The Federalists and the Coming of the War, 181 1-1812 Donald R. Hickey“ Most scholars who have written on the origins of the War of 1812 have focused on the Republican party.’ This is not surprising since the Republicans were the dominant party, and it was their decision that carried the nation into war. The opposition, however, has received less attention than it de- serves. The Federalists in this period are usually dismissed as desperate and embittered losers willing to do almost anything to recapture power.2 That politics played a part in Federalist strategy in the War Congress is certainly undeniable. What is rarely appreciated, however, is that policy played a role too. While the Republicans were busy forging a consensus in favor of full-scale war against Britain, the Federalists were formulat- ing their own program for vindicating the nation’s rights. They advocated outfitting and expanding the navy and authorizing merchantmen to arm for defense because they believed that a * Donald R. Hickey is assistant professor of history, Wayne State College, Wayne, Nebraska, and editor of The Midwest Review. Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison (9 vols., New York, 1889-1891); Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812 (2 vols., Boston, 1905); Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of1812 (New York, 1925); George R. Taylor, “Prices in the Mississippi Valley preceding the War of 1812,” Journal of Economic and Busi- ness History, I11 (November, 1930), 148-63; George R. Taylor, “Agrarian Discon- tent in the Mississippi Valley preceding the War of 1812,” Journal of Political Economy, XXXIX (August, 1931), 471-505; Margaret K. Latimer, “South Carolina-A Protagonist of the War of 1812,” American Historical Reuiew, LXI (July, 19561, 914-29; Norman K. Risjord, “1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation’s Honor,” William and Mary Quarterly, XVIII (April, 1961), 196-210; Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961); Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962); Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964); J. C. A. Stagg, “James Madison and the ‘Malcontents’: The Political Origins of the War of 1812,” William and Mary Quarterly, XXXIII (October, 19761, 557-85. *The standard view of the Federalists can be found in Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madi- son. There is a more favorable view in Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Federalists and the War of 1812 71 carefully limited, undeclared naval war was the best way to defend the nation’s commerce. This plan was in line with tra- dition since Federalists had launched a limited maritime war under similar circumstances in 1798. Thus their behavior in 1812 was not based simply on political expediency but reflected tradition and policy as well. The Twelfth or War Congress convened on November 4, 1811. In his opening address to that body, President James Madison spoke of Britain’s “hostile inflexibility” and recom- mended that the United States be put into “an armor and an attitude demanded by the ~risis.”~Three weeks later Republi- can Peter B. Porter, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, introduced six resolutions to take the sense of the House on the subject of war preparations. These resolutions called for filling the ranks of the existing army, raising addi- tional regulars, recruiting volunteers, authorizing the use of the militia, fitting out the navy, and allowing merchantmen to arm for defen~e.~Each resolution received overwhelming ap- proval, and in the months that followed Congress enacted eight major war measures. Five of these laws fulfilled the promises of the Porter resolutions on everything except the arming of mer- chant vessels. Two others provided for the purchase of ordnance and the construction of coastal fortifications, while the last authorized an eleven-million-dollar war Federalists were traditionally opposed to hostile measures aimed at Great Britain, but there was considerable sentiment in favor of supporting these Republican-sponsored resolutions and bills. Spearheading the Federalist movement in favor of war preparations was Josiah Quincy, scion of an old and distin- guished Massachusetts family that had won national promi- nence in Revolutionary times. Not yet forty, Quincy was able, energetic, and ambitious, but he lacked the discretion and humility that most old school Federalists deemed essential to Letkrs of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848 (Boston, 1913). Recent studies of the party have been sympathetic but have ignored or attacked Federalist views on foreign policy. See David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1965); James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Conuen- tion: The Federalists and the Organization of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York, 1970); Linda K. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca, 1970). 3S~eechof James Madison, November 5, 1811, Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., -1 Sess., 13. Report of the House Foreign Relations Committee, [November 29, 18121, ibid.. 373-77. 5 These laws can be found in the appendix of Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess. 72 Indiana Magazine of History good character.6 Along with John and John Quincy Adams, with whom he maintained a lasting friendship, Quincy did not fit the usual Federalist mold. Although less Anglophobic than the Adamses, he believed that Federalists had little to gain by befriending England. “As to the British,” he once said, “there is a foolish leaning upon them among some of our friends . The truth is, the British look upon us as a foreign nation, and we must look upon them in the same light.”7 Like the younger Adams and so many other Federalists who drifted into the Republican camp, Quincy found it frustrating to be always on the losing side. Yet his solution to this problem was not to jump to the other party, but to turn his own into a winner. Quincy outlined his strategy in a pair of letters to Harrison Gray Otis in late 1811. Republicans talked of war, he said, but even “the highest toned” of the war party conceded privately that war was unlikely because the people were not ready for it. This refrain, said Quincy, was a familiar one. Over the past six years Republicans had often threatened war; yet, the result was always more commercial restrictions. The war talk, Quincy thought, was no more serious in 1811 than it had been in the past. It was a blind, designed to publicize Federalist opposition and secure greater support for the restrictive system. These restrictions, in turn, would insure the destruction of the com- mercial interest and the continued dominance of the planting classes.8 Federalists must avoid this trap, Quincy asserted. They must divest themselves of their pro-British image and refute the charge that they were “more British than the British them- selves.” To accomplish this they must support war preparations without, however, committing themselves on the issue of war itself. Although Quincy considered war unlikely and undesira- ble, he personally believed that it was preferable to the restric- tive system. An Anglo-American war, he argued, would do little permanent damage to either country. America was too weak and unprepared to injure Britain, and the British were too deeply committed to the European war to mount a major offensive against the United States. War, Quincy insisted, Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts (4th ed., Boston, 1868); Samuel Eliot Morison, “Josiah Quincy,” Dictionary of American Biog- raphy (20 vols., New York, 1928-1936), XV, 308-11; Robert A. McCaughey, Josiah Quincy, 1772-1864: The Last Federalist (Cambridge, Mass., 1974). ’ Josiah Quincy to Eliza Quincy, March 26, 1812, in Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 254. Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, November 8, 26, 1811, Harrison Gray Otis Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston). Federalists and the War of 1812 73 would quickly reveal the nation’s weakness. It would expose the Republicans to contempt, drive them from power in dis- grace, and thus lay the foundation for the reestablishment of the Anglo-American accord that had been so profitable for the United States in the 1790~.~ Quincy’s plan looked to the ultimate good of the nation, but even so his motivation was largely political. By preempting the preparedness issue, he hoped to back the administration into a corner. If Federalists supported war measures, Republicans could not fall back on the restrictive system with a plea that the “British party” opposed stronger measures. Deprived of this alternative, the administration would have only two choices: retreat from the brink of war in disgrace or initiate hostilities with the country unprepared and the people unready. Either way, Quincy reasoned, Federalists could expect to make polit- ical capital. Quincy’s strategy of promoting war preparations drew con- siderable support from Federalists, in part because of its polit- ical appeal. Over the years the Republicans had often exploited America’s deep-seated Anglophobia, winning votes and elec- tions by identifying their Federalist opponents as the pro- British party. To avoid being victimized by this tactic again, many Federalists were eager to shed their pro-British image. “The temper of the Country does not favor opposition [to the Republican administration] at this period,” said Congressman Thomas R. Gold of New York; “we hope to avoid being amal- gamated with [the] British.” We will go as far as necessary, Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware told a friend, “to con- vince the country that we have no British partialities.”1° Some Federalists also shared Quincy’s view that war might yield political dividends.