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HUMANITARIAN HPN

The magazineexchange of the Humanitarian Practice Network July 2002g 21 IN THIS ISSUE EDITORIAL

‘Noisy’ emergencies Many humanitarian aid workers have suffered the frustrating and depressing experi- An embarrassment of riches 2 ence of having insufficient resources to be able to respond adequately to people’s The media and noisy emergencies 5 needs in the world’s many ‘silent’ emergencies. Many have also dealt with the embar- The media and Mozambique: a rassment of riches that are made available for a small number of ‘noisy’ emergencies. double-edged sword 8 Each year one, perhaps two, crises dominate international humanitarian response: The East Timor emergency response 8 Hurricane Mitch and famine in Sudan in 1998, East Timor and Kosovo in 1999, Tajikistan: the next-door neighbour 11 floods in Mozambique in 2000, the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, then Afghanistan. The Mother Teresa society and the These crises attract a storm of media attention, a high proportion of official donors’ war in Kosovo 14 funds (and sometimes their militaries too), generous private donations, and a flood of aid agencies.They leave the forgotten crises, and the millions trying to survive them, Practice notes in the shadows. Paying the ultimate price: an analysis of Following the special focus on silent crises in the last issue of Humanitarian Exchange aid-worker fatalities 15 (March 2002), the focus of this issue is on ‘noisy’ emergencies.Toby Porter analyses how Weighing up the risks in aid work 17 the major donor governments favour particular emergencies with resources, deter- Accountability and quality: mining major international humanitarian responses and linking them to the political uncomfortable bedfellows? 19 and foreign policy considerations of the small number of powerful countries that finance Why a trust fund won’t work in the international relief system. The role of the media in galvanising international Afghanistan 22 responses in Mozambique is described, while Nik Gowing explores its part in creating Developmental programming in the the story, taking recent events in the West Bank as an example. The transition from midst of war: a case study from obscurity to the spotlight is examined by Janet Hunt in the case of East Timor, and by southern Sudan 24 Penny Harrison in Tajikistan since the start of the crisis in neighbouring Afghanistan. Nutritional interventions in ‘open And Gani Demolli reveals some of the difficulties that came along with the benefits of situations’: lessons from being in the Kosovo limelight.These cases have much to tell us about the way humani- north-western Sudan 26 tarian actors – governmental, non-governmental and multilateral – make decisions about where, when and how they intervene.They can also teach us lessons about how Policy notes those responses might be made more appropriate and effective in the future. New technologies, new challenges: information management, coordination Lack of strategic interest keeps many crises out of the spotlight, but high levels of inse- and agency independence 29 curity can also keep humanitarian actors away. In this issue, Mike Gent looks at the The French humanitarian system: way aid workers handle the risk that often comes with the job, and Dennis King reform, but how much real change? 31 examines the evidence on lives lost in doing that job.The way data on the subject was Legislating for humanitarian aid 33 assembled provides a model for how information might be managed in the humani- tarian sector, an issue discussed here by Robin Schofield. Endpiece The compartmentalisation of Other articles in this issue consider development in protracted crises, nutritional humanitarian action 36 intervention approaches, the development of new humanitarian policy initiatives by the French government, and the place of humanitarian assistance in national legisla- tion on international development.To end,Gerald Martone appeals to humanitarian organisations to uphold humanitarian values, stand up for human rights and close the protection gap.

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‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES

An embarrassment of riches The rhetoric of humanitarianism fails to disguise a global system where media profile, geography and political considerations are more effective than need in attracting humanitarian assistance. Yet if humanitarian actors are to press for greater fairness with a clear conscience, argues Toby Porter, they need to look to their own shortcomings first

Many reasons have been put forward to explain why of the small number of powerful countries that finance some humanitarian crises remain out of the spotlight: the international relief system. France and Britain, for the lack of strategic, political or commercial interest in example, tend to concentrate their emergency funding a given country, high levels of insecurity or donor for Africa on their former colonies. The US, with its fatigue, to name just a few. But the main reason is that influential Hispanic community, and Spain tend to be the funds and attention have simply gone elsewhere, to the most generous emergency donors in Latin America. the high-profile or ‘loud’ humanitarian emergencies. Public response follows similar patterns. In January ‘Silent’ emergencies and ‘loud’ crises are two sides of 2001, for example, donations from the British public in the same coin. response to the Gujarat earthquake far outstripped what was given for the earthquake in El Salvador the week An analysis of eight years of global contributions to the before. In Spain, it was the other way around, with UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) shows the banks, post offices and schools sustaining a high-profile extent to which resources are concentrated around a appeal for El Salvador over several months. small number of humanitarian crises. Each year since 1994, one or two appeals have dominated the donor Donors also tend to respond generously to crises response; only on two occasions – 1998 and 2001 – nearby, as with the European response to the Balkans have contributions to the largest CAP not exceeded the crisis, or the high levels of Australian government total given to all the other appeals put together. Up to funding for humanitarian work in Indonesia and the the beginning of April, 79% of donor contributions to Timors. Other responses may be politically motivated, all CAPs worldwide in 2002 had gone to Afghanistan. such as the large donation of in-kind food assistance to North Korea, despite the unacceptable conditions What makes an emergency ‘loud’? attached to working in the country. Finally, donors The international humanitarian agenda is inextricably may evince a particularly strong commitment to a linked to the political and foreign policy considerations particular group if they feel implicated in precipitating

CAP contributions, 1994–2001 ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES

HUMANITARIAN 2 exchange ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES 3 Mozambique , Frances Christie and Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July such as Sphere and the Humanitarian Accountability Humanitarianand the as Sphere such Project.result, As a of the and reputation impact the damaged. are aid operation overall crises,In high-profile is cycle project the conventional often jettisoned. situations, in standard Whereas aid usually tryagencies in order donor funding secure to already have that they to implement programmes assessed, can be this order in major emergencies reversed.A of NGOs start good proportion a not with of resources, in search project in with resources but project.This of a search for poor program- is a recipe ming, and partly savoury explains some of the least in major emergencies, behaviour aspects of aid agency and jostling for media profile.such as competition In Albania, for example, for developed sites were new as Kosovo, from refugees competition between the in a camp or sector to work NGOs to be allocated as a bit as frantic and cut-throat often seemed every tender competition. commercial unaccus- emergencies can also create High-profile and professional established tomed dilemmas for more aid agencies. the largest and most experienced Even in difficulties well-publicised had organisations have to match the scaling up their implementation capacity funds.This in available increase glut of funding essen- within a speci- the need to spend money tially makes fied period the primary design, in programme driver a participatory or needs-based overshadowing appraisal process, running contrary and therefore to and performance the reputation of efforts to improve the humanitarian sector as a whole. In the UK, the DisastersCommittee Emergency than £50 million appeal raised more Kosovo (DEC)’s the Britishfrom public, easily the most generous years. of recent response public of this any But before had been disbursed,money the majority of DEC had large contracts signed member agencies already with institutional donors, the running often covering for several costs of their emergency programmes months. As a result, for difficult or impossible it was quickly,them to spend the money further a problem and unexpected return the sudden of exacerbated by the end of the following to Kosovo the refugees conflict. this dilemma a one-off,Nor was solely attributable to excesses of that particular aid opera- the well-known tion. In fact, been associated have the same problems since then, major DEC appeals with the two in Mozambique and Gujarat. In their study and the Great Flood of 2000 ‘British under NGOs came Hanlon note that Joseph being donated to spend the money huge pressure the Disasters Emergency Committee … one through told us,agency representative “Headquarters said to the Maputo Office, 48 hours to put together have you £3 million”’. to spend a proposal of The evaluation states to the Gujarat earthquake the DEC response ‘DEC members balance did not all strike a proper that the crisis. Arguably, Kosovo, in what happened this is Afghanistan. in at work and is these questions,Aside from of media the level far is by factor.the most significant coverage Where interest, is sustained media there a large and well- funded humanitarian operation is virtually guaran- teed. always almost are population movements Massive networks, television by covered well and so receive significant funds: and the Balkans Lakes the Great for six out of the appeals CAP largest the two were 1994 and 2000. between years seven Displacement in Colombia, however, place on an indi- tends to take vidual or family basis; it offersno story for the camera to tell, long struggled to find aid agencies have and funding for their programmes. As for natural disasters, tend to elicit huge earthquakes sympathy. and public media interest that Droughts do not. livelihoods in erode slowly similar events Even levels different completely countriesdifferent receive of exposure. late 1999 and months in a few Within Venezuela,Orissa2000, and Mozambique. flooding hit emergencies people died in the first more two Many than in the last, the dramatic and it was but Mozambique that captured from compelling pictures imagination the huge donor and inspired the world’s response.and public and Orissa received Venezuela little coverage,very little aid. and very little? or too much, Too crises,In most high-profile major donor govern- most donors as multilateral immediately make ments as well substantial emergency funds available, media while significant public attention tends to mobilise a response. As a rule, the bigger the emergency, both from the greater the amount of funds received sources. is not, of funding An over-abundance however, for responsible the most fertile environment programming.As to the of the response the evaluation emergency observed:Rwanda ‘Donor organisations to greater care and implementing agencies should take that duringensure periods are resources when available, freely comparatively the case for the as was the Goma influx, months following two they to be used wisely and cost-effectively.’ continue characteristicThe most visible human- of high-profile more itarian many of very emergencies is the presence aid agencies than the situation requires. Agencies without prior experience of a country or region rush to the area. In addition to the humanitarian impera- tive, be less altruistic for their reasons may there presence, such as media exposure, and the domestic being there.Thefundraising opportunities by afforded ‘briefcase’term to years NGO has been used in recent describe this phenomenon. Not only is their profes- sionalism and ability to implement quality often questionable,programmes such agencies but of the in or appreciation little interest tend to have importance of participating in field coordination mechanisms, initiatives standard-setting or in broader HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 3 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage4 4 ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES The beneficiaries ofhigh-profile emergenciesreceiveThe beneficiaries Towards aprincipledresponse programmes’. within theDECtime-scaleratherthanplanninggood ground begantoseetheirtaskasspendingmoney onthe Managers fundraisingsuccess. organisations’ they becamevictimsoftheir had beendrawn up, Taking fundsfrom many sources before proper plans than “need-driven”. rather became “fund-driven” theresponse ofmany oftheDECmembers capacity, Unable tomatchfundswith and theirlocalcapacities. role theirstrategic between theavailability offunds, mation mechanism. and all-encompassingglobalhumanitarianinfor- tarian assistance,anditsreplacementwithanew inadequate OECDsystemforreportingonhumani- a firststep,reviewisrequiredofthecurrently provided, notjustprojectsincludedintheCAP. As greater willingnesstodeclareallassistance Donors, hostgovernments andNGOsmustshow until much moreaccurate dataisavailable. humanitarian assistancewillinevitablybelimited Progress towards amoreequitabledistributionof 3. Figures ontheaverage amountreceived per 2. Many oftheprojectsincluded inCAPs donot 1. ContributionstoCAPs representonlyabout30% reasons. This dataisinherentlyunreliable,forthreemain UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs). ‘silent’ and‘loud’emergenciesuseresponsesto result, almostallthoseengagedinstudiesaround financial transparency intheNGOsector. As a inadequate, while therearealsodifficultieswith their contributionstohumanitarianassistanceis country. The currentsystemfordonorreportingof humanitarian spending,anditsbreakdown by of clearandreliabledatatoillustrate totalglobal around theforgottenemergenciesissueislack One ofthemajorconstraints oneffective action The datagap HUMANITARIAN involved withCAPs. considered very unreliableby mostOCHAstaff one sector, even thoughthelatterfigureis highest estimatednumberofbeneficiariesfor amount received forallprojectsinaCAP by the beneficiary arecalculatedby dividing thetotal actually received. been requestedinanappealandwhat is reasons why thereisagapbetweenwhat has fore arenotfunded. Thus, theremay bevalid stand uptodetaileddonorscrutiny andthere- of totalglobalhumanitarianassistance. exchange asn hm ni hn oursectorprotests toomuch. Untilthen, raising them. fundsdown astheybecome asadeptatturning are at someNGOsneedto ofthatprocess, aspart And, the NGOsectorhastogreatly improve inhigh-profile emergencies. itsperformance Firstly, happen. two thingsneedto advocacy around forgottencrises, To engageinprincipled through theNGOsector. emergenciesischannelled donor fundingin ‘loud’ thatthebulk ofthisexcessive ofcourse, reality is, The the NGOsectorwas somehow notinvolved. asif entirely intheabstract, in donorfundingpatterns forgotten emergenciestendstotalkaboutinequalities MuchNGOadvocacy around being able tospend it. have by independentevaluators beencriticised fornot and volumes offundinginthehigh-profile situations, cies are often thosewhomostreadily accepthigh mostloudlyoverberating donors forgottenemergen- Yethave thoseNGOs beenbetterspentelsewhere. money wasted couldandshould inhigh-profile crises so and there never seemsenoughtogoaround, Globalaidbudgets are finite is duplicatedandwasted. but much oftheaideffort tion undoubtedlydemands, theirsitua- which assistance, substantial humanitarian ReliefWeb, www.reliefweb.int/library. report, publishedin April 2002,isavailable on which exploresmany ofthepointsraised here. The carried outanExternalReviewoftheCAP for OCHA, consultant. BetweenFebruary and April 2002,he mentioned inthisarticle.Heisnow anindependent 2002, spendingtimeinallofthemajoremergencies Toby Porter Thomas Nagel, 1998. London, April World: Relief, War, andHumanitarian Assistance’, ECHO/ODI conference‘Principled Aid inanUnprincipled Devil Without BeingEaten’,paperdelivered atthe Nick Leader, ‘Proliferating PrinciplesorHow toSupwith Press, 2001). Great Floodof2000 Frances ChristieandJoseph Hanlon, www.odihpn.org. Humanitarian Exchange 20,March 2002,available at On ‘silent’emergencies,seethesetofarticlespublishedin References andfurtherreading Tony Vaux Development inPractice Principles ofNeutrality, ImpartialityandSolidarity’, Hugo Slim,‘Positioning Humanitarianismin War: (London: ODI,1996). Assistance toRwanda: Study III John Borton(ed.), International, 2000). An EndtoForgotten Emergencies? University Press, 1991). and Equality Michael Walzer, available ontheDECwebsiteatwww.disasters.org.uk. Response toEarthquakeinGujarat worked forOxfamGBbetween1995and et al (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). Spheres ofJustice: A DefenceofPluralism Equality andPartiality ., The Joint Evaluation ofEmergency (Bloomington, IN:IndianaUniversity Independent Evaluation: The DEC , vol. 7,no.4,1997. , RRNNetwork Paper 16 (London: DEC,2001), Mozambique andthe (Oxford: Oxfam (Oxford: Oxford HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 5

‘Noisy’ emergencies and the media A large part of the momentum that propels a crisis onto the international agenda is generated by the media. But with new technology bringing wars, disasters and their humanitarian consequences to the attention of publics, governments and aid agencies more efficiently than ever, the question, says Nik Gowing, is not how much coverage there is, but what kind

It is a self-perpetuating myth that increasingly there is endum hours confirmed an appalling level of violence – less media coverage of humanitarian emergencies.The a man was even hacked to pieces in front of a video revolution in information technology and low-cost, camera. Noone now disputes there was a significant lightweight means of recording and transmitting death toll, especially among East Timorese who disap- means there is now more reporting than ever from peared while being forcibly shipped out.Yet for whatever even the most remote and dangerous theatres of reason, whether malicious or emotional, the claims conflict and natural disaster. The question in today’s about the bodies and the police station were exaggerated ‘noisy’ emergencies is, who are the ‘noise’ generators? and the Australian-led UN forces who eventually There are now many more than most assume. entered Dili found no evidence to support them.

The pressures of real-time reporting may mean the This was noise.And while it can help achieve a political reporting created by the new technology is not always purpose of mobilising international concern, it is also as accurate and objective as most would want. worrying. On the other hand, the presence of TV satel- Coverage of such terrifying events as in East Timor lite uplinks in Dili for the first two days of the post- after the 1999 referendum or Goma as the volcano referendum violence had a disturbing but positive erupted, showed how the impact of the media impact. The failure of the Indonesian and/or militia coverage can be immediate and profound, but it might commanders to think of shutting down these uplinks as be skewed in the rush to establish even basic facts at their reign of terror began allowed the world to watch speed. More worryingly, the evidence is that in some the horror unfold in almost real time.Two BBC corre- emergencies it can polarise, radicalise and destabilise. spondents described live how they had escaped being murdered by militiamen wielding machetes. The risks This helps contribute significantly to the impression taken by four women journalists to stay and report by sat that more emergencies have become ‘noisy’ – if bearing phone from the besieged UN compound highlighted witness and recording unfolding events are the yard- the dangers and threats to large numbers of terrified East stick. They are noisier because more people and audi- Timorese. The stark images and reporting had a ences around the world can now get to know about profound effect in mobilising the UN Security Council them. In the recent violence in Nepal, Kashmir, Sri to action, and it did so in a few days. By contrast, months Lanka and the Philippines, for example, we have seen of pre-referendum warnings from UNMET about the much more reported in a timely way, even from remote likely violence failed to galvanise a response. locations, than we have ever seen before. These days,

almost no crises go unreported in one way or another. Since 1999, much has changed. Now bearers of ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES witness do not have to be household personalities or New technology and new players brand names around the world to have an impact. But How has this happened? The new low-cost, go- they too are media – the new, less recognised, but anywhere, real-time technology is central to the often increasingly powerful media, even if some would class breathtaking changes – especially the mobile phone them more as advocates than journalists. and hand-portable satellite phones. So too is the presence of a new, often self-taught cadre of ‘informa- This new spectrum of ‘information doers’ is vastly tion doers’ or ‘bearers of witness’. They have shown different from the traditional, one-dimensional idea of that they create a whole new matrix of media in these media as prime-time TV newscast or story in a leading emergencies.They don’t have to be journalists accred- broadsheet newspaper.As the media business fragments ited to known news organisations or professionally into numerous niche audiences, with intense pressures trained. But the power of what they record and feed to on commercial revenues, new low-cost delivery plat- a growing proliferation of publication or broadcast forms such as websites, e-mail, mobile phones and text platforms can be as great. messages have rapidly generated new challenges to the more establish media. Recent BBC News research has Think, for example, of the impact and power of the confirmed that the median age for traditional forms of anonymous sat-phone reports by the East Timor resis- news consumption is rising significantly: twenty years tance from the hills above Dili in September 1999 ago, the peak age was 25; ten years ago is was 35; it is during the post-referendum campaign of violence by now 45. The avid news-consuming generation is the the Indonesian-backed militias.The messages transmitted same one, getting older and, if the trend continues, will back via an office in Darwin in Australia described soon be a dying breed. Meanwhile younger genera- bodies piled high in the police station and walls stained tions get the information they want (if they want it) with blood. Television images in the first post-refer- from a proliferation of different media sources.

