DOCSLIB.ORG

Implementing the Comprehensive Test

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Implementing the Comprehensive Test Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban New Aspects of Definition, Organization and Verification Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Professor Daniel Tarschys, MP, Chairman (Sweden) Sir Brian Urquhart, Vice-Chairman (United Kingdom) Dr Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica) Dr Gyula Horn (Hungary) Dr Ryukichi Imai (Japan) Professor Catherine Kelleher (United States) Dr Marjatta Rautio (Finland) Dr Lothar Rühl (Germany) The Director Director Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Pipers väg 28, S-170 73 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00 Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33 Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban New Aspects of Definition, Organization and Verification SIPRI Research Report No. 8 Edited by Eric Arnett OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1994 Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © SIPRI 1994 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban / edited by Eric Arnett — (SIPRI research report: no. 8) Includes index 1. Nuclear weapons—testing. I. Arnett, Eric H. II. Series. U264.I47 1994 355.8´25119—dc20 94–19853 ISBN 0–19–829188–4 ISBN 0–19–829187–6 (pbk.) Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn Contents Preface vii Acronyms ix 1. Introduction and executive summary 1 Eric Arnett I. Introduction 1 II. Contentious issues 3 III. Conclusion 24 2. The problem of definition: Just what is a nuclear weapon test? 26 Annette Schaper I. Introduction 26 II. Relevant questions about ambiguous activities 27 III. Activities that might be banned under the CTB 29 IV. Defining the term ‘nuclear weapon test’ in the treaty 41 V. Conclusion 47 3. The proscription on preparing to test: Consequences for 48 verification Eric Arnett I. Introduction 48 II. Detecting preparations to test 49 III. Goals of inspections 56 IV. Conclusion 63 4. The complementary roles of national, private and multinational 65 means of verification Eric Arnett I. Introduction 65 II. Available means of verification 66 III. Conclusion: providing for verification in the treaty 84 Table 4.1. The Alpha network as presented in the Australian 80 draft treaty 5. Organizing for effective implementation 86 Patricia M. Lewis I. Introduction 86 II. Criteria for effective implementation 86 III. Proposals for the CTB implementing authority 89 IV. Settlement of disputes 100 VI. Conclusion 100 vi IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN Appendix A. The Swedish Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 103 Treaty Appendix B. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Australian 108 Resource Paper on Draft Treaty Elements Index 123 Preface The decision of the nuclear powers in August 1993 to charge the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) was a crucial contribution to international peace and security. It now seems possible that the CTB will be concluded in the near future, and that it will enjoy the support of nuclear and non- nuclear weapon states alike. Nevertheless, even in a representative forum like the Conference on Disarmament, it is all too easy for the advanced industrialized powers to overlook the concerns of their counterparts from the developing world in the give and take over their own interests, as they sometimes did during the negotiations on the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. This report, the first publication from the SIPRI study, ‘Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization, Implementation and Proliferation’, seeks to ensure that these views are aired and taken into account in the pursuit of a fair treaty that can be concluded quickly. The conclusions of the contributors are summarized in chapter 1. The non-proliferation goals of the CTB will require a different way of thinking about verification, as described in chapter 2. For example, dur- ing the cold war specialists sought primarily to ensure that even small, decoupled tests in the USSR could be detected and identified reliably, but the new goals might require that preparations to test in any country be detected before a test takes place, as discussed in chapter 3. The CTB will require a new level of co-operation between public and private methods of monitoring compliance with a cost-effective additional multilateral capability created by the treaty, as described in chapter 4. After the initial period, verification activities are likely to be sporadic but intense, so there is a danger that the implementing authority created by the treaty will be under-funded and understaffed. The specific needs of such an organization are judged in chapter 5. Finally, once achieved, the long-sought CTB may suffer the disap- pointment all-too-often associated with high expectations if steps are not taken to assure that it fulfils promises made on its behalf. The intro- duction of new nuclear weapons into the known nuclear arsenals after the treaty is concluded could undermine the hoped-for effect of the treaty in strengthening norms against proliferation. These concerns are viii IMP LEMENTING THE COMP REHENS IVE TES T BAN briefly addressed in the report’s introduction and executive summary, and will be taken up again in a related forthcoming book, which will identify programmes, deployments, and strategies that could have this undesirable effect, as well as additional steps that can strengthen the nuclear stigma or otherwise contribute to positive developments affect- ing nuclear weapons in the