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Home , Abijah Bigelow, Henry Cabot Lodge, Samuel Taggart, Theodore Sedgwick, Timothy Pickering

The Federalists and the Coming of the War, 181 1-1812 Donald R. Hickey“

Most scholars who have written on the origins of the have focused on the Republican party.’ This is not surprising since the Republicans were the dominant party, and it was their decision that carried the nation into war. The opposition, however, has received less attention than it de- serves. The Federalists in this period are usually dismissed as desperate and embittered losers willing to do almost anything to recapture power.2 That politics played a part in Federalist strategy in the War Congress is certainly undeniable. What is rarely appreciated, however, is that policy played a role too. While the Republicans were busy forging a consensus in favor of full-scale war against Britain, the Federalists were formulat- ing their own program for vindicating the nation’s rights. They advocated outfitting and expanding the navy and authorizing merchantmen to arm for defense because they believed that a

* Donald R. Hickey is assistant professor of history, Wayne State College, Wayne, Nebraska, and editor of The Midwest Review. , History of the during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison (9 vols., New York, 1889-1891); Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812 (2 vols., , 1905); Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of1812 (New York, 1925); George R. Taylor, “Prices in the Mississippi Valley preceding the War of 1812,” Journal of Economic and Busi- ness History, I11 (November, 1930), 148-63; George R. Taylor, “Agrarian Discon- tent in the Mississippi Valley preceding the War of 1812,” Journal of Political Economy, XXXIX (August, 1931), 471-505; Margaret K. Latimer, “South Carolina-A Protagonist of the War of 1812,” Historical Reuiew, LXI (July, 19561, 914-29; Norman K. Risjord, “1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation’s Honor,” William and Mary Quarterly, XVIII (April, 1961), 196-210; Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961); Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962); Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964); J. C. A. Stagg, “ and the ‘Malcontents’: The Political Origins of the War of 1812,” William and Mary Quarterly, XXXIII (October, 19761, 557-85. *The standard view of the Federalists can be found in Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madi- son. There is a more favorable view in Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Federalists and the War of 1812 71 carefully limited, undeclared naval war was the best way to defend the nation’s commerce. This plan was in line with tra- dition since Federalists had launched a limited maritime war under similar circumstances in 1798. Thus their behavior in 1812 was not based simply on political expediency but reflected tradition and policy as well. The Twelfth or War Congress convened on November 4, 1811. In his opening address to that body, President James Madison spoke of Britain’s “hostile inflexibility” and recom- mended that the United States be put into “an armor and an attitude demanded by the ~risis.”~Three weeks later Republi- can Peter B. Porter, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, introduced six resolutions to take the sense of the House on the subject of war preparations. These resolutions called for filling the ranks of the existing army, raising addi- tional regulars, recruiting volunteers, authorizing the use of the militia, fitting out the navy, and allowing merchantmen to arm for defen~e.~Each resolution received overwhelming ap- proval, and in the months that followed Congress enacted eight major war measures. Five of these laws fulfilled the promises of the Porter resolutions on everything except the arming of mer- chant vessels. Two others provided for the purchase of ordnance and the construction of coastal fortifications, while the last authorized an eleven-million-dollar war Federalists were traditionally opposed to hostile measures aimed at Great Britain, but there was considerable sentiment in favor of supporting these Republican-sponsored resolutions and bills. Spearheading movement in favor of war preparations was Josiah Quincy, scion of an old and distin- guished family that had won national promi- nence in Revolutionary times. Not yet forty, Quincy was able, energetic, and ambitious, but he lacked the discretion and humility that most old school Federalists deemed essential to

