV And ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared To Ask', Journal of Corifiict Resolution, xvn 0 une 1973). De Poix, Admiral Vincent, 'Security and Intelligence', National Defense Magazine, July-Aug 1974 Dick, James C., 'The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1962: Who Opened a Missile Gap?', Journal of Politics, XXXIV (Nov 1972). Freedman, Lawrence D., 'The Persistence of Technological Enthusiasm: The Technological Input into US Strategic Arms Policy', Millennium, v, (Autumn 1976). Garthoff, Raymond L., 'SALT and the Soviet Military', Problems of Communism, XXIV, Qan-Feb 1975). Getler, Michael, 'Soviets Try to Close Strategic Gap', Technology Week (27 June 1966). Getler, Michael, 'Arms Control and the SS-9', Space-Aeronautics (Nov 1969). Graham, Daniel, 'Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job', Amry (Apr 1973). Graham, Daniel, 'The Intelligence Mythology of Washington', Strategic Review (Summer 1976). Graham, Daniel, 'The Soviet Military Budget Controversy, Air Force Magazine, May 1976 Gray, Colin S., 'The Arms Race Phenomenon', World Politics, XXIV (Oct 1961). Gray, Colin S., 'Gap Prediction and America's Defense: Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years', Orbis, XVI (Spring 1972). Halperin, Morton, 'The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process', World Politics, XIII (Apr 1961). Halperin, Morton, 'The Decision to Deploy the ABM', World Politics, xxv (Oct 1972). Hepfer, John W., 'M-X and the Land-Based ICBM', Astronautics and Aeronautics (Feb 1975). Holst, Johan Jorgen, 'What's Really Going On', Foreign Policy, 19 (Summer 1975). 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McGarvey, Patrick]., 'DIA: Intelligence to Please', in Halperin, Morton and Kanter, Arnold (eds.), Readings i!l American Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, I 973). Morris, Frederic A., 'ABM', Appendices to the Report of the Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct qf Foreign Policy, vol. IV, Appendix K (Washington DC: GPO, I97S)· Murphy, Charles]. V., 'The US asaBombingTarget', Fortune (Nov I9S3) Murphy, Charles]. V., 'The New Air Situation', Fortune (Sep I9SS)· Murphy, Charles]. V., 'Defense: the Converging Decisions', Fortune (Oct 195s). Murphy, Charles J. V., 'The Embattled Mr. McElroy', Fortune (Apr 1 95s). Murphy, Charles]. V., 'Khrushchev's Paper Bear', Fortune (Dec I964). Murphy, Charles J. V., 'What We Gave Away in the Moscow Arms Agreement', Fortune (Sep I 972). McGlinchey, Joseph and Seelig, Jakob, 'Why ICBMs Can Survive a Nuclear Attack', Air Force Magazine (Sep 1974). Nacht, Michael, 'The Delicate Balance of Error', Foreign Policy, I9 (Summer I97S)· Nitze, Paul, 'Comments on an article by Albert Wholstetter', Foreign Policy 16 (Fall 1974). Norman, Lloyd, 'Nike-X', Army (Mar I967). Rosenthal, Burton R., 'Formulating Negotiating Positions for SALT: I968, I969-72', Appendices to the Report of the Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, vol. IV, Appendix K (Washington, DC: GPO, I97S). Schwiebert, Ernest E., 'USAF's Ballistic Missiles-I954-I964', Air Force/ Space Digest (May I964). Scoville, Herbert, 'Upgrading Soviet SAMs', New Republic (9 Oct I 97 I) Slay, Alton D., 'MX: A New Dimension in Strategic Deterrence', Air Force Magazine (Sep I 976). Steinbruner, John and Carter, Barry, 'Organizational and Political Dimensions of the Strategic Posture: The Problems of Reform', Daedalus, CIV (Summer I97S)· Symington, Stuart, 'Where the Missile Gap Went', The Reporter (IS Feb I962). Szulc, Tad, 'Have We Been Had?', New Republic (7 June I97S)· Szulc, Tad, 'The Ascendant Pentagon: Freezing out the CIA' New Republic (24july I976). Ulsamer, Edgar, 'Minuteman: First Among Equals', Air Forcf Magazine (Mar I97I). Ulsamer, Edgar, 'M-X: The Missile System for the Year 2000', Air Force Magazine (Mar I973)· 228 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT Ulsamer, Edgar, 'Our ICBM Force: The Vulnerability Myth', Air Force Magazine (Aug I974l· Ulsamer, Edgar, 'Military Intelligence: Streamlined, Centralized, Civ• ilianized', Air Force Magazine (Aug I976). 'US Electronics Espionage: A Memoir', Ramparts, (Aug I972). \Vasserman, Benno, 'The Failure of Intelligence Prediction·, Political Studies vm (June I 960) 'Weiler, Lawrence D., 'The Status of SALT: A Perspective', Arms Control Today, IV (Dec I974). Whalen, Richard J ., 'The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense', Fortune (I June I967). Wohlstetter, Albert, 'Is There a Strategic Arms Race?', Foreign Policy, I5 (Summer I974l· Wohlstetter, Albert, 'Rivals but no "Race"', Foreign Policy, I6 (Fall I974). Wohlstetter, Albert, 'Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves', Foreign Policy, 20 (Fall I975).

