CHAPTER XIV THE START ON THE SOMhiE-AND

THEtwo new Australian infantry divisions, 4th and 5th, which had been formed at the elid of February, but left in for three months to create their , had received at the end of hlay the order to move to the Western Front. The creation of that artillery was a task unparalleled in British experience, and is the classic example of the speed with which _Australians could be trained. To instruct the 3000 artillery officers and men re- quired by each , some 150 trained officers and men from the older divisions were allotted to each. The rest were light horsemen and infantrymen together with a few hundred artillery reiniorcements, mostly untrained, and a handful from the engineer and other services. The had not one regular artillery officer. For instructing the 12th Brigade Lieut.- Colonel R. A. Rabett (who himself started in the war as a young militia officer) had 5 artillery officers-3 with Anzac experience and 2 reinforcements-and some 30 more or less experienced artillerymen. He had to select 17 officers from non-artillery units, and train them each morning from 4.30 to 6.30, when they in turn began teaching their men. Within a fortnight the new officers, themselves being lectured for four hours daily, and teaching their men for eight hours, were producing results. Only five guns were available, but these were used in relays. In April the artillery were sent to join their infantry on the Canal defences where instruction continued. I ANZAC TO [Mar.-June 1916

In the training of the infantry of these divisions there occurred the harshest experience that the A.I.F.’s instruc- tion had ever included. When the older divisions were being moved from the Canal there occurred a shortage of trains to take the new divisions to the Canal. It was therefore decided that all except the leading troops (the and a of the 4th) should march thither across the desert. The distance was less than forty miles comprising two fifteen-mile stages and a shorter stage on the third day. It was decided to make the march a test, the men carrying full kit, packs, and ammunition. But even in Monash’s, Glasgow’s and Glasfurd’s brigades, which took the usual precautions for desert marching, the movement was accomplished only with great suffering on the part of the troops. In the , however, possibly because men broke the ranks in order to drink the foul water of the “Sweet-water” Canal, which lay beside part of the route, the brigadier (who was afterwards removed for this mistake) insisted on their marching on through the midday hours. The process ended in an almost complete break-down; parched and exhausted men staggered into the New Zealanders’ camp at Moascar on the second evening, leaving many to be picked up during the night by the ambulances and by the succouring New Zealanders. It was rumoured later that some men died through the results; a search of the records after the war did not confirm this, but it may nevertheless have been correct. On arrival in the 4th Division, in which the “outside” States-, S. and W. and Tasmania-were much more strongly represented than in any other division,’ began to enter the line towards the end of June, and by July 4th its artillerymen, who in March had been light horsemen and infantrymen, were responsible for covering their sector of the Western

1 It was composed of three all-States brigades-Monash’s 4th Bde, the 12th Bde (formed from [tic 4th). and the 13th (formed from the 3rd).

218 June-July 19161 THE

Front. This division had by then already raided the Ger- mans, and it was itself raided while its artillery was relieving that of the . (Though the Germans captured a prisoner, their staff remained unaware that the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions had left Egypt.) By July 5th the 1st and 2nd Divisions had been relieved. General Godley and the staff of I1 Anzac became respon- sible for the sector, the Division remaining there under them, with the 5th Australian Division from Egypt just arriving in the back area. The 1st and 2nd under Birdwood and the staff of I Anzac were moving into the sector opposite Messines when, on July 7th, orders arrived that by the 13th they must be in the Amiens area, sixty miles to the south, ready for a con- tinuation of the somme offensive. The project of a stroke against Messines had for the present been given up, and plans and maps for that scheme, then in preparation by I Anzac at Bailleul, were returned to the 2nd staff. For the great Somme offensive was then in full swing. A week previously, on 1st , the British and French armies twenty miles east of Amiens had launched their attack astride that river. After a bombardment, which eventually was extended to seven days, the 4th British Army (General Sir Henry Rawlinson) to- gether with part of the 3rd, and a group of French armies under General Foch, were to break the German line, striking in three stages towards , ten miles away. If, as was hoped, in any of these stages a sufficient breach was made, a British “Reserve Army”, chiefly of cavalry, under the cavalry leader, General Sir , would try to push through to the Bapaume plateau and then, turning north, would “roll up” the German line north of the breach. The bombardment (in which two siege batteries formed from the regular Australian garrison artillery took part) had since June 25th methodically smashed the German defences. At one time every gun and howitzer