Number 21 • July 2002 5 HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage6 6 ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES Palestinians thewave whoengineered ofsuicide theIsraelioperation to neutralisethe 2002 during Bethlehem onthe West BankinMarch and April Ramallahand was provided by events inJenin, An exampleofthenew swirl ofreal-time reporting West Bank,spring2002 supply.restraint isusuallyinshort self- events andamidthetyrannyterrible ofreal time, Butintheemotionand passionof an emergency. inthe swirl ofimmediatenoisein togerminate fail accusations andtheworst assumptionswill innuendo, self-restraint means thatrumour, In contrast, ofcredibility andintegrity.very highinterms emotive languageandassumptionscanbe impetuous, of Theprice restraint whenhandlinginformation. cautionandpublic self-discipline, the needforskill, remains noisycrises charged environments ofinstant, inthesehyper-governments andhumanitarians themilitary, thecore issue forthemedia, 1990s, As Ihave sincethemid- andwarned oftenwritten toprovecasualty numbers it. withfast-growing there are many otherexamples, Inconflictzonesacross theworld operation. military stood inastreet usingasmallcameratorecord a Hewas shotdeadashe 2002 isjustoneexample. inRamallahMarch Ciriello Raffaele journalist murder by ofItalianfreelance picture Israelisoldiers The sometimesfatal. canbevery high, rucksack camerafrom apocket ofpullingadigital or price The because oftheirpower toobserve andreport. neutralise andshutdown the doers’ ‘information to Warring try parties inaconflictzone. security phones are considered aninstantthreat tooperational onmobile camerasandsendreports tiny digital whorecord Those imagesontheir national armies. groups and guerrilla factions, targeted by warring those whobearwitnessare beingactively than ever, more that, Press Institute(IPI)confirms International The way. emergencies isdemonstratedinaterrible in real-time information The power ofthisnew, tional mediaorganisations. thecoveragelenging andperspectives ofthetradi- chal- interpretations, also sometimesinflammatory canofferalternative perspectivesmedia platforms but suchnew timesinemergencies, At ‘noisy’ challenged. The objectivity andbalanceofsuchsitesmay be Palestinian conflict’. in mediacoverage ofthePalestinians andtheIsraeli- enabling you way, toeffectpositiveinformed changes andspininthemediaan distortion lenge myth, they will ‘equip you tochal- states onitshomepage, AstheE-Intifada insights andways ofdelivering. withnew perspectives, ofthemediamatrix, part intheMiddleEastare anew the ‘Electronic Intifada’ emergencies?Conflictzonewebsites suchas tarian isthenew mediachallengeinhumani- then, What, The tyranny ofreal time HUMANITARIAN exchange the IDFwere fuelledby thereal-time further stream Assumptions aboutthescaleofviolenceinflictedby from theworst. assumingandreporting but almostno-oneheldback independent reports, There was noevidence andthere were no correct. voices ofhundredsAuthority ofcasualtiesmust be assuming thatemotive claimsfrom officialPalestinian themediafeltjustifiedin within afew hours), ofPalestinians dead(a claim withdrawn ‘hundreds’ When combinedwithanearlyIDFclaimof operation. taking placeintheIsraelimilitary toassumetheworst was andhumanitarians journalists encouraged Thisfurther aidworkers. humanitarian Defence Forces (IDF)alienatedboththemediaand the Israeli smoke andeven targetedmachinegunfire), ists usinghostilemeans(includingstungrenades, and print TV journal- Byexcludingradio, emergency. profound lessonsforallfrom themedianoiseinthis there are the West Bankcontinue tobeexamined, Even as thechronology andscaleofthoseevents on andallreasonabledistorted senseofreality destroyed. why were perceptions Thequestionis: ‘massacre’. outa widespread beliefthatIsraeliforces hadcarried thencreated the emerged inavery noisycrisis, andexaggerationswiftly rumours information, Itistohighlighttheway violence andbombing. the or Palestinian policyandactionconcerning andwrongs ofIsraeli isexplicitlynottherights article ofthis Thepurpose bombs againstIsraelitargets.

Jenin, 2002:why wereperceptions distorted? ©Juan Carlos Tomasi Carlos ©Juan ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES 7 From The News The (Boulder, CO: (Boulder, Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July . Paper for ‘Dispatches From for ‘Dispatches . Paper (Washington DC: Brookings (Washington New Challenges and Problems for is a main presenter for BBC World, the World, is a main presenter for BBC References and further reading and References TIME War’, ‘Outfoxed in the Information Nik Gowing, be found at 2001. It can Europe, 12 November http://www.time.com/time/europe/me/magazine/0,9868,1 82845,00.html. Nik Gowing, Emergencies: Information Management in Complex Ominous Lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in Late 1996 and Early 1997 Disaster Zones’ conference, London, 27–28 May 1998. Disaster Zones’ conference, London, 27–28 May on http://www.usip.org/oc/events/gowing.pdf. Available in Help or Hindrance ‘Media Coverage: Nik Gowing, on the website of the Available Conflict Prevention’. Deadly Conflict: Carnegie Commission on Preventing http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/media/mediaframe.htm. Media and Complex Humanitarian Adam, ‘The Gordon Emergencies’, International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting, Geneva. http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ReportID=1066. Weiss, G. Thomas Colin Scott, Larry Minear and Action and Humanitarian War, Media, Civil 1996). Rienner, Lynne (eds), Weiss G. Thomas Robert I. Rotberg and Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Media, Public Policy, The Massacres to Genocide: Humanitarian Crises Institution Press, 1996). www.electronicin- Electronic Intifada website is at The tifada.net. But reality was different. was reality But told: was As the conference ‘First, and children final numbersthree that indicate killed during fighting in the the were four women camp. refugee Jenin Second,were children Ali’s Abu them.not among And third, did not the magazine end to happy tell its readersbother to of this relatively its story.’ This example, unique, farfrom reporting. and real-time reality tension between the highlighted It great a of such media noise in a crisis, deal can create out more for drowning and can be responsible balanced, accurate reporting. on. to dream better will have Those who expect for a massive, enough to work Those of us lucky the BBC, like machine news well-resourced which to reportseeks at all times accurately, and objectively and not rushingimpartiallydouble-checking to by judgement, face a major challenge as other players rush to report, than check.Those rather who provide humanitarian to understand also need responses the journalisticreal-time imperfect and increasingly new reality. more The noise will get louder and ever disturbing. The priority this is all is to realise for happening, and that new, uncomfortable dynamics are being created. Nik Gowing TV channel. global news and information BBC’s of vivid,‘reporting’uncorroborated often e-mail by on websites.and The sources, of and timing details ‘reports’ the many often unclear, were or questionable non-existent. claims of checking way no was There deaths, of number about the the stories of bulldozers bodies, runningand tanks over whole families or their homes. in murdered hour,But hour by terrifying an apparently picture emerged. informa- seized the and innuendo Rumour that the IDF found them- in ways tion highground to refute. powerless even made selves Their task was video and occasional streamed by difficult more being digital apparently of Palestinians images IDF soldiers. by in cold blood murdered The impact but, awful was information, in the rush to provide the unanswered:went central question might these images and reporting be faked, another from or taken incident entirely? atmosphere,In the supercharged the price anyone for analysis or cautious observation attempting objective Terje the experience starkly illustrated by of was Roed-Larsen, to envoy special Norwegian the UN’s the Middle East. His cool, horrified as he impressions destruction the in the Jenin around first walked media immediate and adverse camp created refugee ‘noise’. humani- Israeli officials interpreted Larsen’s tarian swiftly as political and responded observations with a virtual character assassination of the envoy. him to Quisling, likened One even the Norwegian Defence Minister under the Nazis. A crisis of journalism? As I write, picture, a far precise more have we though in Jenin. not complete understanding of events concluded that 52 Palestinians Watch Human Rights and 23 Israeli soldiers died. no massacre, was There of some IDF soldiers raised the the behaviour but crimespossibility that war had been committed. of the 22 Palestinian concluded that many HRW ‘wilfully or unlawfully’. killed who died were civilians since been arrested. Israeli soldiers have Several significant,Although casualties on both sides were on be said that the media noise balance it can hardly a during conveyed the Israeli operation in Jenin and qualified reality.considered of the Many emotional claims reported at the time did not stand up to subsequent examination. At the end of May, the Editor-in-Chief of the Israeli crisis‘real of values described Ha’aretz newspaper a for journalism’, based on his experience 20 covering months of the intifada. in At a media conference Bruges in Belgium,Ali Abu the story he related of refugee in the Jenin who lived and his nine children camp.A earlier, weeks few Ali had reportedly told Mr distinguished and influential’‘very a European magazine: buried are beneath nine children ‘all my the ruins.’ a double across spread His photograph was page under the title: tell their story’. ‘The survivors HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 7 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage8 8 ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES etTmr Theremaining populationofaround West Timor. andforced more than230,000intoIndonesian dead, and burning looting leftanunknown number ofEast Timorese Destruction, pro-Indonesia militia. sparked widespread violenceby Indonesianforces and a78%vote infavour ofindependence, The result, proceeded successfully. theplebisciteitself 40,000 and60,000people, displacementofbetweenactivity andtheinternal militia persistent environment, Despite apoorsecurity totheballotatendof in therun-up August. which madeJakarta responsible forpeaceandsecurity Portugal andtheUNsigned Tripartite Agreement, colonialpower theformer Indonesia, May, future.That allowed tovote inaplebiscitetodecidetheterritory’s announcing thatthepeopleofEast Timor would be theworld by Indonesiasurprised In January 1999, to help two decadesofbrutalIndonesianoccupation,theinternational communitywas suddenlysowilling dramatic. Yet even so,themassive donorresponsesurprisedeveryone. The crisisinEast Timor following thepro-independenceballottherein August 1999was swift and The East Timor emergency response Source: of positive benefittobothaidagenciesand,moreimportantly, thoseatthereceiving endofaid. with journalists.Explainingtothemediainadvance thespecific,uniquecontextsofeach disaster couldprove next? Perhaps, aspartofpreparingfordisaster, aidorganisationscouldconsiderbuildingcloserrelationships What canbelearnedfromthisexperienceofpositive mediacoverage oneyear and negative coverage the of cholera. of 2000. The ministryofhealthreported‘severe nutritionalproblems’insomecentres,andtherewerereports less foreignaid,andespeciallyfewerplanes,conditionsinthecentreswerenotasgoodduringfloods people, buttherewerejust20aircraft todothejob.ByMay, therewere220,000peoplein65centres. With centres. The roadsintheZambezevalley hadturnedfromdirttomud. Airlifts weretheonlyway togetfood was notfalling.Morethan500peopleaday, onfootandinboats,weremakingtheirway toaccommodation planes andlessfood.BylateMarch, withthepresslonggone,peoplewererunningoutoffood–andriver result was less TV coverage thanduringthepreviousyear’s floods,lessdonorinterestandthereforefewer The TV cameras camewiththehelicopters,butthenwentaway when therewerenodramatic rescues. The chose tostay put. houses weresecure,theyhadbroughttheirlivestock neartheirhomesandtheyhadfoodstocks, sothey unexpected phenomenonofpeopledecliningtoberescued. Although theirfieldswereunderwater, their 2000. Along theZambeze,many farmerslive above –butfarmfieldsbelow –thefloodlevel. This ledtothe valley –steeper-sided andlessdenselypopulatedthantheflatfloodplainofLimpopowhich floodedin coverage may have beenpartlyresponsibleforameanerinternationalresponse.FloodshittheZambeze In 2001,Mozambiquewas affectedby afurtherepisodeofflooding.Duringthesefloods, negative media international mediacoverage. financial aid,culminatinginpledgesof$470mtoreconstructMozambique,wereatleastpartlyduethis images ofhelibornerescuesonlive TV werebeamedaroundtheworld. The subsequentinfluxofmaterialand Between mid-January andMarch 2000,Mozambiquewas hitby aseriesofdevastating floods.Spectacular Media coverage oftheMozambiquefloods:adouble-edgedsword HUMANITARIAN exchange World DisastersReport2002:Focusing onReducingRisk ainrsos,codntdb CA hadresponsi- coordinated by OCHA, response, tarian from INTERFET.The humani- security international theUNtookover responsibility for 2000, February On23 the UNhadactuallyadministered acountry. was time establishing thefirst acivil government.This transitional administrationinitiallyresponsible for UNSecurity a Council Resolution1272established UNTAET, On25October, quickly behind. followed actors Humanitarian theterritory. securing inDiliandbeganthetaskof arrived by theUN, ledby INTERFET, Australia andauthorised coalition, military aninternational Thefollowing day, Timor. Jakarta cededsovereignty overOn 19September, East Australia. were evacuated toDarwininnorthern protection, alongwithrefugees whohadsoughtUN UN staff, Allbut 11 600,000 fledtothehillsandmountains. (Geneva: IFRC,2002). Janet Hunt explains why, after ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES 9 Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July early placement of UN peacekeepers had been consis- had been peacekeepers of UN placement early ignored,tently rela- good to maintain the need while had inhibited government the Indonesian tions with the UN, planning by contingency the clear despite plebiscite be in should the of violence likelihood independence. of favour In terms capacity, of response Australian govern- the military contingency plans,ment had extensive with in the north in place already of the country.troops It Canberra that detailed intelli- had later revealed was gence information events, about the impending and it certainly the military had quickly. to respond capacity Moreover, to return to people keen UN staff were to abandon, had been forced felt they they while base for humanitarian an excellent Darwin provided their logistics.agencies to organise … International response respects,In many very was Timor response the East successful. the by saved no doubt were lives Many with which humanitarianspeed and professionalism problems provided.Although were assistance was there with the shelter programme, food distributions were quickly targeted, NGOs met immediate health needs successfully reintegrated into were refugees and many their communities.The External of the period Review achievements ‘the overall 2000 concluded that to May been Timor have of the humanitarian in East response and timely’. positive very noted that, The Review by April 2000, as maize and rice distributions food as well seed distributions had been extensive; 734 of 788 re-opened, schools had been previously-existing with a total primary only 4,000 short of school enrolment of 167,000. figure the previous emer- Some 250,000 gency shelter tarpaulins had been distributed, and Timor, West most 161,000 people had returned from internationalwith transport help from agencies. with all coordination strong OCHA established humanitarian actors right the start, from also and Bank to identify areas World with the well coordinated and to rationalise funding requests,of overlap enabling quickly. longer-term to begin rehabilitation relatively Finally, the humanitarian between and relations military components of the response, although initially on self-determination under UN auspices arrives International peacekeeping force Timor. West into 30 August 1999August 30 1999September October 1999 for independence Referendum passes off peacefully; 78% vote 2001August 30 250,000 people militia kill hundreds and force Indonesian troops and pro-Jakarta 200222 March April 200214 200220 May Timor of East administration UN takes over wins elections for 88-seat assembly Pro-independence party Fretilin Legislature adopts new constitution guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao elected president Former becomes an independent state Timor East December 1975 199112 November 1998May 1999 January Indonesian troops kill about 200 protesters in Dili Timor East Indonesia invades referendum Timor J. Habibie, announces plan to hold East B. successor, Suharto’s protests pro-democracy Indonesian President Suharto quits after massive Timeline: from colony to independent state colony from Timeline: bility for both East and West Timor.Whilst the devas- West East and for both bility tremendous, was Timor in East tation in the situation complex, more was Timor West active with very poor security. extremely militia and to The response the by developed was of the emergency this aspect itself,Timor West in government and by provincial humanitarian agencies in Jakarta. ‘loud’ emergency ‘silent’ crisis to a a From Timor, to East The donor response nation of a tiny 800,000 people, generous, remarkably was and unusu- ally rapid. in Tokyo in conference At the donor December 1999, three pledged over $522 million was years, for emergency to $149m promised in addition response. factors and scale of explain the speed Several the rapid international military and humanitarian response, summarised can be they but as intense polit- ical pressure, with the capacity to respond. coupled The crisis sudden and dramatic, was the destruc- and tion wholesale. showing media coverage Widespread outpouring a huge Dili in flames stimulated of public protest,Australia. especially in Thousands of people of Sydney,took to the streets Melbourne and other Australian cities to demand intervention, putting the in particular under intense Australian government to do something.pressure all, Above Timorese the international widespread enjoyed people themselves support, international soli- of an effective the result the previous over darity built network and diplomatic 25 years. leadershipTimorese used all the diplo- The as the crisis could muster they devel- matic leverage oped. Economic Asia-Pacific A meeting of Cooperation (APEC) forum leaders leaders in New active the focus of Zealand on 8 September was government,Australian the by Timorese lobbying the NGOs.and many of the This led to the creation INTERFET coalition, with 20 countries committed 18 September. by also undoubtedly of the impetus for the response Part a feeling of culpability.stemmed from The UN had agreement, May agreed to the flawed and the worst fears of its critics had come true, with greater probably had imagined. they than even ferocity Calls for the HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 9 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 10

difficult, were generally as good as in any previous high-profile emergency, testament to the profession- alism and respect on both sides.

… local exclusion In other respects, however, there were serious short-

comings. Many East Timorese felt overwhelmed and ©UN/DPI photo, Eskinder Debebe alienated by the massive international presence. They had just voted for independence – but suddenly found themselves totally dependent on foreign organisations. There was no agreed framework developed between the humanitarian actors and Timorese leaders and local institutions at the outset.There were constraints, espe- cially at first, as the Timorese political leaders were not in Dili, and local NGO personnel were mostly still in In many respects, the East Timor response was hiding, or in West Timor. However, these problems persisted even as people began to emerge, and the very successful leadership of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) regrouped and returned to Dili. hotel in Dili harbour, from which Timorese were barred, symbolises the disparities, and led to huge There seem to have been several reasons for this. resentment, especially among young Timorese. Whilst Humanitarian agencies appeared to have little knowl- accommodation was in short supply, this solution did edge of East Timor, and were nervous about engaging nothing for the local economy.A dual economy quickly with the CNRT for fear of aligning themselves with a emerged, with hotels, cafes, restaurants and supermarkets political organisation.Yet the CNRT was not a political catering for expatriate workers at prices at least equal to party,but a broad grouping of Timorese interests which those charged in Darwin. For local people, these prices had led the campaign for independence. It had moral were exorbitant, and the display of affluence amid the authority, if no legal standing, yet struggled for months poverty, destruction and unemployment which charac- to secure a building in Dili, to obtain transport and to terised the local economy was an affront. Other deci- get the basic resources to operate.The Catholic Church sions, such as the World Bank’s initial policy to buy was a major institution in East Timor, but few outsiders school tables and chairs from outside the territory, recognised the significance of its role and its reach. rather than get local carpenters to make them, further angered the Timorese. Eventually, the Bank was forced Language was another problem. Few Timorese spoke to change tack, and have at least some school furniture English, few humanitarian workers spoke Indonesian produced locally. or Tetun, and interpreters were scarce. All meetings were conducted in English, and key documents were Lessons generally only available in English.The World Bank in One of the key lessons emerging from the East Timor particular was very slow to translate its monthly response is that we need to develop strategies that newsletter, and often failed to provide interpreters for include and empower local people; in East Timor, as in meetings. Few Timorese had access to the humani- other high-profile emergencies, it is very easy for local tarian compound, and Timorese rarely participated in actors and institutions to be sidelined amid the over- coordination meetings. whelming foreign presence that such crises tend to attract. Language and communication with the popula- An early effort to restore local Timorese institutions tion about what is happening is very important. We was made by the NGO Information Centre, which need to allocate more resources for this purpose, espe- obtained funds and equipment to enable some cially for translators and interpreters, and to build avail- Timorese NGOs to start working.Yet a year later, local ability of interpreters into contingency planning. NGOs claimed that even where partnerships existed Capacity-building should be part of the response, but it with international NGOs, they tended to be unequal – is a two-way process. Local actors may not be familiar it was a ‘donor–implementer’ model, not a real part- with the processes and requirements of the humani- nership. It was months before structures were created tarian community, but the humanitarian community is to give Timorese a say at a governmental level. The not generally familiar with the local community, Timorese felt, with some justification, that their exper- culture and systems. Collaborative learning is essential. tise and knowledge of East Timor was not recognised We also need to acknowledge that a large-scale foreign and used by the international community. presence will have an inflationary effect, and can distort the local economy in damaging ways. Every effort Tensions over the lack of Timorese participation were should be made to source supplies locally to stimulate exacerbated by severe resource imbalances. UN staff the local economy.The UN needs to develop ways to enjoyed a daily living allowance of over $100. The rebuild economies without generating the kind of average Timorese, even before the ravages of September wide income disparities that caused such resentment in

‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES 1999, earned between $300 and $400 per year.A floating East Timor.

