UTILITARIANISM and the IDEA of UNIVERSITY a Short Ethical Analysis1
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John Stuart Mill's Sanction Utilitarianism
JOHN STUART MILL’S SANCTION UTILITARIANISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION A Dissertation by DAVID EUGENE WRIGHT Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Linda Radzik Committee Members, Clare Palmer Scott Austin R.J.Q. Adams Head of Department, Gary Varner May 2014 Major Subject: Philosophy Copyright 2014 David Eugene Wright ABSTRACT This dissertation argues for a particular interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, namely that Mill is best read as a sanction utilitarian. In general, scholars commonly interpret Mill as some type of act or rule utilitarian. In making their case for these interpretations, it is also common for scholars to use large portions of Mill’s Utilitarianism as the chief source of insight into his moral theory. By contrast, I argue that Utilitarianism is best read as an ecumenical text where Mill explains and defends the general tenets of utilitarianism rather than setting out his own preferred theory. The exception to this ecumenical approach to the text comes in the fifth chapter on justice which, I argue on textual and historical grounds, outlines the central features of Mill’s utilitarianism. With this understanding of Utilitarianism in place, many of the passages commonly cited in favor of the previous interpretations are rendered less plausible, and interpretations emphasizing Mill’s other writings are strengthened. Using this methodology, I critique four of the most prominent act or rule utilitarian interpretations of Mill’s moral theory. I then provide an interpretation of Mill’s theory of moral obligation and utilitarianism. -
Mind and Social Reality
Masaryk University Faculty of Economics and Administration Study program: Economics METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: MIND AND SOCIAL REALITY Metodologický Individualizmus: Myseľ a Spoločenská Realita Bachelor´s Thesis Advisor: Author: Mgr. Josef Menšík Ph.D. Ján KRCHŇAVÝ Brno 2020 Name and last name of the author: Ján Krchňavý Title of master thesis: Methodological Individualism: Mind and Social Reality Department: Department of Economics Supervisor of bachelor thesis: Mgr. Josef Menšík, Ph.D. Year of defence: 2020 Abstract The submitted bachelor thesis is concerned with the relation between mind and social reality and the role of the mind in the creation of social reality. This relation is examined from the perspective of the social ontology of John Searle, an American philosopher who is considered to be the proponent of methodological individualism. This thesis aims to reconsider the standard, mentalistic interpretation of Searle’s social ontology, one that is centred around the primary role of the mind in the construction of social reality, to examine criticisms of such approach which highlight the professed neglect of the role that social practices have for social reality, and to provide an alternative, practice-based reading of Searle’s social ontology. The thesis thus proceeds first by outlining the standard interpretation of Searle’s theory as put forward mainly in his two monographs on social reality. Subsequently, the objections against such an approach from an alternative, practice-based approach, which highlights the role of social practices for the constitution of society, are raised. Following these objections, the Searle’s social ontology is looked at again in an effort to find an alternative interpretation that would bring it closer to the ideas and principles of the practice-based approach, and thereby provide a response to some objections against the missing role of the social practices in his theory as well as open the way for the novel interpretation of his social ontology. -
Satisficing Consequentialism Author(S): Michael Slote and Philip Pettit Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol
Satisficing Consequentialism Author(s): Michael Slote and Philip Pettit Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 58 (1984), pp. 139-163+165-176 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106846 Accessed: 15/10/2008 09:26 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Aristotelian Society and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. -
How Three Triads Illumine the Authority of the Preached Word
THE WORDS OF THE SPEAKER: HOW THREE TRIADS ILLUMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE PREACHED WORD By J. D. HERR B.S., Philadelphia Biblical University, 2008 A THESIS Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Theological Studies at Reformed Theological Seminary Charlotte, North Carolina February 2019 Accepted: _______________________________________________________ First Reader, Dr. James Anderson _______________________________________________________ Second Reader !ii ABSTRACT According to J. L. Austin’s important work, How to Do Things With Words, the philosophic and linguistic assumption for centuries has been that saying something “is always and simply to state something.”1 For many people today, speech is simply the description of a place or event. It is either true or