Letkrs of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848 (Boston, 1913). Recent studies of the party have been sympathetic but have ignored or attacked Federalist views on foreign policy. See David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1965); James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Conuen- tion: The Federalists and the Organization of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York, 1970); Linda K. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca, 1970). 3S~eechof James Madison, November 5, 1811, Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., -1 Sess., 13. Report of the House Foreign Relations Committee, [November 29, 18121, ibid.. 373-77. 5 These laws can be found in the appendix of Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess. 72 Indiana Magazine of History good character.6 Along with John and , with whom he maintained a lasting friendship, Quincy did not fit the usual Federalist mold. Although less Anglophobic than the Adamses, he believed that Federalists had little to gain by befriending England. “As to the British,” he once said, “there is a foolish leaning upon them among some of our friends . . . . The truth is, the British look upon us as a foreign nation, and we must look upon them in the same light.”7 Like the younger Adams and so many other Federalists who drifted into the Republican camp, Quincy found it frustrating to be always on the losing side. Yet his solution to this problem was not to jump to the other party, but to turn his own into a winner. Quincy outlined his strategy in a pair of letters to Harrison Gray Otis in late 1811. Republicans talked of war, he said, but even “the highest toned” of the war party conceded privately that war was unlikely because the people were not ready for it. This refrain, said Quincy, was a familiar one. Over the past six years Republicans had often threatened war; yet, the result was always more commercial restrictions. The war talk, Quincy thought, was no more serious in 1811 than it had been in the past. It was a blind, designed to publicize Federalist opposition and secure greater support for the restrictive system. These restrictions, in turn, would insure the destruction of the com- mercial interest and the continued dominance of the planting classes.8 Federalists must avoid this trap, Quincy asserted. They must divest themselves of their pro-British image and refute the charge that they were “more British than the British them- selves.” To accomplish this they must support war preparations without, however, committing themselves on the issue of war itself. Although Quincy considered war unlikely and undesira- ble, he personally believed that it was preferable to the restric- tive system. An Anglo-American war, he argued, would do little permanent damage to either country. America was too weak and unprepared to injure Britain, and the British were too deeply committed to the European war to mount a major offensive against the United States. War, Quincy insisted,

Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts (4th ed., Boston, 1868); Samuel Eliot Morison, “Josiah Quincy,” Dictionary of American Biog- raphy (20 vols., New York, 1928-1936), XV, 308-11; Robert A. McCaughey, Josiah Quincy, 1772-1864: The Last Federalist (Cambridge, Mass., 1974). ’ Josiah Quincy to Eliza Quincy, March 26, 1812, in Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 254. Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, November 8, 26, 1811, Harrison Gray Otis Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston). Federalists and the War of 1812 73

would quickly reveal the nation’s weakness. It would expose the Republicans to contempt, drive them from power in dis- grace, and thus lay the foundation for the reestablishment of the Anglo-American accord that had been so profitable for the United States in the 1790~.~ Quincy’s plan looked to the ultimate good of the nation, but even so his motivation was largely political. By preempting the preparedness issue, he hoped to back the administration into a corner. If Federalists supported war measures, Republicans could not fall back on the restrictive system with a plea that the “British party” opposed stronger measures. Deprived of this alternative, the administration would have only two choices: retreat from the brink of war in disgrace or initiate hostilities with the country unprepared and the people unready. Either way, Quincy reasoned, Federalists could expect to make polit- ical capital. Quincy’s strategy of promoting war preparations drew con- siderable support from Federalists, in part because of its polit- ical appeal. Over the years the Republicans had often exploited America’s deep-seated Anglophobia, winning votes and elec- tions by identifying their Federalist opponents as the pro- British party. To avoid being victimized by this tactic again, many Federalists were eager to shed their pro-British image. “The temper of the Country does not favor opposition [to the Republican administration] at this period,” said Congressman Thomas R. Gold of New York; “we hope to avoid being amal- gamated with [the] British.” We will go as far as necessary, Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware told a friend, “to con- vince the country that we have no British partialities.”1° Some Federalists also shared Quincy’s view that war might yield political dividends. Robert Walsh of Philadelphia sug- gested that war would clear the vision of the people and accel-

