Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan Monies, Markets, and Finance in East Asia, 1600–1900

Edited by Hans Ulrich Vogel

VOLUME 1 Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan

Edited by Bettina Gramlich-Oka Gregory Smits

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010 Cover illustration: Middle section of the Nishikie (Brocade sheet) Kanai tanoshiku kinsen asobiseru zu 家内楽金銭遊セル図, by Utagawa Kunimaro 歌川国麿, 1868. Courtesy of the Waseda University Library.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Economic thought in early modern Japan / edited by Bettina Gramlich-Oka, Gregory Smits. p. cm. — (Monies, markets, and finance in East Asia, 1600–1900; v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18383-4 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Economics—Japan—History—To 1800. 2. Economics—Japan—History—19th century. 3. Japan—Economic conditions—1600–1868. I. Gramlich-Oka, Bettina. II. Smits, Gregory, 1960– III. Title. IV. Series.

HB126.J2E26 2010 330.0952’0903—dc22 2010018108

ISSN 2210-2876 ISBN 978 90 04 18383 4

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Dedicated to John Luke Matsumoto Metzler 2003–2009

雲ゐにもかよふ心のおくれねばわかると人に見ゆばかりなり

Kumoi ni mo No matter how great kayou kokoro no a distance you may travel okureneba my loving heart will wakaru to hito ni never lag behind though it miyu bakari nari may seem we have been parted (Kiyowara no Fukayabu, Kokinshū 378, trans. Laurel Rasplica Rodd)

CONTENTS

Foreword ...... ix Hans Ulrich Vogel Foreword to the Volume ...... xiii Ōguchi Yūjirō Acknowledgments ...... xvii List of Maps ...... xix List of Contributors ...... xxi

Introduction: The Autonomy of Market Activity and the Emergence of Keizai Thought ...... 1 Mark Metzler and Gregory Smits

Money and the State: Medieval Precursors of the Early Modern Economy ...... 21 Ethan Segal

Economic Thought Concerning Freedom and Control ...... 47 Kawaguchi Hiroshi

Guiding Horses with Rotten Reins: Economic Thought in the Eighteenth-Century Kingdom of Ryukyu ...... 67 Gregory Smits

The Shift to Domestic Sugar and the Ideology of ‘The National Interest’ ...... 89 Ochiai Kō

A Domain Doctor and Shogunal Policies ...... 111 Bettina Gramlich-Oka

The Economic Thought of Shōji Kōki and the Tenpō Reforms in Saga Domain ...... 157 Jan Sýkora viii contents

Confucian Banking: The Community Granary Shasō( ) in Rhetoric and Practice ...... 179 Mark J. Ravina

From Tokugawa to Meiji: The Economic Thought of a Local Entrepreneur in the Early Meiji Era ...... 205 Ishii Sumiyo

Policy Space, Polarities, and Regimes ...... 217 Mark Metzler

Glossary ...... 251 References ...... 261 Index ...... 287 FOREWORD

caput xxii quod tyrannus non potest diu durae In istis duobus capitulis intendo probare, quod exigere pecuniam per tales mutationes monetae, est contra honorem regium, et in praejudicium tota- lis regalis posteritatis. Sciendum est igitur, quod inter principatum regium et tyrannicum, hoc interest quod tyrannus plus diligit et quaerit proprium bonum quam commune conferens subditorum: . . . Nicolaus Oresmius (before 1330–1382), De mutatione monetarum: tractatus.1 In my function as the Director of the Research Group “Monies, Mar- kets, and Finance in China and East Asia, 1600–1900: Local, Regional, National and International Dimensions”2 it is both a great pleasure as well as an honor for me to have been asked to write a brief foreword to this book. “Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan” was the title of one of the scholarly conventions of this research group. This international symposium, organized by Bettina Gramlich-Oka and Robert Horres from the Department of Japanese Studies (Institute for Asian and Oriental Studies, Tübingen University), took place from May 29 to June 1, 2008, in Blaubeuren, in the eastern part of the state of Baden- Württemberg in Germany. Blaubeuren provided an ideal location for this meeting, not only because facilities of Tübingen University for such events are available there, but also because of its landmarks and archaeological importance. Participants enjoyed visiting the Blautopf (Blue Pot), the beautiful spring of the river Blau, while perhaps not being aware that in the vicinity of Blaubeuren some of mankind’s earliest works of art, small animal and human figures made out of mam- moth ivory, have been discovered.