false, because it either describes an item or event well, or it does not. It either re-states propositional truth or it does not. Austin’s program was to regain an understanding and awareness of the force of speech—what is done in saying something—and came to be known as speech act theory. Similarly, in the discipline of theology, and in the life of the Church, many people tend to think of preaching as the passing of some “truth” from the divine mind to the human mind, or from the preacher’s mind to the hearer’s mind. While it is that, in a very real and meaningful way, in this paper I seek to explore whether there is more. As incarnate creatures, God has made humans to consist of spiritual and physical aspects. If we focus wholly on the “mental truth transfer” aspect of speech, especially in the case of preaching, how does this leave the Church equipped to bridge the divide between the mental information and what they are to do in their bodies? By interacting with and interfacing the triadic framework of speech act theory with the triadic frameworks of Dorothy Sayers and John Frame, I seek to understand preaching in 1 J. -
Anthropological Theory
Anthropological Theory http://ant.sagepub.com John Searle on a witch hunt: A commentary on John R. Searle's essay ‘Social ontology: Some basic principles’ Richard A. Shweder Anthropological Theory 2006; 6; 89 DOI: 10.1177/1463499606061739 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ant.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/1/89 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for Anthropological Theory can be found at: Email Alerts: http://ant.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://ant.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Downloaded from http://ant.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on November 5, 2007 © 2006 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Anthropological Theory Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) http://ant.sagepub.com Vol 6(1): 89–111 10.1177/1463499606061739 John Searle on a witch hunt A commentary on John R. Searle’s essay ‘Social ontology: Some basic principles’ Richard A. Shweder University of Chicago, USA Abstract In this commentary I respond to John Searle’s conceptual framework for the interpretation of ‘social facts’ as a provocation to spell out some of the philosophical foundations of the romantic pluralist tradition in cultural anthropology. Romantic pluralists in anthropology seek to affirm (to the extent such affirmation is reasonably possible) what the philosopher John Gray describes as ‘the reality, validity and human intelligibility of values and forms of life very different from our own’. With special attention to two examples of contemporary social facts (a witchcraft tribunal in Africa and death pollution practices in a Hindu temple town), the commentary raises questions about John Searle’s approach to the mind-body problem and his account of epistemic objectivity and ontological subjectivity with regard to social facts. -
Advantages & Disadvantages of Consequential Ethics
CONSEQUENTIAL ETHICS: SUMMARY (c) 2019 www.prshockley.org Dr. Paul R Shockley What about Consequences? Significant Types of Utilitarianism: Utilitarianism: The right action is what brings about the greatest good Consequential Ethics (CE): An action is right iff it promotes the 1. Consequentialism = whether an act is morally to the greatest number in the long run. Here are different types of best consequences. The best consequences are those in which right depends only on consequences (not utilitarianism: “happiness” is maximized. Central question: what actions will circumstances, the intrinsic nature of the act, or 1. Hedonistic Utilitarianism: maximize Pleasure & minimalize pain. generate the best consequences? This family of outcome based anything that happens before the act). approaches are varied but two, in particular, heed our attention, 2. Act Utilitarianism: an act should be judged by its results. namely, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) & John 2. Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is 3. Rule Utilitarianism: an act is right iff it follows the rules that promotes Stuart Mill (1806-1873) & egoism or objectivism of Ayn Rand morally right depends only on the actual the best consequences. Ethical rules are chosen in view of the anticipated (1905-1982). Consequential ethics is also referred to as teleological consequences (not foreseen, foreseeable, intended, results flowing from keeping those rules. ethics hence, Greek word teleos, meaning “having reached one’s or likely consequences). 4. Priority Utilitarianism: maximize the achievement of people’s priorities-it is for each person to decide what constitutes personal end” or “goal directed.” This summary centers on utilitarianism. 3. Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is happiness (R.M. -
Reception of Externalized Knowledge a Constructivistic Model Based on Popper's Three Worlds and Searle's Collective Intentionality