HUMANITARIAN 10 exchange ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES 11 Centre , vol. 25, , vol. Rethinking , November , University of , University Disasters : September 1999–May Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July , paper prepared for the UNHCR Regional describes what happened when the happened when describes what is an Adjunct Professor in International Adjunct is an From silent crisis to noisy emergency silent crisis From Afghan conflict, 11 September and the Before even a forgotten crisis. was Tajikistan donors admitted that The country has limited natural resources, poor infrastructure, system and, a fragile government in 1992–97, war the civil following a history of ethnic violence and insecurity. On 8 September, just days the attacks in the US,before the minister of culture assassinated.was April, The previous the deputy interior shot and killed in Dushanbe; minister was months later,two was a group of aid workers district suspected militants by Tavildara kidnapped in of his alleged killers. the release to force apparently Only a handful of international organisations, donors Tajikistan, engaged with and governments and there little donor support for humanitarianwas work. nonetheless great.Needs were Tajikistan, together of the region,with much of faced another year and food insecurity.Thedrought social structure and in collapse;health systems were rates were poverty the Indonesian military would exact revenge if the vote if revenge exact militarythe Indonesian would for independence. was in 1999 prevention That no all. biggest tragedy of is the devised strategies were Janet Hunt Janet Melbourne, University, at Deakin Development Timor East to the Adviser been an She has Australia. of the Director is a former Executive and NGO Forum, Aid, the coordinating Council for Overseas Australian NGOs. Australian for body Penny Harrison Penny (CAPSTRANS), available on the CAPSTRANS website at on the CAPSTRANS available (CAPSTRANS), Rethinking Humanitarianism: Conference Proceedings Rethinking Humanitarianism: . OCHA and the Timor Crisis, 1999: An Independent Study for OCHA for An Independent Study 1999: Crisis, Timor OCHA and the External Review of the Humanitarian Response to the East Timor Crisis Timor to the East External Review of the Humanitarian Response ., et al Assisting East Timor: Independent Roles, Coordinated Objectives Independent Timor: Assisting East regime,Tajikistan was catapulted into the lime- was regime,Tajikistan 2001, available on ReliefWeb at www.reliefweb.int/library. on ReliefWeb 2001, available Relief, Rehabilitation and Sustainable Development’, Timor: Crisis in East ‘Responding to the Christopher McDowell, 2000 (Dili: UNTAET, 2000). Available on ReliefWeb at www.reliefweb.int. on ReliefWeb Available 2000). 2000 (Dili: UNTAET, Whalstrom, Chris Hurford and Margareta Studies Transformation Social Asia Pacific for www.capstrans.edu.au/ pubs/projreport.pdf. www.capstrans.edu.au/ Assistance’, Role of Local NGOs and International The Emerging from Conflict: Timor ‘East Ian Patrick, no. 1, 2001. R. Zambelli, Christian Bugnion, Queensland, 2001, available at the University of Queensland website, www.uq.edu.au. the University at available Queensland, 2001, Crisis’, from Timor Humanitarian Response to the East The Intervention: Helen Leslie, ‘Globalising Proceedings Humanitarianism: Conference 2001. May National Internships Programme, National University’s Australian and the Office in Canberra References and further reading References Reconstruction and of the Capacity of Local NGOs in Relief, ‘Making the Most and Ian Patrick, Hunt Arsenio Bano, Janet from Timor’, Case of East The Development: circus came to town circus For years after the end of the civil war in 1992, Tajikistan attracted little outside attention, despite attracted Tajikistan 1992, in war of the civil after the end years For with the US war all changed This need. economic collapse, ethnic strife and humanitarian insecurity, Afghanistan. in neighbouring Taliban against the and drought faced another severe ago,Tajikistan A year food insecurity, the health system had collapsed and the the country deemed too was in ruins.Yet was economy agencies to operate in, for many insecure was and there regional strategy to tackle infectious no coherent and the food deficit.disease outbreaks Funding for fell short programmes humanitarian and development of needs, and consistently only a handful of committed donors funded international NGOs in the country.This of 11 September. the events all changed following For months,several in the arrival forces of foreign between Afghanistan and the toppling of the neighbouring Taliban light. all corners Journalists trooped from of the world in, looking for the scoop on refugees, pre-positioning of for control for the expected final battle themselves Afghanistan, seeking out stories human disaster, of with crammed warehouses demanding as a backdrop Afghanistan,emergency supplies.With on all eyes next- suddenly important. was Tajikistan door Tajikistan: the next-door neighbour the next-door Tajikistan: Within the response itself, response the Within to be needs attention more military humani- and between to coordination paid tarian planning, political should not allow and we essential contingency us from to divert sensitivities effective, planning contingency planning. make To we of on the politics homework do more need to crises,impending and the issues, the players know and in partnership local work to with credible be ready leaders.This is the wider lesson:work need to that we at prevention. warnings that harder many were There HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 11 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage12 12 ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES ea omv n somewiththeclearintentionof began tomove in, organisations International chronic malnutrition. inlevels deterioration of a further underscored raisedawareness ofpoorweaning practicesand deficit, umbrella inOctober2001highlightedthefood under the Action Against HungerandCARE survey Thenationalnutritional conducted country. andreviewlearn thecontextandsituationin alandmarkvisitto made coordinator, humanitarian theUN’s Kenzo Oshima, onthecountry. lent stories to whataidworkers andsomewrote hadtosay, excel- didlisten journalists More serious collapse andneed. social found starkimagesofcivil war devastation, and a week begantoventure away from Dushanbe, whostayed Journalists including in beyond Tajikistan. needs ofpeopleinCentral Asia more widely, prompted arecognition ofthe andunderstanding to inflictitselfonthepeopleof Afghanistan has thelatestcrisis Cynicalthoughitmay be, detrimental. Not alltheeffectsofthismassive attentionwere Positives maintaining accessamidthisnew-found attention. haddifficulty displaced providing basichealthcare, whichhadbeenworking withthe agency Merlin, TheBritish than generous foodandothersupplies. suddenlylavished donors onpeoplemore instead, were scarcely mentioned; andaccessdifficult, priate thatthesites were inappro- raised theprevious year, Yet issues important Tajikistan and Afghanistan. between whichisdisputedterritory this area, Some12,000peoplewere strandedin organisations. andnewsand accessible siteforeagerphotographers onthePyanj islandsbecameasought-after territory Thepopulationstrandedindisputed the paperwork. nalists willingtopay whatever ittooktospeedup behindjour- end ofthequeueforvisasandpermits, Agenciesfoundthemselves atthe someone dying?’. asking ‘is therefront animageof linein Afghanistan, with yawns from young gunsdesperatetobeonthe lookingforascoopwould oftenmeet journalists attempts todiscussthesituationin Our Tajikistan with issueswere humanitarian sidelined. activity, allthis goods.Amid beeranddried ketchup, supplies, emptiedofwater Supermarkets ficial crossing-point. unof- theprincipal vehicles jammedFarkhor-Kokul, and copter across theborder into Afghanistan soared, of aseatfortheten-minute heli- hopby military Theprice satellite phonesandwaiting forup-links. clutching and thronged Dushanbe’s andhotels, bars andmakingrequests, seekingpapers foreign ministry, jostledonthestepsof Journalists headline news. inSeptember,TajikistanOvernight suddenlybecame was hardthat accurateinformation toobtain. Bureaucratic obstaclesmeant forinstance. malaria, there were casesof halfamillionconfirmed of 2001, by theend Health Organisationacknowledged that, the World reality; health figures hidamuch grimmer Favourable official received very littledirect help. suchastheRasht/Karategin Valley, vulnerability, areas of Isolatedandmarginalised population. rural estimated by the World Bankat80%ofthelargely- HUMANITARIAN exchange ed.Ifthefooddeficitisnotaddressed atthe needs. onlythemostacutehumanitarian chronic issues, fundingsaturationwill notrelieveterm themore Short- programme initiatives level. atthestructural What isneedednow isfundingforlonger-term The humanitarian challenge Development Bank. the World Bankandthe Asian UN agencies, the andconsultativeforums processes ledby NGOs, –are nowlosis andmalaria thesubjectofregional tubercu- public –HIV/AIDS, healthintheregion threats Thegreatest to support. more international andalcoholabuse needs domestic violenceanddrug treatment for longer-term stresses andtrauma, psycho-social care hasshiftedaway from war-related andtheneedfor the socialcontexthaschanged, Both While populations remain excludedandvulnerable. typhoidandmalaria. including brucellosis, outbreaks ofdiseasesepidemicpotential, ductive healthcare andthecapacity torespond to repro- includingaccesstoessentialdrugs, healthcare, the Rasht/Karategin Valley, whichisin needofbasic andthepopulationof previouslymortality existed, where highratesof institutions, of psychiatric in-patients needs thatMSFhasbeenresponding to: There ismore forthe interest andgenuine concern theseprotocols are now fullyendorsed. response; protocols forcommunicable diseasenotificationand Health refused toacknowledge thestanding WHO of theMinistry feverrhagic inKhatlonregion, following anoutbreak ofhaemor- Earlier in2001, thecountry. facing acknowledgement ofthecrises theresult ismore coherent attentionand Tajikistan, required toattractawareness ofthesituationin While we may thatwas resent theintensityofeffort andthere was aresponse. seen, They were feed itselfformore thanafew months. harvests whichhave to notenabled afamily cook, gaspressure solow thatitisimpossible to electricity, of dailyshortages suffering tosurvive, peopletry rural Farfrom theDushanbehotelbar, since taken root. food andnon-foodmediaorganisationshave health, motivatedothers by theneedsin Tajikistan; but cross-bordermanaging activity into Afghanistan, Poor infrastructure posesseriousproblems

for agencies © Bernice Vreezaam/MSF Bernice © ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES 13 , Third (New York: St. (New York: Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July is Head of Mission for MSF–Holland in MSF–Holland for of Mission is Head Journal of Mental Health Reforms Journal , Issue 10, 2001. Tajikistan: The Trials of Trials The Independence Tajikistan: References and further reading and further References Process’, Peace Tajikistan The of Compromise: ‘Politics ACCORD Akiner and Shirin Grare Frederic Mohammad Reza Djalili, (eds), Press, 1998). Martin’s Crisis International An Uncertain Peace’, ‘Tajikistan: Group, December 2001. Rasht/Karategin Health Survey: MSF-Holland, ‘Mother’s April Tajikistan’, 2000. Valley, National Hunger (UK), ‘Representative Against Action and (Sughd, RRS, Kouliab Tajikistan Nutritional Survey Report, October–November Regions)’, Final Teppe Kurgan 2001. Cunningham and Kaz Deborah Baibabayev, Abduvakhid Health Care in ‘Update on the State of Mental de Jong, Tajikitsan’, Quarter 2000. Ministry of Health official health Tajikistan Republic of (in at www.medinfo.tojikiston.com statistics are available Russian). Penny Harrison Penny in with MSF–Holland She worked Tajikistan. in in Uzbekistan in 2000, and Pakistan/Afghanistan 1998–99. HPN Network Paper 39 Paper HPN Network by Robert Muggah. July 2002. Robert Muggah. July by Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action small arms and Reconsidering the tools of war: Civilians and humanitarian workers are regularly killed, maimed and threatened with small arms. The avail- The are regularly killed, maimed and threatened with small arms. and humanitarian workers Civilians forced disability, and physical is also closely associated with psychological ability and misuse of these weapons and social violence. declining access to basic needs in areas of conflict displacement and civilians’ with the issue more proactively a preliminary roadmap for humanitarian agencies to engage paper provides This from both the disarmament and the of small arms and light weapons. It reviews the dimensions of the problem, for understanding and measuring the human- and presents a conceptual framework humanitarian perspective, of the magnitude and scale of the itarian impacts of small-arms use. Its principal argument is that evidence of Solid evidence is the bedrock humanitarian impacts of small arms and light weapons is urgently required. – and humanitarian agencies must lead the way. and intervention sound policy focus on mitigating These emerging. Promising humanitarian responses to the threat of small arms are gradually in violence- humanitarian law of the supply of weapons to human rights violating regimes, the enforcement human- A better understanding of the security in the field. reform to improve affected societies and operational the to inform among stakeholders, and can serve awareness itarian impacts will contribute to generating reduce armed violence. to of interventions evaluation and a practical a moral and use is both Engaging with the humanitarian dimensions of small arms availability are killed, the hundreds of thousands of people who recalls the plight of A humanitarian perspective imperative. A human- and assets at gunpoint. of their homes small arms, and the millions deprived injured and disabled by been has until now a debate which places the security and safety of people at the centre of itarian perspective a disarmament and arms control approach. dominated by central and regionalcentral levels, changing by to policy cotton,prioritise over food crops persist, it will then riskas will the of deteriorated health.There is also a institutional supportneed for to tackle corruption. changed, has indeed While much is political stability assured,still not security and concerns still prevent in the projects establishing from organisations many Rasht/Karategin Valley. Tajikistan attention and assistance to While increased and the region is clearly needed, is this the way scrutiny. careful requires provided The immediate of some donors,reaction the US, notably to provide for assistance as pay-back military and development Afghanistan support during in the war Tajikistan’s is a riskmeans that there this tap will be turned that should this supportoff just as quickly be withdrawn. Humanitarian this, agencies need to resist and to that humanitarianfight to ensure and development politics of bilateral assistance is not confused with the support policy concerns. and foreign Independent and impartial action, which has been critical in Tajikistan, in agency presence protecting must continue. for humanitarian Funding assistance should not be conditional on political support, should be but on need in an impartial based manner.Thisprovided be an old adage,may it has been called into but question in this latest crisis. HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 13 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage14 14 ‘NOISY’ EMERGENCIES nentoa i okr itiue od clothesand aidworkers food, International distributed clothesanddomesticappliances. supplied withfood, andthateveryone withoutexceptionwould be free, water would andotherpublic services be of electricity, someonesomewhere decidedthatsupplies Serb forces, Inthechaosthatfollowed of thedeparture mixed. andourfeelingsare inevitably Kosovans thinkandact, agencies andaidworkers haschangedtheway thepresence ofsomany international same time, andtotheircountries.Yet atthe tothem, be grateful andwe tolifeinKosovo, willalways contribution nary havethem asbestwe madeanextraordi- could.They andwe supported heroes ofhumanityandcharity, We welcomed theseorganisationsasourrescuers, never will Kosovo, beknown. andhow much money flowedorganisations came, into How many workers andmassive amountsoffunding. ofaid withthemuncountednumbers bringing relief agenciesfloodedintoKosovo,international forces from Inthewake Kosovo. oftheNATO action, NATO’s bombingcampaignandtheremoval of Serb everything changedwith In1999, Sweden andtheUS. Germany, Branches were established inSwitzerland, clothing toover ayear. 30,000needyfamilies foodand to thedisabled andelderlydistributed provided specialservices clinicinPristina, a maternity clinics around societyalsooperated theprovince.The with92 had over 7,000volunteers and1,700doctors, theMother Teresa By1998, organisation political life. toexpungethemfromeffort theprovince’s socialand institutions were closeddown inathoroughgoing their from theirjobsandevicted from theirhomes; province’s wereAlbanian majority.Albanians dismissed Kosovo inresponse totheSerbrepression ofthe established in ofthe 1990 aspart ‘parallel society’ The Mother Teresa societywas foundedin charitable Gani Demolli The Mother Teresa societyandthewar inKosovo HUMANITARIAN Widespread destructionpromptedamassive exchange

describes theimpactofaidinflux international response ©UNHCR bnac,but few plansorideasforthefuture. abundance, forpast withnostalgia Kosovans passive andconfused, themassive relief presence hasleft more far-reaching; damageisperhaps Thepsychological widespread. useandprostitution drug are andcorruption, 80%, upto Levels ofunemployment are high, premises. other localNGOswithoutmeansand leaving theMother Teresafrom Kosovo, societyand organisationshavetional humanitarian withdrawn theinterna- Now thattheemergencyphaseisover, of usingthismoney forrelief work. but with nointention hoping toattractforeign funds, many ofthemsetupby relatives were registered, eties’ local ‘soci- Kosovan theirefforts, institutions.Through in andengineers doctors more thanuniversity staff, yet they were paidbetween tenand15times perform, inthetasksthey wereinexperienced asked to Moststaffwere unqualifiedand needed themornot. whetherthey which couldhire themostlocalstaff, Agencieswere competinginaracetosee hostilities). despitetheendof vehicles (even vehicles, armoured andboughtexpensive forcing rents up, best houses, Aidworkers rented the ofneed. evidence and criteria any without other itemsinthestreet indiscriminately, Society. Gani Demolli Intervention’, R. Caplan,‘Kosovo: The ImplicationsforHumanitarian 20 Aid inKosovo “Humanitarian”?’, Raymond Apthorpe, ‘Was InternationalEmergency Relief (Geneva: UNHCR). UNHCR’s Emergency PreparednessandResponse Kosovo RefugeeCrisis: An IndependentEvaluation of R. Garlock, M.Barutciski,P. Sandisonand A. Suhrke, DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds P. Wiles etal., References andfurtherreading A DiscussionPaper OCHA, 2000). Balkan Crisis Larry Minear Yale University Press, 2000). Tim Judah, Crusade Tariq(ed.), Ali 1999. , March 2002. Humanitarian Assistance totheFormer Yugoslavia: (London: Verso, 2000). (London: Verso, Kosovo: War andRevenge et al.,NATO andHumanitarian Action inthe , OccasionalPaper 36(Boston,MA: Tufts, Forced Migration Review Masters oftheUniverse?: NATO’s Balkan Independent Evaluation ofExpenditure is adoctorwiththeMother Teresa (New York: OCHA,1999). (London: DEC, August 2000). Humanitarian Exchange (New Haven, CT: , vol. 5, August The HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 15

PRACTICE NOTES Paying the ultimate price: an analysis of aid-worker fatalities Increasing numbers of aid workers are losing their lives in the line of duty. Yet while this trend is of increasing concern to the aid community, much of the evidence is anecdotal, and there is little hard data on which to base policy. Dennis King describes a research project that has attempted to fill this gap