In addition, articles have been cited from the following newspapers and periodicals: Aerospace Daily; Aerospace Technology; Armed Forces Management; Aviation Week & Space Technology; Baltimore Sun; Business Week; Christian Science Monitor; Flight International; Guardian (London); I. F. Stone's Weekly; International Herald Tribune; Los Angeles Times; Missiles and Rockets; National Journal; New York Herald Tribune; New York Times; Newsweek; Northern Virginia Sun; Philadelphia Inquirer; Saint Louis Post-Dispatch; San Diego Union; Technology Week; Time; US News & World Report; Wall Street Journal; Washington Post; Washington Star.

Unpublished Sources Ball, Desmond, The Strategic Missile Programme OJ the Kennedy Adminis• tration; 196I-1963 (unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National Un• iversity, June I972). Democratic Study Group, ABM (Washington, DC: House of Repre• sentatives, May I969) Kugler, Richard, Government Process for National Intelligence Estimates: Implications for Rationality in Defense and Foreign Policy Making (un• published paper: MIT, Dec I972) Rathjens, George, Wiesner, Jerome and Weinberg, Steven, A Commentary on Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's May 22 Defense of Safeguard, (distributed amongst US Congressmen, dated 27 June I969). Index

Action-reaction phenomenon, 4, 83, 119; Atomic Bomb Test (Soviet Union}, US defined, 1-2; criticisms, 2-3 Estimate of First Test, 64, 191 Advanced Projects Research Agency, 123 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 17, 20, 'Adversary image', 193, 194; defined, 64 185-6; of intelligence analysts, 18g-go; of policy-makers, •go B-1, t8o Air defence (Soviet Union}, 87, 91, 93, 95, B-52, 67, 81, 91, 204n 207n Backfire, 170 Air Force (US}, 97, 123, 151, 152; per• Bay of Pigs, 1 7 ception of Minuteman vulnerability prob• Bear (TU-2o), 66, 67 lem, 120-1, 122, 16o, 163-4, 178, 182, Beecher, William, 115, 116 214n; On mobile missiles, 16o, 181 Bell Laboratories, 95 Air Force Intelligence, 21, 32, 86; Bennett, General Donald, 25 Estimatts- on ABMs, 93, 94; on bombers, Biryuzov, MarshalS. S., 92 65-67; on ICBMs, 70, 71, 73, 75-7, 79, Bison (M-4}, 65, 66, 67 108, 1w; on SS-8, 1oo, 208n; on SS-g, 136, Bissell, Richard, 17 137-8 Board of National Estimates, 19, 36, 37, 54, Allen, Robert, 116 55, 140; composition, 31; set Office of Allison, General Royal, 168 National Estimates Alsop, Joseph, Attacks ONE, 53, 54; on 'Bomber gap', 25, 66-7, 78 Missile Gap, 75, 77; on Option E, 162, Bombers (Soviet Union}, US Estimates of, 16$ on MIRVs, 170 63, 64, 65 -7; see Backfire; Bear; Bison; Alsop, Stewart, 84, 165 Bomber gap Anti-ballistic missiles (A~Ms) (US}, 44, 81, Bombers (US), see B-1; B-52 82, 83, 115, 118, 128, 137. •go Brezhnev, Leonid, 166, 174 Anti-ballistic missiles (Soviet Union), 81, 82, British Intelligence, 68; model for CIA, 13; 86-g6, 103-4, 105, Ill, 120, 121, 123, on 'missile gap', 75 167, 191, 207n; Moscow system, 87-90, Brooke, Senator Edward, 177 95, g6; Leningrad system, 91-4, 95, 96, Brown, General George, 171, 1g8 108, 18g, 207n; see Dog House, Galosh, Brown, Harold, 87, 91, 95, 198 Griffon, Hen House Bush, George, 20- 1, 58 Anti-submarine warfare, 134, 159, 163, 18o Bush, Vannevar, 202n 'Area of Ambiguity', 37, 62, 185, 188; defined, 9, 10 Carroll, General Joseph, 22 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Carter,Jimmy, 1g6; views ofadministration, (ACDA}, 50, 124, 161 182, Jg8 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, 202n Carver, George, 55 Army, 121, 122-3, 124 Central Intelligence Group (CIG}, 13, 14, Army Intelligence, 22, 25, 205n; 30 Estimatts- on ABMs, 93; on bombers, 67; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA}, 9, on ICBMs, 71, 73, 77, 79, to8 14-21, 25, 26, 30, 32, 37. 40, 41, 43· 45· Assistant Secretary of Defense (In• 56, so, 52, 61, ss, 14o, 157, 161, 166, 187, telligence}, 23, 24 188, 18g, 1go, 1g6, 205n; statutory re• 'Assured destruction', 85, 179; defined, 84 quirements, 14; becomes a major in• Atlas ICBM, g8 telligence producer, 14-15; recruitment, INDEX