developing world. SIPRI has assembled an international team of technical experts to address the key issues in the CTB negotiations: Eric Arnett, the leader of SIPRI’s Project on Military Technology; Patricia Lewis, the Director of the Verification Technology Information Centre; and Annette Schaper, senior research associate at the Frankfurt Peace Research Insti- tute. They were given invaluable advice by SIPRI researchers Ragnhild Ferm, Trevor Findlay, Shafqat Ali Khan and Rick Kokoski, who spent a generous amount of their time discussing the authors' contributions and offering support that considerably strengthened this report's final form. Information and suggestions from Katherine Magraw and Rebecca Johnson were also especially helpful. SIPRI would also like to thank Harald Müller, Jürgen Altmann and George Bunn for assistance and encouragement in the preparation of chapter 2 by Annette Schaper. The manuscripts were discussed at a seminar, which could not have been held but for the able efforts of Jaquelin Cochran, Anna Helleday, Bibbi Henson, Marianne Lyons and Monica Rasmussen. The transformation of ragged drafts into the current volume can be attributed to the work of no fewer than three of SIPRI’s justly esteemed editors, Billie Bielckus, Eve Johansson and Connie Wall. SIPRI gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Adam Daniel Rotfeld Director of SIPRI August 1994 Acronyms AEDS Atomic Explosion MTM multinational technical Detection System means AFTAC US Air Force Technical NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty Applications Center NTM national technical means AHF Advanced Hydrotest OPCW Organisation for the Facility Prohibition of Chemical ARPA Advanced Research Weapons Projects Agency PNE peaceful nuclear explosion CD Conference on PNET Peaceful Nuclear Disarmament Explosions Treaty CTB (T) comprehensive test ban PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty (treaty) SIGINT
Load more

Recommended publications
  • FT/P3-20 Physics and Engineering Basis of Multi-Functional Compact Tokamak Reactor Concept R.M.O
    FT/P3-20 Physics and Engineering Basis of Multi-functional Compact Tokamak Reactor Concept R.M.O. Galvão1, G.O. Ludwig2, E. Del Bosco2, M.C.R. Andrade2, Jiangang Li3, Yuanxi Wan3 Yican Wu3, B. McNamara4, P. Edmonds, M. Gryaznevich5, R. Khairutdinov6, V. Lukash6, A. Danilov7, A. Dnestrovskij7 1CBPF/IFUSP, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2Associated Plasma Laboratory, National Space Research Institute, São José dos Campos, SP, Brazil, 3Institute of Plasma Physics, CAS, Hefei, 230031, P.R. China, 4Leabrook Computing, Bournemouth, UK, 5EURATOM/UKAEA Fusion Association, Culham Science Centre, Abingdon, UK, 6TRINITI, Troitsk, RF, 7RRC “Kurchatov Institute”, Moscow, RF [email protected] Abstract An important milestone on the Fast Track path to Fusion Power is to demonstrate reliable commercial application of Fusion as soon as possible. Many applications of fusion, other than electricity production, have already been studied in some depth for ITER class facilities. We show that these applications might be usefully realized on a small scale, in a Multi-Functional Compact Tokamak Reactor based on a Spherical Tokamak with similar size, but higher fields and currents than the present experiments NSTX and MAST, where performance has already exceeded expectations. The small power outputs, 20-40MW, permit existing materials and technologies to be used. The analysis of the performance of the compact reactor is based on the solution of the global power balance using empirical scaling laws considering requirements for the minimum necessary fusion power (which is determined by the optimized efficiency of the blanket design), positive power gain and constraints on the wall load. In addition, ASTRA and DINA simulations have been performed for the range of the design parameters.
    [Show full text]
  • REPORT 2D Session HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES 104–582 "!
    104TH CONGRESS REPORT 2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 104±582 "! PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3144, THE DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996 MAY 16, 1996.ÐReferred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed Mr. DIAZ-BALART, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. Res. 438] The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House Resolution 438, by a nonrecord vote, report the same to the House with the recommendation that the resolution be adopted. BRIEF SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION The rule provides for consideration in the House with two hours of debate divided equally between the chairman and ranking mi- nority member of the Committee on National Security. The rule waives all points or order against the bill and against its consider- ation. The rule also makes in order without intervention of any point of order one minority amendment in the nature of a substitute to be offered by Mr. Spratt or his designee and which is printed in this report. The rule provides that the substitute shall be debatable separately for one hour divided equally between the proponent and an opponent. Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without instructions. THE AMENDMENT TO BE OFFERED BY REPRESENTATIVE SPRATT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, OR A DESIGNEE, DEBATABLE FOR 1 HOUR Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1996''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: 29±008 2 (1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threaten United States Armed Forces wherever engaged abroad.