219 ANZAC TO AMlENS [ngth June-1st July 1916 would fire rapidly with high explosive for twelve minutes on all the villages, following this fire with shrapnel to catch any troops disturbed by this deluge. On other days all German batteries known to the British intelligence staff were shelled; or trenches of the first and second lines were taken under fire and methodically battered down from end to end; or a , like that which would pre- cede the infantry’s advance, was laid on the enemy’s front line, and then lengthened, and then suddenly brought back to catch the German infantry, who might be manning the parapet in expectation of attack. The “bump” of the guns could be heard in England, and under the long drawn out strain the German garrison, whose food, drink and ammunition parties sometimes could not get through, lost in some parts its power of resistance. Thus, when the attack came, on the sector astride the Somme, where Foch’s armies for their six-mile front were supported by no less than goo heavy pieces of artillery, two splendid French corps, the XX north of the Somme and the I Colonial Corps south of the river, penetrated so fast that the German command opposite to them hastily withdrew its troops to a line close in front of Ptronne town, six miles away. The British right flank, immedi- ately north of the French, advanced to the same depth, reaching Montauban village, on the ridge on which lay the second German defence system. It was only through Sir Douglas Haig’s insistence-against the view of the less optimistic commander of the 4th Army, General Rawlin- son-that the first British thrust had been designed to go so deep. But the British Army, though supported by artillery and ammunition on a scale previously unknown to it, was not yet gunned on a scale comparable with the French, Behind its fifteen and a half miles of front were some 400 heavy pieces, and the 12,776 tons of shells used by them on the first day was only half of what the British

220 ist-14th July 19161 THE SOMME were able to throw at the Germans on the first day of the Battle of , nine months later. The deep German dugouts were almost unaffected by the bombardment; at the La Boisselle ruins, on the road from Albert to Bapaume, a little north of the British penetration to Montauban, the attacking troops, Tynesiders of the 34th “New Army” Division, were, for all their devotion, held up practically at the front line. Farther north, where the 3rd British Army attacked with less powerful artillery support, the assault, though it went deep at several points, was largely stopped at the front line, with tragic losses. That day the 29th Division lost 5000 men and the 36th (Ulster) Division, which, with part of the 32nd, had pushed to and beyond on the ridge that but- tressed the northern flank of the Germans, lost 5500. Despite sucli losses a tremendous blow had been struck; and though the achievements did not approach the stage at which Gough’s Reserve Army could be used, nevertheless decisive results seemed to Haig within reach. He knew he must first widen the wedge driven into the German line, and, to do this, must take Thiepval. JofEre vigorously urged him to attack Thiepval again frontally, but Haig was determined to drive farther on the southern flank, where his success had been greatest, and then attack Thiepval from there. He accordingly placed General Gough in command of the front facing Thiepval, the divisions there becoining the “Reselve Army’’. Gough was ordered to hold the enemy while Rawlinson with the 4th Army continued to drive ahead. In the hope of great success within the next few days Haig ordered his other armies, even in Flanders, to be ready to attack at favourable points. But instead it took a week of costly, piecemeal fighting before parts of the 4th Army were far enough forward to prepare an attack on the Germans’ second defence system. Then, in a second great attack, launched on July 14th after two days’ bombardment, the 4th Army, after approaching (by

22 1 ANZAC TO AMIENS [iqth July 1916

Rawlinson’s plan) at night and attacking at dawn, carried the British line across a central part of the ridge on which the German second line lay. The breach now made in that line was only two miles wide-the I11 Brit- ish Corps attempt- ing to extend it had been prevented by the stubborn defence of Pozieres village, a sort of advanced post of the second line- and Thiepval, two miles to the north- west, was thus safe- guarded. But a few squadrons oE Brit- ish and Indian cavalry were actu- ally brought up to the centre of the breach, at High Wood, and looked out over the next wide valley above the far side of which lay Bapaume. There was never the least chance that this cavalry could be effectively used that day, even if two trench-lines and many other works had not still lain beyond. Nevertheless again a heavy blow had been struck at the enemy; that his strongest defence lines could be pierced by the newly raised British armies had now been proved. Twenty-five British divisions had already been thrown in, and the cost was already approaching 100,ooo men, killed, wo~inded or missing. But some of the

