Editors: Rob van Girzkel and Jojada Verrips (University of Amsterdam)

Editorial Board: Raoul R. Alzdersen (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada), Jerenzy E Boissevaitz (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands), Reginald E Byrotz (The Queens University of Belfast, Northern Ireland), Hal B. Levirze (Victoria University, ), Bonnie Maritime Anthropological Studies J. McCay (Rutgers University, USA), Jattzes R. McGoodwin (University of Colorado, USA), G.K. Nzckurzya (University of Ghana, Ghana), Gisli Pdlssort (University of Iceland, Iceland), Vol6, No. 112 1993 Kennetlz Ruddle (National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan), M. Estellie Stnith (State University of New York, College at Oswego, USA), Lawrence J. Taylor (Lafayette College, Contents USA), Torbetz A. Vestergaard (Aarhus University, Denmark). EXTERNALFORCES AND CHANGEIN TRADITIONALCOMMUNITY-BASED MAST (Maritime Anthropological Studies) is an international journal of anthropology on FISHERYMANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE ASIA-PACIFICREGION ...... 1 - fishing and maritime communities. Published twice yearly by the Department of European Kenneth Ruddle and Mediterranean Studies (Euromed) at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, ACCESSAND DISTRIBUTION:TWO ASPECTS OF CHANGINGLOCAL MARINE MAST aims to disseminate knowledge of contemporary and historical societies and cultures of people exploiting maritime environments. RESOURCEMANAGEMENTINSTITUTIONS IN A JAVANESE ...... 38 Anita Kendrick Articles, comments, and books for review should be addressed to: LA INICIATNA PRNADA IN THE MEXICANSHRIMP INDUSTRY: MAST POLITICSOF EFFICIENCY...... 59 Anthropological-Sociological Center Marcela Va'squez Leo'n and Thonzas R. McGuire University of Amsterdam CHAOSON THE COMMONS:SALMON AND SUCH ...... 74 O.Z. Achterburgwal 185 Neal Gilbertsen 1012 DK Amsterdam The Netherlands THETRADITIONAL APPROACH TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF COMMONPROPERTY FISHERY RESOURCES IN NIGERIA ...... 92 Business correspondence should be addressed to: Ade S. Olotnola Het Spinhuis Publishers WIVESAND TRADERS: WOMEN'S CAREERS IN GHANAIANCANOE . . 110 O.Z. Achterburgwal 185 Ragnhild Over6 1012 DK Amsterdam SOCIALMOBILIZATION IN KERALA: The Netherlands FISHERS,PRIESTS, UNIONS, AND POLITICALPARTIES ...... 136 Subscription price per volume (including postage): private individuals Dfl.35.00 (US$18.50), Jo'tza Ha'lfda'narddttir and institutions, libraries, etc. Dfl. 70.00 (US$ 37.00). Please transfer the amount in Dfl. or ALLTHAT HOLDS US TOGETHER: US$ to our postal giro account no. 3691970 or to J. VerripslMAST, ABN Bank account no. UNSHIP AND RESOURCEPOOLING IN A FISHINGCO-OPERATIVE ...... 157 545446406, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, or pay with International Money Order. Charles R. Menzies A FISHERMAN'SAUTOBIOGRAPHY: Cover design: Yvon Schuler TO THE SHETLANDSWITH 'NANNY'IN 1937 ...... 180 Reginald Byrotz Printed by Krips Repro, Meppel, The Netherlands

ISSN: 0922-1476

63 MAST. All rights reserved HURRICANEANDREW AND SOUTHFLORIDA'S PEOPLE: External Forces and Change in Traditional IMPACTSAND IMMEDLATENEEDS ...... 205 James R. McGoodwin and Christoplzer L. Dyer Community-Based Fishery Management BOOKREVEWS ...... 220 Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region

Kenneth Ruddle International Resources Management Institute

ABSTRACT In this paper I analyze and exemplify the historical and contemporary external forces that drive change in traditional community-based marine resource management systems in the Asia-Pacific Region. A summary of policy alternatives regarding the future of such systems is presented.

Introduction

In the Asia-Pacific region, as throughout the world, traditional community-based marine resource management systems are increasingly affected by external factors that cause stresses and often lead to radical change in systems, including their demise.] There is nothing new about this, except that the intensity of impacts and diversity of their sources has increased in recent decades. Thus contemporary community-based marine resource management systems exist under environmen- tal, social, ecological, political, and demographic circumstances that are often very different from those of even the recent past. Nowadays such systems are swept-up in the overall process of national modernization in the Asia-Pacific Region. Among the principal, all-pervasive external forces are the legacy of colonialism, contemporary government policy and legal change, the replacement of traditional local authority, demographic change, urbanization, changes in education systems, modernization and economic development, commercialization and commoditiz- ation of living aquatic resources, technological change, the policies of external

I assistance agencies, and national policies for economic sectors other than fisheries (Fig. 1). Such external forces rarely act in isolation, but rather as a mutually

i reinforcing and potentially destructive complex.2 Somewhat more recent pressures - but not universally so - are the commercial- ization and monetization of formerly local and mainly subsistence or reciprocal exchange or barter economies, which now link them with external markets. This, in turn, leads to changed perceptions in fishing communities regarding the value of marine products, and often to external factors being internalized by village elites, and so to the breakdown of traditional management systems through the weakening or total collapse of traditional moral authority. Small communities are not immune

MAST 1993,6(1/2): 1-37 from the pressures that drive larger polities and commercial elites, and which systems are dynamic, historically conditioned and deeply embedded in larger undermine the moral imperative of local management systems from within. Re- political, economic and social realms. Types of traditional management system vary gional and global markets also have a direct impact on them: external incentives enormously, so any examination of the external factors that impinge on them must introduce temptations for individual profit at the expense of local social equity, and be generalized. Inevitably, there will be many local exceptions. thus undermine systems from within by weakening or even destroying their moral and traditional authority. Thus the equitable allocational and distributive effect of existing local institutions should not be romanticized. The Colonial Legacy Community institutions and management systems are not immutable: they change through time. They are dynamic, adapting to external as well as internal and The principal impact of the colonial era on traditional community-based resource local experiences and pressures, many of which are not directly related to the management systems in the Asia-Pacific Region is a strongly contradictory legal fisheries sector. Participants in community-based management systems cannot be complexity, with the Western-based State law of the now independent nations that assumed a priori as being inherently benign resource conservational and socially essentially regards all waters below the high tide mark as being state property and equitable actors. Hence any policy and program decisions about the present-day open of access, at odds with local, indigenous-based customary law, which rec- and future usefulness of local management systems must be based on a clearheaded ognizes some form of marine property right. Worse, it is generally accepted by and realistic evaluation of the moral authority, motives, interests, and cultural Westerners and those Western-trained that customary law, which locally legitimizes conceptions that underpin and drive them. customary rights to resources, is invalid for upholding legal claims, because it is Traditional management systems decline under pressures exerted by both inter- unwritten, not made by either a sovereign or legally-constituted legislative body, nal and external sources, and the latter can trigger the former, such that local and arises from societies lacking any notion of 'law.' phenomena may mask deeper-seated problems afflicting social institutions. Such As a consequence, in the Asia-Pacific Region, the relationship between the customary law that governs, or governed, community-based marine resource man- agement and statutory law is highly varied and extremely complex. Nevertheless, COLONIAL LEGACY broad historical patterns and resultant contemporary conditions are clear. The impact of British, Dutch, French, German, Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish, and U.S.A. administrations, and the post-colonial continuation by independent nations of the laws introduced and policies pursued by those regimes, has been a major 'external' factor that either by default or deliberately, undermined customary law POLICIES OF INDEPENDENT and community resource rights. --.. Default was widespread and understandable: it never was the objective of colonial regimes to adapt metropolitan legal systems to indigenous systems and I-----, REPLACEMENT OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY I I institutions, rather the goal was that the latter should be displaced and native peoples b DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE educated to use Western systems and institutions. To have encouraged community- b URBANIZATION based management systems rooted in local systems of customary law would have I b EDUCATION CHANGE been inimical to this objective. Rather, the objective would be attained by either legislating directly against community-based systems, or allowing them to b ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT d wither and become displaced during a gradual process of modernization and b INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGE Westernization. t. COMMODITIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION Further, in colonial times as today, the sheer logistical and practical complexity b TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE of attempting to incorporate customary rights into a system of legal norms was almost overwhelming. An extraordinarily diverse society like , tb DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS for example, makes it daunting if not impossible to consider formulating appropri- ate law and policies to embrace the specific customs of some 700 distinct cultural Figure 1. Tile Principal External Factors cartsitlg Change in Traditional Cornmuliity-based Fish- eries Managenlent Systenls in the Asia-Pacific Region. groups into a single system of norms. Deliberate legislative action to do away with traditional community-based apparent that they expected to have their lands and waters returned, in accordance systems was also widespread. The provides an example. According to with Victoria's 'generosity and good faith' (Derrick 1946:248). early Spanish chroniclers, systems of community-based coastal and riverine fish- Detailed instructions regarding the verification and simplification of Fijian land eries management existed in the Philippines in pre-Hispanic and early-Colonial titles of lands to be held in trust for the Fijians were given to the British Governor times, based on independent villages (barangay),around Manila and in the Tagalog of by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.6 But since no similar clear Region of Luzon Island (Blair and Robertson 1903-1909). But as Spanish colonial statement was forthcoming with respect to the reefs, the chiefs began to question rule intensified, the barangay was eliminated as an administrative unit and the the situation. They sent two letters to Victoria expressing their anxiety that their village sea territory disappeared with it (Lopez 1985).3 ownership of the reefs appeared to have passed from them. Today the coastal or 'municipal fisheries' of the Philippines are operated under In response, Kimberley, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Des an open access regime. As established by Presidential Decree 704 (also known as Voeux, Governor of Fiji, instructing him that he (Kimberley) was commanded by the Fishery Decree of 1975) 'municipal fisheries' are those that use boats of 3 gt or Victoria to inform the chiefs that Des Voeux was to investigate the entire matter, less, or gears not requiring the use of a boat. 'Municipal fisheries' operate in both '...and that it is Her Majesty's desire that neither they nor their people should be inland and marine 'municipal waters,' the latter within 3 nm of the municipal deprived of any rights which they have enjoyed under their own laws and custom.'7 coastline (Santos 1980)4. In another dispatch Kimberley further instructed Des Voeux to This situation had its origins in the colonial periods of both Spain and the U.S.A. ...examine into the statements now advanced by the chiefs, and if you are satisfied that these Under the Spaniards fisheries were for the welfare of the town (municipality) and reefs are the recognised property of native communities..., or that they are required for the use were an open access resource, although private rights were leased to individuals, and occupation of some Chiefs or tribe, you will take such measures as may be necessary to particularly for construction of fish weirs ('corrals') (Spoehr 1980). The U.S. secure to the rightful owners the possession of their respective reefs and to effect the registration administration, by Act 4003 Sect. 67 (1932), authorized municipalities to grant of them under the Ordinance relating to native lands; in the same way as other lands (not covzred exclusive fishing rights to concessionaires within municipal waters via public by water) which are the property of the different mataqali ....a If there are any reefs not claimed as the property of any Native Chiefs or Community they auctions, with the principal intention of generating rent for the municipa1ity.s Where will continue to be the property of the Crown together with the other lands which became vested this did not occur, gear was licensed to derive revenue (Santos 1980). However, the in Her Majesty under the terms of the Deed of Cession. Supreme Court ruled that the auction of exclusive rights pertained only to stationary weirs, oyster beds or fry-collection, and that municipalities could not exclude Thus clearly it was both the policy and the intention of both Victoria and the British non-resident fishermen who obtained a permit from the Bureau of Fisheries and Government that, according to customary law, the reefs and fishing grounds have Aquatic Resources (Kalagayan 1991). But under the Fishery Decree of 1975, the Fijian owners in the same way that their lands did. In November of 1881, Des Voeux licensing authority for municipal waters was given to the municipalities. conveyed equally unambiguously the contents of those two dispatches during his opening address to the Council of Chiefs, and added that steps would be taken to The Colonial Reginze in Fiji ensure that the nzataqali would obtain the reefs that belonged to them.9 This The case of Fiji is extremely interesting in that it provides a documented example removed any doubts that the chiefs might have had.10 of a blatant attempt by local colonial officials to destroy a traditional management However, neither royal command nor the official British Government policy system in favor of expatriate entrepreneurs and in defiance of the expressed wishes was ever implemented. There is nothing to demonstrate that anything was ever of the British Crown and the unambiguous orders of the metropolitan government. done to follow-up Des Voeux's opening address statement of November 188 1. The At the time of cession of Fiji to the British Crown, in 1874, the question of Native Lands Commission was unable to devote time and personnel to marine customary resource rights was of major concern to the High Chiefs, most of whom matters. This reneging on royal wishes and official policy is exemplified by the wanted to attach conditions regarding their land and fishing grounds before agree- behavior of Thurston, Acting-Governor, who in 1886 wrote to the Secretary of ing to the cession of the country. But they were dissuaded from so doing during the State for the Colonies that '[ilt has been the habit of natives of this Colony to claim final negotiations by Robinson, the British representative, who explained that as absolute and exclusive, a proprietary right in the reefs ....and in some cases this Queen Victoria '...was willing to accept the offer of cession ...but that conditions has led to pretensions that could not be recognised .... It is however inconsistent attached to it would hamper, and might even prevent, the good government of the with the altered conditions of the country that any exclusive rights of the nature country' (Derrick 1946:248). While the High Chiefs agreed with this, it was indicated can be enjoyed by one class only of Her Majesty's subjects.'ll In 1886, Thurston also opened the b&che-de-merfishery to non-Fijians, in the Fishing Rights in Waters Adjacent to Property.' Outsiders ('...any person other than interests of the export economy and under strong pressure from the colonists. This the [land] owner, lessee or occupier') were prohibited from taking pearl oyster shell, was accepted by the chiefs as only a temporary measure, in that only the outer reefs trochus shell, or bdche-de-mer within 800 m of the highwater mark on the foreshore would be thus opened. But in 1887 the new Governor, Mitchell, opened all reefs to and within a sea area bounded by the seaward projection of the lateral boundaries b&che-de-merfishing, in the interests of the economy.12 of the landholding. The most important commercial marine fishery products were Further, the Rivers and Streams Ordinance (1882) was now being interpreted as thereby reserved for the indigenous landowners. Fish, crustacea, oysters, other meaning that the private fishing rights of Fijians in all rivers and streams were shellfish, and all forms of marine animal life other than whales were included in abolished and that they now belonged to the Crown.13 In addition, colonial officials 1953. held the view that there were no longer exclusive tribal fishing grounds.14

The Colonial Regime in Papua New Guinea Government Policy The situation was quite different in what is now Papua New Guinea, and where the contemporary recognition of traditional fishing rights is based on colonial policy The situation of traditional community-based marine resource management systems under which the indigenous peoples were not divested of their lands, but, on the changed but little with national independence. For most parts of the Asia-Pacific contrary, were protected and secured by the colonial authorities. Hence, today some Region, the present unsystematic and ad hoc statutory framework relating to 97% of the land area is under customary tenure and customary law. Similarly, community-based marine resource management claims is the result of the absence colonial sovereignty of marginal seas did not displace traditional community-based of appropriate policy, which, in turn, is partly a legacy of colonial neglect, a neglect marine tenure, including fishing rights, which were statutorily protected early in which is logical given the underlying philosophy of colonialism. The lack of the colonial era. For example, the Fisheries Ordinance of 1922 (New Guinea) appropriate policy is partly a legacy of colonialism, partly a reflection of a preoccu- provided: 'This ordinance shall not apply to any native fishing in waters in which pation with other development priorities, and partly, as in the case of , in by native custom he has any right of fishing' [Section 2A]. As a result, in most particular, because devolution of power to the local level is an anathema in a vast, traditional coastal communities of Papua New Guinea traditional fishing rights still sprawling archipelagic nation still concerned with the fundamental task of 'nation- regulate activities. Colonial policy was motivated by the need to ensure a steady building.' supply of marine fish to the coastal population. Further, many fishermen lacked Regarding Papua New Guinea, for example, Tom'tavala (1990) observes that in access to alternative resources from which to make a living; their livelihood and early-1990, neither the national government nor the provinces had a policy for incomes depend on the continued recognition of their traditional fishing rights. traditional marine fishing rights, despite the official admission that conflicts over In Papua New Guinea, the attitude of the colonial authorities toward com- them are among the most prevalent contemporary disputes. This actually or poten- munity-based marine resource management was quite unlike the case of Fiji or most tially impedes economic development, leads to social and political instability, and other colonies in the Asia-Pacific Region. In Papua New Guinea the customary contributes to an increase in criminality, since customary claimants tend to uphold fishing and marine resources rights of indigenous peoples were recognized or their claims by physical violence without regard either to the national good or to protected by the various colonial administrations. In the Territory of Papua, just the validity of outsiders' claims. But, as Tom'tavala (1990) observes, physical before establishment of the British Protectorate, in 1884, commercial exploitation violence or the threat of it to enforce claims, although customarily sanctioned in of pearl oysters, pearl shells, trochus shells and bdche-de-mer by expatriates had many parts of Papua New Guinea, is unacceptable according to modern criminal become widespread. In 1891 the administration enacted licensing and other ordi- law. However, unless traditional claims are given some degree of recognition or nances to regulate these activities. In some areas, like the Trobriand Islands, The protection, people will continue to enforce their claims with violence, since they Pearl Shell and B2che-de-mer Fishery Ordinance of I894 (Papua), was used in regard their actions are as both culturally warranted and sanctioned. 1903 and 1910 to close the fishery to expatriates. However, indigenous peoples, In the Asia-Pacific Region the government policy regarding traditional com- such as the Trobriand Islanders were permitted to exploit these resources commer- munity-based marine resource management ranges from confusion, as in cially (Tom'tavala 1990). and Fiji, to the incorporation of traditional systems within modern management Indigenous peoples' fishing rights in waters adjacent to a landholding were regimes, as in much of Melanesia, on the one hand, or to the deliberate undermining explicitly recognized in 1952. Pursuant to the Pearl, Pearl-Shell and B2che-de-mer of traditional systems and their replacement with centralized systems of adminis- Ordinance 1911-1932 (Papua), a proclamation was made for the 'Protection of tration, as in Indonesia, on the other. A centralization policy occurs generally where a government seeks resource rents for investment in other sectors of the national recognition. So rnatai councils now consult fisheries officers when designing and economy, andlor needs to develop an export sector. In other cases, one of the best implementing local rules. The government must cooperate with the matai, thus examples being Indonesia, such a policy is augmented when government imple- blending the management efforts of the two levels (Pers. comm. U. Fa'asili). ments a centralization policy owing to a basic need to exert control over far-flung Thus, at least for the tropical Pacific, it is being increasingly accepted that many national territory, in pursuit of 'nation-building.' subsistence fisheries are governed by community-based management systems, and Government policy has often been to replace traditional community-based that such systems must be accounted for in evaluating potential development management systems with open access systems. But some nations and communities strategies. There a combination of factors make such systems a potentially valuable have rejected this approach. Such an initiative and response occurred in 1976 in management alternative (Lewis 1990:72). In an overview of options and prospects (Johannes 1988), and in Japan during the Meiji era (1867-1912) and again for the 1990s by the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA 1990:362) it was observed that: under the post-war US Occupation in Japan (Ruddle 1985, 1987, 1990). Indeed, Johannes (1988) observes of the Pacific Islands that the level of resentment aroused For management of [the subsistence] fishery sector, it may... be advantageous to examine traditional or customary marine management. The Pacific Islands have a rich history of tra- in fishing communities by official attempts to eradicate community-based resource ditional management that is up to now only partially documented ....Modern management of this management systems will render such attempts impossible in a democracy. Apart fishery can then be based on traditional or cultural practices, This would then greatly facilitate from near urban centers, almost every disappearance of a traditional system in its acceptance. Oceania has resulted from legislation and other actions under undemocratic colonial regimes. Such problems can only become more complex as the demographic change, Further, the policies of many governments, particularly in Melanesia, as exemp- urbanization, commercialization, and other pressures become more pronounced. lified by (Amos 1993), recognize that traditional systems are an integral part of a matrix that regulates social and political relationships and defines cultural Support of Tradition identities and ways of life, rather than being concerned with just fishing rights and In many Pacific Island nations, and especially those in Melanesia but also in parts the organization of economic activities. Thus in many instances abandonment would of and , despite an absence of clearcut policy and the requisite entail severe social and cultural repercussions. In recognition of this, although gener- statutes, the contemporary value and role of traditional community-based coastal- ally not without considerable confusion and complications, in Papua New Guinea, marine resource management systems is recognized. There has also been scattered , and Vanuatu, where traditional marine resource management and somewhat ad hoc attempts to implement this recognition. For example, the systems are recognized as aform of customary law, they have been embedded within government of Papua New Guinea seeks to return enforcement to local 'resource State law. In those countries it is a tenet of policy that customary law may empower owners.' In this, devolution of power to provincial and lower levels is fundamental community-based management, as well as being a basis for co-management of local (Chapau et al. 1991). Similarly, based on the Provincial Goverrintent Act (1981), marine resources. revisions to the Fisheries Act of Solomon Islands seek to transfer inshore fisheries In the context of economic and social change, during which rights to resources management to the provinces, whereby they will have full jurisdiction over 'Prov- increase in value, groups may attempt to obtain codification of their customary incial Waters' for 3 nm offshore, and will formulate their own by-laws. In this way rights. This has occurred in Papua New Guinea (Wright 1985, 1990). Whereas it hoped to achieve a better correspondence between provincial management and formal acceptance by legal and political institutions provides communities with a customary laws (Moore 1987a-g). In Vanuatu all reefs are owned by coastal legally codified basis for control over resources, state supervised codification can communities. This is enshrined in the constitution: 'All Land in the Republic destroy much of the adaptive flexibility characteristic of unwritten customary law belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their descendants' (Art. 7 1, Chap 12) (Ruddle and Johannes 1985, 1990), since, as in Palau, 'the aura of mystery connected (Amos 1993). In Fiji the Native Lands Trusts Board is attempting to increase with [unwritten] traditional resource management... was part of its effectiveness' integration of the traditional community-based fisheries management system with (Johannes 1981). Dilution of the flexibility of traditional systems is clearly not State law, by seeking more formal Fijian ownership of proposed Marine Parks. This desirable. Hence codification can be both difficult and of questionable usefulness. planned devolution of management responsibility has recently received ministerial In Papua New Guinea, statutory law, as enshrined in the Independence Consti- support (Adams 1993). tution, pragmatically recognizes the validity of legal obligations conferred by A similar process is underway in parts of Polynesia and Micronesia. For custom.15 Custom is valid if not inconsistent with Constitutional or other statutory example, in Western since 1988 an attempt is being made to merge local laws, and not repugnant to the general principles of humanity (Tom'tavala 1990). rnatai council rules into national legislation, thereby strengthening them by official This was reinforced by Section 5 of the Customs Recognition Act, which among owned by any individual or tribe, but if that area was to be considered as customarily other things recognized the customary basis of rights to marine areas and resources. owned, then the fishermen of Dunde Village would claim it, as they use it to catch This represents the best attempt by the state to recognize traditional cornrnunity- bonito. Thus they would claim as customary waters those extending to about 6 miles based marine claims. However, this appears to have been intended more to resolve off-shore. In other words, official boundaries would have to be drawn so as to take conflict, than to uphold claims per se, since it refers to recognition and application actual practise into account (Ruttley 1987). of customs during civil litigation, whereas it does not explicitly provide for the prescription by custom of rights in rent (Tom'tavala 1990). However, that 'the Centralization ownership by custom of water or of rights in, over or in connection with the sea or The national policy of Indonesia, for example, is that all marine waters are State a reef, or in or on the bed of the sea' can be legally proven presupposes the property, to be managed centrally, through the provincial, regency and village pre-existence of rights to coastal waters and marine resources based on custom. offices of the Directorate General of Fisheries, for the benefit of the entire nation. Thus where a local community recognizes rights to marine territory or resources, This is tantamount to legally sanctioning an open access system nationwide, these rights could be implicitly recognized under the Customs Recognition Act for regulated theoretically - since it is practically unenforceable throughout the vast all other purposes. archipelago - only by certain technical considerations regarding gear type, vessel However, Tom'tavala (1990) concludes that this interpretation, except for prin- size and mesh limitations.17 ciples of common law and equity, could be overridden by the provisions of any But the centralization philosophy, an integral part of the nation-building effort other law which prescribes anything to the contrary. He goes on to say, 'However, in Indonesia, is a major reason for the undermining of local management insti- if there is a dearth of statutory prescription to the contrary, then, rights to maritime tutions: 'Not only is the Indonesian state generally suspicious of local autonomy, it territories and marine resources (at least for indigenous people) fall to be regulated is actively involved in seeking additional revenues and export earnings' (Bailey and by customs as impliedly recognized under section 5 of the Customs Recognition Zerner 1992a: 10). The control of and rents extracted from marine resources is one Act.' way of achieving these goals. As a result, traditional community-based marine Further, fishing is also an integral part of many traditional coastal societies. For resource management systems are being undermined. In many areas of Indonesia the Trobriand Islanders, for example, the sea and marine life have immense cultural local and fisheries officials uphold the statutory law of free access. This has resulted significance, embracing the whole fabric of their beliefs about their origin, their in physical violence (Zerner 1991a) or disenchantment. For example, on Ambo prowess, their relationships, and their ceremonies. Origin stories tell of the maritime Island in the Balabalakang Islands of the Makassar Strait, an indigenous royalties origins of certain lineages, the relationships of others with certain fish species and system was used for the last 40 years to regulate harvesting. Although having the acquisition of fish magic by others. The sea was also fundamentally important worked well until the mid-1980s, the system is now apparently breaking down, in the ceremonial, inter-island kula trade. And fish were an important symbolic and since outsiders have been blatantly disobeying the rules. This has been encouraged nutritional trading commodity with inland villages.16 Thus the recognition of by the government policy of open access in fisheries. Further, since the local popu- traditional fishing rights is inseparable from the protection of indigenous culture, lation administers a management scheme yet turns over 100% of the royalties to the part of the fifth 'National Goal and Directive Principle,' inscribed the Preamble to Regency Government, receiving very little in return, they are becoming less vigilant. the Constitution (1975) (Tom'tavala 1990). They bear all the management costs but reap none of the benefits (Zerner n.d.). But even the discussion of legislation to register traditional claims can of itself In Majene Regency, Sulawesi, the local traditional regulation of first-comer's lead to changes or attempted changes in systems. For example, in Solomon Islands rights to a spot for a roppong FAD has been overturned by the courts. Zerner (1989a) in some cases exaggerated claims are made because it is anticipated that at some describes one case where the crew of a first-comer's roppong severed the lines of future time a community's exclusive fishing areas would be registered, hence it an intruding raft, and dispatched it to sea. The owner and crew of the first-comer would be wise to stake a claim to an enlarged exclusive area. This occurred in raft '...were found guilty of intentional, wilful destruction of another person's Western Province (Ruttley 1987). property and fined under civil tort claims for damages caused by the loss of the Although in some cases this may be just opportunism, in other cases it may be roppong' (Zerner 1989:12). The Majene court invalidated the traditional practise as seeking to protect both the inshore exclusive area and an off-shore open access area, a custom that must be nullified and abolished. The court considered the practises from which a community's subsistence is habitually derived. An example of the as obstructing national development and would provide an opportunity for individ- latter protective anticipatory claim occurred at Dunde Village on Munda island, uals to play judge and so threaten national stability. This decision both reinforced Western Province. There it was stated that the sea beyond the barrier reef is not the national tendency toward open access in fisheries and deflated confidence in local rules and management procedures. It signalled the centralization of fisheries fish, and did not wish to see the reef monopolized by the chief's clan, as in former management and an increase in transaction costs. times. So the other inhabitants petitioned the Civil Affairs Office, in Chuuk, which supported them by rescinding the restoration order (Tolerton and Rausch 1949).

External Replacement of Traditional Local Authority Demographic Change The decline of traditional marine resource management systems can often be traced to the decline of traditional political systems and their conscious replacement by Demographic change, be it natural growth, in-migration or population decline from Western political systems during the colonial era. In the , for example, various causes, is an all-pervasive factor throughout the Asia-Pacific Region. In regular contacts with Westerners began in 1821, with the activities of the London those countries and regions where human populations are expanding geographically Missionary Society. This entailed the destruction of traditional religion, and thus and increasing in numbers, an increased demand for fish and marine products is part of the basis for traditional authority, and imposition of a British legal and generated, which, combined with the penetration of a cash economy, creates new administrative code adapted to missionary concepts. In 1888 the Cook Islands opportunities to sell surpluses. The impact of this phenomenon on fishing com- became a British Protectorate, and in 1901 were annexed to New Zealand. Colonial munities is exacerbated by the adoption of new technologies to increase harvests to administration was centered on the Resident Commissioner in Rarotonga, sup- provide a regularly marketable surplus,'and the host of social changes that this ported by Resident Agents on the larger outer islands. The early Cook Islands brings about. Parliament became a Legislative Assembly in 1946, and elected Island Councils In-migration, in particular, exerts a major impact on traditional community- were established later. This all functioned to undermine traditional power holders based systems. Similarly, excessive out-migration or population decline for other (ariki),and so too a fundamental component of the traditional resource management reasons can undermine systems. In some locations where there are no longer enough (Sims 1990). people to merit maintenance of a system, neighboring communities may decide to In Palau, traditional social organization has been undermined by modernization. merge their territories, as occurred in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan (Akimichi and The greatest blow to the integrity of the kin group has been the vesting of property Ruddle 1984). ownership in the individual, and the individual accrual of wealth. As a consequence In the Cook Islands localized population decline contributed to the demise of chiefly authority is now minimal, and the economic and political functions of the traditional management systems (Sims 1990). There, demographic dislocation chiefs have become vestigial (McCutcheon 1980). caused by diseases introduced by Westerners decimated local populations. The In Tokelau, as is typical throughout the region, monetization has eroded the population of Rarotonga, for example, declined from some 6,000 or 7,000 in respect and hence authority of the Council of Elders because they are now salaried pre-contact times to about 1,800 in 1867 (Crocombe 1964). The pattern was similar and have ventured into non-traditional areas, like budgeting. It also has enabled on the outer islands. In the northern Cook Islands the dislocation was exacerbated islanders to pay relatively painless cash fines for transgressing fishing regulations by the depredations of Peruvian slave traders. On Penrhyn Island, the worst case, I (Toloa et al. 1991). at one time only 88 people remained, mostly children and the elderly, resulting in I But, in complete contrast are those cases where communities have coopted abandonment of two villages at the southern end of the lagoon (Maude 1982). The I external pressures to bring about changes in traditional authority that they desire. missionaries encouraged resettlement in new villages, and on each island the main For example, traditional fishing rights on Lukunor Atoll, in the Central Caroline village grew from in-migration, such that, for example, by 1895, over 30% of Islands of the Federated States of Micronesia, lapsed during the German adminis- Rarotongans were in-migrants (Crocombe 1964). Such drastic changes ensured the tration. After 1945 the U.S. administration attempted to restore the trapping and decline of traditional society and institutions. Both the moral authority under- fishing areas to their former owners. This was unpopular, since during the last pinning and practical regulations governing marine resource management systems generation, and especially during WW 11, the community had become accustomed were thereby diminished, and this weakening was reinforced by demographic to open access. Hitherto, only 12 people had controlled the reef area, of whom three upheaval. were closely related to the chief. The chief wanted to restore the traditional regime, purportedly for conservation reasons. Further the chief's clan identified with the reef areas and disliked seeing them abused by overfishing. However, the other I inhabitants resented the idea of having to ask permission each time they wanted to j Urbanization Changes in Education Systems

The heavy influx of in-migrants, such as occurs under urbanization, is a major factor The introduction of Western-based educational curricula and formal schooling to causing the breakdown of systems, and against which it is impracticable to defend the Asia-Pacific Region has had a massive impact on the local knowledge that them. Kiribati provides an example. In that nation in-migration occurs to any underpins traditional community-based management. The elite, many of whom significant extent only on Tarawa Island, the capital area. Tarawa fishing rights have been educated in major urban centers, and sometimes overseas, frequently has holders have complained that in-migrants, without first seeking permission, freely a greatly diminished respect for traditional systems, which are thus now generally exploit their shellfish beds, which, by custom (i.e., before the beginning of British neglected and also commonly disparaged by rapidly modernizing traditional com- administration and the subsequent in-migration), had been for their use only. The munities. government has not sustained the customary owners, arguing that since the lagoon Traditional fishing skills have declined with economic and educational changes. and its resources belong to the State, every citizen is entitled to harvest the resources In Tokelau, for example, this is manifested in increased pressure on easy-to-catch (Teiwaki 1988). species, like parrotfish (Scaridae), and a concomitant deduction of pressure on Similarly, in Palau community-based marine resource management has also has stocks such as giant maori wrasse or eel, the catching of which requires either been overwhelmed by in-migrants to Koror Municipality, the seat of the District special knowledge or intense physical effort (Toloa et al. 1991). Center. They now outnumber traditional residents, such that it is impossible to either Owing largely to disparagement, the practical usefulness of local knowledge is determine or define traditional fishermen (Johannes 1988). Elsewhere, where now neither properly acknowledged nor used to assist the design of development lineages are the corporate group owning a marine area, in-migrants will automat- projects or management systems. The tendency to disparage local knowledge is not ically possess either primary or secondary rights to fishing if they are from the new, although the reasons for disparagement have changed. For example, in New appropriate lineage. Caledonia the processes of discrediting the 'superstitions of primitive peoples' has The breakdown of community-based management systems in the vicinity of been going on for generations among European colonists, administrators, educators, urban centers is both inevitable and probably desirable, if it is not to interfere with and missionaries (Dahl 1989). There, at the beginning of the 20th century, Lambert the rational development of the coastal zone, as in Japan (Ruddle 1987). (1900) refused to record all the '...superstitious ceremonies related to fishing. It is In Palau, fish has also been commoditized as a result of urbanization, since sufficient to say: pity our poor natives, may we appreciate and encourage the people no longer have the time to go fishing but still want to eat fresh fish, hence apostolic work, which is alone capable of dispelling such darkness.' Although such they purchase it in the local market. Fishermen also make money by selling their an attitude culminated with Western colonialism and social science of the nineteenth catch to hotels, restaurants, foreign project administrators and foreign contract century (Warren 1989), it was firmly rooted in the works of historians and natural workers (McCutcheon 1980). scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Slikkerveer 1989). Since young adults move to town for career reasons, the ratio of fish providers Interrelated economic, ideological, and institutional factors still combined to to fish consumers has sunk to critically low levels in Palau. In the context of perpetuate the marginalization and neglect of local knowledge and, therefore, of technological change this has had an impact on marine resource management participatory approaches to development and management. The principal among patterns, since new fishing techniques offer more efficient and faster catching. these factors are: But urbanization and associated demographic change that it causes in areas of (1) The 'bias of elite professionalism' as aresult of which local knowledge laclcs out-migration can lead indirectly to the strengthening of traditional systems. For legitimacy in mainstream thought, that regards objective Western science as supe- example, in parts of the Solomon Islands there has been a change in the method of rior. Western and Western-trained scientists generally reject local knowledge which record keeping regarding the boundaries and rights to customary fishing areas. Whereas they either cannot or will not understand, which does not fit into their formal formerly this .information was handed down orally, in some areas this is now being models, and which challenges conventional theories. Local knowledge is still supplemented by written records made by the educated young people. At Tatamba widely belittled, at best, and projects that attempt to make use of it are frequently Village, in Isabel Province, the young people are keeping a record of genealogies and viewed as unscientific and therefore unacceptable. Such attitudes remain deeply rights so as to not be disinherited themselves when working away from the home embedded both in individuals and institutions, such that persons wishing to pursue areas, in other employment. They regard it as almost certain that detailed local unconventional projects and research often face ridicule, and, occasionally, job- knowledge will diminish among future generations, and that they could be disin- loss; herited by prolonged absence were such written records not kept (Ruttley 1987). (2) Related is the belief that empirical methodologies in laboratory settings are modify the age at which traditional education begins, so as to ensure the trans- the only correct procedure. This 'top-down' approach aims at uplifting rural mission of knowledge prior to the departure of youngsters for formal education societies via standardized technological transfer. Such an approach is upheld and overseas, together with a need to convince the Westernized elite of the value of local promoted by the organization and incentive structure of research institutions and knowledge. The value of local knowledge is undisputed by the residents, as is the professions, and the extension services that implement their findings. Former need to adapt the traditional framework to the contemporary world, as well as to weaknesses in participatory development reinforced the conventional skepticism of establish mechanisms for blending biological information with local knowledge individual scientists, institutions and donor agencies. This was compounded by the (Toloa et al. 1991). difficulty of showing, using conventional criteria, quantifiable results to demon- strate 'success' and cost-effectiveness in participatory approaches. Innovative ap- proaches are thereby dissuaded; Modernization and Economic Development (3) The private sector invariably reinforces that approach, since its continuing profits are predicated on the transfer of technology; and This is an all-pervasive factor that includes developments within the fisheries (4) Promotion of local knowledge and participatory development is viewed by capture and culture sectors, infra-structural change; and developments in other some central governments as organizing the rural poor, and therefore subversive. economic sectors. Only a few examples are provided below. The denigration of local knowledge as backward, inefficient, inferior, and Modernization also inevitably causes attitudinal change and alterations in life- founded on myth and ignorance has recently begun to change, having been con- style. One common change is in food habits. In the Cook Islands, for example, fronted with evidence from numerous studies that local knowledge often has further undermining and a diminished valuation of inshore fisheries followed a rational bases: many such practises are logical, sophisticated and often still-evolv- reduced reliance on fishing, because of the development of animal husbandry and ing adaptations to risk, based on generations of empirical experience and arranged wider availability of imported animal proteins. Thus support for the management according to principles, philosophies and institutions that are radically different of lagoon and reef resources, and particularly for access limitations, declined (Sims from those prevailing in Western scientific circles, and hence all-but incom- 1990). Similarly, in Palau, the perception of the value of resources has changed prehensible to them. As a backlash to decades of denigration, there has been a because the dietary importance of fish has been undermined by store-bought canned tendency by some researchers to idealize, romanticize and attribute superior fish and other protein foods. Wage labor now means that the money is available to capacities to indigenous communities. This also is unhelpful, misleading and purchase such foods (McCutcheon 1980). inappropriate. Efforts have begun to counteract the tacit negation of local knowledge by Infrastructural Changes and Development in other Econontic Sectors neglect. Tokelau (among other places in the Pacific) provides an example. There an Although remaining legally recognized, community-based marine resource rights attempt was made to document local ecological knowledge of fisheries, and to may be usurped by such activities as foreshore reclamation, dredging and tourist resort introduce courses on it, taught by the Elders, in primary and secondary schools development, since such infrastructural changes usuaI1y have deleterious impacts on (Toloa et al. 1991). However, since this was opposed by the Westernized elite, who coastal-marine ecosystems and habitats. Agricultural developments and change, perceived the Western curriculum to be superior, and who would have lost status lumbering activities, and the development of pond and coastal may all by having formally uneducated fishermen teach classes, the local education was have deleterious downstream impacts via sedimentation and organic and inorganic transferred to a less-recognized institution, which later became defunct. The elite, pollutants on fishery habitats, and thus on the management systems that control them. many of whom were educated in New Zealand, have a greatly diminished respect , The discharge of waste water and sewage, as well as lighting and general noise for the traditional system, the wrath of which they can escape by leaving Tokelau , from tourist resort complexes, for example, may modify the fish migration and again. aggregation patterns, such that the value of fishing rights is greatly diminished. To counteract these tendencies, some islanders believe in a need to restore the In Fiji, since 1974, the loss or damage to fishing rights by tourism development authority of the Council of Elders, either by restricting it to its traditional roles or has been compensated monetarily. There, whenever an application is made for a by having a Tokelauan with a background in fisheries biology act as an adviser to . Foreshore Lease, a Hearing is called at which the developer must explain his plans the Council, as well as by establishing more effective punitive measures for both in the presence of fisheries rights-holders, and the latter give evidence about the traditional and modern offenses. There is a recognized need to integrate more fully anticipated impact of the proposed development on their rights. Evidence is also biological information from stock assessment studies with local knowledge, to presented by fisheries and sometimes other specialists. An independent arbitrator evaluates the evidence and then fixes a level of compensation based on expected caught and the tuna industry have been problematical. The principal problem is that, negative impacts. The developer is required to pay the costs of the Hearing according to a strict interpretation of the Fisheries Act (1948), baitfishing requires (Baines n.d.). Fiji is the only Pacific Island nation where such a system has been permits from customary fishing rights owners, because it is '...fishing by way of established, although in Solomon Islands traditional rights holders must be con- trade or business.' Only a tenuous understanding, based on State ownership of the sulted about projects that may affect their rights. seabed superseding any fishing rights issues, has allowed baitfishing to operate. It Throughout the Asia-Pacific Region, the construction of physical infrastructure would be extremely cumbersome were each bait boat required to conform to the like causeways and seawalls, without culverts for water passage, has disrupted letter of the Fisheries Act and obtain annual permits for numerous baitfish areas. marine ecology by blocking fish migration paths, and so damaging the fishery. This Further, cash demands to demonstrate 'goodwill' (sevusevu) would be substantial, has compounded the issue of traditional rights to foreshore resources other than and valuable time would be lost waiting for approval from each community, since fish. there are 411 registered rights holding groups, a great many of whose areas might In Kiribati, for example, marine sand, mud, coral, and gravel belonged tra- be worked during a season, depending on the migrations of the baitfish or tuna ditionally to the owner of the adjacent land. It was regarded as sinful to abstract schools. It would be impracticable to organize in excess of 100 annual baiting these from a foreshore area that did not belong to the family. This could be done, licences for each vessel. That plus 'goodwill' payments would financially devastate however, if permission was requested, and there was a moral obligation to allow the pole-and-line fishery. reciprocal access to both paternal and maternal relatives. Free access without The main grievance is that of formal permission to use the traditional rights compensation was permitted for community projects. But this changed with the areas. All other commercial fishermen must first obtain a letter of consent from the imposition of British administration, since all such deposits below the high water rights holders, then a permit from the Commissioner, before obtaining a licence mark were then vested in the Crown, and former owners were then obliged to pay from the Fisheries Division. But since baitfish are not sold, there has always been a license fee for abstraction (Teiwaki 1988). a tacit understanding that baitfishing is not a commercial activity, so licences and Resources are still abstracted for infrastructural works, with no compensation formal permits are not needed.19 But this is a mere legal nicety. to traditional owners. This has caused considerable protest in Tarawa. Private, Increasingly, Fijian public opinion (as elsewhere in the South Pacific) perceives non-commercial users may still obtain materials freely, by seeking permission from that baitfishing has a deleterious impact on inshore fisheries. It is now widely the landowners (Teiwaki 1988). thought that reef fish have become scarce as a result, and that practise should be prohibited. But research in Fiji in the early-1980s, supported by that from Kiribati, The Tuna Baitfisheries: The Impact of the Industrial Fisheries Sector18 Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, demonstrates that at present levels In the South Pacific perhaps the single most important and widespread inshore baitfishing is deleterious neither to baitfish stocks nor inshore fisheries (Ruddle fisheries problem involving traditional community-based fisheries management n.d.). On the contrary, the target species are abundant, small, fast-growing, and systems occurs where tenured waters are also used by industrial fisheries to obtain characterized by a high population turnover rate and high natural mortality. Since live bait for the pole-and-line tuna industry. Since tuna is undoubtedly the most baitfishing has been conducted in Fijian waters with no reduction in yields for important renewable natural resource in the region, and an essential source of export almost two decades, it is probable that the stocks could withstand a much higher earnings, this has become a high level policy issue. fishing pressure. Most of the species caught for bait are sought neither by the The issue illustrates admirably the types of modern external pressures that traditional fisheries nor the commercial sector. Further, they are not juveniles of impinge on traditional marine claims, as well as the difficulties that governments commercially important reef-species. They are not reef-associated species, but have in contending with the resultant conflicts. An invariable consequence has been , mostly cardinals, anchovies and related small pelagics, mobile fish that aggregate a negative official attitude toward traditional fisheries management systems. The within the lagoon either for spawning or feeding. Total stocks are therefore much issue also highlights the problems that face national governments in setting de- larger than the schools inside the lagoons. velopment priorities and deciding on the role@)of the fisheries sector within them, The total national bait catch is small, averaging about 70 t/yr, with a maximum and illustrates a principal intra-sectoral problem within Asian-Pacific fisheries, the of 145 t (1981), and the estimated total national commercial and subsistence reef conflict between small-scale, inshore fisheries and industrial fleets. The issue is fish catch of 20,000 t (1990). Trophic analyses suggest that even at a harvest rate examined here with reference to the claims of customary rights holders in Fiji. of 145 t/yr, baitfishing would cause less than 0.2% reduction in the estimated 20,000 Since baitfishing to supply pole-and-line skipjack tuna boats began in Fiji in t reef fish catch. Thus fears that the activity will cause 'breaks in the food-chain' 1975, relationships between customary fishing rights holders in areas where bait is and a consequent decline in commercial and subsistence fisheries are unjustified. The principal national economic and policy consideration is that tuna-canning newly valuable marine products. Essentially, commercialization attaches a new makes a major contribution to the Fijian economy. Pole-and-line fishing supplies value to products that leads to changes in the local perception of their value, as well all of the 3,000-6,000 tlyr of skipjack tuna caught by the 11 vessels operating in as to technological alteration in the mode of their production, and encourages Fijian waters and canned in Fiji. It comprises about 33% of the raw material for the intensified exploitation of stocks. A major factor in this process throughout the F$50 million of canned tuna exported in 1990.20 This technology requires a regular Asia-Pacific Region has been the monetization of local economies, combined with supply of livebait. Skipjack tuna is the most abundant and resilient deep sea resource wage employment in the modern sector that limits the time an individual has in the Fijian EEZ, where it has an estimated MSY of some 15,000 t, and of which available for subsistence fishing. This contributes to the undermining of traditional at present about 5,000 tlyr is taken by pole-and-liners.21 management systems by enabling consumers to purchase fish from a diminishing But the industry is increasingly threatened by international competition and pool of full-time fishermen. Thus local demand represents a structural change in commodity price declines. Overseas markets have been retained because of the local economies that increasingly demands the breaking of traditional rules against acknowledged high quality of Fijian tuna, and, more importantly, because the fishing for sale. product is entirely from pole-and-line caught fish, from which there is no net- In Indonesia this is particularly evident for trochus, spiny lobster and sea damage or crushing as associated with other gear, and because pole-and-lining is cucumber, among other species. Whereas commonly -but not always -this creates 'ecologically benign' in that it is mostly species-specific and kills no marine opportunities for local small-scale fishermen, it often leads to a loss of local mammals.22 control over resources. It further generally leads to overexploitation and re- Were baitfishing either restricted or made uneconomical, it would have serious source depletion, as well as to an erosion of local equity-based systems of resource repercussions for the Fijian economy, since without it there would be no skipjack allocation. tuna industry. Pole-and-lining is absolutely dependent on baitfish, and it has been For example, the principal external pressure on the sasi, a traditional com- acknowledged that there are no economically viable alternative technologies suit- munity-based management system of Maluku Province, Eastern Indonesia, studied able for Fijian waters, in addition to the ecological insensitivity of purse-seining by Zerner (1991b) has been commercialization of resources, particularly of the and gill-netting. Further, of social and domestic political importance is that Fiji is trochus fishery. Until the 1960s sasi systems governed subsistence fin- and shellfish the only Pacific Island nation with an entirely locally-owned tuna fishing and resources. But since then emergence of a new market for trochus has affected the canning industry. Denied access to domestically caught skipjack, the cannery would sasi system through Maluku Province. Pressures have come from both local be forced to rely either entirely on imported tuna or on chartering foreign fishing government officials and independent entrepreneurs, who have sought to obtain vessels to fish in Fijian waters. Roth would increase costs. But more important is fishing rights from local communities and families. In some instances government likely major marketing problems, since now Fijian canned tuna enjoys duty-free officials have enforced statutory law over sasi rights, and have overridden tradition access to the EEC, under the terms of the Lome I11 agreement, because it is supplied by stressing the development needs of the greater society. Elsewhere, local govern- mainly by vessels fishing in ACP state territorial waters.23 Were imported skipjack ment has hired outsiders to harvest the trochus, depriving locals of both income and to be substituted, Fijian exports would be liable for a 20% import duty. At this time, employment (Zerner 1991b). the EEC trade concession (offered by no other market) gives Fiji a competitive edge In the Aru and Kei islands of southeastern Maluku, entrepreneurs have obtained over its main competitors in Thailand and Southeast Asia, despite their lower labor rights within community fishing areas, by advancing loans to individual families, and operating costs. Thus the uncertain status of baitfishing severely dampens who pledge either their rights or the territory itself as collateral. Families paid-off investment in the domestic tuna fleet. Also of major domestic political importance their debts by transferring their rights to the entrepreneurs. In some cases, local is that the industry employs around 1,000 people, all of whom, apart from a few control over resources has thus been lost entirely (Bailey and Zerner 1992a). administrative staff, are indigenous Fijians. Curtailment of this industry would thus Overharvesting and rapid depletion of the trochus resource has been one major be a severe social and economic blow. consequence of the erosion of traditional management. Under sasi management, trochus fisheries were closed for 3-5 years. Now they are harvested annually. As a result, as in the case of Saparua Island, harvests have declined from 3-4 tlyr to Commercialization and Commoditization of Fisheries 0.8 t/yr (Bailey and Zerner 1992a, 1992b).