15, 26; importance of clandestine services, 22-6, 43· 45, 59, 186-7, 188, 194· 20tn; 15; and NIO system, 55; and DIA, 22, formation of, 22 - 3; relations with service 53-4, 194; and ONE, 36, 59; and Kissin• agencies, 23-4; weaknesses, 23-s; in es• ger, 47-8, 57, 61, 194; on Minuteman timating process, 38-g; and CIA, 22, vulnerability, 162-3; on verification, 53-4, 194; and NIO system, 55; 46-7, 57; EstimaJes- on ABMs, go, 92, 93, Estimates- on ABMs, 93, 94; on ICBMs, 94; on bombers, 65-7; on ICBMs, 6g, 70, IOg-II;onSS-g, 136,137-8, 144;on 71,75-7,107,109-11, 193;onSS-g, 132- Soviet defence spending, 197; on Soviet 3, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 213n; on first-strike capability, 133; see Directorate Soviet defence spending, 196-7. See Di• of Estimates; Directorate of Intelligence rector of Central Intelligence; Directorate Production of Intelligence; Directorate of Plans; Di• Defense Intelligence Estimates (DIEs), rectorate of Science and Technology; 45-6 Office of Current Intelligence; Office of Defense Program Review Committee, 162 Reports and Evaluation; Office of Re• Defense Science Board, 149, 21 1n search and Reports; Office of Scientific Delta-class nuclear submarine, 217n Intelligence; Office of Strategic Research Deputy Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Cherne, Leo, 197 24, 58, 2om China, 91; US ABM versus, 125-6, 128, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 14, 129, 150, 151; Soviet ABM versus, go 15, 16, 31, 32, 4o, 42, 46, 55, 58, 187, 188, Church Committee, 15, 6o 20 1n; importance of interests and charac• 'Circular Error Probable' (CEP), defined, ter of, 15; see Bush; Colby; Dulles; Helms; 99 McCone; Raborn, Schlesinger, Smith Civil Defence, US estimates of Soviet pro- Director of Defense Research and Engineer• gramme, 196, 197 ing (DDR & E), 35, 86, 94, 95, 121, 124, Clandestine operations, 8, 15, 17, 187 130, 139, 140, 150, 161, 162, 212n; see Clandestine services (CIA Directorate of Brown, Currie, Foster, York Plans), 15, 16 Directorate of Estimates (DIA), 59, for• Clifford, Clark, 127; on Soviet offensive mation, 25-6; takes over planning es• build-up, 131-2, 135; on SS-g, 137; on timates, 45 Soviet SLBMs, 154 Directorateoflntelligence (CIA), 15, 16, 31, Cline, Ray, 27, 6o 33· 57 'Cold Launch', 216n Directorate for Intelligence Production Command and Control Silos (Soviet), simi• (DIA), 24 larity to Soviet ICBM silos, 174-5 Directorate of Plans (CIA), see Clandestine Command and Control Silos (US), vulner• services ability ot; g8, 109 Directorate of Science and Technology Committee of Principals, 94 (CIA), 36, 40 Colby, William, 54-5, 56; character and Discoverer satellite, 72-3, 205n career, 20 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 165, 166 Committee on Foreign Intelligence, 57-8 Dog House radar, 88 Committee on Imagery Requirements and Donovan, Colonel William, 13 Exploitation (COMIREX), 33 Dulles, Allen, 16, 17, 18, 40; character and Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance career, 16-17; on CIA and DJA, 22; on (COMOR), 33 'bomber gap', 66; on 'missile gap', 68, 70 