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What Is the Difference Between Weak Negative and Non-Negative Ethical What Is the Difference Between Weak Negative and Non-Negative Ethical Views? Simon Knutsson Foundational Research Institute [email protected] June 2016 Abstract Weak negative views in ethics are concerned with both reducing suffering and pro- moting happiness, but are commonly said to give more weight to suffering than to happiness. Such views include weak negative utilitarianism (also called negative- leaning utilitarianism), and other views. In contrast, non-negative views, including traditional utilitarianism, are typically said to give equal weight to happiness and suffering. However, it is not obvious how weak negative and non-negative views differ, and what it means to give happiness and suffering equal weight, or to give suffering more weight. Contents 1 Introduction2 2 Terminology3 3 The views under consideration3 4 Weak negative utilitarianism and consequentialism3 5 The Weak Negative Doctrine4 6 Weak negative axiology4 7 The difference between weak negative and non-negative views assuming hap- piness and suffering are objectively highly measurable5 8 If statements about magnitudes of happiness versus suffering involve value judgements 7 9 Weak negative and non-negative views are equally affected 10 10 When is it accurate to describe non-negative and weak negative views as symmetric vs. asymmetric? 10 Foundational Research Institute Acknowledgments 12 References 12 Appendix: Value for an individual versus value for the world—where does the negativity set in? 12 List of Figures 1 Common illustrations of non-negative and negative views, showing the value and disvalue of an individual’s happiness and suffering at a point in time. The illus- trations assume that happiness and suffering are factual attributes measurable on the same ratio scale..................................6 2 If happiness and suffering are measurable on separate ratio scales........8 3 Illustration of views from figures 1a, 1b and 1c, but assuming that statements about magnitudes of happiness versus suffering are colored by value judgements.9 1 Introduction which it could fail to hold is if a person’s as- sessments of magnitudes of happiness and suf- If happiness and suffering were factual at- fering are colored by her values. One could tributes measurable on one ratio scale, one then not necessarily distinguish the views in way to distinguish the views would be straight- terms of asymmetric versus symmetric and forward: weak negative views could give in terms of the weight they give to suffering. greater moral or evaluative weight to one fac- The reason is that there would no longer be a tual unit of suffering than one factual unit of clear division between factual units of happi- happiness, while non-negative views could give ness and suffering and the value (weight) that them equal weight. It would then be accurate one assigns to them. One could then under- to call such weak negative views ‘asymmet- stand some disagreements among people iden- ric’ and such non-negative views ‘symmetric.’ tifying as weakly negative versus non-negative However, such measurability is highly contro- in, for example, the following way: the person versial, and if it fails to hold, there is ques- with the “weak negative” view can say, “When tion of how one should understand the differ- we both observe the same suffering, I judge it ence between weak negative and non-negative more severe than you do. Similarly, when we views. It has been suggested that this would consider which individual is as happy as an- be a problem for weak negative views in par- other is miserable, I would point to a happier ticular, but if it is a problem, it is as much of individual than you would.” a problem for non-negative views. One should generally not describe the differ- There are several reasons why such measur- ence between, for instance, a person who iden- ability could fail to hold, and how one should tifies as a weak negative or negative-leaning understand the difference between the views utilitarian, and a person who identifies as a depends on the details. One plausible way in traditional utilitarian, by saying that one gives 2 What Is the Difference Between Weak Negative and Non-Negative Ethical Views? more weight to suffering than happiness, while Griffin (1979) calls the Weak Negative Doc- the other gives them equal weight. That de- trine, and (3) weak negative axiological views. scription can be accurate but need not be. These views are called weak as opposed to strong because they give weight to both happi- 2 Terminology ness and suffering. Strong negative views are typically conceived of as giving weight to only By ‘happiness,’ I mean roughly to feel good, suffering. and by ‘suffering,’ I mean roughly to feel bad. When describing the weak negative views So when I say ‘happiness’ and ‘suffering,’ one in this section, I talk, as is commonly done, could roughly replace those words with ‘plea- about giving ‘more weight’ to suffering than sure’ and ‘displeasure.’ Happiness and suffer- to happiness, that promoting happiness is a ing are some of the things that have been ‘slighter obligation’ than eliminating suffering, conceived of as finally good and bad for an and that suffering ‘matters more’ value-wise. individual (i.e. good and bad for their own This is to explain which views I refer to, but sake, as ends rather than as means). In other such talk is tentative in that I argue that one words, these things, and many more, have should often not think of such views as giving been claimed to be the facts that constitute ‘more weight’ or the like to suffering than to an individual’s ‘well-being.’ How high or low happiness. someone’s level of well-being is refers to how good or bad life is for the individual who leads 4 Weak negative utilitarianism and it. Although I focus on happiness and suf- consequentialism fering, what I say in this essay generally ap- plies to whatever is taken to constitute well- By ‘weak negative utilitarianism,’ I mean ver- being, whether it is happiness and suffering, or sions of utilitarianism that have been said to other facts such as preference satisfaction and give more weight to suffering than to happi- preference frustration, achievement or friend- ness, while still giving weight to both. I take ship.1 it that versions of weak negative utilitarianism include a wide range of views that can span 3 The views under consideration the whole range from caring almost only about reducing suffering to caring almost as much I focus on three kinds of weak negative about happiness as about suffering.2 Weak views: (1) weak negative utilitarianism (some- negative utilitarianism is, roughly speaking, times called negative-leaning utilitarianism) also known as negative-leaning utilitarianism.3 and weak negative consequentialism, (2) what In contrast, traditional utilitarianism is com- 1More on this kind of terminology can be found here. 2I broadly follow the understanding of weak and strong negative utilitarianism in Arrhenius and Bykvist (1995). 3A difference is that my use of weak negative utilitarianism is more inclusive than Brian Tomasik’s use of the term negative-leaning utilitarianism. According to Tomasik(2013), negative-leaning utilitarianism says that “suffering deserves vastly greater weight than happiness” (my emphasis). Similarly, Ord (2013) describes negative utilitarianism as saying that “positive experiences such as pleasure or happiness are either given no weight, or at least a lot less weight” (my emphasis). I use the term ’weak negative utilitarianism’ somewhat differently from Ord and from how Tomasik uses ’negative-leaning utilitarianism’ in that I would say that weak negative utilitarianism need not assign vastly greater or a lot more weight to suffering than to happiness; simply assigning more weight to suffering is enough. However, this difference in use is not crucial for this essay. 4For example, see Arrhenius and Bykvist(1995). I avoid the phrase ’Classical Utilitarianism’ because it ap- pears too narrow. One can be a non-negative utilitarian, and be as concerned with reducing suffering as with 3 Foundational Research Institute monly said to give equal weight to happiness trine different from weak negative utilitari- and suffering.4 In addition to weak negative anism? One difference is that utilitarianism, utilitarianism, there are weak negative ver- including weak negative utilitarianism, says sions of consequentialism that are not utili- that the only thing that ultimately matters tarian. For example, I would say that one is morally is to bring about valuable outcomes a weak negative consequentialist, but not a (where value is understood only in terms of weak negative utilitarian, if the part of one’s individuals’ well-being). However, the Weak morality that concerns individuals’ well-being Negative Doctrine is compatible with the idea has the same form as weak negative utilitar- that other things also matter morally, such as ianism, while one also believes that there are equality, rights, intentions, virtue and deonto- other values besides well-being, such as beauty logical rules that prohibit certain actions. and ugliness, or justice and injustice. 6 Weak negative axiology 5 The Weak Negative Doctrine A weak negative axiological view would say Griffin (1979) sets utilitarianism aside and in- that both happiness and suffering affect the stead talks of the Positive Doctrine and the value of lives or worlds, but that suffering Negative Doctrine, in order to “preserve proper has more disvalue than happiness has value. distance from parochial issues of utilitarian- Weak negative utilitarianism, weak negative ism” and because the topic does not matter consequentialism and the Weak Negative Doc- “only to utilitarians,” but “to anyone who in trine are all normative views that make claims any way gives weight to people’s welfare.”5 about what is morally right and wrong, moral The Positive Doctrine says that “we have obligations and so on.
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