(. . However, this breakdown can also be attributed in part to the internal loss of A universal pressure on traditional community-based marine resource management moral authority, since in some cases villages themselves, motivated by rapidly rising systems arises from the emergence of local, national and international markets for consumer expectations, have encouraged this commercial exploitation. Eventually the 1(IL whole management system becomes undermined, since it is no longer in any For example, of 109 rules, only five related to the marine environment in the 1870 fisherman's interest to control his levels of harvest. book of regulations for Porto Village (Zerner 1991b). Perversely, the very success of traditional community-based fishery manage- The general rule for the marine environment was that only local villagers had ment systems can also lead to their breakdown. Sri Lanka provides a striking access rights to village waters. There were further rules governing species, gear and example. Historically, coastal fishing communities in Sri Lanka were closed to timing of fishing. But since the 1950s and 1960s an external market in trochus and outsiders, and labor for crews was recruited from within the community. Under such other shellfish has driven changes within the sasi system of marine resource conditions, rates of economic return to capital and labor far exceed their respective management. At that time, scores of cash-poor villages and village governments opportunity costs. This results in high rates of capital formation with the closed seized the opportunity to profit from this new market by re-structuring the sasi community and easy access to bank loans for modernization of gear and boats. If system by issuing new regulations. The most fundamental of these was the issuance effort is not controlled, under such circumstances eventually a labor shortage will by village governments of their regulations to village sea space and their right to a arise. This will force the community to gradually admit increasing numbers of percentage of the income generated from it. Thus the management system was outside labor to crew the enlarged fleet, thus accelerating the opening to outsiders transformed from one of free access to village residents when resources had no of the formerly closed community. As this process gathers momentum, returns to commercial value to one in which the local village government regulated activities capital and labor will eventually equal their opportunity costs. Signs of this were in response to local market demands (Zerner 1991b). Thus external markets shaped beginning to emerge in the early 1980s in the villages of Thoduwawa and Matta- internal property rights. In tandem with this, it was specified that the income kotuwella, on the west coast of Sri Lanka (Fernando et al. 1985). This process was from the resource was to be used for community benefit and not for individual also observed earlier in the beach-seining community of Mawelle (Alexander 1977, profit. 1982). In Nolloth Village, on Sapuara Island, as throughout most of Central Maluku, But the commercialization and commoditization of fisheries can also lead to from 1968 until 1989 the new sasi system was based on the auction of trochus opposite outcomes: it can lead either to the reinforcement accompanied by adap- harvest rights to external trading companies. Since January 1, 1990 the village tation of existing systems. It can lead also to the emplacement of a system where government has tightened its grip of the trochus resources by issuing written one has not existed. regulations that severely limited the traditional rights of villagers to marine re- Thus in the Cook Islands only the commercial pearl-shell fishery was valued sources, and aimed solely at the protection and monitoring of trochus and several highly enough to maintain support for the traditional system. There, commercial other resident benthos (Zerner 1991b). In this process the precedent that the Dutch incentive with the development of the pearl-shell fisheries provided the rationale had used to channel the supply of agricultural and other terrestrial produce to the to retain traditional management systems on Penrhyn and Manihiki islands, where market in a steady and reliable stream was simply transposed to the marine realm this industry became established. These developments had led to adaptive changes when resources became commercially valuable. This is the main resource from of traditional systems, as the perceived value of access to areas of lagoon was which local governments derive their income. retained or enhanced by the establishment of commercial fisheries (Sims 1990). Some lagoon fisheries for prawn and mullet in Tamil Nadu State of southern The colonial authorities attempts in the 1920s to eradicate the traditional India are regulated by community-based traditional management systems known as management systems under the Cook Islands Act were resisted by the residents of padu (lit. 'fishing site') (Mathew 1991). This is a village organization based on Manihiki. And the Penrhyn islanders retained their traditional control over pearl- caste and gender. Entrance is limited to male villagers of the periya pattanavar shell grounds well after the Act was passed (Sims 1990). Nowadays the pearl-shell caste, if the Village Council confers eligibility on him. Eligibility depends on a fisheries on both islands are managed under an open access system, although candidate's skill level and acceptability to the village. The padu is a traditional families still know 'their' areas of lagoon, and recent developments have been made system of rotating access to a fishery whereby eligible fishing groups take their turn with reference to these claims (Sims 1990). at specified fishing activities on an allotted fishing ground. In India this system is In the Maluku Islands of Eastern Indonesia commercialization of fish resources used by the marine beach seine fishermen of Tamil Nadu and the lagoon fishermen led to the application of a management system hitherto used for terrestrial resources of Pulicat Lake. Although this is claimed as an ancient management system in to marine resources. This sasi system, in one form or another, is known from Dutch Pulicat Lake, rights have been strongly asserted only since the early-1970s, with colonial records to have been in existence since the 1830s. But there have occurred the development of an export market for prawns. significant changes over time. Prior to the late-1960s sasi was hardly applied to the In Pulicat Lake the padu system is applied to just three small fishing grounds, marine environment, but rather the commercial regulation of terrestrial products. with a total area of 4.2 km2, near the mouth of the lagoon bar. These three units are (ii) Since they are not encompassed by traditional gear categories, which are Three groups of participants, with widely differing values and perceptions, are controlled by specific traditional rules, modern gear types are effectively exempt usually involved in fisheries development and management: (1) international as- from traditional controls, and there is generally a time-lag before rules are either sistance agencies, the programs of which have often emphasized capital-intensive, adapted or made to include new types; production-oriented technological solutions to national and local problems; (2) (iii) Whereas some new gear, like gillnets or spears, may fall partly within a national policy-makers and planners, who are frequently Western-trained and who traditional category, and so be subject to some control, the degree of that thus share these same 'technology fix' values, reinforced by national economic traditional control is no longer appropriate to the catching efficiency of the new imperatives to boost export earnings and encumbered by the need to cater to wealthy gear; and local vested interests; and (3) members of local fishing communities, the 'target (iv) Traditional techniques for monitoring compliance with rights and rules have populations,' who, for the most part, neither trust the members of the first two been rendered obsolete by new vessels and gear types: Poachers can now flee using groups nor share many of their values. Thus, small-scale fisheries development has powerful motorized boats, flashlight spearfishing at night is an unobtrusive been characteristically a top-down process characterized by attempts to impose technique that can be practised surreptitiously, and modern gillnets can be left un- external values on fishing communities (Bailey et al. 1986). attended and require fewer handlers than the older types. Development planners often fail to recognize that small-scale fisheries con- In the Cook Islands, prior to Western contact, fishing gear was handmade from stitute complex cultural systems that have evolved from a long-standing and locally available materials, a factor which determined both fishing techniques used complex interplay of local resources, physical environments, social organization, and fishing pressure exerted. But the introduction of Western gear increased fishing value system, and information (Alexander 1975; Cycon 1986; Firth 1966; Panayotou power and catches, and permitted adoption of new techniques. The main subsistence 1982, among others). Thus individual fishery systems are complex adaptive strat- fishing techniques used nowadays are all based on introductions. This led to egies based on a depth of traditional social behavior and knowledge concerning increased exploitation of pelagic stocks, thereby diminishing the perceived value local natural resources. Clearly, then, small-scale fisheries development projects by of lagoon and reef resources, and further eroding the rationale for the traditional no means begin with either a clean slate, although even a cursory examination of management systems, already undermined by cultural and demographic disruptions the plans for most development projects reveals that planners obviously believe that (Sims 1990) (vide supra). they do (Emmerson 1975,1980). Commercialization of a resource also leads to technological change that, in turn, The new technologies and management systems promoted by persons working has an impact of traditional systems. Whereas formerly the isolation of Tokelau in fisheries development and management are also usually freighted with alien caused marine resources to be used exclusively to satisfy local needs, improvement values, especially those concerning preferred social organization, distribution of in transportation links with Western Samoa has made possible overseas marketing. benefits, and division of labor. As a consequence, when a new technology is The export demand for giant clam (Tridacna sp.), in particular, has led to overhar- introduced, economic concerns tend to displace, probably inevitably, other social vesting and a marked decline in the resource, which was exacerbated by the values among fishermen, as they now require more cash than hitherto to repay credit introduction of diving goggles, gill nets and spearguns, which increased harvesting for such expensive items as nylon nets, engines, fuel, and, perhaps, new boats. All efficiency and so added pressure to the resource (Toloa et al. 1991). innovation is, of course, not inherently bad, since existing fishery systems represent the temporary end result of this on-going process. Problems arise when innovation is attempted without reference to existing systems operated by target populations. Development and Management Projects The types of negative impacts that are likely to arise from such a process have been documented around the world. Traditional management systems and associ- The efforts of international assistance agencies to promote fisheries development ated regulations are commonly disrupted by the introduction of expensive gear are commonly misdirected, despite laudable intellectual efforts, considerable staff types, such as nylon nets, that are beyond the financial capacity of small-scale commitment, and tremendous financial expenditures. For example, efforts to assist fishermen, who then often become low paid laborers for businessmen who can small-scale fishermen are not infrequently based on capital-intensive approaches, afford the new gear. Because of their inability to save from their low salaries to such as purse seining, , and the like, which distort local economies, since purchase nets, the small-scale fishermen often eventually lose their resource rights. often only the wealthy few benefit. They often therefore have a negative impact on Ill-planned development of fisheries has ripple effects that extend beyond the the livelihood and welfare of most fishing families and members of fishing com- immediate fishing community. In Java, Indonesia, for instance, to meet their munities. increased financial commitments to pay for new gear and boats, fishermen needed increased cash incomes, which in turn changed traditional values regarding the Essentially there are three basic alternative policy approaches regarding com- distribution of fish catches. Formerly, the poor had been allowed access to a minor munity-based fisheries management, particularly with respect to its relationship to fraction of the catch by doing odd-jobs or by petty pilfering, and fish were marketed on the development of fisheries and other economic sectors. through local small traders, who served neighboring communities. But the need to (1) The ad hoc approach: Essentially this implies that no clearcut policy is maximize earnings led to a shift to large merchants who supplied urban centers, to established and legislated for, and that each problem is resolved as it arises, based the disallowing of pilfering, and to the ending of odd-jobs. The result was that on its merits in terms of the relative costs and benefits to nation, region and local essential sources of protein and employment were lost in the villages, and villagers community. This has the advantage of political acceptability, since no changes are in surrounding areas lost their fish supply (Collier et al. 1979). This is also required, and traditional sentiments and rights are reinforced. The disadvantages demonstrated at the regional and national levels for Thailand (Panayotou 1980) and are that traditional rights holders incur no obligations, such that development of elsewhere (Smith 1981b; Panayotou 1982), where it is considered that solutions to other sectors will be difficult at best and impossible at worst. Further, because this the socio-economic problems of the small-scale fisheries sector lie in the larger process is ad hoc, solutions to problems will be piecemeal, and no guidelines would economy, and that these fisheries constitute a major survival means for the emerge for the legal interpretation of traditional fishing rights and their articulation multitudes of otherwise unemployed. with national development priorities. It is therefore at best astopgap approach, since In the Asia-Pacific Region, the bulk of international funding has been used to it is obviously unsatisfactory in the long term; expand and improve the commercial fishing sector, whereas relatively little had (2) Legislation to dilute traditional systems: This approach requires legislative been earmarked for small-scale fisheries. This has often led to the impoverishment action to curtail and strictly define the powers of traditional rights holders and to of small-scale fishing communities, especially when the commercial fleets intrude modify traditional management systems to enable the use of certain traditional illegally into inshore waters, with resultant and not uncommonly severe conflict, fisheries rights areas for other economic activities, including commercial fisheries. particularly with commercial trawling (such as that which resulted in the 'trawler Under certain conditions, systems would be abolished entirely. ban' in Indonesia) (Bailey 1984, 1986; Bailey et al. 1987). The advantages of this approach are that it allows both commercial fisheries and Since fisheries development and management programs for the Third World are other economic sectors to develop rapidly, clarifies the issues, and defines the dominated by Western economists and biologists, and their locally-based, Western- - modern rights of traditional rights holders. The disadvantages are that the approach trained former students, it is not surprising that programs are permeated by inap- is often politically difficult and numerous implementation problems would arise. propriate notions (Ruddle n.d; Ruddle et al. 1992). This approach is well-illustrated In many cases, the losses of rent, administrative costs and problems and possible by most programs of international assistance agencies (FA0 1979; Lucas and Loftus social unrest would outweigh the economic and other benefits derived. Further, once 1982; Cycon 1986), the main aims of which have been the economically efficient systems were either abolished or severely eroded, they would be difficult if not exploitation of fishery stocks, based on an expansion of effort through capital impossible to re-introduce at some later data, should the need arise; and investment, higher technology in capture and marketing, improved Western-style (3) Legislation to reinforce but specify the scope andpower oftraditional rights: management, and the organization of marketing. The advantages of this are a recognition of historical and present situations and, possibly, the promotion of resource conservation. That this approach would make conventional development difficult may often not be bad, although many would Concluding Remarks regard it as a disadvantage. But the reduction of the powers of the Central Govern- ment while placing responsibility on the rights holders would likely be construed Despite the enormous pressures now being exerted on traditional community-based as a disadvantage by vested interests. However, this could be overcome by reinforc- marine resource management systems through the Asia-pacific region, some sys- ing the scope of traditional systems within a concurrently legislated framework of tems will have a future usefulness, both nationally and locally. But equally there co-management. will be valid grounds for either diluting, modifying or abolishing outright other. Selecting an alternative is not easy; there are no quick and simple solutions to Deciding which alternative course to follow will certainly depend on national the problem. The question of traditional fishing rights is one of the most interesting priorities. But it should also be based on national fisheries management capacities. and vexing practical, political and philosophical problems confronting fisheries In virtually all cases, however, the future of community-based marine resources management in the Asia-Pacific Region. If the present situation is maintained and management lies in a form of co-management with some higher level of govern- rights reinforced, fisheries development will have to take place within the context ment. of exclusive properties, which is the historical pattern of the Pacific. In each nation a full debate on the issue is required at village, provincial and national levels, and 14. Colonial Secretary's Office 130411893. national governments should thoroughly appraise the provincial governments and 15. The Constitution of Papua New Guinea defines custom as: '[Tlhe customs and usages of the villages of their rights. Before any action is taken, however, it is imperative that indigenous inhabitants of the country existing in relation to the matter in question at the time when and the nature of existing fishing rights systems be documented nationwide, particularly the place in relation to which the matter arises, regardless of whether or not the custom or usage has those that have been or are being exercised. existed from time immemorial.' Thus, the future of traditional community-based marine resource management 16. The exchange of fish for yams and other garden produce between the inland and coastal villages systems over much of the Asia-Pacific region, is uncertain. It rests on the estab- of the Trobriand islands was a legally enforceable reciprocal relationship which Malinowski (1935) used lishment of a consensus regarding national development goals, priorities and to demonstrate the validity of customary laws in Trobriand society. processes. 17. This is in striking contrast to the Basic Agrarian Law, which does recognize and uphold , community-based rights and customary law for agriculturalists.

Notes 18. I am indebted to Dr. T. Adams, formerly Acting Director of Fisheries, Government of Fiji, for a discussion of the baitfishing issue in that country, on which this section is largely based.

1. It is important to note in this context that what is often labelled 'traditional' may not be especially 19. Early in the development of the industry, the Government ruled under Section 5(3)(b) of the old-established. Following Neitschmann (1989), I use the term 'traditional' in a self-referentially Fislieries Act that baitfishing did not require a licence. identifying sense, and not to connote something necessarily deeply embedded in any local history. 'Tradition' or 'custom,' then, is a practise rather than a principle (Crocombe 1989). 20. The balance was from imports of skipjack from Solomon Islands and albacore tuna caught in Fijian waters by chartered Taiwanese vessels. 2. For a case study of such a synergy of external pressures on traditional management systems in the Cook Islands, see Sims (1990). 21. Effort is limited by the economics of the pole-and-line fishery, and by the need for vessels to return each evening for livebait. 3. They were, however, re-introduced during the Marcos era. 22. This latter point has become extremely important in world markets. 4. The 'municipal fisheries' of the Philippines are approximately equivalent to the artisanal, - small-scale or traditional fisheries of other tropical countries. In the Philippines all other fisheries are 23. Tuna imported by Fiji for canning from Solomon Islands or Papua New Guinea would probably termed 'commercial fisheries.' be subject to an EEC import duty of 20%, because it was caught by foreign vessels outside the territorial waters of those countries. 5. Milkfish (CIianos cliarios) fry concessions are an especially impoaant source of municipal funds. In a survey of 35 fry grounds, miW1sh concession fees represented an average of 13% of municipal income (Smith 1981a), and in the Western Visayan Province of Antique 21% of the income of the 15 municipalities is derived from such concessions. Several municipalities obtained almost half their income References Cited in this way. In small coastal municipalities this income is used to pay the salaries of municipal officials and the allowances of the Municipal Council (Smith and Panayotou 1987). Adams, T. 1993 Forthcoming Changes in the Legal Status of Traditional Fishing Rights in Fiji. Soutli Pacific 6. Despatch No. 1,4March 1875. Cottimissiotr, Traditiotial Marine Resoirrce Matiagerne~ita~id Knowledge, Itlfortnatioti B~~lletin 2:21-22. 7. Despatch No. 69.2 June 1881. Akimichi, T. and K. Ruddle 8. Despatch No. 71,2 June 1881 1984 The Historical Development of Territorial Rights and Fishery Regulations in Okinawan Inshore Waters. In: K. Ruddle and T. Akimichi (Eds.), Maritime It~stitittio~uin tlte Western Pacific. S~M 9. A niataqali is 'an agnatically related social unit - usually a lineage of the larger clan' (yavusa) Ethnological Studies, 17. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology. Pp. 37-88. (Ravuvu 1983: 119). Alexander, P. 10. Proceedings of the Council of Chiefs held at Nailaga, Ba, November 1881, p. 32. 1975 Innovation in a Cultural Vacuum. Hi~ttlaf~Orga~rizaiiort 34(2): 333-344. 1977 Sea Tenure in Southern Sri Lanka. Etltriology 16:23 1-5 1. 11. Despatch No. 24, 17 February 1886. 1982 Sri Lankan Fislterrtren: Rlcral Capitalisrt~arid Peasaf~tSociefy. Canberra: Australian National 12. Despatch No. 87,13 June 1887. University Press.

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Two Aspects of Changing Local Marine Resource Management Institutions in a The literature on marine property regimes in Indonesia has identified traditional Javanese Fishery1 common property systems and tenurial arrangements for fisheries and marine resources in parts of Eastern Indonesia (Bailey and Zerner 1992; Polunin 1983 and 1984; Zerner 1989) and Sumatra (Polunin 1983 and 1984) but no clear cases of Anita Kendrick traditional territorial claims to specific fishing grounds or local systems for manag- Cornell University ing resource use based on adat, or customary law, have been documented for Java. Instead, the apparent absence of such institutions in Java has been explicitly noted by several scholars (Bailey and Zerner 1992; Polunin 1983 and 1984; Sya'rani and ABSTRACTTraditional, local sea tenure arrangements or local systems for managing Willoughby 1983).2 marine resource use have not been widely documented for Java, and the apparent While open access is the underlying principle in Javanese coastal fisheries, this absence of such institutions has often been explicitly noted. This paper attempts to does not mean access to fisheries resources is unlimited. Government regulations explain this apparent lack of strong local resource management institutions for exist which limit access through licensing, taxation, and restrictions on certain gear, fisheries in Java by drawing on the study of one rapidly developing fishing community such as the 1981 ban on trawlers and specific provincial level restrictions on certain on Java's south coast. The increasing presence of central government authority, coupled with a Javanese cultural tradition that does not include a strong tradition of other gears (Bailey 1988 and 1992; Bailey, Dwiponggo and Marahudin 1987). sea fishing, may have contributed to the erosion of existing local institutions for Furthermore, local institutions and rules of resource access have developed, some- managing access to fishery resources and prevented the development of strong, new times informally and sometimes through more formal structures, to limit resource local management institutions as an outcome of fisheries conflicts. It is argued that access to fisheries in Java and other parts of Indonesia. Such institutions can be perhaps because of local people's inability to restrict access to fishery resources, new, elusive to the observer: dynamic and embedded in cultural norms, they are usually informal local institutions, based on Javanese cultural traditions, have evolved for location-specific and have evolved in response to particular sets of historical redistributing the fish catch once it reaches shore. circumstances and conflicts that have arisen as a result of changes in the techno- logical and social aspects of fishing production. Community-based fishery resource management institutions may involve rules and norms relating to distribution of the Introduction catch on land as well as access to fish at sea, an aspect which is often overlooked by those focusing on management of the resource rather than social aspects of The concept of 'open access,' much maligned in recent social science literature on resource access. common property resources as contributing to the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin This paper draws on a case study of one rapidly-developing fishing community 1968), is the de facto principle of access to coastal and marine resources in most of in an attempt to explain this apparent lack of strong local resource management Java, as it is throughout Indonesia (Bailey and Zerner 1992). Indonesia's extensive institutions for fisheries in Java. It presents an argument that the increasing presence territorial waters are a common property resource legally considered state property of central government authority, coupled with a Javanese cultural tradition that does and under the management authority of the Indonesian state. The Indonesian not include a strong tradition of sea f!shing, may have contributed to the erosion of government gives no legal recognition to traditional community-based fisheries whatever existing local institutions for managing acce$,to fishery resources there management systems (Ruddle, in press). The principle of open-access in marine had been, as well as preventing the development, of lstrong local management resource use is of course limited by the Indonesian government through laws and institutions as an outcome of fisheries conflicts. Further, the paper argues that regulations governing who may use the resources and how they may be used, but perhaps because of local people's inability to restrict access to the bay's fishery consistent enforcement by a centralized management authority has proven virtually resources, new, informal local institutions, based on Javanese cultural traditions, impossible. This situation results in a common property resource management have evolved for redistributing the fish catch once it reaches shore. The paper begins regime which can be described as combining features of both open-access and state with a description of the community under study and the historical context in which control (Berkes et al. 1989). fisheries development took place, then proceeds to the history of conflicts over new In the literature on fishery resource management, traditional systems of common technologies and resource access and the institutional responses to those conflicts. property management are often equated with sea tenure arrangements, or exclu- The next section of the paper examines local institutions that concern the distri- bution of the fish catch after it reaches shore as an illustration of alternative government), there is a strong perception that those people living around the bay institutions which may affect resource access but are often overlooked. The paper have a preferential right to the resources. There is also a perceived obligation to concludes with some comments about the nature of local resource management share the sea's bounty. This also has to do with the 'luck' aspect of getting a good institutions. catch, and the social obligation to share good fortune when it befalls one. Similarly, anyone who uses 'unfair' advantage to reap the benefits of the sea is acting in a socially inappropriate way. Fisheries Development and the Emergence of Local Resource Management Many of the more explicit 'rules' regarding fishery access in Prigi grew out of Institutions specific conflicts over a particular technology. Each new technology introduced was considered 'unfair' initially. These conflicts were often inter-ethnic in nature,

Bailey and Zerner (1992) have identified relatively low population density, homo- because most of the innovators were non-Javanese, and within the last 20 years at , geneous communities and the use of relatively simple extractive technologies as least, have been mediated within the national legal-political framework which factors which appear to contribute to the efficacy of community fishery resource supported open access to the bay's resources. The more informal norms and management systems in Indonesia. Polunin (1984) has argued that sea tenure traditions surrounding fishing and allocation of the catch seem to have arisen more arrangements are not likely to have developed in areas where people, as a culture, jfrom Javanese and local cultural traditions. These informal institutions are very appear to be averse to the sea and marine exploitation is not highly developed. It powerful because of the dominance of local Javanese in the purse seine and beach would appear that sea tenure systems and strong community management insti- seine labor force (see photo 1). tutions for coastal fisheries are likely to have developed in areas with long traditions These norms and institutions are dynamic and adaptive, constantly evolving in of marine exploitation in a relatively isolated, and therefore homogeneous, setting. response to changing external pressures, such as changes in the market and intro- The Maluku and Makassar cultures, for example, where community fishery re- duction of new technologies, increasing population, and increasing government source managements institutions have been identified by Zerner (Bailey and Zerner presence and intervention in fishing activities. They have developed in response to 1992; Zerner 1989) and others, have a long tradition of fishing, in contrast to the Javanese, Balinese, or many of the cultures of the Lesser Sundas, where such institutions have not been observed. In Prigi Bay, East Java, marine exploitation is relatively recent, with all gear other than simple handmade hooks and lines having been introduced since the 1920s. By the time competition and conflict in fishing developed and intensified, Prigi was sufficiently incorporated into the national legal and administrative struc- ture (first colonial and later the independent Indonesian state) that conflicts tended to be mediated by the police or military or district and regency political leaders within the context of the national legal and security structure. This structure does not recognize exclusive territorial claims to the sea, and thus these conflicts did not result in the development of systems of sea tenure. In a more isolated time or place, such conflicts would have been mediated by traditional local leaders who may have been more inclined toward establishing or supporting exclusive territorial claims. It may be that because Java was much longer and more thoroughly under the Dutch legal system than some other parts of Indonesia that such sea tenure systems had less chance to develop or were suppressed so early on that nothing of them remains. Absence of sea tenure systems does not mean that there are no institutions for regulating resource use and access. Two concepts appear to be key in the formu- lation of these institutions in Prigi: (1) 'local' people have priority claims to use the bay's resources, and (2) the concept of equity or fairness. While there seems to be an explicit rejection of the idea that anyone can 'own' the sea (including the Photo 1. Beach seine pullers (predori~ir~ar~tlyworrlen) pulling in the beaclt sei~tenets. specific historical circumstances, but are firmly embedded in the cultural norms that govern social and economic relations in the wider community. Prigi: A Fishing Port on the South Coast of Java Prigi is a small fishing port located on a small protected bay from which it derives its name on the south coast of East Java (seeMap 1). While fishing has been reported there since colonial times (Kolff 1936), with the exception of dried sharks'tfins the catch was primarily for the local market until the introduction of purse seines in the 1970s. This was partly due to i~olation.~ The whole south coast of East Java is separated from the central agricultural valleys by a limestone mountain range that kept the sparse south coast settlements relatively isolated from the rest of Java until fairly recently. The settlements on the south coast of Java represented the end of the road: beyond Prigi there is only the vast and inhospitable Indian Ocean. As a result, Prigi was formerly a sparsely-set- tled isolated 'frontier' area, open both to migration and resource exploitation. The Javanese are basically agricultural people, not oriented to the sea (Polunin 1983; Sya'rani and Willoughby 1983). This is especially true on the south coast with its rough seas, rocky shores, and heavy mythological associations with Nyai Loro Kidul, the Javanese Goddess of the South Seas. Innovators in fishing devel- opment throughout Java have been primarily ethnically non-Javanese: people of Madurese, Buginese, and Chinese descent.

Photo 2. An irrdeperrdertt hook-arrd-linefistrenlratlretrtrrrittg to shore in his stnall dug-o~tcarroe. Local mythology holds that Prigi was settled by a prince of the court of Solo, from large cities and towns around Java, running their operations through a local and an annual ritual offering to the sea commemorates the peace he made with Nyai agent, with relatively little community conta~t.~These most recent newcomers, Loro Kidul. Irrigated agriculture was established in the narrow valley near the sea, symbols of 'development' and incorporation of this formerly quiet village into the drawing water from the streams cascading down from the nearby hills, and subsist- international economy, have meant increased social differentiation and marginaliz- ence fishing using hooks and lines from small dugout canoes probably dates back , ation of the earlier residents of both Javanese and non-Javanese ancestry: as well to the earliest inhabitants of the area (see photo 2). It is clear, however, that the early as increased dominance of the national legal-political government structure. local elites were landowners, supposedly descendants of the court of Solo, who ' controlled the irrigated rice lands in the valley, rather than fishers of the sea. Fisheries Development and Technological Change The most significant events in the development of fishing in Prigi within memory Iinmigration and Ethnic Diversity were the introduction of beach seines in the 1920s and the introduction of purse Innovations in fishing technology were introduced to Prigi beginning in the 1920s seines in the 1970s. Both revolutionized fisheries production and had far-reaching by immigrants of non-Javanese background: they included people of Japanese, impact on other aspects of the local economy as well. Chinese, Dutch, Madurese, and Buginese de~cent.~These people, using their skills Beach seines increased production dramatically, creating a surplus that was and knowledge, in combination with varying amounts of capital, introduced fishing sometimes destroyed for lack of a market. Competition for beach seine labor innovations that transformed the local agricultural economy. Early migrants from resulted in the introduction of a cash economy and paid wage labor into the area, these groups were attracted primarily by open access to the untapped marine and gradually propelled Prigi into the international economy as cash became resources on the south coast of Java. This immigration occurred primarily from the available to local households for the first time. 1920s through the 1970s, although it continues today as fishers from the east and The purse seine's introduction in the 1970s created a similar transformation of north coasts of East Java migrate both seasonally and permanently to Prigi to seek the local economy. The purse seine brought production of an unprecedented scale, a living from the sea. which resulted in an initial sharp fall in the price of fish, with an impact on fishers Ethnically Javanese people have also migrated into the Prigi Bay area from the using other technologies. As the number of purse seiners increased they created nearby hills and agricultural lowlands. They were motivated by different factors: much more demand for labor than any previously introduced technology other than access to agricultural land and employment in the forests, and to flee poverty, the beach seine. Competition for labor, especially skilled and knowledgeable adverse environmental conditions, and political instability. Once in the coastal area, captains and crew members, resulted in a labor shortage for the beach seines, with many of these people began fishing, in combination with agriculture and work in the result that women and old men and people from nearby inland villages began the forests, as part of their household's multiple livelihood activities. Over time, as to work on the beach seine crews for the first time. The introduction of purse seines access to forests and private land for agriculture became more restricted, these also fueled the creation of secondary industries, particularly . Prior people and their descendants turned increasingly to the sea as the primary basis for to purse seine introduction, very little fish was processed other than for home their livelihood, as either independent hook and line or small net fishers, or as crew consumption. members for the mostly non-Javanese boat owners. The process of becoming fishers Since their introduction, purse seine operations in Prigi have become increas- occurred across, and sometimes within generations. This Javanese in-migration took ingly more capital intensive. As catches have declined, boats have become bigger, place between the 1940s and the present, with the greatest concentration during the ' and larger and more expensive nets have been purchased. Most costly of all has politically tumultuous times of the mid- to late 1960s and into the early 1970s. been the transition from small outboard motors (nzesin teinpel) to inboard engines. Since 1980 a new type of immigration has taken place, as government invest- These were initially made from modified truck engines, but increasingly specially- ment in fisheries infrastructure and other development programs has extended the , designed marine engines are used by those able to afford this technology. In order state apparatus into the area, bringing with it a cadre of mostly low- and middle- to compete for the best crew members and to guarantee an adequate catch, boat level government workers. Agovernment fish auction site (Temnpat Pelelangan Ikan, owners must continually upgrade their gear, requiring more and more capital input or TPI) and other fisheries-related projects and infrastructure were established, and to maintain a comparative ad~antage.~ , along with this development came public health officers, more school teachers, a Increasing capitalization has resulted in the increasing marginalization, through rural bank, and other government employees. With the fisheries port and auction competition and probable resource depletion, of small scale, less capital-intensive site have come commercial fish traders and outside investors in the , fishing activities such as small gill nets, hook and lines, and stationary lift nets and more recently, investors in tourism. These outside investors typically come (), but even including the beach seines and original, smaller versions of the purse seine. The degree of attention paid to the various fishing activities by the TPI tensions further fueled the disputes, which at points became violent and required and Fisheries Service officials in terms of production data and tax collection police intervention. In the end, the bagart were incorporated into the local fishery. provides some evidence of this. Purse seines account for such a large percentage of Today bagan are still owned primarily by people of Buginese descent, although the total local catch that there is little effort devoted to monitoring and collecting they employ crews of mostly Javanese background." tax on other, less productive gear types. These early conflicts over the entry of new gear were primarily mediated by the local desa (village-level administrative unit) officials. These officials were ap- History of Conflict and Institutional Responses pointed, often for life, and were inhabitants of the community. They received In the 1920s a Japanese resident of Java introduced the first beach seine to Prigi. payment in the form of rice land for their own cultivation, and thus formed part of Within a few years a Dutch colonial official and a Chinese-Indonesian immigrant the old agriculture-based village elite, and as such commanded much respect in the from Surabaya were also operating beach seines in the area. These early seines were village. In the mid to late 1970s a series of violent protests by small scale fishers woven from locally-available tree fibem8 Labor for pulling in the seines was over the use of trawlers occurred in several fishing ports around Java (Bailey 1988 recruited from among the strong young males of the local agricultural population. and 1992; Collier et al.; 1979; Emmerson 1982).12Trawlers had never operated out Early catches in these nets were large because the bay's resources were as yet of Prigi Bay to any significant extent primarily because the rock and coral on the bay's relatively untapped.9 floor and the narrow continental shelf make trawling unfeasible. Word of the protests Within a few years many local people, including the locally-powerful land- over trawling had spread to Prigi, and it was in this context that the first small purse owners, had also invested in the beach seines. As more and more nets were acquired seiner was introduced into Prigi Bay in 1973, by a fisher of Buginese ancestry. by local people, conflicts developed over access to the limited areas of beach The purse seiner immediately aroused a protest from the beach seiners and other suitable for placing and pulling the nets. These conflicts were resolved through the fishers threatened by the competition from this new technology. In the context of institution of a rotation system worked out by the beach,seine owners themselves. heightened political tension over the trawlers in other parts of Java, the language This rotation system still operates with no involvement of,local Fisheries Service of this protest reflected the 'traditional versus modern' distinction associated with or other government officials. 1 ' the trawler protest.13 The conflict turned violent at times. The beach seines exercised relative dominance in -'the local fishery into the By the time of the introduction of the first purse seiner, however, there ?,.as a 1970s. The introduction of all subsequent gear types threatened their position and Provincial Fisheries Service (Dinas Perikanan) field agent assigned to Prigi. As a was met with strong, and sometimes violent, opposition.'0 Out of these conflicts, representative of national government policy on fisheries, he worked with the local local institutions developed for managing access to the resources of Prigi Bay which police chief to defuse the conflict, assuring the beach seiners that this new gear was are still strongly adhered to, and enforced, by local fishers. legal, that the government was encouraging 'modernization' in fishing, and that In the 1950s people of Madurese descent migrated to the area and introduced they would have to accept the purse seines' presence in the bay. The same local thepayang, a simple seine operated from a wood-hulled boat called aperahu. There guidelines concerning non-interference with the beach seines were applied to the was initial conflict with the beach seine owners over right of access to fishing within purse seines as had been established for the payang earlier. the bay, but once certain guidelines were established by the community regarding With the introduction of the purse seine, the local fishing economy boomed. where theperahu could operate their nets so as not to interfere with the beach seines, Gradually opposition to the purse seines by the beach seine owners abated as more the two gear types were able to co-exist in the bay fishery for a few decades. The and more of them, and other local people, invested in purse seines themselves. Bank payang fleet in the bay increased but never involved more than about twenty boats, credit was available, and by 1978 the size of the purse seine fleet operating out of primarily operated by Madurese immigrants. Prigi Bay peaked at 67 units. Opposition from the payang, hook and line, and other Around 1970 a group of Buginese men came to Prigi with the intent of fishing, fishers was defused as they themselves were hired to work on the purse seines as bringing with- them very little other than their fishing skills and knowledge of the captains and crew. sea. They bought bamboo from local farmers and used it to build bagan, floating These early purse seiners were small and relatively low-cost compared to the lift net fishing platforms. The bagan were anchored near shore, in the same areas purse seiners in use in 1990. They used smaller boats, but most importantly, the where the beach seines traditionally operated. Serious conflicts developed over the original purse seiners used small (25 H.P.) outboard engines known locally as bagan, regarding not only their placement but also the contention of the beach seine . As competition in the bay increased, these motors were inadequate for going owners that the bagan, which used lights at night to attract schools of fish, were farther and staying longer out at sea, increasingly necessary in order to get an attracting the fish away from the beach seines, reducing their catch. Inter-ethnic adequate catch. Gradually, the smaller boats with outboard motors were completely replaced by larger units using inboard engines made from modified truck engines. of rights to the bay's resources is a fundamental part of the conflicts that have The number of purse seine units operating out of Prigi Bay declined as many of the erupted over fishing technologies. Boundaries are an implicit part of the rules and early investors could not afford to maintain and upgrade their old equipment as expectations which govern fishery access in the bay. necessary to remain competitive. By 1980 the number of purse seining units These later conflicts, since the 1970s, differ from the earlier conflicts over the operating in the bay had declined to only 43. introduction of new gear in that rather than being resolved by the fishers themselves, In the early 1980s people from outside the bay area began to invest in fishing or local desa-level officials, through new rules and arrangements for resource in Prigi. Most of these outside investors were from the big towns and small cities access, these conflicts were mediated by representatives of national, provincial, and of East Java, but a few came from further away. These people could afford to invest district levels of government: Fisheries Service officers, police, and even the in the best, most up to date purse seine technologies, including specially-designed military. Since the 1970s village (desa) officials have not been involved in the marine engines, further increasing competition and costs for the local purse seine resolution of fisheries conflicts in Prigi, other than as an organ for disseminating operators. Purse seine numbers gradually increased again, reaching 58 units by 1990. information and decisions. This reflects their declining power in the highly cen- Conflicts over access to the fishery have continued in Prigi even after the purse tralized government of New Order Indonesia. seines became the dominant gear in the bay. In 1988, and again in 1990, large The Directorate General of Fisheries (Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan), and its numbers of ethnically Madurese payang fishers from the north coast of Java provincial counterpart, the Provincial Fisheries Service (Dinas Perikanan), have migrated to Prigi during the peak fishing season, bringing their boats and gear actively encouraged modernization and capitalization in the fishing industry, with overland by truck. This type of seasonal migration islallowed by the Indonesian the goal of increased production. At the same time, the Indonesian state under the government as long as permission and forms are obtained from the home district's Suharto government has placed a high priority on maintaining stability, especially Department of Fisheries officials as well as thode at the destination. On both in heavily-populated Java. This concern for stability has in a few instances caused occasions the presence of these fishers created immediate unrest in Prigi. The the Indonesian government to disregard its technology and capital-bias and take the primary complaint was that the payang fishers did not 'conform to the local rules' side of the small scale fishers using more 'traditional' technology, as in the famous regarding interference with the operation of beach seines and bagan. It was alleged case of the trawl ban (Bailey 1988 and 1992). This'case of supporting small scale that the payang fishers would drop their nets too near the bagan or purse seines in fishers over the interests of a more capital-intensive fishing industry has been the operation, and would even drop their nets within the area where a beach seine had exception, rather than the rule, however. Fisher protests in Prigi and surrounding been cast and was being pulled to shore. However, much of the conflict apparently communities have for the most part not been resolved in favor of the small scale, also had to do with inter-ethnic tensions and activities on shore. low-technology fishers. The violent incidents in Muncar, Cilacap, and other fishing On both occasions the presence of the migrant payang fishers caused the local ports in Java in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s, have made government fishers to protest to the Fisheries Service officials in the area, and the local police. authorities wary of these large, volatile fishing communities, as the fishers in these Meetings were held to discuss the 'local rules' (sometimes referred to as adat14 by places are aware. They also know the power and willingness of the Indonesian the local people) which the payang fishers were expected to follow. The conflicts government to put down protests, however, so that show of strength on the part of continued, however, and on the first occasion thepayang fishers were asked to leave fishers in opposition to government policy or government-supported technologies the area by the local police chief. In 1990, however, the right of those with proper is a dangerous and delicate balancing act. permits to remain in the bay was upheld by the regency level authorities. The new investors in fishing in Prigi, affluent entrepreneurs from the cities of Only one major fishing technology that has been introduced into the Prigi East Java, have a much greater ability to influence fisheries policy and enforcement fishery has not generated significant opposition. This is the gill net, used in at the district, provincial and national level than do the small scale fishers of Prigi. conjunction with long lines, for deep sea fishing. These units, called lzanyut locally, With a shift away from local institutions and desa-level enforcement to a legal stay three or four days at sea, fishing primarily for sharks and various types of tuna. -political structure based at the provincial and national level, the small, and even That there has been no protest over their use, despite the fact that most of these medium scale investors in fishing technology do not have the means to influence boats, together with their crew, come from another district in East Java, helps to policy and enforcement decisions in their favor, other than through threats to illuminate the principles underlying the informal rules which govern resource political stability. While so far the greater financial and political power of the access. Because these boats operate exclusively outside the bay, there has been no outside investors in Prigi's fishery have not been wielded directly against the local concern voiced by local fishers over their operation. Although distinct boundaries fishers, the potential exists. were never discussed by local fishers, this illustrates clearly that a proprietary claim Local Institutions Affecting Distribution of Fisheries Resources A second institution operates to provide those individuals without permanent positions on purse seiners an opportunity to share in the harvest during peak fishing Conflicts and institutions regulating access to the bay's fishery resources at sea, season. Purse seiners operate with set crews of 14 to 15 people; however, during however, are only a small part of the local institutions and customary practices peak season one may see purse seiners going out with as many as 30 to 35 people relating to fishery resources operating in Prigi, and elsewhere in Java (Collier et al. on board. These additional laborers ngadim, or 'go along,' to help pull in the nets. 1979; Polunin 1983). In Prigi, the strongest local institutions relating to the fishery In return they get fish as lawuhan (for daily food) in the same amount as permanent have to do not with limiting access to the fishery resources, but with reallocation crew members, but no share in the monthly division of the profits. In this way, of the catch once it reaches shore. Perhaps because of an inability to restrict access almost every able-bodied man or youth from Prigi who wants to is able to work on to the bay's resources, the locus of control may have shifted to land, where strmg a purse seiner during the peak season, and brings home a good day's income from local institutions do exist for redistributing the catch of fish post-harvest. Most local the sale of his lawuhan. In this way youths are trained and acquire skills that help people cannot compete for access with capital-intensive gear such as beach and them get permanent positions on purse seiners. The primary purpose of allowing purse seines, and have no access to these gears. A concern with equity and fairness people to ngadim, however, is to provide greater access to the catch. Captains and underlies these redistributive institutions. Access is open, but local institutions of boat owners all say that the presence of these additional hands decreases rather than equity, fairness, and reciprocity demand that a large catch must be shared widely increases operating efficiency on the boat, yet when a crew member appears with among the community. a brother, cousin or friend who wants to ngadim, they are 'forced' to allow them to Redistribution of the catch takes many forms, from simply asking for a few fish go along. Significantly, the practice of ngadim has originated only within the last to an elaborately detailed and uniformly enforced share system. Three distinct forms eight to ten years in Prigi, and apparently does not exist much in other fishing ports that can be considered 'institutions' exist in Prigi which re'allocate access to the fish in Java. catch: (1) the share system used on purse seiners, (2) a%$stem of taking on extra A third institution which operates to redistribute the catch are a number of ways temporary crew members for the purse seiners' peak season, known as ngadim, and of taking fish after it has been caught but before being sold; some of these are known (3) various institutionalized mechanisms for 'taking' or 'stealing' the fish before it locally as ngetrawl. Small boys and old women, in particular, can be seen at the reaches the auction site, or simply giving it away. beach and auction site going from basket to basket ofifish, taking a handful of small When purse seines were first introduced, each boat owner established his own fish and stuffing them into a pocket or a sarong, or in some cases even a small bucket system for paying the crew members, with most of them paying a set wage for each or plastic bag. These activities are almost completely ignored, as the,people who day's work, regardless of the catch. After a while, the laborers began to lobby the do it are considered needy and the activity shameful.16To call attention to it would boat owners for a share of the catch rather than wages as payment, arguing that they create more shame for all involved. should share in the luck of the catch. The crew members wanted to have greater A much more blatant form of appropriating fish from a boat's catch is carried access to the frequent (in those early days) windfalls, and if that meant that on the out by the strong young men who operate sotho, or push scissor nets, in the area days when they got no catch they received no pay, they felt it was worth the risk. A around where the purse seiners land. Prigi has no working pier or jetty, so boats are meeting was held in 1977, attended by all the purse seine owners, captains, and anchored near shore and laborers are employed by each boat to carry the catch in crew members, as well as the local police, military officers, and Fisheries Service large baskets from the boat to the auction site for weighing, sometimes in shoulder- officials. The present share system was decided upon at this meeting (one-third of high waves. Many fish fall out of the baskets in the process, and the men with sotho net profits to the crew and two-thirds to the owner), codified, and imposed on all nets scoop up the fish that 'fall' back into the water. Amidst the chaos of many boats subsequent purse seines operating in Prigi Bay. There is virtually no deviation from unloading large catches in high waves, the fish are often 'helped' out of the baskets. this system on any purse seiners. Boat owners, and to a lesser extent captains, are watchful and try to stop the crowds A purse seine crew member's income has two major components: his share of from knocking fish out of the baskets, but are basically powerless. Security officers the 113 of the monthly net profit divided among the crew members (calculated each of the fishing port are responsible for guarding the fish once it reaches the shore, month around full moon when purse seines cease operations for a few days), and a but the catch is considered the responsibility of the boat's captain and crew until it daily lawuhan (literally 'daily food'), a small amount of fish from the day's catch. reaches shore. This was originally intended to be taken home for the family meal, but is now often Less blatant, but more significant in terms of volume of fish redistributed, are quite a substantial amount to be sold for a few thousand rupiah per fisher.15 the various forms of giving fish away. Every employee of a purse seiner feels he has the right to give some fish to his friends and relatives. As soon as the boats land s'",52 g 0 2. 2 o 0 3 n. E. Y-00--0'24 m g-2 ,.O 100w o 3 ggam33asaw c R-av;.Y'2=;' F4.w 5 s ge.4 3 b L-. mom =SEE a 53 5'2 c gOg,a3g tfsa mom ,a g3 g m 3 2 ;&.a0 I$a 8 sn.g2 $ 0%4 -z<=a -.g.s 2 5.EFQ g 22; -2 - L-. 0 0 g ,S$O"O l.5 avmZmS s 8 8.5E 3=$4a yg 5 oF4.g; 5.g.g.g so Fj.7 - ,-0-w =xpa 5.g 3'6, a;G. g.ZE5.Q.g"msa, 2. ='-0-0 5s.s zg5 2 2 ggg J 2a 5'% ?G e ii; e. 0 sgC-'o 0. *a -3 1Y Notes in of the beach seines has such a low status that most members of the fishing community shun it. Work on the beach seines is the only type of fishing labor in Prigi which is paid a wage rather than a share of 1. This is a revised version of a paper which was presented at the fourth annual meeting of the the catch. International Association for the Study of Common Property, Manila, Philippines, June 16-19,1993. Field 11. One of the reasons that the bagatr are still controlled by the Buginese immigrants is that they have research on which the paper is based was carried out in Java from 1989 to 1991, supported by a U.S. been banned by the provincial government. Local fisheries officers have accommodated the bagatr owners Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Fellowship. by allowing those which already existed at the time of the ban to remain, but prohibiting new bagarr 2. I have found very few references to cases of marine tenure or traditional resource management entering the local fishery. systems on Java. Polunin (1984) cites an anonymous Dutch source (Anon. 1921) which referred to 12. See Bailey (1988 and 1992) for a detailed discussion of Indonesia's ban on trawlers and its impact. markers in the sea indicating fishing spots or territorial boundaries off Tuban, on the north coast of Central Java, but even this could have been a misinterpretation on the part of the observer. Sya'rani and 13. Collier et al. (1979) and Emmerson (1982) have observed that the protests by small scale fishers Willoughby (1983) have argued that adat-based marine management did not exist on Java, and Zerner in Java concerned not only trawlers but other 'modern' fishing gear as well. This was especially true in ' and Bailey (1992) have similarly noted that traditional marine management systems have not been Banyuwangi, East Java, which has long had a strong influence on fisheries development in Prigi through documented in Java, or for the Lesser Sunda Islands. Polunin (1984) speculates that in certain areas marine migration. tenure systems either never existed or disappeared some time ago, and Ruddle (in press) has hypothesized, based on their wide geographical distribution within Indonesia, that local community fisheries manage- 14. Adat is defined as custom or tradition, but has also come to have a more formal legal meaning ment systems were formerly much more widespread than they are today. of customary or traditional law. Dutch colonial law explicitly recognized adat law in certain instances, as does the Indonesian government today. However, adat based community fisheries management systems 3. Perishability of the product was another factor. Ice became widely used only after the introduction have no legal basis under current Indonesian law. of purse seines. Aside from issues of isolation and perishability, however, the fact that the catch of fish was primarily consumed by the local market also reflects the generally low level of production. 15. Collier et al. (1979) have described a similar share system with a daily larvul~anused on the north coast of Central Java. 4. Van der Kolff (1936), during his visit to Prigi in 1936, noted '...the establishment of several large fishing concerns in the hands of Europeans and Non-indigenous Orientals (sic)...'. 16. Collier et al. (1979) found a similar practice being carried out by young boys, referred to as atrak { \ alang-alartg, in fishing communities on the north coast of Central Java. 5. Zerner (1991) has observed a similar process of increasing control by investors from outside the local fishing community in the Mandar raft fishery in South Sulawesi. C ' \I 17. The only person I ever heard use the word 'stealing' (cur;) in reference to any of these activities , was a purse seine investor from a major city who said he had to stay in Prigi to supervise during peak 6. The power structure in Prigi has changed over the last 50 years as fisheries resource exploitation fishing season in order to minimize his loss. has increased. The old elites in Prigi derived their power from control over the irrigated rice lands and access to the resources of the forests. Most of these people (and their descendants) have maintained control 18. Beach seine laborers generally receive a share of fish as larvui~atr,in addition to their guaranteed over these resources, but the power and prestige that control over these resources provides has decreased wage, when the catch is good. with the development of the fishing industry. 19. Beach seine crews typically include between 20 and 50 laborers, depending on the size of the net; 7. Similar upwardly spiraling costs and increasing capitalization has been documented by Zerner purse seine crews usually consist of between 14 and 17 regular members. (1991) in the raft fishery of Mandar, South Sulawesi. 20. Collier et (11. similarly observed in their study of fishing communities on the north coast of central 8. Little capital was required for these early beach seines which were made of locally-available Java that the owner sometimes gives up his own latvui~atzto ensure that the crew have an adequate amount. natural materials such as tree bark. Innovators introduced the skill and knowledge for making and using the nets, and local people then followed suit and profited. Beach seines continued to be made of these local materials until the 1960's when purchased nylon net began to be used. References Cited 9. A photograph from the 1930s showed five large sharks hauled in by the beach seines, whereas today large sharks are almost never found inside the bay. Anon. 1921 Visscherij in Toeban. Adutreci~tbu~~els1:52-78. 10. In the end, however, the newer technology prevailed, and beach seines lost out to the purse seines due to competition for crew, lower prices effected by the greater volume of fish caught by the purse seines, Bailey, C. and ultimately, resource depletion as the catch in the area near shore where beach seines are confined to 1988 The Political Economy of Marine Fisheries Development in Indonesia. Itrdor~esia46:25-38. operate declined. Today in Prigi, beach seines still operate, especially during particular seasons, but their 1992 Lessons from Indonesia's 1980 Trawler Ban. Paper presented at the third annual meeting of the ownership no longer provides great local power or wealth. One measure of this decline is the fact that International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 1992. the laborers who pull in the nets are now recruited from among the women and old men of nearby farming households. Able-bodied young men an: recruited as crew members for the purse seiners, and the pulling Bailey, C., A. Dwiponggo and F. Marahudin 1987 Indotresiatr Marirre Captttre Fisheries. ICLARM Studies and Reviews 10. Manila: International Center for Living Aquatic Resources ManagementUakarta: Directorate General of Fisheries and Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture. Bailey, C. and C. Zcrner 1992 Community-Based Fisheries Management Institutions in Indonesia. MAST 5(1):1-18. Berkes, F., D. Feeny, B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson 1989 The Benefits of the Commons. Nattire 340:91-93. Collier, W.L., H. Hadiioesworo and M. Malingreau 1979 Economic Development and Shared Poverty among Javanese Sea Fishermen. In: A.R. Librero and William L. Collier (Eds.), Ecortotrrics of Aqrcaculttrre. Sea-Fishi~igand Coastal Resottrce Use in Asia. Proceedings of the Second Biennial Meeting of the Agricultural Economics Society of Southeast Asia, Nov. 3-6, 1977. Manila: Agricultural Development Council, Philippines Council for Agriculture and Resource Research. Emmerson, D.K. 1982 Orders of Meaning: Understanding Political Change in a Fishing Community in Indonesia (1975). In: B. Anderson and A. Kahin (Eds.), Itrterpretitrg btdorresian Politics: Thirteetr Co~ttribtctionsto tile Debate. Interim Reports Series, Publication No. 62. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project. Hardin, G. 1968 The Tragedy of the Commons. Scierrce 162:1243-48. Kolff, G.H. van der 1936 The Historical Development of the Labour Relationships in a Remote Comer of Java as They Apply to the Cultivation of Rice: Provisional Results of Local Investigations. The Netherlands: National Council for the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Polunin, N.V.C. 1983 The Marine Resources of Indonesia. Ocea~~ograpliyaf~d Marine Biology: Atr Atttrual Review 21:455-531. Aberdeen University Press. 1984 Do Traditional Marine 'Reserves' Conserve: A View of the Indonesian and New Guinean Evidence. In: I<. Ruddle and T. Akimichi (Eds.), Maritit~reIrutitrrtiotu it1 tlre Westent Pacific. S~MEthnological Studies No. 17. Osaka, Japan: National Museum of Ethnology. Ruddle, K. in press A Gtride to tlie Literatiwe oft Traditiotral Fishery Ma~ragettretrtSyster~u of the Asiart atrd Pacific Tropics.FA0 Technical Paper. Rome: FAO. Sya'rani, L. and N.G. Willoughby 1985 The Traditional Management of Marine Resources in Indonesia, with Particular Reference ta Central Java. In: K. Ruddle and R.E. Johannes (Eds.), Tlie Traditiorrctl Ktto~vledgeatrd Mattage. trtetrt of Coastal Systenrs irr Asia arid the Pacific. Jakarta: UNESCO. Zerner, C. 1990 Marine Tenure in Indonesia's Makassar Strait: The Mandar Raft Fishery. Paper presented at the first annual meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina: September 1990. 1991 Sharing the Catch in Mandar: Changes in an Indonesian Raft Fishery (1970-1989). In: J.J. Pog gie and R.B. Pollnac (Eds.), Brrull Scale Fislrery Developnrettt: Socioctrltttral Perspectives ICMRD: University of Rhode Island. Bailey, C., A. Dwiponggo and F. Marahudin 1987 Irtdot~esianMarine Captrtre Fisheries. ICLARM Studies and Reviews 10. Manila: International La iniciativa privada Center for Living Aquatic Resources ManagementIJakarta: Directorate General of Fisheries and Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture. in the Mexican Shrimp Industry Bailey, C. and C. Zerner Politics of Efficiency 1992 Community-Based Fisheries Management Institutions in Indonesia. MAST 5(1):1-18. Berkes, F., D. Feeny, B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson 1989 The Benefits of the Commons. Nature 340:91-93. Marcela Va'squez Ledn and Thomas R. McGuire Collier, W.L., H. Hadikoesworo and M. Malingreau University of Arizona 1979 Economic Development and Shared Poverty among Javanese Sea Fishermen. In: A.R. Librero and William L. Collier (Eds.), Econortrics of Aquacultrtre. Sea-Fishing and Coastal Resortrce Use in Asia. Proceedings of the Second Biennial Meeting of the Agricultural Economics Society of Southeast Asia, Nov. 3-6, 1977. Manila: Agricultural Development Council, Philippines ABSTRACT Under the guise of structural adjustments in the Mexican economy, the Council for Agriculture and Resource Research. offshore shrimp industry in the Gulf of California has recently changed ownership, Emmerson, D.K. from cooperatives to private entrepreneurs. This paper examines the subsequent 1982 Orders of Meaning: Understanding Political Change in a Fishing Community in Indonesia efforts by the coalition of private owners to effect a redistribution of resources from (1975). In: B. Anderson and A. Kahin (Eds.), Itrterpretittg Irtdotlesiarr Politics: Thirteen the inshore small-boat sector, still largely organized in cooperatives, to the offshore Cor~tribittionsto tlre Debate. Interim Reports Series, Publication No. 62. Ithaca, NY: Comell sector, and to enlist the aid of the government in buttressing the private sector's Modem Indonesia Project. newfound 'comparative advantage.' Hardin, G. 1968 The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162:1243-48. Kolff, G.H. van der Introduction 1936 The Historical Development of the Labour Relationships in a Remote Comer of Java as They \ Apply to the Cultivation of Rice: Provisional Results of Local Investigations. The Netherlands: Within the last several years, Mexico's shrimp resources, historically reserved for National Council for the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies of the Institute of Pacific Relations. state-licensed cooperatives, have been partially 'privatized.' Since 1992 entre- Polunin, N.V,C. preneurs have been officially permitted, indeed encouraged, to purchase and use the boats and equipment of debt-ridden cooperatives. The public-sector fisheries 1983 The Marine Resources of Indonesia. Oceanograplry and Marine Biology: An Anrtrial Review 21 :455-53 1. Aberdeen University Press. bank has ceased operations. Regional federations of cooperatives have been disen- 1984 Do Traditional Marine 'Reserves' Conserve: A View of the Indonesian and New Guinean franchised. The parastatal packing and marketing company is in the process of Evidence. In: K. Ruddle and T. Akimichi (Eds.), Marititne I~lstit~ttiorisit1 tlre Westen1 Pacific. loosing its monopsonic control over the export of Mexican shrimp. Federal agencies Senri Ethnological Studies No. 17. Osaka, Japan: National Museum of Ethnology. charged with the management of this industry are, it appears, increasingly respon- Ruddle, K. sive to the wishes of the private sector. In short, the shrimp industry, like much of in press A Grtide to tfreLiterahire 011 Traditiotlal Fishery Mattagettretlt Systenu of tlte Asian and Pacific Mexico's economy, is undergoing a period of rapid 'structural adjustment.' Tropics. FA0 Technical Paper. Rome: FAO. Mexico precipitated the global demand for adjustment by announcing, in 1982, Sya'rani, L. and N.G. Willoughby that it had exhausted its foreign-exchange reserves and could no longer pay the 1985 The Traditional Management of Marine Resources in Indonesia, with Particular Reference to Central Java. In: K. Ruddle and R.E. Johannes (Eds.), Tlre Traditiot~alKttorvledge and Manage- interest on its massive debt, incurred during the oil of the late 1970s. The trierit of Coastal Systenzs it1 Asia and tlte Pacific. Jakarta: UNESCO. initial response was a brief period of severe fiscal austerity, felt primarily in the Zerner, C. form of wage controls, followed by an accession to the 'Brady Plan,' promulgated 1990 Marine Tenure in Indonesia's Makassar Strait: The Mandar Raft Fishery. Paper presented at the by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury in 1985. The plan conditioned continued first annual meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Duke international lending on 'a series of measures designed to foster economic growth, University, Durham, North Carolina, September 1990. such as encouraging foreign investment, selling inefficient public-sector enter- 1991 Sharing the Catch in Mandar: Changes in an Indonesian Raft Fishery (1970-1989). In: J.J. Pog- prises, reducing import protection, and liberalizing capital markets' (Weintraub gie and R.B. Pollnac (Eds.), S~trallScale Fishery Develop~rtent:Sociocrtlt~tral Perspectives. 1990: 142-43). ICMRD: University of Rhode Island. President Salinas de Gortari embraced the philosophy of the Brady Plan when inflated costs (Miller 1991). By the end of the decade, the economic crisis in the he took office in December, 1988. To enhance agricultural efficiency, competitive- industry came to a head: cooperatives were on the verge of bankruptcy, the ness, and private investment, Salinas has rescinded Article 27 of the Constitution state-controlled BanPesca, which had been providing loans at relatively benign of 1917 - the historic charter for agmrismo in Mexico - and removed much of the interest rates, was closed down, and, as indicated by a sharp decline in catch, it elaborate structure of agricultural subsidies and consumer price supports (Hewitt appears that the shrimp stock itself co1lapsed.l de AlcAntara 1992). To promote economic growth through trade liberalization, he Into the 1990s, the problems continued. Active trawler fleet size was reduced to has negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nader et al. 1993). To some 40% of its level during the 1980s. Cooperatives have closed, their boats foster business confidence and encourage the repatriation of capital, he has repri- repossessed by private banks and sold, frequently well below1) value, to private vatized the banking sector, offered up for sale much of the state-owned commercial investors. There has been a corresponding demise in employment and output of $ and industrial plants of Mexico, dismantled the byzantine regulatory apparatus fisheries-related industries - boat yards, processing plants, and optfitiers. which had been the hallmark of the Mexican state, devalued and stabilized the The small-boat sector, a multi-species, multi-gear fisher$, has! shown more national currency, and curbed, to a degree, inflation (Lustig 1992). And to assuage resiliency through the crisis. But it, too, has suffered from uncontrolled expansion, the distributional consequences of these reforms, he has promulgated the Progranza overcapacity, heavy competition for declining stocks of blue shrimp, and lack of Nacional de Solidaridad, a pot of financial infusions to the impoverished and markets for other species. dispossessed (Salinas de Gortari 1992). In this economic crisis, the private sector has been given the upper hand. The In the rhetoric surrounding structural adjustment, 'efficiency' has come to be inshore sector, still largely organized in cooperatives, lost political representation synonymous with privatization. Here we attempt to unpack this linkage by exam- and negotiating power when the federation of cooperatives, 'Sur de Sonora,' was ining how reform plays itself out in one locale - Guaymas, Sonora - and on one closed. In its place, private producers quickly formed a coalition, the CANAINPES commodity - tropical shrimp. Our central claims are that, in the middle reaches of (Cdmara Nacional de la Industria Pesquera). Boats and other property (freezing the Gulf of California, the 'private initiative' has been a government-sponsored and processing plants and cooperative offices) repossessed by banks from the move to attract capital into an overcapitalized sector of the shrimp industry, has cooperative sector are being concentrated in the hands of the strong members of largely succeeded in defining, and destroying, common notions of efficiency in the this private sector coalition. These are armadores-barzqueros (banker-owners), exploitation of natural resources, and has resorted to government regulation for its some of whom control-the administrative councils of private banks such as Banco own survival. del Atlantico and Banconzer. Others are ex-bank officials. Of a total fleet of 279 We begin by tracing the process of privatization in the offshore sector of the boats from Guaymas that participated in the 1992-93 season, 205 already belonged Mexican shrimp fishery over the last decade or so. We then assess the claims of to the private sector. Ninety percent of the fleet was under private flag by the 'efficiency' made on behalf of the offshore sector vis-3-vis the inshore sector. 1993-94 season. Of the 25 cooperatives that are registered, 21 have declared Finally, we examine the recent regulatory changes in the fishery and the role of the bankruptcy and most of their property has been embargoed (El Inzparcial, June 4, private sector in promulgating those changes. 1993). The reform has also brought about a marked increase in local unemployment. Before the 1993-94 season started, 600 Guaymas offshore fishermen lost their jobs The Process of Privatization when private owners hired fishermen from areas where the financial and ecological crisis is more acute, at significantly lower wages (Rodriguez 1993). Shrimp trawler fleets throughout the Gulf and Pacific littoral grew markedly in the The bitter ironies to the story are manifold. Private capital expanded the offshore 1970s, despite warnings as early as 1971 of 'unaposible crisis' of overcapacity and fleet in the 1970s. Under mandate from the state, still flush with oil revenues, the diminished yields (ChAvez and Lluch 1971:141). Efforts were made in the early cooperatives borrowed from BanPesca and bought out private interests. In 1982, 1980s to curtail this expansion and return the fleet to cooperative ownership after oil prices collapsed, the peso did likewise, and capital throughout the country - and a period of private investment in the 1970s, but the capacity was still in excess of no doubt in Guaymas as well, although it is difficult io trace - fled abroad, often, economically profitable numbers. One study estimated an annual loss per trawler as Lustig (1992:94) notes, earning 'huge capital gains.' The emerging package of of US$30,000 (Rodriguez de la Cruz 1987:50). This loss compounded a debt structural adjustments which developed in the wake of the debt crisis was keyed to problem for most cooperatives dating to the 1982 transition, when coops were the repatriation of this capital. First, internal interest rates were allowed to rise required to purchase their equipment and boats from private owners, often at through the 1980s 'to very high levels intended to offset inflation and, reduce incentives for further capital flight (Hewitt de AlcAntara 1992:9). Then in 1990, not coincidentally, the Mexican banking system was reprivatized - 'one of the most significant moves to restore business confidence and the goodwill of the financial community in Mexico and abroad' (Lustig 1992:107) - and the fisheries law reserving shrimp for cooperatives was rescinded. By then, inevitably, the offshore cooperative sector was deeply in debt, deeply fractionated, and vulnerable - a fire-sale opportunity for private investors. For the most part, by 1992, its assets were in the hands of the armadores-banqueros. In Guaymas, the quest of the private sector for 'efficiency' has now begun, and it is moving resolutely inshore.