91bid. lo Thomas R. Gold to , [December, 181 l?], Nathan Apple- ton Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society); James A. Bayard to [William H. Wells?], January 12, 1812, in Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Papers of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815 (Washington, 19151, 188. See also William Reed to , November 12, 181 1, January 20, 1812, Timothy Pickering Papers, microfilm reels 29 and 30 (Massachusetts Historical Society); to Henry D. Sedgwick, December 27, 1811, Henry D. Sedgwick Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society); to John Taylor, December 14, 1811, in Mary R. Reynolds, ed., “Letters of Samuel Taggart, Representative in Congress, 1803-1814,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, XXXIII (October, 19231, 370; William R. Davie to John Steele, February 10, 1812, in Kemp P. Battle, ed., “Letters of William R. Davie,” James Sprunt Historical Monographs (No. 7, 19071, 70; Boston Gazette, reprinted in Boston Columbian Centinel, December 21, 1811, and in Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, December 28, 1811. 74 Indiana Magazine of History erate the expulsion of the “dem[a]gogues” in power. Gouver- neur Morris was more emphatic. If the administration plunged the nation into a British war, he predicted, “six months’ taste of it [would] bring the people to their senses.”” War was also seen as a means of getting rid of the restrictive system. Repub- lican economic sanctions had already been on the statute books for almost six years without achieving any appreciable diplo- matic results. Unable to point to any diplomatic gains, Republi- cans resorted to defending the system as a means of encourag- ing domestic manufactures and building national self- sufficiency.’* These claims, however, only served to convince Federalists that the real purpose of the restrictive system was to foster manufacturing at the expense of commerce. Given the prospect of endless restrictions, the further erosion of trade, and the destruction of the commercial classes, many Federalists wondered if war might not be ~referab1e.l~ But if politics played a role in the appeal of Quincy’s strategy, so too did tradition. Most Federalists were willing to support some war preparations because, as Congressman Har- manus Bleecker of New York put it, these were “measures of

Robert Walsh to Virgil Maxcy, May 15, 1812, Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington); Diary of Gouverneur Morris, May 2, 1812, cited in Anne C. Morris, ed., The Diary and Letters of Gouuerneur Morris (2 vols., New York, 1888), 11, 539. For similar expressions see Baltimore Federal Republican, reprinted in Charleston Courier, October 8, 1811; William R. Davie to John Steele, February 10, 1812, in Battle, “Letters of William R. Davie,” 70. l2 Governor Simon Snyder to Assembly, December 5, 1811, Niles’ Register, I (December 21, 1811), 282; Richard J. Purcell, in Transition, 1775-1818 (Washington, 1918), 132; Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 19271, 124-25; Gilbert Chinard, : The Apostle of Americanism (Boston, 1929), 471; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time (5 vols. to date, Boston, 1948-1974), V, 611, 620, 629. Republicans later used the same argument to justify the stoppage of trade caused by the war. See speech of James Madison, December 7, 1813, Annals of Congress, 13 Cong., 2 Sess., 543; Boston Independent Chronicle, August 16, 1813; Washing- ton National Intelligencer, November 25, 1813. l3 William Reed to Timothy Pickering, November 12, 1811, Pickering Pa- pers, microfilm reel 29; Samuel w. Dana to Pickering, January 30, February 3, 1812, ibid., reel 30; Samuel Taggart to John Taylor, December 14, 1811, in Reynolds, “Letters of Samuel Taggart,” 370; James A. Bayard to [William H. Wells?], January 12, 1812, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 188; to Hannah Bigelow, March 16, 1812, in N. David Scotti, “Additions to the Letters of Abijah Bigelow,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Soci- efy, LXXIX (October, 1969). 246; Francis Bailey to James Madison, November 6, 1811, James Madison Papers, microfilm reel 13 (Manuscript Division, Li- brary of Congress); Philadelphia United States Gazette, October 3, 181 1; Boston Gazette, November 18, December 2, 1811; Hartford Connecticut Courant, Janu- ary 22, February 5, 1812; Boston Columbian Centinel, Boston Weekly Messen- ger, and Baltimore Federal Republican, cited in Boston New-England Palla- dium, December 3, 6, 20, 1811. Federalists and the War of 1812 75

the old federal school.”14 Quincy later accused those who reject- ed his proposals with “abandoning the doctrines of [George] Wa~hington.”’~Federalists had always believed that if the na- tion were to achieve its diplomatic goals it must be properly armed and that the best way to avoid war was to be prepared for it. They had acted on these maxims in the 1790s when they created the army and navy and launched a program to fortify the coast. And after falling from power in 1801, they had repeatedly attacked the administration for permitting the na- tion’s defenses to deteriorate at a time when threats from abroad grew steadily more ominous. Thus, supporting defense measures in 1811 and 1812 was very much in accord with traditional Federalist policies. The Boston Weekly Messenger aptly summed up the matter when it said: “The propriety of maintaining an adequate force for the defence of the country at all times has ever been a federal principle. Even in time of profound peace, it has been considered a maxim of wisdom to be prepared for war; and surely there is nothing in the present situation of the world, which should induce prudent statesmen to depart from so rational a principle.”16 Another reason many Federalists supported Quincy’s strategy-and this too reflected their heritage-was the possi- bility that the war might be limited to the high seas as it had been in 1798. “If you had a field to defend in Georgia,” said Quincy, “it would be very strange to put up a fence in Massa- chusetts. And yet, how does this differ from invading Canada, for the purpose of defending our maritime rights?”” Federalists believed the nation’s rights could best be defended on the high seas, and they had long advocated expanding the navy and arming merchantmen.18 They were willing to support a