Connally, John, 197 Dulles, John Foster, 16 Cooper, Chester, 42 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, 30 Cuban missile crisis, 18, 1 14 Currie, Malcolm, 16g, 196 Eisenhower, President Dwight D., as Gen• eral, 13, 64; as President bans U -2 flights, de Poix, Admiral Vincent, on intelligence 72 and detente, 194 Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP), 100, 208 Defence spending (Soviet), US estimates ot; Ellsworth, Robert, 58 103, Ig6-7. Energy Research & Development Agency Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), g, (ERDA), 8 INDEX

Enthoven, Alain, on greater-than-expected Hardpoint defence, 12 1 - 2; see Hard-Site, threat, 86; on Soviet objectives, 1 15; on Sentinel, Safeguard ICBM vulnerability, 98, 121, 124, 125, Hard Rock Silo, 147 127 Hard-Site, 16o- 1, 164 Estimating process, 4, 9-61, passim Helms, Richard, 40, 41, 43, 50, 52, 53, 56, Executive Committee (EXCOM), 33 133, 140; character and career, 18- 19; and NIEs, 19; and verification, 46-7; Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI), 8, 6o clash with Laird, 19, 132, 21 In 'First-strike capability', 81-2,97, 132-4, Hen House radar, 87, 88, 157 177-8 HIBEX, 123 Fitzhugh Panel, on DIA, 23, 24 Hosmer, Rep. Craig, 126, 210n Ford, President Gerald, 21, 57, 174, 196 Hotel-class nuclear submarine, 154 Foreign Policy Journal, 196 House Committee on Intelligence, see Pike Foster, John, 16g, 197; develops own in• Committee telligence capabilities, 44, 46, 51; on Huizenga, John, 31, 53, 54; on military ABMs, 91, 92, 95, 207n; on SS-g, 138, 139, intelligence, 36; on policy-intelligence re• 141, 142, 143, 146, 212n, 213n; on Min• lationship, 6o uteman vulnerability problem, 121 -2, Hydrogen bomb (Soviet Union), US es• 124, 126 -7; and safeguard decision, 130, timate of first test, 65 148 Hyland Panel see Strategic Advisory Panel Fractional Orbital Bombardment System Hyland, William, 27, 57, 58 (FOBS), 116 'Fratricide', 178, 2 17n Froehlke, Robert, 24 INR: see State Department Fryklund, Richard, 104, 105 Intelligence collection, 32-4,39, 47, 58, 62, Fulbright, Senator William, 133, 21 In 68, 95; Means- communications, 68, 72; parades, 65 -6; radar, 6g, 87, 204n; satel• Gaither Report, origins, 75; on Soviet lites, 21,32-3, 72-3, 101; On- ABM, 95; ABMs, 86; on Soviet bombers, 67; on ICBMs, 101; nuclear explosions, 64; ICBMs, 75, 82; model of arms race, 82-3 radar, 8g; set Discoverer, U-2, SAMOS Galosh, capabilities, 89-90, 92, 2o6n Intelligence community, 4; components, 8; Garthoff, Raymond, 156, 157 budget, 8; 1971 reforms, 19, 51, 62; 1975 Garwin, Richard, 2 1 1 n reforms, 57-8; structure of power in, Gates, Thomas, 22, 76 58-61, !!8-19 Gelb, Leslie, 174 Intelligence estimates, distinguished from Getler, Michael, III, 144, 170 threat assessments, s; typology, 8; Golden arrow study, 120, 210n influence of political factors on, 1 1 -12; see Graham, General Daniel, 24, 45, 46, 53-4, National intelligence estimates. 197; character and career, 25, 56, 57; Intelligence failures, 9, 200n formation of Directorate of Estimates, Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 25-6; on CIA, 36; on 'missile gap', 79; on (Soviet Union), initiated, 68; tests, 67, ICBMs, 110 6g-7o; deployment, 73, 101, 102, 107, Gray, Colin, 4 111-13,135.153,158-9, !66, 175-6, Great Circle studies, 2 10n Estimates of- 184-s; 1950S, 67 -So; 1900S Greater-Than-Expected threat (GTE), 163, build-up, 101-17; post-196g, 135-47, concept developed; Ss-6; identified, 120; 153 - 4, 156-9, 164-6; new generation, use of, 124-5 16g -76; on accuracy of, gg, 109, 1 12, 11 5, Greenwood, Ted, 8g 122,137,141-2,144, 173,2I6n;suSS-6, Griffon, capabilities, 92 SS-7, SS-8, SS-9, SS-10, SS-11, SS-13, SS- Groves, General Leslie, 64 16, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 Guided Missiles and Astronautics In• Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) telligence Committee (GMAIC), 35 (US), 104, see Atlas, Minuteman, M-X, Titan Hall, Albert, 24 International security affairs (Pentagon), Halperin, Morton, 123 94> 124, 127 INDEX