Pangas and Barcos: Comparative Efficiencies

Since Mexico's economic policy is ostensibly predicated on stimulating private investment in productive endeavors, we ask here whether the acquisition of the offshore fleet by bankers and entrepreneurs is a wise business decision. We address the question through a comparative evaluation of the costs of capturing shrimp in the offshore barco sector and the inshore panga (small-boat) sector. We conclude that the offshore sector is disadvantaged, and the subsequent section will examine the efforts by the private sector and the state to overturn this comparative disad- vantage. To estimate the efficiency of harvesting shrimp, we measure production costs and compare them to revenues in recent seasons. For each sector we determine a breakeven point in which costs of production equal benefits - a minimum necessary production level at a specified ex-vessel price in which all production costs will be covered, but with zero economic profits. If production is at or below the breakeven point, we consider the enterprise to be economically inefficient, and thus, modifi- cations must be made by some combination of lowering costs of production, reducing fleet size, and increasing catch per boat. For a shrimp trawler we estimate that the breakeven point is a total of 12.2 metric tons (mt) of shrimp per season at an average price of US$9.70 per kg. However, during the past five seasons, production per trawler has been consistently below this limit, at an average of 7.6 mt. For the 1991-1992 season production records indicate an average of 6.04 mt per boat. During this season the average number of trips made per trawler was lower than the usual, 4.3 instead of 6 trips (CRIP 1992). Adjusting for this change, we calculate that while average total benefits per trip amounted to $13,624, average total costs amounted to $21,327. This gives an average net loss of $7,703 per trip. IIZPuerto Periasco, up tlte coast of Senora, the lorze shipyard tltat was itz operation during the In the case of the inshore sector in Guaymas, we estimate that aparzga needs to disastrous 1992-1993 shrintp seasort ltad but a single job: refurbishirzg a repossessed trawler for a produce 10.66 kg per day at an average price of $10.69 per kg in order to cover private owner; tlte same boat lie had sold to the cooperative a decade earlier. costs of production. This calculation is based on the assumption bat a fisherman will go out an average of 30 days during the two-month season, missing a number Management, the Private Sector, and the Redistribution of Resources of days as a result of weather conditions and tidal patterns. When fishermen go out fewer days, costs of production per day increase proportionally since equipment In a climate of deregulation and reduced bureaucracy, the Mexican government costs are concentrated into these fewer number of days. This was the case in the nevertheless continues to play a central role in the shrimp fishery through a highly 1992-93 season in which fishermen went out for an unusually low average of only centralized management organization. From its offices in Mexico City, the Fisheries 11.1 days, partly as a result of added political pressure from the private sector, as Ministry (Secretaria de Pesca or SePesca) directs all matters concerning research, we will review below. In this case, the breakeven point increased to a minimum law, and regulatory enforcement through regional administrative and research production of 17.8 1 kg per panga per day. Daily records per panga of the 1992-93 centers. Managers have embarked on a campaign of redistributing gains from the season for an inshore Guaymas cooperative indicate an average production of 23.7 inshore sector to the newly privatized offshore sector. Through this process, the kg. Average total benefits per day perpanga amounted to $253.35, while total costs private sector has been able to test the degree of power it has acquired under the averaged $190.48. This gives an average net benefit of $62.87. These cost/benefit current government. The cooperative or social sector, on the other hand, after calculations leave no doubt as to the comparative harvesting efficiency of the loosing political representation as a result of the disintegration of cooperatives and small-scale sector of the shrimp fishery in Guaymas (see Appendix). The results are the regional federation, is increasingly becoming aware of a loss in the power of even more impressive when we realize that the 1992-93 season was considered to negotiation formerly present vis-8-vis local fishery administrators. Finally, local be below average by inshore producers. level fishery administrators are loosing their flexibility to deal with specific social Another factor that must be taken into account when comparing the economic and economic issues. Instead, they are having to yield to private sector demands. efficiency of the two sectors is the species of shrimp being captured. As indicated The examination of recent regulations, the change in enforcement, and the by the difference in the price per kilogram of shrimp for each sector used in the current intervention of the private sector in matters of management illustrate these above calculations, the average price tends to be higher for the inshore sector than points. We will begin by looking at two basic regulations and how enforcement of for the offshore sector. This reflects a difference in quality of shrimp as well as in these regulations has recently changed. species composition. While 80% to 90% of the shrimp harvested by the inshore sector are blue shrimp (Penaeus stylirostris), the offshore sector produces a much Areas of Legal Exploitation greater proportion of brown (I! caliJCorniensis)than blue shrimp. This is significant Guaymas inshore fishermen, by law, must limit their operations to the Guaymas- in that the export market price for blue shrimp is about 20-25 cents per lb higher Empalme bay, and must share this territory with fishermen from the nearby than the price for brown shrimp. In terms of the overall industry, according to the Empalme cooperative as well as unaffiliated fishermen who obtain a permit from Sonoran state manager of the parastatal marketing firm, Ocean Garden, 40-50% of SePesca. The bay, however, is considered by fishermen to be polluted and too small the blue shrimp produced for export in the Pacific comes from the inshore sector. to support the population involved in shrimp fishing. Local estuaries, on the other While the offshore sector has been significant in increasing the volume of brown hand, are considered by fishermen to be inappropriate exploitation areas in terms shrimp for export, a species found at greater depths (35-40 fathoms), it has not done of resource conservation - while larvae and juvenile 'shrimp can be found in the same for blue shrimp, which tend to be found at relatively shallow depths (2-18 estuaries, adult shrimp migrate to the bay where they achieve an optimal marketable fathoms), migrating offshore from estuaries and bays. size. Conflicts over this issue between Guaymas fishermen and Empalme residents The inshore sector, then, not only produces a significant volume of the most who shrimp in the estuary for subsistence have been commonplace. valuable shrimp species for export, but, as our calculations of economic efficiency In the past, local administrators from SePesca bent the law as a result of pressure indicate, it does so at much lower costs of production. The inshore sector is clearly from inshore cooperatives. They allowed fishermen to shrimp outside the bay, in at an economic advantage in the competition for blue shrimp. In response, the what are considered offshore waters. This was a local arrangement, without ap- offshore sector is pursuing survival strategies that seek to alter the distribution of proval from Mexico City officials, and served to placate the cooperatives. resources in the Gulf of California. However, this arrangement has become increasingly problematic. During the past 4 years, visits of SePesca inspectors from Mexico City have become more frequent and occur during the best tides at the beginning of the season, when fishermen hope to catch perhaps 113 of what they will catch throughout the entire season. During these official visits, fishermen must suspend offshore fishing so as not to expose the arrangement and jeopardize their relationihip with local authorities. The cost to inshore fishermen is substantial. Not only are their overall catches limit the inshore sector's fishing capacity. Outboard motors above 55 hp can be used reduced, but they loose access to market-optimal sizes of shrimp. only if they had been bought and registered with the Delegacidn Federal de Pesca The conflict between local arrangements and centralized rules escalated during before May 18, 1991. The only authorized nets are the cast net and the suripera.2 the 1992-93 season when the private sector, through the CANAINPES, issued a The chinchorro de linea, an efficient and selective gillnet, has been outlawed. formal complaint to fishery officials calling attention to the illegality of inshore Inshore shrimp fishermen can only fish between 0-5 fathoms. The motor can only fishermen shrimping offshore. The complaint not only targeted Guaymas fisher- be used as transportation to and from the fishing area. men, but all inshore fishermen along the southern coast of Sonora. After loosing The official goal of the above regulations is the conservation of the resource: several good tides, fishermen decided to go out, maintaining that the bays had to the inshore sector is believed to be overexploiting shrimp stocks, as indicated by a be cleaned up before they could fish inshore for an entire season. In defiance, wives decline in productivity, and thus effort must be limited. However, there are several accompanied their husbands to reduce the possibility of violence. At least for one contradictions inherent in these new regulations for which no specific and well- more season, the local arrangement was allowed to prevail, albeit through civil founded rationale has been provided. disobedience rather than informal negotiation. Both the suripera and the cast net are less efficient and selective than the chinchorro, and for the suripera net to function, current and prevailing wind The Veda conditions in the Guaymas area require the use of the engine at all times. The During the summer months shrimp fishing is strictly prohibited. The closing and argument behind the banning of the chinchorro is that it encourages illegal fishing opening of the season is determined by the National Fisheries Institute after by non-cooperative members, since it is relatively easy to use. However, fishermen reviewing proposals sent by scientist from the different regional research centers. perceive that this problem has more to do with a deficiency in management and Scientists establish the closure based on studies of gonadal maturation, and the dates enforcement than with the net itself. during which such studies are carried out as well as the expediency with which the Since the law prohibiting the chinchorro was issued, arrangements were made decision to close the season is taken are crucial factors in the conservation of the between local fisheries officials and small-scale fishermen similar to those regard- resource. ing shrimping outside of the bay. The regulation was observed in the breach, until Decisions for opening and closing the season, however, get entangled in the inspectors from Mexico City arrived. In general, local managers familiar with the bureaucracy. This leads to delays in the opening of the season, which greatly affect situation see the new regulation as a political maneuver. However, the arrangement inshore fishermen, and to delays in the closure of the season, which benefit the is being jeopardized by new accusations against the chinchorro coming from the offshore sector in the short run but hurt the fishery in the long run. CANAINPES, mainly that its thin nylon thread cuts and kills the shrimp. Without While for the past three or four years the inshore season has opened at the any empirical foundation as to the veracity of their claim, they argue that true beginning of September, fishermen claim that the best time for fishing in the bay enforcement is crucial for the protection of the resource (El Impartial, May 25, 1993). are the last two weeks of August. But by the time the season actually opens in With regards to the regulation limiting the horsepower of outboards, it was September, most of the shrimp have already migrated offshore. Offshore fishermen, common knowledge that most motors owned by cooperatives are 75 hp, and a large on the other hand, complain that the season closes too late. According to field number of these were bought after May 18, 1991 for the 1991-92 fishing season. observations during the 1992-93 season, studies of gonadal maturation started when Smaller engines reduce the mobility of fishermen and make travel to distant bays approximately 25% of females were already gravid. By the time the season was and estuaries much more risky. officially closed, the percentage of gravid females had doubled. What the above regulations and their implications for the inshore sector indicate Private sector intervention during the 1992-93 season was evident. In contra- is that, instead of conservation being the driving force, other goals are more diction to local biologists' recommendations, and as a result of political pressure important: specifically, the economic weakening of the inshore co;operative sector from the private sector, the offshore season opened two weeks earlier than usual; through a diminution in the possibility of maintaining or increasing yields. An the established practice had been to open the offshore season one month after the obvious consequence of this is an enhanced access to blue shrimp' for the offshore inshore season. sector, and, further, a certain guarantee to the private sector that the government will do its best to increase the offshore catch by reducing competition from the New Regulations inshore sector. In May, 1991, new regulations were issued by the Fisheries Ministry regarding the The offshore sector, however, was also subjected to new regulations - the effects two sectors involved in the fishery (Secretaria de Pesca 1991). These laws directly of which actually benefit that sector. As written by the National Fisheries Institute, 68

the regulations primarily address trawling depths. Shrimp fishing and the use of First, in view of the manifest comparative disadvantage of the offshore sector trawl nets is prohibited between 0-5 fathoms - revising a previous 10-fathom line vis-A-vis the inshore sector, one must question why the private initiative has and thus actually extending the fishing space for trawlers at the expense of the flourished there. The answer appears self-evident. In Mexico's new economic order, inshore fishery. There were no other regulations which in any way modified not only has the private sector been privileged over the cooperative sector, but trawling practices. large-scale investment opportunities have been favored over small ones. Capital Despite evidence which suggests overexploitation of the resource as well as which fled to country, or simply hid in unproductive holdings during the crisis overcapitalization of the offshore sector, new regulations do not address any of these decade of the 1980s, had to be given inducements, big ones, to be put back to work. concerns. Quite to the contrary, the permissive character of the National Fisheries The offshore shrimp sector, once very lucrative, then overexpanded and bankrupt, Institute regulations toward the offshore sector, and the timing in which this is was one such opportunity, and entrepreneurs grasped at it. manifested, actually provide an assurance to the private sector that government Second, the relatively clear and parsimonious reading of the economic and regulations will not interfere or limit their possibilities of success. Moreover, the ecological ills of the offshore sector in the 1980s - too many trawlers - got new regulations assure that trawlers have the upper hand in the competition for blue submerged into another interpretation. This reading, which fuels the spate of new shrimp with the inshore sector. regulations in the early 1990s, claims that the inshore sector is both inefficient and too efficient. The key technology of the sector, the clzinchorro de linea, cuts and kills shrimp, so this reading goes, and also captures too many. The economics and Rnal Moves mechanics of the net refute the first claim, as do the buying preferences of Ocean Garden. The second claim is purely a distributional one. The offshore sector, by The last step in the privatization process is the proposed sale of the parastatal promulgating measures to restrict the activities on the small-boat sector, is simply marketing company, Ocean Garden, a company that has been consistently praised trying to increase its access to shrimp. for its efficiency. Several private parties are competing to acquire the brand name Third, the uneasy local arrangements of the 1980s - the coexistence of the in order to guarantee an organized export market. In Guaymas there are two groups inshore and offshore sectors within a beleaguered federation of cooperatives, and involved in the bidding, CANAINPES and GIPSA (Grupo Industrial Pesquero). the relative autonomy of local managers from the Mexico City bureaucracy - have The CANAINPES, stronger of the two, has vowed not to purchase, process or been undone. In the new Mexican economy which fosters decentralization and market any shrimp harvested by the inshore sector. deregulation, the local private sector is demanding increased regulation of the - While awaiting the outcome of its bid for Ocean Garden, CANAINPES took up inshore sector, increased enforcement of these regulations, and subsidized fuel,for another battle, one which the cooperatives had been waging unsuccessfully for a its trawlers. Officials from Mexico City, from the state of Sonora, andi from the decade. The coalition of private owners approached the governor of Sonora and the parastatal oil company are complying with these demands. directors of Petrdleos Mexicanos (Pemex) for a reduction in the price of diesel fuel, Finally, in a further irony of the rhetoric of adjustment, the technologies of the major running expense for the offshore trawlers. PEMEX, a parastatal, acqui- efficiency and resiliency - the panga and its assorted gear - have been assaulted by esced to a 20% reduction, and the governor promised an additional 20% reduction, the technologies of inflexibility and inefficiency. The business acumen that is to be underwritten from the Secretaria de Hacienda y CrLdito Pliblico, the public presumed to accompany private entrepreneurship is again absent in Guaymas, as treasury (Vdjar Larraiiaga 1993). the urntadores petition a responsive ministry to extend the season, to capture the shrimp bearing next season's product. The industry in the Gulf of California has indeed adjusted. There are fewer boats Conclusions in operation. But the fundamental changes attending la iniciativaprivada have been distributional ones, efforts to reduce the comparative disadvantage of the offshore The sale of Ocean Garden will consummate the process of privatization in the sector by debilitating the inshore sector. Mexican shrimp industry. While the offshore sector has yet to demonstrate that it can be profitable under private ownership, enough has occurred to allow some preliminary observations on the process itself, under the shroud of structural adjustment. Notes Secretaria de Pesca 1991 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6t1.Mexico City, Sept. 26. 1. Although shrimp landing statistics for the Gulf of California are notoriously faulty due to an active Vkjar baiiaga, Alfredo black market, reported catches for two ports, Guaymas and El Golfo de Santa Clara, show a 70 and 80% 1993 Reducen 40% diesel marino. El Itnparcial, Hermosillo, Sonora, November 12. drop, respectively, from the 1989-1990 to the 1990-1991 seasons. The arguments mxshalled by the Weintraub, Sidney scientific community to refute the notion of stock collapse have been assessed in McGuire (1991). 1990 A Marriage of Cotrvenience: Relatiotrs Between Mexico and tire United Slates. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. The suripera is a net tied to two poles which extend outward from each side of the panga. It is open on one end, forming a mouth through which shrimp enter. The gear must be constantly moving Zedefio M, Nieves and Heman Aubert against the current and against the direction of shrimp. 1993 The Spatial Organization of Offshore Shrimping. In: Thomas R. McGuire and James B. Green- berg (Eds.), Maritime Community and Biosphere Reserve: Crisis and Response in the Upper Gulf of California. Occasiotlal Paper No. 2. Tucson, Arizona: Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology, University of Arizona. Pp. 76-89. References Cited

Aubert, Heman, and Marcela Wsquez Le6n 1993 TheEthnography of Fishing. In: Thomas R. McGuire and James B. Greenberg (Eds.), Maritime Community and Biosphere Reserve: Crisis and Response in the Upper Gulf of California. Occasiotral Paper No. 2. Tucson, Arizona: Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology, University of Arizona. Pp. 49-75. CRIP 1992 bole tit^ Infonnativo No.33. Guaymas, Sonora: Centro Regional de Investigation Pesquera. Chhvez, E.A., and D. Lluch 1971 Estado Actual de la Pesca de Camar6n en el Noroeste de Mexico. Revista de la Sociedad Mexicatra de Historia Nattcral32:141-56. Hewitt de AIchtitra, Cynthia 1992 Economic Restructuring and Rural Subsistence in Mexico: Maize and the Crisis of the 1980s. Disctrssiort Paper No. 31. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Lustig, Norma 1992 Mexico: Tile Remaking of art Ecoootny. Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institution. McGuire, Thomas R. 1991 Science and the Destruction of a Shrimp Fleet. Maritin~eA~~t/lropological St~ldies 4(1):32-55. Miller, Margaret 1990 Shrimp Aquaculture in Mexico. Food Researci~I~istitrite Studies 22f 1):83-107. Nader, Ralph et al. 1993 The Case Against Free Trade: GATI: NAFTA, and tile Globalizatiot~of Corporate Power. San Francisco: Earth Island Press. Rodriguez, Raul 1993 Desplazan 10s forheos a 600 pescadores: IRDP. El Ittparcial, Hermosillo, Sonora, June 16. Rodriguez de la CNZ, Mm'a Concepcidn 1987 Aspectos socioecon6micos de la pesqueda y el cultivo de camarones en Mexico. Ms. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations. Salinas de Gortari, Carlos 1992 N State of the Natiot~Report. Mexico, DX: Direcci6n General de Communicaci6n Social, Presidencia de la Repitblica. Appendix: The Inshore Sector Calculations of Economic Efficiency for the Offshore and Inshore Sectors The following calculations of costs and revenues are based on prices for the The OfSshore Sector 1992-1993 shrimp season. The information was provided by the Guaymas inshore shrimp cooperative and individual members, as well as the export company, Ocean The following calculations of costs and revenues are based on prices for the Garden. The calculated average shrimp price of $10.69 per kg. This price is higher 1992-1993 shrimp season. The information was provided by a private owner, a than for the offshore sector since the inshore sector tends to produce better quality cooperative and the export company, Ocean Garden. The calculated average shrimp shrimp, the majority of which are blue. price of $9.70 per kg includes a border crossing fee, insurance, freight, packaging and processing costs, and a sales commission for the export company. Calculation of Costs of Production Initial investment: Calculation of Costs of Production Panga speed boat $2,167 Costs of production are calculated for a 30-day trip at the beginning of the season. Engine Yamaha 55 hp $5,233 As the season progresses, the use of diesel and oil will tend to go down as boats Net (400 m) $ 430 switch from fishing blue and brown shrimp to fishing only brown. In the former Total $7,873 case the engine runs 24 hours per day while in the latter case it runs about 18 hrs per day. It is assumed here, based on historic patterns, that an average of 6 30-day It is assumed that the engine andpanga may last for about 8 years (although apaitga trips are made per season per boat. The following are the average costs for a single may last for 20 years). An engine may last for 2 years after which minor repairs will trip. be needed every year. Both panga and engine are used throughout the year for the fishing of different species. The net fabric (paiio) has to be changed every 2 seasons, Diesel (1,100 It per day at $.28 per It) $ 9,240 Oil $ 400 while the rope, buoys, and lead (collectively, relinga) may last for about 5 seasons. Food $ 1,167 The net is only used for shrimping, thus, it is only used during the shrimp season. Health insurance ($5,666.7 per season) $ 944.4 Costs of production are estimated on a daily basis. The season lasts an average Permits ($3 14.6 per season) $ 56.94 of 2 months, of which an average of 36 days are actually worked. Estimated equipment repair ($9,768 per season) $ 1,628 Credit $ 2,404.6 Engine ($654.125 per year) $ 1.79 Subtotal costs $15,840.94 Engine ($350 per year on repairs) $ .96 Paitga ($270.88 per year) $ .74 Added to the costs of production are the salaries to the crew, which are estimated New paiio for net ($121 per season/30 days) $ 4.03 on a share basis: 20.27% of price times total catch (9.70~). Relirtga ($46.17 per season130 days) $ 1.53 Calculation of Minimum Necessary Benefits per Trip to Break Even Gas and oil $50.00 Total costs per day $59.05 TC-TB=O 15,840 + .2027 (9.70~)- 9.70~= 0 Daily salary to crew ($5 per kg/ 10.69 = 47%): 47% of price times total catch 15,840 = x(-1.97 + 9.70) (10.96~). x = 2,049.16 Calculation of Minimum Necessary Benefits per Trip to Break Even A boat needs to produce a minimum of 2,049.16 kg of shrimp per trip at an average price of $9.70 per kg in order to break even (TC = TB). Thus, for a season a TC-TB=O minimum of 12,294.96 kg must be produced: production above this limit can be 59.05 + .47 (10.69~)- 10.69~= 0 considered net benefit. 59.05 = (- 5.02 + 10.69)~ x = 10.66 Apanga needs to produce a minimum of 10.66 kg of shrimp per day at an average price of $10.96 per kg in order to break even (TC = TB). Production above this level can be considered net profit. Chaos on the Commons production. In both cases the 'tragedy' is avoided by involving management's self Salmon and Such1 interest in the preservation of the commons. Analog models have great power. This is especially true if they are based upon cultural biases. Garrett Hardin's theoretical examination of the 'rational' dynamics underlying the use of British common pasturage ultimately rests upon such a bias. Neal Gilbertsen While extremely useful to the study of common pool resource problems, the analogy Idaho State University is both limited and limiting. In practical applications, this is quite literally the case. After Hardin's work of 1968 was embraced by fisheries managers, Limited Entry programs for salmon and herring were adopted in Alaska, British Columbia, Washington State and elsewhere (Mundt 1974). By restricting access to the com- ABSTRACT Garrett Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons,' assumes a stable biotic mons, bio-managers hoped to attain Maximum Sustained Yields while avoiding the potential for any given set of common pool resources. This assumption leads fisheries problems of overuse. Other solutions included the assignment of individual quotas managers to adopt policies of Maximum Sustained Yields, Limited Entry, and quotas. Because theuniverseis perceived as a finite, steady-state system, rational management (New Zealand, and more recently the Pacific halibut fisheries). That these programs employs allocative strategies intended to promote conservation. If Hardin is wrong, have at least partially failed in attaining their environmental and socio-economic these policies may lead to the destruction of the managed resource. This world view goals lies in the misapplication of the model. is both culture bound and only partially correct. The same population formula Hardin's model presupposes a stable environment in terms of pasturage, water employed in developing maximum sustained yields, can produce deterministic, prob- availability and the like. The economic strategies of the herdsmen leads to an abilistic and chaotic models. Chaotic models, while causal, are non-linear and ex- increase in cattle population which inevitably exceeds the Maximum Sustainable tremely sensitive to initial conditions. Tiny variations in inputs can lead to very Yield (fixed biotic potential) of the commons. Overgrazing causes continued different outcomes. Lacking perfect knowledge and control of all variables, regulatory interventions may produce unexpected results. Management policy which ignores the degradation of the local biosphere which reduces the carrying capacity of the system implications of chaos, is based upon theological, economic and philosophic myopia. (Hardin 1977:16-29). In short, Hardin's model is as tame as the cattle he focuses 'Chaos on the Commons,' explores the relationship between aperiodic energy inputs, upon. and how these inputs are translated through the reproductive strategies of salmon, It Large scale maritime environments have not lent themselves to domestication. further touches upon the implications of managing a semi-chaotic system as if it were Because they inhabit an uncertain universe, many short lived marine species have a deterministic model. Finally, it explores alternatives to the existing paradigm, and adopted a radically different reproductive strategy than have their terrestrial how the existence of chaos must ultimately alter our approaches to resource management. counterparts. Their huge procreative potential produces extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. Seemingly minor variations in winter temperatures, rainfall, ocean currents, etc., result in large amplifications of fish populations. Many, if not most Trivial Variant or Essential Component? of these variables are beyond our ability to monitor let alone control. As a result, fish populations and harvests often seem to defy 'rational' expla- ...population growth must eventually nations. They are, however, in perfect conformity with the Malthusian population equal zero (the case of perpetual wide jluctziations above and below zero is a formula X (next) = XR (I-X), allowing for a variable environmental parameter. It trivial variattt that need not be discussed) is ironic that this equation lies at the heart of both Maximum Sustained Yield (Hardin 1977:17, emphasis added). management strategy and chaos theory. The fact that bio-managers focus upon a single linear outcome space while ignoring aperiodic results, can only be explained in terms of philosophic prejudice. Attempts to 'rationalize' the utilization of common pool resources are based upon If the maritime environment and its biotic potential can be even partially the assumption that all such resources share certain salient characteristics. The most explained by the application of chaos theory, then management approaches rooted important of these is the fixed biological potential of any ecosystem. In avoiding a in Western theology must be re-examined. The attempt to control what is viewed tragedy of the commons, management must reconcile the insatiable appetites of as an orderly, predictable universe (implied by policies of Maximum Sustained individual users with the stable productive abilities of the bio-system. The usual Yields, Limited Entry and Quotas) hust be abandoned in favor of more adaptive solutions include privatizing the commons, or conversely socializing the means of responses. In sacrificing the illusion of control we must redesign both allocative

MAST 1993,6(1/2):74-91 and utilization policies to conform with the inherent instability of fisheries out- William Blomquist, Edella Schlager and S.Y. Tang explore some important comes. qualitative issues in their provocative paper 'All CPRs Are Not Created Equal' (1991). The two dimensions they focus upon are 'stationarity' and 'storage.' As they write, 'This typology classifies CPRs according to whether flow units are stationary Problems in Perception and whether storage is feasible.'

'Tmth' as preached by scientists often Flow Units turns out to be no more than prejudice inspired by prevailing social and politi- Fugitive Stationary cal beliefs (Gould 1977:44). Infeasible fisheries grazing areas Storage - Hardin's cattle graze upon Newton's apples. Their pasturage is limited not only by Feasible irrigation groundwater geographic boundaries, but by philosophic ones as well. Temperature, sunlight, rainfall and the rate of vegetation growth apparently have been uniform in this While such analysis clearly differentiates the common pool resources of fisheries acreage since 4004 BC. The cows are simply animated machines designed to from Hardin's grazing areas in terms of resource mobility, it does not examine the translate this clockwork universe into meat and dairy products for human consump- implications of reproductive strategies in maritime and terrestrial species. Neither tion. While the internal logic leads inevitably to the paradox of destruction, human does it raise the troubling possibility of a chaotic outcome space. The authors do actors retain control of environmental outcomes. note, however, 'If flow units are fugitive, variability in the flows available from one Do we really occupy such an orderly universe? Was it created for the benefit of period to another is likely to be greater and more difficult for users to understand humanity? Does our species enjoy a special relationship with God that entitles it to and anticipate.' a management role? If so, does 'efficiency' lie in the manipulation of the environ- The power of Hardin's model lies in the paradox of rational self interest leading ment or in the adaptation of human appetites? to collective irrationality. In this conflict, the stable productive abilities of a These issues are not new to the scientific community. Lyell's concept of stationary biosphere are destroyed. By pointing out that fugitive common pool uniformity was based upon the precept that natural laws were constant (uniform) resources are more likely to,vary in terms of availability, Blomquist and company in space and time. That if the past was capricious, and God was free to violate natural have torn down the first cultural fence. Hardin's cattle are free to wander, and they law at will, then science could not unravel history. While modern geologists accept belong to those who capture them. the fact that both uniformism and Agassiz's catastrophism have played a part in In her article 'Chaos in Fisheries Management,' M. Estellie Smith has raised this shaping our planet, the uniformist argument has prevailed in cultural mythology issue more directly: (Gould 1977:150). When Darwin introduced his concept of evolution he was forced to graft Adam There are, on the one hand, those who view Nature in classic Newtonian terms; on the other Smith upon nature in order to explain his theory of natural selection within the existing hand, there are those whose understanding of natural processes is strikingly parallel to the model socio-religious context. Each individual within a species, acting in its own selfish being suggested by the newly emerging science of Chaos. Adherents of the first position model the world in terms of linear relationships; those of the second, in non-linear interweavings interest, contributed the necessary genetic materials that allowed for gradual adaptive (1990:4). change (Gould 1977:lOO). Herbert Spencer used this paradigm to justify the inequities of the economic status quo as being no more than 'the survival of the fittest.' The fact Smith suggests that scientific, governmental and academic pressures require a that the co-founder of evolutionary theory, Alfred Russell Wallace proposed a more 'scholarly' view of '...nature as (1) a system and (2) a system in which there is rapid and cataclysmic evolutionary sequence, was largely ignored until the possibility periodic order. (...)In such a system, one must monitor and measure within a context of cosmic collisions was once again allowed into the scientific community. that stays constant from Time Measurement XI to Time Measurement X2, X3, etc.' The concept of an unchanging steady-state universe owes more to religion than (ibid.). An orthodox belief in uniformity is extorted and becomes the standard of it does to science. This is not to say that uniform processes are unimportant in nature, acceptance. or that many if not most outcomes are the result of slow and predictable change. It Members of Smith's second group, made up largely of fishermen, hold an does, however, raise the question of cultural bias in the application of 'scientific' axiomatic view of Nature as 'non-random but unpredictable.' Natural processes are fisheries policy. complicated and dynamic and for all practical purposes aperiodic. While Smith focuses upon the conflict generated by these world views, she does not exclude the of energy conversion there is both storage and loss, which dampens the amplitude possibility that both may be partially correct. manifested in the next stage. In light of Alaska's experience with actual salmon production, it is surprising Many maritime species employ a reproductive strategy of extreme fecundity. that 'chaotic' explanations have not been offered sooner. In 1974, the year Alaska's This allows them the potential of more accurately reflecting the variance in energy limited entry program was adopted, Dr. Dayton Alverson the director of the inputs. Since these inputs ultimately depend upon both weather and oceanic con- University of Washington's Northwest fisheries Center pointed out that in Bristol versions and distributions of solar energy, and since both weather (Lorenz) and Bay 'the biological surpluses can vary by a factor of 30 from year to year' (Mundt hydrodynamics (Swinney) exemplify non-periodic systems: the populations mani- 1974:78). This has been underscored by numerous unanticipated fluctuations in fest a high degree of non-linearity (Gleick 1987:105). Predator populations that Alaskan salmon production. base their reproductive strategy upon low potential-high survival, cannot quickly respond to these fluctuations in energy input. Because energy is dissipated in each link of the food chain, climax predator populations appear nearly steady-state. Predator-Prey Relationships

Hardin's model is both culture bound and anthropocentric. The 'tragedy' would Prey Species Reproductive Strategies seem to lie in the loss of potential collective profits. Were the cattle to enjoy an isolated steady-state pasture, free of predators, they would soon overgraze the area Nature it seems is the popular name for and produce the same results Hardin laments. This would not be described as milliards and milliards and milliards of particles playing their infinite game of 'tragic,' but rather as a manifestation of 'the balance of nature.' billiards and billiards and billiards Were wolves (cooperative predators) introduced into the system, the cattle (Hein 1966:24). population would be constrained, the grasses recover, and the herd's population would stabilize at a higher level than in a system lacking predators. The wolf Salmon, like most other fish, base their reproductive strategies upon an uncertain population would eventually mirror that of its prey. This too would be seen as a future. A spawning pair of salmon may account for 3,000 fertilized eggs. natural balance. Simple replacement re-quires that .067% survive. Obviously, small differences in Population dynamics can be viewed as a problem in energy flows. Grasses this survival rate can lead to huge returns or disastrous failures. A mere 1% increase convert solar inputs into calories that cattle can utilize. Cattle convert these to the would lead to a return 16 times larger than the parental population. protein form that wolves require. At each stage of the food chain there is a 'loss' in Since salmon inhabit a universe that is affected by many variables, (winter terms of this closed model. The grasses are more efficient in terms of 'usable' temperature, fresh water flows, food availability, etc.), their biological response has conversion than are the cattle, the cattle more efficient than the wolves. been to adopt a strategy of extreme fecundity and geographic-genetic diversity. Reproductive strategies reflect a species ability to respond to energy fluctu- Each spawning system can be expected to produce unique annual conditions which ations. Annual grasses produce a prodigious amount of seed, which allow them to will result in localized 'booms' and 'busts.' Should the entire region enjoy favorable survive adverse conditions, and prosper during good times. Breeding cattle produce conditions, and the oceanic environment allow, extreme amplification can occur. a single offspring every year, heavily weighted towards females. While far more Systemic failures are equally possible. fertile than wolves, the cattle cannot advantage themselves quickly of the annual This aperiodicity may be both the result and a component of the survival fluctuations in grass production. In terms of input-grass-cattle-wolves, much of the strategy. Since predator populations are dependent upon prey availability, regularity energy is wasted, and large differences in input are manifested in such slight wolf , encourages predator tracking. Some species, such as cicadas, employ the dual population variance that the system appears stable. technique of predator satiation (extreme fertility), and a reproductive cycle based The food chain can be thought of as a biological storage battery wherein fugitive on large prime numbers (to discourage predator adaptation) (Gould 1977:97). flow units (solar energy) are captured and converted to usable forms. Inputs vary Non-linear population cycles would seem to serve a similar purpose. If so, human over time and season. Arctic and sub-arctic environments are subject to greater . predators must recognize these fluctuations for what they are. fluctuations than temperate and equatorial environments. In all cases the lower links Hardin's model does not include predators, but rather sets humanity apart from of the food chain adopt strategies that are based upon efficient utilization of these nature. Since biotic potential is constant in terms of annual output, he implicitly inputs, and their populations demonstrate a high degree of instability. At each stage endorses rationap exploitation. But salmon are not cattle, and the oceans are not mext

c",-. $3T" gag: 2 2 g' 6. 2 ?.0 g 6'3 1 sggg3 W%, !%gg:3-$3 is 0 za$j%8;t-a E -351 z:sg3m3.0 ZTgP Fa 2 t: 3283. ti. 0 a 8 2 ;g2- 2 ti.%i. 0 3 og a c 5.0 53 a - g. $ I P g-43 ". 8.45's 2 8 ne0.5~'5.z; gg* 0 FgF!..,trw 4 s g Y21% 0 G. g 3 a 8% 0. " tr z0,9 This equation, which ultimately describes all bio-systems, can produce outcome 'Rational' allocative policies have the added benefit of assumed economic patterns that appear to describe deterministic systems, probabilistic systems, or viability. An ongoing fisheries will result in a constant annual harvest to be divided non-periodic 'chaotic' systems. The value ascribed to the environmental growth among a fixed number of users. Since production is constant, and the worldwide parameter (R) is the critical factor. Bio-managers who employ MSY models assume population of consumers is growing, the value of the harvest should increase over that the value of R is fixed at the artificial value of approximately 2.7. (This is the time. point where populations overshoot a stable sustainable level, and if unmolested fall The problem is that reality does not always conform with the limited interpret- back to that level.) ation of the model. The reproductive strategy employed by salmon is instructive. If the biological potential of a fisheries is constrained by a stable environment Tiny alterations in survival rates lead to huge amplifications in populations. To (R), then policies which limit access or assign individual quotas can be employed admit that rainfall varies from year to year, as does winter temperature, spawning to avoid overutilization. Since the spawning population (X), is the only determining acreage, plankton blooms, ocean currents, predator populations etc., is to allow for factor in establishing returns (X next), bio-managers need only concern themselves the possibility of a variable environment. In terms of our model, this would result with escapement levels. In theory, this will lead to a stable productive model with in a movable value for (R). catches at or fluctuating around the point of equilibrium. If this is the case, the concept of Maximum Sustained Yields is meaningless. Policies which restrict participation or assign individual quotas are designed to While each year, or spawning cycle would represent a unique biotic potential, slight limit collective appetites. They usually fail to do so because individual fishermen variations in environmental parameters could result in stable, periodic, or aperiodic attempt to increase their 'share' through overcapitalization in technological inno- patterns as well as unpredictable amplifications of population. Fisheries production vation. Moreover, processors who possess much political influence, require a would at times seem to conform to deterministic, probabilistic and chaotic expla- minimal level of annual production that often exceeds the reproductive potential of nations. actual returns. CHAOS MODEL PROJECTED POPULATION

2.0 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4

R (Envlronmontal Paramotor) year \ - annual outcomes Figure 3. Figure 4. , 3 '1 While the model describing MSYs assumes a stable universe, and deterministic of nutrients to the longer term storage system of forests. It is as if the wolves have outcomes, most bio-managers allow themselves a degree of flexibility. That is, by taken to eating the grass upon which the cattle depend and even the soil which assuming an 'average' case for the environment, they move their predictive models nurtures the grass. into the realm of probability. A certain spawning population will lead to a return In defining the natural world as a discrete set of deterministic relationships, that falls within a normal distribution, (fluctuates around a point of equilibrium). Western science has set a course which will inevitably lead to the exhaustion of the This compounds the problem of identifying 'chaotic' outcomes. very resources upon which it depends. This is 'tragic' only if one views the collapse Most population outcomes of a 'chaotic' R value (over 3.7), fall within the range from the perspective of a species which will be eliminated or reduced to an described by probabilistic models. Managers dealing with such results accept them impoverished existence. Whether the would be managers will be among those as normal and supportive of policies based upon probabilistic assumptions. The species remains to be seen. higher than chance frequency of inexplicably poor outcomes, usually results in blame being placed upon some previously unidentified 'causal' factor and is often accompanied by requests for increased funding. The higher frequency of unexpectedly Managing Chaos favorable outcomes is always attributed to 'good management.' In short, any 'chaotic' outcome can be interpreted as supportive of existing policies and preconceptions. If the natural world allows for chaotic outcomes but management models do not, Scientific governmental agencies have generally refused to incorporate the then the universe must be altered to conform with the model or the model must be implications of chaos theory into their management models. This may have more made congruent with the universe. This is a simple choice between control and to do with the cultural need for 'control' and the requirement of legitimacy than it adaptation. There is little doubt that a culture which denies and fears the existence does with existential reality. Were a scientific-cum-bureaucratic agency to admit of chaos will adopt the former strategy. the possibility of a partially chaotic system, much of its social justification (to attain The last two decades have witnessed the development of two alternative predictable outcomes) would fall away. Such attitudes are rooted in a cultural methods to wild salmon management. Aquaculture or ocean ranching allows for complex which ignores the policy implications adhering to interactive rather than selective breeding and partial environmental control. Pen rearing or 'farming' control systems. allows for total environmental control. Both pose dangers to the continued existence of wild stock fisheries. It is not the fact that either of these methods are more efficient in terms of biological production or cost effectiveness, but rather that they One Creature's X is Another Creature's R conform to the philosophical norms of modern society.

In divorcing themselves from nature humans have assumed a property settlement that may yet be contested. The earth has been defined as and divided into separate Rationality In Phase Space sets of 'resources,' each of which is subject to human control. Because the universe is both ord&ly and stable, it is best understood in terms of simplified systems Afinal analogy may be useful. It involves a roulette wheel. In the first instance, the analysis. 'Unimportant' relationships are discarded. wheel has a single slot into which the ball may fall. There is no gamble, and one's Resource tnanagement incorporates this species specific approach. The Tongass winnings simply depend upon one's investment. The initial 'bet' results in a known National Forest covers most of southeast Alaska and is harvested under the super- return. This is the universe represented in deterministic models. vision of a Forest Service intent upon providing a MSY in terms of timber If the game is now changed to a normal wheel lacking only the outcomes 0, and production. Rivers are calibrated in terms of sustainable hydro potential by the 00, one can play a probabilistic strategy by betting red-black, odd-even. Since an Army Corps of Engineers. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game attempts tc honest wheel will produce each color 50% of the time, a betting strategy of red, red, attain its steady state goal through management of spawning populations. red ... will allow one to finish exactly even. Insurance companies base corporate In this industrial compartmentalization of 'resources,' the interdependency of profits on such calculated odds. periodic and aperiodic manifestations is ignored. The fact that forests provide Finally, if the wheel is changed to include only the thirty two numbers, a many essential salmon habitat may be acknowledged by timber producers, but their pockets strategy must be employed. That is, by covering every number on the table, one can insure a pay-off that allows one to stay even. If all numbers are not covered, success can be quantified in terms of total annual cut. Less recognized is the fact \ that the aperiodic salmon represent a means of transporting oceanic energy in terms big wins will be offset by big losses in a random fashion. Strategies in Fishery Management This increase in production has undermined the economic assumptions used to justify limited entry programs in the wild salmon fisheries. Since farmed fish are Not to encumber the earth -No pathetic now contributing to a worldwide surplus, commercial fishermen have seen their Excelsior, but just this: not to encumber production severed from expected economic returns. the earth (Hammarskjold 1966:66). If this trend continues, farmed salmon will replace natural stock fisheries. When this happens, the cattle will have been put back in the pen, the commons Determinism privatized, and the universe of salmon made to conform to our standards of If deterministic results are to be obtained from a program of fisheries management, predictability. the managers must control both the initial population (X) and all the variables Probabilism contained in the environmental growth parameter (R). The universe must be privatized, simplified, and subject to manipulation. Salmon farming, as introduced While greed may be an individually adaptive trait in a universe characterized by by the Norwegians over a decade ago meets all these requirements. stability, cooperation is a rational response to uncertainty. The maritime origins of

, In addition, the ability of managers to control for size, freshness, year round the insurance industry was a reaction to this problem. By spreading the risks of availability and quality control, would seem to conform to the requirements of the vessel losses, La Rochelle wine merchants assured themselves of good profits while modern market place. These factors have seen worldwide production of farmed avoiding the harsh consequences that the probabilistic maritime environment salmon increase from 15.7 million pounds in 19,80to 596 million pounds SR 1991. eventually extorts (Morison 1971:265). This represents over one quarter of the total world supply (Knapp 1991:1-4). Acting upon the same motivation, Alaska's salmon fishermen instituted a series of collective aquaculture programs nearly two decades ago. These hatcheries were initially funded by a self imposed tax upon fishing receipts during a period of Farmed Salmon Production: World Total severely depressed salmon returns. They now account for over 10% of the salmon harvested in Southeast Alaska and over 50% of the Prince William Sound harvest (milliono or Doundn) 600 (Pinkerton 1993:4-6). Managers of the aquaculture associations enjoy a higher degree of control than do wild stock managers. That is, they not only control the initial population (X), but control all aspects of the environment (R) for the critical first year. The survival rate of hatchery reared fish is considerably higher than that of wild stocks. Returns do seem to oscillate around a point of equilibrium, and usually fall within the predicted range. Unfortunately, these fish compete with wild stock runs (and become part of an altered systemic R). Some fear that the advantages enjoyed by hatchery reared salmon will result in a diminished gene pool. Quasi-Natural selection will inevi- tably lead to a variation in Gresham's Law: the bad (hatchery reared) fish will drive out the good (native). Since the economic imperative which led to these programs (scarcity) has now reversed itself to a point where the wisdom of producing more salmon has been called into question, (supply and demand), the future is unclear. Should farmed production continue to displace wild salmon in the market place, an ever larger percentage of hatchery surpluses will be harvested by aquaculture managers in order

00 01 02 83 04 US 06 07 00 09 90 91 to cover production costs. This will result in diminished returns to shareholders and at best as self-supporting semi-public bureaucracy. yeax Figure 5. Chaos fishery management techniques as deliberately 'conservationist,' this may be an imposition of modern management conceptions (Knutson 1989; Pinkerton 1989). The underlying assumption of Maximum Sustained Yield management, (a stable In point of fact, Haida, Tlingit, Tsimptsian and other Northwest Coast tribes did not environmental parameter) may not be applicable to wild stock fisheries. If this is 'manage' nature, but accepted their position as an integral part thereof. Salmon, the case, the derivative policies of Limited Entry and Individual quotas, will also which provided the chief economic basis for NW culture, would only return so long prove non-functional. By focusing upon escapement requirements (X), managers as the people did not offend the spirits governing them. ignore the far more important consideration of environmental constraints (R). In In accepting their role as an integral part of an interwoven natural system, and terms of Hardin's model, bio-managers are culling the cattle while ignoring the by designing social institutions that provided a means of redistributing aperiodic pasture and water requirements of their charges. acquisitions of wealth, Northwest Coast society engineered a successful predator- . Managers of industrial resources are not exempt from political pressures. The prey relationship. This was not only 'wasteful' to European eyes, but constituted a history of the Alaskan and Canadian salmon industry underscores this fact. When heretical threat to a Western philosophy based on the 'rational' principles of the old instruments of near corporate monopoly (traps, exclusive areas, fishing individual greed, and environmental control. license assignment) gave way to the reforms of limited entry, they were welcomed The potlatch was outlawed by European settlers convinced of the superiority of as steps towards a more equitable distribution of benefits. The twenty years which their own productive and distributional models. Native culture, impacted by disease have followed the introduction of these policies have witnessed an ongoing transfer and displacement, suffered a collapse of confidence. The salmon and their habitat, of both Canadian and Alaskan salmon from the independent small boat (gillnet) which had provided an economic base for a thousand years, were 'offended,' as the sector, to the corporate dominated industrial sector of purse seining (~ilbertsen trees, minerals and fish themselves were redefined as 'property.' 1990). In terms of rational response, a many pockets strategy would seem preferable to policies which result in concentrations of production. Diversification, however, Conclusion cannot be encouraged by a management agency dedicated to corporate profits as a measure of its own success. A man must have chaos within him to be able to give birth to a dancing star (Nietzsche in Schuman 1991:141). Alternatives It may be that 'rational' solutions do not obtain in a chaotic universe, but rather that ....there is no technical solution to the wisdom lies in insecurity. In adopting the non-management philosophy of in- problem (Hardin 1977:17). digenous fishers, we must also accept our role as interactive agents; responsible not only to ourselves, but to the other creatures and spirits that interact with us. Alaska's native peoples adopted a cultural mechanism to deal with the uncertainties 'The case of perpetual wide fluctuations above and below zero,' would seem to of maritime existence. The potlatch served a redistributional function, which be the norm in a healthy biosphere. Such fluctuations of energy input are stored by allowed temporarily prosperous groups to acquire status and prestige through species whose reproductive strategies accommodate aperiodicity. While each link competitive generosity. Since the group receiving the gifts was obligated to eventu- on the food chain tends to dampen amplitude, the assumption of a steady state ally respond or to suffer extreme loss of face, the ceremony can be regarded as an natural universe is a dangerous folly. investment designed to offset the instability of fisheries. This would appear to A philosophic bias which assumes such order and predictability, generates incorporate elements of both insurance and a 'many pockets' strategy. By amelior- demands for manipulation. When a culture discards its strategy of cooperative ating the peaks and valleys inherent in the chaotic systems of local salmon returns, predation, and assumes the role of manager, it simplifies and reduces the storage the potlatch provided a measure of economic stability to the region. Unlike 'tech- capacity of the system. nical solutions' that objectify nature and attempt the imposition of control, it was a Salmon would seem to represent an aperiodic interface between the maritime social solution based upon human adaptation. and terrestrial energy systems. As such, they are an indicator species which reflect Northwest Coast culture did not impose the wrenching dichotomy of humanity the functioning of both. When the storage capacity of forests and watersheds are isolated from nature. While Pinkerton, Knutson and others describe indigenous reduced, they can?ot utilize the oceanic nutrients which salmon carry. Since the energy stored in the terrestrial system is reduced, salmon populations must decline Mundt, J. Carl (Ed.) and in so doing carry fewer calories back to the maritime system. 1974 Litnited Entry Into tlre Cottrttrercial Fisheries. Seattle: Institute for Marine Studies, University of Washington. What Hardin describes is indeed a tragedy, but not for the reasons he asserts. The growth or disappearance of a single species is of little consequence to a dynamic Pinkerton, Evelyn 1993 Economic and Political Benefits From The Coordination of Capture and Culture Fisheries: The universe. Perhaps the great extinction which industrial society is currently inflicting Case of Prince William Sound Pink Salmon. Ms. upon the planet is of similar unimportance. The 'tragedy' lies only in the fact that 1989 Cooperative Managetttetrt of Local Fisheries. Vancouver: UBC Press. we as a choreographic species have forgotten how to dance with stars. Schuman, David F, with Dick W. Olfus 1991 A Preface to Politics. Ithaca, ILL: F.E. Peacock Publishers. Smith, M. Estellie Note 1990 Chaos in Fisheries Management. Maritittze Atifliropological Studies 3(2): 1-13.

1. This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the International Arctic Social Science Association First International Congress of Arctic Social Science, Universit6. Laval, Ste-Foy, Quebec, Canada, 1992.

