“The Dynamics of Executive Approval in Fifth Republic France: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis”* Richard S. Conley Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of Florida 234 Anderson Hall P.O. Box 117325 Gainesville, FL 32611 (352) 392-0262 x 297 [email protected] http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley Abstract This article is the first to develop a theoretical framework for systematically testing the dynamics of aggregate, monthly presidential and prime ministerial approval in Fifth Republic France (1959-2003). The empirical model combines general economic trends, “rally effects” from presidential foreign policy/military actions, socio-cultural factors specific to French political life, including domestic strife and strikes, as well as the three experiences of cohabitation or “divided government,” to gauge changes in monthly public approval for the five French presidents spanning de Gaulle to Chirac and their prime ministers. The results of the time-series analysis suggest that many of the factors presumed to affect presidential approval in the U.S., notably the state of the economy, impact French presidents’ approval in a similar way. However, French presidents do not gain a significant short term boost from either foreign/military actions or from their annual Bastille Day interview. Instead, domestic strife, such as terrorist attacks in the homeland by international groups or regional independence movements (e.g., Corsica, Brittany), produce a more substantive short-term rally effect. National strikes, frequently provoked by governmental policies opposed by France’s formidable unions, drive down approval significantly in the short-term for both the president and the prime minister. Finally, caeteris paribus, both Mitterrand and Chirac won the public opinion duel vis-à-vis opposition prime ministers. The condition of cohabitation—when the opposition party or coalition of opposition parties controls the legislature—enabled Mitterrand and Chirac to reposition themselves for their respective reelection victories in 1988 and 2002. * Author gratefully acknowledges grants provided by the Department of Political Science, University of Florida, and Dr. Gayle Zachmann, Director of the University of Florida Paris Research Center, for this research. The research was completed in Summer 2003 at the Université Aix-Marseille III (Aix-en-Provence, France) and Fall 2003 at the Centre américain de Sciences-Po and the University of Florida Paris Research Center in Paris, France. Paper prepared for the Southern Political Science Association Conference, New Orleans, LA, January 7-10, 2004. Introduction Despite constitutional and developmental similarities between Fifth Republic France and the United States, little comparative analysis of presidential politics in the two countries exists.1 In both nations executive approval is a constant subject of interest in the press and among the public. But do the dynamics of French presidents’ public approval approximate those for U.S. presidents? And do the factors that affect French presidents’ approval similarly structure prime ministers’ approval? To date, these vital questions have not been systematically analyzed by French or Anglo- American political scientists. The French political science literature, rooted in a tradition of constitutional studies and public law rather than quantitative analysis, lends largely anecdotal insight into individual presidents’ and prime ministers’ public approval trends. Moreover, the major French survey organisations, and the annual publications they spawn, provide mostly descriptive evidence to explain patterns—sometimes with the aid of current and former government officials whose party leaders are the subject of the surveys under analysis.2 This article is the first to develop a framework for testing the dynamics of aggregate, monthly presidential (and prime-ministerial) approval in Fifth Republic France (1959-2003). The empirical model combines general economic trends, “rally around the flag effects, socio- cultural factors specific to French political life, and the three experiences of cohabitation or “divided government,” to gauge monthly changes in executive approval for the five French presidents spanning de Gaulle to Chirac, and their respective prime ministers. The analysis permits an implicit comparison of the variables affecting French presidents’ public approval with their American counterparts. The results of the time-series analysis suggest that many of the factors presumed to affect presidential approval in the U.S., notably the state of the economy, impact French presidents’ approval in a similar way. However, French presidents do not gain a significant, short-term boost from either foreign/military actions or from their 2 annual Bastille Day interview—an analogy to U.S. presidents’ State of the Union Address. Instead, domestic strife, such as terrorist attacks in the homeland by international groups or regional independence movements (e.g., Corsica, Brittany), produce a more substantive positive rally effect. Negative events, such as national strikes and protests, frequently provoked by governmental policies opposed by France’s formidable unions, drive down approval significantly in the short-term—and also negatively impact evaluations of French prime ministers. Finally, caeteris paribus, the approval ratings of both Mitterrand and Chirac benefited from the incidence of opposition control of the legislature—as did, ironically, their prime ministers under cohabitation. Yet the French condition of “divided government” apparently furnished greater advantages for Mitterrand and Chirac in their respective reelection bids in 1988 and 2002 compared to their prime ministerial challengers. This article unfolds in several stages. The first section provides an overview of the French dual executive and the import of presidential “domination” of the prime minister in the realm of public approval. The second section presents a comparative synopsis of French presidents’ and prime ministers’ approval from January 1959-August 2003 and theories that account for changes in public approval. The third section details the methodology for gauging the dynamics of monthly public approval for French presidents and their prime ministers. The fourth section discusses the results of the empirical analysis. The concluding section offers some additional thoughts on the prospects for extending comparative analysis of the French and U.S. presidencies. I. The French Fifth Republic: Towards a Presidential Regime The French Fifth Republic has often been referred to as “semi-presidential” or a “dyadic” given a double executive structure (Duverger 1959). In reality, however, the system has moved decisively in the direction of presidentialism, notwithstanding recent periods of divided partisan control of the presidency and the National Assembly (Ardant and Duhamel 1999). Presidents 3 have come to “dominate” prime ministers, creating an imbalance that has prompted some scholars who take a “strict constructionist” view of the Fifth Republic constitution to call for a reevaluation of institutional powers (Lascombe 2002). Regardless, norms and expectations in the Fifth Republic have evolved in the direction of a presidency-centered, not parliamentary- centred, model of executive leadership that accentuates the centrality of public approval for presidents’ policy and electoral fortunes—particularly in recent periods when the president and prime minister have been from opposing parties. Constitutionally, French presidents in the Fifth Republic were supposed to act as “arbiters of republican institutions.” But Charles de Gaulle, the first president of the Fifth Republic, quickly dispelled notions that a parliamentary-centered regime would predominate. De Gaulle swiftly reverted to France’s long tradition of plebiscitarian tendencies. In 1962 he won a constitutionally-dubious referendum to replace a complex, territorially-based electoral college system with direct election of the president as a means of enhancing his—and future presidents’—claims to be the only representative of all the people (Ehrmann 1983, 7-11). He solidified the presidency and the Palais Élysée, the president’s Paris headquarters, as the locus of power and the institution to which the electorate looks for policy leadership. Unwittingly, perhaps, de Gaulle also opened up a greater possibility for divided control of the presidency and the legislature (see Duverger 1986). De Gaulle also introduced another imbalance to the co-ordinate positions of the president and the prime minister for their respective responsibilities. He established the precedent that the president could “fire” prime ministers at will—as he did Michel Debré and Georges Pompidou, despite any such formal-constitutional authority (the Fifth Republic Constitution maintains that the president merely appoints the prime minister, but the latter’s confidence rests in the parliamentary majority—not the president).3 In sum, de Gaulle effectively placed the prime minister and the legislature in an inferior institutional position in the Fifth Republic’s 4 constitutional order—and the impact on the relationship between presidential and prime ministerial approval has been palpable. As Parodi (1971) notes, presidents’ approval ratings typically dominate their prime minister’s—and subsequent presidents have followed de Gaulle’s exemplar to maintain the dynamic. As fusibles4 or “fall guys” prime ministers serve at the president’s pleasure and