Jackson, Senator Henry, 151, 164; on threat Leacacos, John, on Kissinger and in• constructions, 167 - 8, 169 telligence community, 49, 50 Jackson, William, 31 Lilienthal, David, on early intelligence es• Johnson, President Lyndon Baines, 18, timates, 64 42- g, 53. 119, 127 Lynn, Lawrence, 130; distrust of CIA, 139 Joint Chiefs ofStaff, 21, 23, 24, 38, 44, 50, 75, 86, go, 94, 127, 163, 171, 187; on ABMs, McCone, John, 20, 31, 187; character and 123, 126, 161; on Soviet objectives, 2 18n career, 17- 18; influence, IB, 42, 43 Joint Intelligence Committee, 23 McCord, James, 6o Joint Intelligence- Estimates for Planning, McElroy, Neil, 70, 78 45. 94 McGarvey, Patrick, 22 McNamara, Robert, 38, 43, 121, 123, 176, Kaputsin Yar, 6g, 87 188, 205n, 2 wn; theory of the arms race, Karalekas, Anne, 42, 56 1-2, 4, 83-4; on 'Superiority', 118-1g; Keegan, General George, 195, 196 force planning concepts, 85-6, 120; Sen• Kennan, George, 202n tinel decision, 123-6, 21m; on Minute• Kennedy, President john F, 17, 18, 22, 42, man vulnerability, wo-1, 123-6; on 73. g8, 205n Soviet economy, 103; on Soviet ABMs, Kent, Sherman, director of ONE, 31; style of 88-g, go, 91, 93, g6, 103; on ICBMs, 1oo, NIE, 41; on intelligence work, 8, g, 41 ~-2; 101 -2, 103, Io4, 105, Io7, I II- 13, I IS; on CIA, 11 -12, 14-15 on SLBMs, '54 Khrushchev, Nikita, 78, 87, 92 Malinovsky, Marshal, 87 'Kill probability', defined, 99 Marshall, Andrew, 51, 56 Kirkpatrick, Lyman, 2 'Megatonnage', 1og, 118, 208n Kissinger, Henry, 46, 55, 165, 166, 167, 181, Military Intelligence Agencies, g, 14, 21 -6, 197 -8; attitude to bureaucracy, 48; and 59, 193; effect of hierarchical command CIA, 20, 47-g, 57,61, 194; and NIEs, 43, structure, 11, 21, 186, 188-g; and DIA, 48-g; and INR, 27; reforms of estimating 23-4, 26; in inter-agency review, 38 -g; process, 50-~, 56, 60, 188-9; effect of and NIO system, 55 Watergate on plans, 56- 7, 195; and Safe• Millikan, Max, 16, 17 guard decision, 129-30, 148, •so; and Minuteman ICBM, 118, 16o; I, 81, 92, wg; Minuteman vulnerability problem, 162, II, 100, 2o8n; Ill, g6, 122, 140, 14I, 176, 164, 178; on mobile missiles, 160; on 179; Mark 12A warhead, 182; mobile, MIRV, 177; on Soviet ICBMs, 139-40, g8-g I 74 -6; see NSC Staff Minuteman vulnerability problem, g8, gg, Klass, Philip, 72 104, I I7, I 18, 121-2, 124, 178-g; de• Knoche, Henry, 21 velopment of, gg-Ioi, 115, 127-8, Knorr, Klauss, on sets of expectations, 10, 1 1 151 -2, 182; Air Force perception of, 'Knowledge base', 12, 62; defined, 9 120- •; Navy, 121; Army, I2I; SS-g as a Korean war, I6; exposes weakness in es- cause of, 1og, 112, 115, 117, 132-3, timating process, 16, 30- 1 134-47, 173;SS-1I asacauseof, 1og, 112, Kugler, Richard, on NIE drafts, 38 1 17, 173; 'launch-on-warning' as a re• sponse to, 152, 21 3n; MIRV as a response Laird, Melvin, 46, I6g, I76, In. '97, 213n; to, 121, 128, 147, 152, •sg; M-X as a approach to intelligence work, 44, 6o; on response to, 18o-2, 192; Safeguard as a Pentagon intelligence, 24, 20m; con• response to, 130-1, 146-7, 163; Sentinel frontation with Helms, Ig, I32; on Soviet as a response to, 125- 7; SALT as a objectives, 132-4, 