The Dissertation Committee for Matthew Roe Dasti Certifies That This Is the Approved Version of the Following Dissertation
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Copyright by Matthew Roe Dasti 2010 The Dissertation Committee for Matthew Roe Dasti certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Rational Belief in Classical India: Nyāya’s Epistemology and Defense of Theism Committee: ______________________________ Stephen Phillips, Supervisor ______________________________ Daniel Bonevac ______________________________ Edwin Bryant ______________________________ Cory Juhl ______________________________ Robert Koons ______________________________ E. David Sosa Rational Belief in Classical India: Nyāya’s Epistemology and Defense of Theism by Matthew Roe Dasti, B.A.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2010 Preface As I get older, it becomes increasingly clear to me that one person’s successes invariably depend on the shared sacrifices of many others. In light of this, I’d like first to thank my wife Nandanie for her unfailing support and many sacrifices. Without her patience and encouragement, I would not have been able to complete this dissertation in a satisfactory way. I’d also like to thank my mother, Lynn Eick, for a lifetime of support. Third, I am both gratified and humbled to recall the kindness of those who offered me training and guidance throughout my undergraduate and graduate education. Specifically, I’d like to thank Martha Bolton, Robert Bolton, Dan Bonevac, Henry W. Bowden, Edwin F. Bryant, Cory Juhl, Robert Koons, Matt K. Matsuda, Stephen Phillips, David Sosa, and Paul Woodruff. Amongst these, I owe particular debts of gratitude to Professors Koons, Sosa, Woodruff, and most especially Phillips. Looking back over my education, I see that there is no way I could repay all of their efforts on my behalf. My hope is to serve my own students in the same spirit. Professor Phillips, my dissertation advisor, has been a constant source of encouragement, stimulating philosophical discussion, and good direction. It would be difficult to adequately express my indebtedness to him. With immense gratitude, I dedicate this dissertation to my teachers. Abstract Rational Belief in Classical India: Nyāya’s Epistemology and Defense of Theism Matthew Roe Dasti, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Austin, 2010 Supervisor: Stephen Phillips Nyāya is the premier realist school of philosophy in classical India. It is also the home of a sophisticated epistemology and natural theology . This dissertation presents a distinctive interpretation of Nyāya’s epistemology and considers how it may be developed in response to various classical and contemporary challenges. I argue that it is best understood as a type of reliabilism, provided relevant qualifications. Moreover, I show that a number of apparently distinct features of Nyāya’s approach to knowledge tightly cohere when seen as components of a thoroughgoing epistemological disjunctivism. I defend Nyāya epistemology as a viable contemporary option, illustrating how it avoids problems faced by generic reliabilism. In the second portion of the dissertation, I examine the way in which Nyāya’s knowledge sources (perception, inference, and testimony) are deployed in support of a theistic metaphysics, highlighting Nyāya’s principled extension of its views of knowledge acquisition. In an appendix, I provide a full translation and commentary on an argument for God’s existence by Vācaspati Miśra (a 10 th century philosopher who is unique in having shaped several distinct schools), found in his commentary on Nyāya-sūtra 4.1.21. v Table of Contents Primary Texts Cited, Abbreviations, Authors, and Authors’ Dates vii Introduction 1 Chapter One: The Character of Nyāya Epistemology 12 Chapter Two: The Standard Knowledge Sources and Relevant Non-Pramāas 91 Chapter Three: Yogic Perception 115 Chapter Four: Inferential Knowledge of īśvara 153 Chapter Five: Testimony and Testifiers: As Below so Above? 196 Concluding Reflections 222 Appendix A: Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Determination of Veridicality 225 Appendix B: Vācaspati Miśra’s Commentary on NS 4.1.21 232 Appendix C: Notes on Ratnakīrti’s Argument Against Īśvara 252 Bibliography 257 Vita 285 vi Primary Texts Cited, Abbreviations (if used), Authors, and Author Dates 1 Nyāya-Vaiśeika Vaiśeika-sūtra (VS) by Kaāda, c. 100 (all dates CE unless otherwise noted) Nyāya-sūtra (NS) by Gautama, c. 200 Nyāya-bhāya (NB) by Vātsyāyana, c. 450 Padārtha-dharma-sagraha (PDS) by Praśastapāda, c. 575 Nyāya-vārttika (NV) by Uddyotakara, c. 600 Nyāya-mañjarī (NM) by Jayanta BhaǺǺa, c. 875 Nyāya-vārttika-tatpārya-Ƕīka (NVT) by Vācaspati Miśra, c. 950 Nyāya- vārttika-tatpārya-Ƕīka-pariuddhi (NVTP) by Udayana, 975-1050 Ātma-tattva-viveka (ATV) by Udayana Nyāya-kusuma-añjali (NK) by Udayana Kiraāvali by Udayana Tarka-bhāā (TB) by Keśava Miśra, c. 1225 Tattva-cintā-mai (TC) by Gageśa Upadhyāya, c. 1325 Tarka-sagraha (TS) by Aam BhaǺǺa, c. 1550 Bhāā-paricchedaka (with Muktāvali commentary) by Viśvanātha , c. 1550 Nyāya-darśana (ND) (a 20 th Century compilation of