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Russia´S Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Part II FOI-R--1588--SE February 2005 ISSN 1650-1942 User report Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations Systems Technology SE-172 90 Stockholm SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY FOI-R—1588—SE Systems Technology February 2005 SE-172 90 Stockholm ISSN 1650-1942 User report Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations The photograph on the front cover shows the test explosion of the Soviet Union’s “First Tactical Nuclear Warhead” courtesy of the Nuclear Weapons Museum of the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), Sarov, Russia. Issuing organization Report number, ISRN Report type FOI – Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI-R--1588--SE User report Systems Technology Research area code SE-172 90 Stockholm 31 Nuclear Defence Research Month year Project no. February 2005 A6123 Sub area code 31 Nuclear Defence Research Sub area code 2 Author/s (editor/s) Project manager Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton Mattias Waldenvik Approved by Sponsoring agency Scientifically and technically responsible Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton Report title Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations Abstract (not more than 200 words) This is the second part in a series of two reports on Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Part II starts with a description of likely missions of Soviet TNWs during the Cold War era, followed by recent evidence on how Russia contemplates the use of its present nuclear weapons including command and control. The safety of Russia’s TNWs is discussed together with the issue of possible pre-delegation of release authority of TNWs in a time of crisis. Aspects on TNW warhead manufacturing and refurbishment are given and safety problems related to nuclear warhead storage sites and transportation are discussed. The report concludes that while there is a severe lack of transparency on TNW issues in Russia, its TNW warheads are probably more secure than analysts in the West commonly assert. It ends with a proposal that Russia would nevertheless do well to consolidate its tactical warheads into a smaller set of storage facilities in order to mitigate security as well as command and control concerns. Keywords Russia, tactical nuclear weapons, command and control, nuclear weapons storage site Further bibliographic information Language English ISSN 1650-1942 Pages 78 p. Price acc. to pricelist 2 Utgivare Rapportnummer, ISRN Klassificering Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut - FOI FOI-R--1588--SE Användarrapport Systemteknik Forskningsområde 172 90 Stockholm 3. Skydd mot NBC och andra farliga ämnen Månad, år Projektnummer Februari 2005 A6123 Delområde 31 N-forskning Delområde 2 Författare/redaktör Projektledare Gunnar Arbman, Charles Thornton Mattias Waldenvik Godkänd av Uppdragsgivare/kundbeteckning Tekniskt och/eller vetenskapligt ansvarig Gunnar Arbman och Charles Thornton Rapportens titel (i översättning) Rysslands taktiska kärnvapen. Del II: Tekniska frågor och policyrekommendationer Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord) Föreliggande rapport är den andra av två som behandlar Rysslands taktiska kärnvapen. Rapporten ger en tillbakablick över hur Sovjetunionen sannolikt hade tänkt använda sina taktiska kärnvapen. Nyligen publicerade doktriner och genomförda militärövningar analyseras i syfte att hitta ledtrådar till hur man i dagens Ryssland skulle kunna tänka sig använda sina (taktiska) kärnvapen. Kontroll- och ledningsfrågor uppmärksammas med särskild betoning på eventuell delegering av beslutsrätten att använda taktiska kärnvapen vid en större väpnad konflikt. Underhåll och nytillverkning av taktiska kärnvapen behandlas liksom skyddet vid transport och lagring. En slutsats är att säkerheten vid hantering, förvaring och transport av de taktiska kärnvapnen verkar vara större än många västliga bedömare anser vara fallet. En annan slutsats är att säkerheten trots detta kan förstärkas genom fortsatt centralisering - d.v.s. genom att antalet förråd och förvaringsplatser för stridsspetsarna ytterligare reduceras. Dessutom skulle sannolikt högsta ledningens kontroll och samband med underställda enheter påverkas i en gynsam riktning av detta. Nyckelord Ryssland, taktiska kärnvapen, ledning och samband, kärnvapenförråd Övriga bibliografiska uppgifter Språk Engelska ISSN 1650-1942 Antal sidor: 78 s. Distribution enligt missiv Pris: Enligt prislista 3 Russia’s Tactical/Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations Gunnar Arbman, Ph.D. (Swedish Defense Research Agency) Charles L. Thornton (University of Maryland) II-0.0 Introduction to Part II......................................................................................................2 II-0.1 Methodological Approaches to Parts I and II .................................................................4 II-1.0 Current Operational Status of Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Forces....................................7 II-1.1 Tactical Nuclear Weapon Systems and Their Categorizations...................................7 II-1.1.1 Missions During the Soviet Era .........................................................................10 II-1.1.2 The Current Operational Force ..........................................................................12 II-1.2 Recent Evidence on How Russia Contemplates the Use of Its (Tactical) Nuclear Weapons...............................................................................................................................16 II-1.2.1 Evidence from Recent Military Exercises .........................................................17 II-1.2.2 The Issue of Collateral Damage.........................................................................18 II-2.0 Current Issues in Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Force Policy............................................19 II-2.1 The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in the 2000/2003 Russian Military Doctrines 20 II-2.2 How Consistent are the Operation Tactical Nuclear Forces with the 2000/2003 Russian Military Doctrines? ................................................................................................24 II-3.0 Command and Control in the Tactical Nuclear Forces Context...................................27 II.3.1 C2 for Strategic Nuclear Systems: How Relevant? .................................................28 II-3.2 C2 for Tactical Nuclear Forces.................................................................................30 II-3.2.1 Dilemmas of Vulnerability and Command and Control....................................31 II-3.2.2 Authorizing the Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons ...........................................33 II-3.2.3 Concerns About Pre-Delegating Use Authority ................................................35 II-3.2.4 “Permissive Action Links” for Russian Tactical Nuclear Warheads.................36 II-4.0 Technical Aspects of Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons...........................................38 II-4.1 Safety of Tactical Nuclear Warheads .......................................................................39 II-4.1.1 The Possibility of Causing an Unauthorized Detonation?.................................39 II-4.1.2 One-Point Safety................................................................................................41 II-4.2 Manufacturing, Refurbishment, and Modernization Capabilities.............................44 II-4.2.1 Tactical Nuclear Warhead Manufacturing and Refurbishment .........................45 II-4.2.2 Tactical Warhead Testing and Modernization...................................................48 II-4.2.3 Tactical Nuclear Delivery Systems....................................................................49 II-4.3 Russian Tactical Nuclear Force Personnel ...............................................................52 II-5.0 Security of Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Forces ...............................................................55 II-5.1 The Nature of the Tactical Nuclear Warhead Security Problem ..............................56 II-5.2 Current Status of Russian Tactical Nuclear Warhead Security ................................61 II-6.0 Policy Recommendation: Consolidate Russia’s Nuclear Weapon Storage Sites ........63 II-6.1 Background on the Framework for Consolidation....................................................66 II-6.2 Consolidation Proposal .............................................................................................68 II-6.3 Incentives for Russian Acceptance of Nuclear Warhead Storage Facility Consolidation .......................................................................................................................70 II-7.0 Conclusions to Part II....................................................................................................72 1 II-0.0 Introduction to Part II In 1999 the Russian Security Council held a meeting that focused on Russia’s tactical nuclear forces.1 President Yeltsin opened the meeting by saying, “For half a century the nuclear forces have been one of the decisive factors in the stability of the situation in the world as a whole. That is precisely why maintaining the combat readiness of our nuclear potential at a high level is one of Russia’s priority state interests.”2 According to one report, “Particular attention was devoted to the questions of extending the timetable for the storage and operation of tactical nuclear weapons ... Last year the Russian
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