Statistics and documentation concerning fatalities To be included in the chronology, incidents had to among humanitarian workers are woefully incomplete. adhere to a number of criteria: In addition to the efforts of individual researchers, the Office of the UN Security Coordinator keeps records • The incident took place in a country during an and compiles statistics on casualties among UN civilian emergency or post-emergency transition period. staff, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping • Death was the result of intentional violence or a Operations tallies fatalities among UN peacekeepers, work-related transport accident in an aircraft or military observers and other personnel on UN peace- road vehicle. keeping missions. Likewise, the International • Recorded deaths were limited to individuals Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies working for civilian humanitarian-related organisa- and International Committee of the Red Cross tions, both local and expatriate, and all passen- maintain data on security incidents involving Red gers/crew on a humanitarian assistance mission, for Cross delegates, volunteers and local staff. However, to instance drivers, security personnel and pilots. analyse the trends and assess the security threats faced Incidents involving peacekeeping personnel were by aid workers, we need to track incidents involving all included only if such personnel were killed while organisations providing some type of humanitarian providing security assistance for a humanitarian assistance, not just UN agencies. mission or convoy. • Deaths resulting from natural causes or suicide were Chronology of incidents not included. The analysis in this article is derived primarily from reports in the ReliefWeb document database for the years Analysis 1997–2001. ReliefWeb collects and publishes documents An analysis of the information collected in the from over 600 sources. Data follows the standard chronology indicates that more civilian humanitarian promoted by the Structured Humanitarian Assistance aid workers were killed by acts of violence than died Reporting (SHARE) approach, under which data is in vehicle and aircraft accidents. Almost half (47%) of presented with its source, the date of the information and the non-accidental deaths of aid workers were the the geographic area of the incident reported.The research result of ambushes on vehicles or convoys, carried out resulted in the compilation of a detailed chronology of by bandits or rebel groups. fatalities, which is on the ReliefWeb website at http://www.reliefweb.int/ symposium/NewChron1997- The research also produced a list of the ten countries 2001.html. where the greatest number of non-accidental deaths PRACTICE NOTES

Table 1: Number of security incidents per year

Year Vehicle or Stationary Anti-aircraft Aerial Landmine Transport Total convoy attack fire bombing accident ambush

2001 10 8 1 4 4 12 39

2000 29 12 – 2 5 – 48

1999 15 12 9 1 – 27 64

1998 13 11 14 3 1 8 50

1997 14 12 – – – 22 48

Number 21 • July 2002 15 HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage16 16 PRACTICE NOTES the Security ofUNPersonnel andspecialstaffsecurity the Security suchasthe Trust thesemechanisms, However, Fundfor Coordinator.consistent fundingfortheUNSecurity New ways have alsobeenproposed toensure staff. andmore trainingandcounsellingforgeneral officers security fieldandheadquarters resources forhiring allocatingnew at the level, Assistant-Secretary-General Coordinator includingappointingaSecretary security, General hasproposed new measures toimprove Secretary- procedures andcoordination structures.The have ofUNpersonnel security recommended new General tothe Assembly onthesafetyand in1999and2001fromReports theUNSecretary- coordination systems. programmes andsecurity Rescue Committeehave developed training RedRandtheInternational VOICE, InterAction, Organisationssuchas trained officers’. ‘security are employing more bothUNandother, Agencies, awarenesssecurity intotheirtrainingprogrammes. andhave incorporated and response mechanisms, organisations have improved monitoring staffsecurity UNagenciesandinternational and NGOconsortia. aswell asby many NGOs being addressed by theUN, provision trainingis ofbetterprotection andsecurity The aidworkerscivilian humanitarian are serious. by faced The datademonstratesthatthedangers workers Enhancing thesecurityofhumanitarianaid personnel. and/or expatriate inpublicbe reported sources thanthedeathsofUN sincetheseincidentsare lesslikely to probably higher, is The number oflocaland/orNGOfatalities were employed orundercontracttoUNagencies. while41% behalf ofnon-governmental organisations, than half(59%)ofthesevictimsworked fororon More and26%expatriate. werefatalities localstaff, 74%of Among theincidentsofintentionalviolence, are in thesecountries orhave recently beenso. conflict, Unsurprisingly, occurred. Afghanistan 17 Angola 46 nldn ooo 3 5 including Kosovo 11 Federal Republicof Yugoslavia, Indonesia andEast Timor Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 Burundi 6 Somalia 11 Democratic RepublicofCongo Rwanda 17 Sudan 26 HUMANITARIAN exchange Deaths by country (topten) improved awareness security andprocedures. thebasisforpolicy-makingand tion canthenform Thisinforma- andthecausesofthesefatalities. place, where theseincidentshave taken have beenkilled, how aidworkers manyto determine humanitarian Theanalysisprovides representative statistics analysis. canbeusedfor dated datacollectionandreporting consoli- conducted todemonstratehow systematic, The research isbasedwas onwhichthisarticle Data andpolicy-making concerned. mation amongalltheactors thisinfor- incidentsandsharing tracking allsecurity improving thisrelationship istodevelop asystemfor Oneway of their NGOimplementingpartners. relationship betweensecurity UNorganisationsand Coordinator andNGOstoprovide aframework fora betweenUnderstanding theUNSecurity strengthening the1996Memorandumof looked atways of RescueCommittee, International SeniorOperationsDirector atthe Randolph Martin, Exchange,March 2001issueofHumanitarian Inthe personnel. does itapplytolocally-recruited nor ments withtheUNanditsspecialisedagencies; that donothave agree- implementing/partnership the convention NGOs isnotapplicable tohumanitarian However, Nations and Associated Personnel. enacted the1994Convention ontheSafetyofUnited theUN In1999, been prosecuted atnationallevel. but itisnot yet inforce andvery few caseshave crime, awarmakes personnel themurder ofhumanitarian Court Criminal Rome StatuteoftheInternational The personnel. ofhumanitarian address thesecurity law hasalsosoughtto humanitarian International under-funded. seriously are Emergency Appeals, programmes includedintheannual UNConsolidated [email protected]. Geneva in February Humanitarian Information,which tookplacein dinator fortheSymposiumonBestPractices in UNICEF Emergency Operations Centre,andwas coor- tives, includingtheUN’s ReliefWeb projectandthe worked onseveral humanitarianinformationinitia- established HumanitarianInformationUnit.Hehas Dennis King 2001. Security ofNGOStaff’, Randolph Martin,‘A MoreProactive UNRoleinthe Summer 2001. in aComplexEmergency’, Dennis KingandMaxxDilley, ‘How To ShareInformation References andfurtherreading is ChiefoftheUSgovernment’s newly- Humanitarian Exchange 2002. Hisemailaddressis: Humanitarian Affairs Review Humanitarian Affairs 18, March , HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 17

Weighing up the risks in aid work Aid work can be a dangerous occupation. Here, Mike Gent looks at how aid workers weigh the risks they face, and suggests how these judgements may be better made

Aid workers face a variety of hazards, including inten- were able to give, and their security. Their driving tional violence, traffic accidents, disease and stress. Many motive was to make ‘real’ contact with people and to humanitarian disasters involve conflict, and most help them. Security was a major problem – especially conflicts occur against a backdrop of collapsed states, if provided by the military, since this could compro- where treaties and UN Charters are not observed. mise their impartiality (and make them more of a Under these conditions, civilians and aid workers are target). Another problem sometimes encountered was afforded little protection. Some level of exposure to risks hostility from the beneficiaries themselves. This is inevitable, and may even be necessary to get the job hostility was particularly difficult for aid workers to done. But the imperative that drives most aid workers – deal with because, in part, it was due to their inability to help people in need – may encourage them to put to provide beneficiaries with adequate relief supplies. themselves into excessively dangerous situations. Judging risks Mortality rates among aid workers Among the first people to look into our perceptions In an article in the British Medical Journal in 2000, of risk were the psychologists Amos Tversky and Mani Sheik and colleagues at the Johns Hopkins Daniel Kahneman, in the 1970s. They suggested that, School of Hygiene and Public Health reported 375 in order to manage information and simplify decision- deaths among civilian UN and NGO aid workers and making, we tend to use three basic ‘rules of thumb’ UN peacekeepers in the 14 years from 1985. Their when we analyse risk. conclusions are presented in the table below. Vivid memories and images The number of deaths rose from 1985, and peaked in Our assessment of risk in a given situation may be 1994 at the time of the Rwandan crisis. The high greatly affected by personal memories. High-profile, number of intentional deaths compared to road dramatic events that we identify with are more easily accident fatalities reflects the increasingly violent available to us, and so we judge the associated risk to conditions that aid workers face. be higher. This operated in all the interviews I conducted with aid workers. Events that they or their Against this background, this article describes research colleagues had experienced conjured up powerful, that looks at the risks aid workers are typically easily-retrievable images. One interviewee explained exposed to, and how they perceive them. It is based on how the memory of the death of his brothers had interviews with experienced aid workers carried out affected his behaviour towards the risk of HIV: ‘I in June last year. know the consequences. I come from a big family.We were 11 of us and three of my brothers died of AIDS’. What concerns aid workers? Most of the aid workers interviewed were mainly A vivid image can also affect the level of perceived concerned with two matters: the quality of aid they risk. One woman explained why she would not wear PRACTICE NOTES Number of fatalities, by cause Organisation Intentional Unintentional Motor vehicle Other* Total violence violence accident

UN programme 145 3 23 6 177

UN peacekeepers 45 13 24 6 88

Non-governmental 23 6 10 19 58 organisation

Red Cross/Red Crescent 40 5 7 NA 52

Total 253 27 64 31 375

NA = not available * Includes disease

Number 21 • July 2002 17 HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage18 18 PRACTICE NOTES okdhr opeaefrtevst andhadinvestedworked hard toprepare forthevisit, may bebecause they had when visitingthearea.This whichthey wear would normally vests andhelmets, thatthey couldnotfindtheirbullet-proofthe fact to continue withavisittodangerous despite region where aidworkers decided my oneincident, researchunearthed For instance, sions andinvestment. because we feelwe must justifyourprevious deci- ofactiondespitepoorresults.Wecourse may dothis Escalation iswhenwe ploughonwithaparticular Escalation other people’s neighbourhoods. because theimplicationisthatthingsonlyhappenin ment may beover-confident andover-optimistic It’s judge- pretty safe’.This or inmy neighbourhood. nothinghasever happenedonmy compound years, commented that ‘now thatI’ve lived there fortwo Oneinterviewee confidence inourown judgements. biasisover-negative thingstootherpeople.Another and believe thatpositive thingswillhappentous, we tendto Unrealistic optimismisacommonbias: Unrealistic optimismandover-confidence Other biases tioning theirdecisions. their judgementsmay discouragepeoplefrom ques- but becomingtooreliant on position tojudgerisks, may officers beinthebest Security taken care of.’ Sothat’s been time we have togetoutofthatarea. timewe what cangoinandwhat where we cango, ‘He makes sure thatheknows whatisgoingon, officeraboutwhichareas werea security safetovisit: viewee how they described relied onthedecisionsof Oneinter- judgements. an over-reliance onothers’ alsoinvolves Anchoring adequate adjustmentslater. become anchored toitandmay tomake fail we Once we make aninitialjudgementaboutarisk, Anchoring andadjustment or itmay beanover-estimate ofthethreat they pose. may beasensible precaution – citizens.This ordinary they were stillseenasmore dangerous than unarmed, even thoughtherefugees were So, threat. greater andtherefore feltthatthey represented a ants’, refugee campsaw therefugees as combat- ‘former Anotherinterviewee working ina that isimportant. she isinbut group whatshedoestoavoidrisk HIV thatitisnotthe leadshertoignore thefact of herself Thisstereotyped image behaviour group’. high risk ‘With HIV/AIDS I’mnotinany of HIVinfection: One interviewee asbeingatlow classedherself risk Stereotyping such thinking. and trainingmay have tothevividness of contributed briefings Security so hasmadecontingencyplans. and ithappening, but imagines in suchanincident, Shehasnever beeninvolved down I’mstillatarget’. ifIlie from thecarandthere’s nothinginthefield, T-shirt ifIgointothefieldbecausehave torun a red don’tT-shirt wear ared whenonafieldtrip:‘I HUMANITARIAN exchange escalation withinthegroup. Thismay betheidealbreeding-ground for formed. may be where andrivalries strong friendships teams, Many aidworkers operateinsmall and respect. anddevelopingmade inbuilding friendships trust ortosave theinvestment preserve one’s reputation, maySo increased beanattemptto risk-taking be seenby therest ofyour colleaguesasthewimp’. funny judgementtomake becauseyou don’t want to it’s abitof Now obviously, be forced intogoing. shouldnothave thatperson to ingoing, comfortable ‘we dorecognise doesnotfeel thatifaperson back: the incidentshowed anotherreason fornotturning explorationof Further significant timeandenergy. over-cautious norreckless? where people’s actionsare neither ‘optimal risk’, ataconceptof Isitpossiblethey toarrive face? how canpeoplemake betterdecisionsabouttherisks andthequestionis: decisionshavereality, tobemade, In people tobeeitherover-cautious orreckless. Biasesmay cause these judgementsaboutrisks. We in oferror canonlyspeculateonthedegree Conclusion the risks. tokeep themaware justtotry of from visitingareas, problem andsometimesdeliberatelystoppedhisteam Anotherrecognised the get more dangerous’. Itcan because atany stagethey candecideotherwise. but Ithinkitshouldn’t betreated like that happen, Iknow whatisgoingto It’s like, routine toyou. ‘whenithappensseveral timesitbecomes the army: commentedaboutbeing interrogated byOne person was alsonotedby interviewees. relaxed aboutthings’ andofbecoming getting usedtorisks ‘a bittoo Thedangerof becomesan oflife’. risk part ‘integral something ‘you havething you tolive accept’; with’; wererisks toas referred ‘one ofthosethings’;‘some- many Intheinterviews, toomuch. against worrying Desensitisation canbeusedasadefencemechanism they may becomeblasé. a number oftimes, destination despitepassingthrough adangerous area ifaidworkers safelyattheir arrive For instance, them. changes over timeaswe with becomemore familiar ourperception ofrisks us topotentialdangers.Thus, cansometimesdesensitise Becoming inured torisk Habit reduced. theperceived ofHIVis risk Because ofthiserror, may well beHIVpositive.not having diedof AIDS, while many more oftheinterviewee’s acquaintances, moreover, knowledge ofasmallnumber ofpeople; Thisideaisbasedonlyon figures. official mortality andsodoubted people whohaddiedof AIDS, interviewee One onlyknew twodata thatisavailable. ormay notconsiderallthe have incompletedata, anindividual may In makingajudgementaboutrisk, Relying onincompletedata PRACTICE NOTES 19 , 185: Science Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July , HPN Good Practice Review 8 , HPN Good Practice Operational Security Management Operational , vol. 321, 15 July 2000. 321, 15 July , vol. , vol. 354, no. 9,179, 1999. , vol. Judgement in Managerial Decision- Judgement The Lancet The (New York: John Wiley, 1986). Wiley, John York: (New a) because I’ve been lucky so far? lucky been I’ve a) because the situa- used to too become I’ve b) because seen as a wimp? to be want I don’t c) because to happen won’t I think bad things d) because tion? me? put in? I’ve 1,124–1,131, 1974. Max Bazerman, Making Van Brabant, Koenraad in Violent Environments (London: ODI, 2000). References and further reading and References in Dangerous Workers Aid for the Safety of ‘Thought Places’, Mani Sheik, et al., ‘Deaths Among Humanitarian Workers’, Among Humanitarian Mani Sheik, et al., ‘Deaths British Medical Journal Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgement Under and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgement Tversky Amos Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, 4) that work I need to pull back despite the hard Do of the aware more should be made Aid workers affect decision-making,biases that may and encour- judgements.aged to analyse their information More face. risksis needed about the aid workers Incidents errors to identify possible could then be analysed of judgement,the lessons to be learned. and Further is necessaryaid whether training to establish research in risk leads to better decision- perception workers making, statistical models could be and whether decision-making in field situa- to help developed tions. for which one is held responsible.Thus accountability certain to undertake … the responsibility involves taking actions) and the actions (or forbear from an account of those actions’. to provide responsibility Code of Conduct, to the Red Cross/NGO According account- are humanitarians in disaster relief working seek to assist and to those from ‘to both those we able accept resources’. whom we clients: two are So there ‘payers’ the ‘users’. and the of the humanitarian serviceThe client-payers the are , accountability can in fact hamper efforts to improve quality , accountability can in fact hamper efforts to improve John Adams John and adjust my estimate of the risk?adjust my Laurent Larose Laurent a) do I know enough to make a judgement? enough to make a) do I know earlier decisions and b) do I need to rethink (mine or others’)? because of the way the humanitarian system operates because of the way quality and accountability when applied to What are of the world humanitarian from action? Borrowing business, with its clients and suppliers, might define we ‘the conformity of the humanitarian servicequality as to the explicit and implicit needs of clients’.Therefore, by should be evaluated the quality of programmes ‘customer satis- of surveys and quantitative qualitative faction’, besides the technical indicators that measure elements of the service and the process. to According Rob Gray,Professor ‘the duty to accountability is of those actions an account … or reckoning provide Accountability and quality: uncomfortable bedfellows? Accountability and quality: uncomfortable within the humanitarian of initiatives been the subject of a variety and ‘quality’ have ‘Accountability’ Yet, debate between proponents of the different approaches. and there has been lively community, argue Although assessing risk assessing Although personal and is a complex decision- people’s matter, to improve possible be it may making skills. is that, problem One in the field, either wrong, is usually receive we feedback the non- existent, to need or open to interpretation.We delayed aware to become process the decision-making examine to. subject are and errorsof the biases we that can be been developed have Statistical models risksused to analyse outcomes. and predict These models out-perform experts in their consistency of results.This at collecting better is because people are it.information at processing are than they Most been used in static situations,models have as the such someone a bank loan;decision to offer to it remains can be adapted for field conditions. be seen if they of risk perception While the individual is important, the aid organisation and its risk-management strategy risk an effect on the amount of their also have may to.personnel themselves expose Organisations should not if the outcome was good decisions even reward intended.what was encourage better This may decision-making, of risks a greater appreciation and a in riskreduction exposure. be eliminated,Risks can never some these are but up the weighing are things to think about when we risk: 1) facts?: the Do I have 2) Am I exaggerating risk because of past experiences 3) Am I under-estimating the risk?: HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 19 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage20 20 PRACTICE NOTES problems ofqualitycontrol andwastage’. leadingto pressure tospendfunds, enormous tion onKosovo meantthatagencieswere under Kosovo evaluation statesthat atten- ‘the international EmergencyCommittee(DEC)’sThe UKDisasters then neglectthesetools? worked hard todefinestandards andgoodpractices Why didthesameorganisationsthat sanitation. areas like includingincrucial dards were rarely met, andsuggestthatstan- general lackofprofessionalism, Yet evaluations of the response notea standards. toimplementandfieldtesttheSphere an opportunity response.This offered and thescaleofinternational healthoftherefugee population, the goodpre-crisis thanksto ofepidemic, risk there was noshort-term itquicklybecameclearthat In Albania in1999, design. inneedsassessmentandprogramme participation regarding particularly refugees’ and codesofconduct, epidemics may drive agenciestobypass goodpractice theimperative toprevent In mostemergencies, Kosovo 1999:constraints onquality restore theircopingcapacities. haveor man-madedisasters toassistance theright fromacknowledges natural thatpopulationssuffering whichconveys and respect forhumandignity, bearers’, We couldusetheword ‘rights- evaluating impact. results and rather bedemonstratedby monitoring andshould actioncannotbetaken forgranted, tarian thebenefitsofhumani- However, provided. services that peopleinvariably benefitfrom thehumanitarian and impliespassivity, Thisterm called ‘beneficiaries’. raison d’être ofthewholeaidbusiness –are theso- –the client-users private andinstitutionaldonors.The are more public attentionisdrawn tosituationsthat Thus, situation’. thehumanitarian andsympathy for, ness of, are calledonlywhenthere is ‘sufficient public aware- DECappeals responses’.To beeffective, humanitarian andto ‘raise standards intheimplementationof way’, timelyandfullyaccountable are usedinaneffective, coordination bodieslike theDECsothat ‘funds raised NGOshaveHumanitarian developed fundraising way tolessdramatic rehabilitation work. funding whentheimmediateemergencyphasegives negative consequencesofthisincludeless attracts.The andhencetheamountofpublic interest it emergency, depends largelyonthelevel ofmediaattentiontoan Funding an emergencyandtheavailability offunds. linksbetween themediaprofilesee thepernicious of lbly eore r iie thisfund-raisingmecha- resources are finite, globally, Because, over-funding ofhigh-profile emergencies. the Children, Tearfund and World Vision UK. Fund ofGB, Concern,Helpthe Aged, Merlin,Oxfam,Save UK, Children’s Aid Direct,Christian Aid, ChristianChildren’s ActionAid, theBritishRedCross,CAFOD, CARE International disasters overseas. Itscurrentmembershipcomprises coordinates theUK’s nationalappealinresponsetomajor 1 The DECisanumbrellaorganisationthatlaunches and HUMANITARIAN already exchange ne h ei ptih,andwe have under themediaspotlight, 1 hs we Thus, oiis orfetteraiyo h rcs,thepolicy Topolicies. reflect thereality oftheprocess, Some limitationscouldbereduced by reformulating Addressing theconstraints onquality cated budget regardless ofthereal level ofneed. tospendtheallo- andcompelsmanagers programmes, high-profile fundingsystemencouragesbig, tarian ofthehumani- institutionallogic The market share’. adversely affecttheorganisation’s ‘humanitarian beingprofessional would In short, the nextemergency. thiswould reduce the amount offundsmadeavailable totheorganisationfor Inturn, her organisation. andthusreduce theapparent capacity ofhisor ture, may well lowerrather thantoavailable expendi- funds, menting programmes that respond toactualneed, Amanagerimple- previous emergencies. during capacityisestimated according tothesizeofprogrammes implemented Thus, ture inrecent years. estimated according totheNGO’s overseas expendi- Thisis NGO’s capacitytorespond tothe ‘disaster’. money? Mostfundingsystemsare basedonthe anddoesnotusealltheavailable only thereal needs, What happensifanemergencymanageraddresses accountabilitymay notgive usquality.Thus, ratherthanneeds-driven. are mainlyresource-driven, guard againstwasting money inprogrammes which itprovides nosafe- define maximum standards inaid, AsSphere doesnot resources. global humanitarian allocationof atafair paramount confoundsefforts is thattheintentionofdonors Stating impartiality. of ultimately challengethefundamentalprinciple andmay atagloballevel), ability (totherights-bearers mayability (todonors) prevent downward account- to save Thisishow lives upward account- inanother. inonedisastercouldwelllittle extracomfort beused Butmoney usedtoprovide a torefugees. distributed kits inhygiene agencies supplieddisposable razors fundswere soplentifulthat forinstance, Kosovo, In for oneemergencycannotbeusedanother. andfundsraised flexibilityislimited, able todonors, stage?Becauseoftheneedtobeaccount- in thefirst more in-depthassessmentare lessgrave thanestimated Butwhathappensiftheneedsidentifiedby a tion. andtheirassumedevolu- according toassumedneeds, Fundsare allocated of thesituationisavailable. before aclear picture are launchedassoonpossible, inorder tobeeffective appeals Meanwhile, assessment. Programmes are rough plannedaccording tothefirst while assessmentsare stillbeingcompleted. life-saving programmes are implemented required, Becauseaquickresponse is evolving situation. by arapidly phase ofanemergencyischaracterised first theallocationofresources.The Another concerns system ontheother. ofthehumanitarian logic andtheorganisational hand, andobjectives principles ontheone humanitarian example oftheantagonismthatexistsbetween Thisisone are andhow much attentionthey attract. how largethey regardless ofwhere they are, gencies, responsenism isprejudicial toemer- totheimpartial HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page a