222 July 19161 FROMELLES exhausted divisions had already been sent to other parts of the front from which fresh divisions were brought down to replace them. However, the Germans were now found to have been doing likewise; on July 13th among the Germans on the Somme were found some just trans- ported from Lille. The British staff at once thought of a recently suggested plan for a British attack south of Lille, which, if undertaken now, might pin the Germans to that front. This project was to attack the Sugar Loaf , opposite the southern end of the I1 -4nzac line south of ArmentiPres. Lieut.-General Haking, the commander of the XI British Corps, which lay south of I1 - Codonnep& Anzac, had been urging as ="wD,, acombinedand practicable the Anzac attack operation sectors, from his toa E-X%P cut off that salient and in- corporate the ground per- *-w-ffY& manently in the British line. An advance here might seein to threaten the German possession of the Aubers Ridge, just south of Lille-where already, in 1915,the British had made two costly and unsuccessful at tempts. On July 12th it had been decided that this project was unsuitable for the purpose then in view"; but now Haig's staff suggested that an artillery demonstration against the Sugar Loaf salient might deter the Germans from transferring more of their troops from that region to the Somme. Accordingly on July 13th staff officers from G.H.Q. hurried to discuss this project with the 1st Army commander (Sir Charles Ilionr-o, back from his Mediterranean command) and the staffs concerned. As -"See Yo1 III, pp 108-9 3The original O~JCC~of the proposed uperation was to take dtl\anlage of any weakening of the German line in the north'.

225 ANZAC TO AMIENS [loth-13th July 1916

the Sugar Loaf lay opposite the boundary of two British armies, 1st and and, each of them could contribute guns and ammunition for a strong artillery demonstration. Haig’s staff did not propose that the infantry should attack at all; but they found that Monro and the army staffs favoured General Haking’s plan, which was an extensive one for employing three divisions (eventually reduced to two) and even, if possible, capturing the Aubers Ridge near where it was topped by the straggling village of Fromelles, a mile behind the German line. General Haking was to command thc operation; and the bombardment, which was to last for about three days, would begin at once. Haking now proposed that his bom- bardment should “give the impression of an impending offensive operation on a large scale”. It would be wlowed by an attack by the two divisions, one against eackide of the salient. One division would be British, the other the newly arrived 5th Australian Division lent by I1 Anzac. As the result of this conference Haig ordered the attack. A few days before this proposal G.H.Q. had decided, though with doubts, that the 4th Australian Division despite its having entered the Western Front line only a week before, should be sent with the 1st and 2nd to the Somtne, leaving behind, however, its newly raised artillery. The British artillery normally serving the Lahore Division of the Indian Army would acconi- pany it instead. Most of the 4th Division had been in the line only three days when, on July loth and 11th, the still less experienced infantry of the 5th was hurried for- ward and relieved it. The half-fledged artillery of the 4th helped that of the 5th to acquaint itself with the Western Front, and was then attached to it for the coming “demonstration”. General Haking’s conviction that the Sugar Loaf salient would be captured and held was apparently undiminished by the costly failure of a closely similar

224 13th-16thJuly 19161 FROMELLES operation undertaken by him on June 29th against the Boar’s Head salient four miles farther south. The present attack was to be made with much heavier artillery--n$3 field-guns and howitzers with ~15,000shells, and 64 medium and heavy pieces, mainly “60 pounders”, with a due allowance of ammunition. There would be a field- gun or howitzer to every 15 yards of the 4000 yards front to be attacked, though the barrage would be less concen- trated than that figure might imply. At several intervals during July 17th the artillery would lay half an hour’s barrage on the German front trench system to be attacked, and would then suddenly lengthen racge and throw its shells beyond. It was hoped that the Germans, assuming this to be the immediate prelude to attack, would man their parapets. The artillery would next suddenly bring its fire back to the front system in order to catch them there. It was hoped that after several such experiences the Germans would be shy of manning their trenches quickly. This might give our infantry-when, at dusk, it did attack after a strong barrage-the chance of crossing no-man’s- land, in some parts 400 yards wide, before the Germans were ready to defend their trench. Further to help them to cross in time, opposite the Sugar Loaf, where no-man’s- land was widest, the infantry ii*ould begin the crossing while the barrage was still falling. Despite these and other precautions, Haig’s staff was still highly doubtful about the pl-oject-one of them who visited the line with Brig.-General H. E. (“Pompey”) Elliott formed the opinion that there was grave risk of disaster. On July 16th a leading officer of Haig’s staff again went north to First Army, questioned the sufficiency of artillery and ammunition, and stated that the need for the operation was then no longer urgent. However, General Haking “was most emphatic” that the artillery was “ample”; and the commanders present said that the troops “were ready and anxious” to make the attack, and its cancellation would be bad for morale They therefore