Reception of externalized knowledge A constructivistic model based on Popper's Three Worlds and Searle's Collective Intentionality Winfried Gödert – Klaus Lepsky April 2019 Institute of Information Science TH Köln / University of Applied Sciences Claudiusstraße 1, D-50678 Köln [email protected] [email protected] Summary We provide a model for the reception of knowledge from externalized information sources. The model is based on a cognitive understanding of information processing and draws up ideas of an exchange of information in communication processes. Karl Popper's three-world theory with its orientation on falsifiable scientific knowledge is extended by John Searle's concept of collective intentionality. This allows a consistent description of externalization and reception of knowledge including scientific knowledge as well as everyday knowledge. 1 Introduction It is generally assumed that knowledge is in people's minds and that this knowledge can be com- municated to other people as well as taken over by other people. There is also a general consensus that, in addition to direct communication, this can also be achieved by conveying knowledge through various forms of media presentation, e.g. books, and their reception. The prerequisite for this mediation is the externalization of knowledge by the knowledgeable person, e.g. by writing a book.1 For the consideration of such externalization and reception processes it seems reasonable to make the following distinction between types of knowledge: • Knowledge in one's own head for various purposes, such as problem solving or acting. • Knowledge in other people's minds. • Knowledge in externalized form, e.g. -
Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism Roger Chao*
Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.2, No.1 (March 2012):55-66 [Discussion Paper] Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism * Roger Chao Abstract For many philosophers working in the area of Population Ethics, it seems that either they have to confront the Repugnant Conclusion (where they are forced to the conclusion of creating massive amounts of lives barely worth living), or they have to confront the Non-Identity Problem (where no one is seemingly harmed as their existence is dependent on the “harmful” event that took place). To them it seems there is no escape, they either have to face one problem or the other. However, there is a way around this, allowing us to escape the Repugnant Conclusion, by using what I will call Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism (NAPU) – which though similar to anti-frustrationism, has some important differences in practice. Current “positive” forms of utilitarianism have struggled to deal with the Repugnant Conclusion, as their theory actually entails this conclusion; however, it seems that a form of Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism (NAPU) easily escapes this dilemma (it never even arises within it). 1. Introduction For many philosophers working in the area of Population Ethics, it seems that either they have to confront the Repugnant Conclusion, or they have to confront the Non-Identity Problem. To them it seems there is no escape, they either have to face one problem or the other. What I will try to show in this paper however, is that there is a way around this, allowing us to escape the Repugnant Conclusion, by using what I will call Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism (NAPU) – which though similar to anti-frustrationism, has some important differences in practice. -
Having Hands, Even in the Vat: What the Semantic Argument Really Shows About Skepticism by Samuel R Burns
Having Hands, Even in the Vat: What the Semantic Argument Really Shows about Skepticism by Samuel R Burns A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors Department of Philosophy in The University of Michigan 2010 Advisors: Professor Gordon Belot Assistant Professor David Baker ”With relief, with humiliation, with terror, he understood that he also was an illusion, that someone else was dreaming him.” Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins” “With your feet in the air and your head on the ground/Try this trick and spin it/ Your head will collapse/But there’s nothing in it/And you’ll ask yourself: ‘Where is my mind?’” The Pixies © Samuel R Burns 2010 To Nami ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................iv 1. The Foundation ............................................................................................1 1.1. The Causal Theory of Reference ........................................................................4 1.2. Semantic Externalism ........................................................................................11 2. The Semantic Argument ...........................................................................16 2.1. Putnam’s Argument ...........................................................................................16 2.2. The Disquotation Principle ..............................................................................19 -
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy the Chinese Room Argument