    [Show full text]
  • NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS Introduction: the Energy Characteristics and Output from Nuclear Weapons Differ Significantly from Conve
    NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS Introduction: The energy characteristics and output from nuclear weapons differ significantly from conventional weapons. Nuclear detonations exhibit much higher temperature within the fireball and produce peak temperatures of several hundred million degrees and intense x-ray heating that results in air pressure pulses of several million atmospheres. Conventional chemical explosions result in much lower temperatures and release the bulk of their energy as air blast and shock waves. In an atmospheric detonation, such as was deployed in Japan, it is the blast and thermal component of the nuclear explosion that is the major factor in destruction and death, not nuclear radiation, as the public believes. The effective range of immediate harm to humans from nuclear radiation from the atmospheric explosion is much less than the effective range from blast and thermal heating. In order to limit the discussion of weapons effects to elementary terms, this discussion is based upon a single worst-case scenario. Probably the largest weapon that might be employed against a population would have a yield of less than one-megaton (or 1 million tons of TNT equivalent energy or simply 1 MT). However, a crude terrorist nuclear device would probably be in the range of a few thousand tons of TNT equivalent energy or a few KT). The discussion here is based upon a nuclear detonation of 1 MT. Yield: The destructive power of a nuclear weapon, when compared to the same amount of energy produced by TNT is defined as the ‘yield’ of the nuclear weapon. A 20-kiloton (KT) weapon, such as was detonated over Japan in World War II was equivalent in energy yield to 20,000 tons of TNT.
    [Show full text]
  • Digital Physics: Science, Technology and Applications
    Prof. Kim Molvig April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) DDD-T--TT FusionFusion D +T → α + n +17.6 MeV 3.5MeV 14.1MeV • What is GOOD about this reaction? – Highest specific energy of ALL nuclear reactions – Lowest temperature for sizeable reaction rate • What is BAD about this reaction? – NEUTRONS => activation of confining vessel and resultant radioactivity – Neutron energy must be thermally converted (inefficiently) to electricity – Deuterium must be separated from seawater – Tritium must be bred April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) ConsiderConsider AnotherAnother NuclearNuclear ReactionReaction p+11B → 3α + 8.7 MeV • What is GOOD about this reaction? – Aneutronic (No neutrons => no radioactivity!) – Direct electrical conversion of output energy (reactants all charged particles) – Fuels ubiquitous in nature • What is BAD about this reaction? – High Temperatures required (why?) – Difficulty of confinement (technology immature relative to Tokamaks) April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) DTDT FusionFusion –– VisualVisualVisual PicturePicture Figure by MIT OCW. April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) EnergeticsEnergetics ofofof FusionFusion e2 V ≅ ≅ 400 KeV Coul R + R V D T QM “tunneling” required . Ekin r Empirical fit to data 2 −VNuc ≅ −50 MeV −2 A1 = 45.95, A2 = 50200, A3 =1.368×10 , A4 =1.076, A5 = 409 Coefficients for DT (E in KeV, σ in barns) April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) TunnelingTunneling FusionFusion CrossCross SectionSection andand ReactivityReactivity Gamow factor . Compare to DT . April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) ReactivityReactivity forfor DTDT FuelFuel 8 ] 6 c e s / 3 m c 6 1 - 0 4 1 x [ ) ν σ ( 2 0 0 50 100 150 200 T1 (KeV) April 20, 2006: 22.012 Fusion Seminar (MIT) Figure by MIT OCW.
    [Show full text]
  • Kazakhstan Missile Chronology
    Kazakhstan Missile Chronology Last update: May 2010 As of May 2010, this chronology is no longer being updated. For current developments, please see the Kazakhstan Missile Overview. This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2009-1947 March 2009 On 4 March 2009, Kazakhstan signed a contract to purchase S-300 air defense missile systems from Russia. According to Ministry of Defense officials, Kazakhstan plans to purchase 10 batteries of S-300PS by 2011. Kazakhstan's Air Defense Commander Aleksandr Sorokin mentioned, however, that the 10 batteries would still not be enough to shield all the most vital" facilities designated earlier by a presidential decree. The export version of S- 300PS (NATO designation SA-10C Grumble) has a maximum range of 75 km and can hit targets moving at up to 1200 m/s at a minimum altitude of 25 meters.