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1 MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: A Data 19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997) Movements by T. Dusauchoit (1994) 20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and 2 Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: Support of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997) The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM) by 21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience D. Mukupo (1994) by I. Levine (1997) 3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by 22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by M. Duffield (1994) P. Atkinson (1997) 4 Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The Political Economy 23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern Sri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997) Ethiopia by K. Van Brabant (1994) 24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by 5 Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold War Era: C. Palmer (1998) Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs by K. 25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief Rupesinghe (1994) ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998) 6 The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: initial 26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for under- successes and failures in food assistance by S. Jaspars (1994) standing rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998) 7 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief ed. disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998) J. Borton (1994) 28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999) 8 Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role of Formal and 29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience Informal Research Methods in Relief Operations by P. Ward of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda by and M. Rimmer (1995) K. Neefjes (1999) 9 Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD in 30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola by ACORD (1995) Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999) 10 Room for Improvement: the Management and Support of 31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Relief Workers by R. Macnair (1995) Well-being by R. Garfield (1999) 11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, Southern 32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Ethiopia by P. Jenden (1995) Sector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000) 12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons from the 33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need Health Sector by J. Macrae (1995) to Know by P. Le Billon (2000) 13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide and Directory to 34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for the Internet for Agencies involved in Relief and Accountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, Rehabilitation by L. Aris, P. Gee and M. Perkins (1996) V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000) 14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: 35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Assessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996) P. Holzmann (2001) 15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment 36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996) Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, 16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001) Study III ed. J. Borton (1996) 37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in 17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002) A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996) 38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations 18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and for Practice by A. Smith (2002) Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by 39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humani- J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996) tarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002)

Good Practice Reviews Good Practice Reviews are commissioned ‘state of the art’ reviews on different sectors or activities within the relief and rehabilitation field. Prepared by recognised specialists, and subject to peer review, they are produced in a format that is readily accessible to field-based personnel. 1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994) Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives by 2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Telford (1997) J. Shoham (1994) 6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced 3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Populations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998) Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996) 7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in 4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998) Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996) 8 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments 5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in by K. Van Brabant (200)

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK PRACTICE NOTES 21 is also a 20, March later this year. (Paris: Bordas, (Paris: (Geneva: UNHCR, (Geneva: , www.unhcr. John Adams John Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July , www.disasters.org.uk. , which has an article on the insti- , which Humanitarian Exchange Humanitarian Exchange Independent Evaluation of DEC Kosovo Independent Evaluation (London: ODI, 2000), available at (London: ODI, 2000), available has worked for both MSF and Oxfam. has worked Traité de la Qualité Totale de la Qualité Traité Mapping Accountability in Humanitarian Mapping et al., The Kosovo Crisis Kosovo The et al., (London: ALNAP/ODI, (London: ALNAP/ODI, 2000). Handbook for Emergencies DEC Policy Handbook DEC Policy References and further reading and References and we of Sphere is currently under way, An evaluation will report on it in UNHCR, Peter Raynard, Raynard, Peter Assistance to Silent Emergencies’; and Voice ‘Giving Anna Jefferys, ‘Medair and the ISO 9001 Quality Verboom, David Standard’, both in In the meantime, see the September 2001 issue of In the meantime, see the September Humanitarian Exchange Charter. tutionalisation of Sphere and the Humanitarian See also: Laboucheix, V. 1990). Astri Suhrke, at www.unhcr.ch. 2000), available et al., Wiles, Peter Appeal Funds www.disasters.org.uk/dec_standard/upload/kosovo.zip. DEC, 2002. Laurent Larose Laurent and a and trainer, a consultant, researcher He is now of humanitarian a network Trinôme, founder member of work other’s sharing ideas and reviewing each workers performance. His e-mail address is: to improve [email protected]. and as a trainer He works Trinôme. member of in Lyon. at Bioforce researcher the organisational level.the organisational its own generates system Each internal logic, institutional be some ways in may which objective. its overall at odds with in all This happens organisations, world. in the commercial even undoubtedly are the DEC bodies like Fundraising mechanisms, fund-raising effective and the efforts of the account- both the humanitarian to improve sector are of the serviceability and the quality it provides clearly sincere. the limitations demonstrated here But for the quality objectives realistic argue for more process. disappoint- help us to avoid will This realism ment, humanitarian wasting actors from and prevent time, debate on unproductive effort and resources evaluations. and about quality approaches of bodies such as the DEC could be that appeals are appeals be that DEC could as the such of bodies needs, estimated by driven a response not solely are and or fundraising opportunity.Appealsto a media could be clear that, raised, funds are if excessive the surplus will phase, the post-emergency be used for for alleviating or human sufferingother acute parts in other the of the spirit still capture world.This funds in which would donated.Thewere main concern of donors is that their in need, people donation will reach and not be wasted. informing by also be reduced and The constraints may educating donors of the field and, reality about the all,above training aid workers. by to want really If we the quality of humanitarian action,improve have we humanitarianfirst to convince actors of the crucial importance in the of implementing good practices field, with programmes and monitoring and evaluating indicators.objective of quality The main limitations funding no links between are that there are processes and rights-bearers’ satisfaction, the service providers. over Even no power and that the rights- bearers have the evaluated paid by are independent evaluators organisations, difficult. making objectivity inevitably the DEC evaluation explain why This ambiguity may ‘concerns about expresses response of the Kosovo quality,programme particularly such as assess- in areas ment, monitoring and evaluation’, while stating further and appro- relevant broadly ‘was that the assistance needs’.priate to people’s it is question how One may and appropriateness of to assess the relevance possible have when monitoringprogrammes evaluation and been neglected. should be trained in the techniques All field workers used in sciences surveys and quantitative of qualitative and marketing, sociology like them to so enabling work. their own evaluate also help would Training actors to internalise for quality, the quest which would approach, efficient than a top-down be more where the issue is the concern of headquarters and consul- tants, of field staff. not really but most emergencies, In the impulse to meet immediate needs on the ground those codes precisely to bypass lead field workers may headquar- by and advocated developed and standards ters. on the ball our eyes Keeping stems from None of the limitations of quality processes a lack of commitment to quality, or at the individual HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 21 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage22 22 PRACTICE NOTES itiseasierfor anddealwith Afghans tounderstand • itenhancesthecoherence andaccountabilityof • fundhasmany advantages: atrust Wolfensohn, According to committee. World BankPresident James ofitsmanagement withtheUNDPaspart involved, World Bankandtheotherfinancialinstitutions administeredThe by the ARTF isamulti-donor fund, Why atrustfund? including healthworkers. forstateemployees, expensessuchassalaries running aswell as includinginthehealthsector, projects, Administration infundingphysical reconstruction intended toassistthe Afghanistan Interim Thesefundsare and$380mover fouryears. year, first anticipatedtototalmore than$60millioninthe Bank, tothe contributions accordingARTF tothe are, World Pledged organising pledgeswithinasinglemechanism. to support international Afghanistan by ‘streamline’ the ARTF isdesignedto Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bankand the (UNDP), theUNDevelopment Programme World Bank, Ajointproposal ofthe was launchedinMay 2002. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund(ARTF) Reconstruction TheTrust Afghanistan Fund Afghan healthsystem. of thedecimated its suitabilityinthereconstruction Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund–andassesses theseresourcesat onemechanismformanaging –the looks Thisarticle 30months. $4.5 billionforthefirst haveof fundingforthecountry reached more than pledges attention, publicity andsuddeninternational massive Afghanistan may finallybewithinreach.Amid Shah in 2002haveApril raisedhopesthatpeace in November kingZahir offormer 2001andthereturn The capture ofKabul by theNorthern Alliance in Valéry Ridde The term‘reconstruction’isalready replacing‘rehabilitation’inthelexiconof Afghan aid.Here, Why atrustfund won’t work in Afghanistan actually fell,from$8percapitato$5.5. poverty. Between1996and2000,levels ofaid developing countriesaccordingtoindicatorsof Programme ranked Afghanistan eighty-ninthoutof90 severe levels ofneed:in2001,theUNDevelopment raised just50%oftheamountrequested. This despite and 2001,internationalappealsfor Afghanistan finding ithardtosecurethefundingdoso.In2000 keep Afghanistan’s socialservicesgoing,while For years before11September, NGOsstruggledto Afghanistan’s aiddeficit HUMANITARIAN an international aidprogramme deliveredan international viaa aid; international exchange takes issuewithproposalsforatrustfundtomanagereconstructionfunds manage fundsfor Afghanistan’s reconstruction. There are fundto three argumentsagainstusingatrust Arguments againstatrustfund itpromotes thatthe nationalunityby ensuring • itsimplifiestheprocedures forNGOs toobtain • itoffsetsthelow tax-raisingabilitiesofastate • ihtehl fNO.Hwvr the World However, Bank with thehelpofNGOs. of The reconstruction Afghanistan canonlybedone NGOs. andthusmainlyon aid, depends oninternational 70%ofhealthcare provision in Afghanistan Overall, responsible forover 168clinicsin18provinces. TheSwedish Committeefor Afghanistan is hospital. (AMI)built a$400,000 Médicale Internationale French NGO Aide forexample, In theearly1990s, have NGOs built healthfacilities. expertise. particular responsibility tolocalstaffandthey have developed a they have alwayscountry’s given culture andcustoms, they have ofthe anexcellentunderstanding years, Someorganisationshave beenthere forover 20 tained. haveAfghanistan thatsomebasicservices beenmain- It isonlythankstothepresence ofafew NGOsin services’. improving thequalityandeffectiveness ofthe the reach ofsystemshealthcare provision thanin edges thatit ‘has beenmore successfulinextending itselfacknowl-in anevaluation ofitsactivities,WHO possible inaUNprogramme.Yetthe qualityofservice the NGOlacked capabilityandwas unable toprovide claimingthat NGOMerlintotacklemalaria, British theWorldHealth instance, Organisation (WHO)didnotwelcome by the efforts for East Timor, In Coordination (OCHA). ofHumanitarian Affairs a recent prepared report fortheUN’s Officeforthe according to seems tobeaconstantoftheUNsystem, ThetendencytosidelineNGOs November 2001. agendaheldin meeting onthereconstruction onlyonewas invited toa World Bank Afghanistan, France thathave presence in hadalong-term ofthemany NGOsfrom For example, pushed aside. such away –theNGOswillbe thatthemainactors isthepossibilitythataidwillbeorganisedin The first Sidelining NGOs needs of competing groups areneeds ofcompetinggroups addressed. and funding; that state; strengthening thecapabilitiesofgovernment of whileatthesametime undergoing reconstruction, different programmes; ratherthanthrough many single mechanism, PRACTICE NOTES 23 , vol. 40, no. , vol. Humanitarian L’Aide Humanitaire L’Aide (Québec: Presses de Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July (Dili: WHO, (Dili: WHO, 2000). Social Science and Medicine Transitional Support Strategy Afghanistan Support Strategy Transitional is studying for a doctorate in commu- doctorate for a is studying East Timor Health Sector Situation Report: Timor East 6, 1995. WHO, 2000 January–December l’Université Laval, 2002). Laval, l’Université Cost and Utilization of ‘Quality, Fournier, S. Haddad and P. A Longitudinal Countries: Health Services in Developing in Zaire’, Study Internationale Canadienne Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field (London: ODI for OCHA, 2001). Humanitaire et la Santé de la Ridde, ‘L’Aide Valéry Y. Tâlebân’, in Afghane sous le Régime des Population (eds), Vera Conoir and G. References and further reading and References Bank, World Bank Group, 2002). World DC: (Washington the Reconstruction of ‘Launching Wolfensohn, D. James at a working Afghanistan’, official text of remarks delivered 2001, session at the US State Department, 20 November Bank website, www.worldbank.org. World at the available Wiles, Nicola Reindorp and Peter Valéry Ridde Valéry Quebec, Canada, University, nity health at Laval assistant. Between 1993 he is also a research where and of development in charge and 1999, he was organisa- French run by aid programmes emergency and Haiti. Iraq Afghanistan, tions in Mali, Niger, the poorest households than for the richest:than for households the poorest around 30%, to 7%. compared evidence is also much There the reduces payment of direct introduction that the that servicesamount used. are between In Zaire 1991,1987 and of health services use by declined 40%, fall a attributable mainly to cost. in other institutions Bank and World the With charge of managing the trustcoordinating fund and programmes, be Afghans will is a danger that there privatisation, into forced is thought to since the state Bank World and unaccountable.Thebe bureaucratic has stated as much, to recon- that its approach saying struction sector going is based on getting the private again.Timor,East In wish of the despite the express to all, accessible a health system freely for Timorese considering WHO are moving Bank and World the mecha- payment setting up direct rapidly towards nisms for service users.Afghanistan, In an have we system and opportunity healthcare to organise a new methods based on funding public to establish sharing risk at the national and perhaps even regional level, or tax. insurance through and efficient means funding is still the only effective Public and fair access to healthcare. universal of providing also foster national funding could Using public to the of credibility a level and restore reconciliation state apparatus. Privatising health Privatising is ARTF for opposing the and last reason The third system of the healthcare connected with the nature which will be on offer to the population. Reconstruction of the health sector should be based on the principle that health is a right and not a commodity. Charging for health services is not fair, nor will it work: in summer 2001, I carried out a that income from Afghanistan that showed in survey charging corresponded to just 4% of the expenditure of a regional hospital, 10% of the expen- and around rural clinics. of two diture Furthermore, of household at the proportion I looked province in the higher for four times was spent on healthcare wealth Complicating coordination has ARTF for arguing against the The second reason bureaucratic of aid by to do with the coordination institutions. mechanism is, A coordination of course, of organisations that necessary the hundreds given Afghanistan. in It is to get involved want going to are Bank and the UN represent World less clear that the of doing this.the best way Timor, In East the where in charge of reconstruction,UN was NGOs were the consent of the to do almost nothing without able UN, and had to participate in interminable daily meetings. Meanwhile, homes went Timorese East unrepaired, with the UN’s Dili swarmed while four-wheel-drives,brand-new colonialism’. ‘new of a politicians to talk Timorese leading some to an inter- An NGO scheme to train health workers mediary level, within available so making some care months rather than years, the UN. by blocked was to change resistant that UN agencies are know We and that, to the OCHA-commissioned according report, structures, ‘governance funding sources, weak all constitute management and institutional cultures coordination’. obstacles to effective Afghanistan,In and efficient effective need an we mechanism,coordination Afghan of the views where precedence, take men and women experi- and where a significant role. allowed enced NGOs are In partic- ular,Afghanistan Body for Agency Coordination the Afghan NGOs Coordination and the (ACBAR) (ANCB),Bureau international which coordinates and Afghanistan,local NGOs within should be supported support. financial and capacity-building through appearsstatus of to the NGOs relegating intent on as contrac- simply NGOs ‘service providers’.Treating tors both compromises to calls to tender responding these organisations, that inspire the values and ignores the crucial to rebuilding contribution can make they Afghanistan.While NGOs are the question of whether one, sensitive UN agencies is a than effective more it is certainly less bureaucratic, case that NGOs are the and community around is based more that their work participation. characteristics These two alone should of effectiveness. guarantee a certain level HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 23 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 24