References Cited

Agencies and Indian Tribes of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority 1990 Integrated System Platr for Salttlon atid Steelliead Prodr~ctiottIt1 tlie Cohnrbia River Basin. Anderson, Lee G. 1981 Econottric Atialysis for Fisheries Managenlent ~ians.Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Science Pub- lishers. Blomquist, William, Edella Schlager and S.Y. Tang 1991 All CPRs Are Not Created Equal: Two Important Physical Characteristics and Their Relation to the Resolution of Commons Dilemmas. A.P.S.A. Gilbertsen, Ned 1990 Corporate Control of Common Property Resources. Victoria, B.C. Catradiatr Political Science Associatioti Proceedings. Gould, Stephen Jay 1977 Ever Sitice Danvin. New York: W.W. Norton. Hammarskjold, Dag 1966 Markings. New York: A. Knopf. Hardin, Garrett and John Baden 1977 Matragitig tlie Cottiinons.New York: W.H. Freeman. Hein, Piet 1966 Grooks. New York: Doubleday. Knapp, Gunnar 1991 Alaska Salmon Markets and Prices. Juneau, AK. Salttlott News. Knutson, Peter 1989 The Unintended Consequences of the Boldt Decision. Biliural Survival Quarterly. Morison, Samuel Eliot 1971 The Europeatt Discovery of Anzerica. New York: Oxford University Press. The naditional Approach Towards Sustainable lation by communities based on traditional practices with the aim of controlling fishery exploitation conditions (Weigel 1985). However, the extent to which tra- Management of Common Property Fishery ditional management strategies can enhance the productivity of the fishery re- Resources in Nigeria sources, arrest the declining trend in fish production or prevent over-exploitation of the resources in the country remain largely unsubstantiated. Yet, unless there is adequate information concerning the effectiveness of such strategies it will be Ade S. Olomola difficult to take sound decisions on the appropriate line of action that could assist Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (Niser) in achieving optimal utilization and renewability of the fishery resources. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of traditional resource manage- ment in fostering sustainable use of fishery resources in the artisanal sub-sector. ABSTRACT The search for effective ways of managing renewable natural resources Specifically, we shall (a) examine the incentives from common property rights, is currently being intensified in many developing countries. In order to attain optimum (b) identify the mechanisms of fishery management by the fishing communities, utilization and renewability of the resources, emphasis is often placed on state (c) determine the factors influencing the compliance with the rules mutually agreed regulation and private ownership to the utter neglect of local collective actions. Both approaches have made limited impact on the sustainable development of fishery upon by the resource users, and (d) assess the effectiveness of the management resources. The root cause of failure has been the misperception of the property regimes mechanisms. under which fishery resources are being managed within the local environment. The The study was conducted in Ondo and Rivers States in Southwest of Nigeria. study reveals that traditional fishery management under a regime of common property Four villages were covered in each state. Rivers State is located approximately could be effective and so alternative management strategies such as privatization and around latitude 4'12' N and 5'50' N and longitude 5'22' E and 7'36' E. The four public control being frequently recommended in the literature will be a misplaced villages selected for the study in Rivers State are Ogbema in Ahoada Local priority. Government Area (LGA), Sagbama in Sagbama LGA, Kaiama in Yenagoa LGA and Elele Alimini in IKwere LGA (see Map 1). Ondo State lies entirely within the Introduction tropics between longitudes 4'30' E and 6' E and latitudes 5'45' N and 8'15' N. The four villages selected from the state are Igbekebo, Itebukunmi, Orereara and Nigeria is endowed with both marine and inland fisheries resources. It has a Sabomi; all in the IlajetEs'e-Odo LGA in the southern part of the state where fishing coastline of 800 km and a continental shelf of about 37,943 km2. With the new is most widely practiced (see Map 2). regime of the sea, the country's jurisdiction over marine resources covers about Data for the study were collected between July and December 1991 following 256,000 km2. There are extensive inland fisheries in rivers, lakes, estuaries, reser- a reconnaissance survey conducted in the study area early in the year. Data voirs, seasonal flood plains and lagoons. These resources are being exploited by a collection involved key informant interviewing and participant observation. For the large number of small-scale (artisanal) fisherfolk whose output account for over 80 purpose of collecting data on types of traditional authority, patterns of water tenure per cent of the total domestic fish production in the country. In recent times the system, lineage patterns associated with the use of the fishery resources and trend of output from the artisanal fishery sub-sector appears to be unimpressive and management strategies, the traditional rulers, chiefs and other community leaders this has generated considerable concern among analysts and policy makers about as well as experidnced fishermen were chosen as key informants. Information the sustainability of resource use in the sub-sector in view of the fact that a large relating to resource characteristics and exploitation techniques were obtained by number of fisherfolk depend on the fishery resources as their major source of means of participant observation. All the key informants were used as a vital source livelihood. of information on a variety of topics including kinship, lineage-affiliation, inherit- The fisherfolk operate under varying property regimes - from open access in ance, alienation and other factors which influence the management of the fishery the case of the ocean fisheries to common property regimes with regard to the inland resources. fisheries. Although they have no control or managerial jurisdiction over the ocean fisheries, the same cannot be said about the inland fisheries some of which are owned communally and managed by the fishing communities using traditional methods. Traditional methods of fishery management refer to prudent self-regu-

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Map 1. Locatiorz of Study Areas in Rivers State Map 2. Location of Study Areas in Ondo State Conceptual Issues in Common Property Fishery Management anisms that did exist. Such interventions have achieved nothing but the conversion of a common property regime to open access; thus worsening the depletion of the In many local settings around the developing world, fishermen depend on the natural resource (Cordell and McKean 1986; Messerschmidt 1986; Kanbur 1992). available fishery resources as means of livelihood and have been involved in The misconception of the nature of common property resources originates from managing the resources as their common property. However, this role has been the famous work of Hardin (1968) which he termed the 'tragedy of the commons.' misinterpreted by some economists as the primary source of inefficiencies in fishery Hardin's metaphor has engendered critical debates on natural resource management production (Gordon 1954; Bell 1972; Christy 1975; Blomquist and Ostrom 1985; under common property regimes. Several writers who have contributed to the Randall 1983). debate (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Dasgupta Although the bulk of the economic literature tends to blame the problem of 1982; Gardner, Ostrom and Walker 1990; Dasgupta and Maler 1991; Bromley 1991) inefficiency in fishery production on the common property condition of the re- emphasized the need to distinguish between the physical properties of a resource source, current thinking among researchers and development agencies indicates that and the institutional arrangements for managing it because a common property is such a literature is flawed on account of the inherent illogicalities; historically and not 'everybody's property.' Hardin's thesis was faulted for failing to distinguish analytically. Evidences abound which consider the interpretation of the 'economic between common use situations characterized by an absence of defined property theory of common property resource' as an inadequate conceptual tool for the rights governing access and use, typically referred to as open access, and common solution of fishery management problems; and which are in support of the role of property, defined as a distribution of property rights in resources in which a number the common property approach in providing remedy to overfishing (Ciriacy- of owners are co-equal in their rights to use the resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Wantrup 1975; Bromley and Cernea 1989). The seeming confusion stems from the Bishop 1975). initial misunderstanding of the concept of common property such that common Open access in the case of fisheries implies that each potential fisher has property resources and open access resources are actually regarded as synonymous comulete autonomy in respect of use since no one has the legal ability to keep others (Gordon 1954; Demsetz 1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1973; Johnson and Libecap out; the natural resource is subject to the rule of capture and belongs to on one until 1980; Libecap 1981). it is in someone's physical possession (Bromley and Cernea 1989).'1n open access Unfortunately, policy decisions and efforts in search of effective management there are no property rights; there is only possession. In other words, property - a strategies in respect of common property resources have been based on this notable social contract that defines an individual and an object,of value vis-a-vis all other misperception. Indeed, conclusions arising from the economic interpretations of the individuals - cannot exist when an individual must physically capture the object initial misunderstanding of the concept of common property resource have been before it is brought under effective control. Under common property, however, the used to justify far-reaching proposals for changing the way some common property rights of the co-equal owners are not lost through non-use of the resource. But resources are managed (Ostrom 1985; Runge 1986; Lawry 1990). One school of potential resource users who are not members of a group of co-equal owners are thought suggests the creation of full private property rights in the commons as a excluded. Common property is private property for the group and to that extent the necessary condition for avoiding over-exploitation (Gordon 1954; Demsetz 1967; decision regarding who shall be excluded belongs to the group. In view of the Johnson 1972; Picardi and Siefert 1976; North and Thomas 1977; Moloney and foregoing, Hardin's hypothetical pasture would fit into a regime of open access Pearse 1979). Nonetheless, studies have shown that privatization of the commons whereas the freshwater fisheries in our study area, as we shall see, could be offers no protection against sub-optimal management or outright annihilation (Page characterized as common property resources. 1977; Bromley 1982) and that property rights tend to be more effective in assuring conservation if they reflect the joint interests of a community of users rather than isolated individuals (Ostrom 1977; McCay and Acheson 1987). Incentives for Common Property Rights in the Freshwater Fisheries According to another school, the intervention of the state is necessary in order to alleviate the management problems of the common property resource (Hardin Our investigation of the management strategy of the freshwater fisheries in South- 1968; Bell 1972; Carruthers and Stoner 1981). But this approach has been found to west Nigeria reveals that these renewable natural resources are being managed be ineffective because in many instances where it has been applied, the problem under common property regimes through local collective actions. The rights of seems not to have been properly diagnosed. There are situations where policy ownership of lakes and rivers in the area has been traditionally assigned from time makers rushed to substitute state control for what has been misperceived to be no immemorial and the age-long socio-cultural values of the fishing villages are control; and in the process they ended up destroying the common property mech- strongly in favour of collective actions in fishery management. The ownership of \ open waters in the rivers, creeks and lakes is communal. The indigenes of each particular village lies with the village head and the council of elders acting as village claim descent rights over the use and management of the fishery resources. representatives of the villagers. In each village, such elders are appointed in a Communality of ownership implies that the resources are subject tot the rights of manner that is reflective of the geographical spread and lineage affiliations of the common use by all indigenous members of a particular village. As descendants of resource owners. The elders command tremendous respect from the fisherfolk as the founder of a particular village, the indigenes regard themselves as having equal dictated by tradition and culture. Any infringement of the common property rules rights to fish in any of the aforementioned fishing grounds. Even if an indigene of is promptly detected and sanctioned without fear or favour. In view of the foregoing, one village is engaged in any occupation other than fishing, his or her ownership the fisherfolk did recognize and accept the community as the decisionmaking unit rights cannot be denied. Such a person is free to enter into fishing whenever he or and have discouraged the role of individuals in matters relating to the access to and she decides to do so; and to participate in decisions relating to the management of control of the fishery resources commonly owned by them. In what follows, we the resources including the defence of the territorial fishing boundaries when the examine the mechanisms of fishery management and the extent of compliance with need arises. common property rules. Members of the village who presently have ownership claims over the fishing grounds become owners by virtue of their membership of the particular lineages through which the villages were founded. Invariably, their heirs would also become Mechanisms of Fishery Resource Management under Common Property co-equal owners through the same lineage affiliation. The owners demonstrate strict Regimes compliance with the inheritance rules and practices, maintain exclusive rights over the resources and uphold the principle of inalienability so as to ensure ease of As the role of common property resource management is becoming increasingly transferability to their heirs. It is worthy of mention that the right of an individual important in promoting sustainable development of the rural environment in the under the communal ownership system covers only the use of the resource and not developing countries, there is need to fully understand the capability of local its alienation. No individual has the right to transfer any portion of the fishing collective action in the management of natural resources. The rampant cases of ground in the rivers, creeks or lakes permanently or even temporarily in any form policy shifts from common property to privatization or government control should whatsoever. not have arisen if there had been a clear understanding of the social, economic and Besides, certain features of the fishery resources and the rural economy provide cultural factors which jointly promote collective actions in managing these re- strong incentives for collective actions at the local level. For instance, it is difficult sources. to establish private property rights in the riverine fisheries because the associated The theory of collective action, also known as the theory of public goods, can transactions costs will appear to be too exorbitant and can hardly be borne by any provide the basis for understanding the conditions under which users of common member of the fishing community. Consequently, no objections have been raised property resources (such as fisheries) will act in order to prevent over-exploitation. against communal ownership of fishery resources by individuals within the com- Collective action is action by more than one person intended to achieve a common munity. In addition, in view of the seasonality of fish production activities and goal or satisfy a common interest; which goal or interest cannot be obtained by an variations in the productivity of the fisheries from one location to another (Olomola individual alone. Achievement means that a public or collective good has been 1991), private property rights cannot be effectively established. This is because it provided. According to Wade (1987), the collective action might be setting and will be difficult for an individual to have access to varying portions of the resources observing a rule of restrained access to a common property resource, and the public from time to time and to bear the costs that will be involved in demarcating specific good might be the sustainable exploitation that results. Objections have been raised sites and in guarding against poachers. It is inevitable therefore, that fishery concerning the viability of this theory on the ground that rational, self-interested management in the area tends to persist under common property regimes. individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests unless there is Moreover, the procedures for establishing and enforcing common property rules coercion of some other special device to make such individuals act in their common do not encourage free-riding. The mechanisms of management make it possible for interest (Olson 1971). It appears, however, that there is no strong basis for this the behaviour of a fisherman to be easily detected. All the resource users depend on pessimism since several studies have shown that local level collective actions are fishing as a means of livelihood and there is widespread understanding that the effective in the management of common property resources without the imposition benefits of proper management in terms of increased catch and earnings will accrue of punishment by external agents (Runge 1985; Ruddle and Johnson 1985; Scudder to them almost to the same degree. The authority to regulate resource use and to and Conelly 1985; McKean 1984; Ostrom 1986; Wade 1987) as implied by Olson's protect the fisheries in the interest of the past, present and future members of a proposition. Our study of the formulation, enforcement and effectiveness of common that consumer demand can better be satisfied while producer income is stabilized property rules concerning the lake and riverine fisheries in southwest Nigeria and maintained at a satisfactory level. To allow castnetting therefore is tantamount reveals that the members of the fishing communities act in a manner that is to offering a licence for killing the goose that is laying the golden egg. The problem consistent with the theory of collective action. There are four ethnic groups in the was nipped in the bud by the elders in the community who reviewed the develop- seven communities covered in the study. They are Abuan (In Ogbema community), ment and reversed the trend by imposing a ban on capturing the bony tongue fish Ijo (in Kaiama and Sagbama communities), Apoi (in Sabomi and Igbekebo com- through the casting of nets. The mesh size of castnets has been under control since munities) and Ilaje (in Itebukunmi and Orereara communities). The communities 1988. No one is allowed to use a castnet whose mesh size is wider than 5 cm within have a long history of existence ranging from 200 to 600 years and all along fishing the territorial boundary of the community. This restriction is to continue on a has been the dominant occupation of the inhabitants. Fishing is carried out in rivers permanent basis. Gear restriction in the other community (Igbekebo) affects poie- and creeks as well as lakes in the case of Kaiama and Sagbama. Over the years and line-fishing. The ban on the use of the pole-and-line technique for capturing several rules have been laid down by members of the communities to promote Ophiocephalus Obscurus was being periodical imposed to last for one year on each sustainable use of these resources. occasion whenever it was observed that the level of catch was far below expectation First, the prohibition of immature catches in the riverine fisheries of Kaiama, based on their fishing experience in the locality. The fisherfolk recognize the Itebukunmi, Orereara and Igbekebo. The major fish types involved are the snake prodigious reproductive potentials of the fish and they believe that if the stock head (Ophiocephalus Obscurus) and the bony tongue fish (Heterotis Niloticus). remains untouched for one year (in addition to the ban on the harvest of fingerlings) Women were in the habit of gathering the fingerlings during the rainy season using the productivity is likely to improve to their own satisfaction. baskets. The fish was used for household consumption and was particularly re- Third, is the prohibition of fishing in some creeks in Ogbema and Sagbama. In garded as a delicacy for the young children. Experience has shown, however, that Ogbema such creeks include Oone, Eghololo and Ubaghan; while the notable ones the season following the one during which the practice was rampant often witnessed in Sagbama are Ndoro and Bomadi creeks. These creeks are regarded as sacred a lower level of catch of the mature fish (which was indeed highly priced in the grounds and are reserved only for making sacrifices to some deities which are area) than would normally have been the case in the absence of widespread believed by the worshippers to be playing useful roles in protecting the lives of the harvesting of the fingerlings. It was therefore, realized that the harvesting of inhabitants of the communities. It is also the belief of the people that once the fingerlings was adversely affecting the productivity of the fisheries. To remedy the sacrifices are made promptly and properly the deities would release a large quantity situation, the elders of each community met, examined the problem and imposed a of fish from such grounds to other locations where the fisherfolk will be free to ban on the harvesting of immature fish in the area. With the authority of the head harvest. The prohibition is therefore inadvertently protective of the fish stocks in of the community it was easy to communicate such a decision to all members of the such grounds. community through the appointed 'town crier.' Fourth, is the prohibition of fishing on the days of festival. This is not a common Second, is therestriction of the use of particular fishing gears either permanently regulatory mechanism. Nor is it intentionally meant for fishery management. It is or temporarily. This has been done in Itebukunmi and Igbekebo. The practice of applied during the days of the yam festival (usually in September) in Kaiama and using castnests for capturing large fish, like the bony tongue fish, sprang up in the one-week festival (usually in May) in remembrance of their late hero who was Itebukunmi in 1988 when the fish was noted to be in abundance during the rainy in indigene of the community. Nonetheless, the prohibition implies that the fish season. Several members of the community frowned at this practice because of its which should have been caught annually during the period would remain un- tendency to cause rapid depletion of the particular fish stock and the detrimental touched. To that extent its indirect contribution to the conservation of the stock of effects it could have on their economic well-being. Notably the bony tongue fish is fish in the area cannot be regarded as negligible. the second most highly priced fish in the areas (second only to the trunk fish Fifth, is the prohibition of the use of chemicals as a means of catching fish in (Gymnarchus Niloticus). A mature fish of about 4-8 kg could be sold for between Ogbema and Sagbama. This is a recent development which is detested by the 8450 and $4200 as at the end of 1991. The fisherfolk abhor a situation where a large majority of the members of these communities. In view of the health hazards and quantity of such fish will be available at aparticularpoint in time whereas at another environmental degradation associated with the use of toxic chemicals it was not time during the same season it disappears altogether. They prefer a situation difficult for a consensus to be reached among the inhabitants regarding the impo- whereby the availability of the fish spreads over the season rather than being limited sition of a ban on this obnoxious fishing technique. to a month or two through the use of castnets; at which time prices are likely to be Sixth, is the prohibition of the use of magical power in fish harvesting. The ban depressed and thus engendering lower level of earnings. Their preference means is in force in the Ilaje communities (Itebukunmi and Orereara) where it has been discovered that some of the fisherfolk engaged in the use of secret power to increase especially in Ogbema, Kaiama and Sagbama. In Ogbema, it is forbidden (on totemic their catches extraordinarily to the disadvantage of their counterparts. The users of grounds) for the village head and his second in command to eat certain fish species. charms and magical power are detected in two days. When someone within the Thus, members of the ruling house who are fishermen often refrain from catching group of fisherfolk in a particular fishing ground is observed to have a catch which those fish species. There are also individual taboos in these communities which are exceeds that of any other person several-fold and which is not in conformity with reinforced by the belief that frequent ailments will bedevil the lives of those who the low variance in catch often observed among them, the person will be accused violate them. The management implication of taboos is that the fish species which of using magical power. Also, if, some fish species are observed in the local market are not being caught by some fisherfolk, because it is forbidden for them to eat such or at home to have unusually high rate of spoilage and abnormally low shelf life fish, are apt to remain protected until they have the misfortune of being caught by when smoke dried, such fish would be regarded as a product of magical harvest. those who are free to eat them. The source of supply of such fish could easily be traced and in some cases the The ninth and the last mechanism is the use of closed seasons in the lake fisheries procedure is more or less a confirmation of the initial suspicion. The use of charms of Kaiama. There are eight natural fishing lakes (Boulala, Beinmolala, Amagbale, and magical power is considered to have similar devastating effect to that of Opomu, Awere, Akarawaruba, Eniaka and Ou) owned by the Kaiama community. chemicals and has therefore been prohibited in the Ilaje communities. In each of these lakes, with the exception of lake Ou, fishing is allowed only twice Seventh, is the emphasis on ritualism for the replenishment of fish stock. This in a year. The first fishing season corresponds with the rainy season while the second is a widespread phenomenon in all the fishing communities. When the level of catch one usually comes up at the onset of dry season when the water level begins to fall. appears to be very low based on the comparison of the catch from season to season Fishing is done in a particular lake only for one day in each of the seasons. The it is believed that the solution lies with the water spirits who must have been particular day of fishing and the name of the lake concerned are announced by the offended through neglect or infringement of certain totemic taboos. The community appointed 'town crier' with the authority of the community head. Fishing in Lake members would therefore decide to seek the favour of their ancestral spirits and Ou is closed for a rather prolonged period of time. The fishing season comes up also appease the water spirits so that fish could be released in abundance. In this once in seven years. This is in keeping with the injunction of the water spirit which circumstance all members of the community are involved one way or the other in occupies the lake. The spirit is referred to as 'Ou'. It is believed by the members of the ritual celebrations. Besides, the worshippers of specific deities offer sacrifices the community that whoever breaks the injunction and enters the lake with the in the sacred grounds from time to time and pray for increased availability of fish. intention of fishing will be, killed by crocodiles. Fishing in Lake Ou at the appro- Amanifestation of the annoyance of the deities is the lack of adequate rainfall during priate time is indeed a remarkable event. The fishing season is open only for two the rainy season as it is the case sometimes in Ogbema. The problem is usually consecutive days. The dates are well publicized within Rivers State through radio solved by performing rituals for four days to appease the gods and to invite rainfall. announcements authorized by the head of the community. The event has drawn At the end of the season another four days would also be devoted to ritual hundreds of participants (fisherfolk) from within and outside the community over ceremonies for the flood to recede and for fish to be available in large quantity. In the years. Prior to the commencement of fishing, rituals would be performed Sagmaba special sacrifices involving beating of drums, dancing, wining and dining including the display of masquerades and prayers to their ancestors so that the by members of the community are offered to their ancestral spirits and water spirits exercise could be undertaken without hitch. An indication that the water spirit has for increased fish availability on an annual basis. There are some lakes in Sagbama actually been appeased would be the absence from the lakes of c;ocodiles and any (e.g. Tungbe, Akpolokia and Akpayia) which could not be entered for fishing unless harmful creatures. All the crocodiles would have turned into sticks and no unfortu- permission has been sought through special rituals to the water spirits believed to nate incidence would occur during the occasion. However, to avoid unpleasant be controlling the lakes. In Itebukunmi elders in the community decided in 1983 to consequences participants at the two-day fishing expedition should abstain from invite a spiritualist to perform rituals in their territorial waters in order to increase sexual intercourse at least one week from the commencement of fishing and must the productivity of their fisheries. As the rituals were performed the spiritualist be convinced that they have not been involved in any devilish acts. Furthermore, warned the inhabitants against pilfering of fish within their territorial waters. They female participants should no be in their menstrual period. The people believe that were made to believe that the low level of catch at that time was a penalty by the anyone who fails to adhere to the injunctions would be attacked by crocodiles and water spirits against pilfering which was becoming rampant among the members of would not be alive to witness the following fishing season. the community. During the fishing period participants are accommodated in fishing camps The eighth regulatory mechanism (although inadvertent) is the incidence of constructed around the lake. Fishing is usually declared open by the head of the taboos. Some of the fisherfolk regard the eating of some fish species as a taboo, community by firing a gun shot into the air. The occasion is a source of high income to both the individuals and the community as a whole. Whereas the indigenes have a good sense of value in terms of respect for elders and commitment to the belief the right to operate freely, the non-indigenes have to pay access fees ranging from system as well as the existence of a powerful and respectable traditional authority. 2410 to Pi50 each depending on the type of gears employed. For instance, users of Once the elders meet and take a decision, such a decision is binding on all matchets are to pay 9410 per day each while drag netting attracts $420. The fee for community members because of the respect which the elders deserve and the belief spear fishing is 3430 per day per person while set netting and castnetting attract a that they will always act in the best interest of the community. Besides, nobody is fee of W50 per person per day. The fees are collected by accredited representatives exempted from obeying the common property rules. The rules are designed for the of the community and are paid into the community's purse. benefit of all and sundry within the community of co-equal owners of the fishery resources; and not for a particular set of fisherfolk. The feature of equalitarianism appears to go down well with the generality of the fisherfolk and has tended to Factors Influencing Compliance with Fishery Management Mechanism reduce dissensions to the barest minimum. Furthermore, the mechanisms appear to be yielding desired results. Both the The foregoing regulatory mechanisms adopted intentionally and inadvertently by intentional and inadvertent mechanism are found to be effective in the sense that the fishing communities are indicative of the reasonable extent to which the they have resulted in an improvement in the level of output or are believed to be fisherfolk understand the principles of conservation and the due regard given to the capable of doing so. For instance, the fisherfolk interviewed in the course of the avoidance of over-exploitation of their fishery resources. For instance, by protect- study confirmed that there has been an improvement in the level of catch since the ing the fingerlings today for a better harvest in the future, they have demonstrated ban on fingerling harvest was imposed. Similar results were obtained in respect of an understanding of the need for sustainable development in the management of gear restriction, mesh size control and ritual ceremonies to replenish the fish stock. their fisheries. This and other regulations enjoy widely acceptability among the Since the expectations of ritualism such as adequate rainfall, recession of flood and fisherfolk through the influence of traditional customs, belief and culture of the abundant catch are also being fulfilled from time to time, the belief of the fisherfolk people as well as the socio-economic setting in which fishing activities are being tends to be strengthened. By implication therefore, continued compliance with such carried out. The communities have considerable fishing experience and there are a mechanism can be expected in all the fishing communities. well established social systems based on kinship and virile institutional arrange- ments. These and other factors account for the limited emphasis on extraordinary measures for the enforcement of rules. In many of the communities, everyone Concluding Remarks accepts the responsibility of being his brother's keeper; thereby making it possible for deviant behaviour to be detected and penalized effortlessly. Usually the penalty This study provides empirical evidence in support of the effectiveness of collective for non-compliance is the payment of fines by the offenders. Anyone who detects actions in fishery management as demonstrated in some Nigerian fishing com- an encroachment on the fishery resources by external bodies promptly brings the munities. The evidence has come up in contradistinction to the emerging pessimism matter to the notice of the community members and decisions would be taken concerning the effective management of common property resources in Sub-Saharan speedily to ward off the aggression. In this circumstance, every adult readily accepts Africa. In a recent article, Lawry (1990) argues that communal resources are the challenge to defend the community's territorial waters, which in many cases becoming increasingly marginal to the economic well-being of many individual have a clear-cut boundary. It is only in the lake fisheries of Kaiama that special villagers and that the ability of user groups to assert control over all users is limited guards have to be constituted from among the community members to enforce the in view of the variation in the relative importance of communal resources to closed seasons. The guards were empowered by the council of elders to watch out household income. This incentive problem coupled with the claim that traditional for offenders and expose them or make 'arrests' where necessary. Such an action authorities have lost or are losing their legitimacy are the major factors, according has been taken so as to discourage free-riding and thus ensure that the substantial to the author, militating against the viability of local-level resource management. benefit that is accruable to the community consequent upon this management These arguments and similar pessimism about the role of collective action are mechanism can actually be seen to be accessible to all the fisherfolk who have contradicted by our findings. Truly the Nigerian rural society is undergoing some chosen the right path of abiding by the stipulated rules. I modernization but the level of transformation and diversification of economic Other factors which have contributed to the high degree of compliance with the activities which has been attained provides insufficient incentives for the creation management mechanisms include the homogeneity of the fisherfolk, linguistically, of a variety of job opportunities. Thus, the economic environment is permissive of culturally and economically, the cohesiveness of the social relations, the display of local collective actions in the management of communally owned natural re- sources on which many rural communities depend for the livelihood of their References Cited members. In all the communities included in the study there is mutual agreement among Alchian, A., and H. Demsetz the fisherfolk regarding the design of management mechanisms. There is no 1973 The Property Rights Paradigm. Jortnial of Econotnic History 13:16-17. problem of enforcement because every member of the community is his brother's Bell, F.W. keeper. Those who violate rules are easily detected and social pressures are brought 1972 Technological Externalities and Common-Property Resources: An Empirical Study of the U.S. to bear upon them. Evidently, the mechanisms adopted are effective in engendering Northern Lobster Fishery. Jor~nralof Political Econo~ny80: 148-58. sustainable development of the fisheries. The traditional belief system, cohesive- Blomquist, W., and E. Ostrom 1985 Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma. Policy Studies Review ness of the social system, homogeneity of the fisherfolk and their commitment to 5(2):383-93. the socio-cultural values of the communities are the main determinants of the Bromley, D.W. effectiveness of management mechanisms. The dearth of requisite knowledge 1982 Land and Water Problems: An Institutional Perspective. Atnerican Jo~trnalof Agricultural concerning the role of these factors has been responsible for the changes in Econotnics 642334-44. institutional arrangements for fishery management within the local communities of 1991 Testing for Common Versus Private Property: Comment. Journal of Enviro~ltr~errtalEconomics many developing countries. In many instances, such changes are informed by and Managen~ent21 :92-96. theoretical models and development orientations of external agents rather than Bromley, D.W. and M. Cernea empirical evidence regarding the capabilities and incentives of local-level collec- 1989 Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Overview of Bank Experience. In: tive actions. It is disheartening, however, that the changes have not only failed to L.R. Meyers (Ed.), Innovatiorr in Resource Managerner~t,Proceedings of tlte Nintll Agricultural achieve the desired results but have also led to the frustration of local initiatives Sector Sytnposiun~.Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Pp. 29-45. and heightened the inefficiencies in the use of fishery resources. Carmthers, I. and R. Stoner 1981 Economic Aspects and Policy Issues in Groundwater Development. World Batik Stag Working In Nigeria, any emphasis on the alternative management strategies such as Paper 496. Washington D.C. privatization and government regulation being frequently recommended in the Christy Jr., F.T. literature will be a misplaced priority. The unfolding results are in support of 1975 Property Rights in the World Ocean. Nat~tralResorlrces Jo1rrnal15:695-711. management under common property regimes. The economic, social, and cultural Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. and R.C. Bishop settings in the fishing communities are in favour of local-level collective actions. 1975 Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy. Natitral Resources Journal The communal ownership of riverine fishery resources and local-level actions for 15:712-26. managing them need to be encouraged and reinforced in Nigerian fishing com- Cordell, J.C. and M.A. McKean munities. The government can play a facilitating role by assisting to define the 1986 Sea Tenure in Bahia, Brazil. In: National Research Council, Proceedings of the Cor2ference on boundaries of each fishing community on the territorial waters where they are COII~IIOIIProperty Resoltrce Management. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. currently in dispute or non-existent. Policy actions should also be geared towards Dasgupta, P. recognizing and strengthening the traditional authority systems so that they can 1982 Tl~eControl of Resources. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. continue to be effective in the formulation and enforcement of common property Dasgupta, P. and G. Heal rules at the local level. 1979 Economic Tlteory and Exliartstible Resonrces. Cambridge: University Press. Dasgupta, P. and K.G. Maler Acknowledgement 1991 The Environment and Emerging Development Issues. Proceeding of the World Bank Annual This research was assisted by a grant from the Project on African Agriculture of the Conference on Development Econo~~~ics1990. Supplement to The World Bank Economic Review and The World Bank Research Observer. Pp. 101-31. Joint Committee on African Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council with funds provided by the Ford Founda- Demsetz, H. 1967 Toward a Theory of Property Rights. An~ericanEconotnic Review 57(2):347-59. tion and the Rockefeller Foundation. Gardner, R., E. Ostrom and J. Walker 1990 The Nature of Common-Property Resource Problems. Rationality and Society 2:335-58. Gordon, H.S. 1954 The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery. Journal of Political Econoniy 62: 124-42. Hardin, G. Page, T. I968 The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162:1243-48. 1977 Cortservation and Ecottontic Eficietlcy. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Johnson, 0. Picardi, A. and W. Siefert 1972 Economic Analysis. The Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems. Jotirnal of Law and 1976 A Tragedy of the Commons in the Sahel. Tecl~ttologyReview 78:42-51. Ecotiotnic 15:259-76. Randall, A. Johnson, R.N. and G.D. Libecap 1983 The Problem of Market Failure. Natttral Resotirces Jourrtal23(1):131-48. 1980 Agency Costs and the Assignment of Property Rights: The Case of Southwestern Indian Ruddle, K, and R.E. Johannes, Eds. Reservations. Soutltent Ecottotrtic Jountal47:332-47. 1985 Tlie Traditional Knowledge atid Managenlent of Coastal Systetizs bt Asia and tlte Pacific. Kanbur, R. Jakarta: UNESCO. 1992 Heterogeneity, Distribution and Cooperation in Common Property Resource Management. Runge, C.F. Workblg Paper Series, No. 884. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 1985 Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development. Proceedings of tlte Lawry, S.W. Cotifererice or8 Cornnton Property Resource Managetrtettt, No. 31. 1990 Tenure Policy Toward Common Property Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Natitral 1986 Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action. Joiimal of Politics Resoiirces Jourrial30:402-33. 46:154-81. Libecap, G.D. Scudder, T. and T. Conelly 1981 Lockirtg ttp tlte Rattge. Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing Company. 1985 Management Systems for Riverine Fisheries. FA0 Fisheries Teclt~ticalPaper no. 263. McCay, B.J. and J. Acheson (Eds.) Wade, R. 1987 Tlie Qriestiorr of tlie Conlmotts: A~itltropologicalCo~ttribtctiotts to Natlcral Resoitrce Matrage- 1987 The ~ha~ementof common Property Resources: Finding a Cooperative Solution. Tlie World ment. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Bank Researclt Observer 2(2):219-34. McKean, M. Weigel, J.Y. 1984 Managemerit of Traditio~~alCornrrlort Lands itt Japatt. Duke University, Department of Political 1985 Traditional Management of Some Lagoons of the Gulf of Guinea (Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin). Science. FA0 Fisli Circ.: 790. Messerschrnidt, D.A. 1986 People and Resources in Nepal: Customary Resource Management Systems of Upper Kali Gandaki. In: National Research Council, Proceedirtgs of the Cotifererice ott Contrnort Property Resortrce Manageittent. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.. Moloney, D.G. and P.H. Pease 1979 Quantitative Rights as an Instrument for Regulating Commercial Fisheries. Jotcrnal of tlte Fisheries Research Board of Canada 362359-66. North, D., and R. Thomas 1977 The First Economic Revolution. Econo~tiicHistory Review 30:229-41. Olomola, Ade 1991 Capture Fisheriesand Aquacultui-e inNigeria: AComparativeEconomic Analysis.African Rtcral Society Scie~tceSeries, Researclr Report No. 13. U.S.A.: Winrock International. Olson, M. 1971 Tile Logic of Collective Actiott. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Ostrom, E. 1977 Collective Action and the Tragedy of the Commons. In: G. Hardin and J. Baden (Eds.), Managirtg tlte Corimtot~s.San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 1985 Are Successful Efforts to Manage Common-Pool Resources a Challenge to the Theories of Garret Hardin and Mancur Olson? Working Paper W85-31. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Indiana. 1986 Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Ap- proaches. In: B. McCay and J. Acheson (Eds), Captiiring tile Comr~~orrs.Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Wives and nadess Location Role in the system Sex Activity Women's Careers in Ghanaian Canoe Fisheries1

Fishing community Canoe owner 8 Managing the fishing Ragnhild Over; company, credit. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen I Canoe Fisherman 6 ' Fishing, maintaining i equipment ABSTRACTCanoe fishing is extremely important in Ghana, both as a source of protein Carriers $a' and income on the family level, and as a national source of revenue. Women play a Canying crucial role as intermediaries in the processing, distribution and exchange of fish. They i have also played an important role in the introduction of new technology into the Beach Standing woman ? Credit artisanal sector as creditors, financing canoes, nets and outboard motors. And an Wholesale increasing number of women are owners of means of production and managers of 1 fishing companies. This article focuses on women's careers and how they becomefish Fishbuyers ? Wholesale-retail tnamtnies in Moree, a Fante fishing town in the Central Region. A particular attempt .1 is made to explain how women use their roles as mothers, wives and daughters in their Carriers 0 Carrying strategies in the fishing economy. It is argued that there is a clear correlation between 1- their economic success and their domestic position. Compound Fishsmoker ? Processing Family members d (smoking, salting, drying) Seasonal helpers Packing Introduction 4 Carriers d'9 Carrying Transportation It is well known that women are indispensable in fishing societies, not only through t 4 station Drivers and mates cF Driving, loading, transfer their domestic roles but also in fish related activities (Nadel-Klein and Davis 1988; of information and money Cole 1991; Nieuwenhuys 1989; Chapman 1987). Women in the artisanal fisheries I 1 of Ghana are a case in point. The sustainability and potentials of this system of Marketing Lodging woman ? Accomodation, provide fishing build on the complementarity of the genders in the sharing of work tasks. town 4 marketing and credit Men fish and women exchange, process and distribute the fish. As intermediaries, Middleman cJ' facilities women have achieved what seems to be unusually strong economic positions. The 4 focus of the present article is on women's careers in the canoe fisheries, and it Carriers d Carrying emphasises the significance of socio-economic networks for the careers of both the & small-scalefish wives and the large-scalefish mammies. These two broad categories The Wholesaler 9 Exchange of fish and cover a wide range of women in the fisheries. The majority of women in the fisheries Wholesale-retailer 9 information are fish wives. The term origins from the traditional division of labour where each Retailer ? Credit fisherman handed the catch over to his wife or, if he was not married, to his mother Distribution or sister (Vercruijsse 1984:31). Thus a fish wife is not necessarily a wife; she is a Marketing 1 destination Consumer 8 9 Payment in cash fish processor and trader on a relatively small scale. Some fish wives, especially of the product Consumption those who are too poor or too young to have 'started their own,' in other words to have established an independent career, operate oq a very small scale, and are helpers and carriers for those who operate on a 1arger'scale.iFish mammies are those who have had successful careers as fish wives to the extent that they own canoes Figure 1. Activities and roles in a chain of prod~rction,processiiig and distribution offish. and houses; they often employ other women to do the fish smoking and trade for of the men, when the work load, responsibility and influence in the community are them, and are rich by local standards. Fish mammies have many roles, such as left to the women to a greater extent than what is 'normal.' In Norway, for example, wholesaler, large-scale processor and market trader, canoe owner, creditor and women were crucial for the viability of the fishing communities as farmers, for manager of fishing companies.2 raising children and as 'ground crew,' essential for the fishing activities of the men In the process from production to consumption of fish, women are, as Figure 1 (Gerrard 1987). Cole (1991) found that women in maritime households in Vila Cha illustrates, indispensable as intennediaries. The more intermediary links a fish in Northern Portugal played a much more active role in production than in the mammy deals with and controls, the more roles she is able to combine, and the more nearby farming households. Can the special features of making a living of fishing power she has, both in economic and social terms. These women have made careers explain the importance of women in their productive and reproductive roles in in their gender defined roles to the extent that they constitute an elite in their Norway, Portugal or Ghana? A number of empiricaI examples seem to contradict communities. this, such as the apparently inferior position of fisher women in Kerala in spite of , Women in the canoe fisheries are not only autonomous economic agents, but their important role in the fishing economy (Nieuwenhuys 1989), or in Camurim also wives and community members. In contrast to many other parts of the world, in Brazil, where wives of fishermen are more or less excluded from fish related where women often have to choose between a career and a family, or they have a activities, and their power is confined to activities in the domestic sphere, in hard struggle combining the two, a combination of productive and reproductive accordance with men's macho ideals (Robben 1989). It is thus evident that we must roles in fishing communities in the West African context is apparently possible. It see gender relations in a fishing community within the context of the socio-cultural is even expected. Among the matrilineal Fante, two central aspects of being a features of that community and its region. woman stand out: to give birth to children and to be economically independent. In the context of a fishing village, the most obvious economic option and socially accepted way to achieve these goals is to be a fish processor and trader. A woman Gender and Fisheries in the West African Context is expected to be a mother in order to secure the continuity of the lineage, and to be I economically independent in order to support the children and sometimes even her With the introduction of outboard motors and modern nets (such as ali and poli), husband, and to contribute economically to the extended family. To be able to Ghanaian canoe fisheries have experienced a tremendous expansion over the last contribute to this socio-economic network of kinship and marriage, is a necessity thirty years. Ghana is today the leading fishing nation in West Africa (Haakonsen for survival as well as a precondition for social status and potential for success in and Diaw 1991). 70% of the total fish catches are landed by the artisanal sector, the fishing economy. which consists of more than 8,000 canoes in addition to the estimated 2,000 'Ghana Social relations in the fisheries are still decisive for how fishermen and fish- canoes' on seasonal or long term migration to other West African countries. In 1970 mongers organize activities, which also is the case when they fish or trade far away the motorisation of canoes was estimated to be 20-25% (Vercruijsse 1984), and in from their home towns, either on seasonal or long term migration (Jorion 1988; 1989 more than 57% of the total canoe flee; had outboard motors (Koranteng 1990). Nukunya 1989; Hagan 1983; Odotei 1991; Haakonsen and Diaw 1991). The fish The canoe fish landings rose from 27,500 tons in 1961, to 262,400 tons in 1987 mammies, with whom the fishermen deal in daily life, are often their mothers, (Hernses 1991), and the increase in fish production employed a growing number of wives, aunts, grandmothers or daughters. Technological development has trans- fishermen. The Ghana Canoe Frarne Survey of 1989 (Koranteng 1990) estimates formed the fisheries, but they are still to a large extent organized through matrilineal the number of fishermen to be 91,400 and suggests that an additional 1.5 million and conjugal relations. Although recruitment of men as crews has become more people are 'dependants' of these. Hence, the increased production also provided contractual (Ninsin 1991), and women's ability to purchase fish more dependent on new opportunities for those who process, distribute and sell the fish: the women. capital, it still has a lot to do with kinship and marriage. In other words, without a In this process, the fish mammies became the main financiers of the new socio-economic network in the system of fishing, fishermen and have technology (Christensen 1977; Vercruijsse 1983; Odotei 1991). With the increased small chances of success. production, some wealthy women were able to combine profitable investments with Socio-economic studies of fisheries often focus on the economic activities of crucial social contacts, and emerged as a group of large-scale intermediaries. They the fishermen, with an emphasis on the special 'features of fishing societies, were able to accumulate considerable wealth and converted their gains into power- including the physical hardships and high financial risksI involved (Acheson 1981; ful positions. Some have characterized them as capitalist exploiters (Vercruijsse Vercruijsse 1984; Robben 1987; Jorion 1988; Pilsson 1989). In cases where women 1984; Ninsin 1991). However, we question the relevance of using such concepts in have strong positions in fishing societies, it is often explained by the long absence this context. For example, in the ongoing discussion of the relationship between fishermen and intermediaries (i.e. Acheson 1981; Platteau 1989; Ninsin 1991; rings, and fish, which their husbands have gotten in the sea, whereof the women buy much, and Tvedten and Hersoug 1992), gender relations must be central. Given the fact that carrie them to other towns within the land, to get some profit of them, so that the fish which is the persons who inhabit the positions of intermediaries in Moree are women, the taken in the sea, is carried at least an hundred or two hundred miles up into the land, for a great present, although many a times it stinks like carrion, and hath a thousand maggots creeping in implications of the concepts we use change. The close integration of economic and it. Those women are verie nimble about their businesse, and so earnest therein, that they goe at social relations must inevitably have consequences for our understanding of the role least five or sixe miles every day to the places where they have to doe, and are laden like asses; of these intermediaries. As Vellenga (1986) points out, the specific cultural charac- for at their backes they carrie their children, and on their heads they have a heavie burthen of teristics of West Africa, such as the coexistence of polygyny, lineages, and class fruit, or millia, and so go laden to the market, and there she buyeth fish, to carrie home with her, divisions may create dividing points in a society different from those familiar in the so that oftentimes, they come as heavily laden from the market as they went thither (in Nypan West (ibid.:63). Female entrepreneurs are not less exploitative because they are 1960:2). women, but gender is of relevance in explaining why women emerged and remain Marketing of agricultural surplus was regarded as a wife's duty, as described by in these powerful positions. Field in 1940 in her works on the Ga, and this, of course, also includes fish: When new technology has been introduced to traditional systems of production, it has often had negative effects for women (Boserup 1970; Rogers 1980; Whitehead It is a woman's duty to trade any fish or food her husband produces over and above the amount required to feed the husband, wife, and children. For instance, when a husband has a catch of 1985). From the above presentation of women in the Ghanaian canoe fisheries, a fish, he will say to his wife - or to each of his wives - 'This is five shillings worth of fish. Take different picture from what we often meet in representations of African women, it and give me ...five shillings in three day's time ...' A man cannot demand of his wife that she emerges. Instead of being 'victims,' the fish mammies of Ghana appear as entrepre- works on his farm...But it is her bounden duty, as a wife, to do all the marketing and exchanging neurs; individuals who assume risks and make important decisions concerning the of farm goods for her husband (Field 1940:62-63). operation of an enterprise, in order to achieve some economic or social goal (Lewis But to trade was not solely a duty. Women saw it as an opportunity to earn money 1977:132). The importance of women for the development of fisheries, in Ghana and achieve status in the market system and in their communities. As structural as well as elsewhere in West Africa, also contradicts the commonly held view that conditions changed, women also changed their strategies in entrepreneurial ac- women are conservative and that men are the initiators of economic change. tivities. For example, Fante women took advantage of the opportunities to trade on Moreover, a study of fishing societies with emphasis on the gender dimension can give new perspectives on stereotyped views like the men:sea/ women:land and the credit with colonial companies (Lewis 1977). As we have seen, another opportunity men:public/women:private dichotomies (Nadel-Klein and Davis 1988). came later with the modernization of the canoe fleet. However, the opportunities to operate on a large scale in market trade are limited for the majority of women. Little information exists on the historical development of the strong positions of fish mammies (Odotei 1991), how they are maintained, and how women use Although 84.6% of the people employed in the commercial sector in Ghana are social relations as parts of their economic strategies in the fishing economy. It has women, 98.5% of these are retail traders (Ewusi 1987), 'and even within retail been pointed out that in many West African societies, political structures are gender trading, petty trading, hawking and peddling are the main pre-occupations of women' (ibid.: 14). With the economic situation Ghana is facing today, with urban- sensitive and dual-sex in nature (Moran 1990:166). Both men and women are able to achieve social status via exclusively male and female channels (Okonjo 1976). ization, population pressure and increasing unemployment, women have few in- come-generating alternatives besides trading with meager turnovers. But, although In Ghana, the market system in particular provides an opportunity - often the only opportunity - for women; a hierarchy that is not dominated by men, where entre- people are broke they can at least afford some fish in the soup, and the increased preneurial activity and age grants prestige. This dual-sex type of status system, fish production was therefore welcomed as an important source of protein for the growing Ghanaian population. upheld by the cultural construction of the genders as twe separate, noncomplemen- An examination of the historical, economic and cultural processes that have tary kinds of human beings (Moran 1990), could be a key to an understanding of created the present situation of the fish mammies in Ghana, is beyond the scope of how women have achieved their economic role in fisheries. this article. It will examine how women in a particular fishing community, i.e. In Ghana, the position of women as market traders or intermediaries is deeply rooted in the traditional production system and cultural values (Lawson 1971; Lewis Moree, deal with daily life. The major topics to be addressed are, firstly, how women develop strategies for making a living in a fishing community and, secondly, how 1977; Ardayfio-Schandorf and Kwafo-Akoto 1990). Nypan (1960) quotes a de- some women achieve dominant positions in the fishing economy, in other words scription by de Marees dating back to 1602: become fish mammies. In the closely intertwined economic and domestic spheres The inhabitants of the sea-side come also to the market with their wares, which they buy from of the fishing community women combine productive and reproductive roles in the Netherlanders in the , as linnen cloth, knives, ground corals, look-glasses, pinnes, arme their strategies, and it will be argued in the following that this combination of roles Large canoes with outboard motors fish with drift gill nets and purse seines. is a prerequisite for a successful career in both fields of life. According to the chief fisherman in Moree there are 400 small canoes (down to 15-20 feet) with a crew of 8-10 men and 100 big canoes (40-50 feet) with a crew of 20-25 men. Owning a canoe is a sign of wealth which is limited to a small Fishing and Trade in Moree proportion of the population, and some canoe owners have more than one canoe. Moree has a total of 400 canoe owners. Approximately 100 of these are women, Moree is a Fante fishing town 8 km east of Cape Coast in the Central Region of with the proportion of female canoe ownership increasing. These women are either Ghana, and has approximately 15,000 inhabitants. However, the resident population sole owners of the canoe(s) and equipment, or co-owners with their husbands. An varies with the fishing season as a large proportion of the fishermen and women example of the latter is a woman who, with credit from her canoe owning husband, migrate westward to the villages near Sekondi, Axim, Half-Assini, etc., during the buys a canoe, and with her own capital buys the outboard motor and nets. In such off-season from October to April. During this period the town is very idle until a case, the husband may be the manager of the wife's fishing company and receive activities pick up with the herring and sardinella fisheries from July to September. 50% of the catch until the loan is paid back. But there are also wives who lend their Moree is a fishing town with few alternative income generating activities. Only a husbands money for the purchase of a canoe, which in turn is an advantage to her few families rent a plot of land to supply the household economy. People engaged own fish supply. in non-fishing occupations are mainly providing services for the fisher folk, and When the fish is landed on one of the six landing beaches surrounding Moree, farm produce is brought in from the nearby villages to the market in Moree, es- known to be the most rocky beaches in Ghana, the catch is divided amongst the pecially from the nearby Ewe/Ada migrant settlement Twuwiim.3 crew and the canoe owner. The most common share system is to divide the catch according to the number of crew members, plus one share for the canoe, one for the net and two shares for the petrol expenses. Thus, if a canoe has 10 crew members, the number of shares would be 14. The canoe owner would get four shares and each crew member one. But with the enormous increase in petrol prices, which were exceptionally high in 1991 as a result of the Gulf War, the common procedure is now often to deduct the cost of petrol first, and then share what remains of the catch between the canoe, the net and the crew. With such a share system, the canoe owner earns substantially more than the crew members, but helshe must also bear the costs of repair, losses of nets, etc. Each crew member gets his bucket, which before the fishing trip contained food, filled with chop fish (fish for cooking). He gives the chop fish to his wife, or sells it if he is not married. The fishermen's income in cash is settled and paid in the canoe owner's house, every Tuesday, which is the non-fishing day. In addition to the canoes that land fish in Moree, the women purchase fish at the nearby fish market in Elmina, and sometimes they hire trucks to buy cartons of frozen fish from the coldstores in the harbour of Tema. Another source of fish supply is the factory trawlers. Most industrial trawlers in Ghana are owned by foreign companies, but regardless of nationality, the Moreeans call them the Koreans. Five fish mammies in Moree, all of them canoe owners, have special agreements with the commercial trawling companies to buy fish of inferior quality, known as dumping fish. They also supply the crew of the trawler with fresh food, such as he location of the continental s coco-nuts, tomatoes ana kenkey (the typical Fante staple food made of maize). Only the five women's canoes are allowed to deal with the trawlers. Their canoes are Map 1. Etlztzic glaripsfishirzg aloly the coast ofGhalta, atzdfishing techriiqrres andfishiizg grorirtds known as Seicos and are registered by number, and sometimes the crew of the Seicos on the Continental Sire& even spend a few days aboard the trawler. Little information exist on how and why these 'contracts' developed, but the few women who obtained them are clearly in a regular fish buyers, fish wives who operate on a relatively large scale, and they may privileged position, and so are their dependents, their daughters, sons, in-laws, in turn resell the fish to small-scale fish wives. If fish is scarce, the standing women canoe crew and fish carriers, who welcome this opportunity for employment during have primary access to buy fish to smoke, and they can also choose the fish with the lean season. the best quality. The standing women sell fish on credit, and are thus in a good The price for each head pan of fish is settled for all traders on the beach in the bargaining position towards their fish buyers. Since the credit schemes of the morning, but this beach price may fall if the fish landings are large throughout the governmental and the commercial banks have proved very unsuitable for the day. The prices also vary with season. The price for a pan of herring (40-50 kg) may fishermen's needs, customs and the nature of their fishing activities, they often turn vary between 500 and 4,000 cedis ($ 1.4 - $ 11 in 1991). In accordance with the to the person who is in charge of exchange of fish for credit, for instance, when a day's beach price and the number of head pans, the wholesale price for the complete canoe owner needs to replace a motor or net. Thus a standing woman is often also catch is settled between the canoe owner and the standing woman. She is a fish the creditor of the canoe company she is attached to. Women in such positions, mammy and the intermediary link between the canoe and the fish wives. She is establish credit dependency relationships with fishermen and companies. The usually either the wife of the canoe owner or a canoe owner herself. She may have fishermen are seldom able to clear the whole debt, and creditors thus have a good bargaining position when the fish price is to be settled. Fish mammies who are both standing women and canoe owners, have strong and influential positions in the exchange of fish. The profit exceeding the canoe's wholesale price, is the profit of the standing woman. Thus a female canoe owner who also controls the wholesale of her canoe's catch, is in a favourable position compared to a male canoe owner, who has no direct control of that link in the market chain. She practically controls both ends, as an intermediary between production and exchange. Most of the fish in Moree is smoked; some is salted andlor dried. The women process the fish on traditional circular mud ovens in their compound. The fish is

Photo I. Afish rtzamnty cor~trolstlze crew as tlzey lartncl~her cartoe. Photo 2. 'Redfish'is turned on the overz and srnoked on the other side. washed and placed in up to six layers, with broom between them. The fish is smoked for 2-4 hours, which leaves the fish soft and tasty, and it can be kept for two or three days before it is spoilt. Preferably, the fish has to be sold the following day. The fish can also be smoke dried, whereby it is smoked for about seven hours. Then it can be kept for up to six months, if it is properly stored and regularly resmoked. Markets are women's domain, and a market has its own rules, social organiz- ation and political leaders. Every commodity branch has its Queen Mother. She is elected by the other market women of her branch, on the basis of her position acquired through her abilities in trade, and her political talent. Her main function is to be a mediator when there are conflicts between the traders. The traders themselves claim that Queen Mothers have no economic advantages, nor much power over other women, but that: 'We need her when there is a problem.' The main market for the fish traders from Moree is Mankessim for the small scale traders, and during periods of small catches, for the large-scale traders as well. But Kumasi is the most important market during the main season or when there is a bumper catch. The fish traders from Twuwiim have Techiman as an additional marketing centre. The smoked fish is transported with big trucks to the inland markets, while the traders themselves go by public transport via Accra on a better road. In the bumper season, groups of traders often hire a bus (a rttanza lorry or Benz) and go together directly from Moree to Kumasi. Map 2 indicates the marketing region for Moree and Twuwiim, and shows that the smoked fish ends up as far away as 600 km, in northern Ghana, and sometimes even further north, to Burkina Faso. Some few coastal women trade fish in the northernmost market centers, but the majority seldom go further than to Kumasi, Techiman and Berekum. It is wholesalers from the north (mostly female) who transport the fish from the big inland marketing centres to their home regions. During the main fishing season, many of the fish mammies stay in Moree to manage their business while a daughter or younger sister, called a representative, is sent to Kumasi to take care of the fish trade there. The representatives travel back and forth between Moree and the market in Kumasi, or they stay in the receiving end for 2-3 months during the whole season until September. Most women stay with a lodging wornan in the marketing town. In addition to accommodation, she provides facilities in the market and credit. Such lodging women often have a rjziddler~tanin their service, men from Northern Ghana who organize carriers and arrange the wholesale trade. At the fish market in Kumasi, small scale traders sell fish to bypassers, but those with long experience and those who trade on a larger scale, have regular customers to whom they sell on credit, and thus long lasting trading relationships develop. Such personal contacts are of vital importance, since the whole system of trade is based on credit and trust. For instance, the traders have I I developed a sending system: Each woman has a synzbol; a painted figure on her fish boxes, or a piece of cloth on fish baskets. The fish trader's co-operation partners in Map 2. The marketing region offishfrotn Moree. the marketing town (the representative, the lodging woman and the middleman) must know her symbol. The truck driver also knows each trader's symbol, and he fie, but she brings the evening meal, which it is her duty to cook, to thefie of the is often trusted to bring large amounts of cash from one trader to the other. husband where she also sleeps. In polygynous marriages the wives alternate on a With the close integration of production and marketing, a highly specialized and monthly basis in this arrangement. The husband has the obligation to give his wife vertically integrated artisanal fishery sector has developed in which 5% of the (wives) a monthly or weekly sum of money for cooking, the chop money. He is also Ghanaian work force is employed (Koranteng 1990). It is a system that hitherto has expected to pay the school fees of the children. Children mostly reside with the proved more efficient and flexible than attempts of introducing industrial trawlers, mother, but adolescent boys often spend a period with their father, and fostering is refrigeration facilities and centralized distribution systems (Hern~s1991). The also very common. Thus in Moree the most common way of living is a combination described processing- and distribution system is necessary for the functioning of of a conjugal household and a matrilineal residential group; a flexible network of the system of fishing, or system of employment (Jentoft and Wadel 1984), as a persons, with arrangements for production, reproduction and consumption. This whole. The dynamics of this system do not only involve the work tasks in all the socio-economic network is for most people their only social security system, and stages the fish goes through, but also the social relations between the persons who the extent of its resources is significant for both women's and men's potential to perform them. This is of great importance when we analyze women's careers in a manage economically. fishing community. Since most couples, whether in a full customary marriage or a 'lover marriage' (see Abu 1983), do not have a common residence and the children belong to the mother's lineage, breaking up a marriage is - at least practically - not very dra- Women as Traders and Women as Wives matic. And divorce rates are high. Hagan (1983) describes the pattern of divorce in an Effutu fishing town, where 'husband and wife have distinct, but complementary Fish supply is the clue to a fish trader's success. She must have access to fish from responsibilities for their own needs and the needs of the children. This system seems a canoe, as well as the money to buy it. Previously, women usually had access to to create crises for the husband-wife relationship' (ibid.:192). Hagan sees clear fish through a husband's or brother's share of the canoe's catch, and small-scale variations in the divorce rates, with one peak in April, when the fishermen return fish traders are still referred to as fish wives. Today marriage has to some degree to their families after months of seasonal migration; periods where extramarital lost its significance as a direct source of fish for a woman's trading activities, and relations are frequent. The other peak is in September after the fishing season, when as a way for the husband to get cash for his catch. A fish wife as an intermediary the income and debts of the fishermen and fish wives is to be settled. The most link between the fisherman and the market, is no longer a necessity. Nowadays, the important cause of divorce is not infidelity, but the problem of money and economic women related to crew members through family or marriage, only get the chop fish. duties that are not fulfilled in the conjugal relation. To fulfil the duties and rights The fish the wife of a fisherman smokes and sells is bought from a standing woman. of marriage is not easy, and the problems are almost always related to fish, or as the Thus a woman's ability to purchase fish rests on the amount of capital she has, but saying goes: 'No fish means no money, and that means trouble in marriage.' A very few small-scale fish wives have a capital base, and can therefore only pay for marriage, therefore, must have a significance other than a reproductive one. To be the fish after she has sold it on the market. So in practice her access to the fish supply married to a fisherman opens up possibilities in the fishing economy. According to rests on the ability she has to obtain credit through social contacts. Access to the the women in Moree, husbands are the most frequent source of credit in their own vital inputs, fish and credit, are mainly obtained through kinship and marriage. Thus fish business. However, the women also lend money to their husbands, and they a woman's opportunities are limited if she has no favourable relations in the fishing stress that it is a loan that must be repayed. This mutual credit relationship makes economy, through a husband or matrilineage. marriage important for the ability of both men and women to make a living out of The Fante have a matrilineal kinship system. Each person is a member of a fishing. Women are regarded as the 'bank of the household'; she should make wise matrilineage, the abtrsua, with a male lineage head. The abusua relate to a common dispositions with the income from the fishing season, often with credit from the ancestress, to whom members trace matrilineal descent heaching back about four husband or his canoe company, in order to carry the family through the lean season. generations (Bleek 1987:139). The abtrsua is divided into many matrilineal residen- A fisherman put it this way: 'If a man gives money to the wife, she is supposed to tial entities, fie, with a male or female head. The size and composition of the make more money out of it.' This implies that he gives her credit to buy, process households vary with season and with its development cycle. There are many and sell fish. A wife also lends the husband money when he is broke during the lean exceptions and variations, but generally the Fante practice a matri-local pattern of season, so that he can cover the expenses for consumer goods, food and school fees residence. Women and men continue to live with their matrikin after marriage. for the children. At the end of the fishing season, the wife should pay back the loan Husband and wife also have a separate private economy. The wife works in her own from the income of the season's fish trade, and the husband is expected to have earned enough during the fishing season to pay his debt to the wife. If he is a proper Prom Fish Wife to Fish Mammy husband, he also gives her cloth for a dress. Thus, to some extent the significance of exchange of fish in marriage has been replaced by contributions in cash. But still The three following cases are examples of women who all make a living in the the income of both spouses comes from canoe fisheries; modernized, but organized fisheries, but with different starting-points, on different levels and with different through social relations of production, and the relationships between the persons in degrees of success. The two first cases exemplify different categories of fish wives, this employment system are important for how they organize their activities, and and the third case is the success story of a fish mammy. for their potentials for success. The case of fish carrier Adjoa illustrates how the majority of women through If a woman is born into a poor family, or does not have a husband who is able marriage and their own entrepreneurial activities, try to establish independent to support her with chop money and seasonal credit, she has 'nobody to turn to,' careers as fish wives. Adjoa (19) is still very young and very poor. She lives in her which is a category of fish wives often referred to in Moree. Women and men who mother's brother's house together with the mother, the sister and her seven children. lack an economically viable family network and a contact network in the fisheries, Adjoa has a nine months old daughter. The father of the child is a crew member on are the poor people of Moree. A base in a wealthy family, active in the fishing a canoe. With credit from the husband's canoe company and another canoe from economy, is significant for the socialisation into fish related occupations, as well Cape Coast, Adjoa has bought 10 head pans. They cost 4-5,000 cedis each, and a as for aperson's contact network and for obtaining credit and access to fish supplies. credit burden of 50,000 cedis ($ 137 in 1991) is considerable for a small-scale For example, a wealthy mother may give her daughter a sum of money to 'start her like her. However, the fact that the husband is the creditor, makes the own' career. But the matrilineage is not an unlimited source of credit, as expressed repayment of the loan more flexible, and Adjoa is willing to take the risk. The by a young fish wife: 'If you ask your mother, you get. But you don't get the next investment in head pans is a conscious strategy to get an advantage over the other time.' fish carriers. Competition is hard, she says: 'There are plenty, plenty carriers. The Both men and women face the dilemma of his or her inability to fulfil both one who gets the fish first, gets it.' For each pan Adjoa carries, she gets 3 or 4 fishes. obligations towards matrilineage, spouse and children (Oppong 198 1; Bleek 1987; Hagan 1983; Vellenga 1986; Abu 1983). To be part of a security network, contribu- tions are expected in return. Residence pattern, polygamy, seasonal periods of separation of the spouses and failure to fulfil the expected obligations are destabil- ising elements in the conjugal relation. People seem to be more attached to theirfie, and there are no indications that the significance of the matrilineal, extended family is losing ground as a result of the modernization of the fisheries. When asked in what to invest a large sum of money, the majority of women in Moree answer that they would 'invest in the fish business.' Their aim is to expand from their present level, however small, and increase their profit potential. For those who are so prosperous that they can imagine any such possibility, the major goal is to build a house. This is the aim of the majority, but achieved by few. The building is often done very gradually, and many families live in incomplete houses. These incomplete houses can literally be seen as physical manifestations of people's life projects. Through their fishery-based careers, women hope to be able to establish afie; a house for their children and maternal relatives, which in)turn is means to an end: Economic security in old age and a social position in (the community. The two spheres are closely interrelated, and success in one realm tends to generate success in the other.