157; on Safeguard, response to, 161-4, 166-8, 178-82, I 29, I 49-5 I; on Hard-Site, 164; on Soviet ULMS as a response to, 122, 124, 128, I CBMs, I 53-4, 164-5, 167; on SS-g, 136, •s•, •sg, 192 138-g, 142-4, IS6-8, •sg; on SS-i I, MIRVs, and strategic doctrine, 176-g; dis• I sg; on SLBMs, I 67 tinguished from MRVs, 116, qo- I, (US) Langer, William, 3I g6, "9· 121,128,147,152,159, 191;effect Latter, Richard and Albert, 21 2n on Soviet ABMs, go, 93, 95, I 15; see 'Launch on warning', 152, 213n Minuteman Ill. (Soviet Union) 50, 116, INDEX 233

117, 16g-71, 173, 2ogn, 215n; ste SS-g National Security Council, 19, 27, 34, 55, 6o, MIRV Panel, so, 139-40 63, 150, 162; use of NIEs, 42 'Missile gap', 25, 35, 40, 67-Bo, 81, 85, 107, National Security Council Intelligence 108, 188, 205n Committees, formed, 51; abolished, 57 Missile site radars, 1~ National Security Council staff, 47, 48, 49, MIT, 16; Center for International Studies, 50, 57· 140, 100, 162, 167, •95 17 National Security Study Memoranda, 49 Mitchell, John, 50 Navy, on ABMs, 123; on Minuteman Mobile ICBMs, g8-g, 121, 123, 151, 160, vulnerability problem, 120-1 18o- 1; ste Minuteman, M-X, SS-13, SS- Naval Intelligence, 22; Estimates- on ABMs, 16 93; on bombers, 67; on I CBMs, 71, 73, 77, 'Monster missiles', 146, 164-7 79 Moorer, Admiral Thomas, 144 Net assessment, 51 Morris, Charles, 130 .New rork Timts, 176 Morse, Richard, 87 Newhouse, John; 47, 86 MRVs, 116, 140-1; see Polaris A-3, SS-g Nike-X ABM, 121, 123, 124, 148 Murphy, Charles, 75, 8g Nike-Zeus ABM, 91 M-X, 180-2, 182, 192 Nitze, Paul, 8g, 117, 197, 210n Nixon, President Richard, 18, 29, 48, 50, 53, National Foreign Intelligence Board, 197 s6, 164, 166, 167; safeguard decision, National intelligence estimates, ( 1) Form, 129-31, 150; on need for retaliatory •g, 32, 44· 45· 46, sg; commissioned, 34; options, 134; on ICBMs, 159, 165; on SS• drafting, s; inter-agency review, 37; and g, 138, 140 USIB, 39-40; style of, 41; influence of, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 42-3; reform of,. 49-50, 52; and greater• (NATO), 126 than-expected threat, 86. (2) Content: on NSC-68, on Soviet design, 63; on Soviet Soviet military capabilities, 43, 49-50, capabilities, 65 55, 187, 188, 197; on Soviet first strike, 133; on ABMs: 1g63 NIE, 9$ 1964 NIE, Office of Current Intelligence (CIA), 16, 17, 93; 1965 NIE, 88; 1g66 NIE, 8g; 1967 18 NIE, go; on Bombers: 1955 NIE, 67; 1958 Office of National Estimates, 16, 25, 31-2, NIE, 67; 1959 NIE, 67;on ICBM.s: 81, 94, 45, 59, 61, 139, 188; formation, 31; com• 102-3; 1957 NIE, 70, 75; 1958 NIE, position, 31; preparations ofNIE, 34-41; 7s-6; •9S9 NIE, 70, 76, 101; •goo NIE, and policy, 41-2; influence, 42 -3; de• 73, 77, 101;June 1961 NIE, 73, 101, 1962 cline, 48-52; fall, 52-4; and CIA, 36; and NIE, 101, 105, 108; 1g63 NIE, 104, 105, Military Intelligence, 36; and Strategic 108; 1g64 NIE, 104, 107; 1g65 NIE, 108; Advisory Panel, 40; and Consultants, 1g66 NIE, 108, 111; 1967 NIE, 108, 202n 112-13, 135; 1968 NIE, 135; 1971 NIE, Office of Reports and Evaluation (CIA), 16, 167; on SS-9: 1g65 NIE, 108; 1g67 NIE, 30 113; on SS-u: 1965 NIE, 108-g; 1967 Office of Research and Reports (CIA), 16, NIE, 173; on MIRVs: 1g65 NIE, 1og, 115, 17, 18 116; 1g66 NIE, 115, 116; 1g67 NIE, 115, Office ofScientificlntelligence (CIA), 16, 17 116, 117;onSLBMs: 1g66NIE, 154, 1967 Office of Secretary of Defense, 21, 160, NIE, 154; •g68NIE, 154; 1g6gNIE, 156. 163-4 See Special NIEs, Board of National Es• Office of Strategic Research (CIA), 26, 4$ timates, Office of National Estimates formation, 18; used by ONE, 36 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), Office ofStrategic Services, 13, 27, 31, 54; see ss-6, •g6 Research and Analysis Branch National Intelligence Projections for Plan• ning (NIPP), 44-5 Packard, David, 130, 150, 164, 2ogn National Photographic Interpretation Cen• Payne, Fred, 121 ter, 33 Penkovsky, Oleg, 73-4, 205n National Reconnaissance Office, 21 Pike Committee, 24, 26, 57, oo National Security Agency (NSA), g, 26-7 Pipes, Professor Richard, 197 234 INDEX