l4 Bleecker to Henry D. Sedgwick, December 27, 1811, Sedgwick Papers. I5Quoted in Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 241. Boston Weekly Messenger, reprinted in Boston Gazette, December 26, 1811. For similar sentiments see Robert Walsh to Virgil Maxcy, December 27, 181 1, Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers; William Reed to Timothy Pickering, January 20, 1812, Pickering Papers, microfilm reel 30; statement of James Emott and Josiah Quincy, January 1, 1812, in Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812 (New York, 1868), 21711;Boston Gazette, Decem- ber 19, 26, 1811; Boston Gazette, reprinted in Boston Columbian Centinel, December 21, 1811, and in Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, December 28, 1811; Hartford Connecticut Courant, January 22, 1811; Newport, Rhode Island, Mer- cury, December 28, 1811; Alexandria, Virginia, Gazette, October 15, 1811; Philadelphia United States Gazette, reprinted in Alexandria Gazette, December 13, 1811; Charleston, South Carolina, Courier, March 23, April 23, 1812. I7Speech of Josiah Quincy, January 25, 1812, Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 957. For Federalist support of naval expansion, see Report of the Secretary of the Navy, January 12, 1801, American State Papers: Naval Affairs (4 vols., Washington, 1832-1861), I, 74-75; speech of Gouverneur Morris, February 24, 76 Indiana Magazine of History maritime war, but it had to be free of commercial restrictions and territorial ambitions. As the Philadelphia United States Gazette put it: “War will be cheerfully encountered and man- fully prosecuted, whenever it shall be found indispensable to the enjoyment of a free and lawful commerce. But it must be a war of force, of fighting; not of embargo and restriction-A war by which the rights of commerce are to be asserted and en- forced not abandoned and prohibited-A war undertaken with means adapted to the protection of lawful trade, and the de- fence of our maritime frontier, and not to the conquest of foreign territorie~.”’~ Maritime war also appealed to Federalists because of their own spectacular success with it in the late 1790s. From 1794 to 1798 had seized almost twenty-million-dollars worth of American property on the high seas and in French ports. In the summer of 1798 the United States had authorized American naval ships and armed merchantmen to attack armed vessels flying the French flag. Within a year the American fleet had swept the Caribbean free of French raiders and had put an end to the seizure of American ships and cargoes. As a result, much property had been saved, and marine insurance rates had dropped sharply all along the Atlantic seaboard.20 Federalists could not hope for such a rich harvest in 1812 because the nation faced two antagonists, one of whom had a powerful fleet at sea. Although preferring to focus the nation’s wrath on France, Federalists could see advantages in a limited maritime