Photo 3. Afish wife builds a new sntokitzg oven of nzrrd. Her mother and alcrzt star~dby. This is so little that she seldom bothers to smoke the fish, but sells it fresh or use it The two foregoing cases show the dependence of small scale fish wives on their in the daily cooking. But when the supply of fish is abundant, she can buy some husbands in their careers. The following case of Afi, on the other hand, shows a extra fish, and smoke it on her mother's oven. She sends it with the sending system woman who has managed to become economically independent from both husband to Kumasi, where her husband's brother's wife, who lives there, receives it. Thus, and matrilineage. She has achieved the dream of most women in Moree, and has marriage does not only give her access to credit, but also to a market contact in established a socio-economic network in which she has a dominant position. Kumasi. Afi is a successful fish mammy. She is approximately 50 years old, has given The expansion of Adjoa's career as a fish wife is going to be a slow process, and birth to 11 children of whom 9 grew up. She divorced her first husband and is now she can not afford more loans to purchase larger quantities of fish. Besides, her married for the second time. She owns a house and two canoes, she is standing mother's limited smoking oven capacity is a problem. But with time and with hard woman, fish processor and trader, landlady and head of her fie. Afi and her two work, and if the coming fishing seasons bring fish, she can, over the years, maybe younger sisters have built their big houses next to each other, overlooking Moree expand from her status as a standing woman's carrier to that of a regular fish buyer, from a hill side which has been given the name Three Sisters. Afi tells the story of whereby the profit potential would increase, and her dependence on credit from the how this all came about: husband would decrease. Adjoa's goal is to help the mother to build a house. Through marriage, then, Adjoa extends her socio-economic network which can I have been doing fish trade in Moree for more than thirty years. This is the story of how we got enable her to make a career as a fish wife, which again is a strategy to achieve status the name Three Sisters. I was the first born. The house of the second born sister is in the middle, and then comes the thud sister. I started by going to Aboadze [Sekondi-Takoradi] and buy fish ' in the matrilineage. Whether she has the chances to become a fish mammy is there as I was young [approximately seventeen years old]. That fish was already smoked, and I doubtful. Her capital input is not big enough to enable her to make the necessary sold it in Moree. We bought it in Aboadze for f 1 for 100 fish, and sold it in Moree for maybe f investments. 1,5. Then I started buying with a truck from the coldstores in Tema for five cedis per carton. I Aba is one of thefish wives who have 'nobody to turn to.' She says she is 30 would smoke it and sell it for six cedis. This was in the time of Kwame Nkruma [in the t~ly years old, but looks like 40. She lives in her mother's brother's house, and Abadoes sixties, when Afi was in her mid-twenties]. Then Nkruma got away, and the fish got more expensive. At that time I started teaching my younger sister [the second born] how to do the not know when the mother, who is on long term migration with her father to Nigeria, buying and smoking, and I included her in my business. And then I took the third sister too. This will return. Since both the uncle and the two other women in the house are old, Aba was at the time when the trawlers started coming [in the seventies]. All of us smoked fish, and is more or less the only breadwinner. She has three sons, 13, 10 and 7 years old. one of us at the time went to Kumasi to sell the fish. We shared the profit amongst ourselves and Aba's husband works as a crew member on various canoes, but he does not earn shared it with our mother. Now the second born sister has got her own three canoes, I myself enough to fulfil his obligations towards the wife and children. Amutually beneficial have two. We have built our houses next to each other. My youngest sister has now also started her own. co-operation in the fisheries is therefore not possible. Thus Aba struggles really hard to make ends meet during the lean season. She explains her situation: Afi belongs to the generation and group of fish traders who contributed to and took advantage of the introduction of new technology in the canoe fisheries. She had a The men don't look after their women now and they don't give them money. Before they would give them 1000 now and 1000 then, but not now. The petrol takes it all. And the fish we get from base in a relatively wealthy family, and could thus take the opportunities when they our husbands is so little that we cannot make any profit on that either. When I go to Mankessim were there. In other words, she had sources of starting capital. The role of her these days I am only left with 50 cedis. ex-husband in building her career is not clear, She is certainly independent of her present husband, who is a rich canoe owner with four wives, of which she is number The husband has no money to lend her, and there is nobody else she feels she can two. He has been important as an advisor in her purchase of canoes and management turn to. A standing woman would not give credit to a woman she knows will not be of canoe companies, but her main co-operators are her sisters, who also have able to pay her debt. Aba and her family live on the margin and can only wait for benefitted from the expansion of Afi's enterprises. Their role is not insignificant for the fishing season to start. Then the husband can go fishing again,/ and Aba hopefully her success. Thus the success of the Three Sisters is interlinked through a complex gets credit for fish to smoke. During the three or four months before the season of network of extended family and marriage relations which gave them access to activity and income, Aba has no security network to lean on, neither through the resources and the right contacts, and at the right time. For example, Afi is one of fie, the temporarily unemployed husband, nor from more prosperous colleagues. the few in Moree who have a Seico-contract with the trawlers, and she has obtained The lack of resources in the socio-economic network perpetuates 'failure,' and such it through the h"sband of her sister, who is a Tema-based trawler com- pany's families often enter a circle of poverty. contact person in Moree. The oldest son (31) of Afi is the captain of one of her canoes, and his two wives In a society where the extended matrilineal family is so important, economic are Afi's regular fish buyers. Her oldest daughter (25) has gotten training as a success, and hence the ability to share, can be converted into social status by letting seamstress, but goes as her representative and sells her fish in Kumasi during the the success 'trickle down' to other persons. Afi is a mature woman who has had main fishing season. The second oldest daughter (20) has 'started her own,' and her success in both her domestic and economic career, and can expect to get something husband is her motor-man (the man in the canoe crew responsible for the outboard in return for her contributions to the children, husband and lineage when she reaches motor). A teenager daughter (12) is a helper and is being trained to become a skilled old age. She enjoys the fruits of her life and runs her business with help from many processor and trader as well, and one of the younger sons (16) is an apprentice as a hands. Afi is a highly respected person. By making other people dependent on her crew member on one of her canoes. The recruitment of relatives in the fishing support, she has created something in life, and will be remembered as a 'matron' to activities is significant for Afi's control over her employees. For example, since she whom many feel grateful. In this way she can convert economic independence based does not go fishing herself, a son as canoe captain gives her more control over the on fish, into a social network that gives her economic security and social status in. operations of the crew. Moree, as well as political influence and prestige as a woman in the dual-sex Afi is an entrepreneur and administrator; she employs and manages a large hierarchy. The socio-economic network that gave her these opportunities is also the number of people who depend on her for their livelihood. She keeps the accounts 'investment object' of her success. in her head, and she seems to be everywhere - collecting money and giving orders. Without doubt Afi has authority both as afish mammy and as Mami, as her family and canoe crew call her, and she combines the roles of canoe owner, standing What Makes a Successful Fish Mammy? woman, wife, sister and mother, both when she is at home in the house and when she is on the beach managing the business. Who are the women who have 'made it,' who have become wholesalers, interme- diaries, creditors and owners of means of production; the women who enjoy relative wealth and prestige in Moree? And who are the ones who have not? We must seek explanations in the specifics of the socio-economic organization of the, in this case Fante, culture that are decisive for women's access to fish and credit, which are essential elements in their economic activities. My suggestion is that two main strategies may be used in order to get access to fish supply and credit, which, are the two deciding factors for the scale and profit potential of a woman's career in the fisheries. Firstly, there are those who use the domestic strategy. They come from wealthy families that can finance the start of their careers, or they get access to the vital inputs by marrying a canoe owner, for example. Secondly, there are those who through their entrepreneurial activities take the risk of obtaining credit from sources outside the lineagelmarriage network, such as from standing women, canoe companies, or even from banks or money lenders: this is the economic or entrepreneurial strategy. This strategy requires risk taking, skill, luck and the ability to build a business network. Thus the strategy is of course a limited possibility for those 'who have nobody to turn to.' Since they lack an 'ascribed path' to success through a security network, they lack the possibility to take the risks it takes to be an entrepreneur. The women who were able to combine both the economic and domestic strategies when the opportunities for investment in new technology were there, are those who today inhabit the positions of fish mammies, with the wealth and prestige involved. As we know, also before the introduction of the outboard motor, women had central positions as intermediaries in processing and distribution of fish. The Queen Photo 4. Afik son-in-law and 'motor tnatz, 'carries her outboard nzotor ashore for n~aiiztei~ance. Mother of Moree (approximately 75 years old) recalls that she and other women smoked fish in Sassandra in Ivory Coast, which they sold in Kumasi. They hired a the canoe fisheries one generation back. Modernization in other contexts has been 'wooden truck' to the river Pra, crossed the river by canoe and walked to Adanse described as a transformation to 'a single-sex political system modeled on the West, and Bekwai, and if they could not sell all the fish there, the women would walk to where men and women find themselves pitted against each other in a unitary system Kumasi! She also recalls that her mother owned a canoe, and so did the mother's of ranking' (Moran 1990:167). Such a process has been described by Christine sister who was the former Queen Mother of Moree. The position of a Queen Mother Oppong (1981) in her book on Akan women migrating from fishing and farming is not inherited, it is obtained by merit. Thus she would not have been elected as a communities to Accra, in the pursuit of education, elite husbands and urban life Queen Mother if she had not been very skilful and successful in her profession. But style. But instead of becoming house wives, the women in Moree continued to make her background in an active and wealthy family is significant for her success. She a living as fish wives, and some made careers as fish mammies in their gender was socialized into and encouraged in the profession of a fish trader, and she was defined roles. The introduction of new technology in the canoe fisheries was given starting capital and got access to fish supply through the network of her articulated through a traditional form of production which was, and still is, clearly mother and mother's sister. divided by gender, and where men and women pursued social status in separate Another fish mammy is Auntie B. (45), who inherited her mother's unmotorized hierarchies. In addition to employment for a large number of men and women, the canoe in the late sixties. It did not bring her much income, and after a while it was expansion in fisheries clearly led to accumulation of wealth in the hands of canoe not profitable, since the other canoes were increasingly equipped with motors. But owners and wholesalers. The resulting social stratification took place along gender Auntie B. had security in her mother's capital, based on fish trade, which she lines within the dual-sex hierarchies. Through their intermediary roles in the market converted into a successful career as a fish mammy. She built a house and to some system, combined with their roles as wives, mothers and daughters, entrepreneurial degree she educated her six children. In 1988 Auntie B. was able to buy a canoe women in the fisheries in many cases outclassed men, as when they were able to with an outboard motor, partly with credit from an Agricultural Development Bank combine the positions of standing woman and canoe owner. Small-scale fish traders women's group, and today she runs a small canoe company with a crew of six men. still operate within the dual-sex status system. The large-scale fish traders and the In 1981 Auntie B. divorced the father of her children because he did not fulfil his increasing number of female canoe owners might, however, have crossed the economic responsibilities towards them. Neither has he 'looked after them' after boundary between male and female spheres and compete in the same system of the divorce, she says, and since then she has managed without a husband. She is ranking. Is it possible, then, that a unitary system of ranking is developing in the independent from him, and as a fish mammy she is able to secure the future through rural fishing communities, and not only in urban centers; a single-sex hierarchy her children: 'I can never marry again. Maybe somebody comes and wants to marry among the elite, which consists of male and female canoe owners? In that case, the me, but I do not want that. I use the money I earn on my children, but now they are modernization of artisanal fisheries in Ghana has not first and foremost led to a grown, so maybe it's my turn to get some.' Auntie B. is an example of a woman greater dependency of women on men, but of small scale fishermen and fish wives who benefitted from the motorisation process. But an important point to be made on 'patrons' and 'matrons.' here is that she could not have made it without the initial help of her mother. The process of modernization through the introduction of outboard motors gave opportunities for a large number of women in fishing communities to make a living, Conclusion and made the large-scale traders extremely wealthy by local standards. But also for them, social relations were of vital importance in their careers, as we saw in the By virtue of their economic and domestic position, women are the backbone of the success-story of Afi. She got access to credit through her mother; she had good system of fishing: As intermediaries, and as mothers contributing economically to helpers and cooperation partners in her sisters; she got a Seico-contract through the the family and reproducing the lineage and cultural values. Women possess knowl- husband of her sister, and she employs family labour in her entrepreneurial activities edge and skills that are needed for the sustainability of the fishing economy. The in fish production, processing and trade. On a smaller scale, the carrier Adjoa also viability of the fishing community is not only dependent on the fish related uses entrepreneurial skills, risk-taking and social relations in her pursuit of a career. productive activities of the women, but also on their reproduction of human labour However, conditions for success are not the same in the artisanal sector today as and of the daily needs of the family. Thus the continued importance of women as they were at the time when Afi and her sisters founded the base of the success that intermediaries is not solely related to economic factors and accumulation of wealth, they now experience. The economic situation in Ghana and the resource situation but also to their domestic position. Economic independence is a prerequisite for a in the Gulf of Guinea may not allow the same possibilities for viable careers on the strong position as wife and mother in the community at large. But this goal is not basis of entrepreneurship as it did for those who benefitted from the expansion of easily achieved without the network of conjugal and matrilineal relations. Hence women's achievements in their economic and domestic careers are mutually de- 3. Twuwiim (which in Fante means wliere tlrey draw tlie net) is inhabited by 200 semi-permanent pendent, and the combination of roles in the two spheres is a rewarding strategy for settlers from Ada and the Keta area, who are Ga-Adangbe and Ewe. There are two canoes and beach women in their life projects. seines in Twuwiim. The Ewe and Ada combine fishing with fanning, which is common in their home The preceding description of the social organisation in Moree has shown that region (Hill 1986). Apart from selling some of their surplus of tomatoes, pepper, cassava, palm nut- and coco-nut oil, and the use of shared public facilities like drinking water, there is not much integration of an extended socio-economic network opens up for a career in the fishing economy. the migrant settlement and Moree. Access to fish supply and credit through kinship and marriage is crucial if one is to make a living as a fish wife and achieve an independent position in relation to the husband and the matrilineage. This independence is the basis for further expansion: References Cited to become a fish mammy through entrepreneurial activity. Capital enables a woman to operate on a large scale, which implies a significantly higher profit potential. One Abu, K. fish mammy said: 'Fishing is like lotto. If you have a lot of money you can win a 1983 The Separateness of Spouses: Conjugal Relations in an Ashanti Town. In: C. Oppong (Ed.), lot. Otherwise it is only kakra, kakra [small, small].' Some entrepreneurial women Fenrale and Male iri West Africa. London: George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 156-68. who had access to the vital inputs, seized the opportunities that came with the Acheson, J.M. modernization of the canoe fleet; an opportunity they could take with their already 1981 Anthropology of Fishing. Annual Review of Antlrropology 10:275-316. well established role as intermediaries in exchange, processing and distribution of Ardayfio-Schandorf, E. and K. Kwafo-Akoto fish. 1990 Wornen in Glrana. An Antiotafed Bibliograpliy Accra: Woeli Publishing Services. The interrelation between the productive and reproductive roles offish nzanz- Bleek, W. mies; how they can achieve status as women, is a key to an understanding of the 1987 Family and Family Planning in Southern Ghana. In: C. Oppong (Ed.), Sex Roles, Population and Developmerrt in West Africa. London: Heinemann. Pp. 138-53. cultural constructs of gender in this context. The values of motherhood and women Boserup, E. as family providers goes hand in hand with the requirernents,for success as fish 1970 Won~a~i'sRole irr Ecortortric Developtnent. London: Earthscan Pubfications (1987). mammies. A combination of productive and reproductive roles is required in order Chapman, M.D. to become a part of the socio-economic network, which again is a prerequisite for 1987 Women's Fishing in Oceania. Hurnon Ecology 15(3):165-220. success in the fisheries. Christensen, J.B. Acknowledgements 1977 Motor Power and Women Power: Technological and Economic Change among the Fanti Fishermen of Ghana. In: E.M. Smith (Ed.), Tltose who Live Frorti tlte Sea. A study in Maritir~~e I sincerely thank Inge Tvedten, Gisela Geisler, Kristian Stokke, Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Antlrropology. New York: West Publishing. Pp. 7 1-95. Irene Odotei and G.K. Nukunya for good comments and encouragement, Tone Cole, S. Andersen for correcting the language, and Kjell Helge Sjprstrprm for 'computerizing' 1991 Wonren of tire Praia. Work and Lives in a Portugese Coastal Community. New York: Princeton and improving my maps. University Press. Ewusi, K. 1987 Urbanizaiiori, Modenrimtion, and Ettrploy~~rentof Wotnen. Accra: Adwinsa Publications. Notes Field, M.J. 1940 Social Orgarriytio~iof the Ga People. London: Crown Agents. 1. This article is based on a thesis for the ca~rd.polit.degree (see Overl 1992). The material was Gerrard, S. collected during fieldwork in Moree from November 1990 to May 1991. 1987 Women in the Fishing Districts: The 'Ground Crew' of the Fishing Industry. In: D. Grobech and i S. Genard (Eds.), Wotneti in Tlte Nonvegiari Fislteries.FDH Report, Finnmark Distriktsh~gskole, 2. The termfish mamnry is here used to indicate the scale of a,woman's fish related activities. The term origins fromfisli ~notlrer,which in this article is called a standing wo~tran.But, for example, it will Hagan, G.P. appear that such a woman often also is a fish wife, in the sense that she sells the catch of her husband's 1983 Marriage, Divorce and Polygyny in Winneba. In: C. Oppong (Ed.), Fe~naleand Male in West canoe. Thus a fish mammy here is not synonymous with standing woman or fish mother, she is a woman Africa, London: George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 192-203. who operates on a large scale in the fishing economy. However, the terms that are used in the literature (cf. Vercruijsse 1984; Ninsin 1990; Overl 1992) on categories of women employed in the fisheries need Hernres, P.O. to be developed further. 1991 Moderriizitrg Gltanaian Fislteries. Tlie Need for 'Social Carriers' of Teclrnolosy. Oslo: Ad Hill, P. Oved, R. 1986 Talking wit11 Ewe Seine Fislten~tertand Sltallott Far~~rers.Cambridge African Monographs, 1992 Fish Mammies. The Role of Women in tile Artisattal Fishery Sector of Gltatla. Thesis for the No.6. ca~td.polit.degree presented to the Department of Geography, University of Bergen. Haakonsen, J.M. and Diaw, M.C. (Ed.) PSlsson, G. 1991 Fishenttet~5. Migrations in West Africa. IDAFlWPl36. Cotonou: FAO. 1989 The Art of Fishing. MAST 2(1): 1-20. Jentoft, S. and C. Wadel (Eds.) Platteau, J.P. 1984 I samme bat. Sysselsetti~~gsystemerfiskeri~~a.ri,lgen.Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1989 Penetration of Capitalism and Persistence of Small-scale Organizational Forms in Third World Jorion, P. Fisheries. Development and Clrarrge 20(4):621-51. 1988 Going Out or Staying Home. Seasonal Movements and Migration Strategies among Xwla and Robben, A.C.G.M. Anlo-Ewe Fishermen. MAST 1(2):129-55. 1989 Sons of the Sea Goddess. Ecotio~nicPractice and Discursive Cot~Jictin Brazil. New York: Koranteng, K.A. ~oluibiaUniversity Press. 1990 Gl~anaCanoe Frame Survey 1989. Information Report No. 25. Tema: Fisheries Department Rogers, B. Research and Utilization Branch. 1980 Tile Donlestication of Wonte~~.Discri~~~inatio~~ in Developirtg Societies. London and New York: Lawson, R.M. Tavistock Publications. 1971 The Supply Response of Retail Trading Services to Urban Population Growth in Ghana. In: Tvedten, I. and B. Hersoug (Ed.) C. Meillassoux (Ed.), The Developntent of b~digenorcsTrade and Markets in West Africa. 1992 Fishing for Development. 9nall Scale Fislieries in Africa. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute Oxford: International African Institute1Oxford University Press. Pp. 377-398. of African Studies. Lewis, M.A. Vellenga, D.D. 1977 Female Et~treprenec~rialStyles. An Exantinatio~~of Coastal Fante B~csi~~esswornen.University 1986 Matriliny, Patriliny and Class Formation Among Women Cocoa Farmers in Two Rural Areas of of Washington. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International. Ghana. In: C. Robertson and I. Berger (Eds.), Wornert and Class in Africa. London: Holms & Moran, H.M. Meier. Pp. 62-77. '1 1990 Civilized Women. Gender and Presitge in Sorifl~easternLiberia. Ithaca and London: Cornell Vercmijsse, E. University Press. 1983 Fishmongers, Big Dealers and Fishermen: Co-operation and Conflict Between the Sexes in Nadel-Klein, J. and D.L. Davis (Eds.) Ganaian Canoe Fishing. In: C. Oppong (Ed.), Fetnale and Male in West Africa. London: George 1988 To Work and to Weep. Wo~~renit1 Fislring Ecot~omies.Social and Economic Papers No. 18. Allen & Unwin. Pp. 179-91. Institute of Social and Economic Research. St. Johns: Memorial University of Newfoundland. Vercruijsse, E. Nieuwenhuys, 0. 1984 Tire Penetration of Capitalis~~t.A West-African Case Study, London: Zed Books. 1989 Invisible Nets. Women and ChiIdren in Kerala's Fishing. MAST 2(2):174-93. Whitehead, A. Ninsin, K. 1985 Effects of Technological Change on Rud Women: A Review of Analysis and Concepts. In: 1991 Economic Modernisation and Social Change. Evidence from Mumford, a Ghanaian Fishing I. Ahmed (Ed.) Tecl~nologyand Rural Wonten. London: George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 27-64. Village. Africa 61(1):98-116. Nukunya, G.K. 1989 The Anlo-Ewe and Full Time Maritime Fishing. Another View. MAST 2(2):154-73. Nypan, A. 1960 Market Trade. A San~pleSurvey of Market Traders in Accra. African Business Series No. 2. Economic Research Division, University College of Ghana. Odotei, I. 1991 It~troductionof New Techr~ologyin tlre Artisanal Marine Fislring It~?ustryin Glrana. Vol 11: Tlre Role of WOIII~II.Trondheim: Senter for Miljp, og Utvikling. Okonjo, K. 1976 The Dual-Sex Political System in Operation: Igbo Women and Community Politics in Midwest- em Nigeria. In: J. Haflcin and E.G. Bay (Eds.), Women in Africa. Studies in Social arid Ecor~omic Cltartge. California: Stanford University Press. Pp. 45-58. Oppong, C. 1981 Middle Class African Marriage. London: George Allen & Unwin. Social Mobilization in Kerala mobilization work in the fishing villages nor did they react on the fisherfolk's Fishers, Priests, Unions, and Political Parties problems. Thirdly, individual Catholic priests and social workers active in various fishing villages, sought in the late 1970s to canalize the rising spontaneous protests of the people into organized action for defense of their interests. With this in mind they promoted the establishment of fishers' cooperatives and unions. By creating cooperatives the fisherfolk tried to break down the existing exploitative social structure in the villages, whereas the unions have organized large-scale agitations aimed at influencing the official policy toward the fisheries. ABSTRACT This article discusses the emergence of social organizations and increas- The present article tries to shed some light on the role of Catholic priests in ing politicization of marine fisherfolk in Kerala (India) and the role played by Roman mobilizing Kerala's fisherfolk for social struggle in their own interests. Cultural, in Catholic priests in these processes. Under certain social circumstances, it is argued, this case religious, factors, I argue, may play a decisive role in political mobiliz- cultural/religious factors may play a decisive role in political mobilization. In this case, worsening life situation of Kerala's fishers due to decreasing fish catches ation, at least in certain social circumstances. together with apathy of political parties to come out in their favour led to massive This article is partly based on field work data collected in a Catholic fishing unrest among the fishers in the 1970s. Catholic priests and social workers active in community in coastal-Quilon (southern Kerala) in 1991. There, I conducted field- several coastal localities motivated the creation of fishers' cooperatives and unions, work which was a part of my M.A. research project on modernization processes in in an effort to direct the people's anger into organized actions to defend their interests. India in general and Kerala's fisheries in particular.1 In the following I will first This article tries to shed some light on the interplay between socio-economic pro- discuss the question of the late unionization of Kerala's fishers and point out the cesses, technical modernization, and culturallreligious factors in the organization and main reasons for the lack of mobilization work of political parties and their affiliated politicization of Kerala's fisherfolk. unions in the fishing villages. The religious division of the fisherfolk, the historical connections of religious institutions and communal organizations with political parties, and the role of the Catholic church and its representatives in the Catholic fishing villages will be emphasized. Secondly, I will briefly outline the policy toward modernization of Kerala's fisheries, and its socio-economic implications for It is by no means a special feature of India that fishing grounds face depletion. Nor those engaged in the fishery sector. Thirdly, the rise of fisherfolk's cooperatives and is the rising protest of fisherfolk against their worsening life situation restricted to unions, increasing politicization of Kerala's fisherfolk, together with the involve- artisanal communities in India. What is rather unique is the role played in organizing ment of the Catholic church and priests in the processes will be highlighted. As an social movements on behalf of fisherfolk by Roman Catholic priests in Kerala in illustration of these processes at the local level I will briefly discuss the emergence India. and function of a grassroot organization of Catholic fishers in coastal-Quilon. The level of political participation and unionization in the state of Kerala has long been higher than the total average in all of India. Unionization of Kerala's fishers, on the other hand, had a relatively late start, the first unions being estab- lished in the late 1970s. This article will show that three main interacting factors gave rise to increasing politicization and social organization of Kerala's fisherfolk The state of Kerala situated on the south west coast of India is one of the leading in the late 1970s. maritime states of the country. Kerala's coastal waters (up to a depth of 50m) belong First, fast decreasing catches of some important fish species denoted overfishing to India's most productive fishing zone.2 Kerala has a prominent role within India's in Kerala's coastal waters, consequent to drastic changes in the techniques and fishing economy. The state contributes about a quarter of India's total marine fish methods of fishing and sharp increase in fishing effort. Faced by decreasing prod~ction,~and approximately one third of the nation's foreign exchange earnings productivity, lowering of their share in the total fish harvest, and increasing from marine products (Gopalan 1987:43).,Apart from being an important export economic difficulties, artisanal fishermen became exceedingly restive over their industry, fishing has been a major source of animal protein for Kerala's inhabitants situation, expressed in massive unrest in the fishing villages and violent conflicts and an important avenue of employment. An indication of the significance of marine at sea. Secondly, the artisanal fisherfolk were, so to say, socially and politically a fisheries as a source of livelihood is, e.g. the fact that more than 30% of India's 'forgotten' group. Political parties, left and right, neither showed any interest in marine fisherfolk live in the state. This proportion is quite high, since only 3.7% of

MAST 1993,6(1/2): 136-156 the total Indian population lives there. According to the Fisheries Department of the Government of Kerala, the population of marine fisherfolk in the state totalled 734,000 persons in 1989-90, or a little over 2.5% of the total population. During the last three decades the number of active fishermen has been growing at about 2% per annum. In 1961 there were 80,700 active fishermen in Kerala, 122,000 in 1979 and 134,000 in 1985-86 (Department of Fisheries 1987:40; Kurien and Achari 1990:2013; Meynen 1989:5). The majority of them (about 85%) are engaged in artisanal fishing, operating and canoes of different sizes. Around 35% of the artisanal fleet had been motorized by the mid-1980s (Kurien and Achari 1990:2014). The remaining 15% of the active fishermen are employed in the mechanized sector, which consists of trawling boats, gill netters and purse-seiners. In addition to active fishermen, hundreds of thousands of people are employed in activities related to fishing like processing, marketing, netmaking and boat-build- ing.4 Even though there is a rather big professional population engaged in the marine fisheries, unionization of fishers has a short history compared to other groups of workers in Kerala (such as agrarian and industrial labourers). The first steps toward organization of a state-wide union of fishers were taken in 1978. Then leaders of various newly established, local fishers' organizations met with leaders of similar organizations in Goa and Tamil Nadu to discuss the need for nation-wide action for the benefit of fisherfolk. Subsequently, they established the National Fishermen Forum (NFF), through which unionization in the state was further promoted. The origins of the small local organizations can be traced to mobilization work undertaken by some Catholic priests and social activists in various fishing villages in southern Kerala in the 1970s. Indeed, there were fishers' organizations active in Kerala before, but they had been based on caste or community membership. The novelty of the associations emerging in the late 1970s and early 1980s was, first and foremost, that culturally and religiously diverse fishing communities united around a common cause. But why did unionization of Kerala's fisherfolk have a relatively late start? An important explanatory factor is the lack of mobilizing activities on behalf of political parties and their affiliated unions in the fishing villages. Why this political disinterest toward the fisherfolk? Before attending to this question, the particular political orientation in Kerala must be addressed.

Kerala is known for a high level of trade unionism and political participation. The i comparatively long history of trade unionism in Kerala is strongly related to the important role played by the communist parties (CPI and after the split of the party in 1964 also CPI[M]) in the political history of the state. Ever since the first general KUMARI elections in Kerala (1957), when the CPI was voted to power by 41% of the electorate, the communist parties have had a stronghold in the state. Actually, unlike the domination of the Congress party in the central government and in most states, Kerala no party has been able to gain an absolute working majority in Kerala's elections. The different governments in power have been based on a coalition of parties, with Both Islam and Christianity have a long history in Kerala. Islam was introduced the CPI(M) as a leading party in leftist coalition governments and the Congress on the Malabar coast (north Kerala) in the 8th century. Syrian Christians (who are party either leading or supporting the more rightist coalitions. Both of the commu- socially high ranking and generally well-off) are believed to belong to a sect of nist parties have emphasized the major importance of class struggle for economic Christians who came to Kerala at the early stage of Christianity. Conversions to and social development. The communists with the active participation of agrarian Roman Catholicism date back to the arrival of the Portuguese Vasco da Gama (1498) workers and peasants, for instance, managed to bring about important structural and the following Portuguese hegemony on the Malabar coast. Traditionally, transformations in agriculture, notably the most comprehensive land reforms im- Kerala's fisherfolk belonged to the lowest segment in the Hindu caste system and plemented in India. Moreover, Kerala is considered socially as the most advanced their occupation was regarded as polluting to people of higher castes (and com- state in India, e.g. the state scores highest on a scale of the Physical Quality of Life munities like the high ranking Syrian Christians). Even though a large number of Index. This is displayed in factors like high literacy rate (85% in 1990), spread of the fisherfolk were converted to Catholicism and Islam, they did not escape the education and health services, high life expectancy, low infant mortality rate and 'untouchable' status ascribed to their occupation. Therefore, the different religious low population growth compared to the average Indian standards. communities faced similar social stigmatization and the same miserable social reality. This brings us to the question of the restricted (even absent) interest shown by the In the 19th century Christian missionaries started working in Kerala. They soon political parties in the artisanal fishing communities - until the 1980s when the gained adherents, especially among untouchables in the then princely state of organizational strength of the fisherfolk became apparent. The main reason why Travancore in south Kerala. According to Kooiman (1984: 190), the social reform left-wing parties refrained from mobilizing the fisherfolk is that they were regarded movement in Travancore differed from the reform movement elsewhere in India in as a vote-bank for the Congress party and the Muslim League. Actually the latter some important respects. The reform movement elsewhere mainly consisted of parties did not have to make any effort to obtain the fisherfolk's votes. Additionally, 'high caste individuals bent on individualistic and mainly female-oriented reforms.' the left parties viewed the artisanal fisherfolk as a sort of petty bourgeoisie (being In Kerala, on the contrary, the social reform movement mostly embodied 'low and mostly self-employed entrepreneurs), and not as a potential working class section. untouchable communities, fighting the inequities of a [relatively] rigid caste system 'This was a section that would automatically die) in the development process' and sponsored by European missionaries.' The large scale conversions of untouch- (Vijayan 1987:55). The very limited organizational work undertaken by the left ables were probably of great influence on the establishment of Hindu reform among fishworkers had been concentrated on workers in the mechanized sector, societies at the beginning of the 20th century. Generally speaking, the caste-based mainly in Quilon and Cochin. reform societies aimed at changes in the existing caste customs, while low caste But why this voting behaviour toward the right on the political spectrum in the organizations also fought for the elimination of restrictions based on the ideology leftist oriented Kerala? In order to explain this, one has to look into the religious of ritual purity. division of the fisherfolk, the historical affinity of the religious institutions, and The Hindu reform societies did succeed in realizing a number of their aims, like communal organizations with the above-mentioned political parties. the official elimination of caste restrictions regarding e.g. access to public facilities, education, governmental jobs and the legislature. But the leadership of these movements, mainly drawn from the better-off sections in their communities, did 111 not question growing economic differentiation within their caste or community. Growing polarization of classes, rapidly deteriorating status of peasants and What makes the religious division of Kerala's fisherfolk particular is the compara- workers (especially during the depression years), spread of secular ideas among tively high proportion of Christians (mainly ~oma/n'~atholics)and Muslims to Kerala's youth through schooling are only a few but important factors stimulating Hindus. Of the total Indian population 83% are ~indus,'about10% Muslims and the rise of a leftist movement in the early 20th century. This movement, unlike the 2.6% Christians. In Kerala, on the other hand, 60% are'~indus,17% Muslims and existing caste and communal movements, brought together people who were 21% Christians. Within the fishing population there are only 27% Hindus, but 30% experiencing a similar economic situation and yet belonged to different castes and Muslims and 37% Christians (Hiro 1976:4; Kooiman 1984:185; Meynen 1989:ll).5 communities (see Lieten 1982). The religious groups are further divided into endogamous sub-castes or groups In the late 1920s and 1930s most of the emerging leftist leaders were recruited between which there is limited social contact. into active-politics within the Indian National Congress in the fight for national freedom. By the 1930s they had formed a separate organization, the Congress 142 143

Socialist Party, and in 1940 they separated themselves fro established a local unit of the CPI. Within a few years the le mobilize Kerala's workers and peasants on a large scale Catholic fisherfolk in the agitations against the CP1 ~~Ovementchallenging the social system as a whole. sidered as marking the beginning of their politicization. As mentioned above, the leftist movement did not have participation was purely communal in ~har~~- fishing c(XTlmunities. Apart from regarding the fisherfolk as a guarding the interests of the church and the geoisie', mobilizing them was not assumed viable because of g a secure vote-bank for the Congress Party* role of religious leaders in the villages. Moreover, although isherfolk with political parties (Congress included) re- isolated from the wider society, the artisanal fishing communities n the 1980s, political parties ba~me position. Unlike agriculture, fishing was the activity ofa single 1 when the fisherfolk had clearly shown their community) and interaction with other castes and corn Catholic priests had a major say in limited. tion. This time not with the intention of Simultaneous to the politicization process of KeralaTs itutional church, but to motivate the people lated within some of the communal organizations, regarding question that arises is: How was it possible tations and strategies. The case of the Ezhava move at way? The answer can be found in the example-' Conflicts based on divergent ideologies, 'the M resentatives in the fishing villages. and the Protest ideology based on relative depfiva ence is rather recent in the fishing come led to a Split in the movement (Rae 1976:86). The lefti as a social institution played a dominant role in the political* themselves from the movement and joined the CPI, whe fisherfolk. It was the central institution and l3zhavas strengthened the ties with the Congress. ' (Houtart and Nayak 1988:6). In fact, In sum, mass Support for the leftist movement made it n ad a major say in village affairs and the organizations to take a reactionary turn,,?nd to emphasiz nity. In the local political and administrat- values of (a rigid caste) society. In the words of Liet villages, church committees sometimes even func- became the safest way of politics for the ruling classes. Their (gmm sabha) (Klausen 1968; Meynen 1989). The National Congress, ultimately became a "coalition of ethn good relations with the local elites (mostly educated vested interests".' The affinity of communal associations litical relations between the church and the elites7 with the Congress was clearly manifested after the first c he latter's preponderance in the church to Power in 1957. After staying only for two years in power rch used to levy tax on the fishermen* Congress government. The official reason given for this aily catches, and usually was collected by government had been unable to maintain law and order in the ,no similar mechanism existed with regard to other Order~roblems,on the other hand, mostly stemmed from viole s. Merchants and other salaried workers only contributed the the primarily the Catholic church and the of ritual observances. Nevertheless, whereas the church 'has high caste 'Nayars'. The main stumbling block for the cathol education and health services, the fishermen have Bill, introduced by the CPI, which was meant to e*ge stat al beneficiaries of these services' (Houtart and Nayak 1988:6).

(Nieuwenhu~s1990:254). The Nayars joined the ls role in the village was (and is) not limited to spiritual or main abhorrence being the Land Reform Bill, lande also engaged himself in all secular matters, even telling the threatened. Not surprisingly, in view of the strength of the c ld vote for (or not vote for) at election th~es.Until Kerala's fishing vilhZes, the Catholic fisherfolk on a large scale wer option was the Congress party. In the 1970s an important the agitations against the CPI government. ing the priests' engagement with the fisherfolk-At them began acting as individuals promoting changes in the ges, instead of practicing their traditional e institutional church and the existing social order. Even though only a minority of priests have turned away from the conventional munity (Klausen 1968:142). The local merchants either sold the fish directly to ideology regarding their purpose as religious leaders, and whose secular interests consumers or to merchants belonging to other communities. Before the use of ice they are to serve, their involvement in the union struggles indeed has caused for the preservation of fish became common, fisherwomen salted, dried or smoked controversies within the institutional church. The church hierarchy even has trans- fish that could not be directly sold. ferred some 'problem' priests from the coastal area altogether. However, before In the early 1950s the first mechanized boats, together with the newest ice and discussing the new fishers' organizations and the priests' involvement in the process freezing-techniques for fish preservation, and isolated vans for fish disposal were any further, it is necessary to briefly view the socio-economic processes going on introduced in three fishing villages in Quilon district (Sakthikulangara, Neendakara in Kerala's fisheries in the last few decades. I say necessary because it was the and Puthentura). The mechanization efforts were a part of the 'India Norwegian miserable social reality faced by the artisanal fishing communities (and their Project' (INP) undertaken in cooperation between the Norwegian and Indian gov- competition with the mechanized sector) that triggered violent responses which ernments. Fishermen were chosen for training on the INP boats which they could later were canalized into organized actions. buy on a subsidized basis. Local cooperatives distributed the boats together with state support, such as loans for operating costs, and purchase of subsidiary equip- ment given independently of INP. The mechanization activities remained quite isolated until around the mid-1960s. Then the government reoriented its policy toward modernization of the fisheries and introduced the 'rapid growth model' Until the 1960s fishing and related activities were solely carried out by members instead of the former 'slow modernization' strategy (Kurien and Achari 1988). of fishing communities, who traditionally belonged to the lowest ranking group in The first decade after the establishment of the Kerala state (1956), the govern- the social stratification system. The social features and technical limitations of the ment laid the main emphasis on upgrading existing fishing techniques and gradually artisanal fisheries were important factors in restricting the scale of exploitation of introducing new ones through state subsidies distributed via cooperatives. The main Kerala's fish resources. The social context of production characterized by low reason for the change in emphasis toward modernization in the mid-1960s were productivity served as a framework. The production of the fisherfolk was motivated factors such as: increasing thrust of the Indian government for the development of by the subsistence needs of their households contrary to motivation for production fish export industries; increasing demand for prawns on the international market characterizing market economies 'where production is motivated by the accumula- (especially U.S.A. and Japan), and successful experiments with for tion of profit and capital' and 'production targets are indefinite' (PBlsson 1991:43). prawns in the coastal waters off Quilon (undertaken by the INP). Until then prawns Within this framework fishing efforts were limited by!(technical factors such as the were an untapped resource in Kerala. Prawns were not an important part of the local construction and labour-intensiveness of craft andgear. These had been adapted cuisine, but had mainly been exported in dried form to South-East Asian markets. over the centuries to the different ecological conditions faced by various localities In the late 1950s private merchants had begun experimenting with the marketing of along the coast. The operation of the various fishing nets in use was selective, that frozen prawns in the U.S.A. The successes of the experiments with bottom trawling is, specific nets were used for catching particular species in different seasons. and marketing of prawns heralded a new phase in Kerala's fisheries known as the Furthermore, fishing as a lowly regarded caste-based activity, plus the specific skills 'pink gold-rush.' and knowledge needed to carry it out prevented free entry of capital and people In accordance with the modernization-cum-growth model, existing techniques from other communities (Kurien 1985). came to be regarded.as obstacles to growth and state subsidies for the development Even though the production of the artisanal fishermen was meant chiefly for the of the artisanal fisheries were withdrawn. Instead the main thrust and financial meeting of domestic needs, the fishing communities $ere not isolated, self-suffi- incentives were made available for the introduction of mechanized trawling boats cient entities. Firstly, fishing generally was the fisherfolk's sole occupation. There- (mid-1960s) and purse-seiners (after 1976), together with the latest techniques in fore, other goods had to be purchased through market exchange. Secondly, even at fish processing (ibid.:22). Until the mid-1970s there was a noticeable increase in very low levels of productivity, large surpluses were available for disposal and trade both prawn and overall fish landings in Kerala. After that, there was a steady decline (ibid.:70). Hence, a part of the catch was sold to local consumers, people in nearby in the production of prawns, and the total fish catches began to fluctuate. At the villages and, to some extent, to long distance markets within and outside India same time, prices for fish, particularly for prawns increased manyfold which to a (mostly Burma and Ceylon). The marketing was in the hands of different vendors, large extent compensated decreasing catches. in terms of scale and distances served. Generally, the first hand sales took place In sum, by the mid-1970s signs of overfishing, especially of demersal (bottom- between fishermen and middlemen or merchants, all belonging to the same com- dwelling) fish species, became apparent in Kerala's coastal waters. The fact is with the introduction of large-scale fishing methods, no notice was taken of either the barriers of the sector. A number of new investors came from merchant communities, existing ecological and social systems, or what ecological and socio-economic e.g. exporters of coir and cashew who began experiencing a set-back in their consequences this modernization strategy would have. Organizations of artisanal industries in the 1960s. In the late 1960s and early 1970%big business houses also fishermen, environmental activists and scholars, for instance, have argued that the began investing in Kerala's fisheries (see e.g. Kurien 1985; Platteau 1984). More- direct transfer of gear combinations innovated for fisheries in the temperate waters over, prawn-peeling sheds and modern fish-processing plants attracted labourers (like trawling and purse-seining) to the completely different ecological context of from outside the traditional fishing communities. Whereas no measurements were the tropical waters off Kerala has led to serious ecological disturbances (see e.g. taken to limit harvesting of the fish resources in the coastal waters, the modern- Kurien and Achari 1988 and 1990). Furthermore, stimulated by governmental ization process soon led to overfishing, which further aggravated the economic and policy and accelerating fish prices, the boat fleet operating in the coastal waters has social disparities in Kerala's fisheries. The process resulted in the fall of the fish grown at a fast rate, and actually far exceeds recommended levels.7 harvest, lower or stagnating wages, increasing class differentiation, heavier work Also, the export-oriented growth strategy implemented in Kerala's fisheries has burden on artisanal fisherfolk, and decreasing work opportunities in the fisheries led to increasing socio-economic disparities between regions as well as fishermen. (see for instance Achari 1988; Kurien 1985; Kurien and Achari 1990; Nieuwenhuys According to several scholars (see Klausen 1968; Nieuwenhuys 1989; Platteau 1989). And lastly, availability and quality of fish sold on the local market de- 1984), the level of class distinction was low in the artisanal fishing communities, ~reased.~ mainly because the concentration of ownership over the means of production was Thus, although increasing fish prices to a certain extent compensated decreasing maintained within reasonable limits. The class distinction between fishermen and or stagnating catches, the effects severely were felt in the fishing communities. fish-merchants (other than small-scale vendors like female headload vendors) was Artisanal fishermen experienced a decline of 50% in productivity from 1969-70 to more clear-cut. The local merchants often also functioned as moneylenders in the 1979-80, and their share in the total catches fell from 84% in 1967-75 to 69% during fishing villages. In order to secure access to as much of the daily catches as possible, the period 1976-80 (Kurien and Achari 1988:18). The poverty, social backwardness, the merchants generally established loan contracts with owner-operators. Their in the form of low educational and health standards, and generally unhealthy living main strategy was to advance loans to owners of fishing assets against the agreement conditions in the fishing villages, became quite clear in an official socio-economic that the daily catches would be disposed of through them'arid that a predetermined census survey conducted by the Department of Fisheries in 1979. This survey proportion of the sale proceeds would accrue to them as interest payments (Platteau demonstrated that the socio-economic conditions of the fisherfolk in all aspects 1984:78). This used to be the only way for owner-operators to acquire necessary credit were in sharp contrast with the high-quality life index of Kerala. As much as 50% money for productive purposes. At the same time, they were completely at the mercy of the 118,000 fishermen's households had an annual income below Rs 1,000, while of fish-merchants concerning when and how much they would get for their catches. only 3% had income above Rs 3,000 (Kurien 1985:80). This means that most of the When the modernization-cum-growth model was introduced no effort was made fishermen's households were living beneath the poverty line set at Rs 4,200 per year to change the existing exploitative social structure in the villages. Therefore, a in 1980 (Mathew and Scott 1980). process started where those with economic and political power were able to The artisanal fishermen, experiencing decreasing productivity and lower share consolidate their power position, e.g. by making use of governmentally-subsidized in the total fish harvest together with increasing incidents of damage caused to their incentives, distributed via cooperatives. Indeed, the setting up of fishermen's fishing gear by the mechanized boats, became exceedingly discontented with their cooperatives was promoted by the Department of Fisheries parallel to the modern- situation in the late 1970s. Direct, often violent confrontations at sea between ization efforts. But according to a governmental report (published in 1981), the artisanal and mechanized boats became common in the face of increasing compe- scheme of distributing mechanized boats to real producersi was a failure because tition over the scarce resources in the coastal waters. The situation culminated in the so-called fishermen's cooperatives were almost,all 'benami7(under false name), massive unrest in the fishing villages in the late 1970s. At that time a new process sponsored and controlled by the rich and influential in the fishing communities set in as fishers, motivated by individual priests and social workers, began to fight (quoted in Kurien and Achari 1990:2013). Moreover, many (if not most) fishermen in an organized manner for social betterment and against the destruction of their who did acquire mechanized boats were unable to manage the higher investment, means of subsistence. operating and maintenance costs in the end losing their fishing assets into the hands of fishmerchants-cum-moneylenders.8 An important feature of the period of the 'pink gold-rush' was a rapid entry into the fisheries of persons traditionally not involved in it, which broke the former caste remote areas away from the coast. The opposition of the church particularly adversely affected the KSMTF activities in the district of Trivandrum where 75% As indicated earlier, priests in several fishing communities in the southern districts of the fisherfolk were Catholic (Kuriackos 1986:49; Meynen 1989:28-29). of Kerala promoted the establishment of fishers' associations in the late 1970s. Most In dealing with the authorities, the fishers' unions only have been moderately of these organizations were joined together in the 'Kerala Latin Catholic Fishermen successful. Their ecological argumentation -relating to the need for restrictions on Federation,' which had the backing of the Catholic church. After the foundation mechanized fishing in the coastal waters - have weighted lightly against economic of NFF (1978) unionization in Kerala was further stimulated. In 1980 repre- arguments of the powerful mechanized boat-owners, big merchants and exporters - sentatives of different fishers' associations met and formed the Kerala Swatantra such as expected loss of foreign exchange earnings and employment if mechanized Matsya Thozilali Federation (KSMTF, Kerala Independent Fishermen's Feder- fishing were restricted. Nevertheless, the government of Kerala has enacted laws ation). Even though the majority of these organizations were Catholic, this was an limiting access to the coastal waters, and installed committees of enquiry into the important step in uniting the fisherfolk of different religious communities around situation of the fisheries. But due to absence of an effective enforcement machinery their common cause. On the other hand, the fact that most of these associations were and legal loopholes, together with the strong position of the mechanized sector, under the umbrella of the church hindered the KSMTF in its effort to keep the implementation and enforcement of laws and measures has been considerably federation non-communal and apolitical, and soon led to conflicts within it. Ac- limited. Although the authorities have been reluctant in putting measures of fishery tually, confrontations with the communist-led coalition in power during the first management into practice, in the early 1980s they did implement some important two years of KSMTF, significantly eased the union struggle. But when a Congress- welfare measures for the benefit of the fishing communities. Simultaneously, in led government took over in 1982, the shape of the union changed and the conflicts accordance with the policy of the central government, the government of Kerala escalated (Meynen 1989:28). The church hierarchy could neither subscribe to the pursued a scheme aimed at motorization of the artisanal fleet. In view of the efforts of some of the union leaders to have the KSMTF put on autonomous footing, situation of the fisheries motorization, of course, only aggravates the depletion nor to the strategies used in the union struggle. The conflicts finally led to a split in problem. As referred to earlier, the government of Kerala, in the early 1980s, the federation in 1983. The conservative faction broke away to form another union recognized that the former policy of distributing incentives through cooperatives (Akhila Kerala Swatantra Matsya Thozilali Federation) which had the backing of had been a complete failure. This recognition led the authorities to establish new the church hierarchy, the Congress party, and parties to the right. At the same time cooperatives with the aim of distributing loans and subsidies for motorization and KSMTF officially was registered as a trade union. welfare measures. But, as Kumar points out: 'The principal hurdle remains: the KSMTF defined its primary issues to be: the depletion of the fish resources; the political installation of outsiders as office-bearers of the cooperatives. This immedi- destructive methods used by the mechanized boats; the harm caused by the newly ately aborts the avowed objective of creating full-blooded fisherfolk's organiz- introduced technologies of fishing to the livelihood of artisanal fishers; and to strive ations' (1988:581). This is in clear contrast with grassroot cooperatives which have for socio-economic betterment and justice in the fishing communities. The union been established by fisherfolk in several localities in southern Kerala in the last two has been at the front of regular widespread agitations of Kerala's fisherfolk. Actions decades. These cooperatives have played an important role in reinforcing the union and protests taking place in the monsoon months of 1980-81 and 1984 were process in the Catholic belt. The first of these was established in 1968 when particularly large-scale and widespread causing law and order problems in the fishermen in the village Marianad in Trivandrum district created the Marianad state.10 The agitations got the attention of the press and, indeea, could not be Fishermen's Cooperative Society. overlooked by any political party. - This village was created on formerly uninhabited land, between 1960-62 by the In the early 1980s the larger political parties createdltheir own fishers' unions, church-aided Trivandrum Social Service society. A group of community organizers something they had neglected before. Although other unions made their inroads into was invited to live and work in the village. After working there for seven years coastal Kerala, KSMTF was the leading force concerning strategies and demands, (following a community development approach) the group realized that their work and joint struggles of the unions became common. This was reflected in cooperation would be of limited use if the exploitative economic structure of the village was not between KSMTF and unions sponsored by the left parties. Increasing teamwork of dealt with. Most of the village land was owned by a landlord. He had gained KSMTF and the left, together with involvement of clergy in the union agitations extensive control over the fishers as they, in return for his permission to live on his was - not surprisingly - met with hostility from the institutional church. Besides land, had to sell their catches through him (Meynen 1989:31). By establishing a reinforcing doubts and misgivings among the fishers toward the union, the church cooperative, the fisherfolk successfully managed to escape the grip of the landlord hierarchy transferred a number of priests, who had participated in the agitations, to and improve their economic situation. The cooperative took care of the auctioning of the members' fish, including obtaining credit from the buyers. Integrated with years, the Salesians concentrated on social uplift activities and on bringing the the auctioning system the cooperative ran a saving scheme and a credit system people together. Since approximately 90% of the people were illiterate one of their linked to the purchase of fishing equipment for its members. The Marianad example first tasks was to start to teach reading. After a short time span, the Salesians was extended to several other fishing villages during the 1970s. extended their activities to four neighbouring villages which was not quite appreci- In Trivandrum district the process was aided by the activities of the Programme ated by the church hierarchy. According to a local parish priest, both their mobiliz- for Community Organization (PCO), an autonomous NGO organization started by ation effort and concrete acts provoked the church hierarchy. A case in point is that the group of community workers active in Marianad. In 1980 around 15 such the Salesians gave the church land in Pallithottam to the people to live on and village-level societies jointly formed an apex body, the South-Indian Federation of assisted a number of families to build on the land. However, it was their mobilizing Fishermen Societies (SIFFS). In the 1980s cooperatives in Quilon district, estab- work in the villages which most irritated the church hierarchy. As my informants lished by the Fishermen Community Development Programme (FCDP), and so- told me, the church hierarchy contended that the Salesians (and later the FCDP) cieties operating in Kanyakumari district (in Tamil Nadu) joined the SIFFS. were preaching Marxism in the villages. Within SIFFS, which adopted a three-tier organizational structure, the main The priests succeeded in mobilizing the fisherfolk. Icstead of justifying the function of the independent primary-level village societies is: marketing of the existing exploitative social relations, they postulated that the extreme economic members' production; promotion of saving schemes among the fishermen related inequality in the fishing communities was sinful. They helped the people realize the to the auctioning; arrangement of bank loans for fishing equipment. Some of them exploitative social structure in their villages, the main causes for their poverty-rid- are also engaged in boat-building andlor selling of fishing requisites. The second den situation, and most importantly, that by concerted action something could be tier, or the district federations, have representatives from each of the village done to change the situation. In 1977 the 'Latin Catholic Matsya Thozilali Union' societies. They intervene in the marketing of fish for distant internal and external was formed in the area, under the leadership of Fr. A. Parishavila. The fisherfolk's markets. They sell fish directly to export houses eliminating a chain of middlemen. movement in coastal Quilon was one of the initiators of the National Fishermen Moreover, in addition to monitoring and assisting the primary-level societies they Forum and the KSMTF. In 1979 FCDP was founded, and officially registered. Apart engage in the supplying of ice, purchasing of fishing requisites in bulk, and from the condition set by the Salesians, that the chairman of the organization should educative and welfare activities. The main function of the apex SIFFS (apart from be a Don Bosco priest (in Pallithottam), FCDP was put under the control of the supportive role offered to the district federations) is: development and promotion fishers themselves. of new technology, e.g. boat-building, research and training. Although SIFFS Beyond direct union activities and other motivational work aimed at promoting extends only to a minority of Kerala's artisanal fishers and its operation capacity is critical awareness among the fisherfolk, FCDP succeeded in destroying the 'tradi- limited, it, at least, has been able to curb the exploitative practices of the local elites. tional' fish-marketing structure. Through establishing fishermen-controlled mar- keting centres in all five villages, FCDP has been able to break down the former power of merchants-cum-moneylenders who controlled both the prices of fish and when the fishers got paid for their sold catches. Moreover, by mediating grants and loans on soft terms from banks and funds, FCDP further challenged the money- Whereas the primary-level societies within SIFFS all are based on similar prin- lenders' grip on the fishers. As indicated by a 36 year old fisherwoman: ciples, there are local varieties regarding strategies and successes in dealing with One of the most important changes taking place in the fishing villages in my life is that the elites. Among the more successful are the cooperatiyes in Quilon district organizations like FCDP make. it possible for poor people to acquire privately or cooperatively organized by the FCDP. In contrast with the PC0 in Tr'vandrum, which has no direct owned fishing assets instead of entirely having to rely on work Tor others. Banks, of course, did ties with the Catholic church, FCDPis closely related o>the local clergy; aparticular exist but they only lended to the rich people like the mechanized boat owners in Sakthikulangara. congregation within the Catholic church called the Salesians of Don Bosco. There were no possibilities for poor people to acquire loans except from moneylenders. Priests belonging to that congregation were offered a parish in a well-off The union activities were separated from FCDP in 1984 and the economic activities neighbourhood in Quilon-town in 1975.11 They refused the offer and insisted on were set on autonomous footing in 1985 - under the name 'Fishermen Welfare being placed in a coastal parish. Accordingly, they were assigned to an ecclesia in Society' (FWS). Nevertheless, the relations between FCDP, FWS and KSMTF have Pallithottam, a small fishing village in the Quilon municipality. Pallithottam, like remained very close and their work interwoven. Since 1985 FCDP mainly has been most fishing villages, was known for its poverty, and moreover, for the increasing concerned with social and educational activities, like formal and non-formal edu- violence of its inhabitants, due to growing economic difficulties. During the initial cation, all kinds of social projects, seminars and courses on various subjects of concern for the fisherfolk. Furthermore, since 1982 a fisherwomen's organization based on the 'will of God' and the fisherfolk's poverty is their 'fate', toward a more has been active within FCDP. It is concerned with various topics of relevance for progressive or radical one. the fishing community in general and the fisherwomen in particular. The activities of FWS are similar to other SIFFS cooperatives. About 1,200 fishermen, operating motorized and non-motorized artisanal crafts, are members of FWS (1991). Those VIII who bring their catches to auctioning in one of the FWS markets automatically become members of KSMTF. Indeed, the fisherfolk in the five villages, on the As discussed above, Kerala is known for its long history of political radicalism and whole, are highly unionized. Of the approximately 5,000 persons directly engaged trade-unionism. This fact undeniably provided the initiators of the fishers unions in fishing and related activities, around 3,000 are members of KSMTF and a number and grassroot cooperatives with an important start in their mobilization effort and of the other 2,000 are members of the union related to the institutional church. strategies to deal with the authorities (see Meynen 1989:23). The unionization Moreover, according to my informants amongst fishers in coastal Quilon (including process of Kerala's fisherfolk in many ways resembles that of other groups of FCDP, KSMTF and FWS workers) the people in the villages on a large scale support workers earlier this century. Although later than for most categories of workers, the the left-wing parties. The fisherfolk's movement itself does not relate to any same process of a turn from social organization based on communal representation political party, and this left-wing tendency neither is appreciated by the church toward a class-based organization can be detected in the case of the artisanal hierarchy nor the Salesians. fisherfolk. This does not mean that communalism has become absent in their According to the chairman of FCDP,12 the persistence of the Salesians in the struggle, but that at least they have taken important steps toward uniting around struggle for, and with, the fisherfolk, no longer can be disrespected by the institu- their common cause. tional church. Although the relations with the church hierarchy still are far from It is important to note, that whereas the mobilization of Catholic fisherfolk in being smooth, the clear strength plus the economic and social achievements accom- the agitations against the first CPI government in Kerala could be viewed as the plished by the FCDP have forced the church hierarchy to improve the relationship, first stage of their politicization, their interaction with political parties was very and in some ways to change their strategies toward the villagers. This is, for limited for years to come. Only much later the fisherfolk united in struggling for instance, reflected in recent years by the Quilon Social Service Society which under their own interests. It is significant that in both cases, the major initial drive came the auspices of the institutional church and headed by the local clergy (other than from the Catholic church, and not from political parties and their affiliated unions. the Salesians), has been building up a similar marketing system as that of FWS. Though certainly unintended by the church hierarchy, the church stimulated a Although they, of course, present some competition to the FWS, they are more seemingly paradoxical development of organizing the fisherfolk and later even concerned with inland fishers and less with marine fishers than FWS. motivating the rise of a union that has increasingly worked together with the Hence, it might be argued that the modernization of the fisheries, the subsequent political opponent of the church, the left in Kerala. The indisputable success of the depletion of the coastal waters, and the increased competition over the resources priests in mobilizing the fisherfolk, first of all, is related to their social function in enhanced changes in the political and social culture of the villages. Seemingly the Catholic fishing villages and, generally speaking, to the importance of religion paradoxical, the prime mover for translating the people's dissatisfaction over their for the fisherfolk. Just as the priest is the 'ex-officio' leader in the villages, so is difficult socio-economic situation into political action were Catholi~~priests.13 religion more than 'belief' for the fisherfolk. Rather, it is the philosophy of In sum, even though Kerala's fisherfolk still face enormous socio-economic existence, penetrating into all aspects of life and death in the fishing communities. problems, and their grassroot associations only involve a small part of the total To conclude, some individual priests in Kerala have rejected the conventional fishing population, at least locally they have been able 50 curb the malpractices of theological epistemology, which takes the existing social structure as 'natural' or the elites, and influence policy making in the fisheries. Keeping in mind the 'god-given,' and preaches obedience to spiritual and secular authorities. In view of traditional conservatism of the Catholic church as a social institution in Kerala, the the very important role of religion and religious leaders in the fishing communities, role played by individual priests in the process indeed is extraordinary. Most by taking side with the people these 'problem priests' gave the people substantive importantly, they set in motion a change concerning the fisherfolk's ideas over the basis for revolting against the exploitative social structure in the villages. Moreover, reasons for their miserable socio-economic situation and mobilized them into direct by assisting the people in finding 'secular' causes for their poverty, e.g. the exploitative organized action to change it. In essence, the priests motivated a turn from the socio-economic relations and over-exploitation of the fish resources and stimulat- conventional ideology by rejecting that the existing exploitative social order is ing them into action, they have given the people hope for changes in real life. Acknowledgements in the monsoon is particularly harmful, because by scraping the seabottom the trawl-nets destroy the fish spawn. I wish to express my gratitude to Mikl6s RBcz and the editors of MAST for their valuable comments. I also want to thank Polly S. Hewson for commenting on my 11. My information on the history of FCDP is mainly derived from personal interviews with its English. chairman, director, and local KSMV leaders. 12. Personal interviews with the chairman of FCDP who is a local Don Bosco priest. Notes 13. I say seerrrirtgly because if the development of the priests' involvement in the fisherfolk's struggle in Kerala is put in a broader context, it becomes clear that the process is not at all paradoxical. The non-conformist movement within the Catholic church in ICerala namely is not an isolated phenomenon. 1. The main findings of the research are presented in my M.A. thesis; 'Modernization in India; Example Kerala's Fisheries.' It corresponds to similar movements that base their theological considerations on 'liberation theology' and are active in many other so-called Third World countries. 2. All fishing operations of the state are conducted in the coastal waters.