Plesetsk, 72, 73 'Seeded bomb', 100 Polaris SLBM, 81, 88, 92, 98, 99, 118, 121, Senate Armed Services Committee, 151 134, 154; A-3 warhead, 137, 140-1 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 100, 'Policy-makers', relationship with in• 132 telligence, 12, 34, 42, 6o- 1, 182 -98; Senate Intelligence Committee, see Church influence on intelligence of, 184 -7; Committee influence of intelligence on, 187-98 Senate Watergate Committee, 6o 'Politicisation', defined, 183; of intelligence Sentinel, 129, 130, 145, 148; Sentinel de• estimates, 192 - 8 cision, 122 -8; as hard point defence, PoseidonSLBM,96, 121,122,124,134,159, 125-7. 150 176 'Sets of expectations', 10, 11, 184-5 Powers, Francis Gary, 6g, 70, 87 Silo-hardening, hardening, defined, gg; fur• President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory ther, as a response to Minuteman vulner• Board, 28-9, 196-7 ability problem, 121-2,123, 124;onMin• President's Scientific Advisory Committee, uteman III, 147-8 148 Singer, David, 4 Project Defender, 123 Smith, Abbot, 31, 140 Proxmire, Senator William, 218n Smith, Admiral Levering, 134 PVO-Strany, 95 Smith, Gerard, 213n Rabi, Isadore, 64 Smith, Perry, 63 Smith, Walter Bedell, 18, 31, 42, 187; Raborn, Admiral William, 15, 43; character and career, 18, 200n character and career, 16 Smith, Wayne, g8 RAND, 51, 97; 1954 Strategic Bases Study, Snowcroft, General Brent, 57 96; 1956 Strategic Bases Study, 98, 99 Solid-fuelling, 103, 105 Rathjens, George, 136 Soviet Rocket Forces, 51 Reagan, Ronald, 196 Soviet Union, intentions of, estimates, 63, Research & Analysis Branch (OSS), 13 Retargeting capability, 135, 136, 145 115, 127, 132, 184-5. 193, 194-8; links Richardson, Elliot, 20, 27, 56 with estimates of capabilities, 10, g6, 184, 218n Roosevelt, President Franklin D, 13 Rumsfeld, Donald, on Minuteman vulner- Spartan ABM, 8g ability problem, 179; on new intelligence Special National Intelligence Estimates, 32 Special Projects Office, 134, 21 on estimates, 195 Sprint ABM, Bg, 148 Rusk, Dean, 94 Ryan, General John, 168 Sputnik I, 35, 67, 6g, 82, 191; and In• telligence estimates, 6g -70 Safeguard ABM, 182; decision, 129-31, SS-6, 74. 78; capabilities, 7 I' 105; deploy• 138, 139, 146; limitations as hard point ment, 73, 135; estimates of, 71, 73, 76-7 defence, 148-52, 163-4, as anti-China SS-7, 105, 107; capabilities, 100, 2o8n; de• defence, 150-1;as'bargainingchip', 152, ployment, 101, 112, 166 213n;opponentsof, 131,132-3,142,147, SS-8, 105; capabilities, I oo, 2o8n; deploy• 152 ment, 101, 107, 112, 166 SAMOS Satellite, 72 SS-g, 45, 51, 107-13, 114, 120, 148, Sary Shagan, 87, Bg, 91, 95 149-50, 161, 164, 166, 175, 2ogn; de• Schelling, Thomas, 3 scribed, 107; deployment, 107, 111, 113, Schlesinger,James, 24, 53, 56, 6o, 176, 2om; 135-6, 146, 153, 156-8, 167, 214n; hard• character and career as DCI, 19-20; 1971 target capability of, 1og, 112, 115, 121, Report, 19, 51, 62; on CIA biases, 36; 127, 132-3, '34· '47> '59. 162, 163, 167; changes NIEs, 52; as Secretary ofDefense, 'Triplet', 117, 136, 137, 146-7, 170, 212n, 56, 57, 195; on Minuteman vulnerability 213n; compared with Polaris A-3 war• problem, 178-9; on M-X, 181; on Soviet head, 137, 140-1 ICBMs, 170, 171, 173-4, '75 SS-10, 2o8n Scott, Paul, 116 SS-11, 107, 1o8-13, 114, 115, 120, 148, Sea-Based Anti-Ballistic Missile (SABMIS), 149-50, 161, 163, 166, 171, 175; deploy• 123 ment,I35. 153,156,158-9,167, 176;new INDEX 235