1 Nicolas von Oresme, De mutatione monetarum: tractatus; Traktat über die Geldabwertungen, übersetzt von Wolfram Burckhardt, mit einem Nachwort von Mar- tin Burckhardt, Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 1999, p. 62. 2 See http://www.monieseastasia.uni-tuebingen.de/. x foreword

The research group “Monies, Markets, and Finance in China and East Asia” was founded in 2004 when it first received funding from the Ministry of Science, Research and Art of the State of Baden-Württem- berg. Later, from October 2005 onwards the project could be considerably expanded, due to the generous support of the German Research Foundation (DFG), which will continue to finance this undertaking until late 2011. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Ger- man Research Foundation, not only for the Research Group in general, but also for such specific events as the international symposium in Blaubeuren. In this context also other institutions deserve mention due to their continuous financial contributions, especially the German– East Asian Forum of Sciences and Humanities of Tübingen University, the Association of the Friends of the University of Tübingen, and the China Society of Baden-Württemberg for the Advancement of Scien- tific and Technical Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. The publication of this volume on economic thought in early modern Japan is remarkable not only due to its content, but also because it marks the first volume of the Research Group’s new series published now with Brill.3 This series is namedMonies, Markets, and Finance in East Asia, 1600–1900. As is suggested by its title, it will publish work on the history of monies, markets and finance in East Asia, mainly during the period from 1600 to 1900 and with a regional focus on China, Japan and Korea. We understand monies not only as referring to physical objects and monetary functions, but also to such related aspects as mining, smelting as well as transportation of, and trade in, monetary metals. Markets are the places where the sale and purchase of goods and services take place. The multiplicity and diversity of markets in a premodern East Asian context imply the existence of different currency circuits and competing currencies, with monies fulfilling the various needs of individuals, groups, associations, and institutions. The topic of finance includes case studies both on public dimensions and private institutions, such as war finance, sources for public revenue, private financial institutions, and credit and trust networks. Contributions in this series, however, will not only deal with

3 Before shifting to Brill, the research group published one volume with the LIT Verlag. See Thomas Hirzel and Nanny Kim (eds.),Metals, Monies, and Markets in Early Modern Societies: East Asian and Global Perspectives, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008, vol. 17 of Bunka—Wenhua: Tübinger Ostasiatische Forschungen/Tuebingen East Asian Studies. foreword xi empirical and theoretical approaches to economic, social and political aspects of monies, markets and finance, but also with their cultural characteristics and meanings. By establishing a strong foundation in the research of monies, markets and finance in premodern East Asia, the series aims at serving as a starting point for solid cross-cultural comparative research. And this, in my view, is exactly the contribution of the first volume in this series edited by Bettina Gramlich-Oka and Gregory Smits. Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan deals with a impressive number of topics, ranging from concepts of freedom and control, the ideology of “national interest”, the economic thought of local entrepreneurs, to such subjects as monetary policy in the medieval period and the rhetoric and practice in the management of community granaries, to mention only a few. When juxtaposed with the projects of the Research Group, it can be easily seen that the subjects dealt with in this volume cover important areas of its agenda, with a much welcomed regional focus on Japan. What I especially appreciate is that this series does not start with China, but with Japan, highlighting the important insight that East Asia was not a uniform entity, but consisted of different regions with a variety of approaches to economic, political, social and cultural problems and challenges. This volume of articles, moreover, makes clear the great variety of currents of thought in the multiplestate system of Japan itself, in stark contrast with the picture of a single state ideology. Another prominent feature are the results obtained by prosopographic studies on individual thinkers, which reveal that scholastic categories were not as fixed as one might have assumed, but that there existed large areas of social interaction and overlapping of different strands of thought. The importance of market forces, including the function of merchants, in a rather dynamic phase of development, found its reflection in the thought of a variety of historical actors, resulting, for instance, in metaphors comparing commerce with the bodily functions of blood and ki (material force, “ether”) or being governed by the same or similar principles like the cosmos or nature. The problematic relationship between gain or profit on the one hand and morality and the public weal on the other was another topic pervading discourses, as were the conflicting views of the role of the state in regulating and controlling the economy, especially commerce and the markets. These different currents of thought, which one might call interventionist and accom- modationist, also characterized much of Chinese statecraft debates, as xii foreword we know from recent studies of Lin Man-houng4 and Helen Dunstan.5 As a matter of fact, in spite of the restrictive policy of the Tokugawa shogunate in foreign policy and trade, Japan was not an isolated place, but was in contact with China, the Dutch, Korea, Ryukyu, and the Russians. China, especially, played an important role, not only in commercial respects, but also as a source of literature and texts that served as a potential treasure trove of economic ideas. Due to its prospects for a rich harvest of promising results, this fascinating field of intellectual exchange between China and Japan no doubt deserves to be explored in much greater depth in the future. Granted that we agree that there exist three ways of worldmaking, subsumed under the terms ‘wealth’, ‘power’ and ‘meaning’,6 then this volume concentrates on the dimension of meaning, without neglecting however the other two domains. While the projects of the Research Group deal mainly with the economic and political aspects of monies, markets and finance, with a substantial focus on state and semi-state actors, it has always been our aim to strive for a more comprehensive approach, especially by explicitly taking cultural dimensions and intellectual history into account. Therefore, this volume is not only an important contribution, but also a necessary complement to the Research Group’s overall program in particular and for the research community in general. I do not doubt that this fine collection of articles not only marks an excellent beginning of the new series, but that it will also set a benchmark for all the upcoming contributions.