3. In 1988-89 India's marine fish production totalled 1,817,000 tonnes (National Fishermen Forum References Cited 1991:31).

4. It is difficult to tell exactly how many persons are employed in these activities due to a lack of Achari, T.R.T. reliable data. Meynen, for instance, indicates that in 1979 roughly the same number of people were 1988 Status Report on Kerala's Fisheries. In: K. Mathew (Ed.), Voice of tlre Storrn. Cochin: N.F.F. estimated to be engaged in activities related to fishing, as that of active fishermen (1989:5). Leela Gulati, Pp. 20-43. on the other hand, refers to the fisheries as providingemployment for another 350,000 people (1988: 151). Department of Fisheries 1987 Kerala Fisheries art Overview. Trivandrum: Government of Kerala. 5. The Catholic fishing communities are mainly concentrated in the southern districts of Kerala while the Muslim communities chiefly are in the northern districts. Gopalan, U.K. 1987 The Fishery Resources of Kerala and Their Exploitation. In: Fisheries Crisis arrd Policy 6. Ezhavas (Iravas, Erevas) together with ~hoiansand Tiyyas were classified as toddy tappers, Approacft Kerala (Proceedings of the State Level Seminar held at Trivandrum on August 27-28 although only a few of them actually were occupied as such. Most of them were sub-tenants and agrarian 1987). Trivandrum: PC0 Centre. labourers. In the caste hierarchy, they were regarded as being the highest among untouchables. As outcasts, Gulati, L. they had to observe many restrictions related to their polluting state, which seriously restricted their moves 1988 Women's Changing Roles in the Kerala's Fishery. In: 3. Nadel-Klein and D.L. Davis (Eds.), in the fast changing society at the turn of the century. Together they formed around 25% of the total To Work and to Weep: Worl~errirr Fislrirtg Societies. St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic population in Kerala. Presently these groups are all known under the name Ezhava. Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland. Pp. 149-168. 7. In 1986 an official fishery-experts committee recommended: 1,145 trawlers, 0 purse-seiners, HfilfdfinardBair, J. 2,690 motorized artisanal boats, and 20,000 non-motorized boats to be allowed to operate in the coastal 1992 Modernization in India; Example Kerala's Fisheries. M.A. Thesis, University of Amsterdam. waters. In fact, there were: 2,807 trawlers, 54 purse-seiners, 6,934 motorized, and 20,170 non-motorized Hiro, D. boats in operation (Kurien and Achari 1990:2014, table 4). 1976 Irrside India Today. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I ' ' 8. Platteau, for instance, cites in his analysis of the transformation process in Sakthikulangara that Houtart, F. and N. Nayak the majority of trawler owners have never been regular active fishermen, but rather those engaged in 1988 Kerala Fislrentterr - Culttire arrd Social Orgattization. Lourain-la-Neuve: Centre D'Andyse occupations related to fish trade 'more specifically in the marketing and processing stages of the export Sociale De la Culture (Centre Tricontinental) and Trivandrum: PC0 Centre. "fish chain"' (1984:88-89). '1 Klausen, A.M. 1968 Kerala Fislrertrtert and tlre Irtdo-Nonvegiart Pilot Project. London: Allen and Unwin. 9. According to Kurien, the latest estimates of protein inlake in ICeraladate back to the early 1960s. Then, fish was the cheapest source of animal protein in ~egalaand accounted for 314 of the total animal Kooiman, D. protein intake. He emphasizes that while the per capita availability of locally consumed fish was 15.2 kg 1984 The Gospel of Coffee. In: D. Kooiman, 0, van den Muijzenberg and P. van der Veer (Eds.), in 1956-58, it had decreased to 9.2 kg in 1982-83 (1985:80 and 86, note 102). Corlversiort, Corrrpetition and Corflict; Essays ort tlre Role of Religiort irt Asia. Amsterdam: Free University Press. Pp. 185-214. 10. The monsoon months (June-September)constitute the main season of bottom trawling for prawns. Kumar, K.G. Monsoon also is thespawningseason formany fishspecies in the coastal waters. Artisanal fishers together 1988 Organising Fisherfolk Cooperatives in Kerala. Econanric artd Political Weekly XXIII(12): with a number of fishery experts (see e.g. Kurien and Achari 1988 and 1990) argue, that bottom trawling 578-582. Kuriackos, N.U. 1986 An Exploratory Study on the Unionization of Traditional Fishers (with Special Reference to Kerala Swatantra Matsya Thozilaly Union QuiIon District). Project Report submitted to the University of Madras, in part fulfillment of the requirement for the M.A. Degree. Kurien, J. 1985 Technical Assistance Projects andSocio-Economicchange, Norwegian Intervention in Kerala's Fisheries Development. Ecotrottric mrd Political Weekly XX(25-26):70-87. Kurien, J. and T.R.T. Achari 1988 Fisheries Development Policies and the Fishermen's Struggle in Kerala. Socirtl Actiotr 38: 15-36. 1990 Overfishing along Kerala Coast, Causes and Consequences. Ecotromic atrd Political Weekly XXV(35-36):2011-2018. Lieten, G.K. 1982 Tlre First Conrnrrttrist Mitristty in Kerala. Calcutta: Bagchi. Mathew, M.T. and W. Scott 1980 Developing a Motritoring Systettr at tire Local Level, Vol.1: Socio-Ecotrott~icObservatiot~ Areas itr Kerala. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Meynen, W. 1989 Contradictions and Constraints in Fisheries Development: Capital, Artisanal Workers and Shrinking Resources in Kerala. Workitrg Prcper No. 51. Den Haag: Institute for Social Studies. National Fishermen Forum 1991 An Approach to the National Fisheries Policy for Fuller Employment and Sustainable Devel- opment in the Eight Plan. New Delhi: National Fishermen Forum. 1989 Invisible Nets: Women and Children in Kerala's Fishing. Maritinre AtrtIrropologicaI Studies 2(2): 174-194. Nieuwenhuys, 0. 1990 Angels with Callow Hatrds: Ci~ildretr:~Work itr Rrrral Kerala (Itrdia). Ph.D. Dissertation, Free University Amsterdam. PSlsson, G. 1991 Coastal Ecotro~~ries,Qtltttrul Accorttrts; Hrtnratr Ecology mrd lcelatrdic Discourse. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Platteau, J.Ph. 1984 The Drive Towards Mechanization of Small Scale Fisheries in Kerala: A Study of the Trans-for- mation Process of Traditional Societies. Developttretrt ntrd Clratrge 15(1):65-103. Rao, M.S.A. 1979 Social Movettretrts atrd Social T,.cctrsfor~tmtiott.Madras: MacMillan. Vijayan, A.J. 1987 Whither the Independent Unions. In Programme for Comn~unityOrganization Developttretrt wirere Natrtre Wottlett atrd Mefz Matter; TetlffiYear Review. Trivandrum: PC0 Centre. Kuriackos, N.U. 1986 An Exploratory Study on the Unionization of Traditional Fishers (with Special Reference to All That Holds Us Together Kerala Swatantra Matsya Thozilaly Union Quilon District). Project Report submitted to the Kinship and Resource Pooling in a Fishing Co-operative University of Madras, in part fulfillment of the requirement for the M.A. Degree. Kurien, J. 1985 Technical Assistance Projects and Socio-Economic Change, Norwegian Intervention in Kerala's Fisheries Development. Ecorrortric arrd Political Weekly XX(25-26):70-87. Charles R. Menzies Kurien, J. and T.R.T. Achari City University of New York 1988 Fisheries Development Policies and the Fishermen's Struggle in Kerala. Socicrl Actiorz 38: 15-36. 1990 Overfishing along Kerala Coast, Causes and Consequences. Ecorrortric arrd Political Weekly XXV(35-36):2011-2018. ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of networks of co-operation and resource . Lieten, G.K. pooling within a fishers' co-operative, the Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative 1982 The First Conatrrorist Mitiistry in Kerala. Calcutta: Bagchi. Association. Fifty-plus years after its initial establishment in 1939 the Co-op is the Mathew, M.T. and W. Scott only one of its kind to have survived in an industry dominated by three large vertically 1980 Developirrg a Morriforitrg Sj~stettzat tlte Local Level, Vol.1:Socio-Ecorrortric Observatiorr Areas integrated fishing companies. By identifying the way in which fishers organize their in Kerala. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. productive enterprises, their specific forms of co-operation and resource pooling, and Meynen, W. the role of the Co-op in assisting the fishers in maintaining and perpetuating their enterprises, this analysis suggests that the co-operation networks of member fishers 1989 Contmdictions and Constraints in Fisheries Development: Capital, Artisanal Workers and Shrinking Resources in Kerala. Workirrg Paper No. 51. Den Haag: Institute for Social Studies. plays a cmcial role in the economic survival of the Co-op. National Fishermen Forum 1991 An Approach to the National Fisheries Policy for Fuller Employment and Sustainable Devel- opment in the Eight Plan. New Delhi: National Fishermen Forum. Introduction 1989 Invisible Nets: Women and Children in Kerala's Fishing. Marititrre Atitlrropological Strrdies 2(2): 174- 194. In this article I explore the role of resource pooling networks in the continued Nieuwenhuys, 0. success of a commercial fishers' co-operative (Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-oper- 1990 Angels tvitlr Callorrs Harrd.~:Clrildrert 4 Worh bt Rrrral Kerala (Irrdia).Ph.D. Dissertation, Free ative Association, PRFCA) and the role of the PRFCA in the social reproduction of University Amsterdam. the member-fishers' family-based fishing enterprises. In what follows particular Pfilsson, G. (,,I ,, attention is paid to 1) the way in which fishers organize their productive enterprises; 1991 Coastal Ecorrorrries, Crtltural Accortrrts; Hirttrctrr Ecology arrd Icelatrdic Discourse. Manchester: 2) the specific forms of co-operation and resource pooling among family-based Manchester University Press. fishing enterprises, and; 3) the role of the Co-op in providing the institutional Platteau, J.Ph. framework within which a coalition of small-scale producers can raise financing 1984 The Drive Towards Mechanization of Small Scale Fisheries in Kerala: A Study of the Trans-for- mation Process of Traditional Societies. Developnrerrt arrd Cltarrge 15(1):65-103. for vessel purchases and collectively process and market their fish. Too often analysis of fishing co-operatives situate themselves in terms of either Rao, M.S.A. particular attributes of the co-operative itself (cf. Rodman 1989; Clement 1986; 1979 Social Movenrents arrd Socicrl Trcrtrsfomratiorr, Madras: MacMillan. Hayward 1984; Suster 1980) or in terms of the attributes of the individuals who Vijayan, A.J. 1987 Whither the Independent Unions. In Programme for Community Organization Developttreru belong to the co-op (Petterson 1980; Poggie 1980; Davis and Jentoft 1989). What ~vltereNatrtre Worrrer~and Met2 Matter; Tetrtlt Year Review. Trivandrum: PC0 Centre. is left unsaid is the interaction between the networks of members on the one hand and the organization that they helped to create on the other. By focusing on the narrow aspect of resource pooling among the members of the PRFCA the dynamics of the interrelationships between resource pooling networks among commercial fishers and the economic viability of fishers' co-operatives can be clarified. The Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-op As the co-operative movement matured a process of winnowing and amalga- mation occurred leaving the Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative Association The PRFCA is located in Prince Rupert, British Columbia (Canada), a coastal as the only co-operative active in the British Columbian fishing industry. Over time community of about 16,500 people. The local economy is dependent upon resource the Co-op has grown into a successful firm with an active membership of 500 fishers extraction industries such as fishing and forestry. Prince Rupert is also a major grain and a member-owned fleet of approximately 200 boats (the difference between and coal exporting port. number of members and vessels reflects the Co-op's membership structure in which Today's Fishermen's Co-op arose out of the struggle between independent both deckhands and boat owners are members). At its home plant in Prince Rupert small-scale fishers and large monopoly fish processing firms over the price paid for the Co-op employs up to 350 shoreworkers with an annual payroll of 10 million fish (cf. Clement 1986: Hill 1967). The early co-operatives that arose out of this dollars. During the ten year period, 1978-1988, the Co-op's average annual produc- struggle were attempts by coalitions of small-producers to circumvent the private tion was 38 million pounds with annual gross sales of 67 million dollars (PRFCA companies control of the market. Their project was simple: sell collectively the fish 1988). caught by a coalition of independent fishers direct to the fresh fish market and then The current recession has hit the PRFCA hard. During the past decade the Co-op divide up the profit. If things went well everyone would receive a better price for lost nearly 10 million dollars; mostly as a result of misguided attempts to diversify their fish than if they had sold through the private companies. These early co-oper- into areas such as , fish food manufacture, and a specialty fish pro- ative experiments formed along lines of co-operation between kin and within cessing plant in the United States. As a result the Co-op has been forced to undergo geographically bounded areas (for example, North Island Co-op, Clayoquot Sound an extensive programme of restructuring over the course of the last several years. Co-op, Sontula, etc, see A.V. Hill 1967). Many co-ops failed, but those that survived The most obvious and explicit change has been the creation of a new company, had at their core interlocking networks of co-operation and resource pooling that Pacific Challenger which now owns all of the Co-op's processing facilities and had been in existence prior to the establishment of the co-op. assets. The PRFCA, however, retains majority ownership of Pacific Challenger. In

BRITISH COLUMEIA

Islands

Map 1. The British Colw~lbiacoastal area. Photo 1. Prirlce Rupert Fislterr~ie~t'sCo-operarive Associati011 home plant in Prince Rupert. a series of at times rambunctious and confrontational general meetings the mem- vessel. A single enterprise may own several vessels. In addition to these possible bership of the PRFCA passed a sequence of resolutions that created this new ownership patterns crew members may also be recruited from members of other company and opened the door for 'outside' investment (that is allowing non-Co-op enterprises. This degree of complexity makes focusing on the vessel and crew members the opportunity to purchase a share in the Co-op's processing enterprise) problematic. In fact, the fishing vessel is best understood as a site of interactiort and expanded its recent policy of processing non-members' fish. Despite all of the between several enterprises. This typically occurs in one of two ways: 1) at the level changes (perhaps in some cases because of them) the Co-op has maintained a of the crew, or; 2) at the level of ownership. committed core of fishers. As I argue in this paper the commitment of these fishers Ad 1. Labour requirements vary according to the fishery a vessel is engaged in. to the Co-op can be explained in part by their extensive networks of co-operation For example, a typical herring seine crew is six, a halibut crew is seven? and a and resource sharing and in part by the ability of the Co-op to facilitate the salmon seiner requires a crew of four or five. The regular crew, those fishers development and maintenance of these interlocking networks. considered to have security of tenure, is typically the salmon crew. Thus, a vessel which is owned and operated by one family enterprise may at different times in the fishing year require additional crew members. Family Fishing Enterprises and the Co-op Extra crew members required for fisheries such as the halibut are often recruited from amongst the owners and crews of vessels which are not licensed for the fishery. Co-op fishers' primary fishing related economic activities are organized in terms of Thus the typical halibut crew would include the regular salmon crew, one or more family-based fishing enterprises (of which there are nearly two-hundred).' Each vessel owners and/or one or two crew members off a non-licensed vessel. Since the family-based enterprise consists of groups of kin who combine and coordinate their additional crew members are not members of the family enterprise which owns the economic effort. In emic terms members of particular enterprises refer to each other vessel in question, but are reinvesting their halibut crew-shares into their own as members of the same family. However, one should not confuse this social group family fishing enterprise, it would be misleading to consider this vessel as repre- whose primary purpose is economic with the anthropological unit domestic group: senting a single unified fishing enterprise. The point here is that the vessel defines 'those basic units which ...[revolve] around the processes of production and repro- aplace, a site of interaction where members of different family enterprises co-oper- duction, of shelter and consumption' (Goody 1972:4). These family-based enter- ate in meeting seasonal variations in labour requirements. One must not, however, prises are constituted solely for the purposes of combining economic effort and only loose sight of the fact that co-operation at the level of the crew relies on there being periodically (during transitory phases of their developmental trajectory) do aspects economic differences between family enterprises such that propels some family- of reproduction, shelter, and consumption cocncide. based enterprises into sending their members out to work on other boats (or, in Boats owned by the same family enterprise tend to operate as autonomous units certain cases into industries other than fishing). of production while fishing even though they might co-oderate in the domain of Ad 2. Whereas co-operation between family-based fishing enterprises in meet- resource pooling. Exceptions do exist in which several boa& form a pool and ing fluctuating labour demands necessitates a degree of social inequality between combine their fishing effort in such a way that competition between pool members co-operating enterprises, co-operation in ownership tends to be between enterprises is eliminated and overall catching potential is exparided. However, this is an unusual of roughly equivalent economic capabilities. The purpose of combining the capital situation usually limited to the winter roe-herring fishery or during strikes by the of several enterprises in the purchasing of a vessel is normally to provide an industry's main fishers' union, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union opportunity for a young fisher to run a fishing vessel. In technical terms this is a (UFAWU). In the highly competitive herring fishery pools reduce uncertainty. Pools form of expanded reproduction 'in which income generated [within one or more during UFAWU strikes allow Co-op fishers (who do not see themselves bound to fam'ily-based enterprise] is used to establish a new one on the same scale' (Fried- tie-up during UFAWU strikes) to co-ordinate their catching potential so as to mann 1978:88). The form of expanded reproduction among Co-op fishers differs maximize productive capacity without exceeding, their plants processing capa- from that extant under a fully capitalist form of production in that rather than bilities. A more typical example of inter-boat co-operation on the fishing grounds concentrating capital and reducing competition expanded reproduction among involves the sharing of information on fish catches and boat positions. However, Co-op fishers is subject to demographic pressures which result ultimately in the the overall level of coordination and co-operation between boats while fishing is fiss.ion of family-based fishing enterprises and increased competition on the fishing highly limited. grounds. Thus, by combining the capital of several enterprises young fishers are Family-based fishing enterprises ,are constituted in a variety of ways. One able to run their own fishing vessel and eventually establish their own fishing enterprise may own a single vessel. A coalition of enterprises may own a single enterprise. Jason White, a longtime Co-op member has been involved in several joint and equipment is worth $750,000). Even though the Co-op's big boat fleet is partnerships with kin, former shipmates, and crewmembers. His first boat, pur- relatively small (17 out of about 200 boats) they account for more than 40% of the chased in 1961, involved apartnership with his father-in-law and his former skipper. Co-op's production. His current seine boat (the Northern Squall) involves a partnership with two other These contradictions between Co-op members have on occasion threatened to fishers. In addition to this he owns shares in two other seiners and in 1989 sold off destabilize the Co-op's ability to operate (Menzies 1992). One of the ways in which the shares he had held in a third. Of the three boats he currently holds shares in he Co-op members have attempted to mediate potential conflicts is through an informal skippers one, the second is a partnership with his eldest son, and the third is a joint agreement that allocates a fixed number of seats on the board of directors to small venture with an ex-crew member who had fished with Jason White for the ten years boat owners, large boat owners, and crew members. More important for our previous to their purchasing the boat. consideration here is the way in which specific points of conflict, such as between There is a great deal of diversity amongst the fishing enterprises within the skipper and crew, are moderated and constrained by occurring within a matrix of co-operative. Most of them (75-80%) operate only one fish boat. A few enterprises family-based fishing enterprises. are also engaged in non-fishing ventures such as real estate speculation, hotels, marine supply stores, and fish farms. Out of the fleet of approximately two-hundred vessels delivering to the Co-op 99 are licensed to gillnet salmon, 93 to troll salmon, Family Fishing Enterprises and the Accumulation of Capital 13 to seine salmon, 38 to longline halibut, 180 to gillnet herring, 10 to seine herring, and 4 with trawl licenses.3 Three types of family-based fishing enterprises can be identified: simple, confeder- This diversity of enterprises conceals several crucial~socio-economicdif- ated, and complex. These types correspond with differing structures of the division ferences which have an important impact on the ability of the Co-op to operate as of labour within the enterprises and to the manner by which capital is accumulated. a viable economic entity. The first is the division between boat owner and crew. The Simple enterprises involve both the lowest degree of internal division of labour and second is between small boat and big boat.4These sets of social differentiation arose are the least able to accumulate capital in a manner that allows expansion beyond in the course of the Co-op's transformation from a marketing co-operative into a their basic task of perpetuating the enterprise. In contrast, complex enterprises processing co-operative. The small boat fishers who initially organized the Co-op exhibit a high degree of internal division of labour, rely more heavily on purchasing operated vessels thirty-five to forty feet long and rarely hired crews; if they did it the labour power of non-family members, and are able to accumulate capital in such was from among kinsmen. During the Co-OR'Sexpansion in the 1940s fishers a way as allows them to expand and diversify their productive capacity. owning more capital intensive, larger vessels (fifty to eighty-five feet long), with Family-based fishing enterprise are typically first constituted as either a simple crews of four to seven men joined the Co-op. While some of these boats' crew or a confederated enterprise. This variation is related to the size and type of fishing members owned shares in these bigger boats, the majority-,of the crews did not. vessel operated. Simple enterprises usually operate less expensive gillnetters or The position occupied by the crews of the Co-op's big'boat fleet is one of the trollers and are those in which the classic anthropological household coincides with most perplexing and is the one which most often breaks into open conflict (cf. the economic, reproductive, and dwelling units on a one to one basis: a single family Menzies 1990a, 1990b). The deckhands on these 'boats are also members of the owns and operates a fishing vessel without outside labour inputs. Co-op and thus have a say in the running of the plant. However, in the context of A confederated enterprise links several households together in a joint enterprise the fish boat they are labour. The skipper-owner controls the means of production. which operates the more capital intensive seine and longline vessels (see Smith In this capacity he has the authority to hire, fire, and set the conditions of work. The 1989 for a discussion of confederations of households among Peruvian peasant skipper thus occupies a position that allows him specific controls and powers that cultivators). The linkage is manifest in the pooling of operating capital and labour. to the crew are denied. Though fraught with tension this potentially volatile Consumption and reproductive processes are not inter-linked. Confederated enter- relationship is constrained by the crews' and skippers' shared membership in the prises may own more than one vessel and coordinate their fishing operations or Co-op. several households may collectively own a single vessel. The distinction between small and big fish boats also contains the potential for In simple and confederated enterprises accumulated capital is shared equally conflict. The Co-op fleet is an amalgam of large and small vessels prosecuting a among (in the case of simple enterprises) household members or (in the case of variety of fisheries. These vessels range from a low of $150,000 for asmall gillnetter confederated enterprises) the constituent households. In both the social division of (the average 'small boat,' with licenses and equipment is worth $300,000) to $2.5 labour is minimal. However, in a complex enterprise one or two central households million dollars for the most expensive seiner (the average big boat, with licenses expropriate the bulk of the capital and the division of labour is unequal. Differences between these forms of fishing enterprises are also manifest in their scale of well that by 1947 it was able to provide the bulk of the Co-op's day to day operating production and the manner by which the enterprises reproduce.5 credit requirements as well. With the Credit Union firmly established by the late The social reproduction of most Co-op fishing enterprises occurs at the level of 1940s the Co-op was well placed for expansion. Fishers who had previously been simple reproduction (ire.,the maintenance of the means of production at the current unable to come to the Co-op due to a lack of non-company financing were now free level). Expanded reproduction (the concentration of capital and increased produc- to do so. tive capacity independent of technological factors) occurs only to a limited extent. The Co-op's marketing structure is designed to return to the fisher the portion Qpically expanded reproduction only occurs when the family-based enterprise of the value of their fish that would normally be expropriated by the shareholders needs to accumulate capital to assist a family member in purchasing a fishing boat. of the industries private fishing companies. Co-op fishers receive a down payment The new boat is then either incorporated within the existing enterprise or the parent when the fish are delivered to the plant and the balance after the fish is sold. enterprise splits into several smaller simple andlor confederated enterprises. Enter- Historically Co-op fishers have earned between 15% and 30% more on equivalent prises which do not hive off in this fashion are able to make the transition from a poundage than have company fishers. There have been many changes to this system confederated to a complex enterprise and break free of the cycle of simple repro- over the years but its basic format has remained unchanged. duction - hence generating a process of class differentiation in which surplus value In the following case histories the concepts of simple, confederated, and com- is appropriated by a central family-based enterprise or individual. plex fishing enterprises are examined with reference to the developmental trajec- tories of two family fishing enterprises. Central to this discussion is the inter- dependence of the success of the Co-op and the individual family-based fishing The PRFCA and the Accumulation of Capital enterprises. Case one traces the history of a simple fishing enterprise. Case two is an inter-generational history of a fishing enterprise that began as a confederated Though the crucial process of capital accumulation is organized at the level of enterprise in the 1920s but has since developed into a myriad of fishing enterprises family-based fishing enterprises it is the Fishermen's Co-op that provides the among which can be found examples of all three forms. institutional framework within which the fishing enterprises operate. The Co-op's role in capital accumulation is twofold: 1) the Co-op provides access to inexpensive credit through an affiliated credit union, and; 2) the Co-op's marketing system Case One: Stephen Pedersen and Family's Fishing Enterprise returns to members a higher price for their fish than they could get selling outside / the Co-op. Each aspect of the Co-op's involvemeh in the family-based enterprises Stephen Pedersen and his brother James joined the Co-op in 1959. Prior to joining entails some costs and the benefits of the marketing system is not always readily the Co-op the brothers had each owned gillnetters. Their boats were sadly in need apparent to non-member fishers. of repair but the brothers felt it was unlikely they would be able to raise the money Financing of fishing vessels is a perennial problem for'fishers. Though modest needed to rebuild them fishing outside the Co-op. The Pedersens were recruited by government support has been available in one form or other since the late 1960s Larry Hansen, the skipper of a newly built fishboat the Flying Wave. The Flying (primarily in the form of reduced rate and government guaranteed loans for capital Wave had been built for the halibut and reduction herring fisheries by a consortium improvements) British Columbian fishers have for the most part relied on non- of Co-op fishers and was jointly financed by the Co-op and the Credit Union.6 governmental sources to finance their vessels and daily operating expenses. For Shortly after joining the Co-op the Pedersens sold their gillnetters and went to work many fishers this has necessitated seeking out financing from the fish processing for Larry Hansen. The Pedersens quit the Flying Wave in 1967 and with their companies. This form of financing, however, tied fishers to the company that savings and a loan from the Credit Union they each built themselves a combination provided financing. During the Co-op's formative period tied financing was one of gillnetltroll fishboat well suited for the British Columbia fishery. the major obstacles that had to be overcome. Thus, the early co-operators saw the Two points are important here. Firstly, both Stephen and Fumes continued to fish need to establish a credit union as integral to the building of a producers' co-oper- for halibut on the Flying Wave until the Canadian fleet was shut out of Alaska in ative. I 1978 as a result of the U.S. declaration of a 200 hundred mile limit. Secondly, the In 1940 Prince Rupert fishers put theory into action. The first general meeting I Pedersen brothers formed the core of a co-operation network which shared infor- of the Prince Rupert Fishermen's Credit Union (PRFCU) was held in the Deepsea mation, labour, and capital during the summer salmon season and after 1973 in the Fishermen's Hall, March 28, 1940. By 1943 the Credit Union was able to cover early spring roe-herring fishery. Like the earlier networks of co-operation among individual Co-op fishers' operational capital requirements. The Credit Union did so i the fishers who came together in the 1930s to form the Co-op the Pedersen's co-operation network consisted of a small number of fishers united at the core in labour requirements internally was also the point at which Stephen Pedersen's sons terms of either kinship or work history. The Pedersens, their brother-in-law, and two (Jim and Alec) began to desire a boat of their own. However, their ability to purchase former shipmates from the Flying Wave form the core of their group. their own fishboats was severely limited by the scale of production of their families The Pedersen's network of co-operation is most clearly demarcated during the enterprise. The purchase a gillnetter, for example, requires a minimum of $150,000. course of the roe-herring fishery which begins in late March and rarely lasts beyond Jim and Alec did not earn enough working on their father's boat to save for a down the first or second week of April.7 Since 1975 Stephen Pedersen has co-ordinated payment3 Thus, they required an external source of revenue (such as, for example, the herring operation of his co-operation network. He arranges leases of licenses working on a big boat andlor onshore during the off season). from the Co-op and other fishers as is necessary and hires the crews. He prefers to lease licenses from the Co-op because these licenses are offered to Co-op fishers at below market rates. The Co-op also hires boats to pack the herring from the fishing grounds to the processing plant. It is in both the interests of the Co-op and Table 1: Distribution of Gross Fishing Incomes, 1984 Pedersen's co-operation network to increase the Co-op's overall herring roe pro- Gross income duction. Thus Co-op distributes the costs of packing fish and licenses leasing among Seine the general Co-op membership as opposed to just the herring fishers. During the 1970s and into the early 1980s Stephen Pedersen and his family operated their boat themselves with only minimal labour inputs from non-family members. Additional crewmembers were only required during the roe-herring fishery where hired from among Stephen Pedersen's co-operation network. The point at which the Pedersen family's fishing enterprise was able to fulfil all of its From: the DPA Group inc., British Columbia Salmon Fleet Financial Performance 1981 - 1985. Vancouver: Government of Canada, Dept, of Fisheries and Oceans (pacific Region), 1988.

Several factors are at play in limiting the potential for capital accumulation in the - 1959: joins Co-op, owns gillnetter. gillnet and troll fishery: 1) government regulations concerning gear type and access 'Simple' enterprise. to fishing grounds; 2) the resultant small scale of production, and therefore; 3) a restricted catching capacity. These factors are not completely independent of each Accumulates other. For example, while the scale of production in the gillnet fishery has always Capital - 1963: sells gillnetter, to a been small (with respect to the individual harvesting units --the boats), government } crew on Co-op seiner, ' The Flying Wave. regulations in recent years have served to inhibit any potential expansion in the J - 'Complex' enterprise. scale of production. The government limits the gillnet fishery by placing restrictions , J on the length, depth, mesh size, and number of nets a gillnetter may use. It would, - 1967: builds new gillnetter. however, be remiss for me to claim government regulations are the sole limiting 'Simple' enterprise. factor. The small scale of production is also the product of a river fishery in which a larger boat and net is not practical. This set of factors thus combine in such a way 1 as a gillnetter/troller is only able to generate sufficient income to maintain their - 1980's: sons work on big boats. I means of production (boat and nets) and provide for the subsistence needs of the I immediate household.9 Any expansion beyond this basic level requires external inputs of capital. Accumulate --. 1988: Aleck and Jim become i In 1987 Jim, Alec, and their father built a larger fibreglass gillnetter. The full partners with Stephen Pedersens solved the inherent problems of capital accumulation in this scale of and build new gillnetter. 'Confederated' enterprise production in two ways: 1) as with the boat built in 1967 the Co-op and credit union played a major role in providing financing for this new vessel, and; 2) Jim and Alec Figure 1. Pedersen Fatnily Enterprise History found jobs on the larger Co-op seiners. First Jim (in 1986) and then Alec (1989) went to work on the larger vessels during the salmon season. Both sons first found these small independent' fishers consisted of a very small segment of the fishery. employment on the Virago, a seine boat owned by a longtime friend and former Independent fishers did not become a dominant force in the halibut fishery until the shipmate of their father, Robert Bruce. When Jim mastered seining he Look a job mid 1920s. The New England Fish Co. entered the halibut fishery in 1894 and by on a boat in which Robert Bruce held a 30% interest (the Wayward) and Alec took 1911 was producing 80 per cent of the Canadian halibut catch (McMullen 1987:40). over his job on the Virago. Jim and Alec's partnership arrangement with their father In the period between 1911 and 1926 the dominance of company control and the and their jobs on the larger boats are the means by which they hope to achieve their doryltendership technique was undermined by the development of a storage and goal of owning and operating their own gillnetters. transportational infrastructure and the removal of territorial barriers to rnarkets.10 The Co-op has played a crucial role throughout the history of the Pedersen Like Jake Hendrickson, many dory fishers reinvested their earnings from the family's fishing enterprise. By joining the Co-op Stephen and James Pedersen dory fishery in smaller (40-50 foot) longliners. The 'steamers employed salaried gained access to employment in the highly lucrative reduction herring fishery. Their crews of eleven to thirteen, as well as the dory fishers. This meant high fixed wage eight years on the Flying Wave allowed them to accumulate sufficient capital for a costs at a time when the halibut stocks were declining' (McMullen 1987:40). In down payment on new fishing vessels of their own, to build a reputation as 'steady contrast to the capitalist form of production of the large steamers, the smaller, and hard working' that facilitated the approval by the Credit Union of financing for family-run longliners were able to suppress their subsistence needs and exploit their boats, and ultimately provided access to employment for their sons in the family labour without the need of monetary remuneration. 1970s and 1980s. Jake ran the Vagabond until he retired in the late 1950s. Over the course of owning the boat Jake bought out his partners. Thus, by the time his four sons were

Case Two: Jake Wendrickson and Family's Fishing Enterprises

The history of the Hendrickson family enterprise is really the history of a succession of enterprises. The first in this series was a confederated enterprise (1920-40). Following which was a brief phase (1940s) when the Hendrickson's household and enterprise coincided in a one-to-one relationship (simple enterprise). Subsequent manifestations have oscillated between simple and confederated enterprises as kinsfolk pool and withdraw their labour andlor capital from the enterprise. Several of the family's contemporary enterprises are complex, or partial confederations involving an asymmetrical division of labour and capital between constituent households. The Hendrickson family's involvement in the British Columbia fishing industry spans four generations (see figure 2) and dates back to the earliest days of the industry on the west coast - Jake's father-in-law brought one of the first halibut longliners around Cape Horn to Prince Rupert. Jake and his two brothers came to Bob Ernie Dave Kevin North America from Norway in 1911. Jake worked briefly as a lumberman before taking up fishing. He then worked a few seasons on the halibutsteamers as a dory fisher. In the early 1920s Jake and four other dory-fishers purchased the halibut 1 longliner Vagabond. Their purchase of the Vagabond corresponded to changes British Columbia's halibut fishery was then undergoing. I /'AhA/AA British Columbia's commercial halibut fishing began in the late 1880s as a Daryl Teny Dan Paul Mark doryltendership fishery financed and controlled by large capitalist firms. There was, N.B. Only family members who in the 1880s, 'a small group of two-man sailing slops that could carry about 3,000 have worked on a fishboat pounds of fished halibut to supply the local markets of Victoria, Nanaimo, Van- are noted in kinship chart. couver, Port Townsend, and other Puget Sound points' (Bell 1981:77). However, Figure 2. Herzdrickso~lFarnily Kitiship Cliart = Deceased old enough to work on deck the Vagabond belonged solely to the Hendrickson Jake Hendrickson joined the Co-op in 1941 as part of a wider move among family. During a brief period in the 1940s the fishing enterprise directly corre- Prince Rupert halibut fishers to join-up. The halibut fishers, represented by the sponded to the household unit; production, reproduction, and consumption was Prince Rupert Vessel Owners Association (PRVOA) and the Deep Sea Fishermen's constrained within a single household entity. However, as Jake's sons grew older Union (DSFU), signed an agreement with the Co-op to open a halibut liver plant. and established families of their own they began to establish their own fishing As their part of the deal the Halibut fishers put up half of the cost of the new plant enterprises (see fig. 3). and agreed to market all of their fish through the Co-op. All of Jake's sons began their fishing careers on the Vagabond. But by the early 1950s they began to crew on other vessels. In 1958 Bob, Kevin, and Dave Hendrickson built a combination herring-seinerlhalibut-longliner, the Lady Jane with the financial assistance of the Prince Rupert Fishermen's Credit Union and the Co-op.11 Ernie Hendrickson first ran, then purchased a salmon seiner the Credit Union had repossessed. During the intervening three decades these brothers and their households have continually co-operated in a variety of ways and have produced a number of different fishing enterprises. A detailed description of the particular histories of each fishing enterprise generated by the Hendrickson family is beyond the scope of the current discussion. What follows examines the crucial aspects of their co-operation and the manner by which the Co-op facilitates co-operation and resource pooling.

* Left bigboat fleet in mid-1960's Key:-//- = Boat otvrier and bought a gillnetter. ( ) = Crew or Non-Owner Sold this boat in early 1970's and s =Skipper took job on non-family seine boat. 0 =Boar ** 0 = Notfisl~ir~g Learned to fish on uncle's - = Prittiary Link Capital (4) boat in early 1960's. --- = Primary Link Kitisl~ip

Figure 3. Heridricksoti faniily e~iterpriseIiistoty. Photo 2. Dressiiig halibut orz [lie deck of a halib~~tlortglirier 20 r~iilesoffshore, just west of Prirlce Rupert. Resource Pooling The pooling of capital (including instruments and means of production) engen- ders partnership arrangements and is the most common form of co-operation among Over the course of the Hendrickson family's involvement in the fishing industry the various Hendrickson family enterprises. Coalitions among family enterprises several types of resources have been shared among enterprises: labour, capital, has been commonplace. Two of the four contemporary fishing enterprises involve licenses, and knowledge. Though the pooling of resources occurs among most of the pooling of capital. Bob Hendrickson, for example, has had a long history of the fishing enterprises in the Co-op in one form or another, it is most pronounced joint ventures. Most recently he and his nephew Terry collectively own and operate amongst groups of family enterprises such as the Hendrickson's. two seiners. The pooling of labour occurs in two situations: 1) on a short term basis to fulfil With the exception of labour, the pooling of licenses is the major point of the labour requirements during specific fisheries, and; 2) on a long term basis for co-operation between households of different families. The sharing of licenses form the purpose of accumulating capital. Among the Hendrickson family enterprises part of a larger pattern of co-operation which also involves sharing of knowledge labour is pooled in conjunction with the roe-herring season and on the Argonaut and reciprocal exchanges of equipment and gear. Though the individual enterprises where the skipper's brother is also a crew member. While both forms of labour do attempt to maximize the license rent, their ability to do so is modified by these pooling represent asymmetrical divisions of labour and access to capital, the case pre-existing networks of co-operation. Licenses are most commonly pooled during of the Argonaut is most pronounced. the roe-herring fishery. Fishing enterprises enter into limited agreements (rarely for The Argonaut is a 65 foot seine vessel with a crew of five. There is a clear longer than one season). One enterprise rents its license to another for an agreed division of labour in the work process between skipper Mark Hendrickson and his upon share of the catch and other considerations such as jobs for family members crew. This division of labour is reflected in rights to the catch, sleeping quarters, and preferred rights to other resources (such as equipment). and control over the work process.12 The antagonisms created by the different social Though the pooling of knowledge is a more ephemeral process than the pooling interests of crew and skipper are modified by Mark hiring his brother Paul. Paul, of capital or labour, it is the most crucial in the creation of co-operation networks. however, receives the same share of the catch as the non-kin crew members, despite Knowledge sharing takes two forms: I) learning the technical skills involved in investing a greater share of labour for his brother than the other crew members. running a fishing boat, and; 2) collecting information on fish location. The first form of knowledge sharing generates dyadic relationships between an experienced skipper and one of his younger male relatives (father-son, uncle-nephew). The sharing of information about where fish are extends beyond basic kin relationships and provides the basis to the larger networks of co-operation. Co-operation networks have at their core dyadic kin relations (brother-brother, father-son, uncle-nephew) and friendships generated between former crew mates. Beyond the central core relation these networks are informal and ill-defined. Network membership is best visualized in terms of a sequence of concentric and overlapping rings that include and exclude fishers and their household enterprises in accordance to the immediate context (see fig. 4). John Gatewood has noted the existence of similar networks of co-operation at work in the Alaskan seine fishery: 'information-sharing cliques' (Gatewood 1984:350-370). However, Gatewood argues these 'cliques are very small, exclu- sive, temporary groups' (1984:357) based on 'relationships [of an] ...enduring and diffuse nature' (1984:356). The information cliques are 'formed in advance of some seine periods to share scouting reports on the numbers of fish and other boats seen in the various areas' (1984:355). As soon as the opening begins, says Gatewood, these cliques disperse. The co-operation networks co-op fishers engage in are, however, of a more enduring nature and extend the realm of co-operation beyond the pre-opening period of the fishery and also include resources other than knowl- Photo 3. Skipper overseeing lrattlirtg back Iralibrrr gear from the top of the wlieelhotrse. edge. The pooling of resources is an important unifying feature of the enterprises Conclusion which make up the co-operative. As we have seen three classes of resources are pooled: labour, capital (including instruments and means of production), and; This paper suggests that the success or failure of a co-operative derives in good part knowledge (an important component of the forces of production). The enduring from networks of co-operation between fishers. From the case studies we get a nature of these interconnections between enterprises, which serve to reduce the glimpse of some of the detailed interlinkages between individual fishing enter- uncertainty of fishing, strengthen the individual enterprises and unites them as prises, their networks of co-operation, and their co-operative. The Co-op plays a co-operators. crucial role in the reproduction of family-based fishing enterprises. Through the affiliated credit union co-op fishers have access to affordable credit for operating expenses and vessel purchases. By processing and marketing their own fish Co-op fishers also earn more than if they sold 'outside.' For their part the networks of co-operation act to cement individual fishers to the Co-op since access to important resources such as labour, capital, and knowledge are accessed through these networks. Over the past fifty-plus years the Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative Asso- ciation has provided those British Columbian fishers who so choose an opportunity to fish free from the economic control of the private fish companies and banks. It has continuously expandied its sphere of activities to include the processing and market- ing of most commercialy harvested fish species in British Columbia. Though its membership has fluctuated a dedicated group of members linked in networks of co-operation and resource pooling based on links of kinship and work history has continued to belong to the Co-op and advocate the co-operative way.

Key: /\ = Skipper - - - = Lblkage by kinship - = Lit~kageby joitzt-orvrrersl~ip - I - = Linkage by friendslril~ (5,000+ Figure 4. Co-op sgirze skipper co-operatioit rtetwork. Photo 4. Saltiton seiner preparing to 'brail'fish orct of a big set salnio~i). Acknowledgements 4. Big boat and small boat are emic terms used to designate a particular class of fishing vessel. Big boats typically employ three to seven crew and are larger than forty-five feet in length. The big boats are This paper draws upon research conducted during 1988,1989, and 1990, and from seiners, dragggers, and some longliners. Small boats are shorter and employ fewer crew. They are usually my journals and notes kept since 1982. An earlier draft was presented in December gillnetters and trollers. 1991 at the American Association of Anthropology meeting in Chicago (thanks to Jonathan Hearn for his assistance here). Thanks is due Margaret Rodman, Gerald 5. The productive capacity of many of the fishing enterprises in the Co-op has expanded during the past twenty years. Ironically, this increase in productive capacity and its concomitantly higher degree of Gold, and Marilyn Silverman for their advice during the initial period of research. capital investment is a product of the interaction between resource depletion and government policies Thanks also to Gerry Sider, Kate McCaffery, Anthony Marcus and the editors of ostensibly designed to restrict catching capacity by limiting the number of vessels permitted to enter a MAST for their comments on subsequent drafts and most especially to Jarek and particular fishery. In contrast with unregulated fisheries where competition between fishing enterprises Tristan who have spent their first two years helping out in a way that only they results in the expansion of the number of harvesting units (is, fish boats), competition between fishing could. The writing and revision of this paper was supported in part by a Social enterprises in situations of limited access results in greater levels of capital investment and the expansion of the existing fleet's catching capabilities. However, once increases in productive capacity resulting from Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship, technological change and government regulations (such as license limitation) are factored out the relative #752-9 1-3094. scale of these fishing enterprises has in fact remained relatively constant over time.

6. Until 1968, when the herring stocks were nearly destroyed, the winter or reduction herring provided the major source of winter employment for British Columbia's commercial fishers. The Notes reduction herring season began in September and ended in Febmary or March. The fish was used solely for the purpose of making . Today's herring fishery is oriented toward a luxury roe market and 1. Membership in the Co-op, however, is on an individual basis with each fisher having only one does not commence until early March when the herring begin to spawn. vote irrespective as to whether a fisher is an owner, a deckhand, or has more money invested in Co-op The halibut fishery has also gone through a major change since the early sixties. As early as the shares. first world war halibut has been one of Prince Rupert's major fisheries. However, stock depletion and changing international agreements effectively reduced the halibut season from five months to five to ten 2. The structure of halibut crews is currently in flux as the result of a new regulatory regime based days. on individual vessel quotas (NQ). Data from a preliminary analysis of the impact of the NQsystem seems to indicate that crew sizes are being reduced (for a comparable case in the New Jersey sea clam 7. The roe-herring fishery is relatively new. It began in the early 1970s shortly after the collapse in fishery see McCay, Gatewood and Creed 1989). the late 1960s of the reduction herring fishery. It is tightly regulated by the federal government's Department of Fisheries and Oceans and is renowned for fishery openings of short duration that are 3. These numbers are somewhat misleading as they refer to the ?umber of licenses, not vessels or announced with little advanced warning. Most fishers attempt to minimize their risk in this fishery by fishing enterprises. This discrepancy is the result of an economic strategy in which a vessel is equipped forming pools with other fishers and/or by leasing additional licences. to fish more than one fishery. Thus a family-based enterprise may own a forty foot vessel licensed to gillnet and troll salmon and to longline halibut. 8. For example, between 1981 and 1985 the average gross income of a gillnet vessel was $32.300 These figures were provided by Robert Strand, PRFCA production manager. Overall production (The DPA Group Inc, 1988:15). During the same period a gillnet crew member earned, on average, during the 1989 season by gear type was: gillnet: 2.5 million pounds, $3.8 million landed value to fishers; $4420.00. troll: 2.6 million pounds, $3.6 million; seine: 5.3 million pounds, $4.5 million; halibut: 1.1 million pounds, $1.8 million, and; trawl: 7.4 million pounds, $3.5 million. As a result of the Co-op's current 9. The reader is cautioned that not all trollers are small boats with limited capacities to generate financial problems these dollar values are down significantly froxn previous years. For comparison, total capital. There is also a highly capitalized fleet of offshore freezer trollers with crews of four or more landed values to fishers in 1978 was $23 million versus $16.2 in the 1989 season. The difference in these costing in the neighbourhood of $1 million. They are, however, a minority of trollers. figures reflects two factors. Firstly, prices for declined significantly on the world market. The second factor is that Co-op fishers voluntarily reduced their evings in an attempt to keep their 10. See McMullen (1987) The Orgatrization of tile Fislieries, for an expanded explanation of this co-operative enterprise solvent. process. Since the 1989 fiscal year the Co-op's production fluctuated around) 26 million pounds peaking 11. The Prince Rupert Fishermen's Credit Union was established in the 1930s to help fishers finance at 28.7 million pounds in 1991. This compares with an average productioni of 35 million pounds during boats. The credit union played an important role in providing capital to fishers who wanted to be most of the early 1980s. Decreases in overall production since 1991 reflect the change from member to independent of the large fish companies. non-member status of the trawl fleet. In 1992 the majority of the Co-op's trawlers opted out of the Co-op but agreed to have their fish custom-processedby the Co-op in Prince Rupert. In effect, the Co-op leases 12. The divisions amongst crew and skipper and the implications for the Co-op are discussed in out its trawl-fish processing plant to a consortium of trawlers, some of whom who were Co-op members greater detail in my paper 'On Permanent Strike: Class and Ideology in a Producers' Co-operative' (1992). some of whom who were not. The end result is a more cost-efficient plant and a shifting of the economic risk off the majority of remaining Co-op members. Production figures for the bulk of the Co-op member- who fish salmon have remained relatively stable (taking into account fluctuations in fish stocks). A Fisherman's Autobiography tar and heated over an oil stove. The tar had to be so hot that it became as thin as water. Then the pot was placed on the pier and one man stood or knelt to hold down To The Shetlands with 'Nanny' in 1937 the length of line in the pot while it was pulled through. With the help of rags wrapped round our hands, all the surplus tar was squeezed back into the pot. The oil stove was burning all the time, because when one length of line had been pulled Reginald Byron through, the tar cooled off and had to be re-heated. Tarring the lines took almost University of Wales, Swansea two days to finish. Then the lines had to be hung up on poles to dry and to prevent them from getting stuck together in a tangle. They had to be separated to let air in between them. The lines were left hanging like this for a few days. When your fingers did not stick to the lines, they were dry. ABSTRACTThe following autobiographical account, by Bengt Olausson, recounts his Every man had his own lines, but the number each had to tar was different. old experience of his first trip to sea as a green fourteen-year-old,with his father and uncle, aboard the Swedish fishing 'Nanny' in the spring and summer seasons of 1937. lines could be re-tarred if they were not too worn. If an old line was replaced by a At that time, 'Nanny' was one of many Swedish boats going to the North Sea ling new one it had to be tarred too. Seven of the men in our crew had eight lengths of fishery. Ling is a fish of special symbolic significance to Swedes: unsalted and line, or 'hundreds,' making fifty-six hundreds. I was the cook, and so I had only air-dried, it is called lutfisk and is served as a part of the traditional Christmas feast. half the usual number of lines, or four hundreds. Each man had one length of line The fish were caught on longlines, and Bengt Olausson's account is particularly in reserve, making eight 'spare' hundreds. Then we had a couple of so-called informative about the preparation and use of the gear at a time when the fishermen 'drinking lines,' each of which was three-quarters of a hundred. The fish caught on still made their own lines, and when there were no mechanical aids other than a simple winch. The story also describes something of the social organisation of the boat: what contributions the members of the crew made to the boat's food supplies and outfit of lines, and how shipboard tasks were arranged. The source is an undated manuscript in the archival collections of the Department of Ethnology, University of Gothenburg. The original story, in Swedish, struck me as a very rare document indeed: I had certainly never before come across such a gripping, colourful and reflective autobiographical narrative that conveyed as much ethno- graphic detail. In my translation, I have reorganised a number of passages and, where necessary, fleshed out a few details clarify certainf'points and to bring out their sociological and historical significance, while at the same time attempting to preserve the story's intimacy as a personal record of Bengt Olausson's coming-of-age as a fisherman.