1803, Annals of Congress, 7 Cong., 2 Sess., 199-200; speeches of William Milnor, December 7-8, 1807, ibid., 10 Cong., 1 Sess., 1062, 1066, 1071; speech of Josiah Quincy, December 10, 1807, ibid., 10 Cong., 1 Sess., 1140-41; speech of James A. Bayard, February 12, 1810, ibid., 11 Cong., 2 Sess., 562-63. See also roll call votes, ibid., 9 Cong., 1 Sess., 848, 1076. For Federalist support of the arming of merchantmen, see speeches of Samuel W. Dana, April 17, 1806, ibid., 9 Cong., 1 Sess., 1064; December 8, 1807, ibid., 10 Cong., 1 Sess., 1064-65; February 27, 1809, ibid., 10 Cong., 2 Sess., 1191; May 30, 1809, ibid., 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 155-56; January 25, 1810, ibid., 11 Cong., 2 Sess., 1324. See also speech of , November 29, 1808, ibid., 10 Cong., 2 Sess., 171; speech of James Lloyd, quoted in , Life and Letters of (Boston, 1878). 491; Josiah Quincy to , December 15, 1808, quoted in Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 146; to Timothy Pickering, January 19, 1808, January 15, 1809, in Charles R. King, The Life and Corre- spondence of Rufus King (6 vols., New York, 1894-1900), V, 65, 128. Philadelphia United States Gazette, May 30, 1812. 2o George A. King, The French Spoilation Claims, in US.,Senate Document nu. 451, 64 Cong., 1 Sess. (US.Serial Set 69531, 52; Marshall Smelser, The Congress Founds a Nauy, 1787-1798 (Notre Dame, Ind., 1959), 166-91; Robert G. Albion and Jennie B. Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience (2nd ed., [Hamden, Conn.], 1968), 81-83; Report of the House Naval Committee, January 17, 1799, American State Papers: Naval Affairs, I, 69. Federalists and the War of 1812 77 war even if both belligerents were included in the reprisals. The navy could perform patrol and convoy duty as it had in 1798. Armed merchantmen could not meet British warships on an equal footing, but they could resist the depredations of the small but pesky privateers that roamed the seas on behalf of France and her satellites. Moreover, if successfully contained, a maritime war would be less costly than an assault on Canada, and it would spare the American coast from excessive bom- bardment or lengthy blockade. Finally, such a war could be brought to an end by executive order without resorting to the sort of time-consuming negotiations that prolonged so many wars.21 Both tradition and politics, then, contributed to the popu- larity of Quincy’s strategy. This is not to suggest that all Federalists supported Quincy, for a sizable number did not. In especially, many Federalists of the old school thought that Quincy was playing with fire and that neither the party nor the country would profit. Timothy Pickering, for one, did not see how Federalists could avoid the charge of “Br[itish] gold” unless they voted for a declaration of war against England-a course he considered unthinkable.22 feared that Quincy’s tactics would precipitate a British war, a French alliance, and hence “irretrlievlable ruin.”23 Other Federalists in the region shared these views,24 but as Tables 1 through 3 show, even New England Federalists were willing to vote for some of the proposed war measures. On naval and maritime preparations, Federalists from all sections of the union were of essentially one mind. Federalists in the House of Representatives supported Porter’s resolution to outfit the navy by a margin of 30 to 3, and Federalists in both houses voted almost unanimously for the various bills and

21 Baltimore Federal Republican, [December 4, 181 11, reprinted in Niles’ Register, I (December 7, 1811), 251-52, and widely reprinted in the Federalist press; Boston Gazette, December 5, 181 1; Philadelphia United States Gazette, December 9, 1811; An Address of the Minority to Their Constituents, [June, 18121, Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 2218; Address of New Jersey Federalist Convention, July 4, 1812, printed in Newport Mercury, August 8, 1812; speeches of James Lloyd, February 27, 1812, and Josiah Quincy, January 25, 1812, Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 131-32, 145-46, 963-64; Brown, Republic in Peril, 109. 22Timothy Pickering to Samuel W. Dana, January 16, [February ll?], 1812, Pickering Papers, microfilm reel 14; Pickering to William Reed, January 31, 1812, ibid. 23 Richard E. Welch, Jr., Theodore Sedgwick, Federalist: A Political Portrait (Middletown, Conn., 1965), 247. 24 Henry D. Sedgwick to Theodore Sedgwick, Jr., December 18, 1811, Henry D. Sedgwick Papers; Boston New-England Palladium, December 3, 6, 20, 1811; Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 241; McCaughey, Josiah Quincy, 72-73. 78 Indiana Magazine of History amendments to outfit and expand the navy and to build coastal fortifications. There was also general agreement on the merits of authorizing merchantmen to arm for defense. This proposi- tion, the Baltimore Federal Republican said, “meets our pecul- iar approbati~n.”~~In the House, Federalists supported Porter’s resolution on arming merchantmen by a vote of 30 to 2. In the Senate, Samuel W. Dana later sponsored two bills-apparently with the approval of his colleagues-that would permit mer- chant vessels to arm and associate for mutual protection.26 In each case, however, Federalists were careful to draw the line at defense. When Republican Robert Wright proposed that armed merchantmen be allowed to undertake offensive as well as defensive operations, all the Federalists except Quincy and William Reed voted against it.27This opposition was in keeping with Federalist policies of 1798 when merchants had been al- lowed to protect their own property but not to prey upon the enemy’s. Although Federalists fully supported preparations for war at sea, they differed over measures for war on land. While Federalists from the middle and southern states were inclined to support land war measures, their colleagues from New Eng- land were not. On Porter’s resolutions to fill the ranks of the existing army, raise additional regulars and volunteers, and authorize the use of the militia, New England Federalists de- livered a total of 31 yeas and 44 nays, while Federalists from the middle and southern states voted 24-0 and 34-4 respec- tively. Likewise, when these proposals were enacted into law, New England Federalists voted 19-44, while Federalists from the middle states voted 14-2 and southern Federalists 14-11. As these figures suggest, there was a persistent division in the party over the merits of raising new troops. Even those Federalists who supported these measures, however, were not sanctioning a Canadian war. They simply believed that the country ought to be prepared to defend itself on land as well as at sea.28