Hans Ulrich Vogel Tübingen, February 15, 2010

4 Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808- 1856, Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: Harvard University Press (Harvard East Asian Monographs; 270), 2006. 5 Helen Dunstan, State or Merchant? Political Economy and Political Process in 1740s China, Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: Harvard University Press (Harvard East Asian Monographs; 273), 2006. 6 See Johann P. Arnason, Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theo- retical Traditions, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2008, pp. 195 ff. FOREWORD TO THE VOLUME

Perhaps the first person to consider the economic history of early modern Japan compared to that of Europe was Sir Rutherford Alcock (1859–1864). Roughly 150 ago, immediately after Japan concluded treaty agreements with various European countries, Alcock led the first English diplomatic mission to Japan. Over the course of five years, while engaging in diplomatic negotiations, he also observed Japanese politics and culture with keen interest. After he retired, he wrote an account of his stay in Japan, entitled The Capital of the Tycoon; the preface includes the following passage: with the Japanese we take a step backwards some ten centuries, to live over again the Feudal days. We read our own past in Japanese history. Feudalism, so seemingly after time and out of place, is here, with sufficient identity and analogy in all its leading features to make the coincidence striking; and yet with sufficient divergence to make its study in this Eastern phase deeply interesting.1 This passage reveals how Alcock, who plunged headlong into the society of the final years of the Tokugawa period bakumatsu( ), tried to understand this unknown realm by comparing it to Europe’s feudal period. He points out that between bakumatsu Japan and feudal Europe there are both areas of ‘identity and analogy’ as well as many points of ‘divergence.’ Alcock was not a scholar of history, but as an intellectual with a European education he arguably managed to express something of the distinctive character of bakumatsu Japan. Beyond any possible intention of Alcock, his work also foreshadows the path taken by research into early modern Japan over the past 150 years, which has continued with comparisons to European history in mind. When research into Japanese history was first conducted based on European historical methodology, it began by pointing out how similar Japan’s medieval and early modern periods were to Europe’s feudal past. As research progressed and the unique characteristics of Japanese history became clearer, attention shifted to its differences from the European model. In this respect, the most distinctive characteristic of

1 Alcock 1868, pp. xix–xx. xiv foreword to the volume

Japan’s early modern period is the strength of the political power held by the shogunate; for this reason, early modern Japan was given the paradoxical label of ‘collective feudalism,’ but ultimately this system unique to Japan came to be called the baku-han system. It has been portrayed as a society with a shogun at its apex and centralized control extending to every aspect of state, diplomatic, economic, and regional affairs.2 On the other hand, an alternate view holds that the structures for political and social control in early modern Japan cannot be explained solely with reference to feudal systems and the absolute power of the shogunate. Rather, appropriate kinds of state service were imposed according to class—warriors with military service, peasants with tax levies, townsfolk with town service; more than feudal service, this should be understood as duty to the state. So long as those at each level of society fulfilled their assigned roles and kept to their prescribed status, the entire social and political system could remain stable.3 Early modern Japan has thus been understood in various ways, as anything from an autocratic centralized state to a society in which stability was preserved by the division of class roles; but at the root of all these analyses lies a comparison with the European feudal system. Recently, researchers in Europe, America, and Asia have all conducted wide-ranging research on the events, historical figures, social and political systems, and intellectual history of early modern Japan. We might suppose that these researchers’ various countries of origin might lead to results that incorporate richly varied ideas and approaches. But unfortunately, compared to other fields of scholarship, there have been few opportunities for the world’s scholars of early modern Japan to compare and discuss their results; this is a lack that should be rectified. Providing a step in this direction, the international symposium titled “Economic Thought in Premodern Japan” was organized and hosted by the Department of Japanese Studies (Institute for Asian and Oriental Studies, Tübingen University) in Germany in 2008. Ten top- rank young researchers from various parts of Europe and the United States and five members of the Research Group of the History of Eco- nomic Thought Keizai( shisōshi kenkyūkai) from Japan were invited,

2 Sasaki 1985. 3 Bitō 1981. foreword to the volume xv and two days of presentations and discussion were held based on the papers they prepared. This volume collects the final versions of papers from that symposium and the additional symposium held at Columbia University in New York City in 2009. At the invitation of the organizer, Bettina Gramlich-Oka, I was able to attend the symposium at University of Tübingen. I am honored to convey my respects to all those who participated in the presentations and discussion, as well as those who helped organize the event, and to be able to say a few words commemorating the publication of this volume.

