Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban New Aspects of Definition, Organization and Verification Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Professor Daniel Tarschys, MP, Chairman (Sweden) Sir Brian Urquhart, Vice-Chairman (United Kingdom) Dr Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica) Dr Gyula Horn (Hungary) Dr Ryukichi Imai (Japan) Professor Catherine Kelleher (United States) Dr Marjatta Rautio (Finland) Dr Lothar Rühl (Germany) The Director Director Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Pipers väg 28, S-170 73 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00 Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33 Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban New Aspects of Definition, Organization and Verification SIPRI Research Report No. 8 Edited by Eric Arnett OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1994 Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © SIPRI 1994 All rights reserved. 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Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn Contents Preface vii Acronyms ix 1. Introduction and executive summary 1 Eric Arnett I. Introduction 1 II. Contentious issues 3 III. Conclusion 24 2. The problem of definition: Just what is a nuclear weapon test? 26 Annette Schaper I. Introduction 26 II. Relevant questions about ambiguous activities 27 III. Activities that might be banned under the CTB 29 IV. Defining the term ‘nuclear weapon test’ in the treaty 41 V. Conclusion 47 3. The proscription on preparing to test: Consequences for 48 verification Eric Arnett I. Introduction 48 II. Detecting preparations to test 49 III. Goals of inspections 56 IV. Conclusion 63 4. The complementary roles of national, private and multinational 65 means of verification Eric Arnett I. Introduction 65 II. Available means of verification 66 III. Conclusion: providing for verification in the treaty 84 Table 4.1. The Alpha network as presented in the Australian 80 draft treaty 5. Organizing for effective implementation 86 Patricia M. Lewis I. Introduction 86 II. Criteria for effective implementation 86 III. Proposals for the CTB implementing authority 89 IV. Settlement of disputes 100 VI. Conclusion 100 vi IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN Appendix A. The Swedish Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 103 Treaty Appendix B. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Australian 108 Resource Paper on Draft Treaty Elements Index 123 Preface The decision of the nuclear powers in August 1993 to charge the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) was a crucial contribution to international peace and security. It now seems possible that the CTB will be concluded in the near future, and that it will enjoy the support of nuclear and non- nuclear weapon states alike. Nevertheless, even in a representative forum like the Conference on Disarmament, it is all too easy for the advanced industrialized powers to overlook the concerns of their counterparts from the developing world in the give and take over their own interests, as they sometimes did during the negotiations on the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. This report, the first publication from the SIPRI study, ‘Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization, Implementation and Proliferation’, seeks to ensure that these views are aired and taken into account in the pursuit of a fair treaty that can be concluded quickly. The conclusions of the contributors are summarized in chapter 1. The non-proliferation goals of the CTB will require a different way of thinking about verification, as described in chapter 2. For example, dur- ing the cold war specialists sought primarily to ensure that even small, decoupled tests in the USSR could be detected and identified reliably, but the new goals might require that preparations to test in any country be detected before a test takes place, as discussed in chapter 3. The CTB will require a new level of co-operation between public and private methods of monitoring compliance with a cost-effective additional multilateral capability created by the treaty, as described in chapter 4. After the initial period, verification activities are likely to be sporadic but intense, so there is a danger that the implementing authority created by the treaty will be under-funded and understaffed. The specific needs of such an organization are judged in chapter 5. Finally, once achieved, the long-sought CTB may suffer the disap- pointment all-too-often associated with high expectations if steps are not taken to assure that it fulfils promises made on its behalf. The intro- duction of new nuclear weapons into the known nuclear arsenals after the treaty is concluded could undermine the hoped-for effect of the treaty in strengthening norms against proliferation. These concerns are viii IMP LEMENTING THE COMP REHENS IVE TES T BAN briefly addressed in the report’s introduction and executive summary, and will be taken up again in a related forthcoming book, which will identify programmes, deployments, and strategies that could have this undesirable effect, as well as additional steps that can strengthen the nuclear stigma or otherwise contribute to positive developments affect- ing nuclear weapons in the developing world. SIPRI has assembled an international team of technical experts to address the key issues in the CTB negotiations: Eric Arnett, the leader of SIPRI’s Project on Military Technology; Patricia Lewis, the Director of the Verification Technology Information Centre; and Annette Schaper, senior research associate at the Frankfurt Peace Research Insti- tute. They were given invaluable advice by SIPRI researchers Ragnhild Ferm, Trevor Findlay, Shafqat Ali Khan and Rick Kokoski, who spent a generous amount of their time discussing the authors' contributions and offering support that considerably strengthened this report's final form. Information and suggestions from Katherine Magraw and Rebecca Johnson were also especially helpful. SIPRI would also like to thank Harald Müller, Jürgen Altmann and George Bunn for assistance and encouragement in the preparation of chapter 2 by Annette Schaper. The manuscripts were discussed at a seminar, which could not have been held but for the able efforts of Jaquelin Cochran, Anna Helleday, Bibbi Henson, Marianne Lyons and Monica Rasmussen. The transformation of ragged drafts into the current volume can be attributed to the work of no fewer than three of SIPRI’s justly esteemed editors, Billie Bielckus, Eve Johansson and Connie Wall. SIPRI gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Adam Daniel Rotfeld Director of SIPRI August 1994 Acronyms AEDS Atomic Explosion MTM multinational technical Detection System means AFTAC US Air Force Technical NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty Applications Center NTM national technical means AHF Advanced Hydrotest OPCW Organisation for the Facility Prohibition of Chemical ARPA Advanced Research Weapons Projects Agency PNE peaceful nuclear explosion CD Conference on PNET Peaceful Nuclear Disarmament Explosions Treaty CTB (T) comprehensive test ban PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty (treaty) SIGINT