Developmental programming in the midst of war: a case study from southern Sudan

The debate over the relationship between development and relief approaches in emergencies continues. Yet, says Mark Adams, many of the dilemmas faced by NGOs working in conflict are simply more extreme versions of those confronted in many ‘development’ programmes, and can be tackled with many of the same techniques

This article outlines the British NGO ACORD’s use ening the control that unelected military forces exert of participatory programming techniques and over civilian populations in some areas, developmental capacity-building in the context of the war in approaches, though challenging, can make important southern Sudan. ACORD has worked in Sudan since contributions to the quality of humanitarian response. the mid-1970s, and currently has programmes in areas controlled by the government and both main rebel The benefits of participation groups. In non-government areas, ACORD is part of Participatory methodologies offer the opportunity to the UN-coordinated Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). canvass the opinions, priorities and concerns of Impartiality (treating people based on need and different sections of communities in a structured way. regardless of political, religious or ethnic status) and They can be useful in finding out who the poor are, neutrality (refusing to support political groups or posi- where they are, what their problems are, and how they tions) have been at the core of ACORD’s program- can be best assisted. For example, ACORD’s food ming in southern Sudan. In the context of on-going security programme at Tali in Juba county was devel- war and contested political authority, this approach is oped following a participatory assessment in 1998. crucial. This used PRA tools to ask men and women in all parts of the area about their priority needs and In south Sudan, ACORD has faced many difficult concerns. The assessment was carried out by a multi- issues, such as identifying and reaching the poorest and disciplinary team of men and women. As a result of most vulnerable people, gaining access to them and the assessment, ACORD began a food security building space with local elites for such interventions. programme focused on agriculture and water. There These issues can be seen as extreme versions of the was an emphasis on training and support for local dilemmas that most development programmes face. capacities. Development programmers also need to identify the poor and most vulnerable, gain access to them, and At each stage, the humanitarian counterpart, the build agreement for pro-poor interventions from local Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), elites, state structures and interest groups. was consulted on the design and implementation of Development work has pioneered a range of tech- activities. The local authorities and traditional chiefs niques aimed at tackling these issues, including partici- were also regularly consulted about proposed activities, patory rural appraisal (PRA) and its offshoots, and how the programme could work with them. community dialogue and capacity-building. Through the local branch of the Women’s Union, women’s leaders were encouraged to form groups and While some development methodologies can offer a represent themselves to the programme, and a way to address the dilemmas that face relief agencies, Sudanese Community Development Officer was even in conflict situations, there are ethical and prac- employed to encourage this process. tical dilemmas associated with pursuing capacity- building and similar strategies in southern Sudan. Not In late 2000, workshops were held with groups in the all agencies agree with such an approach and are community to review the work to date, and propose uncomfortable with establishing relationships with the future activities. The groups involved comprised humanitarian organisations of the rebel movements. women’s leaders and women’s group members; the Efforts by these humanitarian ‘wings’ to develop traditional chiefs and their headmen; young people; policies in areas such as health have been resisted by and local authorities and counterparts. Information some agencies on grounds of autonomy and neutrality. gained was documented and fed into a joint review Some organisations have sought to keep matters on a and planning workshop that brought together all the more classical ‘relief’ footing, with interventions programme staff, local SRRA officials, the ACORD designed, implemented and reviewed by the imple- field director and regional and national SRRA staff, as menting agency and its donors. Most dramatically, a well as the district’s overall political administrator. number of NGOs were forced to stop working in areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation This process was invaluable – and difficult. The indi- Movement (SPLM) in 2000 after refusing to sign the vidual workshops provided important feedback on the SPLM’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). success and appropriateness of activities.They also gave

PRACTICE NOTES PRACTICE While there are dangers in legitimising and strength- feedback on failures in the programme, and their

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causes. Criticism was directed at ACORD and the and seems a more sustainable approach than interven- local authorities, counterparts and traditional leaders; tions implemented by international NGOs. And it all of us were found to be at fault. seems particularly appropriate in a context where insecurity often means that NGO staff are unable to Information about the diversion of relief materials visit project locations; where funding is uncertain and such as seeds and tools came to light through the short-term; where the creation of physical assets workshops, and members of the community creates targets for bombing and attack; and where complained of some villages being excluded from the people are living in the midst of a chronic, long-term distributions. Complaints were also made about what emergency which shows no sign of ending. was seen as the biased siting of boreholes. Considerable detail about who had been involved in One clear example of capacity-building undertaken by the diversion of goods and what they had done was ACORD was training of local water pump mechanics, forthcoming. The programme team already knew or and providing them with tools and equipment. Prior suspected much of this, but the fact that this informa- to the intervention in Tali, only two out of 11 existing tion came from local people in public meetings hand pumps were functioning, serving a population of attended by ACORD and counterpart staff meant it around 55,000 people. Most people relied on swamps was harder for the authorities to gloss over them, and and water holes, and water-borne diseases and guinea they were flagged up as needing addressing. Action worm were endemic. Repairs were carried out by was taken by the authorities against some individuals, mechanics from other areas, which could take months and working methods were changed. In addition, the because of the lack of transport and poor roads and information helped to identify marginalised groups communications. and overlooked areas. ACORD set about training and equipping local It was not possible to immediately address all the issues mechanics to maintain existing boreholes, as well as raised, and the feedback process was not an easy expe- developing new sources of water. After 18 months the rience. Some of the divisions within the rebel change was dramatic: the 11 boreholes functioned movement became apparent, and ACORD was also almost constantly, and an additional seven had been challenged as to what it had and had not done. drilled. The number of households to each borehole Hopefully, however, this initial step was important as fell from nearly 4,578 to 504. Most of this improve- the start of a process which builds greater transparency ment was due to building local capacity. Drilling new and accountability on all sides. holes is difficult and expensive in southern Sudan – bombing meant that two of the new boreholes had to While being careful not to overstate the impact an be drilled at night, for instance – and without local individual NGO can have on issues of democratisation maintenance capacity they are likely to break down and governance, it was a concern to us that the ‘clas- and not be repaired. sical’ relief model, in which agencies delivered vertical, top-down interventions, threatened to leave the A similar approach has been used by the livestock intended beneficiary populations disenfranchised, programme in southern Sudan, which ACORD while perhaps, and ironically, allowing those with joined in 2000. The programme, implemented by a power in the area more chance to divert goods for number of international and Sudanese NGOs, trains their political, military or personal ends. The community-based animal health workers (CAHWs) to workshop aimed at starting a process whereby a wider provide basic veterinary care. They are supervised by group of local people and interest groups would be more highly trained animal health workers and by a aware of and involved in the interventions than had local committee. The aim is that, eventually, the hitherto been the case. In this way, opportunities for committee will manage a revolving drug fund, and PRACTICE NOTES the misuse of humanitarian assistance might be fees charged for the drugs will provide wages for the reduced. Ideally, the review and planning workshop workers involved.While financial sustainability is some would have been carried out in the programme area, way away, the methodology has already proved its which would have allowed more community ability to sustain the provision of veterinary care to members to take part. However, renewed bombing by livestock in an insecure environment, which often government forces meant that the workshop was held forces agencies to evacuate their staff. As livestock are across the border in Uganda because of security central to the livelihoods of many of the tribes of concerns. An important future step would be to hold southern Sudan, this plays an important role in review meetings in the project area. helping people living in the midst of a chronic emer- gency to preserve their livelihoods and thus prevent Capacity-building famine. Capacity-building is not just about strength- Agencies working in south Sudan are increasingly ening skills, but also about directly helping to meet discussing the pros and cons of capacity-building. basic humanitarian needs. Within ACORD, we felt that training and support to increase the capacities of local people to meet their The importance of dialogue basic needs was a valid way of addressing humanitarian Dialogue, presence, persistently seeking out those in needs. Capacity-building can be more cost-effective, the community who may have been excluded: these

Number 21 • July 2002 25 HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 26

can be valuable tools in helping to address humani- niques of development are applicable in humanitarian tarian needs in a ‘chronic emergency’ such as in programmes, and can be effective in addressing southern Sudan. Participatory techniques, which humanitarian needs. emerged in the development sector in order to deal with issues not dissimilar to those faced by humani- Mark Adams was Field Director for ACORD in southern tarian agencies in conflict areas, have proved valuable Sudan from July 1998 to February 2001. The views in the design and implementation of appropriate expressed here are those of the author and do not interventions, and for identifying the poor and necessarily represent those of ACORD. marginalised. They have also been useful in exposing the diversion and misappropriation of relief items. References and further reading Capacity-building has helped to meet emergency needs, and has perhaps challenged the mindsets and John Mande, ‘Balancing Principles and Needs: Capacity- interests that help to keep chronic emergencies going. Building in Southern Sudan’, Humanitarian Exchange 19, While the debate continues as to whether humanitari- September 2001. anism is and should be distinct from development The Capacity-Building Working Group, ‘Capacity-building work, and it is clear that decisions on the type of in Southern Sudan’, Humanitarian Exchange 18, March interventions to be pursued must be made alongside a 2001. political analysis, it seems clear that some of the tech-

Nutritional interventions in ‘open situations’: lessons from north-western Sudan

Humanitarian organisations are increasingly confronting ‘open’ situations, where access to, and coverage of, beneficiary populations is complicated. Aranka Anema argues that such situations demand a more flexible approach

Humanitarian agencies have been progressively stan- strategies that prevent nutritional deterioration, dardising the planning and management of emergency without affecting local coping mechanisms or the programmes and responses. In the field of nutrition, food economy of patients’ families by instituting standardisation has contributed to advances in inter- dependency.There is no universal approach to nutri- organisational agreements on protocols for nutritional tional interventions. Determining an appropriate assessments, feeding, surveillance and monitoring. nutritional intervention requires consideration of These standards have been invaluable to the imple- context-specific factors, including: mentation of nutritional programmes in traditional ‘closed’ emergency settings, where populations are • the stage of food insecurity; located in centralised areas such as refugee camps. • the nutritional and medical status of the popula- However, there are concerns about the efficacy and tion; appropriateness of certain protocols in ‘open’ situa- • the socio-political environment (war, population tions, where resident and displaced populations are displacement, camps, the health environment, or geographically dispersed. presence of NGOs in the area); • the size of the population and its access to the Dissatisfaction with standard procedures in unconven- programme; tional settings has prompted humanitarian organisa- • the anticipated evolution of the crisis; tions to experiment with alternative approaches in the • the feasibility of implementation (human resources field. In January 2002, Médecins Sans Frontières and logistics, for instance); and (MSF) conducted a workshop to evaluate lessons • the potential side-effects of different interventions. learned from its 2001 nutritional intervention in West Darfur, Sudan. The goal of the evaluation was to Since it is difficult to obtain an all-encompassing determine which nutritional strategy was most effec- view of a nutritional situation (i.e., including an tive and appropriate given the ‘open’ setting, and analysis of all of the above), humanitarian organisa- establish context-specific operational strategies for tions also rely on previous field experience to deter- future interventions in north-western Sudan. mine appropriate strategies. MSF has been conducting health and food programmes in Sudan Choosing an appropriate nutritional strategy since 1978, when it responded to a refugee crises on One of the greatest challenges for humanitarian the Ethiopian border. It has been working in Darfur

PRACTICE NOTES PRACTICE organisations in Sudan is to implement intervention intermittently since 1984. In recent years, widespread

HUMANITARIAN 26 exchange PRACTICE NOTES 27 Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July entire population. entire population’s the cover It would needs, food basic immediate deterioration of prevent nutritional status, liveli- regular and restore maintain hoods, mortality.A food security ensure and prevent ensure short-term would programme blanket supportunder five families to children targeting by of age,years and support groups, vulnerable other and lactating women,for example pregnant the elderly and the disabled, food in case of insufficient incomplete food distribution.accessibility or an In the end, that a general food established it was for MSF to be too complicated distribution would ‘open’ Darfur’s West in implement effectively setting, of restricted because logistical and human capacity,resource the lack of political support from difficult access to the and Sudanese government rugged terrain.food MSF had no pre-established pipeline in the area, of delivery staff for the and few rations. MSF and other Institutional links between limited. Darfur were West organisations in The the poten- did not recognise Sudanese government tial for crisis, unwilling to therefore and was support implementation. programme geog- constrained due to complicated capacity was Logistic in some areas; and a lack of roads raphy beneficiary camel during by populations could only be reached season. the rainy compounded These operational difficulties were of the nutritionalbecause the scope and severity crisis itself unclear. in Darfur was a conse- This was quence of differing inter-organisational assessment findings. and cut-off in methodology Variations Arm (MUAC) Circumference points (Mid-Upper and geographic differ- Weight-for-Height) versus West Northences in nutritional and status (between Darfur) caused SC-UK to report high malnutrition rates, while MSF reported only moderate ones. Based on the rationale that malnutrition causes risk and increased immunity of infection, reduced MSF-Holland carried out a measles vaccination campaign coupled with emergency preparedness measures, foodstuffs and materials, such as delivering season. the rainy before were These initiatives supported a nutritional to verify the by surveillance of the campaign,effectiveness in and identify trends nutritional status, internal displacement and coping capacity. 18,000 children, MSF-H vaccinated and by August 2001 determined suffi- that the situation was to close the programme. ciently stable Lessons learned Darfur in 2001 West The nutritional situation in stable. relatively proved However, ten- Darfur’s given history of food shortageyear and famine, is a there nutritionalgood chance that a similar or worse situa- tion will occur in the future. famines in Previous the that mortality by is caused more Darfur reveal health consequences of displacement, for instance disease,communicable a lack of food alone. than by or preventative MSF-H agreed that a proactive

©Frances Stevenson A Weight-for-Height nutritional survey, Sudan nutritional survey, Weight-for-Height A food insecurity north-western and famine across of various called for the implementation Sudan have programmes:food distributions general to entire populations; targeted at feeding programmes blanket groups,vulnerable as women, such elderly and the socially marginalised; children, supplementary the for moderately malnourishedfeeding programmes individuals; for feeding programmes and therapeutic malnourished. the severely Darfur West in 2001 intervention MSF’s of 1.6 million, Darfur has a population West 90% of in isolated rural areas.whom live The region is sporadic tribalaffected by conflict and poor rainfall, fluctuations, in sudden market resulting livelihood changes and displacement.The national health system functional.is barely Primary is limited and health care inaccessible; are coverage drug supply and vaccination low; of training of medical and level and the number what is required. below staff are The combination of geographic isolation, erratic rainfall, health system renders instability and an ineffective socio-political inhabitants particularly to medical and vulnerable nutritional problems. In December 2000,Agriculture and the Food (SC)- the Children and Save Organisation (FAO) UK reported alarming food shortages in western Sudan. plummeting and grain prices were Livestock prices rising failure. as a consequence of crop Local for lower working increasingly populations were wages, assets and pursuing alterna- selling productive income-generating activities.tive Humanitarian aid wide-scale loss of to avoid deemed imperative was life.The to determine issue for MSF was whether to the initiate a general food distribution to cover population,entire feeding programme and a blanket groups,targeted at vulnerable or to adopt an alterna- approach.tive Theoretically, a general distribution to the available that food becomes ensure would HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 27 Page pm 4:43 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:43pmPage28 28 PRACTICE NOTES )I h iuto al o nitreto,MSF-H Ifthesituationcallsforanintervention, 3) OnceMUAC infor- early-warning findingsconfirm 2) interventions inDarfurwillbeaccompa- Nutritional 1) should includethree preventative steps: interventions thatfuture inDarfur agreed nutritional Participants attheMSF-HDarfurevaluation workshop morbidity andmortality. andthereby avert oflivelihoods, tion anddeterioration insomeareas ofSudantopreventsary distress migra- interventionsapproach may tonutritional beneces- Copies oftheCD-ROMarefree;foryours, contact Alison PrescottattheHPN([email protected]). All HPNpublicationsareavailable inEnglishandFrench. • research reports,briefingpapersandresearch summariesfromtheHumanitarianPolicy Group. • abstracts ofeightHPNGoodPractice Reviews;and • 38HPNNetwork Papers; • 20issuesoftheHPNnewsletterandHumanitarianExchange; The CD-ROMcontains: humanitarian practice andpolicy from1994toMarch 2002. Hundreds ofarticles,research papers,briefingpapersandgoodpractice reviewschart thedevelopment of A CD-ROMisnow available withpublicationsfromtheHPNandHumanitarianPolicy GroupatODI. HUMANITARIAN take-home Phase2programme.This would include SFCwouldUpgraded coordinate a ‘decentralised’ the patientsare clinicallystable, malnourished onceseverely Afteroneweek, severe malnutrition. specific complicationsanddiseasesassociatedwith andtreats severely individuals, malnourished to follow-up andmonitoring) treatment, (diagnosis, Phase 1intensive care medicalandnutritional itprovides Inaddition, individuals. malnourished foodsupplementstomoderately and fortified namely medicalcare SFC, functions ofanormal Itprovides the Centre (TFC) andaregular SFC. between adecentralised Therapeutic Feeding SFCisacross Upgraded Feeding Centre (SFC)’.An will implementan Supplementary ‘Upgraded Sudanese government. suchas WFP andthe by relevant institutions, andlobbying forfooddistribution UNIMIX orBP5, suchasBP100and shelf-life therapeuticfoods, Thismay includethestockingoflong- be initiated. EmergencyPreparedness (EPREP)will and SC-UK, mation from reliable organisationssuchas WFP, FAO nations andadeworming campaign. measlesvacci- tion withtheprovision ofvitamin A, MUAC assessmentswillbeconductedinconjunc- nied by basicpreventative andcurative healthcare. exchange HPN publicationsnow onafree CD-ROM gies forfuture interventions.gies anddevelop effective context-specificstrate- learned, toreflect uponoperationallessons opportunity MSF-H’s evaluation workshopand protocols. an offers proceduresto complementstandardised nutritional anddevelop flexible strategies edge we have acquired, there isaneedtoexpandbeyond theknowl- agencies, references are helpfulinguiding humanitarian standards and formal populations.While beneficiary of, andcoverage complicate accessto, ‘Open situations’ Conclusion Holland. Aranka Anema Malnutrition duringFamines’, Steve Collins,‘Changingthe Way We Address Severe www.fao.org/docrep/X4390t/x4390t05.htm. FAO, undated);available ontheFAO websiteat Emergencies: Bahral-Ghazal,SouthernSudan Brian Thompson, Oxfam, 2001). Response: ReportofanInter-Agency Workshop Minimum StandardsforFood SecurityinDisaster of Socio-EconomicData’, Alex De Waal, ‘Famine Early Warning SystemsandtheUse (Geneva:2000). WHO, The ManagementofNutritioninMajorEmergencies MSF NutritionGuidelines 16, 2002. Challenges in Assessment Methodology’, Aranka Anema, ‘LessonsLearnedin West Darfur: References andfurtherreading hrpui od andweekly hospitalfollow-ups. therapeutic food, forinstanceplumpynut andready-to-use rations, the provision ofsmallquantitiestake-home is amedicalanthropologistatMSF- Coping withChronicComplex Disasters (Paris: MSF, 2002). The Lancet , vol. 12,no.1,1988. , vol. 358,2000 Field Exchange (Oxford: (Rome: HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:43 pm Page 29

POLICY NOTES

New technologies, new challenges: information management, coordination and agency independence Robin Schofield argues that, as donors press for more centralised coordination models, field agencies ignore the ramifications of new technologies at their peril

Humanitarians still see information management as This marginalisation of information management in peripheral to relief activities.The OCHA symposium on the humanitarian sector has important, yet poorly ‘Best Practice in Humanitarian Information Management understood, implications. Information is not a and Exchange’, held in Geneva in February 2002, typified neutral commodity, and discussion of its position and this ‘ghettoisation’of information management within the use within the humanitarian system should not be emergency aid sector. Despite ReliefWeb’s best efforts to limited to purely technical questions to do with encourage wider participation, the four-day meeting was databases, the Internet or Geographical Information dominated by UN agencies and northern donors, with System (GIS) technologies. As donors become delegates almost exclusively technical specialists, with very increasingly interested in information systems as a few field workers, and little representation from the media way of fostering inter-agency coordination, the way or the military.While delegates debated expert resources, in which information is managed, exchanged and data standards and deployment challenges at length, they deployed will have important implications for the did not tackle the wider issues around information tech- shape of the humanitarian system, and for the inde- nology and management tabled by the organisers. As pendence of individual agencies. symposium coordinator Dennis King put it,‘I hope for a time when information management will be integrated Conflicting models into everybody’s work, but at the moment it is still However, discussions at the Symposium and elsewhere considered specialised’. suggest that there are increasingly two very differing

The OCHA Symposium

Some 200 delegates from donor governments, the UN, NGOs and the private sector attended the symposium on ‘Best Practice in Humanitarian Information Exchange’ in Geneva on 4–8 February 2002, hosted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

During the first two days of the conference, delegates worked in four task teams to:

• share best practices in the development of field-based websites and make recommendations to strengthen field- based information exchange among humanitarian partners; • investigate the use of new emerging technologies and approaches, such as portal search engines and knowl- edge management gateways, to enhance the exchange and retrieval of information; • review lessons learned and evaluate database applications for field-based, cross-sectoral information coordi-

nation; and review lessons learned and evaluate field-based (regional and country) humanitarian information POLICY NOTES centres.