16-01

225 ANZAC TO AMIENS [17th July 1916 urged that unless it would actually hamper the Somme operations, it should be carried out. Notwithstanding the opinions of these commanders the troops were, in truth, far from ready. In the the plans had been sprung on Maj.-General M’Cay on the night of July 12th on which he took over the line. Many of his troops had never yet been in a front line; and, when the day chosen for the attack (July 17th) actually dawned, in spite of their forced marches to the line and subsequent “side-slipping’’ on to the narrow front of attack-movements which kept many of them without sleep for most of two nights and two days-neither the infantry, artillery and trench mortars nor the ammunition were completely in position, nor were the necessary trench repairs finished. After the night-long approach through crowded communication “trenches”, the weary infantry on reaching their proper bays dropped to the ground and fell asleep. The bom- bardment had begun the day before and was to continue during most of the morning. But at this stage chance intervened. On the previous day the heavy artillery had been prevented by rain from registering its guns upon their targets, and now the country lay in thick mist. At g a.m. Haking asked for postponement of the attack and Monro agreed. The weary troops received the news with relief, and part of them were at once sent back to the reserve line and neigh- bouring villages to rest. General Monro now asked Haig if the project could be cancelled, but this time Haig, doubtless recalling the arguments of the previous day, insisted that it must be carried out as soon as possible- if Monro was satisfied that his artillery was sufficient and conditions favourable for the capture and holding of the Sugar Loaf. Haig had already ruled out Haking’s pro- posal to push on to Aubers Ridge if opportunity occumed. It was decided to attack at 6 p.m. on July igth, the final seven hours’ bombardment beginning at 1 I a.m. Down

226 17th-igthJuly 19161 FROMELLES at the Somme Birdwood and White were acutely anxious as to the whole project but had no power to intervene. However the troops of the 5th Australian and 61st British Divisions, which were to attack respectively the northern and western sides of the salient, were given at least one welcome day in which to rest and finish their preparations. Each division would attack with all its three brigades in line, but each brigade would use only two for actual fighting; half of the third would carry ammunition and stores to the attacking troops-the other half would garrison the front system. The fourth battalion would be held in reserve. July 19th was a bright summer’s day, and during the bombardment, which began with mere registration but gradually increased in density, the infantry and other attacking troops from the rear moved gradually to the front line. Although the attacking troops were not aware that they were seen, signs of this movement-and of many preparations before it-were clearly visible to German observers a mile back among the trees and roofs on Aubers Ridge; in any case the bombardment since July 16th had warned the enemy that attack was probable. Early in the afternoon, therefore, the German guns began to shell heavily the area of the assembly. Half an hour before the attack the communication “trenches” had been so blown down or blocked that the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade sent the third and fourth waves of its attack formations over the open country to the front line. At the same time some of the troops opposite the Sugar Loaf began to move out into the very wide no-man’s-land, The Australians were in great fettle and were cheered to see the German parapets leaping into the air in shreds under the bombardment. The Germans were shelling no- man’s-land, but their guns33 light and 29 heavy-were insufficient to break up the two attacking divisions; and at 6 pm., with three and a half hours of daylight still ahead, the general advance began.

