DOCSLIB.ORG

Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: a Modern Interpretation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: a Modern Interpretation Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1987 Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: A Modern Interpretation Ralph P. Forsberg Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Forsberg, Ralph P., "Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: A Modern Interpretation" (1987). Dissertations. 3134. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3134 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1987 Ralph P. Forsberg THOMAS HOBBES' THEORY OF OBLIGATION: A MODERN INTERPRETATION by Ralph P. Forsberg A Thesis Subaitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillaent of the Requireaents for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 1987 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I a.a grateful to David Ozar, David Schweikert, Fr. William Ellos, and Patricia Werhane for their guidance, comaents, and encourageaent in the execution of this dis­ sertation. I owe special thanks to ay wife, Sharon, for her eaotional support and typing skills and to my son, Darian, for simply being there. A special note of thanks goes to David Ozar for his personal faith in my ability and emotional support during difficult aoments. And finally, I want to thank my friend Corliss Swain for her advice and encourageaent. ii VITA The author, Ralph P. Forsberg, is the son of Sulo Forsberg and Gertrude (Mattson) Forsberg. Be was born August 28, 1948, in Chicago, Illinois. Bis eleaentary education was obtained in the public schools of Chicago, Illinois. Bis secondary education was coapleted in 1966 at Lane Technical High School, Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Forsberg attended Loyola University of Chicago fro• 1966 to 1967. In 1967 he entered Bradley University and obtained a Bachelor of Science in psychology in June, 1970. While at Bradley he was a aeaber and president of Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity. Fro• 1970 to 1973 Mr. Forsberg pursued graduate studies in philosophy at Roosevelt University in Chicago, receiving the degree of Master of Arts in 1973. Be entered graduate studies in philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago in 1973. Fro• 1976 to the present, Mr. Forsberg has taught philosophy at Loyola and Harper College, Palatine, Illinois. In 1985 Mr. Forsberg was elected a aeaber of Alpha Sigaa Nu, the Jesuit National Honor Society. iii NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations are used throughout this dissertation: Hobbes E.W. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (13 Vols.), William Molesworth, editor. Other abbreviations of Hobbes' work appear as a result of my intention to preserve the integrity of citations by other authors: I have not altered references that appear following paraphrasing of Hobbes' words by other authors where the precise quotation was unclear. Wittgenstein B.B. The Blue and Brown Books, Harper & Row, 1958. o.c. On Certainty. P.G. Philosophical Grammar. P.I. Philosophical Investigations. P.R. Philosophical Remarks. z Zettel. All references are to numbered paragraphs, unless otherwise noted; the references to B.B. are to page nuabers. iv TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii VITA . iii NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS iv INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I. THE MATERIALIST THESIS A. Background and Overview 9 B. Method and System 16 c. Psychology and Ethics 27 D. Political Theory .... 52 Works Cited-Introduction and Chapter I • 61 II. THE NATURAL LAW THESIS A. Introduction • . • • . • • . 63 B. The Taylor Thesis • . • • . • • . 66 C. Warrender' s Thesis . • . • • • . • 80 D. Hood's Thesis ......•.•.•••. 111 Works Cited-Chapter II • . 141 III. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASE A. Introduction ... 142 B. Strauss' Indivualism . 145 C. Oakeshott's Thesis ... 173 Works Cited--Chapter III . 197 IV. THE METHOD OP INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS A. The current State of Hobbes Scholarship ... 199 B. The Method of Historical Interpretation ..• 239 C. Wittgenstein . • . • . 264 Works Cited--Chapter IV .... 294 V V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION A. Introduction . 296 B. Historical Atmosphere .......... 302 C. The Three Interpretations as Coexistent . 334 Works Cited--Chapter V. • 367 VI. CONCLUSION . 369 Works Cited--Chapter VI . • • 381 REFERENCES. • • 382 vi INTRODUCTION Different pictures of Hobbes can emerge from different judgments as to what is central and what is peripheral in his work, and in cases of apparent contradiction or superfluous multiple explanations, from different judgments as to what reflects his real intent. No single, final, and unequivocal account of the meaning and significance of Hobbes's political theory is therefore likely to arise. (Spragens, p.21) At present the truth of this claim seems undeniable. Even more now than in the past, it seems that no settled interpretation of Hobbes' political theory is possible. Three competing views concerning Hobbes' theory of obligation are receiving the bulk of attention today. These views are what I will call: (1) the mechanistic/egoistic or traditional interpretation, (2) the natural law or moral interpretation, and ( 3 ) the individual rights interpretation. Each view seeks to explain Hobbes' true intentions regarding the derivation of obligation, and do so independently of each other. Briefly stated, these views hold: ( 1 ) The traditional view: Hobbes is a materialist sparked by the ideas of the new, emerging science of motion begun by Galileo. Hobbes methodically applies its themes and procedures to the establishing of civil and ethical theories whose issues are understood from within the same 1 2 perspective. His