The findings of this work were presented in the last two days of the conference in plenary session, with additional panel-led discussions:

• What has been accomplished in the field of humanitarian information over the last five years, and what key challenges remain? • What are the benefits and constraints for organisations to collect and share information in the field and what can be done to promote organisational buy-in to share this information? • How can simple common standards and practices enhance inter-operability of systems and the sharing of infor- mation? • How is information used for humanitarian coordination and strategic and operational decision-making?

For a full report of the symposium and the Statement on Best Practices in Humanitarian Information Management and Exchange, see ReliefWeb’s website, www.reliefweb.int/symposium.

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‘mental models’ for the future development of human- Figure 2, the actors are not contained within the system itarian information systems which are being made boundary, and do not necessarily have to ‘buy in’ to the possible by advances in UN capabilities. system in a specific way.

The first model is highly structured, in which all Figure 2: Independent service model agencies cooperate to achieve the common aim of effective humanitarian response. This ‘systems’ model derives from structures borrowed from governments and the military, where information is gathered at the base of a hierarchical pyramid structure, and passed to decision-makers at the top of the pyramid. In the humanitarian world, this equates to field agencies feeding a system with information at the local crisis level, desk officers distilling this information at a national, regional or headquarters level, and donor officials responding with policy decisions and funding at the international level, as in Figure 1. It is important to note that all actors are at least conceptually ‘contained’ within the system, and so have to subscribe or ‘buy in’ to the system rules.

Figure 1: Integrated system model

Coordination and independence Different groups in the humanitarian system tend to favour one model over the other as right for the further development of improved humanitarian infor- mation systems.This may be attributable to differences in organisational culture between those organisations tending towards collective behaviour with a top-down structure, and those organisations with independent charters and a more bottom-up decision-making process. Thus, the military, donors and offices of the UN Secretariat tend towards an integrated systems model, and NGOs towards the service model.

This distinction was evident at the OCHA symposium. Many donor participants saw in maturing technologies an opportunity to develop better humanitarian infor- mation systems along governmental or military lines. The second model – the ‘service’ model – is a much more This enthusiasm among donors, and among informa- loosely coupled arrangement. Here, individual informa- tion professionals, may work against the interests of tion services fill particular niches. Each agency or indi- operational agencies, which to date have shown little vidual within an agency then chooses whether and how enthusiasm for developments in information manage- to use these services. Service providers are effectively ment. In particular, any embedding of a centralised competing to achieve the common aim of effective model in common information systems risks formal- humanitarian response. This model, which derives from ising a hierarchy of relationships between national commercial news and market information services such as donors, the UN system and NGOs. Developments in Reuters and Bloomberg, is closest to humanitarian infor- this area could significantly affect the operational mation services currently operational, such as ReliefWeb approach favoured by NGOs and UN agencies, and and OCHA’s Integrated Regional Information Networks potentially lead to a further eroding of the separateness (IRIN).This model allows the high degree of operational of the humanitarian agenda. independence favoured by many NGOs and larger UN agencies, which see themselves as reporting to a charter or Quality and feasibility boards of trustees, rather than national governments or the There are also practical concerns with the systems

POLICY NOTES wider UN system directly. In this model, depicted in approach. Experience in the commercial world casts

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doubt on whether greater systems integration across the donor community share for greater systems inte- such a fragmented industry as humanitarian assistance gration. NGOs in particular will have to commit more is feasible. One experienced OCHA information resources to their own efforts to develop information manager believes that a services model also does not systems, in order to avoid dependency on one necessarily mean less coordination: ‘In fact, indirect centrally delivered vision. facilitation has proved to be the most productive means by far to get agencies working together’. Robin Schofield is a manager at the management and technology services organisation Accenture. Previously The likely quality of the information delivered by a he has worked on EU, NGO and UN information full systems model is another concern.This has already projects in the Balkans, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia proved a significant problem, even for reasonably self- and the African Great Lakes. Robin can be contacted at contained and long-standing information manage- [email protected]. ment projects, such as the country-level Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs) OCHA has deployed to References and further reading Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Initiatives which cause over-stretch will inevitably depend on For a report on a symposium hosted by OCHA’s precursor, the lowest common denominator of input, and so risk the Department for Humanitarian Affairs, in October delivering a ‘junk’ system. 1997, see the HPN website, www.odihpn.org/ report.asp?ReportID=1695. Conclusion Existing humanitarian information services In the context of international humanitarian action, ReliefWeb: www.reliefweb.int the services approach, with its multiple information sources and ‘market-driven’ character, is more likely IRINNews: www.irinnews.org than a systems approach to promote improved human- Existing humanitarian information centre projects itarian response through providers competing on Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS): delivery and quality. For this to happen, however, www.hic.org.pk operational agencies will have to actively engage in Occupied Palestinian Territories HIC: www.reliefweb.int/ forums like the OCHA symposium in order to opt-hic balance the enthusiasm information professionals and

The French humanitarian system: reform, but how much real change? French humanitarian assistance has undergone a series of reforms since the 1980s. François Grünewald asks whether these changes are more than skin deep

France is not a major donor of emergency assistance. The relatively marginal position that emergency aid In 2000, French bilateral humanitarian aid stood at occupies in France’s overall aid architecture is reflected less than $200 million; the largest aid donor, the US, in the haphazard way in which it has traditionally gave nearly $1.2 billion, and the next two, the been organised within the government. In 1982, the

Netherlands and the UK, gave just below $400m Secretary of State for Human Rights, former president POLICY NOTES each. Emergency assistance also accounts for a rela- of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Claude Malhuret, tively small portion of overall French aid: 6% in 2000. was put in charge of some aspects of humanitarian aid, By comparison, 40% of development aid goes on with an inter-ministerial mechanism called the Cellule education and health, and over 20% on debt relief. d’Urgence (CELLUR) acting as the operational body. Overall aid allocation is heavily skewed towards This system was later revised, and another ex-MSF French overseas possessions and former colonies; the man, Xavier Emanuelli, became Minister of State for largest recipients of development aid in 2000 were Humanitarian Affairs, attached to the Ministry of French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Other major Health. The move was the first real sign of a willing- recipients include Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Senegal, ness within the government to get involved in Cameroon and Mayotte. The only non-francophone humanitarian action. Emanuelli’s successor, MSF countries in the top ten of aid recipients in 2000 were founder Bernard Kouchner, spent three years as Poland and Egypt. However, the distribution of Minister of State for Humanitarian Action, from 1988 humanitarian aid was more opportunistic than until 1991, and proved himself a dynamic and high- anything else; in 1999, Kosovo got the lion’s share, profile figure. Yet he also created tensions within the while in 2001 it was Afghanistan. administration, and with NGOs. These tensions

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The allocation of French emergency aid by region, The administrative and financial system under which 2001 the DAH functions has by and large been made more efficient, although only time will tell what impact the change will really have.The DAH is currently headed by an experienced diplomat, Gildas Lelidec, who has worked in, among other countries, Cambodia and the Congo. For early warning, the DAH is supported by a body connected to the Ministry of Defence and the French intelligence network, the Secretariat General à la Défense Nationale (SGDN). This arrangement is supposed to help in analysing developing crises. The SGDN is also in charge of coordinating the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and civil–military rela- tions in the post-crisis reconstruction period. Civil–military relations are high on the policy agenda in the wake of Bosnia and Kosovo.

The reforms also overhauled the wider development architecture, establishing the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) as the core French agency for development aid, and the main actor in the post-crisis period. The AFD, which is co-managed by the stemmed primarily from the increasing confusion Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of between politics and humanitarian aid. Kouchner Finance, has only lately become involved in post-crisis found himself in dispute with the key ministries, the situations, most recently in Afghanistan, and has also Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of been active in zones of instability, such as in Burundi Cooperation. and the Horn of Africa. It is still in the early stages of developing its strategy vis-à-vis these new contexts, In the late 1990s, the institutional position of humani- and will need to grapple with some difficult questions tarian aid was reformed again. The Ministry of around the relationship between humanitarian aid and Cooperation was folded into the Ministry of Foreign rehabilitation.The will seems to be there, but whether Affairs, with a Deputy Minister in charge of coopera- these issues can be adequately resolved remains to be tion and relations with the francophone countries. seen. Humanitarian affairs were brought back into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a twin structure was Progress, but could do better? created, comprising the low-profile Service de The 2002 reforms mark a real step forward in the l’Action Humanitaire (SAH), and the still inter- organisation of official French aid. Some coherence ministry CELLUR. This meant that decision-making has been brought to what was a messy arrangement, was essentially decentralised, and spread between with little consistency between diplomacy and aid and departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and very little input into the kind of theoretical and philo- other interested ministries, such as defence.There were sophical debate that characterises the Anglo-Saxon aid also administrative difficulties, as standard procedures world. were not adapted to the particular demands of emer- gency situations; tenders were delayed, for instance, However, the DAH is badly under-resourced, both and lengthy recruitment procedures failed to fill financially and in terms of human resources. The vacant positions in time. regular budget is around 10m a year, equivalent to around $9m, to be supplemented from other coopera- Post-Kosovo change tion funds if required. Although the French contribu- In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, the French govern- tion to humanitarian efforts is largely channelled ment, like others, took a hard look at its emergency though ECHO, NGOs and multilateral actors are assistance architecture. An audit by the Ministry of nonetheless concerned at the extremely limited means Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance was available to the DAH, and it is unclear whether the strongly critical of the current structure and, after reforms will signal a larger financial commitment to lengthy debate, further reforms were introduced. emergency aid from the French government. These changes were announced at an international conference in June 2001, attended by representatives How the DAH positions itself within the wider of development departments in European Union debate on state humanitarianism is also unclear, and states, as well as by NGOs. By early 2002, the changes its relations with the Ministry of Defence, the SGDN were in place. A new body, the Delegation à l’Action and the armed forces will be under close scrutiny Humanitaire (DAH), was established within the from NGOs. While French NGOs recognise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which combined the func- importance of strong political support in establishing

POLICY NOTES tions of the SAH and CELLUR. independent and impartial humanitarian space, they

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also resent negative political interference in humani- welcomed debate and evaluations to improve their tarian action. There has also been no attempt to work, and have called for reinforced, more inclusive clarify where the DAH fits within the wider changes and regularised exchanges with NGOs, academics and in humanitarianism under way within Europe, with other centres of excellence.They have also highlighted the changing role of ECHO and the emergence of a the importance of working closely with their European foreign policy, security and defence European counterparts, and acknowledge that their identity. best allies in the fight for resources are the NGOs and civil society.That is at least a good start. Whether the creation of the DAH marks real progress in French official aid remains to be seen, and its value François Grünewald is Chair of the Groupe URD and a will only become clear through its performance in real member of the Haut Conseil de la Coopération crises. The head of the DAH and his deputy have Internationale (HCCI).

Legislating for humanitarian aid Frances Stevenson and Joanna Macrae argue that humanitarian assistance needs to be defined in national law

In February 2002, the International Development Act politics has always been complex. Providing aid in a passed into UK law.While the main aim of the legisla- conflict involves engaging with political actors, and tion is to set out the purpose and principles of devel- can have an impact on the course of conflict. opment assistance, it also covers humanitarian aid, as International responses have always varied according well as other activities such as conflict reduction and to national interests and the strategic significance of peacebuilding. However, the Act does not attempt to the country or region affected.There is, however, little define the specific nature and principles of humani- evidence of direct foreign ministry involvement in the tarian action. According to the Department for allocation and management of humanitarian assis- International Development (DFID), ‘any definition of tance. Most humanitarian crises tend to be off the humanitarian assistance in legislation would be unnec- main diplomatic map, and responsibility for humani- essary, and would furthermore constrain our ability to tarian policy lies with aid ministries, who may consult react quickly, to respond to need, to learn from the with, but are not normally directed by, foreign operation of humanitarian assistance programmes, and ministries. to reflect those lessons in future programmes’. During the 1990s, governments and donors tried to What is humanitarian aid? influence belligerents by withholding funding for There is no agreement internationally about what humanitarian aid, and by providing assistance to constitutes humanitarian assistance. Different donor particular groups. These experiments proved contro- governments allocate humanitarian aid funds to a versial within donor administrations, parliaments and wide range of different activities. In addition to life- the humanitarian community more broadly. By the saving activities in response to conflict and disaster, end of the decade, there seemed to have been a move humanitarian assistance funding is used for conflict away from attempting to use humanitarian assistance management and peacebuilding, for security, for to exert leverage over conflict. In the US, for example,

democracy- and nation-building, for infrastructure the independence of humanitarian assistance from POLICY NOTES rehabilitation, and for ‘hearts and minds’ activities in direct foreign policy influence has been affirmed, at military operations. Some donors use it to support least in the State Department and the Agency for refugees on their own soil: in 2000, 38% of bilateral International Development. In Europe, the evolution humanitarian assistance was spent in this way.The US of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has led government, for example, allocated $451 million of its ECHO to downplay its role in conflict management, $1.2 billion humanitarian aid budget in 2000 to and to assert its political independence from the EU. supporting refugees in the US. Over the past five years, the policy landscape has There is considerable unease within humanitarian become more complex and confused, and humani- organisations and agencies that official humanitarian tarian assistance has become politicised in a different assistance is becoming more politicised. ‘Politicisation’ way.The relationship between humanitarian and polit- in the humanitarian context is commonly understood ical and military responses to conflict has evolved and as foreign policy objectives influencing the provision – humanitarian assistance is now often closely associated or non-provision – of humanitarian assistance. The with – in some cases integrated into – military and relationship between humanitarian assistance and political intervention and the human security agenda.

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Existing legislation

Very few countries have established a statutory basis for their humanitarian assistance. One of the few to do so, Switzerland, introduced a federal law in 1997 that set out clearly the country’s commitment to, and princi- ples for, providing humanitarian aid. According to the legislation: Humanitarian aid is given namely in the case of natural disasters or armed conflict and in general in emergency situations that are of such dimensions that the area or country concerned cannot master them alone. The first aim of humanitarian aid is there- fore to save lives and to alleviate suffering among the population affected by the consequences of the emergency.

The legislation goes on to stipulate that ‘humanitarian aid is not to be used as a substitute for other instru- ments’; the causes of an emergency, especially armed conflict, should therefore be tackled not with humani- tarian aid, but with other foreign policy instruments. And humanitarian aid should be ‘neutral, impartial and unconditional in its approach, in contrast to commitments in other fields. It is designed solely to meet the needs of the victims of these situations’. The legislation also stipulates that the provision of humanitarian aid is the responsibility of ‘civil departments’, with the military ‘sometimes’ being called upon to provide security in the field.

European Union countries also agreed clear assumptions about the principles and objectives of humanitari- anism when they established the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). These are spelt out in the preamble of EC Council Regulation 1257/1996:

humanitarian aid, the sole aim of which is to prevent or relieve suffering, is accorded to victims without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic group, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation and must not be guided by, or subject to, political considerations … humanitarian aid decisions must be taken impartially and solely according to the victims’ needs and interests … the independence and impartiality of non-governmental organisations and other humanitarian institutions in the implementation of humanitarian aid must be preserved, respected and encouraged.

In a recent audit of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Audit Office drew attention to the absence of a legal basis for Denmark’s humanitarian assistance. It recommended that it is included in the law on interna- tional development, and the ministry has said it will consider the recommendation when the law is revised.