227 ANZAC TO AMIENS [igth July 1916

In front of the left (8th) and centre (14th) brigades of the 5th Australian Division, no-man’s-land was only 150-250 yards wide, and they quickly crossed it. The trenches of the 8th Brigade, on the left flank of the whole front of attack, had been so long and heavily shelled that several hundred Australians had been killed or wounded while waiting to advance. The fringe of their own artillery’s barrage also caught them throughout the oper- ation; and, when they leapt on to their parapet and walked down it into no-man’s-land and towards the opposing breastwork, the Germans farther north, who were not being attacked, stubbornly manned their para- pet despite hot fire from an English brigade which was to keep them quiet, and shot into the Australian flank. An Australian mine, which was fired there at “zero hour” in order that the thrown up earth might shelter the left flank, also announced the moment for the attack. The men of the 8th Brigade had had no front-line experience until the last few days. But the brigade was well trained, and determined to show itself equal to the rest. Many men and leaders fell, but as the lines neared the German breastwork most of the enemy fled and the Australians, clambering up the sandbagged slope, fired from the top at men running away through neighbouring breastworks-alleys and dugouts-on to the flat, tousled grassland beyond. The left flank battalion, the gmd, from , seized and blocked the front line on that flank and also a long German communication trench, which led far to the enemy’s rear past the stump of DelangrC Farm. Leaving their first wave, as planned, to clear the front line, the second, third and fourth waves of the gist (Queensland and ) and 32nd pushed on as ordered to the grassland in search of the third and last line of the German front trench system which, they had been told, lay 150 yards beyond. The two battalions of the 14th () Brigade on the right of the 8th had crossed no-man’s-land

228 19th July 19161 FROMELLES more easily, and found many of the garrison crouched behind the breastworks or in concrete shelters built into these. The front trench was quickly taken, but many leaders were shot as they moved among Germans scattered amid the breastworks just beyond. However, here too the first wave was left to clear the front line; and the second, third and fourth waves pushed on, through alleys between the breastworks, and out into the meadows, where they fired‘at Germans fleeing towards the higher ground some- times visible in the distance through the haze of shell smoke. But here, all along the line, the scattered parties of infantry and their leaders who emerged-mostly out of touch or even sight of all other parties in the smoke haze- were puzzled by the absence of any sign of the “third trench” which they were to seize and hold as their front line. They strolled on through the grass, like sportsmen after quail, occasionally shooting at Germans who had settled in shellholes and who now started up to run farther. After crossing one or two watery ditches the surviving leaders everywhere realised that some mistake had been made; either the third trench shown on the map did not exist, or one of these ditches must represent it. Accordingly they gradually settled their men along the ditches, in some sectors in the first ditch, in others in the second. The troops began to fill their sandbags with mud and made the best they could of the drains, though the water in these was well over their boots and in parts deeper. Although actually the forward troops of 14th and 8th Brigades ,thus formed a thin line of posts in the intended pmition, the dust and smoke from their own barrage, close ahead-and from enemy shells and exploding dumps and, here and there, burning farms and villages-rendered it difficult to see clearly, and few of the posts were aware even of the general position of the others; and Colonel Toll of the gist, who with part of his troops had gone a

229 ANZAC TO AMIENS [lgth July 1916 quarter of a mile or more before turning back, found no recognisable “trench” except the old German front line, and at sunset he withdrew most of his men to that position. The front line was thus disjointed. Nevertheless, in the sector of these two brigades there was, at nightfall, a fairly strong line in the position intended. The bat- talion commanders had established their headquarters in the old German front line in various dugouts, some of which were deep and well furnished. The carrying parties were arriving with ammunition and stores; other parties were digging trenches across the old no-man’s-land; and a number of messages reaching the brigadiers and Maj.- General M’Cay gave an accurate account of this situation. Unfortunately, in the sector of the right brigade (15th) opposite the Sugar Loaf, where no-man’s-land was widest, the result feared by the staff officer from G.H.Q. had happened. It is true that the bombardment had appeared to be thorough. “Boys, you won’t find a German when you get there,” Brig.-General “Pompey” Elliott had told his men as he watched it. Yet even during the bombard- ment some German machine-guns had fired at the lines of men beginning to leave the Australian trench; and within two minutes of the bombardment’s ending the fire was fierce and rapidly swelling. Here no-man’s-land extended to a quarter of a mile in width, and from the Australian trench it was difficult to see what happened. At 6.15 the German fire died away and, judging from this and other signs, Elliott at 6.30 reported that the attack appeared to have succeeded. Actually fire had ceased because the attack had been shot to earth. The men of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had managed to survive the shelling and to man their machine-guns immediately the boin bardment ceased. And the Victorians of the on emerging from the remains of an old orchard, half-way across, had