account of obligation is derived from an egoistic psychology which ultimately rests upon the materialistic presuppositions. Duty is a matter of prudence, i.e. of the rational pursuit of self-interest, which is in turn determined by the motions of appetite and aversion. This position will be examined in detail in Chapter I. (2) The natural law view: This position rests upon two propositions: (a) the apparently scientific cast and mechanical basis of the first view is misleading if taken to represent the true character of Hobbes' mature thought, and (b) the true nature of his ethical and political thinking is derived primarily from the Christian natural law tradition. Slightly different versions of this position are offered by A.E. Taylor, F.C. Hood, and Howard Warrender. This position, the various versions of it, and their differences will be examined in Chapter II. (3) The individual rights interpretation: Hobbes is seen as an analyst of individual man, singling out two passions as crucial to morality: vanity and fear of a violent death. Hobbes' starting point is taken to be natural right, not natural law nor materialism. His theory of obligation is seen to rest upon a notion of individual right, which in turn rests upon an understanding of human passions gained from self-examination. Again there are slightly different versions of this approach given by Leo 3 Strauss and Michael Oakeshott, both of which will be examined in Chapter III. Each view claims to be the true interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation. Each, in turn, is supported by numerous particular passages from Hobbes' writings and by various thematic threads traced through the whole of Hobbes' work. Consequently each makes a case for the exclusion of the other interpretations based on their errors of interpretation, misunderstanding of texts, and faulty reasoning. Each view assumes or explicitly argues that the other views are based on passages taken out of context, misstated by the interpreters, or actually mistated by Hobbes himself. "Once we clear away the biasses and interjected assumptions of those other views," each says, "we will then see that Hobbes is really saying ... ", just what that view interprets Hobbes to be saying. The obvious problem is, however, that three mutually exclusive interpretations of a single theory of obligation, drawn from a single set of written works by a single author, cannot all be correct at once. How is it possible that such conflicting positions can be attributed to one author? The unspoken assumption adopted by all three sets of interpreters is that Hobbes was in fact confused about his own beliefs or else not capable of stating them clearly. Once this assumption is made, whether it is stated or not, it is hard to see how we could ever determine which, if any, 4 or of all three or some other is the "true" account of Hobbes' derivation of obligation. There is, of course, another possible resolution of this puzzle, one based upon a different underlying assumption. Suppose we assume, quite simply, that Hobbes plainly stated his position, that the position embodies a coherent theory of obligation encorporating all three of the divergent elements noted above into a single unified whole, and that he had valid reasons for the seeming contradictions in his works. This hypothesis seems particularly warranted in Hobbes' case (though it seems rational, until proven otherwise, to assume that all philosophers are trying to clearly communicate a coherent position to their readers). For, as W.T. Jones notes, "Although in outlook Hobbes was almost wholly a man of the new mold, he inherited from the Middle Ages a disposition to think systematically and to view the function of philosophy as the construction of a unified world view, in which all the special sciences are derived from one supreme science, and in which the answers to all questions that can be asked are ultimately statable in terms of a single formula" (Jones, p.120). It seems quite reasonable to assume, then, that such a systematic thinker, seeking such a unified theory, would be able to recognize self-contradiction and be able to exclude competing or contradictory rationales within his theory of obligation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Do Diffusion Protocols Govern Cascade Growth?
    Proceedings of the Twelfth International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM 2018) Do Diffusion Protocols Govern Cascade Growth? Justin Cheng,1 Jon Kleinberg,2 Jure Leskovec,3 David Liben-Nowell,4 Bogdan State,1 Karthik Subbian,1 Lada Adamic1 [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 1Facebook, 2Cornell University, 3Stanford University, 4Carleton College Abstract Large cascades can develop in online social networks as peo- ple share information with one another. Though simple re- share cascades have been studied extensively, the full range of cascading behaviors on social media is much more di- verse. Here we study how diffusion protocols, or the social ex- changes that enable information transmission, affect cascade growth, analogous to the way communication protocols de- fine how information is transmitted from one point to another. Studying 98 of the largest information cascades on Facebook, we find a wide range of diffusion protocols – from cascading reshares of images, which use a simple protocol of tapping a single button for propagation, to the ALS Ice Bucket Chal- lenge, whose diffusion protocol involved individuals creating and posting a video, and then nominating specific others to do the same. We find recurring classes of diffusion protocols, and identify two key counterbalancing factors in the con- struction of these protocols, with implications for a cascade’s growth: the effort required to participate in the cascade, and Figure 1: The diffusion tree of a cascade with a volunteer the social cost of staying on the sidelines.