Governments use the term ‘humanitarian’ to describe bilateral humanitarian assistance went to south-eastern and justify political and military interventions, and Europe – the same proportion as went to all 24 other humanitarian assistance is seen by many as part of an countries that were subjects of consolidated appeals. integrated effort to manage or resolve conflicts and build peace. Would legislation help? The lack of a clear definition of what constitutes The role of donor governments as players in interna- humanitarian aid leaves humanitarian activity open to tional humanitarian response is also changing. While manipulation for other objectives. In this context, they used to rely primarily on UN and NGO partners there are a number of reasons why it would be useful to carry out humanitarian programmes, they are now (and logical) if domestic law on international develop- more prominent actors in their own right. Donor ment incorporated such a definition. It would establish governments – which are sometimes also parties to the in law a country’s commitment to uphold interna- conflicts in which they behave as humanitarian actors – tional humanitarian law, and the principles of impar- are now much closer to humanitarian decision-making. tiality and humanity which are the cornerstones of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Lastly, humanitarian resources are being concentrated A legal commitment to principles of humanitarian heavily on a small number of countries that are strate- assistance would complement an ethical foreign policy, gically significant to those donor governments. The help guarantee the independence of aid policy from current system of allocating multilateral and bilateral national foreign policy and provide a legal base against humanitarian resources does not correlate closely with which a government could be held accountable. It need, and is far from impartial. In 1996–99, the top would also match the public understanding of what five recipient countries of bilateral humanitarian aid humanitarian aid is for, namely a tool for the relief of were all political hotspots of strategic importance to suffering, not a component in a political process. the main donors (Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslavia, Israel and Iraq). The next five The demands of working in very different conflict (Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan, Angola and Indonesia) situations around the world mean that legally received half the total allocated to the top five defining a single package of assistance is not feasible ($1,388m, compared to $2,725m). In 2000, 21% of all or desirable. Issues of context, objectives and prin- POLICY NOTES

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ciple are what are important. Concerning context, A clause in individual countries’ legislation on inter- the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) national development spelling out a commitment to defines a humanitarian emergency as a situation the values of impartiality, humanity and indepen- where the capacity of government, other authorities dence of humanitarian action would help to safe- and the community is overwhelmed, so that the guard the place of the humanitarian mission amid population cannot meet its basic needs. The objec- the complex and competing demands of national tive of humanitarian assistance as laid out in interna- and international politics, and ensure that the needs tional humanitarian law is to prevent and alleviate and rights of people in conflicts and natural disasters suffering, protect life and ensure respect for the are better met. human being. Regarding principles, the legitimacy of intervention by humanitarian organisations Frances Stevenson is the Coordinator of the depends on them being able to act independently of Humanitarian Practice Network and a Research governments’ interests, and this independence Fellow at the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG). should be protected in law. Joanna Macrae is HPG Coordinator.

References and further reading This article is based on research by the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, available in the form of both short briefing papers and longer reports: Joanna Macrae, International Humanitarian Action: A Review of Policy Trends, ODI Briefing Paper, April 2002. Available at http://www.odi.org.uk/briefing/bp_april02.pdf. Joanna Macrae (ed.), The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action, HPG Report 11 (London: ODI, 2002). Available at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport11.pdf. Joanna Macrae and Nick Leader, The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, HPG Briefing 1, July 2000. Available at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgbrief1.pdf. Joanna Macrae and Nick Leader, Shifting Sands: The Search for Coherence Between Political and Humanitarian Action, HPG Report 8 (London: ODI, 2000). Available at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport8.pdf. See also Anna Jefferys, ‘Giving Voice to Silent Emergencies’, Humanitarian Exchange 20, March 2002. The UK International Development Act 2002 is available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020001.htm. International Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation (Including Swiss Disaster Relief), Bill to Swiss Parliament, 1996/97, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland.

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Humanitarian Exchange is now published three times a year: in March, July and November. Each issue contains articles on practical experiences and policy developments in the humanitarian field. Each issue also has a special feature of articles on a particular theme or country/region: in this issue, it is ‘noisy’ emergencies, which follows the special feature on ‘silent’ emergencies in the last issue. The special feature in November will be the food crisis in southern Africa. POLICY NOTES

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ENDPIECE The compartmentalisation of humanitarian action Many of today’s conflicts are characterised as ‘protection crises’, yet protecting human rights is somehow seen as at odds with providing humanitarian aid. Gerald Martone argues that this contrived categorisation is both dangerous and obsolete

The primary mandate of relief agencies operating in tion issues. UNHCR, the UN’s Inter-Agency humanitarian emergencies is to provide urgent assistance Standing Committee (IASC) and the ICRC have all to people in need.This typically involves providing food, published practical field guides for NGO staff, and shelter, water, medical care and other essential and life- initiatives such as the Reach Out refugee protection saving services.The physical and legal protection of civil- training project provide a useful base of protection ians is regarded as subordinate to these commitments.Yet parameters particularly relevant to aid workers. The suffering may frequently stem from the loss or denial of International Rescue Committee and a few other physical and legal protection, for which humanitarian NGOs have established departments with a mandate aid offers no remedy. The traditional perspective of to address advocacy,public policy and protection. humanitarian motivation must expand beyond the conventional view of how people are dying, to embrace Considering the frequency, duration and severity of an enlightened appraisal of how people are living. human rights abuses, it should not be a question of whether relief agencies address the issue of human Human rights or humanitarian assistance? rights protection, but rather to what extent and how The protection of human rights is somehow seen as at they do so. Responses range from the strict neutrality, odds with the provision of humanitarian assistance.The discretion and non-disclosure of the ICRC to the consensus definition of protection, as given by the public demarches and vocal advocacy of human rights ICRC, is ‘any activity which prevents or puts a stop to organisations. Interventions responding to negligent or a specific pattern of abuse and/or alleviates its imme- ruthless parties can be categorised into three types: diate effects’. Relief assistance tends to focus on the persuasion in an attempt to convince and compel second aspect of protection, and does not address authorities; denunciation in order to pressure and directly human rights violations at their source: ‘We’ll shame authorities; and substitution to replace authori- die with full stomachs’, as the oft-quoted Bosnian ties that have failed to meet their responsibilities. refrain has it.There is thus a conspicuous compartmen- talisation peculiar to the field of humanitarian action Neutrality: an obsolete principle that distinguishes as entirely distinct guilds activities Relief organisations have pervasive concerns that the that are in fact interdependent and interrelated. These public denouncement of human rights abuses in a host simultaneously coexisting spheres of activity sometimes country will result in their expulsion; put at risk the perform in oblivious parallels. This contrived categori- security of their staff; and incur bureaucratic penalties. sation works against a holistic engagement to political In general, aid agencies deliberately avoid even institu- crises; it is compassion without understanding, and tional proximity to the public protest of human rights means that the cumulative impact of these disparate agencies. actors is not realised. This has not always been the case. Examples abound of Human rights organisations and humanitarian assistance organisations registering their outrage at government agencies interact only accidentally or socially,despite the mistreatment of civilians and the restriction of human- countless situations where both simultaneously operate. itarian access, without punitive consequences. In some In the one unifying covenant governing humanitarian instances, as with MSF in Burundi, public protest has conduct, the Code of Conduct for the International Red actually resulted in improved access to formerly inac- Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster cessible populations. In Angola, MSF held a series of Relief, none of the ten principles delineates a commit- press conferences and released a report in late 2000 ment to the protection of vulnerable civilian popula- that was very critical of government and rebel abuse of tions. The practical dimensions of political advocacy, the civilian population; the move drew little official community mobilisation and public protest are conspic- reaction. Indeed, it had unforeseen benefits, such as uously absent.This critical lacuna in an otherwise prac- inviting more open expression of public opinion, and tical code demonstrates how allergic aid agencies are to the use of the report’s findings to advocate for dealing with the root causes of abuse. improved conditions.

That said, relief organisations are beginning to Exaggerated fears of expulsion and a tenacious

ENDPIECE consider the integration of human rights and protec- adherence to the ideal of neutrality can become

HUMANITARIAN 36 exchange ENDPIECE 37

©Gerald Martone Number 21 • July 2002 Number 21 • July providing humanitarian assistance providing Protecting human rights is seen at odds with Protecting human rights is seen at odds conflict over the other.conflict over Hence,neutrality becomes passive. humanitarian outcry withhold public is heartless.To Only an justify the could extraordinarily aloof perspective back on human misery.decision to turn one’s This act is an unforgivable fickle and calculating gesture of feigned moral purity. sarcasti- As one aid worker cally puts it, ‘the modern agency has replaced relief the principle with arrogance’. of neutrality When a humanitarian is outraged at a agency particular situation, silence is a a rationalised to react. way particularly cruel uncreative and and tenacious What is needed instead is a relentless on pressure aid agencies that exerts engagement by negligent governments. In the face of atrocious and unforgiving situations, local force must we authorities to contend with our irritating presence. action, Unaccompanied by of the silence context international agencies in an abusive message, the wrong conveys that violations will be tolerated or condoned.A passive, presence resigned not only fails to deter violations of civilians, but also inoculates perpetrators of against the presence international witnesses. be conspic- must Protests uous, and courageous. forceful amalgam A new the needs of war- The challenge is to address affected people in a principled manner, that is to that a way in activities manage programme upholds humanitarian values, while simultane- ously standing up for human rights.‘protec- The tion gap’ be closed. must Assistance agencies that in this peculiar segregation of duties – conspire failing – are to meet their protection versus relief conditions that the very to address moral burden demand their services. It is no longer acceptable 19, , vol.8, stature. stature, where 1 Peace Review Peace non-political Humanitarian Exchange Humanitarian Exchange non-discriminatory So-called ‘rebellious So-called ‘rebellious humanitarianism’ 2 Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, ‘The Theory and Practice of and Practice Theory ‘The Bouchet-Saulnier, Françoise T. B. Seybolt, ‘The Myth of Neutrality’, Myth of Neutrality’, Seybolt, ‘The B. T. September 2001. “Rebellious Humanitarianism”’, 1 2 no. 4, 1996. Agencies are beginning a renewed Agencies are to promote emphasis on the principle of impartiality, which refers to an agency’s alibis in a conspiracy of silence. in a conspiracy alibis is The dilemma choice: an oversimplified to reduced denunci- public riskation at the of expulsion, the risk or silence at of complicity. passive diver- point of this very It was the rigidgence from the ICRC that neutrality of the formationinspired of MSF duringthe Biafran in 1967.war Opposed to the statutory and neutrality of ICRC,silent diplomacy founders spoke MSF’s had witnessed.Without they out about the atrocities campaign of advocacy, mobilisation of the a vigorous opinion,public human rights monitoring and infor- mation sharing, palliative, assistance is merely relief to a natural the response from and indistinguishable disaster. Humanitarianneutrality – interpreted to sides in hostilities or engagingmean not taking in political, racial, religious ideological or controversies justifies a neutral stance towards – in no way suffering human rights: of basic or the abuse when responding ‘Neutrality cannot be maintained to complex emergencies; it is irresponsible to be instances it would otherwise … in some pretend neutral.’ to remain morally repugnant neutrality refers to its enduring a more guiding prove Impartiality may principle for humanitarian action. Impartial assis- that it does not tance is allocated in such a way discriminatethe basis of nationality, on race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. to need, in proportion It is aid given not as a factor of demographics.word death of the slow The relief the lexicon of beleaguered neutrality from evolution.agencies is a welcome This shameful and abstention not dispassionate notion connotes engagement, abandonment not involvement. taking a stand against tyranny Protest: for operational ‘Silence cannot be a precondition freedom’. demands that agencies have a responsibility – and a a responsibility demands that agencies have capacity – to influence the political, military and operate.economic context in which they Neutrality can no longer be a silent deal, assistance whereby with the conflict in agencies agree not to interfere exchange for the combatants’ agreementnot to with the aid effort.interfere The cloak of neutral and tentative positioning masks the reluctance of assistance agencies to stand up for popula- resolve tions in extremis. rhetoric The hollow of neutrality has become an alibi for the timid to shrink from protest. In this regard, inter- it has been conveniently action that any as a duty to abstain from preted furthers the position of one side of a or disadvantages HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:44 pm Page 37 Page pm 4:44 2/8/02 HE21.qxd HE21.qxd 2/8/024:44pmPage38 38 ENDPIECE refugee ombudsmen.We must alsoseektoinvolve the focalpointsand humanrights forprotection, advisers agencies canalsopoolresources technical tosupport Aid justiceworkers authorities. anddistrict NGOs, andcapacity-building fornational accompaniment’ liaisonand ‘protective centres andlegalaidservices, Theseincludeestablishing information they serve. field programmes ofpopulations toprotect therights that aidorganisationscansuccessfullyincludeintheir proven andeffective approaches There are practical, are regardedinalienable rights assecondary. and allother the non-negotiable moralabsolute, imperative becomes status.This consigned aninferior are allotherconcerns imperative, humanitarian As longastheprovision asa ofaidisconstrued assistance agencies. unwonted oranunwanted aspectofthework of tobeeitheran for theprotection ofhumanrights Brookings Institution,June 2001). Marc DuBois,‘Beyond theClassicHumanitarianResponse:MSF’s Advocacy in Angola’, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,February 1996. from thefinalreportofConferenceonCooperation betweenHumanitarianandHumanRightsOrganisations, J. deMilliano,‘The MSFPerspective ontheNeedforCooperation betweenHumanitarianandHuman RightsOrganizations’, Roberta CohenandJames Kunder, (London: ODI,1999). Diane Paul, September 2001. Paul Bonard, Diane Paul, UNHCR, Paper 7(London:ODI,1994). Code ofConductfortheInternationalRedCrossandCrescentMovement andNGOsinDisasterRelief, ICRC, References andfurtherreading contribute toourunderstandingoftherolesmallarmsinhumanitarianoperations. (+41) 229085782;[email protected]. Your participationistrulyappreciated,andwillgreatly If you would liketoparticipateinthisimportantproject,contactRobertMuggahattheSmall Arms Survey. Tel: should takenomorethan20minutes. meant tosolicitimpressionsandperceptions, anddoesnotrequirespecialistknowledge. Completingtheform confidential, andrespondents’namesorganisationalaffiliationswillberemoved. The questionnaireis tions offieldworkers withexperienceofareasaffectedby armedviolence.Responseswillbekeptstrictly The study teamhasdeveloped ashort,self-administeredquestionnairetocollecttheperceptions andobserva- agency personnelandcivilians. small armsincirculation inoperational zones;and assessthethreatsposedtosafetyandwell-beingof measure injuryandmortalityrates amonghumanitariananddevelopment workers; estimatethevolume of Humanitarian Dialogue,inconsultationwiththe World HealthOrganisation,arecollaborating inastudy to seeking toassist. Against thisbackground, Johns HopkinsUniversity, theSmall Arms Survey andtheCentrefor One oftheprimaryconcernsreliefagenciesissecuritytheirpersonnel,andcivilians theyare HUMANITARIAN exchange Strengthening Protectionin War: A Search forProfessionalStandards Protecting Refugees: A Field GuideforNGOs Growing theSheltering Tree Protection inPractice: Field-Level Strategies forProtectingCivilians fromDeliberate Harm Modes of Action Usedby HumanitarianPlayers Assessing theimpactofarmedviolenceoncivilians andrelief personnel:anew study Humanitarian andHumanRightsEmergencies , UNIASCReferenceGroup,March 2001. (Geneva: Atar SA,1999). (Geneva: ICRC,1999). tance interventions. must becomeacentralelementofrelief assis- rights ciples andeducatingwar-affected peopleabouttheir prin- trainingpublic officialsinhumanrights media, the public and alerting violations, human rights of Themonitoring abuses. effects ofhumanrights workersresponse.Their are indirect contactwiththe violationsdemandadeliberate scale ofhumanrights Relief agencieswork insettingswhere thescopeand violators. rights tohuman mobilised community isapotentdeterrent A intheirownpeople canparticipate protection. war-affected local dialectsandraisingawareness, bulletins in publishing information communities, Bysensitisingaffected people we intendtoprotect. email addressis:[email protected]. the InternationalRescueCommittee,New York. His Gerald Martone (Geneva: ICRC,2001). is DirectorofEmergency Responseat , Policy Brief83(Washington DC: The Humanitarian Exchange , Network Paper 30 RRN Network 19, HE21.qxd 2/8/02 4:44 pm Page 39

Trends in humanitarian action: new research from the Humanitarian Policy Group

The international humanitarian system has experienced a massive rate of change over the past decade. There have been significant shifts in the understanding of humanitarian need and of the context in which humani- tarian assistance is provided. At the same time, international expectations of the role of humanitarian action have evolved. No longer seen as simply a palliative for the worst excesses of man and for the impact of natural hazards, many see humanitarian action as part of a wider agenda of conflict management and development. The very meaning of humanitarianism has become elusive, as a new set of actors has claimed it as part of a new, more interventionist international order. As the definition of humanitarianism has been stretched, so iden- tifying the actors on the humanitarian stage has become more difficult. The cast of characters has changed significantly in recent years, to include new, often unfamiliar faces.

A new report from the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the ODI, entitled The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action, charts the key elements of change as they impinge on humanitarian policy and practice. A series of detailed studies describes and analyses:

• changes in the financing of humanitarian assistance; • developments in the role and structure of UN humanitarian assistance; • trends in US humanitarian policy; and • developments in the European Union’s approach to humanitarian action.

The report’s key conclusions are:

• Events in Kosovo in 1999 cemented the association between humanitarianism and a new, and sometimes controversial, security agenda. The events of 11 September have reinforced this link between assistance and security issues. The humanitarian label is being used by Western governments to legitimise their military intervention. The use of this label, and the fact that these same governments are the financiers of the human- itarian system, risks compromising the independence of humanitarian action.

• International actors working in conflict-related crises are becoming increasingly diverse. A new generation of military, paramilitary and developmental actors have emerged to fill the gaps apparent in international crisis response. The inevitable confusion of humanitarian actors with these other groups compromises the actual and perceived neutrality of humanitarian action, and therefore endangers the access of humanitarian agencies to people in need.

• There is an increasing differentiation of response between countries. This is reflected in the uneven distri- bution of humanitarian aid resources, as well as different arrangements for the coordination and execution of humanitarian action. While the UN looks set to remain as the core of humanitarian coordination in most crises, in the more strategically significant areas a more bilateralised response is likely to prevail. This has implications for the impartiality of the humanitarian system as a whole, and for the ability of the UN to maintain a global role.

• The struggle continues to define consistently the purpose of humanitarian action, and the principles according to which it operates. While there is now greater caution regarding claims that humanitarian action can exert significant leverage over conflict, there remains uncertainty regarding whether and how it might contribute to conflict reduction, and to the legitimisation, domestically and internationally, of political and military strategies. The tendency towards greater diversity of principle is likely to continue as new frame- works to govern humanitarian action are explored, including rights-based approaches.

• Donors have introduced tighter procedures through which to monitor and evaluate the performance of their partners. However, despite many initiatives to improve accountability and performance, the most basic data regarding need and resource flows remain opaque. Addressing these statistical and management gaps will require not only investment, but also consensus between the different stakeholders regarding the definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance, and even what constitutes humanitarian need.

The New Humanitarianisms is edited by HPG Coordinator Joanna Macrae. Copies are available from Alison Prescott ([email protected]).

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Humanitarian Practice Network

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience.

HPN’s aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individual and institutional learning.

HPN’s activities include:

• A series of specialist publications: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and Humanitarian Exchange magazine. • A resource website at www.odihpn.org. • Occasional seminars and workshops to bring together practitioners, policymakers and analysts.

HPN’s members and audience comprise individuals and organisations actively engaged in humanitarian action. They are in 80 countries worldwide, working in northern and southern NGOs, the UN and other multilateral agencies, governments and donors, academic institu- tions and consultancies.

HPN’s publications are written by a similarly wide range of contributors.

Funding support for HPN is provided by institutional donors (DFID, Ireland Aid, DANIDA, SIDA, MFA Netherlands, OFDA and ECHO), non-governmental organisations (the British Red Cross, Save the Children UK, Oxfam GB, Médecins Sans Frontières and CARE International), and UN agencies (WFP, UNDP and OCHA).

Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) Overseas Development Institute 111 Westminster Bridge Road London, SE1 7JD United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0331/74 Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399 Email: [email protected] Website: www.odihpn.org

Humanitarian Exchange is edited by Frances Stevenson and Matthew Foley. Produced, printed and bound in the UK by Publish on Demand Ltd.

ISSN: 1472-4847 © Overseas Development Institute, London, 2002.

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