5/30/2016 The Chinese Room Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Chinese Room Argument First published Fri Mar 19, 2004; substantive revision Wed Apr 9, 2014 The argument and thoughtexperiment now generally known as the Chinese Room Argument was first published in a paper in 1980 by American philosopher John Searle (1932 ). It has become one of the bestknown arguments in recent philosophy. Searle imagines himself alone in a room following a computer program for responding to Chinese characters slipped under the door. Searle understands nothing of Chinese, and yet, by following the program for manipulating symbols and numerals just as a computer does, he produces appropriate strings of Chinese characters that fool those outside into thinking there is a Chinese speaker in the room. The narrow conclusion of the argument is that programming a digital computer may make it appear to understand language but does not produce real understanding. Hence the “Turing Test” is inadequate. Searle argues that the thought experiment underscores the fact that computers merely use syntactic rules to manipulate symbol strings, but have no understanding of meaning or semantics. The broader conclusion of the argument is that the theory that human minds are computerlike computational or information processing systems is refuted. Instead minds must result from biological processes; computers can at best simulate these biological processes. Thus the argument has large implications for semantics, philosophy of language and mind, theories of consciousness, computer science and cognitive science generally. As a result, there have been many critical replies to the argument. -
Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence
MIRI MACHINE INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence Carl Shulman, Henrik Jonsson MIRI Visiting Fellows Nick Tarleton Carnegie Mellon University, MIRI Visiting Fellow Abstract Some researchers in the field of machine ethics have suggested consequentialist or util- itarian theories as organizing principles for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) (Wallach, Allen, and Smit 2008) that are ‘full ethical agents’ (Moor 2006), while acknowledging extensive variation among these theories as a serious challenge (Wallach, Allen, and Smit 2008). This paper develops that challenge, beginning with a partial taxonomy ofconse- quentialisms proposed by philosophical ethics. We discuss numerous ‘free variables’ of consequentialism where intuitions conflict about optimal values, and then consider spe- cial problems of human-level AMAs designed to implement a particular ethical theory, by comparison to human proponents of the same explicit principles. In conclusion, we suggest that if machine ethics is to fully succeed, it must draw upon the developing field of moral psychology. Shulman, Carl, Nick Tarleton, and Henrik Jonsson. 2009. “Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence.” In AP-CAP 2009: The Fifth Asia-Pacific Computing and Philosophy Conference, October 1st-2nd, University of Tokyo, Japan, Proceedings, edited by Carson Reynolds and Alvaro Cassinelli, 23–25. AP-CAP 2009. http://ia-cap.org/ap-cap09/proceedings.pdf. This version contains minor changes. Carl Shulman, Henrik Jonsson, Nick Tarleton 1. Free Variables of Consequentialism Suppose that the recommendations of a broadly utilitarian view depend on decisions about ten free binary variables, where we assign a probability of 80% to our favored option for each variable; in this case, if our probabilities are well-calibrated and our errors are not correlated across variables, then we will have only slightly more than a 10% chance of selecting the correct (in some meta-ethical framework) specification. -
Social Ontology
Social Ontology Brian Epstein, Tufts University “Social Ontology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version published March 2018, http://plato.stanford.edu/social-ontology Social ontology is the study of the nature and properties of the social world. It is concerned with analyzing the various entities in the world that arise from social interaction. A prominent topic in social ontology is the analysis of social groups. Do social groups exist at all? If so, what sorts of entities are they, and how are they created? Is a social group distinct from the collection of people who are its members, and if so, how is it different? What sorts of properties do social groups have? Can they have beliefs or intentions? Can they perform actions? And if so, what does it take for a group to believe, intend, or act? Other entities investigated in social ontology include money, corporations, institutions, property, social classes, races, genders, artifacts, artworks, language, and law. It is difficult to delineate a precise scope for the field (see section 2.1). In general, though, the entities explored in social ontology largely overlap with those that social scientists work on. A good deal of the work in social ontology takes place within the social sciences (see sections 5.1–5.8). Social ontology also addresses more basic questions about the nature of the social world. One set of questions pertains to the constituents, or building blocks, of social things in general. For instance, some theories argue that social entities are built out of the psychological states of individual people, while others argue that they are built out of actions, and yet others that they are built out of practices.