I grew up in a fishing family in Skiirhamn in TjGrn. when I was a boy, in the thirties, fishing was very different than it is now. Everyone in our family helped my father and my uncle to prepare their fishing gear. Our boat was called 'Nanny,' a 53-foot wooden motor boat built for my father in 1919, and skippered by my uncle Hilmer. We used Nanny to catch ling in the North Sea, off the$hetldnd Islands. Ling are big fish, like cod, which we caught with longlines. In 1937, I was fourteen years old, and I was going to make my first trip to the Shetlands as Nanny's cook. The preparations for the spring fishery started in the autumn. We made all the fishing gear ourselves. Of course, we had to buy the cordage, hooks and the cork for the floats, but making a complete longline involved seven or eight families and Photo 1. A boat of Narzrty's type, probably at Skiirltamtt or a rzearby port in the 1930s. Note thefull many weeks of hard work. First, the new line had to be tarred to prevent it from suit of sails, the extra barrels offirel lashed to the forward bulwarb, artd the split fish dryitlg in the rotting, which was done in the open air on the pier, A big iron pot was filled with shrouds for dontesdc rise aboard tlze boat (Bildarkivet, Bohuslans Museum, Uddevalla).

MAST 1993 6(1/2): 180-204 the 'drinking line' were shared by the whole crew, and the money went to pay for home and waterproofed with linseed oil. Ready-made oilskin trousers of rubber a party after the fishing trip. The total number of lines we carried to sea was at the were very heavy and bulky and expensive, and we prefersed the home-made ones. most seventy hundreds. Each hundred is about 200 fathoms long, so if all the lengths Another important part of the preparations was the supply of food that each man of line were joined together, it would be 14,000 fathoms long, fourteen nautical had to provide for himself or, rather, that his mother or wife had to provide for him. miles or over 25 kilometres! That is why it took nearly two days just to pull the line The most important of these preparations was the baking of bread. This had to be through the tar-pot. done in good time, about a month before the voyage. The bread was part of each Then each section of the line had to be fitted with the leaders, or snoods, and man's private supplies and he took a big sackful of bread aboard the boat. Because floats and hooks. Short snoods and long snoods alternated. The long ones were the amount of bread was so large, the women used to bake in teams. They rolled about a metre and a half long, and the short ones about 30 cm. The snoods were out the dough into thin rounds and made a hole in the middle with a drinking glass. made from fine cotton marline. We made up the snoods ourselves with a machine This bread was browner in colour than the so-called 'fishermen's bread' you 'can that had a system of cranks and rollers. The cotton was bought in skeins. Before the buy in Swedish supermarkets these days. Next the rounds were hung on a long pole snood-making could begin, it had to be rolled up into balls. This was done by our in the loft. They were left hanging to dry for several weeks until they were hard. mother, either with a winder or by hand. My little sister and I used to help as well. The dry home-made bread was the best, because it kept fresh during the whole During fishing, there was no time to undo the hook from the mouth of each fish, fishing trip which could last up to seven weeks. Once, we bought ship's biscuits in so you used a special kind of stick to pry the fish off the hook, and most of the time Denmark, but they kept for only a few days. It was so damp on board that they went it came loose. If it didn't, the snood snapped. The snood always snapped between mouldy and had to be thrown away. The left-over flour sacks could be used for many the hook and the float. Quite a few snoods could snap every day, which meant that things. I had a small Norwegian sailing gig in those days, and my mother had made we had to have a good stock of them in reserve. Almost everyone in the family the sails from flour sacks. helped. i There were private and common supplies of food for the voyage. Some things My little sister Majken used to sit on the kitchen sofa, where it was warm and were provided for us 'by the boat' and other things we had to provide for ourselves. nice, working the machine, making the short snoods. This work was done during The first spring trip in April was shorter than the others; it lasted for about three autumn and winter evenings. Up in the loft, we had another machine, a bigger one, weeks. Not so many supplies were needed during this trip. But the first 'real' trip but the loft was cold and unheated. There my father and I had to stand up to make started in May and lasted until Midsummer. Then we had to have food for seven the long snoods. We could not sit down to make them because of their length. My weeks at sea. The usual common provisions, which we all shared, were eight sacks father and I made about 1,600 long snoods that year, of potatoes, one barrel of salted bacon, and enough yellow peas, onions, margarine, Next, the floats had to be made, cut to shape and waied to prevent them from sago, dried fruit and coffee. The peas and bacon were mostly for Sunday meals. becoming brittle and spoiled by the salt water. We bought the cork for the floats, Otherwise we had fresh fish and potatoes for dinner and the evening meal consisted and it came in rough pieces in jute sacks. The sacks were kept in the cellar until of fried potatoes, fried eggs, bread and coffee. they were needed. I said cork, but it was really willow bark, not real cork. The bark Each man also had his own private supplies of food. They consisted of bread, was split and cut into pieces. Their appearance was( not very important, but each butter and eggs. Each man had his big sackful of home-made bread. The butter was float had to have the same lifting capacity. The lines lie on the bottom during fishing, salted so as not to turn rancid. Each man also brought as many eggs he could afford. while the floats lift the hooks upwards from the bottom so that the bait is not eaten They were wrapped in newspaper and kept in big honeycomb boxes of wood to by crabs. Moreover, the ling will be able to see the bait better, because they swim protect them from breaking. The eggs were ordered from the farms around Skk- and look for food a bit above the bottom. At each end of thefloat a gash was cut to hamn the last week before putting to sea. This was done so they would be fresh, secure it when we tied it to the snood. Each man maqked his own floats, using a and you had to order them because of the demand. There were many boats going stamp heated over an oil stove, to brand his initials. I used my father's stamp. Next, out fishing at the same time, and everyone wanted to take a supply of eggs to sea. the floats were submerged in a pot of boiling wax. When they were done they were The men also provided their own tobacco or snuff. Snuff was bought in big brown set out to dry. cartons, I think there were a hundred boxes in each carton. We also made our own seagoing clothes. My mother made oilskin jumpers and Nanny also had to be fitted out. In the spring, the boat was taken to the slipway dungarees from washed white flour sacks. Sometimes she used shop-bought for painting: red lead below the waterline, white enamel above. When the boat was bleached canvas. This was oiled three times with linseed oil to make it waterproof. back in the water, we oiled the deck, scraped and varnished the brightwork, and Our sou'westers were usually bought in Norway, but they could also be made at painted the upperworks. Sometimes the mast and other spars needed scraping, oiling and varnishing. Usually the wooden hoops that slid up and down the mast, holding How I came to be on board was a story in itself. Nanny lay at home in Skiirhamn the sails, needed work, and the sails themselves might have to be repaired before by Walter Hendry's pier ready for ling fishing. The water, fuel and everything else they were bent on to the hoops again, especially if the sails had been used for herring was on board, even the sails were hoisted. The boat had been ready for a week. The fishing earlier in the year. Like most Swedish motor fishing boats at that time, men were ready for the fishing trip too, but one man was missing. There were seven Nanny carried a full suit of sails. We had a jib, mainsail and a small triangular men but they needed eight, and nobody was willing to cook. They had asked spanker behind the wheelhouse. The registration number was always painted on the everywhere. That is why they had not left yet. sail. Nanny's number was MD 351, the 'MD' was for Mollosund, another fishing The men persuaded my father to take me on board as a deck-boy and cook, now place nearby. When all the work was done, the boat looked neat and handsome. that I had finished school. My teacher, Wke Arvidsson, came to our house three Nanny was 53 feet long, the first year I was in the crew. The following year, times that week to try to persuade my father not to take me fishing. I had a good 1938, she was lengthened to 65 feet, 12 feet longer. The lengthening was done in head for studying and the teacher even offered to pay for my studies if I was allowed the Hallevikstrand shipyard. Nanny became like a new boat after the lengthening, to go to the high school. But I obeyed my father and went fishing with Nanny. My because there was much more room on deck. The engine was a 65 horsepower father later said several times that he regretted having taken me out fishing at such Skandia oil engine and Nanny made about seven knots with it. In the forecastle a young age. there were eight bunks. I slept in a top bunk because I was a junior member of the So, in April 1937 we set off and headed for Skagen, in Denmark, to buy fresh crew. It was best to sleep in a bottom bunk where you did not have to climb to get herring as bait and to get supplies. We bought canned condensed milk, powdered in. The mattresses were strange and curious. They were made from bedticking milk and margarine for frying. Tobacco was bought in hectogram packets; it was which was filled with fresh straw from a farm. When you slept on the mattress for cheaper to buy it for export. When we had finished our business in Skagen we set the first time the straw was not pressed down and the wooden cubicle of the bunk course for Haugesund in Norway. Haugesund had an ice plant and cold storage was hardly big enough for it. Your nose was up against the ceiling if you were lying works where the herring used for bait, which we had bought in Denmark, were on your back. It took about a week for the mattress to get pressed down to normal frozen. We also took ice aboard. Because this was a short trip, we iced down the height. It was flattened down by its owner rolling on it in high seas. The bunks had fish in the hold, which would keep fresh until we landed it. On the longer trips, we shutters which could be closed in rough seas to prevent you from falling out, and a had to salt down the fish because the ice wouldn't last for the whole voyage. When small opening was left for air to get in. the bait had been frozen in the cold storage works and delivered back on board, we Nanny's little lifeboat was a Bohus that had been made in Orust. It was set sail for HBlla Bank, eighty sea miles west-southwest of Haugesund. about sixteen feet long and five feet abeam. The boat was lashed to rings on the port I stood a turn at the wheel, steering a course by the compass of west-southwest- side of the deck and there was an axe so that the lashings could be cut quickly in by-half-west. We were about eleven hours out from Haugesund, and we were case of an emergency. But we used to use the dinghy as a handy place to put things streaming the patent log to measure the distance out to the fishing bank. We were like tools and rope, and if we had really needed the dinghy in an emergency, we making about seven knots with our'skandia engine. The weather was very good, probably would have sunk before we would have managed to get everything out. and I remember that we arrived at HBlla Bank on a Thursday. Now we had to sound Among the last preparations for sea were filling up with fresh water and fuel the bottom to find the right place to shoot the line. We measured the depth with a oil. The fuel tank for the engine was not large enough for a seven week trip, so we leadline, which ran through a guide on the rail. We had to stop the boat to sound the had to take about fifteen extra two-hundred-litre barrels of fuel. The barrels were bottom, and we did this over and over again until we found the right place. lashed to the bulwarks on the deck, just forward of the shrouds. In good weather The lead weight had a hollow cup at the bottom, and in the cup you put a lump we fetched the barrels aft, and filled up the tank in the engine room below with a of tallow or butter. When the lead touched the bottom an impression was made of hosepipe. As the barrels were emptied, they were used,for storing the ling livers. the character of the ground, so you could tell whether it was rocky, sandy or muddy. I was only fourteen the first time I went ling fishing, in 1937. It was the first trip The sounding-line was marked along its length by bits of coloured cloth which in April, which is shorter than the ordinary trips. If we caught a lot of ling and the indicate the depth. HIlla Bank had fine light-brown sandy ground. If we saw grains weather was good, the first trip might take less than the normal three weeks, but of this special light-brown sand in the tallow-cup of the leadline, we knew that we that was unusual. On this trip, Nanny had a crew of eight. The skipper was my were in the right place. This sand was found only on HBlla Bank. The depth varied uncle Hilmer Hermansson. The other men were Karl Albin Andreasson, Arthur between 120 and 130 fathoms. Pettersson, Gustav Holmberg, Ernst Eriksson from Stockevik, Albert Larsson, my If it was too deep or the bottom was wrong, we continued until we found the father Albert Olausson, and me, Bengt. right spot. Then the sea became deeper, and when we shot the anchor and buoy that the end of the fishing line was attached to, we were out at the edge of the bank, at Nobody could go out in the open. Mountainous seas were pouring over the bulwarks about 180 fathoms. and sweeping across the deck. Anybody trying to get from the forecastle to the We found our spot late that day, and baited and set the lines. At one o'clock in wheelhouse would have been washed overboard. the morning, the men went below to sleep until the lines had to be hauled two hours All the rest of the men were aft, in the wheelhouse and the engine room helping later, at three. It was my job to sit in the wheelhouse and watch the buoy marking to steer and mind the engine. The steering wheel was connected to the rudder with the end of the line, to keep an eye on it and not let it get so far away that it a chain, and the weight of water hitting the rudder could easily have broken disappeared out of sight. At three o'clock, I went forward to the forecastle and put someone's arm. It would have been hard to get control of the wheel again if it started the coffee kettle on the stove. I woke the men with cups of coffee and then they to spin freely. That is why two men had to hold it all the time. went up on deck to haul their lines. While I was lying in the top bunk in the forecastle in those high seas it felt like Now it was my turn to go to sleep. I was woken again at six. Every man hauled being on a roller coaster, but worse. First a fall into the deep trough between the his own 'hundreds' or sections of the line, which had been joined together end to waves, and then my body was pressed down heavily against the mattress when the end. At six o'clock my lines were nearly at the winch so I had to get up and haul boat rose to crest the next wave. Every time Nanny slid downhill and crashed into them. The snoods were marked and the lines arranged in a fixed order so we knew the bottom of a trough, there was a bang in the bow like a cannon shot. I was very exactly when it was time to haul our lines. It was now Friday and that first haul was frightened that the planks at the stem would be sprung open by the constant an exceptional catch. I went ling fishing for several years after that first trip, but we pounding and the boat would go down like a submarine. We learned later that some never got another catch like it. The fish were big and fat, with black spots. Each of Norwegian fishing boats that had been with us on Hilla Bank during that storm had them weighed at least ten kilos, and up to eighteen. We got over eight tons that day indeed sprung planks and gone to the bottom. on a single haul. If we had got the same amount on the next two nights after that, But Nanny's planks stayed tight. My father and the other men said they soon we would have filled the hold to its capacity of twenty-five tons and gone home lost sight of any other boats. Nanny lay to, bows to the wind, the men watching after three days, instead of three weeks. constantly and steering to prevent the boat broaching, or slewing broadside to the But things did not go that way. The fishing vessel 'Prolific' from Hallevikstrand waves, which could roll the boat right over, The reefed spanker was sheeted home was also fishing on Hilla Bank. The skipper, Anders Hansson, was a friend of our hard. The Skandia engine was working at full power to keep us up against the wind. skipper. Both of them were members of the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union. The radio I became fainter and weaker each day. The water tank was in the forecastle but I on Prolific was much better than ours, and they had heard the Norwegian weather could not manage to get out of my bunk. I had no water, but neither did the rest of service give a hurricane warning for this part of the North Sea. Shipping was advised the men, because there was no water tank aft, only in the forecastle. Despite the to seek shelter, it said. Prolific came up to us and layqthere rolling in the sea. You forecastle being boarded up, seawater was deep over the floor, and food, empty could almost see the keel when she rolled. Prolific's skipper called out through a bottles and other things floated around in it. I was still very seasick and getting megaphone: 'A hurricane is on its way. Will you follow us to Haugesund?' But our weaker and weaker. From Saturday to Tuesday I heard nothing from the rest of the skipper shouted, 'No!' Perhaps Nanny's men thought that the storm would settle in men. On Tuesday it calmed down a little, but it was still blowing around seventy- a few days, which was common; or maybe, having got such a good catch during the five miles an hour. night, they thought their luck would hold. 'We are going ashore,' called the skipper Suddenly the door to the forecastle burst open and my father came down the of the Prolific. And then they set off towards Haugesund. stairs. The sea gushed in after him before he managed to close the door. 'How are The weather was calm and bright, but there was a heavy swell. If only we had you? Are you alive?' he asked. 'Yes, I am, but I am very thirsty,' I said. 'Give me followed the Prolific. On Saturday the hurricane arrived. Later we found that a wind water!' There were plenty of empty bottles floating around in the forecastle, so he speed of over forty metres per second, or nearly a hundred miles an hour, had been quickly filled four or five bottles from the tank. He had insisted on going to see how measured in Utsira. I was alone in the forecastle, right up in the bows of the boat, I was, so the men had tied a rope around him as a lifeline, because it was so when the storm hit us. The men had shut me up in the forecastle, thinking to protect dangerous to cross the open deck. All the other men had warned him not to go out me, and that the storm would blow over in a day or two. But it blew at full gale on deck, but he was determined to get to the forecastle to see if I was all right. My force for almost a whole week, and there I was in my top bunk, trapped in it by the father had to board up the forecastle again and then the men hauled him back to the violent pitching and rolling of the boat. I could not get out of my bunk even for a wheelhouse with the help of the rope. drink of water. I was seasick and weak. The engine was running at full throttle all I got the water bottles to my bunk and I drank. But the water didn't get very far the time to keep the boat steady against the sea and to keep the bilge pump going. down my throat before it gushed out of me. I was too sick and weak to keep it down. I was alone again in the forecastle. The others were still trapped aft in the answered our skipper, 'he is.' I was standing between the mast and the forecastle. wheelhouse and the engine room and could not get food or water either. The food Standing is not exactly the right word. I was more or less sitting, because my legs supplies were in the forecastle as well as the water tank. My father was half drowned did not want to carry me. My knees pulled towards my chin. We berthed alongside after having crossed the deck, but the men down in the engine room could at least Prolific and the men carried me onto the pier and laid me down on a couple of big be warm and dry. After this lull on Tuesday, which must have been the eye of the wooden boxes. I was lying there, resting. The men tried to help me stand up and storm, the wind started blowing strongly again and continued on Wednesday, walk a little, but my knees went up to my chin with each step I took. It was Thursday and even into Friday. I did not hear anything from the others during all impossible to walk. I had to lie down again on the boxes and after a while I tried that time. some food. I had to eat carefully and not too much in the beginning, since I had The storm had lasted for almost a week. By Saturday the wind had gone down been without food and water for so long. I was lying like this the whole day. Now almost to normal. The forecastle door opened and the men came down the stairs. and then I got up to try to learn to stand on my legs again. On Saturday night I was 'How are you? Are you alive?' they asked. 'Yes,' I said, but I was so sick and faint able to walk a little without help. There was a dance there in Haugesund that that they might as well have thrown me overboard, I thought. 'Well,' said the men, evening, and I managed to hobble that far. The Norwegian girls who worked in the 'it is calming down now and we will try to get to Haugesund.' They helped me up cold-storage works brought a gramophone and danced to the music. They had heard the ladder and I looked out over the sea. The sea was still boiling more violently about the little Swedish boy who had been out in the storm and they went home to than I had ever seen it, and yet this was better weather and lower wind force than get some sweet buns for me. I was in nice company and the girls danced to the before. How must it have been when the weather was at its worst? The North Sea gramophone and we all had a good time. was in uproar. Normally we would not have dared to try to make any distance in a When I had recovered, I said to my father, 'There must be trains from here so I sea like this, but now we turned around and scudded towards, as we believed, can go home.' It was not very pleasant to meet with a storm like that during my first Haugesund. When we approached the Norwegian coast none of the men recognized fishing trip to the HHlla Bank. 'Well, we will see,' he said, 'but the weather is good the coastline. Where are we now? they wondered. But then we saw the peak of now, and we will be fishing for only another week or ten days. We have to return Marstein, which stands at the entrance to Bergen. The storm had taken us that far home soon anyway. We just had supplies for three weeks this time, and we have to north. From there to Haugesund it was about forty-five sea miles and it took us get the boat ready for the next fishing trip.' So, I was persuaded to go out again with another seven hours to get there. Nanny. A sad scene met us when we came into Haugesund. House roofs had blown off The weather was bright and calm when we left Haugesund, a week later. I sat and there were flags at half mast. Later we learned about twenty Norwegian fishing in the wheelhouse and steered all the way to HHlla Bank. Everything was fine again boats had gone down in the storm, most of them from here and some from Bergen. and the storm almost forgotten. But when we arrived at HAlla Bank a new storm There was a big gathering of people on the pier when Nanny came in. We had been blew up. It was not blowing as hard as the last time, but hard enough for the tops out in this storm and survived, while the crews of so many Norwegian fishing boats of the waves to 'smoke' or be blown into spume. We baited our lines but never got had perished. a chance to use them. We had to lash down everything loose on deck again; no more Later we got to know that the crew of the Prolific, who had returned to fishing during this trip. The first week of our trip we had been caught in the Haugesund before the storm and had been here thd-whole week, had been keeping hurricane, the second week we lay in Haugesund, and this was the third week, which a constant watch for any sign of us, taking turns as lookouts on the highest rock in was to be used for the return trip home to Skiirhamn. Now all we could do was to Haugesund. But during the whole week they had watched the sea, they had not seen go back to Haugesund and wait for the storm to blow over, and then go home. any sign of life from Nanny and they thought that we had not made it and perished Looking back on my first trip, I still remember it all vividly. It was awful to see in the storm. They had begun to give up hope. The sliipper of the Prolific, Anders Haugesund with all the house roofs blown off and the flags at half mast. We had Hansson, telephoned home to his wife and told her about the storm and said that been lucky to come out in one piece after that storm. If I had had water to drink we probably had gone down. His wife had in turn called my aunt Olga in Skiirhamn, from the beginning I might have felt a bit better. But after that hurricane I became who was the wife of our skipper. Aunt Olga had put on a black dress and stockings immune to seasickness. Out in the North Atlantic, west of the Hebrides or around and went to see my mother and told her what the skipper of the Prolific had said. the Shetlands, where we were fishing the rest of the season, I could stand down in But then Nanny came steaming into Haugesund harbour. Returned from the the forecastle in high seas and gales juggling with the frying pan and the hot stove, dead, all those people must have thought. We came up to the pier and there was the amid the smoke and smells, frying potatoes and eggs for supper, when even old Prolific. Anders Hansson called from a distance, 'Is the little boy alive?' 'Yes,' hardened fishermen like my uncle Hilmer had to go up on deck to vomit. But he was tough, uncle Hilmer, because after he had been sick he came down to the In Smogen we bought fresh mackerel for bait. About three tons was the forecastle and sat down to finish his meal as if nothing had happened. minimum amount for fishing. There were many boats looking for mackerel and When we returned to Skarhamn again, we unloaded the ling on Emil Pettersson's sometimes we had to lie in Smogen for two days before we could get enough. The pier and began to prepare for the season's main trip, which lasted from May to mackerel had to be gutted and washed, which took time as well. Some of the Midsummer. All the food for seven weeks had to be got aboard, along with all the mackerel were salted in barrels, but as bait they did not catch much ling. The best other necessary supplies, including the barrels of extra fuel for the engine. All the bait was the fresh mackerel and it was packed into boxes with ice before the freezing tools and gear were stowed. The big marker buoys were lashed to the shrouds. Salt, in Haugesund. On some trips we had to go to Kristiansand in Norway to get enough to preserve the ling, was taken on board. The tanks were filled with water and fuel. mackerel. When we were finished in Smogen we set a course for Skagen to complete The day came when every-thing was ready, and the sails were hoisted. We were our supplies of food. Then it was off to Haugesund. We stayed there for about a day going first to Smogen to buy bait, and then to Skagen to complete our supplies. and a half until the freezing was done. The frozen mackerel kept for about two From there we would sail to Haugesund for the freezing of the bait and after that to weeks, and when it was finished we had to use the salted mackerel for bait. With the Shetlands. salted bait we only got half as much ling as with the fresh bait. It used to be a solemn occasion when the fishermen set off in these small boats, When everything was ready in Haugesund, we set a course for the Shetlands. It because many of them met a watery grave out there. The Swedish flag was flying took a few days to reach the fishing grounds. Then the hard work started. Fishing, at the stern. The flag was hoisted and lowered three times at departure. All the snatching a little sleep, and more fishing day in and day out for seven weeks in a families were gathered to wave goodbye, and they watched us closely all the way continuously rolling, skewing and pitching workplace. Ling fishing has always out from Skiirhamn harbour until we were out of sight. Every leave-taking was the been considered the hardest kind of fishing, even with modern aids. During the last same.

Photo 3. A Swedish crew workirig on deck, at sea, in the 1930s. The crew iricliides a boy of aboiit Photo 2. Srriogeri in tire 1930s, slzowing boats croivdirig the pier to iiriloadfr.eshfish (Bildarkivet, Betigt Olaiissorzk age. Tlie equiptrzetit suggests that this boat is a trawler; tliefislz appear to be cod Bohuslans Museum, Uddevalla). (Sjofartsmuseet, Goteborg). few years it has become increasingly difficult to find enough men willing to do this Because I was also the cook, I had only four hundreds, and my hundreds were set kind of work, and to get a big enough crew. The boats get smaller due to complicated out every second time. The link was made up in this way to avoid unreasonable European rules, as a result of increased fishing restrictions. But the decrease in ling work for each man. Imagine if the men had to haul all their eight hundreds in one fishing is mostly due to the difficulty of getting crews. Fishermen don't want to be go! That is 1,600 fathoms, or 3,200 metres of line! This is why each man's lines at sea for such a long time with all the hard work that ling fishing involves. were tied together in this alternating pattern. The floats on the lines were marked Moreover, the crew has to be experienced. You don't become a ling fisherman with each man's initials so they knew in good time when it was time to haul in their overnight. In 1980 there were only three Swedish ling fishing boats: 'Britta' of lines. In this way, the men could take brief turns with the different work operations: Skarhamn, 'Shetland' of Mollosund and 'Sando' of Grundsund. As a comparison, shooting, hauling, unhooking and gutting the fish and 'steering in' the lines. TO the first year I went ling fishing, in 1937, there were about seventy. 'steer in' the lines meant that during the hauling of the lines, the boat was held When Nanny reached the grounds to the west of the Shetlands, before the lines against the sea with the rudder so that the line was at the right angle to the winch. could be set, we had to look for the right depth and bottom with the leadline. The I myself, despite being the cook, had to steer in the lines many times. The skipper banks were slanting outwards and the normal practice was to set out the lines in a could not stand in the wheelhouse steering all the time; he had his own lines to depth of 120 to 130 fathoms with the last line set in 180 to 190 fathoms. First the take care of as well as other things to do. We took turns with the different oper- lines had to be baited. Each man baited his own lines and this was done in the ations. following way: in an empty line-tub the line was wound up on a roller at one end. There was another way of doing things, called fishing with 'stubs.' It involved At the other end the baited hooks were laid down one at the time in parallel rows more work, but gave better results. The fishing was done twenty-four hours a day after each other. It was important that each float was laid down above its respective without rest. It was done by connecting two hundreds from each man into one link hook. If the floats were laid wrong, the lines could get tangled or the hook might of sixteen hundreds, a little over three sea miles long. Four of these stub links were get caught in your hand when the lines were shot overboard. On deck each man had made up and set and hauled in rotation, in a non-stop sequence. Just as soon as one his own line-tub; small blocks were fixed to the deck to keep the line-tubs in place stub was shot, another was hauled in. There was no break or rest. Between shooting during rough seas. A funny thing happened to me once when I was sitting by the and hauling, the baiting, cleaning and salting of the ling continued. Fishing with mast on my tub baiting my lines. Nanny nosed into a really deep trough and when stubs was very hard work, but the catch was much bigger. Each man had a spare she rose again my tub jumped out of its wooden blocks and I slid on the tub along hundred kept in reserve, but it was only set out if a line had snapped, was worn out the whole length of the deck, from the mast to the wheelhouse. or had become entangled. Each man had eight hundreds. I had half, four hundreds, because I took care of The setting out of the lines was done by hand. Nowadays plastic floats are used the cooking as well. This makes altogether sixty hundreds. If we joined them all instead of willow bark and there is a metal fairlead on the stern for shooting the end-to-end in one 'link,' it would be about twenty-five kilometres or twelve sea link. In my days, each hook had to be cast by hand. It was a dangerous job, and you miles long, or about the distance between Mollosund and Lysekil, as the crow flies. had to have deft fingers when shooting the lines. Mostly it was my father, Albert Every hundred had about sixty hooks and the total for the whole link, including the Olausson, who shot ttie lines, and sometimes it was Arthur Pettersson. But, first, 'drinking hundred,' came to about 3,690 hooks. In bad weather we could set out a the marker buoy to which the anchor rope was attached was set at sea, and then the smaller link, but the sixty-hundred link was the normal length. When the whole link anchor, which was connected to the link, was thrown over the side. The buoy had was baited and shot, we had two or three hours of rest before the lines had to be a pole on top, with a red flag during the day and an oil lamp at night, so we could hauled aboard again. At the normal line length of sixty hundreds, each man's see it more easily. At the bottom end it had a length of chain to make it stand straight hundreds were linked together to one single link in the following order: up in the sea. The buoy was an awkward thing to handle. It was about four metres Gustav Holmberg 1 9 16 24) 31 39 46 54 long and you had to be careful when it was thrown overboard or hauled in, because Ernst Eriksson 2 10 17 ~2-5 32 40 47 55 it could easily pull you over the side if you caught it wrong; you used the swell to Albert Olausson, father 3 11 18 26 33 41 48 56 help you get it aboard, and often it was easier to handle when big seas were running. Albert Larsson 4 12 19 27 34 42 49 57 When the anchor reached the bottom, the shooting of the lines started. Arthur Pettersson 5 13 20 28 35 43 50 58 The lines were placed in a stand astern, on the starboard side. Two men worked Karl Albin Andreasson 6 14 21 29 36 44 51 59 in a team. Nanny would be going at half-throttle, about three or four knots. One HilmerHermansson,uncle 7 15 22 30 37 45 52 60 man set out the line-tubs in the right order, and tied together the line hundreds. The Bengt Olausson, myself 8 -- 23 -- 38 -- 53 -- lines were tied together by the ear band, a spliced loop in each and of the line. The line was spread out and another man cast the hooks one by one as the line ran out. the engine had been stopped, and had got cold, starting it up again was complicated The hooks were picked from left to right from each row in the tray, and the floats because there was no electric starter motor and you couldn't turn it over by hand. were above each baited hook. When the line had run out enough, the float was lifted, The cylinder had to be heated up with a blowlamp, the valves were set and then it and was thrown with a jerk of the hand. Then the same was done with the next hook was turned over with compressed air or with an explosive cartridge fired into the and float. You had to be quick and sure-fingered when picking and casting the hooks cylinder. The air tank always had to be charged with enough pressure. We had to and floats. When the whole link had been shot, another anchor and buoy was check the gauge constantly. Seven or eight kilos of pressure was usual, but the attached and thrown over the side to mark the end of the link and to keep it in place, fittings leaked a little. With less than three or four kilos of air pressure the engine stretched out along the bottom. would not start. The engine was kept running day and night for weeks on end, and We fished most nights, reckoning to finish setting the lines around one o'clock was never stopped at sea. Since it was a compression-ignition Diesel with just one in the morning. The others went down to the forecastle to sleep until about three. very large cylinder, it knocked loudly every time it fired and the noise carried right During the fishing none of us got much rest. I myself was always at the helm through the boat. Tonk-tonk-tonk it went, so slowly you could count each revolu- between those times watching the marker buoy. We never anchored while fishing tion. When we came into port and stopped the engine, there was an eerie silence. It and the engine was always running, except when we went ashore sometimes in the was as if someone had died, we used to say. Sometimes it could be difficult to sleep Shetlands or the Hebrides to get fresh bait. in port because of this strange silence. We were so used to hearing the engine It was important that the engine was attended to, once every few hours. The knocking all the time. engine had a reservoir for the lubricating oil, and there was a drip-feed system with The propeller had variable-pitch blades, which was handy when we were a crank-wheel regulating the flow with every revolution. You had to open the lid of laying-to, watching the buoy. It wasn't necessary to use the throttle. A turn of the the reservoir and fill it from a can of oil. There was a handle on the crank-wheel propeller-control wheel in the wheelhouse and Nanny was going forward slowly, which sometimes had to be turned a few times to prime the lubricating system. Once the propeller biting the water. If we wanted to drift for a while, we threw the propeller blades into neutral pitch, and when we were far enough away from the buoy, we turned the propeller-control wheel again. If you wanted to, you could make the boat lie almost still. You adjusted the steering wheel and the propeller pitch, and, if it was blowing, you increased the engine revolutions a little. About three o'clock, I would go down to the forecastle to put on the coffee kettle and call the men who had been sleeping for only a couple of hours. After coffee it was time to haul the lines. Then, around three-thirty, it was my turn to go to bed, and around six my lines were next in the sequence and I had to go up on deck to haul them. We took turns with the different chores. One of us would be unhooking the fish and then arranging the lines in the tubs. Then the next man would take over the unhooking and somebody else would be cleaning the fish, hauling the lines, and stacking and salting the fish in the bins down in the fish-room. There was a kind of circular movement between the different chores. I had to cook as well as do all the other normal deck chores. If you stood at the stern of the boat and looked down at the line while it was being hauled in, you could see the white belly of the ling shining in the deep for a ~hile~beforethe fish reached the surface. When the fish came up from the deep they were 'blown up,' that is, their bellies had been forced out through their mouths like balloons because they were hauled up faster than they could adjust to changes in the water pressure. They didn't resume their normal appearance until they had been lying on the deck for a while. When the ling came aboard, they were pulled along by the line which was being hauled through the winch, and before the fish had slid Plioto 4. Lottglines arranged in tlzeir tubs (Yrkesfiskaren). too far across the deck you had to be ready to get it off the hook. You slipped the aired now and then to prevent the livers fermenting and splitting open the steel the Shetlands, and at Stornoway in the Hebrides to get bait and ice. The ling barrels. Since the livers were going to be boiled down to make lamp-oil, it didn't preferred fresh mackerel to old salted bait. matter that they were contaminated with Diesel fuel. Once, when we were fishing with the salted mackerel as bait, the ling weren't When we gutted the fish, our faithful seagulls got their reward. Day after day biting and we had gone closer to a coral reef to try to catch them, but when we they stayed close to Nanny. They were kittiwakes, timid and beautiful birds, smaller hauled the lines there were sharks on every hook! They were small sharks, called than ordinary seagulls, with shiny black eyes and black feet, real deep-sea sailors dogfish. There were tons of them, and we were up to our knees among hundreds of that you never saw near land. But when the fish were being cleaned and the entrails the wretched things slithering all over the deck. It was not very pleasant. The worst were being thrown overboard, they completely changed their nature and became was their razor-sharp teeth that gnawed all the snoods to tatters. Luckily we had very aggressive and fought over the fish guts. For the most part they stayed at a enough short snoods with us to mend the lines and make them complete again. We distance, but the bravest of them sometimes perched on the dinghy up in the bows. thought we would try to trade the shark for fresh bait in Lerwick, but we did not They sat there, watching us working on deck. think we could sell them. We went to Lerwick with all this shark on deck, packed When the fish had been gutted, they were thrown down into the fish-room, where them into boxes and put them up for auction. We didn't know that people in some a couple of other men salted them and stacked them in the bins. First a layer of salt parts of Britain like to eat dogfish or 'rock salmon,' and we were astonished that was put into the belly of the ling and then salt was sprinkled on top. The fish were the catch sold so easily. We bought fresh mackerel for bait and had a bit of money arranged in the bin so that they lay in alternating directions, and when one layer to spare. When we got out to the banks again we got a good catch; the ling liked was done, salt was sprinkled over it with a scoop, and the next layer was started. fresh bait. So the sharks brought us good luck, in spite of all the extra work they Two bins were always filled at the same time, one at the port side and one at the caused us. starboard, so that the cargo was evenly distributed and the boat did not heel over. Another time we went ashore at Lerwick to get bait, together with the 'Elsy' of As the fish and salt settled, the bins had to be filled up continuously as the layers Kyrkesund. In Lerwick there were herring salt-houses and girls were standing there sank. When a bin was full with ling there was room for more on the top after a while. in long rows, wearing heavy aprons, gutting and salting the herring into barrels. The ling we caught was salted immediately. We caught fresh ling only during the The girls lived in red-painted barracks and each room had bunks in tiers of three or last week before returning home, if we had any ice. four along the walls. They had to use ladders to get up to their bunks in the evenings. When we were out at the Shetlands or in the North Atlantic, we saw nothing but I think these girls travelled from place to place during the season to salt down sky and sea. Fishing continued day after day, weekdays and Sundays. In early herring all over Scotland and the east coast of England. When they had finished summer the birds had their breeding season around the Shetlands. There were big their work in the evening, they enjoyed it when we Swedes came to visit and they bird rookeries there and sometimes, when we got close to land, the cliffs were white offered us tea. I have a funny memory from one of my many visits to Lerwick. I from roosting birds. Thousands of birds were continuously circling the cliffs. The remember that the skipper of the Elsy was with us when we went to visit the girls. gulls, gannets, fulmars and terns followed us constantly day after day. On the other He was wearing wooden clogs and he could tap dance and play the drumsticks at hand, we seldom saw other boats. We sometimes went for weeks without seeing the same time. He was tap-dancing and tapping the sticks along the cobbled streets another boat. Now and then a big British trawler might pass by, on its way to Iceland. of Lerwick while we were taking the girls home. They were laughing as much as In those days they were coal-burners and the smoke could be seen at a good distance. we were. Sometimes they came close when passing. They were probably a little curious about Another memory from the Shetlands was when we were fishing together with who we were: a little white Swedish boat out in the middle of howhere. It was very several other boats. This was unusual. Among the boats there was a small fifty- seldom that we saw other ling fishermen from Bohuslan near us, even though there footer from Grundsund. I am not sure of its name. None of the men on board was were about seventy boats fishing for ling in those days and of those more than ten under sixty or seventy. Because of this the boat was nicknamed the 'Old Folks were from Sktirhamn. It just shows how big the sea is. Home.' But everybody thought it was great that these old men were still ling fishing Normally we reckoned to catch about twenty-two tons of salted ling, and then in the Sheflands. You had to have quick hands and everything had to be done fast there was the fresh ling we caught during the last week which, if we were lucky, in ling fishing. There wasn't much time for taking it easy. When the other boats had would fill Nanny to her capacity. Our supplies were enough to last for seven weeks. caught about twenty tons of ling, the 'Old Folks Home' used to come home after Sometimes the trip could be shorter, five or six weeks, if the weather was good and six or seven weeks with about twelve tons, which was not bad going for pensioners. if we came across a lot of fish. Occasionally we went ashore at Lerwick in the They unloaded their ling on Johan Olausson's pier in Sktirhamn. 'We are waiting Shetlands to get fresh bait. We also went ashore at Scalloway on the west side of for the "Old Folks Home",' they used to say when we came in there to unload. Despite the playful name for the boat, we all admired them because we thought they water only half way or the water would spill over the side with the motion of the were real tough old boys. boat. When the eggs were boiled, I lifted out the string bag and dipped it into a When we were fishing I had to do all the different jobs along with the rest of bucket of cold seawater to let the eggs cool. We had to be careful with fresh water. the men: baiting, shooting, hauling, unhooking, gutting, salting down in the fish- We only had one tankful and it had to last for six or seven weeks. room, and steering in the lines. When the rest of the men were down in the forecastle We had a big oil stove and boiling the water did not take long. The stove had sleeping, it was my duty to stand in the wheelhouse on my own and watch the buoy. adjustable fiddles to keep the saucepan, kettle and the frying pan in place in rough Moreover I had my cooking chores. Cooking was not something you could do with seas. When the eggs were done I went up the ladder and called to the men, 'You can your left hand while you were doing something else with your right, and so my job come down and eat now!' The benches around the table had lockers under them, was harder than the adults, even though I was only fourteen. where we kept our drinking glasses, plates and cutlery. We took out our own bread Around nine o'clock I made breakfast. It consisted of boiled eggs, coffee, bread and butter. I distributed the eggs and coffee among the men. Breakfast was the same and butter. Before boiling the eggs I first had to ask each man how many he wanted. every day. Dinner was about one or two o'clock, and it could vary. Everything It usually varied between one and three. Worst was my uncle Hilmer. When I asked depended on how the fishing was going. Most of the time we had fresh boiled ling him, 'I'll take eight,' he would answer. He had a big appetite. Eight eggs for and potatoes. I washed the potatoes in a little sawn-off barrel on the deck. We used breakfast every day! When everyone had said how many eggs he wanted, I used a up a twelve-litre bucket of potatoes daily. I used a stiff brush to scrub them, and pencil to mark them with each man's initials. Each one had his own eggs; they were then whisked them around in the bucket. Then they were emptied into another not part of the common supplies. I put the eggs into a string bag and submerged it bucket and lowered down the forecastle ladder. The was next to the steps. into boiling water. I used a big copper kettle for the eggs, but it could be filled with There was not much room for cooking. On Sundays we used to eat yellow peas and bacon for dinner. On Saturday night I cut the salted bacon into pieces and left them to soak together with the peas. On Sunday I boiled the bacon and peas. For dessert I made sago pudding with dried fruit. After dinner we went up on deck to bait and set the lines. The men slept a little longer on Sunday morning, but I had to cook, so there was not much sleep for me. In the evening, around seven or eight, depending on the fishing, I made supper. I fried potatoes, onions, eggs and bacon. I also made coffee. The potatoes I fried were the remainder of the bucketful I had scrubbed that morning. The potatoes were fried in a special way, almost mashed. I used a big iron frying pan and every time I turned the potatoes I mashed them, then I added a few drops of coffee to make the potatoes look brown. On our spring trips, our friends in the Prolific usually kept company with us. But, while the other boats stayed in the North Sea around the Shetlands in the summer, we often went further out into the Atlantic. Around the Shetlands we got about 150 ling per day and we thought this was too little. We had to catch enough ling for our families to live on. We all had loans and overdrafts that kept us in debt, and things were difficult in Bohuslan in those days. The ling fetched only about twenty ore per kilo in 1937. We rounded Sumburgh Head, at the southern end of the Shetland Islands, went North of Orkney and out to the North Atlantic to a place called Flannan. It is about forty sea miles west of the most northern point in the Hebrides. Nanny was only 53 feet 16ng, the first time we went to Flannan. The other boats did not want to come Photo 6. Fish 1nerclzant5.piers, probably at Skdrharlfrt,1920s or 1930s. The split lirtg are held open with us, so we went there by ourselves. It was risky to go so far out at sea in these by woodett splints while they are dryirtg. Ifit rair~ed,tlrefish would have to be covered with tarparclirzs small boats. For one thing, if anyone got seriously sick or hurt, it might take two or or taker1 into the sheds (Goteborgs Historiska Museum). three days to get help. All we had was a small first-aid kit containing plasters, gauze bandages and things like that. It was important to stay healthy. In spite of being eight to twelve tons of ling, but with 37.5 tons aboard, Nanny looked like a freighter careful, we often cut ourselves on the hooks or even on the sharp teeth of the ling. carrying stone from the granite quarries at Rixo, the way she was so low in the water. It was not possible to wear gloves and our hands got cut, swollen and torn. When we had said good-bye to the other boats at the Shetlands we set a course Sometimes your hands were too sore to button up your jumper or trousers. The old homeward. men had a recipe for this. We dipped our hands into a barrel of brine. This prevented When we approached the Norwegian coast, we headed for Bergen to sell the them from becoming infected, said the old men. The pain made you hop round the livers to the tryworks there. The tryworks was on an island called Feio in the Bergen deck with your hands between your knees until the worst had passed. It helped, archipelago. On this island there was also a plain little graveyard, where Swedish because afterwards we could move our fingers normally again. We did this after fishermen were buried. It dated back to the time when the lines were set and hauled meals or at break times up on deck. But it did not take long before your hands were from open boats. Many fishermen were killed in those days through accidents. One stiff and swollen again. wave could swamp the boat and drown the men. The older men in Nanny's crew When we were lying there in the North Atlantic sometimes whales came up to told me that their fathers and forefathers had put up simple wooden crosses and breathe before they dived again. I particularly remember one time, it was Sunday stone cairns in memory of their drowned comrades here on this little island. and we had as usual our meal of peas and bacon. We had baited and set the lines. I When we had sold the livers to the tryworks we went directly back to SkLhamn. was the only one awake, the others were down in the forecastle. I was on deck We arrived on a Sunday afternoon and there was a big gathering to greet us when washing the dishes. Suddenly I heard something strange and I wondered what on Nanny came into the harbour. People saw that Nanny was low in the water, which earth is that? It was a big whale. He came up alongside the boat and spouted like a meant work for many of the people ashore. We berthed at Walter Hendry's pier. First steam geyser right up in the air. He was much bigger than Nanny and lay quite still we unloaded the fresh ling and the fish-girls started to work on them immediately. spouting water. It came pelting down on the deck like rain. The rest of the men came The ling were slit open, the back bone was cut out and then the fish were opened quietly and slowly up on deck. Nobody dared frighten the whale away. He could out. Wooden sticks were stuck into the ling to keep them stretched flat and then they have crushed Nanny with one sweep of his tail if he had been annoyed. Finally the were hung to dry on stages in the open air. Unsalted, air-dried ling was called whale spouted a last time before diving and we could breathe freely again. 'lutfisk.' Every Swede knows that lutfisk is a part of the traditional Swedish We fished for twelve days at Flannan, and the fishing was very good. We had Christmas feast. But not many of them know where these special fish are caught, been ashore at Stornoway, on the east side of Lewis, to buy fresh bait. By the time or how. we had used it up in our last week of fishing, Nanny was laden with as much fish A couple of men were down in Nanny's fish-room throwing the ling up onto the as she could carry. We had caught 37.5 tons of ling: 22 tons of salted ling, and twelve deck. The whole catch was unloaded by hand without mechanical help. Down in tons of fresh ling, which we had caught the last week, and over three tons of halibut the fish-room they put a couple of barrels on top of each other to reach the hatch. and other fish. We had to use the supply room to store the ling below deck. The They worked at the bins on both sides of the boat, port and starboard. Three or four cargo hold was full and the supplies were as good as finished anyway. It was time fish were brought up at a time to a man standing on the barrels and he threw them to go back to Skarhamn. up on deck. When the salted ling came up on deck they were hit a couple of times My father set our course for the long voyage home. It would take a whole week. against the bulwark so that the thick layer of Mediterranean salt would come loose The tide tables said that we would be going with the current through the Pentland before throwing them up onto the pier for weighing on the scales. If the loose salt Firth, so we decided to take this way home. We had never gone this way before; wasn't knocked off, the buyers, standing on the pier watching the unloading, would usually we went north of the Orkneys. It was the same when we went from the object. The ling was weighed on the scales to make up hundred-kilo lots, and then Shetlands to Flannan or to some other bank in the\North Atlantic, we always took it was moved to the buyers' piles on the pier. Then the fish-girls put the ling to soak the route around Sumburgh Head. The Pentland Firth is notorious for its strong tidal in water until the following day so it would soften enough to be split open. Then it currents, which can run at up to eleven knots. We entered the Firth at five or six in was salted down in big round wooden barrels and left for a few weeks. After that it the morning. There was a bit of a morning fog and we did not see much, only bare was taken from the barrels, rinsed off and sold as 'kabeljo.' cliffs. The British trawlers were familiar with the currents of the Pentland Firth and When ling fishermen returned home the children gathered on the pier because they stayed close to land, where the current was weaker. We stayed in the middle thky knew that there were sweets to be had. We used to bring them Balta stars and of the sound and passed through at a good speed. When we passed through the candied sugar. Balta stars were white or pink. They could be star shaped, round or fishing grounds around the Shetlands we came across several boats which had heart shaped. We bought them in the village of Baltasound on the island of Unst in remained there, among others the 'Argo' from Skiirhamn. They had caught only the northern Shetlands. The candied sugar sweets came from Norway. Sometimes we bought biscuits in the Shetlands. They were unsweetened biscuits in a jar and did not taste very good. The jars they came in, on the other hand, were very nice and it was mostly because of the jars that we bought them. When the unloading of the ling was finished, the preparations for the next trip started and after a week of rest we were on our way to the Shetlands again. We made three trips that season. Our earnings for all three trips were 1,800 kronor per full share. I had three-quarters of a share, and so I got 1,200 kronor for five months' work. These days, in Sweden, a skilled workman might earn that much in a day. But things were different then. Acknowledgement I am grateful to Professor Sven B. Ek, Head of the Department of Ethnology, University of Gothenburg, for permission to use the undated typescript, 'PA Ldngafiske med Nanny,' by Bengt Olausson, from the Department's archives. This translation is reproduced with permission from Reginald Byron (1994) Portraits of the Past; Bolzuslan Society in the Twentieth Centuly. Goteborg: Etnologiska Foreningen i vastsverige. The book can be obtained from Etnologiska Institutionen, Goteborg universitet, Vastra Hamngatan 3, S-411 17 Goteborg, Sweden. we bought biscuits in the Shetlands. They were unsweetened biscuits in a jar and Hurricane Andrew and South Florida's did not taste very good. The jars they came in, on the other hand, were very nice and it was mostly because of the jars that we bought them. Commercial Fishing Peoples When the unloading of the ling was finished, the preparations for the next trip Impacts and Immediate Needs started and after a week of rest we were on our way to the Shetlands again. We made three trips that season. Our earnings for all three trips were 1,800 kronor per full share. I had three-quarters of a share, and so I got 1,200 kronor for five months' James R. McGoodwin work. These days, in Sweden, a skilled workman might earn that much in a day. University of Colorado But things were different then. Christopher L. Dyer University of South Alabama I am grateful to Professor Sven B. Ek, Head of the Department of Ethnology, University of Gothenburg, for permission to use the undated typescript, 'PB Llngafiske med Nanny,' by Bengt Olausson, from the Department's archives. This translation is reproduced with permission from Reginald Byron (1994) Portraits of the Past; ABSTRACTThe authors visited south Florida shortly after Hurricane Andrew struck the region in August, 1992, in order to assess the storm's impacts on commercial Bolzuslan Society in the Twentieth Century. Goteborg: Etnologiska Foreningen i fishers and to learn about their needs for recovery in the storm's aftermath. Surpris- vastsverige. The book can be obtained from Etnologiska Institutionen, Goteborg ingly, while discovering that the region's fishing peoples had indeed suffered grave universitet, Vastra Hamngatan 3, S-411 17 Goteborg, Sweden. impacts as a result of the storm, they also learned that practically no attention had been focused on these peoples by the governmental and scientific institutions which otherwise are responsible for south Florida's fisheries and marine ecosystems.

Introduction

When Hurricane Andrew slammed into south Florida's coastline early in the morning on August 24, 1992, we assumed there were devastating impacts on that region's commercial fishers and fishing industry.l After all, the storm hit with winds in excess of 170 MPH, killed 41 people and injured many others, damaged 125,000 homes and apartments (of which 63,000 were utterly destroyed), left 160,000 people homeless, caused around 20 billion dollars in property damage, and required that 23,000 federal troops be sent in to provide relief and secure the area against widespread looting and other crimes (Sun Sentinel 19925 and 17; Anonymous 1993:1-8). Later that same day, as televised news broadcasts began to show pictures of the destruction left in the storm's wake, we imagined with horror what must have happened to south Florida's coastal fishing peoples. Certainly there must be many fishing vessels sunken and broken apart in their berths, or stranded on high ground, shore facilities destroyed and partly washed away, and debris strewn everywhere. We figured a few fishers probably lost their lives, while many others must now face economic ruin in the storm's aftermath. Surely, we thought, a storm as violent as Hurricane Andrew must have exacted a heavy toll on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples. We feel that commercial fishing peoples merit special attention when extreme our exposure to television and print news. The piece quoted a biologist from events - in this case a violent tropical storm - impact coastal zones. Commercial Florida's Department of Natural Resources (DNR) as saying 'I had the impression fishers are almost always present in such regions, and they are usually a distinct this was not the storm,' that is, not 'the big one,' that everybody had predicted for sociocultural and occupational component of the larger coastal population. More- years would eventually hit south Florida. Furthermore, the article went on... over, their high degree of dependency on coastal resources and facilities leaves them Because wind damage, rather than water damage, was Humcane Andrew's clnim to fame in particularly vulnerable to suffering great losses when extreme events occur in the Florida, and because the effects were serious along such a narrow comdor, most of south regions in which they work and live. Florida's commercial fishing industry was untouched by it. From Key West to Marathon, and For studying the problems of commercial fishers, we have found the concept of westward past Flamingo to the southwest coast's Everglades City, commercial fishermen were the 'natural-resource community' (NRC) to be very useful (see Dyer, Gill, and Picou wide-eyed over theu good luck. 1992). In the fisheries, we define NRCs as people whose economic welfare and The article also noted that marine biologists were disappointed that the storm had sociocultural identities are similarly articulated with, and dependent upon, certain not been more severe. For more than 30 years, it said, the area had not experienced marine resources. In this sense, a 'fishing community' may include peoples living a big storm which might beneficially cleanse important marine habitats of the turtle in a named, nucleated settlement, which obviously has a great deal of fishing grass which had come to choke them in recent years. industry, as well as dispersed commercial fishers living here and there along a Thus, as we packed our bags for the flight to Miami, we wondered just what we coastline who do not live in any particular settlement. What is important is that might find. Would there be any significant impacts on south Florida's fishing fishers in either situation have much in common, and for purposes of locating them peoples worthy of our scrutiny, or, instead, as the article cited above suggested, and assessing their problems and needs it is useful to conceptualize them as would we find the region's commercial fishers 'wide-eyed over their good luck' at natural-resource communities. having come through comparatively unscathed?