230 19th July 19161 FROMELLES met such a tempest of machine-gun and rifle fire that line after line, its leaders shot and its ranks decimated, was forced to shelter in ditches and furrows in the unkempt grass. The wide ditch known as the River Laies, crossing no-man’s-land obliquely, became a death-trap down which swept fire from the German breasms-ork. The later lines, trudging across no-man’s-land looking for their pre- decessors who, they imagined, must be lying ready for the final rush, met the same fire and found only dead and wounded and a few survivors in shellholes and the Bavarians lining the parapets, 150 yards away, firing at everything that moved, “and looking,” as a survivor said, “as if they were wondelirig what was coming next”. Of the two l’ictorian battalions here attacking 35 officers were hit, more than half of them mortally. The extreme right flank of the 14th Brigade had been caught in the same manner and lay in no-man’s-land next to the 15th. And the three brigades of the 6ist British Division, which had attacked the other face of the salient. had been caught by German artillery and machine-guns during their assembly and in crossing no-man’s-land. Except on the extreme right, where one British battalion seized, and for a short time held, a section of trench, they reached the German line only at isolated poin’ts, from which they were quickly driven back. Near the Sugar Loaf, though they were pinned down like the 15th Brigade, some troops were at first believed to have entered the enemy trench. Actually the only material success on the battlefield was that of the 8th and 14th

25 1 ANZAC TO AMIENS [igth July 1916

Australian Brigades which had captured 1000 yards of the enemy’s front system. By the non-success of the 15th Brigade the flank of the 14th was from the first exposed to the Germans who still held the Sugar Loaf. All senior officers of the 53rd Battalion having been killed or wounded, this section was under a young Duntroon graduate, Captain C. Arblaster of the 53rd Battalion, who, leaving a junior captain4 to superintend consolidation arld defence in front, stationed himself at the foremost angle of the exposed flank and organised its defence. The 61st Division now planned to capture the Sugar Loaf salient by a second attempt and asked the 15th Brigade to help. Accordingly at g p.m., as dusk fell, a brave attempt was made by half the 58th Battalion under another Dun- trooner, Major A. J. s. Hutchinson. The 61st Division’s plan had then been cancelled, but news of this arrived too late. Hutchinson himself dashed on, even when his men stopped, and was killed at the German wire, but the attempt was hopeless from the start. As the 61st Division was then being bombed out of its last foothold in the German line, Haking decided to withdraw all its troops to their old front line for a renewed attempt next day. Meanwhile, about dusk, the reserve companies of the Bavarian battalions that had been driven from the line tried, with help from the neighbouring German regi- ments and the supports, to recapture from both flanks the Australian line. On the left they were seen assembling and the 8th Brigade with help of artillery (though at first it shot too short) repelled them. But on the right flank the situation was more dangerous. Part of the old Ger- man front trench there had been left empty by the Aus- tralians-according to the plan the troops there were to move forward when the trench was cleared. The

4 Caplain J. J. Murray, a major-general in World War 11.

232 19th-nothJuly 19 IS] FROMELLES

Bavarians from the Sugar Loaf worked along this, and, to his amazement, young Arblaster in the advanced line suddenly saw their spiked helmets along the parapet of the old German front trench, between his position and the Australian line. He organised a fierce counter-attack on them, as did part of the 55th Battalion which was sent up to reinforce. In constant fighting at this point the intruders were stopped, but not driven out. It was now dark. All night the forward parties worked to turn their ditches into trenches, while others from the rear reinforced them. The inexperience-and the eager- ness-of the troops was shown in the way in which most carrying parties, arriving with their first loads, stayed to join in the fight instead of returning for more supplies. As the call for reinforcements continued, the brigadiers were allowed to use their reserves; and thus, except for a thin garrison in its old front line, almost the whole 5th Division was gradually drawn in. The command of the forward troops of the 14th Brigade was now being exercised by the commander of the 34th Battalion, Lieut.- Colonel Cass (of Krithia fame); but not until after 2 a.m. was he aware that his right flank in the enemy’s line was exposed. Till then the fact that some of the 15th Brigade had entered the German trench on t!~flank of the 14th had led him and others to suppose that the 15th was duly holding the flank. But shortly after 2 o’clock it was realised that the Bavarians were again attacking and had forced their way farther behind Arblaster’s trench. Where that youngster held out, the din of bombing, which for a time had lessened, again became continuous, and white flares, blurred by dust and smoke, constantly curved through the air. From that corner the call for bombers never ceased; and, as it came, Captain hiurray, farther along the front, would nod to one of his officers after another to move off with their men into the inferno. Of every ten men who went barely one came back. Troops firing