the Nyāya-sūtra and principal commentaries by Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha) 1 Here, I generally follow Potter (1977 and 1992). Most of the dates for Classical texts and authors are approximations based on a number of considerations. Generally, I have rounded off for mnemonic ease. vii Buddhism Abhidharma-kośa-bhāya by Vasubandhu c. 350 Pramāa-samuccaya by Dignāga c. 500 Pramāa-vārttika by Dharmakīrti c. 600 Tattva-sagraha by Śāntarakita c. 725 Īśvara-sādhana-dūaa by Ratnakīrti c. 1000-1050 Yoga Yoga-sūtra (YS) by Patañjali, c. 300 Yoga-bhāya (YB) by Vyāsa, c. 750 Tattva-vaiśaradī by Vācaspati Miśra, c. 950 Vedānta Vedānta-sūtra (or Brahma-sūtra ) by Badarāyana, c. 100 Śarīraka-bhāya by Śakara, 788-820 Śrī-bhāya by Rāmānuja, 1017-1137 Mīmāsā Mīmāsā-sūtra by Jaimini, c. 200 BCE-200 CE Śabara-bhāya by Śabara, c. 200 viii Śloka-vārttika (SV) by Kumārila BhaǺǺa, c. 650 Other Sākhya-kārikā (SK) by Īśvaraka c. 450 Vākya-padīya (VP) by Bharthari, c. 450 Bhakti-rasa-amta-sindhu (BRS) by Rūpa Goswamin, c. 1500 ix śraddhā-mayo ‘yam puruah yo yac-chraddha sa eva sa This person is composed of trust. As his trust is, so is he. (Bhagavad-gītā 17.3) Introduction The above passage from the Bhagavad-gītā illustrates a familiar theme in Upaniadic literature: the identification of a single psycho-physical quality in order to underscore its importance in human development. Such formulations take the form “a person is composed of x” and underscore the care one must take in developing the quality in question. 1 Later verses in the seventeenth chapter of the Bhagavad-gītā note that one’s trust or faith (śraddhā ), broadly construed as a tendency to place confidence and focus one’s efforts, impacts fundamental decisions including the kinds of thing one chooses to venerate, the kinds of hardships one chooses to endure, and the kind of person one becomes. As such, it must be cultivated with extreme care. Here, “trust” does not have a uniquely epistemic sense. But many pioneering Indian philosophers would stress the centrality of epistemology and epistemic trust in support of a well-lived life. The Buddha’s famous Eight-fold Noble Path begins with the development of 1 Perhaps the most famous of such passages is Bhadāranyaka Upaniad 4.4.5 , which claims that a human being is composed of desire ( kāma-māya ). Desires motivate actions of various kinds, which, taken in sum, shape one’s character. The moral is that one should develop the habit of desiring properly, since what one becomes depends upon what one desires. 1 “right views” ( samyak-dǶi ), life-guiding perspectives which allow one to live according to truth. Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.2 claims that correct apprehension of reality ( tattva-jñāna ) is the lynchpin of a life directed to attainment of the summum bonum .2 Philosophers in the Mīmāsā (Exegete) tradition develop a sophisticated epistemology in defense of Vedic testimony and an associated culture of sacrificial duty. Skeptics notwithstanding, a fairly common perspective held that achievement of the highest personal good(s) requires acting in conformity with the proper metaphysical map. Such maps were drawn and defended by appeal to the deliverances of recognized knowledge sources ( pramāas ). 3 As India’s classical period of philosophy (c. 500-1500 CE) flourished, the importance of epistemology only increased. 4 The dialectical and adversarial nature of classical Indian philosophy—which, from its early stages, was comprised of various competing schools—led it to emphasize evidence, proof, and rational defense of one’s own metaphysical and ethical positions. Matilal (1998: 32) aptly captures this in his suggestion that for classical thinkers, debate was “a preferred form of rationality.” What unites an individual’s quest for life-guiding knowledge and a philosopher’s struggle to publicly defend the metaphysical and ethical holdings of his school is the employment of pramāas . Pramāas , knowledge sources, are means by which veridical cognitions are produced. The most prominent pramāas are perception, inference and testimony. As means of veridical cognition, they are furthermore the ultimate court of appeal in philosophical debate. 5 A phrase which was common in classical debate was atha bhavata 2 . tattva-jñānāt niśreyasa-adhigama. 3 See K. K. Chakrabarti 1984: 339 and Ganeri 2001b: 15-16. 4 The classical period of Indian thought begins soon after the dawn of the Common Era and continues through the latter portion of the second millennium. It is bracketed by the earlier Vedic period and the later modern period. See Phillips 1995: 324n.1. 5 See Matilal 1986: 35-6. 2 ki pramāam ? “What is your pramāa ?” 6 In other words, how is your metaphysical or ethical holding derived from pramāa -produced cognitions? This dissertation examines Nyāya’s pramāa theory, particularly as deployed in defense of theistic belief. In its mature development, the Nyāya school claims that knowledge sources converge in support of the theistic hypothesis, and it appeals to the resources of pramāa theory to defend theistic belief against the attacks of various competing schools.