Prior to Leaving for the Field In South Florida

Eager to see south Florida's fisheries as soon after the storm as possible, we applied After arriving in Miami we found lodgings in Coral Gables in the south end of for Quick-Response Grants, which are funded by the National Science Foundation greater Miami; south of here there were no viable lodgings available, and even in and administered by the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Coral Gables we found our hotel had sustained considerable damages, with several Center at the University of Colorado-Boulder.2 We titled our project 'Reconnais- rooms unavailable for occupancy, and considerable water damage in the main sance of south Florida to Assess Damages, Planned Responses, and Future Needs hallways leading to all the rooms. Then, we rented a car and spent our first two in the Fisheries Stemming from Hurricane Andrew,' and what we intended to do days driving around, familiarizing ourselves with the region the hurricane had was make a week-long field study of the hurricane's impact on south Florida's most severely impacted, and meeting with all the commercial fishers we could fishing peoples, as well as find out what relief efforts were needed. Overall, we locate. hoped this endeavor might eventually become the basis for subsequent research Overall, the devastation throughout the region was much worse and more involving similar natural disasters in other coastal fishing communities, as well as extensive than we had anticipated. Indeed, as we drove around we commented reveal needed reforms in south Florida's fisheries policies. several times that the scenes we were seeing brought to mind 'ground zero' in the Once we learned that our proposals had been favorably reviewed and funded, aftermath of a thermonuclear blast, only in this instance 'ground zero' had travelled we prepared to leave for south Florida, and eventually arrived there in late October, across the landscape, leaving in its wake a 25-mile wide corridor of awesome around 2 months after the hurricane had gone through. However, shortly before destruction. Thus, we were surprised to find how little the region had recovered in leaving for Miami, we were puzzled by a piece we saw in National Fishernzan (Fee the nearly 2 months that had elapsed between the storm's passing and our arrival. 1992:12) - the journal of record for much of the commercial fishing industry in We found that most of the region's roads had been cleared of debris - which had north America. The piece was titled 'Hurricane Andrew: A Narrow Swath Cut been removed to several mountainous dump sites - and electrical power had been Through Florida,' and, regarding the storm's impact on south Florida's commercial restored'throughout most of the region, but otherwise the restoration effort seemed fisheries, it characterized the storm as being more like a '20-mile wide, two-hours- to be only beginning. Throughout the most severely impacted zone we saw hundreds long tornado,' than the extensively destructive storm we assumed it had been after of abandoned homes which lacked roofing or walls, everywhere the trees were broken and bare, debris was everywhere, federal troops still patrolled the area, and losses, whereas the total number of commercial fishers in the impacted region was many people were living in tents or other makeshift shelters. 'insignificant.' During our first days in south Florida we met with various fishermen, learning We were assured by these NMFS staff members that the few commercial fishers first hand how they had come through the storm, and about the losses they had that were to be found in south Florida had come through the hurricane practically suffered. After that, we had several meetings with state and federal officials who unscathed. And, when we asked whether anybody from their organization had made are concerned with the region's commercial fisheries, as well as with scientists at any visits to the impacted region to assess possible impacts commercial fishers the region's major marine-research institution. From these peoples we hoped to might have suffered, they repeated that there simply were not enough fishers in this learn how they had assessed the damages to south Florida's commercial fishing region to justify such an effort, and, moreover, that any such fishers were so peoples in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. However, and to our great surprise, dispersed that they would be hard to locate now, particularly in the aftermath of the they basically corroborated the story we had read in National Fisherman, affirming storm. The only community of commercial fishers in the area of any significance, the view that the storm's impact on the region's commercial fishing peoples had they said, was a group devoted to catching spiny lobsters, whose docks were along been minimal. the Miami River in downtown Miami. However, they were quick to point out, these were located considerably north of the storm's destructive path, and as a result had suffered no loss of life nor any damages to their vessels. Instead, they assured us, 'Minimal Impact' these fishers 'came through just fine,' as their boats safely rode out the storm snug in their berths along the Miami River. Then, when we asked if anybody from the We presumed that the agencies and institutions we contacted, both during our field NMFS had interviewed any of these fishers to learn about possible losses caused study and subsequently through correspondence, would be the ones that would be by the storm, one staff member joked, 'no, how could we, none of us speak Cuban.' responsible for assessing the impacts of the hurricane on commercial fishers, as While making the rounds in Miami we also visited the Rosenstiel School of well as for planning and coordinating relief efforts. All of these agencies, and the Marine and Atmospheric Science (RSMAS). This institution is a component of the marine-science institution, have offices in the greater Miami area. University of Miami which, for the most part, is supported by the Sea Grant Prior to leaving for our trip we had contacted Florida's Department of Natural Research Program of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminis- Resources, inquiring about the effects the storm had on south Florida's commercial tration - in much the same manner as other major U.S. marine-research institutions. fishing folk. In reply, we had received information which speculated on what might Here we learned that the RSMAS had underway the development of a research have happened to certain valuable marine stocks, but otherwise were sent no proposal for assessing the impact of Hurricane Andrew along south Florida's information concerning the storm's impact on commercial fishing people. Next, coastlines. However, we also learned, the impacts that would be explored were after arriving in Florida and meeting with various officials of this agency, we were limited to the storm's effects on marine organisms and marine ecology, physical and surprised to learn that it had made no efforts, nor did it intend to make any effort, chemical oceanography, and other traditional oceanographic and ocean-science to assess the impacts of the hurricane on south Florida's commercial fishers. concerns - and there would be no exploration of the storm's impact on any people. Expressing surprise at learning this, one official at the DNR told us that the agency Subsequent to this visit we received a copy outlining the RSMAS's proposed was charged mainly with assessing fish stocks and reporting on marine-ecological research more fully, yet lamentably - and despite our urging that they do so - they conditions, and was not charged with fisheries management per se. The agency, he have no intentions of studying the impact of the hurricane on south Florida's said, reports its stock assessments to the National-Marine Fisheries Service people - commercial fishers, or otherwise. Thus, while one section of the RSMAS (NMFS), and defers most fisheries-management respon$bilities to that agency. proposal is elaborated under the subheading of 'The Community,' all that is planned Our next meetings were at the regional offices of the National Marine Fisheries in this regard is to assess the extent to which sunken recreational fishing boats are Service in Miami, where we met with the director and members of his key staff. contributing to coastal pollution by leaking fuels and lubricants into the region's Here again, they corroborated the view that the hurricane had made only a 'minimal harbors and bays. impact' on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples. Moreover, they stressed, We felt that perhaps the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and there are 'almost no commercial fishermen' in the region of south Florida that was the Small Business Administration (SBA) might have focused some special atten- impacted by the storm, and the few that did exist there were few in number and tion on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples, but, as far as we know, they did geographically quite dispersed. South Florida's 'boating community,' they told us, not. Given the magnitude of destruction caused by the storm and the limited was mainly comprised of recreational fishers, whom they said had suffered grave resources these agencies had available, it is understandable that they could not focus C~~i5g-g-,3 zgon3; sf+> "0 ugg.3 z 5.g g Mf-cE g E.;$ ;$ g smggg7 3 5 3 20 ar;;za$ g.ggg~;? a ~ii:~E. z30a00~8303"X Q,PJ3,a 3 ii: WE: g &e. %ii&u0G a: 8 "0 GU"% g $;+=-g s c~ gg3-O. g,"'0Y$E g 3 4Ba 0 %~..tjj0 3 3 0 g 0 L$ "-0 "3 3 z. B > ' w &.za 2.BL$ri.3m- g 2.9. 3 n 4 -. g$"83= -.@I; g g E2%0 0, ~2 8 zgg z?=I"<'. gs'm z.0 0 8 0 wgg2. ~33aY 3 1 "0 O a2 gm*$gS " 5 Err.&g 30.5 30 u " 0 00 0.- The artificial reefs which have been placed off the Dade coast from the Broward nearly 20 miles down the coast and where the center of the storm's eye had passed. line to Homestead are the backbone of a local diving industry, which has important The impact we discovered among the bait fishermen at Coconut Grove was one we recreational and commercial components. Some of the more important species of had not anticipated; these reported that they had not experienced any loss of life, marine life to be found around these reefs, and which are of interest to both groups, serious injuries, or even the loss of any fishing vessels or important fishing gear. include jackfish, snappers, sea basses, and groupers. Instead, they said, because of the extensive losses of recreational fishing boats - The devastation wrought on artificial reefs is clear evidence that seafloor whose owners, generally speaking, were either not as skilled or as interested in configurations were severely altered by the force of Hurricane Andrew in the securing their boats in advance of the storm - local demand for bait shrimp had impacted area, a finding which is clearly opposite to that which was reported in dropped considerably, and several of these fishermen said they might have to go National Fisherman shortly after the storm. Robert Arnove, a Miami dive captain out of business if it did not increase soon. for 11 years, said the following about the Tarpon, a 165-foot sunken vessel: At the Black Point marina, on the other hand, which had experienced the'full fury of the storm, the situation for commercial fishers was much worse. There Everything that was alive on the reef was picked clean. It was alive with soft corals, sea fans, almost all of the recreational boats that used the marina had been severely damaged, and sponges, and now nothing is there. It has been ripped right out of the bottom. I swam way north and way south along the reef and it's all the same. It's just devastated. Looking to the future, with many completely destroyed, resulting in an almost total collapse in demand you have to wonder if it will ever be a viable dive site again (Miattzi Herald, 1 September 1992). for the bait shrimp caught by commercial fishers working out of the Black Point marina. However, unlike at the Coconut Grove marina, at the Black Point marina Similarly, the destruction of natural coral reefs in south Florida also hurt the local many of the commercial bait boats had suffered severe damages as well. diving industries - both commercial and recreational. And, again, this impact was Thus, when we visited the Black Point marina, only two months after the not quickly appreciated by local governmental officials. However, by now various hurricane had gone through, only 2 of its 17 bait boats had resumed operations. The assessments of the impact on marine productivity which may have resulted from fishermen working on these boats told us that despite good quantities of shrimp damages to artificial and natural reefs caused by the hurricane have been launched by the Florida DNR and the RSMAS. Severely deleterious impacts on other fishery habitats, including mangrove and seagrass regions, have also been discovered, especially by the Florida DNR and the RSMAS. Not surprisingly, their preliminary reports all suggest that the storm did indeed have a devastating and extensive impact on these environments and their respective marine resources (see Map 1). However, rather than elaborate further upon these marine-environmental impacts, for which there is already a growing body of worthy scientific information, we wish to focus instead on the storm's impact on peoples working in south Florida's fishing industry. Because of time limitations, our study of commercial fishing peoples along the south Florida coast is more a sample than a truly comprehensive survey. Neverthe- less, we found the conception of the natural-resource community quite useful in helping us to locate and analyze the storm's impacts on the major components of this region's otherwise dispersed commercial fishing industry. We eventually ident- ified three important components of south FloridaIs commercial fisheries which had suffered particularly significant losses as a result of the storm. These, we are fairly certain, are the major components of south Florida's commercial-fishing NRCs, and include the following: the bait fishery; the spiny lobster fishery; and the seafood processors. Below we summarize the deleterious impacts suffered by each. South Florida's bait fishers catch shrimp for sale to recreational fishers in the region. We met with bait fishermen at two locations: the large marina at Coconut Photo 1. Cotnmercialfiltertttetz at the Black Poitzt nzaritza repair their bait boat itz the afrert~zatlt Grove in the south end of greater Miami, and the marina at Black Point, situated of tlte stornl (photo by J.R. McGoodwin). being available and correspondingly good catches, they were experiencing insuf- migration routes (something which the Florida DNR has independently corrobor- ficient demand for their production to justify continuing operations. Moreover, all ated for us). of the fishermen we met at Black Point expressed great uncertainty concerning The lobster fishermen along the Miami River also made many expression of whether they might remain in business in the near future. Several doubted they could frustration and anger concerning the Florida DNR and the NMFS, who, they said, raise sufficient capital to make necessary repairs on their boats, and nearly all said had not shown any concern for them. Similarly, they expressed critical sentiments that while there currently seemed to be a lot of shrimp immediately offshore, they concerning the SBA, who they felt had not provided adequate loans to help them worried that the extensive destruction of the mangroves around Black Point - the replace the lobster traps they had lost. Several even offered an opinion that the main rearing grounds for the shrimp - might mean a collapse in these stocks in Florida DNR had secretly urged the SBA not to provide loans sufficient to restore several months in the future. Moreover, all expressed resentment that the NMFS - their traps to pre-storm numbers. Before the storm, they said, the DNR had for many that agency of the U.S. government which they felt should be concerned for them - years been trying to limit the number of traps a boat could deploy, and over the past had done nothing. 'Tell the fisheries service we need help,' one group repeatedly several years had progressively raised license fees on traps to discourage any urged us. increase in their numbers. Thus, these fishermen said, the storm had accomplished Another component of south Florida's commercial fishing industry that suffered for the DNR what it had been unable to accomplish on its own: a significant severe impacts was the spiny lobster fishery, and particularly the lobster fishers who reduction of the number of traps being utilized in the fishery. They also said they are located in downtown Miami along the Miami River. These people fish exclu- had repeatedly disputed the DNR's attempts to limit the total number of traps being sively for spiny lobsters, a high-value export item, by deploying baited traps in utilized in the fishery in the interest of conserving the resource, feeling the DNR relatively shallow waters offshore, and it is precisely this group which NMFS was showing undue favoritism for the recreational diving industry, which also officials told us had come through practically unscathed. When we met with these targets spiny lobsters. The DNR denies urging the SBA to drag its feet in providing fishers we learned that all 25 of the boats involved in the fishery had come through in good condition, and the nearly 100 fishermen who work on these boats - nearly all of whom are either Cuban immigrants or descendants of Cuban immigrants - had experienced no loss of life or any serious injuries. Indeed, just as the staff member at the regional NMFS offices had told us, these fishermen had been able to secure all their boats snugly in their berths along the Miami River well in advance of the storm's arrival. Nevertheless, we quickly learned of two especially severe impacts these fisher- men had suffered as a direct result of Hurricane Andrew. First, they all had a large number of lobster traps deployed when the first storm warnings were announced, and subsequently were only able to recover around 20% of these prior to the storm's arrival. Overall, the fleet lost around 80% of its lobster traps, amounting to an average loss per fishing boat of around $16,000. Moreover, these fishermen explained, their fishing success was heavily depen- dent on their ability to intercept lobsters along certain predictable migration routes. These routes, they explained, are imprinted wvthe lobsters are still young by magnetic fields along the sea floor. However, now that the storm had greatly disrupted bottom configurations in the areas they customarily fished, the lobsters were not showing up at the usual locations in the same numbers, and catches had dropped considerably. Thus, these fishermen stressed, even if they had the same number of traps they had before the storm, and even if the lobster resource was not diminished by the storm, they were no longer able to sustain pre-storm production Photo 2. Spiny-fobsterfishi~tgboats, such as these alortg tlie Miami River; safely rode out the storm levels because the lobsters were po longer showing up along their usual iri their 6ertiis. However; this fleet lost approxiitlately 80% of its lobster traps, slrch as those seen stacked ort tlte dock (photo by J.R. McGoodwin).

estimate this 'community' to consist of around 200 primary producers, plus several research institutions, to assess the impact the hurricane had on the region's com- times that number of ancillary people who supply and support the fishing industry - mercial fishers and to help with their recovery. a significant chunk of humanity whose welfare following the storm was woefully As a result of completing this brief field study which focused on a single neglected. occupational sector in south Florida, a sector which otherwise has little visibility in There is another crucial difference between the situation in Louisiana and that the region, we have been able to illuminate human problems which otherwise might in south Florida. While both states have significant recreational-fishing sectors, in have escaped wider attention. This affirms for us the value of applied-anthropologi- south Florida the recreational sector of the fisheries long ago eclipsed the commer- cal research of this sort. It also enables us to proceed to the next stage of our work - cial sector in terms of its economic significance, political power, and corresponding bringing these problems to the attention of governmental and scientific institutions, ability to influence fisheries-management policies. Both Meltzoff (1989) and Dur- individuals, and others, whom we hope will help commercial fishers come through renberger (1992: 195-96) have discussed the pre-eminence of the recreational fish- natural disasters in the future. ing sector in south Florida (and in the Florida Keys), and particularly its ability to dominate fisheries policies against the interests of the commercial sector. Durrenberger describes how 'fishing for fun' has supplanted 'fishing for exchange' Notes in south Florida's fisheries, noting these fisheries have become 'playgrounds for the rich,' and he criticizes this as an aspect of the state's 'Disney World' mentality 1. Throughout this article, wherever we refer to 'south Florida' we mean the east and southeast (ibid.). facing Atlantic coastline of the Florida Peninsula from Miami southward to the Florida Keys. That coastline has a sizeable human population and is where practically all commercial fishing is based. The remaining coastlines of the Florida Peninsula - those to the south, southwest, and west - have negligible human populations, almost no commercial fishing industry, and for the most part are part of the Everglades Recommendations National Park.

As maritime anthropologists with particular interests in fishing peoples, we found 2. We especially thank Gilbert F. White, Director, and Mary Fran Myers, Project Manager, at the the neglect of south Florida's fishing peoples in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, for their advice and support in conjunction with this project. to be deplorable. In essence, we feel the NMFS is the natural and obvious federal agency in the U.S. government which should be responsible for assessing the impacts of natural disasters on fishing peoples, while working with other state and References Cited local governmental entities to coordinate relief efforts, mitigation, and recovery. After all, commercial fishing is a business, and the NMFS is part of the U.S. Anonymous Department of Commerce. On the other hand, it seems appropriate that other 1993 Untitled editorial. Aide 24(1): 1-8. agencies - the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance - have no mandate Durrenberger, E. Paul to help commercial fishers in the aftermath of natural disasters, and should instead 1992 It's All Politics: Soittl~Alabanta's Seafood Ittdusrry. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. remain focused on environmental and ecosystem concerns. Dyer, Christopher L., Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou At present the NMFS has no such mandate to help commercial fishers come 1992 Social Disruption and the Valdez Oil Spill: Alaskan Natives in a Natural Resource Community. through natural disasters such as hurricanes, and, correspondingly, no discretionary Sociological Spectrttnr 12:105-26. funds for attending to these needs. Thus, we hope legislation will be introduced Fee, Russ which will enable the NMFS and the statei agencies articulated with it to play a more 1992 Hurricane Andrew: A Narrow Swath Cut Through Florida. Natiot~alFisltent~an 73(7): 12. decisive role in seeing to the needs of U;S. commercial fishers in the wake of natural Meltzoff, Sarah K. disasters. 1989 Politics of Conservation in the Florida Keys. In: E. Paul Durrenberger, Lee Maril, and J. Thomas Now, slightly more than a year since we visited south Florida, we understand (Eds.), Marine Resource Utilizatiotl. Mobile, Alabama: Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Con- sortium. Pp. 125-132. from correspondence that the coastal area which was directly struck by Hurricane Andrew is still one of widespread destruction, and that many commercial fishers have been unable to resume fishing - their preferred lifestyle. We also remain unaware of any significant efforts on the part of any governmental agencies, or Book Reviews regarding folk models of fishing. Chapter three deals with this subject and more generally with the relations among types of fishing economies and production discourses - 'the ways in which people represent fishing and fisheries to themselves and to others' (p. 54). The author explains that representations are constructed in action and that representations and practices are embedded in social production systems. Following his own model, PBlsson distinguishes PALSSON, Gisli Coastal Economies, Cultural Accouizts. Hurrzarz Ecology and Icelaltdic four types of fishing societies. He examines how their members explain differential success Discourse. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991. xviii 202 pp., ill., bibliogr., + and which notions of labor they have. With regard to production discourse, there may be index, ISBN 0-7190-3543-0, £ 35.00 (hardback). (1) a folk model for differential success and personal differences among fishermen; (2) no folk model and no measurable differences; (3) no folk model but personal differences and (4) This is a thought-provoking and stimulating book. Though elegantly concise, it contains an a model but no personal differences. These four logical possibilities are not distinguished for overwhelming amount of information and many interesting theoretical observations. In the the sake of pigeon-holing. What is important is 'how different kinds of discourse are iliitiated first part of his book, Icelandic anthropologist Gisli PBlsson unfolds his analytical framework and reproduced as authoritative systems' (p. 81) and this can only be understood in terms of referring to the work of scores of social theorists in a critical manner. In the second part, he social life and history. applies this framework to the ethnography of Icelandic fishing. Though the better part of his PBlsson applies this theoretical perspective to the ethnography of Icelandic fishing. He monograph has been previously published in a variety of scholarly journals and volumes, one deals with three distinct periods in three separate chapters: the phase of peasant or household may welcome this compilation. production from roughly the ninth to the late nineteenth century (chapter four), the phase of In the first chapter the author delineates three models concerning the relationship of the expanding market economy during the first half of the twentieth century (chapter five), individuals and society: the private, the dualistic, and the constitutive model. The first sees and the phase of consolidated capitalism and state intervention in recent decades (chapter six). human beings as self-contained rational individuals for whom group membership is optional; Each transformation in the production system was accomplished by a change in the Icelandic the second considers society as being outside the individual and the individual outside society; fishermen's discursive models or representations of nature and production. the third suggests that individuality and agency of human beings derive from their During peasant production, there was a natural ceiling on production due to technical and involvement in social relations. P5lsson opts for the last model, contending that it avoids social constraints and in the folk model fishermen were seen as passive recipients of fish. reducing individuals to instruments and conflating social differences between production Relations aboard boats were egalitarian, success or failure of catches was not attributed to systems. anyone personally. Aseries of anomalous water-beings mediated between the sea and the land, In the next chapter, he forcefully argues for a model of fishing in which the social forces between nature and society. The focus of production discourse was on nature, viewing fishing of production are at the core. Too often, anthropologists have adopted a 'natural' model of as a struggle against the elements. fishing 'which depicts the individual producer as an autonomous isolate, engaged in the This representation changed when peasant fishing gave way to capitalist fishing in the era technical act of catching fish' (p. 23). This model further tends to distort or suppress the role of market expansion. The 'natural' ceiling on production seized to exist, labor became a of women in fishing economies. PBlsson proposes another approach which distinguishes the commodity, and a competitive production discourse arose in which differential success was social differences in access to resources and circulation of products. attributed to personal differences among skippers with a concomitant competition for prestige, I agree with the purport of Pftlsson's argument in this chapter on anthropological dis- capital, and labor. The labor process became gender-specific; only the work of men was cussions of fishing economies (parts of which appeared in this journal under the title 'The Art regarded as productive. The mythology of water-beings became redundant and fish were no of Fishing'; see MAST 1989,2[1]: 1-20). However, I regret that his review omits much of the longer perceived as gifts but regarded as being subject to human control. In short, the focus more recent maritime anthropological literature. The 'social' models of fishing P5lsson so of production discourse shifted to society, seeing fishing essentially as a competition among eagerly propagates are not entirely absent. For instance, the debate on common property fishermen. resources has not only yielded new ethnographic insights, but has also been important in During the phase of consolidated capitalism overfishing caused resource problems, the theory and model building. Matters like mod s of access and their distributive consequences state intervened and bureaucrats increasingly based their policies on data gathered by marine are central to this debate. What is more, in his '7 model the author confines himself to discussing biologists. This led to a "'scientific" discourse on production and resource use. .. and with it access and circulation; why not explicitly include the other aspects of the social relations of emerged a new rationality which assumes that humans are collectively responsible for the production: control over the means of production and the division and organization of labor? maintenance of fish' (p. 133). A ceiling on production was imposed through a quota system. This would render P5lsson's model - in which he distinguishes two modes of circulation (for Production discourse became centered on both ecological and social relations, in that human use and for exchange) and two modes of access (without and with ownership) more - beings are seen to depend on fish and fish on human beings. The new rationality challenges comprehensive. the wisdom of fishermen and is beginning to make their folk model of production redundant. Admittedly, PBlsson does state that his model is an idealtypical simplification. Its sig- Since the introduction of quotas, the discourse on differential success and its causes has lost nificance lies in the fact that it can help understand the construction, logic, and evolution of its importance, capital is concentrated in fewer hands, and it is very difficult for newcomers production systems and illustrate and account for cross-cultural differences, for example to enter the fishing industry. As PBlsson rightly observes: 'Apparently neutral and technical management decisions have had important effects on the balance of power and structure of probably due to the deep historical scope. This forces Holm to use different sources which the fishing industry by changing the possibilities and alternatives with respect to access to require very different methodological angles. Besides the general problems of addressing such fish' (p. 138). It should be understood, however, that 'scientific' models are as much social a long time period, the region discussed includes the coasts of three countries, Denmark, constructions as folk models. Sweden and Norway, which at times makes it confusing for the reader as to were he is. These In the last chapter, Pltlsson returns to some of the broader theoretical issues raised earlier, objections are very much related to the structure of the book and the magnitude of the author's reiterating some of his major points in a comparative perspective. In a programmatic fashion, project. he states that 'rather than elaborate on the unique and the idiosyncratic, the apparently Poul Holm touches uuon topics which have been studied by several scholars. This becomes boundless variety in ethnography, anthropological analysis should strive to establish both the especially significant in the last chapters of the book, beginning with a discussion of the contrasts and the parallels in production discourse and to look for explanations for such mentalities of the changing maritime cultures. The author engages in a critical discussion of contrasts and parallels' (p. 160). Moreover, he makes a point stressing that human agency and the idea of the 'democratic' Scandinavian maritime society mainly present in the works of purpose should be reintroduced in social theory. I can highly recommend Pltlsson's own Olof Hasslof (1949) and, to a lesser extent, Orvar Lofgren (1977). But today this discussion ambitious book to those wishing to embark on that course. Though one may of course squabble seems redundant as the flaws of, for instance, Lofgren's transactional perspective were already over some matters of detail, he presents a cogent argument and his analysis is replete with clearly pointed out in the late 1970s (Kildegird-Hansen 1979). The critique becomes all the observations deserving further research. more 'out of date' as Holm does not discuss perhaps the most significant and pioneering study Rob van Gitzkel of maritime culture and economies in Scandinavia, Thomas Hojrup's discussion of life modes University of Amsterdam among Danish fishermen (Hojrup 1983). This is a serious objection, as a comment on Hojrups' reasoning could have opened up a more mature theoretical discussion, which is generally lacking in the book. Well aware of HOLM, Poul Kystfolk. Korztakter og santtnetzhaenge over Kattegat og Skagerak ca. 1550- several differences regarding politics, economies and structure and organization of the 1914. Esbjerg: Fiskeri- og Sldfartsmuseet - Saltvandsakvariet, 1991. 348 pp., ill., English fisheries, the book would have benefited from a general discussion of maritime conditions of summary, ISBN 87-87453-525. the North Atlantic. Despite the flaws which I have pointed out, Poul Holm's book provides a solid description Since the 1950s and 1960s Scandinavian maritime cultural research has been enriched with of the cultural and economic complexity of the Skagerak-Kattegat region over a period of various publications, representing different theoretical views and perspectives. Thus this book four hundred years. It is rich with examples and vivid descriptions and one gets a convincing is built upon a solid foundation of decades of scholarly knowledge. The book is a result of a picture of coastal people struggling to cope with hazardous environments to make their living collaboration between several universities, museums and archives in Norway, Denmark and by fishing and seafaring. As I see it the strength of this book is its summarizing discussion of Sweden involved in the Skagerak-Kattegat project which has yielded a number of publica- Scandinavian maritime cultural and historical research. As such I warmly recommend the tions. book. The waters of Kattegat and Skagerak, besides being a Nordic lake, connect the Baltic sea Finnur Magtzusson with the North Sea, providing excellent opportunities for close contact between the coastal University of Lund Sweden settlements. The aim of Holm's book is to take a closer look at how, during the period 1550-1914, people along the shores of Denmark, Southern Norway, South- and West Sweden References Cited have used the resources of the sea and how they created a way of life adapted to the maritime Hasslof, Olof conditions. During this long period the region experienced several economic as well as 1949 Sverrska [email protected] i en yrkesgricpps trdringsliv oc11sociala krrltur. Goteborg. political changes. Politics and economies were often intertwined, as the geography of the Hojrup, Thomas region rendered it anextremely strategic passage to the Baltic Seai Holm's aim is to investigate 1983 Det glemte folk. Livsfonr~erog ceritradirigering. Copenhagen. the livelihood of the inhabitants without regard to changing national boundaries. The main aspect of Holm's view is that he rejects the idea of the Skagerak-Kattegat region Kildegkd-Hansen, Bjame (Ed.) 1979 Det forsornte tik. Etnologi og folkloristik siden '68. Nord-Nyrr. Nordisk tidskrifr for folkelivs- as a historically cultural whole, split apart by the consequences of capitalism and modern- forskr~iry4. ization. lnstead he shows us the vast cultural differences of the region in a historical perspective. In this respect the book is a success. Holm convinces the reader of the complexity Liifgren, Orvar Fdtlgser~dtti irtdtrsrrisarr~lriillet.Eri Irallii,tdsk kustbygds ort~var~dlbig1800-1970. Lund. of the region, and how differently various coastal habitats have adapted to political, economic, 1977 ecological and technological changes during the period. But to reach this conclusion which in itself can hardly be regarded as revolutionary or innovative, Poul Holm presents such detailed empirical descriptions that he seems to lose sight of the overall objective. The elaborate descriptions leave only limited room for a general theoretical analysis. This is GINKEL, Rob van Tussen Scylla en Charybdis. Eetl Etnohistorie van Texels Vissersvolk but with the fact that fishermen were threatened in their livelihood .... They had to try to survive (1813-1932). Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1993.348 pp., ills., bibliogr., ISBN 90-73-052-696. from week to week, and initially chose to intensify their efforts' (p. 77). Second, the behaviour of Texel oyster fishermen can only be understood in the context of specific infrastructural, technological and socio-economic developments in that same period: the invention and It has often been noted: fishermen sail a narrow course, their fortunes depending on the dissemination of steam engines, the opening of new markets and the increase in consumer vagaries of nature as well as on the whim of market forces. Van Ginkel titled his book Between purchasing power, and the introduction of more efficient harvesting methods. Hardin's theory, Scylla and Clzarybdis, applying the classical imagery of sea monsters and whirlpools to the Van Ginkel warns, must be contextualized and does not have a universal value. parameters affecting the lives of the fishermen of Texel, a small island along the north coast Developments in the eelgrass industry provide an interesting contrast. From its inception of the Netherlands. Van Ginkel studied two contrasting fishing communities on this island, around 1845, this Texel industry was highly regulated. Van Ginkel distinguishes four types focusing on the period 1813 to 1932. Combining anthropological fieldwork with archival of tenure: open access, private property, communal property, and state-owned grounds. The research, his book provides a special understanding of long-term developments in the regulation of the industry was not caused by the danger of overexploitation, however, but by relationship between fishermen and their natural environment. a desire to gain control over market prices. Overexploitation was not likely to occur in this 1813 was the year in which Napoleonic rule over the Netherlands terminated, bringing a sector due to the specific characteristics of the product; the eventual decline of the industry period of isolation to an end. Interestingly, Texel had been heavily involved in international was caused by reduced demand in the mattress industry and not by a deterioration of the affairs in the eighteenth century: the oyster fishermen of the village of Oosterend sold their resource base. produce on the markets of Hamburg and Amsterdam, and the population of Oudeschild State intervention and privatization are regularly brought forward as solutions for provided piloting services to the fleet of the Dutch East India Company which anchored off tragedies of the commons, and Van Ginkel's historical material on Texel gives us a glimpse the coast of Texel. Both activities suffered during the French occupation; whereas oyster of their value. His analysis of the eelgrass industry illustrates, for example, that state fisheries recovered upon their departure, the men of Oudeschild were forced to try their luck intervention can be motivated more by the desire to generate revenues than to protect the in coastal fishing. resource. And while his material in my opinion does not allow for conclusions as to the In the course of the next 120 years, Texel fishermen demonstrated a remarkable capacity significance of privatization for resource conservation, it does demonstrate the price tag which to adapt to changing circumstances. When oyster fisheries finally collapsed around 1850, may be attached: pauperization of a large segment of the population and a sharp distinction eelgrass harvesting (for the mattress industry) and shell quarrying (for the construction between the haves and have-nots. industry) grew and brought with them specific sets of production relations. And when Unfortunately, at least for those who are eager to draw lessons from history, Van Ginkel opportunities in these sectors worsened, the Oudeschild fishermen went into prawn fishing does not venture policy conclusions with regard to the effectiveness of forms of sea tenure. and processing, whereas Oosterend fishermen invested in deep-sea fishing. The boom which The off-hand remark (p. 115) that 'the combination of access regimes is more effective than took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century caused boat builders (instead of one single regime' tickles the reader's curiosity, however, and begs further elaboration. merchants) to extend ample credit to enterprising fishermen, leading to growth of the fishing Van Ginkel's book contains a wealth of original material on the character of and changes fleet. By the turn of the century, however, fisheries slipped into a decline which lasted basically in Texel fisheries between 1813 and 1932 and on the people who effected and were affected until 1932, the year in which the dam sealing off the Zuiderzee and changing the marine by them. Although it deals with an earlier period, the issues at stake still strike the reader as ecology of the entire region was completed. contemporary. The book would gain in clarity if time periods were indicated more consistently The first chapters of Between Scylla and Cl~a~ybdisprovide an overview of developments and a chapter containing an overview of developments in the period was added. As it is, one in the fields of demography, politics, infrastructure and fishing technology during the research is sometimes left wondering how the pieces fit into the puzzle. However, the book's main period and the period preceding it. Van Ginkel emphasizes that the evolution of Texel fisheries limitation is that it is written in Dutch. One wishes anEnglish language version were available. was closely linked to broader developments such as the increasing strength of the Dutch Maartert Bavinck national state. Three topics figure prominently in subsequent chapters: the strategies fishermen University of Amsterdam employ in the face of changes in market or ecology;I fishermen's organizations and the conditions under which they arise; and the validity of Hardin's theory of the 'tragedy of the commons'. For reasons of brevity only the last issue will be considered here. DURRENBERGER, E. Paul It's All Politics: Soutlz Alabama's Seafood Industry. Chicago: Van Ginkel provides two detailed examples of sea tenure on Texel: in oyster fisheries and University of Illinois Press, 1992. xvi + 216 pp., tables, figures, references cited. ISBN in the harvesting of eelgrass. Both activities were of considerable economic importance and 0-252-01910-5. witnessed a long boom period, followed by decline. On the face of it, developments in Texel oyster fisheries confirm the tragedy of the commons theory: the commonly owned oyster beds Paul Durrenberger's new book is not only an important contribution to understanding the became overexploited, leading to a steady drop in catches and ultimately -when the market historical and political processes that shape the course of fisheries, it is also a readable and also collapsed - to the demise of the whole industry. But Van Ginkel makes two important detailed history of Alabama's Gulf-coast fisheries, from ante-bellum times through the qualifications. First, overexploitation 'had nothing to do with an innate predatory mentality present. Here is a history of a major fishery which is so rich in its details that it prompts us to reflect upon the limitations of synchronic studies when it comes to understanding fisheries His two concluding chapters also explore other commonplace problems which are dynamics. Durrenberger shows how Alabama's coastal fisheries and the communities articu- besetting so many fisheries these days; and show how policies for fisheries are increasingly lated with them are not phenomena which are situated in certain spaces over long periods of being influenced by events occurring in other contexts which seem remote from the fisheries. time, or which have grown and changed in a more or less predictable fashion while retaining Commenting on this, he says that 'Often the fishing industry is not the central concern of the important continuities. Rather, he shows them to be richly variegated phenomena which can policy, as with imports, environmental quality, and endangered species.' change kaleidoscopically, and which sometimes change so radically that altogether new In the book's last chapter Durrenberger argues that anthropologists can make a great systems of organization and activities emerge. contribution to understanding the political dynamics influencing fisheries policies, since Durrenberger describes three major eras of development in Alabama's seafood industry: 'matters of allocation and distribution effects, political issues, are often what anthropologists first, fishing for local and regional commerce, from roughly 1819 through 1915, a period when are most competent to talk about.' Such concerns, he says, are 'part of our subject matter, part seafood was preserved with ice and during which rail transportation networks and ice of the data we try to understand, while it is not part of the subject matter of biologists.'Fisheries production expanded, increasing the market for seafood - with dynamic consequences for administrators, he notes, most of whom had their formal training in the biological sciences, local producers; second, industrial canning, from roughly 1915 through 1950; which event- have continued to focus on biological or conservationist issues because they cannot give much ually fostered conditions favorable for the third major era, industrial shrimping and freezing, recognition to an obvious fact: that each regulation, regardless of its biological or conser- beginning around 1950 and continuing through the present. 'In each of the three periods' he vationist impact, will benefit some people while bringing about a loss for others. writes, 'we see the interaction of different elements... Each period is a different system with As a political-economic history of a major fishery, and for its concluding discussion interdependent parts. As one changes, the others change until the whole system changes and exploring the complex dynamics underlying fisheries-management policies, this book is a a new period starts.' tour de force. On the other hand, some readers may find the considerable historical detail in One might be tempted to therefore appraise the book as a neat blending of history, the book's main body tedious to get through. Overall, congratulations are in order for both economics, and political and policy science, but otherwise not regard it as particularly author and press. anthropological, since the author's emphasis throughout is the political-economic history of James R. McGoodwirz Alabama's coastal fisheries and seafoods industries. To the contrary, the book is anthropo- University of Colorado-Boulder logical because of its unwavering focus on the human actors involved with these fisheries, their feelings, desires, and motivations. Commenting on his not having taken the usual References Cited ethnographic approach, which might have instead focused on a single community and tracked McEvoy, Arthur F. it through time, the author says this 'widens our view but sacrifices the intimacy and detail 1986 Tlie Fisheniron b Problem: Ecology arid Law in tlie California Fislieries, 1850-1980. Cambridge: of participant observation.' Cambridge University Press. Thus he has given us an intimacy with actual history - its multiplicity of differentially motivated and empowered actors, its surprise tums, its sometimes paradoxical outcomes. Perhaps not since the publication of McEvoy's (1986) detailed history of California's fisheries POLLNAC, R.B., C. BAILEY and A. POERNOMO (Eds.) Contributions to Fishery Devel- have we seen so thorough a history of a major fishing region. Indeed, I feel this book ranks oprnerzt Policy in Indonesia. Jakarta: The Central Research Institute for Fisheries (CRIFI), with McEvoy's superb work as a similarly outstanding study of a major fishing region and its 1992. 169 pages, ISBN 979-8186-19-2. problems, but which is even more humanistic and anthropological. Durrenberger's main sources were newspapers, espkcially the Mobile Register. Second- In his ethnography Malay Fishertnerz Raymond Firth offers a detailed cross-section of the arily, he relied on other published accounts, fishery statistics, and so forth. He also obviously economy of one part of the South-East Asian region, without at all mentioning the subject of conducted extensive field work in coastal Alabama. biological carrying capacity. The fact that prominent contemporary maritime anthropologists In the books final two chapters the author discdsses the inappropriately great influence deem the status of the resource now to be 'the most basic issue to be considered in the which scientific discourse now exerts on fisheries policies. 'Since science has become the formulation of fisheries policy' (p. 1) is indicative of changed times. The contributions to this foundation of (modem) policy,' he writes, 'science itself has become political.' Fishers, he volume on fisheries policy in Indonesia invariably highlight the biological underpinnings of notes, have not often availed themselves of science for fighting back against those who are the economic system. using it against their best interests. Here he is perhaps overly cynical when he concludes that It is a heterogeneous volume, both in terms of quality and subject matter. Published by 'scientific expertise can be aligned with either side of a contest; a plausible scientific rhetoric the Central Research Institute for Fisheries in Jakarta, the book contains eight papers on topics can be constructed for any position,' and similarly where he states that 'When "science" such as tuna resources potential in Indonesian waters, the role of women, the success of becomes a form of rhetoric in the service of policy, it no longer has the status of a way of fishermen's cooperatives, and the development of fisheries in various parts of the country. knowing things. It becomes, rather, a political weapon in the hands of those powerful enough The most interesting contributions describe what has happened in several sectors (riverine, to afford it.' reservoir and coastal fisheries and aquaculture) since the Indonesian government (uniquely) announced a trawler ban in 1983.1 Conner Bailey, in his paper on coastal aquaculture development, observes a clear link the Moluccan Islands is partly due to government encroachment on an effective traditional between the trawling ban and the large increase in acreage and productivity of brackish water management system. ponds in Java. He describes a dualist economy in which large investors occupy a more and The papers collected in this volume, uneven as they are, form a step in the documentation more prominent role to the exclusion of small traditional producers. However, the intensifi- of the variation of fisheries development in South-East Asia. Not pretending to provide a cation of aquaculture has an interesting side effect: employment and pay levels increase complete overview of the subject, they demonstrate the fruitfulness - and sometimes the significantly in comparison with traditional units. Intensification also bears a substantial risk ungainliness as well - of interdisciplinary cooperation, such as takes places in the Central of total collapse, and the author pleads for a shift from intensive to semi-intensive systems Research Institute for Fisheries (CRIFI) in Jakarta. with a lower incidence of disease and pollution. Interestingly, he considers associations of Maarten Bavinck shrimp producers, exporters and feed mill owners to be able to play an important role in I University of Amsterdam this change-over, as they collectively benefit from a sustainable form of shrimp produc- tion. Note Charles Zerner discusses the development of small-scale freshwater cage culture fishery 1. The paper by Bailey and Zemer was published earlier in MAST 5(1) 1992 under the title in newly constructed reservoirs in Java. Meant generally for local persons who were displaced 'Community-based Fisheries Management Institutions in Indonesia,' and will receive only cursory by the inundation of their land, it appears that outside investors have gained a strong grip on attention here. this fishery, employing local people only as labourers. Jurisdictional overlaps and general environmental oversight has resulted in serious overcrowding of cages and incidence of fish kills. DIEGUES, Antonio C.S. (Ed.) kdition and Social Change it1 the Coastal Corntnunities of The development and management of riverine fisheries resources in Kalimantan and Brazil: A Reader ofMaritirne Antlzropology. SBo Paulo: University of SBo Paulo, 1992.207 pp. Sumatra is reviewed by Richard Pollnac and Stephen Malvestuto. It appears that traditional management systems are prevalent and effective in fisheries along the Kapuas River in Diegues leads off with a paper describing the main problems Brazilian researchers have to Kalimantan, but wholly absent along the Musi River in Sumatra, where the government rents face to understand changes artisanal fishermen and their communities in Brazil are going out access to the highest bidder. The authors do not explain the absence of a traditional through. He points to the disorganization caused by polluting industries, degradation of the management system in the latter location, but it may be speculated - following the argument environment, real estate development, forest exploitation, and the expansion of tourism and of Bailey and Zerner with regard to the Moluccan Islands - that the lack of recognition of suggests that development programs benefit large entrepreneurial interests rather than small- traditional management regimes by the government has contributed to their breakdown. scale fishermen because low productivity is not necessarily a problem, the programs fishermen This brings us to a central theme in this book: the plea for development which is not only did not control, and the social and cultural contexts and power systems in the fishing ecologically sustainable but also beneficial to the poorer members of traditional fishing communities have not been taken into account. Social science should help the small-scale communities. Decentralization of government decision-making and increased community producers. management are argued to be essential elements in such an approach. The pressures against Beck discusses how people of Santa-Catarine Isle have been forced into artisanal fishing such a development are strong, however. by deprivation of other alternatives; how the sea fishery supports the beach fishery by the The incursion of private investors following the lure(of profit from the (international) wages it pays fishermen who invest in the shore fishery. She indicates that the diversities of market is one issue. An interesting question in this regard is whether the trawling ban in artisanal fishing make generalization impossible and demand detailed study to understand Indonesia has caused the redirection of capital to other areas and other kinds of fishing, hereby how they are responding to the expansion of industry, real estate development, and tourism. shifting the very problem it was meant to solve. This does seem to have occurred in aquaculture %nia Elias Magno da Silva discusses small-scale producers who, though they produce for in Java as described by Bailey; the other authors do not \comment on the cause of large outsider markets, fail to accumulate capital as their income is used for the maintenance of the domestic investments in the sectors under consideration. 1 group and replacement of their fishing gear. Small-scale producers are subordinated to Another constraint is that the Indonesian governdent, despite the fact that its 'ability to , capitalist production indirectly through monopoly of markets and destruction of stocks, and effectively manage the nation's far-flung and extraordinarily diverse fisheries resources is the history of small-scale producers is conditioned by the development of capitalist produc- extremely limited' (p. 51), is reluctant to recognize and convey authority to local level tion. Small-scale production becomes disorganized and subordinate to capitalist production institutions which might be more efficacious. As the fear for decentralization in Indonesia is but does not disappear. Gllucia Oliveira da Silva presents a fascinating discussion of the not limited to fisheries alone (a fact which is not touched upon in this volume), a change of conceptions of lagoon vs, sea and the analogic logic that links lagoon, women, menstrual approach does not appear to be realistic in the short-run. blood, confinement, immobility, death, impurity versus the sea, men, unconfined, live, mobile, Being policy-oriented, the book does not question government intent. At several points dynamic, and pure such that women can work in the lagoon but not at sea. Furtado discusses however, authors note that government action has actively contributed to the degeneration of relations between household fishing and capitalist fishing and Mello points out that conflicts fisheries potential and the effectiveness of local management institutions. Bailey and Zerner are not simply between artisanal fishermen and industrial fishing but among artisanal provide the clearest example, demonstrating that the rapid depletion of trochus resources in fishermen as state sponsored loans to a chosen few led to the development of markets and fishing technological divisions within the artisanal sector. Hartmann discusses conflicts in Given the degree of activity that this book indicates, hopefully, the international academic inland waters between fishermen who want to direct production to larger markets and those community can look forward to more work on Brazilian fisheries in the future. Two areas who participate in more integrated locally centered subsistence centered systems and between could be examined with profit. The first is the nature of household production, since it is a fishermen and other claimants to water and shore resources such as real estate development, recurrent theme in this work, but remains untheorized as a system (cf. Durrenberger 1984). agriculture, cattle raising, mining, industry, and hydroelectric power. He calls for locally The second is to examine the Brazilian state itself and its role in fisheries management. What appropriate measures considered legitimate within fishing communities and intensive partici- are its policies? How are they formulated? Whom do they benefit? Who controls the process. pation of communities and informal regulation. Martins sketches the share system, tech- There are many suggestions in this book, but they do not coalesce into analysis of the nology, and income of artisanal fishermen on the north coast of Maranhso. He says that the phenomenon that would embrace the political process and its clients from industrialists to government departments responsible for technical assistance to artisanal fishermen do very conservationists and detail the place of fishermen in the process. little so any technological advances are a result of the fishermen's own experience; most E. Paul Durrenberger people he talked to did not know of cooperative associations or government projects, and there University of Iowa is virtually total lack of municipal services such as water, electricity, sewers, transportation, medical assistance, and schools. Luiz Geraldo Silva outlines the history of fishermen's groups Reference Cited in northern and northeastern Brazil from 1966 to 1988. BranPo discusses a project to prepare Durrenberger, E. Paul an ethnolinguistic atlas of fishermen in the state of Rio de Janeiro and Edila Vianna Silva 1984 Cl~ayanov,Peasants, arrd Ecottottric Atttitropology. Sen Francisco. Academic Press. describes an interdisciplinary project to study language and ethnography of fishing com- munities in the same state while Begossi discusses biological classification, especially of fish, in the Isle of Blizios. She shows that fishermen know their areas and the species they fish and TVEDTEN, I. and B. HERSOUG (Eds.) Fishitzg for Developnzertt: Stnall-Scale Fisheries itz concludes that projects should center on fisherman participation. Siqueira describes the life Africa. Uppsala. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992. 227 pp. and problems of shore dwellers and fishermen on the north coast of S2o Paulo since its integration into the rest of Brazil via roads and television while Rodrigues, Oriando, and This is a collection of ten papers invited for a conference on fisheries development in Africa Ruano da Silva discuss fishing in the estuarine area of Lago Dos Patos to show that which was arranged by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies and the Norwegian contradictions accumulated in the artisanal fishery until they began to threaten its continued College" of Fisheries Science. This is an important work. Its importance transcends Scandi- existence. GlAucia de Oliveira Silva discusses the totemic classification if living beings among navia, Africa, and fisheries as it addresses much larger problems, problems to which all social fishermen of Piratininga in Rio De Janeiro. Diegues argues that coastal ecosystems in Brazil scientists should attend. have not been common property or open access resources but were owned and controlled by In the introduction the editors point out that fishing is most important in the western and the people who used them and only became common property when capitalist fishing southern parts of Africa and least important in the east and north, Some of the constraints to expanded to include these areas, a process that was made possible by making the inhabitants development in marine and inland fishing include lack of technology and expertise, short- of such areas legally and rhetorically invisible by laws and practices that favored industrial comings with marketing and distribution, pricing and credit, storage and processing, difficult- and entrepreneurial fishing so fishing managers could simply ignore those who preceded these ies with joint approaches, unevenly distributed and exploited resources, all of which developments. These populations have only become visible by repeated resistance. Conser- complicate identification of areas for coordinated policies regarding possible over-exploi- vationists share the industrialists view and contribute to the invisibility of fishermen and tation. Reasons for considering artisanal fisheries include that development policies of the 'ill-conceived conservation, like uncontrolled "development," can be a pathway to increasing 1950s and 1960s aimed at industrial fishing have failed to such an extent to initiate new marginality of local coastal populations' (p. 187) as conservationists move to create national policies and that production costs of artisanal fisheries are low and they have disproportional parks and ecological reserves in coastal reserves4 mangrove swamps, coral reefs, and island effects on employment. Artisanal fisheries, however, are characteristically dependent on areas. He goes on to describe some local systems of sed tenure and conservation practiced by external markets for their gear and to sell their fish, and industrial fishing influences them in local fishermen. terms of its impact on the resource, the market, and competition for fishing areas. Artisanal All in all, this book presents a vivid picture of the varied conditions, concepts, and practices fisheries are, however, variable and insecure in terms of both catches and income. The editors of fishing in all of their complexity in modem Brazil and the problems facing artisanal fishing present a picture of a classical tragedy of the commons in which all participants increase effort from the development of contradictions within the artisanal fishery itself as goals and objectives to increase production resulting in resource depletion and the difficulties of cooperative shift from household provisioning to market production, the problems with environmental management. Relations between fishermen and intermediaries is complex and interlocking. degradation due to industry and tourism, and the problems of invisibility of powerless people Artisanal fishing is usually combined with other sources of subsistence and income. This in the face of those with privileged access to the machinery of law, government, and enforce- sector of the African fisheries has survived and developed more in spite of government efforts ment. Diegues is to be congratulated and thanked for bringing this body of work to the attention than because of them, and without external development aid, the industrial sector would of the English-reading public and for pointing out the importance of these issues to discussions probably never have developed. Artisanal fisheries do not receive a share of development aid of development programs and fisheries management everywhere on the planet. proportional to their importance, for one reason, because, requiring only small sums of money but extensive administrative work, they fit only badly the mold aid organizations prefer. Thus should be the cost-benefits, money flows, and strategic choices of fishermen and others in the there is conflict between industrial and artisanal sectors for resources, credit, markets, and system. institutional support. The book addresses itself to these issues and to questions of relationships Lindqvist and MB& return to the general theme that all things are not equal in their essay between industrial and artisanal fishing, directions for development, and research priorities. on whether management of small-scale fisheries is possible. They outline some common 'We still know more about the different species of fish in African waters than we know about features of African artisanal fisheries and point to the variability to suggest that adaptive African artisanal fishermen, both in terms of quantity, migrations, and internal dynamics' management would be most suitable to operate in terms of real social, economic, and cultural (p. 25). They argue that Scandinavian researchers should have the freedom to work where systems rather than relying on fisheries and economic models that get caught up in the fisheries are (rather than where their governments put development projects) to find out the contradictions of everyday reality in practice. characteristics of households and economic systems in which artisanal fisheries are important, Degnbol concludes the book with a paper that continues the same theme: development the relations of fishing with other means of subsistence and income production, to understand and aid agents are committed to a model of fisheries management based on northern European relations among fishermen and middlemen, relations between modem and traditional com- experience and projected onto a tropical artisanal fishery where it is often inapplicable because ponents, whether popular participation is possible in development projects, the relevance of ecological, economic, institutional, and cultural variables are quite different so that, for resource management models imported from other areas, and the nature of joint venture instance, the assumptions of 'tragedy of the commons' are not universally appropriate. Even arrangements between African and Scandinavian countries. They underline the most import- complexifications of basic fisheries models rely on external interference to maximize some- ant finding of the collected research as that artisanal fisheries are not remnants, doomed to thing outside agents want to maximize. Not only the approach but also the objectives are alien extinction as modem fisheries expand. Rather, more than 90% of fishermen are artisanal and to the local community. The means are government agencies, restrictions, control, and provide about 65% of the domestic catch. prosecution rather than support and cooperation. He argues that in some cases the most Hersoug shows the inherent contradictions between realities of fishing and development important assistance to the artisanal sector would be discontinuing harmful interference. The projects. The ideas about how fisheries projects should be organized are impossible to practice first step to appropriate management is for managers and developers to convince themselves in aid agencies because they opt for control and safety. Administrative procedures of agencies that artisanal fishermen understand their condition, the dynamics of the resources they depend act against the practice of participation and favor top-down 'blueprint' approaches; goals are on, and that they are innovative and adaptive socially, technologically, and in terms of not decided but evolve in practice so expensive planning is largely irrelevant; different groups management. have their own political agendas and administration is not politically neutral. Local institution All of these papers, one way or another hint at a problem that none addresses directly. If building is sacrificed in favor of some concept of efficiency of operation. In terms of fishing, a social process, such as development programs from Scandinavia aimed at artisanal or as a process, fishermen do not follow neoclassical theory because they have neither perfect industrial fisheries in Africa continues, then it must be doing something for someone. This is information nor freedom of choice, so they do not always abandon the fishery when they especially obvious if the programs have goals they repeatedly fail to achieve. This suggests 'should.' The administrative process allocates differential power to different groups, thus the announced goals are not the real goals of the programs. What is needed is an analysis that constraining future choices. Project goals may be mutually exclusive or contradictory. Add to is bold enough to back up and ask for whom these programs are working? Who benefits from this that there is great uncertainty about theoretical optima in fishing so that efforts to increase them? Clearly the entrenched development program and international aid community bu- catch capacity may result in resource depletion and reduced income. This is a lucid discussion reaucrats benefit. They make their livings from promoting such programs. Fisheries managers of the problems of development, a problem that warrants further attention since most benefit. They make their livings from such ill-informed programs not only in Africa, Asia, economic and fishery management theories take place in fictitious vacuums which disappear Northern Europe, but also in the United States and Canada which face the same problems of in practice sometimes to the puzzlement of the theoreticians. The implicit message is for the inappropriate and failed management at national, international, and local levels. If the development of more participatory practice oriented local projects rather than highly admin- programs work for these people, then they work. What is at stake is not a fishery here or there istered theory driven centralized ones. i\ in Africa, but jobs for fisheries biologists, economists, and international aid bureaucrats. A These points are underscored by SkjBnsberg's paper which shows that the only vacuum new generation of analyses needs to address the questions in this broader perspective. It is in fisheries projects in northern Zambia was the vacuum of relevant analysis and information. not, as SkjBnsberg (p. 160) suggests that social scientists have neglected their duty to present From a total of 55 titles she found relevant to the area, only one had any sociological data or findings that are accessible to development planners and administrators. Such findings, on analysis, and that was scanty. 'The main emphasis among fisheries planners on biology and the evidence of this book, these workers, and their bibliographies, is widely available to all technology (fish resources and gears) may account for the many failed fisheries development who care to read them. The problem is not that social scientists do not speak the 'language' interventions of the Northern Province,' she says laconically. This is certainly true of the of bureaucracy. We all know that language all too well. The problem is that there are powerful United States as a whole, and this essay makes it clear that this lack is more widespread. She national and international systems of management and programs with their own dynamics, argues the point, obvious to any anthropologist, that the first stage in any project should be politics, constituencies, economics, cultures and networks of backwards and forwards link- to understand the complexities of the existing fishing system, how the parts relate to each ages (e.g. universities to train the managers who provide students for the university programs, other, and how they define conditions for choice for the people in them. In other words, to etc.) not unlike those described for artisanal fisheries in this book. The problem is that those find out the realities instead of assuming that all things are equal. Basic to such analyses systems make rational analyses, such as these, largely irrelevant, as many of these studies intimate in one way or another. If there is an answer, it may well lie in analysis at a higher shrimpers withhold data from biologists. It might be interesting to entertain the idea that the level of socio-cultural integration, the level of the national and international agencies rather biologists' objective is not,only optimistic, but that it might be impossible, as several recent than the village. We know the outlines of the answers at the village level; if we do not know works in this journal have argued (Wilson and Kleban 1992; Smith 1991; Finlayson 1991) or the answers, we know how to find them as this body of work shows, in detailed local analysis. misformulated (McGuire 1991). It would seem that this case is a good example of chaos theory We are less knowledgeable about the systems that contain us as producers and constrain us in action as well as the particular sociology and politics of chaos that Smith and Wilson discuss. and make our work less effective than we would like it to be. While van den Hoonaard discusses the centralizing tendencies of Iceland's fishery E. Paul Durrenberger management, he discusses the process of 'going south,' what Americans might call lobbying University of Iowa or special interest politics, to bring pressure to bear on both scientists and politicians to achieve a desirable outcome. This would appear to be a very open political system when local delegations of shrimpers can have such an immediate political result as he documents. This HOONAARD, W.C. van den Reluctarlt Pioneers: Constraints and Opportunities in an has not been possible for shrimpers in the United States. Icelandic Fishing Corntnunity. New York: Peter Lang, 1992. xi + 173 pp., notes, graphs, While these interesting issues remain taken for granted, no single monograph can address bibliography, tables, ISBN 0-8204-1801-3. all questions, and van den Hoonaard presents a complex historical and ethnographic case that will benefit all who are interested in fisheries policy, local politics, occupational groups, Van den Hoonaard centers his analysis of shrimping in a village in Iceland's West Fjords on shrimpers, or Iceland. the sociology of occupational groups established in other settings. The problems he addresses E. Paul Durrenberger are both the internal and external dynamics of the occupational culture of these shrimpers. He University of Iowa situates the shrimpers in terms of the complexities of the Icelandic fishing industry with its trawlers, longliners, and jiggers, and shows how shrimping is a part of some fishing careers. References Cited He discusses how these shrimpers, like other occupational groups, distinguish between Finlayson, Chris themselves and others, develop and maintain an occupational image, develop ideologies in 1991 Notes on Chaos in Fisheries Management by Estellie Smith. MAST4(1):91-97. support of their interests, and claim that their occupation promotes the general public interest. McGuire, Thomas R. In addition to placing the shrimpers among other fishermen, he situates them in terms of 1991 Science and the Destruction of a Shrimp Fleet. MAST 4(1):32-55. marine scientists from Iceland's capital, who define the terms of fishing policy, and the politics Smith, M. Estellie of the bureaucrats and politicians who set details of fishing policy, as well as the claims of 1991 Chaos in Fisheries Management. MAST 3(2): 1-13. processors and other fishermen. He illustrates the gap between the practical knowledge of shrimpers and the abstract understandings of scientists and how these conflict, as well as how Wilson, James A. and Peter Kleban shrimpers, scientists, and politicians have negotiated policies to conserve shrimp via a quota 1992 Practical Implications of Chaos in Fisheries: Ecologically Adapted Management. MAST 5(1):67-75. system, if not always according to every participant's ideals. The shrimpers were successful in making claims for their expertise, and in political maneuvering to get a quota system based on individual boats that allows each to catch the amount most 'natural' to it and allows the best skippers to float to the top of a hierarchy that shrimpers claim is based on skill. This fortifies the occupational image of shrimpers, presen- tation of which is essential to the way they deal with outsiders whether they be fellow community members, other fishermen, processors, biologists, or politicians. While van den Hoonaard does an admirable job of situating the shrimpers in the overall Icelandic context, some interesting issues femain unexplored. One is the shrimpers' contention that their hierarchy of success is based on knowlkdge and skill. From his other tables it would appear that van den Hoonaard has sufficient data to test this notion by checking the relation- ships between experience and non-experience related variables with success. One wonders how important it could be when, for instance one learns that 'one of today's most highly reputed crews learned to fish for shrimp in one day' (p. 118). He presents the view from the top of this hierarchy more systematically than that from the bottom. The objective of a scientific determination of maximum sustainable yield, van den Hoonaard tells us, is optimistic, and the biological information becomes critical. Poor data weakens the position of biologists as their predictions are often incorrect. Meanwhile, Books Received

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