Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1987 Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: A Modern Interpretation Ralph P. Forsberg Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Forsberg, Ralph P., "Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Obligation: A Modern Interpretation" (1987). Dissertations. 3134. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3134 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1987 Ralph P. Forsberg THOMAS HOBBES' THEORY OF OBLIGATION: A MODERN INTERPRETATION by Ralph P. Forsberg A Thesis Subaitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillaent of the Requireaents for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 1987 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I a.a grateful to David Ozar, David Schweikert, Fr. William Ellos, and Patricia Werhane for their guidance, comaents, and encourageaent in the execution of this dis­ sertation. I owe special thanks to ay wife, Sharon, for her eaotional support and typing skills and to my son, Darian, for simply being there. A special note of thanks goes to David Ozar for his personal faith in my ability and emotional support during difficult aoments. And finally, I want to thank my friend Corliss Swain for her advice and encourageaent. ii VITA The author, Ralph P. Forsberg, is the son of Sulo Forsberg and Gertrude (Mattson) Forsberg. Be was born August 28, 1948, in Chicago, Illinois. Bis eleaentary education was obtained in the public schools of Chicago, Illinois. Bis secondary education was coapleted in 1966 at Lane Technical High School, Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Forsberg attended Loyola University of Chicago fro• 1966 to 1967. In 1967 he entered Bradley University and obtained a Bachelor of Science in psychology in June, 1970. While at Bradley he was a aeaber and president of Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity. Fro• 1970 to 1973 Mr. Forsberg pursued graduate studies in philosophy at Roosevelt University in Chicago, receiving the degree of Master of Arts in 1973. Be entered graduate studies in philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago in 1973. Fro• 1976 to the present, Mr. Forsberg has taught philosophy at Loyola and Harper College, Palatine, Illinois. In 1985 Mr. Forsberg was elected a aeaber of Alpha Sigaa Nu, the Jesuit National Honor Society. iii NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations are used throughout this dissertation: Hobbes E.W. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (13 Vols.), William Molesworth, editor. Other abbreviations of Hobbes' work appear as a result of my intention to preserve the integrity of citations by other authors: I have not altered references that appear following paraphrasing of Hobbes' words by other authors where the precise quotation was unclear. Wittgenstein B.B. The Blue and Brown Books, Harper & Row, 1958. o.c. On Certainty. P.G. Philosophical Grammar. P.I. Philosophical Investigations. P.R. Philosophical Remarks. z Zettel. All references are to numbered paragraphs, unless otherwise noted; the references to B.B. are to page nuabers. iv TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii VITA . iii NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS iv INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I. THE MATERIALIST THESIS A. Background and Overview 9 B. Method and System 16 c. Psychology and Ethics 27 D. Political Theory .... 52 Works Cited-Introduction and Chapter I • 61 II. THE NATURAL LAW THESIS A. Introduction • . • • . • • . 63 B. The Taylor Thesis • . • • . • • . 66 C. Warrender' s Thesis . • . • • • . • 80 D. Hood's Thesis ......•.•.•••. 111 Works Cited-Chapter II • . 141 III. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASE A. Introduction ... 142 B. Strauss' Indivualism . 145 C. Oakeshott's Thesis ... 173 Works Cited--Chapter III . 197 IV. THE METHOD OP INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS A. The current State of Hobbes Scholarship ... 199 B. The Method of Historical Interpretation ..• 239 C. Wittgenstein . • . • . 264 Works Cited--Chapter IV .... 294 V V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION A. Introduction . 296 B. Historical Atmosphere .......... 302 C. The Three Interpretations as Coexistent . 334 Works Cited--Chapter V. • 367 VI. CONCLUSION . 