model, 169, 215n; as mediumf Tammen, Ronald, 4, 91 intermediate range ballistic missiles, Taylor, General Maxwell, 29 158-9, 21 4n 'Team A and Team B', 197-8 SS-13, 110, 113; deployment, 135, 153, 156, Teller, Edward, 197 167, 175 Test Ban Treaty, US Hearings, 87, 91, 100 SS-16, 170, 215-16n 'The Triad', 133, 100, 18o SS-17, 169, 170 - 1, 216n; deployment, 176 Thompson, Ambassador Llewellyn, 74-5 SS-18, 170, 216n, 217n; hard-target capa- Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge, 140, 144 bility, 171, 17$ deployment, 175 Threat assessments, distinguished from in- SS-19, 170, 171, 173, 216n; hard-target telligence estimates, 5 capability, 171; deployment, 176 'Threats', defined, 1 -7, 194, 1g8, 1ggn; see SS-N-4, 154 Greater-than-expected threats SS-N-5, 154 Thurmond, Senator Strom, 207n SS-N-6, 154, 216n Titan ICBM, g8, 134 SS-N-8, 49, 217n Tokaty-Tokaev, G. A., 68, 204n SS-NX-17, 217n Treasury Department, 8 SS-NS-18, 217n Trident, 18o; see ULMS Stalin, joseph, 65, 68 Truman, President Harry S, 13, 16, 26; on State Department, 50, 63, 161; Policy Plan• co-ordination of intelligence estimates, 30 ning Staff, 42; offered intelligence co• Tully, Andrew, 74 ordination role, 13, 16 Tyura Tam, 69, 71, 73, 74• 77 State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 9, 27-8, 188, 195; U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, 32, 67, 69, 70, on DIA, 22; treatment by Henry Kissin• 71, 72, 76, 78, 87; capabilities, 71 ger, 27, 57; in NIE process, 38-9; Underwater Long-Range Missile System on ABMs, 4$ on Soviet first• Estimates- (ULMS), 122, 124, 128, 151, 159, 192; see triplet, 137 strike capability, 13$ on SS-9 Trident Stoertz, Howard, 1g6, 197 United States Intelligence Board (USIB), Strategic Advisory Panel, 40-1 17, 21, 23, 25, 27, 32, 33· 34· 39-40, 41, Strategic Air Command, 94, g8 Talks (SALT), 57. 133· 140, 197 Strategic Arms Limitation 'US Force Plus Options', 85 57,oo,g6, 100;ABMTreaty, 196;lnterim Agreement on the Limitation of Offensive Arms, 166-7, 169; Vladivostok Accord, 'Verification', 46-7 174; and Soviet ICBM deployment, Verification Panel, 50, 51, 57, 162, 164 156-7; effect on Intelligence Estimates, Vietnam War, estimates on, 26, 27, 36, 43, 46-8, 49-52, 194, 195-6; US Negotiat• 52, 53; effect on Soviet force planning, ing Position, 94, 127, 100-2, 164, 166, 110, 114 174-82; 'Option E', 61-2 'Strategic superiority', 118-19, 210n Warnke, Paul, 126 STRAT-X, 121-2, 124, 127, 148, 100 Watergate, 19, 20, 56, oo, 195 Strauss, Lewis, 64 Whalen, Richard, 116 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Wheeler General Earle, 115, 127 (SLBMs), (US) see Polaris, Poseidon, Tri• Wilson, General Samuel, 26, 218n dent, ULMS; (Soviet Union) deployment Wohlstetter, Albert, on intelligence es- of, 154, 156, 167; US estimates of, 104, timates, 3, 108, 196; on ICBM vulner• 153-6, 170. See SS-N-4, SS-N-5, SS-N-6, ability, 97, 136, 162 SS-N-8, SS-NX-17, SS-NX-18, Hotel• Wohlstetter, Roberta, 10, 11 class, Delta-class, Yankee-class 'Survivability studies', 162-4 Symington, Senator Stuart, 69 Yankee-class submarines, 50, 154, 155, 157, 167, 216n Systems analysis (Pentagon), 85, 86, 124, Yield, defined, 99 130, 150, 162-3 York, Herbert, 91, 95 Tallinn Line, see Anti-ballistic missiles (Soviet Union) Zablocki, Rep. Clement, 141