    [Show full text]
  • Tokamak Foundation in USSR/Russia 1950--1990
    IOP PUBLISHING and INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY NUCLEAR FUSION Nucl. Fusion 50 (2010) 014003 (8pp) doi:10.1088/0029-5515/50/1/014003 Tokamak foundation in USSR/Russia 1950–1990 V.P. Smirnov Nuclear Fusion Institute, RRC ’Kurchatov Institute’, Moscow, Russia Received 8 June 2009, accepted for publication 26 November 2009 Published 30 December 2009 Online at stacks.iop.org/NF/50/014003 In the USSR, nuclear fusion research began in 1950 with the work of I.E. Tamm, A.D. Sakharov and colleagues. They formulated the principles of magnetic confinement of high temperature plasmas, that would allow the development of a thermonuclear reactor. Following this, experimental research on plasma initiation and heating in toroidal systems began in 1951 at the Kurchatov Institute. From the very first devices with vessels made of glass, porcelain or metal with insulating inserts, work progressed to the operation of the first tokamak, T-1, in 1958. More machines followed and the first international collaboration in nuclear fusion, on the T-3 tokamak, established the tokamak as a promising option for magnetic confinement. Experiments continued and specialized machines were developed to test separately improvements to the tokamak concept needed for the production of energy. At the same time, research into plasma physics and tokamak theory was being undertaken which provides the basis for modern theoretical work. Since then, the tokamak concept has been refined by a world-wide effort and today we look forward to the successful operation of ITER. (Some figures in this article are in colour only in the electronic version) At the opening ceremony of the United Nations First In the USSR, NF research began in 1950.
    [Show full text]
  • The Agenda for Arms Control Negotiations After the Moscow Treaty
    The Agenda for Arms Control Negotiations After the Moscow Treaty PONARS Policy Memo 278 Nikolai Sokov Monterey Institute of International Studies October 2002 Ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty), signed by Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush on May 24, 2002, is all but certain. Critics in both capitals have apparently been proven wrong—it turned out to be possible to break with three decades of arms control experience and traditions and to sign a treaty that almost completely lacks substantive provisions; even those that are included into the treaty cannot be efficiently verified. In contrast, this treaty exemplifies the Bush administration’s assertion that the United States and Russia no longer need complicated treaties that impose many restrictions on the maintenance, operation, and modernization of the two countries’ nuclear arsenals. Optimism about near unlimited flexibility, which the new treaty grants both sides, seems misguided, however. Although traditional concerns about a “bolt out of the blue” first strike have no place in the existing environment, both sides still need the reassurance and mutual trust that only a robust transparency regime could provide. Both sides have already proclaimed their intention to pursue further negotiations: the United States appears to favor the exchange of data whereas Russia seems more interested in measures that would limit the uploading capability of the United States. Either way, at issue is the predictability of the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship. The stable cooperative relations between the United States and Russia offer an opportunity that should not be missed. The two sides feel reasonably safe vis-à-vis one another and can afford approaching transparency negotiations without undue haste.
    [Show full text]
  • The Breach: Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum
    Issue Brief #3 Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The Breach: Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum Mariana Budjeryn Russia’s annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine places an uncomfortable focus on the worth of the security assurances pledged to Ukraine by the nuclear powers in exchange for its denuclearization. In 1994, the three depository states of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom—extended positive and negative security assurances to Ukraine. The depository states underlined their commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by signing the so-called “Budapest Memorandum.”1 Using new archival records, this examination of Ukraine’s search for security guarantees in the early 1990s reveals that, ironically, the threat of border revisionism by Russia was the single gravest concern of Ukraine’s leadership when surrendering the nuclear arsenal. The failure of the Budapest Memorandum to deter one of Ukraine’s security guarantors from military aggression has important implications both for Ukraine’s long-term security and for the value of security assurances for future international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Russia’s breach of the Memorandum invites strong scrutiny of other security commitments and opens an enormous rhetorical opportunity for proliferators to lobby for a nuclear deterrent. UKRAINE’S NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT In 1991, Ukraine inherited the world’s third largest more cautious approach to its nuclear inheritance, nuclear arsenal as a result of the collapse of the concerned that Russia’s monopoly on nuclear arms Soviet Union.2 By mid-1996, all nuclear munitions in the post-Soviet space would be conducive to its had been transferred from Ukraine to Russia resurgence as a dominating force in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Detente Or Razryadka? the Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Theses & Dissertations CGU Student Scholarship 2013 Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American- Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977. Daniel S. Stackhouse Jr. Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Stackhouse, Daniel S. Jr.. (2013). Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977.. CGU Theses & Dissertations, 86. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/86. doi: 10.5642/cguetd/86 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Détente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 by Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. A final project submitted to the Faculty of Claremont Graduate University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History. Claremont Graduate University 2013 Copyright Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr., 2013 All rights reserved. APPROVAL OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Janet Farrell Brodie, Chair Claremont Graduate University Professor of History William Jones Claremont Graduate University Professor of History Joshua Goode Claremont Graduate University Professor of History ABSTRACT Détente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 by Daniel S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tokamak As a Neutron Source
    PREPARED FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, UNDER CONTRACT DE-AC02-76-CHO-3073 PPPL-2656 PPPL-2656 UC-420 THE TOKAMAK AS A NEUTRON SOURCE BY H.W. HENDEL AND D.L JASSBY November 1989 PMNCITON PLASMA PHYSICS LASOffATORY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY NOTICE Available from: National Technical Information Service U.S. Department of Commerce 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield. Virginia 22161 703-487-4650 Use the following price codes when ordering: Price: Printed Copy A04 Microfiche A01 THE TOKAMAK AS A NEUTRON SOURCE by H.W. Hendel and D.L. Jassby PPPL—2656 DE90 001821 Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Princeton University Princeton, N.J. 08543 ABSTRACT This paper describes the tokamak in its role as a neutron source, with emphasis on experimental results for D-D neutron production. The sections summarize tokamak operation, sources of fusion and non-fusion neutrons, principal nsutron detection methods and their calibration, neutron energy spectra and fluxes outside the tokamak plasma chamber, history of neutron production in tokamaks, neutron emission and fusion power gain from JET and TFTR (the largest present-day tokamaks), and D-T neutron production from burnup of D-D tritons. This paper also discusses the prospects for future tokamak neutron production and potential applications of tokamak neutron sources. DISCLAIMER This report was prepared as JH account or work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsi­ bility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or repre^r-s that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
    [Show full text]
  • 1. Energy and Power1
    1. Energy and Power1 © John Dawson At the end of the Cretaceous period, the golden age of dinosaurs, an asteroid or comet about 10 miles in diameter headed directly towards the Earth with a velocity of about 20 miles per second, over ten times faster than our speediest bullets. Many such large objects may have come close to the Earth, but this was the one that finally hit. It hardly noticed the air as it plunged through the atmosphere in a fraction of a second, momentarily leaving a trail of vacuum behind it. It hit the Earth with such force that it and the rock near it were suddenly heated to a temperature of over a million degrees Centigrade, several hundred times hotter than the surface of the sun. Asteroid, rock, and water (if it hit in the ocean) were instantly vaporized. The energy released in the explosion was greater than that of a hundred million megatons of TNT, 100 teratons, more than ten thousand times greater than the total U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Before a minute had passed, the expanding crater was 60 miles across and 20 miles deep. It would soon grow even larger. Hot vaporized material from the impact had already blasted its way out through most of the atmosphere to an altitude of 15 miles. Material that a moment earlier had been glowing plasma was beginning to cool and condense into dust and rock that would be spread worldwide. Few people are surprised by the fact that an asteroid, the size of Mt. Everest, could do a lot of damage when it hits the Earth.
    [Show full text]
  • Stellarator and Tokamak Plasmas: a Comparison
    Home Search Collections Journals About Contact us My IOPscience Stellarator and tokamak plasmas: a comparison This article has been downloaded from IOPscience. Please scroll down to see the full text article. 2012 Plasma Phys. Control. Fusion 54 124009 (http://iopscience.iop.org/0741-3335/54/12/124009) View the table of contents for this issue, or go to the journal homepage for more Download details: IP Address: 130.183.100.97 The article was downloaded on 22/11/2012 at 08:08 Please note that terms and conditions apply. IOP PUBLISHING PLASMA PHYSICS AND CONTROLLED FUSION Plasma Phys. Control. Fusion 54 (2012) 124009 (12pp) doi:10.1088/0741-3335/54/12/124009 Stellarator and tokamak plasmas: a comparison P Helander, C D Beidler, T M Bird, M Drevlak, Y Feng, R Hatzky, F Jenko, R Kleiber,JHEProll, Yu Turkin and P Xanthopoulos Max-Planck-Institut fur¨ Plasmaphysik, Greifswald and Garching, Germany Received 22 June 2012, in final form 30 August 2012 Published 21 November 2012 Online at stacks.iop.org/PPCF/54/124009 Abstract An overview is given of physics differences between stellarators and tokamaks, including magnetohydrodynamic equilibrium, stability, fast-ion physics, plasma rotation, neoclassical and turbulent transport and edge physics. Regarding microinstabilities, it is shown that the ordinary, collisionless trapped-electron mode is stable in large parts of parameter space in stellarators that have been designed so that the parallel adiabatic invariant decreases with radius. Also, the first global, electromagnetic, gyrokinetic stability calculations performed for Wendelstein 7-X suggest that kinetic ballooning modes are more stable than in a typical tokamak.
    [Show full text]