    [Show full text]
  • Reflections on Social Norms and Human Rights
    The Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights Deborah A. Prentice Princeton University Chapter to appear in R. Goodman, D. Jinks, & A. K. Woods (Eds.), Understanding social action, promoting human rights. New York: Oxford University Press. This chapter was written while I was Visiting Faculty in the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ. I would like to thank Jeremy Adelman, JoAnne Gowa, Bob Keohane, Eric Maskin, Dale Miller, Catherine Ross, Teemu Ruskola, Rick Shweder, and Eric Weitz for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of the chapter. Please direct correspondence to: Deborah Prentice Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall Princeton, NJ 08540 [email protected] 1 Promoting human rights means changing behavior: Changing the behavior of governments that mistreat suspected criminals, opponents of their policies, supporters of their political rivals, and members of particular gender, ethnic, or religious groups; changing the behavior of corporations that mistreat their workers, damage the environment, and produce unsafe products; and changing the behavior of citizens who mistreat their spouses, children, and neighbors. In this chapter, I consider what an understanding of how social norms function psychologically has to contribute to this very worthy project. Social norms have proven to be an effective mechanism for changing health-related and environmental behaviors, so there is good reason to think that they might be helpful in the human-rights domain as well. In the social sciences, social norms are defined as socially shared and enforced attitudes specifying what to do and what not to do in a given situation (see Elster, 1990; Sunstein, 1997).
    [Show full text]
  • Cascading Leadership
    FACULTY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES Cascading Leadership Emile Jeuken Doctoral thesis offered to obtain the degree of Doctor of Psychology (PhD) Supervisor: Prof. dr. Martin Euwema Co-supervisor: Prof. dr. Wilmar Schaufeli 2016 Funding Dissertation funded by “de Belastingdienst” (the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration). I Summary Cascading leadership is defined as the co-occurrence of leaders’ values, attitudes and behaviors, at different hierarchal levels within an organization. The aim of this doctoral thesis is to get a better understanding of cascading leadership as well as the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon, with special focus on perceived power. We conducted three studies, using three different research methods: a systematic literature review, a field survey study, and an experimental study. Chapter 1 introduces cascading leadership research, exploring both societal and academic relevance, as well as the aims of our study and overview of the PhD. Chapter 2 presents our first study. As there has not been published a systematic review on the subject before, we conducted such a literature review, resulting in a selection of 18 papers, with 19 empirical studies. These studies cover a wide array of cascading constructs and theoretical perspectives. However, all studies are cross sectional, typically survey studies. Positional power and sense of power appear to play an important role, however have hardly been studied. Chapter 3 describes our second study, in which we investigate whether trust in leadership cascades across three hierarchical levels of leadership and whether it is directly and indirectly related to work engagement of the front-line employee. Only one other cascading leadership study to date included four hierarchical levels.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Development of Spinoza's Account of Human Religion
    Intermountain West Journal of Religious Studies Volume 5 Number 1 Spring 2014 Article 4 2014 On the Development of Spinoza’s Account of Human Religion James Simkins University of Pittsburgh Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/imwjournal Recommended Citation Simkins, James "On the Development of Spinoza’s Account of Human Religion." Intermountain West Journal of Religious Studies 5, no. 1 (2014). https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/imwjournal/ vol5/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intermountain West Journal of Religious Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 52 James Simkins: On the Development of Spinoza’s Account of Human Religion JAMES SIMKINS graduated with philosophy, history, and history and philosophy of science majors from the University of Pittsburgh in 2013. He is currently taking an indefinite amount of time off to explore himself and contemplate whether or not to pursue graduate study. His academic interests include Spinoza, epistemology, and history from below. IMW Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 5:1 53 ‡ On the Development of Spinoza’s Account of Human Religion ‡ In his philosophical and political writings, Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) develops an account of human religion, which represents a unique theoretical orientation in the early modern period.1 This position is implicit in many of Spinoza’s philosophical arguments in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the Short Treatise, and Ethics.2 However, it is most carefully developed in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (hereafter TTP).3 What makes Spinoza’s position unique is the fact that he rejects a traditional conception of religion on naturalistic grounds, while refusing to dismiss all religion as an entirely anthropological phenomenon.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Destructiveness and Authority: the Milgram Experiments and the Perpetration of Genocide