25 Baltimore Federal Republican, [December 4, 18111, reprinted in Niles’ Register, I, 251. 26 For the Dana proposals see Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 199- 201, 208-209, 220-22. 27Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 564. 28 Pittsburgh Gazette, January 31, 1812; Charleston Courier, April 23, 1812; Timothy Pickering to Samuel W. Dana, [February ll?], 1812, Pickering Papers, microfilm reel 14. Federalists unanimously opposed a resolution that called for raising troops specifically for the invasion of Canada. See Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1058-69. Federalists and the War of 1812 79

Federalists showed somewhat greater agreement in oppos- ing measures to finance the nation’s war program. In the House they voted unanimously against a Republican resolution to im- pose new taxes. Having suffered a revolt against their own tax program in 1800, Federalists hoped to turn the tables on the Republicans in 1812. Most Federalists also opposed the bill to authorize a war loan, although Quincy and six other members of the party voted for it. On the whole, then, Federalists supported maritime prepa- rations, divided on land-related proposals, and opposed finan- cial measures. The party’s level of internal agreement was consistently high on a broad range of legislation. Table 4 shows Federalist cohesion levels on all issues voted on in the War Congress. Even on military measures and loan proposals, which for Federalists were two of the most divisive issues of the session, party cohesion did not fall below 80 percent. Federalist cohesion on most other issues was somewhat higher. For the session as a whole it was 90.8 percent in the House and 93.8 percent in the Senate. What differences Federalists did have gradually receded as the session progressed. Table 5 shows Federalist cohesion levels for each month of the War Congress. A general upward move- ment in the party’s cohesion index is apparent. In the House of Representatives the index was 88.2 percent in November, 1811, and 79 percent in December. Thereafter, it advanced steadily upward, reaching a peak of 99 percent in the first eighteen days of June. In the Senate the pattern was more irregular, but the trend was essentially the same. For three of the first four months, the index in this house was in the eightieth percentile. Thereafter it was over 90 percent, and in June it jumped to 100 percent. Thus, by the spring of 1812, Federalists in both houses of Congress had closed ranks. By then all the major war prepara- tions had been enacted into law. As far as most Federalists were concerned, Quincy’s strategy had run its course. Quincy himself still believed that his colleagues should be more ag- gressive, that if they wanted to get rid of the restrictive system, they “must be willing to wish, prefer, and even demand war.”29 But few Federalists were willing to go this far. Most would support war only if it were clearly substituted for the restric- tive system and carefully limited to the high seas. As the session wore on, it became increasingly clear that neither of these requirements was likely to be met.

