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Schelling, Hegel, and Evolutionary Progress Schelling, Hegel, and Evolutionary Progress J. M. Fritzman Lewis & Clark College Molly Gibson Independent scholar This article presents Schelling’s claim that nature has an evolutionary process and Hegel’s response that nature is the development of the concept. It then ex- amines whether evolution is progressive. This article argues that, insofar as a notion of progress is conceptually ineliminatable from evolutionary biology or required to articulate the shape of life’s history, progress should be viewed as constitutive. Preview This article presents Schelling’s claim that nature has an evolutionary pro- cess and Hegel’s response that nature is the development of the concept. It then examines whether evolution is progressive. While many evolutionary biologists explicitly repudiate the suggestion that there is progress in evo- lution, they often implicitly presuppose this. Moreover, such a notion seems required insofar as the shape of life’s history consists in a directional trend. This article argues that, insofar as a notion of progress is indeed conceptually ineliminatable from evolutionary biology or needed to artic- ulate the shape of life’s history, progress should be viewed as constitutive. The section on “Why Schelling and Hegel?” articulates the motivation for investigating their views about evolution and progress. The “Back Story” brieºy discusses the philosophies of Kant and Fichte, since these Three anonymous reviewers for Perspectives on Science are thanked for suggestions that led to useful revisions; all authors should be blessed with such readers. Earlier versions were pre- sented to the Northwest Philosophy Conference at the University of Oregon on 6 Decem- ber 2008 (David Kolb is thanked for his commentary) and to a joint Department of Philos- ophy & Summer Research Colloquium at Lewis & Clark College on 19 September 2008. Claire Kodachi and William A. Rottschaefer are thanked for their comments. Gordon P. Kelly is thanked for modifying Terentius’ Latin. Lewis & Clark College provided support through a Collaborative Research Grant. Perspectives on Science 2012, vol. 20, no. 1 ©2012 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 105 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/POSC_a_00058 by guest on 28 September 2021 106 Schelling, Hegel, and Evolutionary Progress are the points of departure for Schelling and Hegel. These two sections also indicate how scientiªc developments inºuence them. The section on “Schelling, According to Richards and Grant” compares divergent inter- pretations of Schelling’s philosophy. These interpretations have distinc- tively important results when considering Schelling’s claim that nature has an evolutionary process and when that claim is compared to contem- porary evolutionary biology. “Evolution, Emanation, Development, Ac- cording to Hegel” presents Hegel’s reasons for denying that nature evolves or emanates and for instead maintaining that it is the development of the concept. “Schelling and Hegel after Darwin: A Brief Comparison” consid- ers Schelling’s acceptance, and Hegel’s rejection, of evolution and progress in nature. “Progress as Complexity, Autonomy, or Convergence” indicates the limitations of three ways of articulating progress. “Is Progress Like Pornography?” argues that, sadly, it is not. Whereas pornography can still be recognized even if it cannot be deªned, this is not so for progress. “Progress as constitutive” notes that, while many evolutionary biologists explicitly repudiate the suggestion that there is progress in evolution, they often seem to implicitly presuppose this. It is argued that, insofar as notions of progress are indeed conceptually ineliminatable from evolu- tionary biology or required insofar as the shape of life’s history consists in a directional trend, progress should be viewed as constitutive, rather than only regulative or merely a façon de parler. Humanity should be the stan- dard by which progress is measured. Recognizing the inherent dangers of deªning “progress” and “humanity” in reference to “us,” the article con- cludes by urging that “we” be expanded. Why Schelling and Hegel? Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) accepts the inertia principle of Isaac New- ton (1643–1727), according to which objects only move—or, if already in motion, cease moving—as a result of the application of an external force. Billiard balls are a useful example of this. Kant thinks that the principle of inertia is constitutive, describing nature as it actually is. Thus, he con- cludes that matter is “lifeless.”1 Because Kant accepts the principle of iner- 1. Kant 1985, 105–106: “The inertia of matter is and signiªes nothing but its lifeless- ness, as matter in itself. Life means the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal principle, of a ªnite substance to determine itself to change, and of a ma- terial substance to determine itself to motion or to rest as change of its state. Now, we know of no other internal principle of a substance to change its state but desire and no other activity