233 ANZAC TO AMIENS [noth July 1916 to their front were being shot from the rear. Bombs ran short, ammunition began to fail. Finally, having held the Germans till early morning, Arblaster decided that the only remaining chance of saving the position was to face to the rear and charge the portion of the Germans who were holding their old front line. He lined his men out, distributed bombs, gave the signal, and then led the charge. Heavy fire immediately broke out. Arblaster was inortally wounded, and the line fell back to its trench. The right flank was now almost cut off; and shortly before dawn the left and left centre also were attacked. Germans appearing out of the mist eventually managed to thrust, both from the gap between the two brigades and also from the left flank, into the old front line behind part of the 8th Brigade, whose advanced troops still held out in the big communication trench and the ditches. By 3.45 most of these Australians on the left, under the leaders who had directed them all night, had to face the desperate task of charging back through the enemy to the old Australian trench.K Notwithstanding the terrible fire laid by the Germans on no-man’s-land, a large number got through. By 5.45 on July 20th the last of the 8th Brigade had been forced out of the German line. At that hour General Haking was holding a con- ference to considei- the renewal of the 61st Division’s attack, which, despite his repeated order had, fortunately, not been again attempted, the 61st having been unable to get its companies into position. The army commander was present when news arrived that the 8th Brigade had been driven out and the position of the 14th was desper- ate. Orders were at once sent to prepare to withdraw the 14th Brigade. In the old German front line Colonel Cass arranged for a rearguard under a particularly fine leader, Captain Norman Gibbins of the 55th Battalion, to hold

5SCC YO/. 111, pp. 414-5.

254 20th July 19161 FROMELLES

part of the captured line to the last, while the troops withdrew through a communication trench dug across no-man’s-land during the night. Gibbins, a Queensland bank manager, of great height and strength, magnificently performed this duty. Already, largely under his direction, parties of the 55th had greatly eased the position by vehement bombing attacks from both flanks of the 14th Brigade, driving the Germans back along their old front line. Now, though for some reason unknown the final order to withdraw was not received till nearly 8 a.m.-and some of the troops even then would not believe it genuine-the difficult task was carried out successfully. Though hard pressed, Gibbins and his party held off the Germans till the brigade had withdrawn. He himself, the last to leave, on nearing the Australian line, left the communication trench in order to avoid crushing the wounded with whom it was clogged, and as he walked over the Australian parapet a German bullet killed him. Behind the German lines other AUS- tralian parties, hopelessly cut off, fought on till 9.20 a.m. The scene in the Australian trenches, packed with wounded and dying, was unexampled in the history of the A.I.F. In one night and the hours preceding it the 5th Division had lost 5533 men, of whom 400 were prisoners. Very many wounded lav in no-man’s-land, especially opposite the Sugar Loaf. ‘Here an =-lustralian batman, searching for his dead officer right up to the German wire, was challenged by a Bavarian officer, whose humanity now made posiible an informal truce to which many Australians owe their lives.6 The loss d the 6 I st Division in this battle was 1547 and that of the Germans apparently 1500. Two years later, when the German defences here came into British possession, the present writer examining the battlefield found that the supposed “third line”, which the Australians were set to reach,

6 For details of this episode see Vol. 111, p. 4j9

235 ANZAC TO AMIENS [igth-20th July 1916 though then indistinguishable from ordinary field drains, was apparently the remains of old trenches begun by the Germans a year before the Fromelles attack, but aban- doned on becoming waterlogged. Within a few hours of its delivery, the infantry had achieved precisely the opposite effect to that intended. An artillery demonstration, as suggested by Haig’s staff, niight have avoided all this loss and have led the Germans to apprehend that a bigger attack was being prepared. But now they knew the operation to be a mere feint, and if they had previously any doubts as to the wisdom of “milking” that front for reserves for the Somme, the fight had actually dispelled those doubts. The episode had another unintended effect. The 6ist Division had previously, while in England, been used as a second-line division, and constantly robbed of some of its best elements to feed other divisions. It was under strength, and the orders and counter-orders of its staff during the night, though possibly inevitable in the con- ditions, did not make it a satisfactory partner in a desper- ate offensive. The impression already created in the A.I.F., that the new British armies lacked something in fighting capacity, was noticeably strengthened by this episode.

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