Why States and Self-Determination Groups Fail in Bargaining Over Autonomy
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Divided and Conquered: Why States and Self-determination Groups Fail in Bargaining Over Autonomy A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham Committee in charge: Professor David A. Lake, Chair Professor Eli Berman Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch Professor Philip G. Roeder Professor Barbara F. Walter 2007 The dissertation of Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm: ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ ______________________________________________ Chair University of California, San Diego 2007 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page……………………………………………………………………... iii Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………….. iv List of Figures and Tables ………………………………………………………….vii Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………... viii Vita ………………………………………………………………………………… ix Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………. xi Chapter One: Introduction ………………………………………………………… 1 Studying Autonomy ……………………………………………………….. 2 The Argument ………………....................................................................... 3 Variation in Fractionalization ……………………………………... 4 Fractionalization and Bargaining………………………………….. 6 Existing Literature …………………………………………........................ 14 Evaluating the Theory ……………………………………….…………….. 17 Statistical Analyses ………………………………………………... 17 Case Studies ……………………………………………………….. 18 Plan of the Dissertation …..………………………………….…………….. 20 Chapter Two: A Theory of Fractionalization and Bargaining …………………….. 24 The Bargaining Process …………………………………………………… 24 Variation in Internal Fractionalization .……………………………………. 27 Effects of Fractionalization …………..……………………………………. 31 Internal Bargaining………………………………………………… 32 External Bargaining ……………………………………………….. 38 Hypotheses ………………….……………………………………………... 42 Which governments will offer autonomy? ………………………... 43 Which self-determination movements will be offered autonomy? ... 44 What type of agreements will we see? .............................................. 45 When will we see autonomy increases? ……………………………46 When will we see conflict? ………………………………………... 51 Conclusion ………………….…………………………………................... 51 Chapter Three: Quantitative Analysis of Bargaining Process and Outcomes.…….. 53 The Data …………………………………………………………………… 53 Cases……………………………………………………………….. 54 Measuring the Dependent Variable: Autonomy Increase …………. 56 Measuring the Independent Variables: Internal Fractionalization and Resources ……………………………………………... 58 The Statistical Model ……………………………………………………… 64 Autonomy Outcome Analysis …………………………………….. 65 Civil War Outcome Analysis ……………………………………… 75 iv Faction Responses to Autonomy Analysis ………………………... 79 Government Strategies Analysis ……...…………………………… 81 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 82 Chapter Four: The Corsican Self-determination Dispute in France ………………. 86 Theoretical Expectation ……………………………………........................ 90 Overview of the Case ……………………………………………………… 92 Evaluating the Propositions ……………………………………………….. 95 Proposition One: Veto Players and Devolution Attempts ………… 97 Proposition Two: Internal Side-payments ………………………… 110 Proposition Three: Strategic Interaction …………………………... 116 Alternative Explanations …………………………………………………... 121 Additional Factors …………………………………………………………. 125 The Role of Violence ……………………...………………………. 125 The Role of Culture ……………………………………………….. 126 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 128 Chapter Five: The Mizo, Naga and Bodo Self-determination Disputes in India ….. 131 Theoretical Expectations …………………………………………………... 135 Overview of Governance Politics in India and the Mizo, Naga and Bodo Cases ………………………………................................. 138 The Mizo, Naga and Bodo Cases ………………………………….. 143 Evaluating the Propositions ………………………………………………...145 Proposition One: The Role of Internal Consensus in Gaining Autonomy………….……………………………………… 145 The Mizo Movement for Self-determination ……………… 145 The Naga Movement for Self-determination ……………… 153 The Bodo Movement for Self-determination ……………… 159 Proposition Two: The Use of Limited Concessions and Varying Scope of Autonomy…………………………………………165 Proposition Three: Post-settlement Integration and Repression …... 172 Alternative Explanation …………………………………………………… 176 Additional Factors …………………………………………………………. 178 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………….181 Chapter Six: Conclusion ……………………………………………………..……. 183 Findings …………………………………………………………………… 184 Quantitative Analyses ……………………………………………... 184 Qualitative Analyses ………………………………………………. 186 Implications of the Study ………………………………………………….. 