whatsoever but thought, along with what depends upon such desire, namely feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and appetite or will. But these determining grounds and actions do not at all belong to the representations of the external senses and hence also do not to the determinations of matter as matter. Therefore all matter as such is lifeless. The Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/POSC_a_00058 by guest on 28 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 107 tia, he argues that biological organisms are not able to move themselves but instead are moved only by external forces, that they do not develop themselves, that they do not act because they have no goals, and that na- ture itself is without purpose. He argues that humans can never compre- hend how it is possible that, although actually lifeless, biological organ- isms nevertheless appear to be alive. This is Kant’s point when he claims that “it is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the or- ganized beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical principles of nature, let alone explain them; and indeed this is so certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for human beings even to make such an attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a New- ton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather, we must absolutely deny this insight to human beings” (Kant 2000, section 75, 270–271, Ak. 5:400). In order to study biological organisms, then, it is necessary to make the false assumptions that biological organisms can move themselves, that they contain within themselves principles for self- development and self-replication, and that they have goals.2 It is not merely that these assumptions are psychologically ineliminatable because individuals have an unavoidable tendency to presuppose them, moreover. They are conceptually ineliminatable because humans are incapable of ever comprehending biological organisms without them. These false as- sumptions are regulative, according to Kant. They are heuristic devices that guide research. Nevertheless, they are still false. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) and Georg Wil- helm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) respond that since such assumptions are necessary to understand biological organisms, as Kant concedes, this is sufªcient reason to regard these assumptions as constitutive.3 Schelling ac- proposition of inertia says so much and no more.” Compare Westphal 1998. Westphal shows that Hegel correctly perceives that Kant’s a priori argument for matter’s inertness and lifelessness is fallacious and so Kant should have regarded matter’s inertness as an em- pirical question. 2. The leaves of a plant turn toward the sunlight, for example, in order for photosynthe- sis to occur. 3. More precisely: Kant claims that matter is inert and so lifeless. As a consequence, he argues that all attempts to understand nature, either in part or as a whole, as purposeful are not constitutive but only regulative. Schelling urges, however, that form is inseparable from content, Hegel agrees with this, and so there is no reason for Kant to nevertheless maintain that the form of organisms is something added by humans. “While the Kantians are right to insist that the idea of purpose involves that of some guiding intelligence,” as Frederick C. Beiser explicates Schelling’s conclusion, “they must also admit that, in the case of an organism, this intelligence is within the object itself” (Beiser 2002, 521). Also see Friedman 2006, 26–43. Like Schelling, “Hegel adopts Kant’s idea of an intuitive un- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/POSC_a_00058 by guest on 28 September 2021 108 Schelling, Hegel, and Evolutionary Progress cepts panpsychism, according to which all matter is enminded. That is to say, matter always has some aspect of mind, however rudimentary, and he seems to identify the level of complexity of a matter’s structure with mind. He further maintains that consciousness results when matter has a sufªciently complex organization. Although Hegel apparently rejects pan- psychism, he agrees with Schelling that the proper model for conceptual- izing nature is the organism, not the machine, and that biological organ- isms really are alive.4 Robert J. Richards argues that Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882) believes that evolution is progressive and teleological, with humans on the highest rung (Richards 1987; Richards 1992). He further maintains that Darwin’s theory of evolution is inºuenced by Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (Richards 2002).5 Richards argues that Ernst Heinrich Philipp August Haeckel (1834–1919), who is primarily responsible for introducing Dar- win’s theory in Germany, also believes that evolution is progressive.6 Al- though Kant believes that there can never be a Newton of a blade of grass, Haeckel claims that Darwin is this Newton. Haeckel can believe this, however, only because he rejects Kant’s views on inertia (see Haeckel 1889, 95; Cornell 1986).
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