369 Works Cited--Chapter VI . • • 381 REFERENCES. • • 382 vi INTRODUCTION Different pictures of Hobbes can emerge from different judgments as to what is central and what is peripheral in his work, and in cases of apparent contradiction or superfluous multiple explanations, from different judgments as to what reflects his real intent. No single, final, and unequivocal account of the meaning and significance of Hobbes's political theory is therefore likely to arise. (Spragens, p.21) At present the truth of this claim seems undeniable. Even more now than in the past, it seems that no settled interpretation of Hobbes' political theory is possible. Three competing views concerning Hobbes' theory of obligation are receiving the bulk of attention today. These views are what I will call: (1) the mechanistic/egoistic or traditional interpretation, (2) the natural law or moral interpretation, and ( 3 ) the individual rights interpretation. Each view seeks to explain Hobbes' true intentions regarding the derivation of obligation, and do so independently of each other. Briefly stated, these views hold: ( 1 ) The traditional view: Hobbes is a materialist sparked by the ideas of the new, emerging science of motion begun by Galileo. Hobbes methodically applies its themes and procedures to the establishing of civil and ethical theories whose issues are understood from within the same 1 2 perspective. His account of obligation is derived from an egoistic psychology which ultimately rests upon the materialistic presuppositions. Duty is a matter of prudence, i.e. of the rational pursuit of self-interest, which is in turn determined by the motions of appetite and aversion. This position will be examined in detail in Chapter I. (2) The natural law view: This position rests upon two propositions: (a) the apparently scientific cast and mechanical basis of the first view is misleading if taken to represent the true character of Hobbes' mature thought, and (b) the true nature of his ethical and political thinking is derived primarily from the Christian natural law tradition. Slightly different versions of this position are offered by A.E. Taylor, F.C. Hood, and Howard Warrender. This position, the various versions of it, and their differences will be examined in Chapter II. (3) The individual rights interpretation: Hobbes is seen as an analyst of individual man, singling out two passions as crucial to morality: vanity and fear of a violent death. Hobbes' starting point is taken to be natural right, not natural law nor materialism. His theory of obligation is seen to rest upon a notion of individual right, which in turn rests upon an understanding of human passions gained from self-examination. Again there are slightly different versions of this approach given by Leo 3 Strauss and Michael Oakeshott, both of which will be examined in Chapter III. Each view claims to be the true interpretation of Hobbes' theory of obligation. Each, in turn, is supported by numerous particular passages from Hobbes' writings and by various thematic threads traced through the whole of Hobbes' work. Consequently each makes a case for the exclusion of the other interpretations based on their errors of interpretation, misunderstanding of texts, and faulty reasoning. Each view assumes or explicitly argues that the other views are based on passages taken out of context, misstated by the interpreters, or actually mistated by Hobbes himself. "Once we clear away the biasses and interjected assumptions of those other views," each says, "we will then see that Hobbes is really saying ... ", just what that view interprets Hobbes to be saying. The obvious problem is, however, that three mutually exclusive interpretations of a single theory of obligation, drawn from a single set of written works by a single author, cannot all be correct at once. How is it possible that such conflicting positions can be attributed to one author? The unspoken assumption adopted by all three sets of interpreters is that Hobbes was in fact confused about his own beliefs or else not capable of stating them clearly. Once this assumption is made, whether it is stated or not, it is hard to see how we could ever determine which, if any, 4 or of all three or some other is the "true" account of Hobbes' derivation of obligation. There is, of course, another possible resolution of this puzzle, one based upon a different underlying assumption. Suppose we assume, quite simply, that Hobbes plainly stated his position, that the position embodies a coherent theory of obligation encorporating all three of the divergent elements noted above into a single unified whole, and that he had valid reasons for the seeming contradictions in his works. This hypothesis seems particularly warranted in Hobbes' case (though it seems rational, until proven otherwise, to assume that all philosophers are trying to clearly communicate a coherent position to their readers). For, as W.T. Jones notes, "Although in outlook Hobbes was almost wholly a man of the new mold, he inherited from the Middle Ages a disposition to think systematically and to view the function of philosophy as the construction of a unified world view, in which all the special sciences are derived from one supreme science, and in which the answers to all questions that can be asked are ultimately statable in terms of a single formula" (Jones, p.120). It seems quite reasonable to assume, then, that such a systematic thinker, seeking such a unified theory, would be able to recognize self-contradiction and be able to exclude competing or contradictory rationales within his theory of obligation.