Afghanistan; Recruitment by Armed Groups

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Afghanistan; Recruitment by Armed Groups European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Recruitment by armed groups September 2016 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Recruitment by armed groups September 2016 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Print ISBN 978-92-9494-180-0 doi:10.2847/62143 BZ-02-16-887-EN-C PDF ISBN 978-92-9494-181-7 doi:10.2847/044654 BZ-02-16-887-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office, 2016 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Recruitment by armed groups — 3 Acknowledgments EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum departments as the co-author of this report: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research) The following departments reviewed this report: Hungary, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Documentation Centre Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos – Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysis United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RSD Section A quality review was carried out by Kate Clark from the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), an independent non- profit policy research organisation. It aims to bring together the knowledge, experience and drive of a large number of experts to better inform policy and to increase the understanding of Afghan realities1 ( ). (1) https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Recruitment by armed groups — 5 Contents Acknowledgments ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3 Disclaimer ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 7 Glossary and Abbreviations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8 Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11 Map of Afghanistan ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 1. Taliban organisation and modus operandi ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 1.1. Leadership ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13 1.2. Command structure and recruitment mechanisms ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������14 1.2.1. Local Taliban fronts ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14 1.2.2. Mobile Taliban units �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16 1.2.3. Training camps..................................................................................................................................16 1.2.4. Ideology, communication and propaganda channels ���������������������������������������������������������������������16 1.3. Ethnic and tribal affiliation �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18 1.3.1. Pashtun tribes �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18 1.3.2. Hazaras in the Taliban’s ranks ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19 1.4. Incentives for recruitment �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20 1.4.1. Economy and unemployment ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20 1.4.2. Insecurity caused by other armed actors ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 1.4.3. Ideology ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 1.4.4. Grievances against the government ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 1.4.5. Adventure, honour and pride ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 1.5. Forced recruitment and the use of coercion ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 1.5.1. Badakhshan ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 1.5.2. Kunduz ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 1.5.3. Kunar ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 1.5.4. Helmand �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 1.5.5. Nangarhar �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 1.5.6. Consequences in case of refusal ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24 1.6. Pakistan as a base ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24 2. Islamic State in Khorasan ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27 2.1. Recruitment ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28 2.1.1. Ideology ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28 2.1.2. Disillusionment with the Taliban ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29 2.1.3. Economic reasons �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29 2.1.4. Forced recruitment and the use of coercion �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������30 6 — EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Recruitment by armed groups 3. Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 3.1. Recruitment ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������32 4. Pro-government militias ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 4.1. Recruitment into ALP ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������34 4.2. Recruitment into militias ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������35 4.2.1. On the role of a shura or strongman ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������35 4.2.2. On the individual choice �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������37 4.2.3. Forced recruitment and the use of coercion �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������37 4.2.4. Economic incentives �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38 5. Child recruitment ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39 5.1. Prevalence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 5.2. Child recruitment by armed opposition groups ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 5.2.1. Methods of recruitment among children ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������42 5.3. Child recruitment by ANSF �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������44
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