29Quoted in Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 257. 80 Indiana Magazine of History

Federalists could count on considerable Republican support in their fight against the restrictive system, but their struggle was in vain. Several attempts were made to modify or to repeal the nonimportation law, which was the latest of the restrictive measures. Federalists fully supported these efforts but in each case met with defeat.30 This meant that some twenty million dollars worth of American property would remain hostage in England, imprisoned there by the nonimportation law. It also suggested that the Republican majority considered war a sup- plement to the policy of economic coercion rather than a substi- tute for it. Federalists also had considerable Republican support for their maritime policies, but once again they struggled in vain. Quincy and Lloyd delivered powerful speeches for naval ex- pansion, calling upon the nation to upgrade the fleet by build- ing additional frigates or ships of the line.31 Federalists fully supported these proposals, but agrarian Republican majorities sent each measure down to defeat.32 Moreover, although the Senate gave its approval to Dana’s proposals to allow mer- chantmen to arm for defense, House Republicans quietly shelved these measures to await further development^.^^ All this suggested that Republicans intended to vindicate the na- tion’s maritime rights in Canada rather than on the high seas. A northern land war, however, was not the sort of war Federalists could endorse. As much as they wished to vindicate the nation’s rights, they could not support a war of conquest aimed at Canada. On June 1, 1812, President Madison recommended a decla- ration of war against England. Over the next eighteen days Congress took the matter under advisement. By this time even Quincy no longer felt he could vote for war, and, as the tables show, Federalists voted as a bloc on the war bill. In the House they unanimously supported a bid by Quincy to make the end

30Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 188-89, 235, 239, 1280-1314. See also Boston Gazette, March 23, 1812. Speeches of James Lloyd, February 27, 1812, and Josiah Quincy, Janu- ary 25, 1812, Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 131-47, 949-68. These speeches were widely reprinted in the Federalist press. For similar expressions see Boston Gazette, March 5, 1812; Boston New-England Palladium, April 7, 1812; Newport Mercury, October 12, 1811; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, March 9, 1812; Hartford Connecticut Courant, reprinted in Alexandria Gazette, Janu- ary 28, 1812; Alexandria Gazette, February 12, 22, 1812; Charleston Courier, March 17, 23, 1812. 32Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 164, 999, 1003-1004. =Ibid., 220-21, 1347, 1353-54. See also speech of Josiah Quincy, April 3, 1812, ibid., 1605. The Dana proposals passed the Senate without a recorded vote. Federalists and the War of 1812 81 of the restrictive system coterminous with the declaration of war, but this proposal was defeated.34 In the Senate they unanimously supported a series of proposals that called for limited maritime war against one or both of the belligerents. Although one of these propositions was very nearly successful, in the end all were defeated.35 Thus the war bill passed both houses of Congress essentially unchanged and was signed into law on June 18.36 With the passage of the war bill the decision was sealed for full-scale war against England with Canada as the target. Federalists already had steeled themselves for opposition, and for the duration of the contest they opposed nearly every war measure except those connected to the navy or maritime de- fense.37 They might have supported a war limited to the high seas, especially if France had been included in the hostilities. A limited maritime war might have served the nation as well as, if not better than, the one chosen by Republicans. In opting for a broader war the administration assumed an enormous burden for itself. It also insured that it would get little help from its domestic opponents. For in support of a Canadian war, the Federalists would open neither their hearts nor their purses.

34 Ibid., 1633-34. 35 Ibid., 266-271, 284-87, 296-97. 361bid., 297, 1637. 37 See Donald R. Hickey, “Federalist Party Unity and the War of 1812,” Journal of American Studies, XI1 (April, 1978), 23-39. TABLE 1 Federalist Votes on Porter’s Resolutions December, 1811 House of Representatives

Resolution

To raise volunteers To fill ranks of existing army To call out militia 1 To outfit navy To arm merchantmen

New England Federalists Quincy (Mass.) + Reed (Mass.) r+- Sullivan (N.H.) Chittenden (Ver.) + Moselev (Conn.) I+ +I +I + Pitkin (Conn.) I+ +1+1+ Tallmadge (Conn.) + White (Mass.) + Elv (Mass.) + +I I+ Taggart (Mass.) + Wheaton (Mass.) + Bigelow (Mass.) I+ Brigham (Mass.) I+ +lo1 0 Champion (Conn.) + Jackson (R.1.) + Law (Conn.) + Sturges (Conn.) + Potter (R.1.) + Davenport (Conn.) + TABLE 1 (cont.)