189 Creating consensus and cooperation within self-determination movements ………………………………………………… 189 The consequences of bargaining failure …………………………... 190 v Dynamic interaction and internal fractionalization ……………….. 192 Implications of this project for political science …………………... 193 Data Appendix ………………………………………………………….................. 195 Works Cited ……………………………………………………………...... ……... 197 vi LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figures Figure 1.1: Internal Bargaining in Governments (high degree of institutionalization) ………………………………………………............... 7 Figure 1.2: Internal Bargaining in Self-determination Movements (low degree of institutionalization) ……………………………………………... 9 Figure 1.3: Government Considerations in External Bargaining …….…………….10 Figure 1.4: Self-determination Movement Considerations in External Bargaining …………………………………………………………. ……... 12 Figure 2.1: Institutionalization Continuum ………………………………………... 30 Figure 2.2: Expected Likelihood of Autonomy Based on Government Veto Players ……………………………………………………….. ……... 47 Figure 2.3: Expected Likelihood of Autonomy Based on Self-determination Movements Factions ………………………………………………. ……... 49 Figure 3.1: Effects of Government Fractionalization on Likelihood of Autonomy …………………………………………………………………. 72 Figure 3.2: Effects of Movement Fractionalization on Likelihood of Autonomy………………………………………………………………….. 74 Figure 3.3: Effects of Movement Fractionalization on Likelihood of Civil War…………………………………………………………………… 78 Figure 4.1: Dominance of Autonomy or Independence Demands Overtime ……... 120 Tables Table 2.1: Prediction Chart Based on the Number of Internal Divisions………….. 50 Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics ……………………………………………………. 64 Table 3.2: Logistic Regressions on Autonomy…………………………………….. 69 Table 3.3: Logistic Regressions on Civil War……………………………………... 76 Table 3.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression on Contested and Uncontested Autonomy………………………………………………………………….. 80 Table 3.5 Ordered Logistic Regression on Change in the Number of SD Factions………………………………………………………………… 82 vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My work on this dissertation benefited from the expertise and hard work of a number of people at the University of California, San Diego. Foremost among these is my advisor David Lake. He contributed to the project at every stage, from its inception in my first years of graduate school to its final form today. His support and encouragement have been instrumental in achieving this goal; his unflagging willingness to read and re-read many drafts of the dissertation and to talk through many aspects of the project with me were invaluable. I have also had the pleasure of working closely with Barbara Walter and Philip Roeder, who have contributed immensely to the project, both in its development and execution. Kristian Gleditsch and Eli Berman also helped to improve the project at many stages. This dissertation also benefited from my graduate school colleagues, though many seminars and hallway discussions. In particular, Emily Beaulieu, Carew Boulding, Melody Ellis, Susan Hyde, Jessica Trounstine and Rosco Williamson contributed to the development of the project. I am grateful for additional support and encouragement from my mother Patty, my brother Ryan and my sister-in-law Amy, all of whom heard at great length about the ups and downs of writing a dissertation. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my husband and colleague David Cunningham for his unwavering support of me, this project and everything I have endeavored to achieve in the last five years. The end of this project has also coincided with the beginning of our family. This dissertation is dedicated to David and our new son Kevin, both of whom make this meaningful. viii VITA Education B.A., cum laude, with High Honors, in Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 1999 M.A. Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 2002. Ph.D. Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 2007. Honors and Awards Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, Dissertation Fellowship, 2006. Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies Travel Grant, 2005. Dean’s Social Science Travel Fund Grant, 2005. Mark Twain Fellowship, UCSD, September 2000 – present. American Political Science Association Travel Grant, 2004. Invited participant and presenter in the 2004 Women In International Security Summer Symposium, 2004. Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, UCSD 2002. Publications 2007. “The Shining Path Insurgency,” in DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo, Eds., Civil Wars of the World: Profiles of the Most Intense Internal Conflicts Since World War II , forthcoming 2007. Conference Presentations 2006. “Inter-group Differences and the Status of Religious and Ethnic Minorities.”