    W&M ScholarWorks Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1995 Human Destructiveness and Authority: The Milgram Experiments and the Perpetration of Genocide Steven Lee Lobb College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd Part of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Lobb, Steven Lee, "Human Destructiveness and Authority: The Milgram Experiments and the Perpetration of Genocide" (1995). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625988. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-yeze-bv41 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS AND AUTHORITY: THE MILGRAM EXPERIMENTS AND THE PERPETRATION OF GENOCIDE A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Government The College of William and Mary in Virginia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Steve Lobb 1995 APPROVAL SHEET This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Steve Lobb Approved, November 1995 L )\•y ^ . Roger Smith .onald Rapi limes Miclot i i TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy of Contractual Obligation, 21 Marq
    Marquette Law Review Volume 21 Article 1 Issue 4 June 1937 The hiP losophy of Contractual Obligation Robert J. Buer Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Robert J. Buer, The Philosophy of Contractual Obligation, 21 Marq. L. Rev. 157 (1937). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol21/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOLUME XXI JUNE, 1937 NUMBER FOUR THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION ROBERT J. BUER THE HISTORY OF CONSIDERATION T HE doctrine of consideration has stood for several centuries as a pillar in the law of contracts, an essential to their enforcement. Students of the law have, from the first instance of their contacts with the great body of jurisprudence, regarded consideration as one of the rudimentary principles upon which future knowledge of the refine- ments and technicalities of the law must be based. However, in recent years, chiefly because of the exceptions to and inconsistencies of the fundamental rule that every contract to be enforceable must be sup- ported by a sufficient consideration, liberal students of the law have advocated the alteration or abolishment of the rule.' These advocates of change in the doctrine are not without sound historical authority as a basis for their demands.
    [Show full text]
  • 2. We and They
    2. We and They Democracy is becoming rather than being. It can easily be lost, but never is fully won. Its essence is eternal struggle. WILLIAM H. HASTIE OVERVIEW Chapter 1 focused on factors that shape an individual’s identity. It also described how those factors are sometimes used to exclude people from membership in various groups. Chapter 2 considers the ways a nation’s identity is defined. That definition has enormous significance. It indicates who holds power in the nation. And it determines who is a part of its “universe of obligation” – the name Helen Fein has given to the circle of individuals and groups “toward whom obligations are owed, to whom rules apply, and whose injuries call for [amends].”1 For much of world history, birth determined who was a part of a group’s “universe of obligation” and who was not. As Jacob Bronowski once explained, “The distinction [between self and other] emerges in prehistory in hunting cultures, where competition for limited numbers of food sources requires a clear demarcation between your group and the other group, and this is transferred to agricultural communities in the development of history. Historically this distinction becomes a comparative category in which one judges how like us, or unlike us, is the other, thus enabling people symbolically to organize and divide up their worlds and structure reality.”2 This chapter explores the power of those classifications and labels. As legal scholar Martha Minow has pointed out, “When we identify one thing as like the others, we are not merely classifying the world; we are investing particular classifications with consequences and positioning ourselves in relation to those meanings.
    [Show full text]
  • Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences
    Philosophy Study, July 2016, Vol. 6, No. 7, 377-416 doi: 10.17265/2159-5313/2016.07.001 D DAVID PUBLISHING New Perspective for the Philosophy of Science: Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences Refet Ramiz Near East University In this work, author evaluated past theories and perspectives behind the definitions of science and/or branches of science. Also some of the philosophers of science and their specific philosophical interests were expressed. Author considered some type of interactions between some disciplines to determine, to solve the philosophical/scientific problems and to define the possible solutions. The purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define new perspective for the philosophy of science, (iii) to define relation between new philosophy perspective and philosophy of science, (iv) to define and organize name, number, relations, and correct structure between special science branches and philosophy of science, (v) to define necessary and sufficient number of branches for philosophy of science, (vi) to define and express the importance and place of new philosophy of science perspective in the new system, (vii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of science, (viii) to re-define meanings of some philosophical/scientific theories, (ix) to define systematic solution for the conflicts, problems, confusions about philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science, (x) to define new branches of science, (xi) to re-construct branches and hierarchy of science, (xii) to define new theories about science and branches of science. Author considered R-Synthesis as a method for the evaluation of the philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science.