Resolution To raise additional regulars To raise volunteers

Southern Federalists

TJ= yes vote g=no vote I=absent or abstaining

Source: Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 419-20, 545-48, 565-66. TABLE 2 Federalist Votes on War Measures in the Twelfth Congress December, 1811June, 1812 House of Representatives

Bill or Proposal' To declare war

To fill ranks of existing army To build ships of the line To build frigates To outfit navv2 I To build coastal forts 1 New Endand Federalists IHI Quincy (Mass.) + ++ Reed (Mass.) + ++ Sullivan (N.H.) Taggart (Mass.) ++++ White (Mass.) ++++ Brigham (Mass.) + ++ Chittenden (Ver.) +++ Moseley (Conn.) + ++ Pitkin (Conn.) +++ Jackson (R.I.) + ++ Tallmadee (Conn.) I+ I I I Potter (R.1.) I+I+I+I+ Ely (Mass.) I+ l+l+ I+ Biaelow (Mass.) I+ I I + I+ Wheaton (Mass.) Davenport (Conn.) + + + + Sturges (Conn.) Law (Conn.) ChamDion (Conn.) I + I I + 10 TABLE 2 (cont.)

Bill or Proposal' To declare war To impose taxes

To raise volunteers

++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 00

+ + +o 0 0 0 0 to 00 00 4= yes vote a = no vote 3 = absent or abstaining

Source: Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 566-67, 691, 800-801, 999, 1003-1005, 1030-31, 1092, 1155, 1637.

* There were no recorded votes on the passage of the militia and ordnance bills. * Many Federalists abstained on this vote to show their disgust with the defeat of naval expansion. TABLE 3 Federalist Votes on War Measures in the Twelfth Congress December, lSll-June, 1812 Senate

Bill or Proposal1 To declare war To raise additional rermlars To call out militia To fill ranks of existing army - To purchase ordnance

New England Federalists

Dana (Conn.) +++ Hunter (R.1.) ++ Goodrich (Conn.) I+ I+ I+ lo Southern Federalists 1 Horsey (Del.) + +o Bayard (Del.) + II

Source: Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 33, 85, 99, 164, 192-93, 297. There were no recorded votes on the passage of the navy, fortification, volunteer, and loan bills. TABLE 4 Federalist Cohesion Levels in the Twelfth Congress November 4, 1811Tune 18, 1812 By Issue

House Senate Type of Number of Cohesion Number of Cohesion Legislation Roll Calls Index' Roll Calls Index' Naval Measures 8 96.Wo 1 1oo.wc Coastal Forts 2 100.0 - - Maritime War2 3 95.8 6 100.0 Military Measures3 44 80.6 21 89.0 Tax Proposals 21 94.8 1 100.0 Loan Proposals4 3 87.5 - - Full-scale War5 16 99.2 12 100.0 Trade Restrictions 23 96.2 12 100.0 Misc. Foreign Votes 7 97.4 9 92.9 Cong. Recess 7 94.7 5 92.3 Cong. Apportionment 7 77.1 5 100.0 Contested Election 4 100.0 - - Statehood Bills 4 89.3 - - Private Bills 11 95.6 8 75.7 Misc. Domestic Votes 8 90.7 3 84.6 Totals 168 90.8% 83 93.8%

Source: Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess.

1 This figure measures the unity of the party. It is reached by dividing the party majority on roll call votes by the party's total vote. If, for example, on three roll calls, Federalists voted 8-2, 9-1, and 10-0, then the cohesion index would be 27/30, or 90 percent. 2 Includes 3 House votes on the arming of merchantmen, and 6 Senate votes on the war bill to limit the contest to the high seas. 3 Includes all votes on the army, volunteers, militia, and ordnance. 4 Includes treasury note proposals. 5 Includes all votes on the war bill except the Senate votes to limit the contest to the high seas. TABLE 5 Federalist Cohesion Levels in the Twelfth Congress November 4, 1811Tune 18, 1812 By Month

House Senate Month Number of Cohesion Number of Cohesion & Year Roll Calls Index' Roll Calls Index' November 1811 11 88.2% - - December 1811 12 79.0 13 89.7 January 1812 20 81.9 6 100.0 February 1812 23 86.1 4 88.2 March 1812 30 94.8 12 83.0 April 1812 40 94.7 23 95.5 May 1812 14 96.3 7 90.0 June 1-18 1812 18 99.0 18 100.0 Totals 168 90.830 83 93.830 Source: Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess.

See note 1 on Table 4.