    [Show full text]
  • A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth Edition
    A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth edition John Losee OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science This page intentionally left blank A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Fourth edition John Losee 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © John Losee , The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN ––– Typeset in Adobe Minion by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn Preface This book is a historical sketch of the development of views about scientific method.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom and the State: the Social Contract This Course Aims To
    Freedom and the State: The Social Contract This course aims to introduce students to central questions in political philosophy, through engagement with the work of several significant political philosophers: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. The topics with which we will be most deeply concerned include the legitimacy of the state; the limits of the state’s authority; the basis of rights of resistance or rebellion; the relevance of consent to political authority; the nature and value of freedom; the relationship between politics and human nature; and social justice. We will also, as often as we can, attempt to relate the views of these philosophers to contemporary debates. Program of lectures and reading Week 1 (15/01) Lecture 1: Political Legitimacy and the Social Contract Tradition Reading: Easy: Wolf (2006): 34-48. Easier: ‘Authority’ and ‘Political Obligation’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Harder: Boucher & Kelly (1994): ch. 1. Hampton (1997): Chapter 3. Week 2 (22/01) Lecture 2: Hobbes on Human Nature and the State of Nature Primary Reading: Leviathan, Part I, chs. 11, 13-16. Secondary Reading: Easy: Wolf (2006): 8-17. Easier: Levine (2002): 15-32. Newey (2008): ch. 4-5. Harder: Warburton, Pike and Matravers (2000): 100-105. Seminar question: If human nature is, or were, as Hobbes describes it, does it follow that life in the state of nature would be ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short’? Week 3 (29/01) Lecture 3: Hobbes on the Covenant, the Sovereign and the Right to Rebel Primary Reading: Leviathan, Part II, chs.
    [Show full text]
  • Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum
    LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ AND THE CONTINUUM LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ AND THE CONTINUUM By PATRICK RIESTERER, B.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements For the Degree Master ofArts McMaster University © Copyright by Patrick Riesterer, August 2006 MASTER OF ARTS (2006) McMaster University (Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum AUTHOR: Patrick Riesterer, B.A. (Trinity Western University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Richard Arthur NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 110 ii Abstract In this thesis, I address the extent ofSpinoza's influence on the development of Leibniz's response to the continuum problem, with particular emphasis on his relational philosophy oftime and space. I expend the first chapter carefully reconstructing Spinoza's position on infinity and time. We see that Spinoza developed a threefold definition ofinfinity to explain the difference between active substance and its passive modes. Spinoza advances a syncategorematic interpretation ofinfinity, and founds a causal theory oftime directly on this conception ofinfinity. In the second chapter, I examine the changes Leibniz's understanding ofthe continuum problem underwent during 1676 and immediately thereafter. During this period, Leibniz's interacted extensively with Spinoza's ideas. We see that several fundamental features ofLeibniz's philosophy oftime take shape at this time. Leibniz adopts a Spinozistic definition ofdivine eternity and immensity, he reevaluates several analogies in an attempt to understand how the attributes ofa substance interrelate, and he develops the notion ofthe law of the series that will become an essential feature ofmonadic appetition. Leibniz synthesizes several ofthese discoveries into a first philosophy ofmotion.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright © 2008 by Lydia R
    ABSTRACT Analogy, Causation, and Beauty in the Works of Lucy Hutchinson Evan Jay Getz, Ph.D. Dissertation Chairperson: Phillip J. Donnelly, Ph.D. Lucy Hutchinson's translation of the ancient epic De Rerum Natura is remarkable in light of her firm commitments to Calvinist theology and the doctrine of Providence. David Norbrook and Jonathan Goldberg offer strikingly different explanations for the translation exercise. For instance, Norbrook argues that Hutchinson translates Lucretius in order that she might learn from the false images in Lucretius and make better ones in such works as Order and Disorder (Norbrook, “Margaret” 191). In contrast, Goldberg argues for compatibility between Lucretian atomism and Hutchinson‟s Christianity, seeing no contradiction or tension (Goldberg 286). I argue that neither critic accounts for the aesthetics of beauty in Hutchinson's poetry; both critics instead attribute an aesthetics of the sublime to Hutchinson. In making this argument, I show that Hutchinson's theory of causation has much in common with Reformed Scholasticism, whereby she is able to restore a metaphysics of formal and final cause. Hutchinson also revives the doctrine of the analogy of being, or analogia entis, in order to show that the formal cause of creation is visible as God's glory. After a discussion of her metaphysics and ontology, I then show that Hutchinson's poetry reflects a theological aesthetics of beauty and not the aesthetics of the sublime. In the fourth chapter, I compare the typological accounts of Abraham found in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan and Hutchinson's Order and Disorder with a view to virtue as the proper basis of authority.
    [Show full text]