Ōguchi Yūjirō (Professor Emeritus, Ochanomizu University) Tokyo, August 2009

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume is the product of two conferences, various meetings, many emails, and a great deal of work on the part of many people. It is our pleasure to acknowledge the assistance of those who have contributed to its production. The idea of generating an edited volume on economic thought in early modern Japan stemmed from Bettina Gramlich-Oka’s participation in the project “Monies, Markets, and Finances in East Asia, 1600– 1900,” a project funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft, DFG) under the lead of Hans Ulrich Vogel (Institute for Chinese Studies, University of Tübingen). As she became familiar with the research of the many scholars of China with whom she worked, she became aware of the paucity of English-language literature that introduces economic history and in particular economic thought in early modern Japan to the general reader. Collaboration with a small but active group of Japanese scholars currently working in this area, who are members of the Research Group in the History of Economic Thought Keizai( shisōshi kenkyūkai), led in 2008 to our first conference under the auspices of the Institute for Japanese Stud- ies, University of Tübingen. Robert Horres, Wolfgang Fanderl, and Gramlich-Oka organized the conference “Economic Thought in Pre- modern Japan” at Blaubeuren with funding from the DFG. Scholars from Europe, North America, and Japan participated, and the present volume began to take form. Our gratitude goes out to participants in the Blaubeuren conference: Anna Andreeva, Mitsumizo Hiroyuki, Hans Thomsen, Harald Witthöft, and Yajima Michifumi, whose fascinating research illuminated the wide range of economic thought. We reserve special thanks for Ōguchi Yūjirō, who was able to join us and whom we were able to convince to write our foreword. In the meantime, Gregory Smits joined the growing project as a con- tributor and editor. As the specific papers and overall issues became more distinct, we organized a second conference to allow the volume’s contributors to sharpen their ideas and subject them to outside cri- tiques. The second conference took place in New York City in June 2009 with financial support from the University Seminar on East Asia: Modern Japan, Columbia University. We would like to thank all the conference participants for their hard work and cooperation. We are xviii acknowledgments especially grateful to several discussants whose comments and questions were invaluable in shaping the final form of our essays. David Howell provided insightful comments on several papers, and Robert Horres and Ronald Frank broadened the scope of the discussions with their prescient questions and remarks. Behind the scenes numerous colleagues and graduate students assisted with the logistical details of both conferences. Robert Hor- res and Wolfgang Fanderl made the Blaubeuren conference a fulfilling experience for all the participants, and Ayako Maeda served as our interpreter. Warmest appreciation also goes to supporters of the New York conference, including our interpreters Maren Ehlers and Steve Wills, our rapporteur Leam Moore, our designer Nancy Xu, and Alice Newton and Pamela Guardia, who took care of much of the logistical work that a conference requires. Special thanks go to Robert Belknap, who as the director of the Columbia Seminars has been supportive of this project from the very beginning. The volume would not have been possible without the close cooperation of the authors, who always responded well to our messages urging speed in writing and revising. Particular thanks go to Mark Metzler, whose broad-ranging intellect and hard work enhanced the volume on several levels. His broad, forceful vision and energy helped shape the volume into a work whose appeal extends to economic historians generally, not only to Japan specialists. Moreover, this volume would not have been possible without the assistance of editors Patricia Radder and Albert Hoffstädt at Brill. Albert’s encouragement at an early stage was crucial for its realization. Julia Perkins copyedited the final version of this volume, improving its readability. Stephan Dieball, our cartographer, listened tirelessly to our many requests. Anne Holmes produced our index. Jennifer Guest deserves special recognition, since she helped improve the final manuscript on so many levels, as a translator and editor, as well as helping with the glossary and bibliography. Our appreciation also goes to an anonymous reviewer’s careful reading of the chapters and useful comments. We express our appreciation to the Schoff Fund at the University Seminars, Columbia University for its help in making this publication a reality. It has been a pleasure, an honor, and a learning experience to work with all the participants in this project.

Bettina Gramlich-Oka and Gregory Smits Tokyo and State College, PA January 2010 LIST OF MAPS

Tokugawa Japan ...... 3 Ryukyu Islands ...... 69 Shizuoka and Vicinity ...... 208

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Ishii Sumiyo, M.A. (2001) in Economics, Keio University, is Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo. She has published on economic thought of local entrepreneurs in the early Meiji era, including in Kawaguchi Hiroshi, ed., Nihon no keizai shisō sekai: 19-seiki no kigyōsha, seisakusha, chishikijin (Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2004).

Kawaguchi Hiroshi is Professor of Japanese History of Economy and Economic Thought at Waseda University, Tokyo. His research concentrates on economic thought of the Tokugawa period. His publications include Edo Jidai no keizai shisō (Keisō Shobō, 1992).

Mark Metzler, Ph.D. in History (1998), University of California, Berkeley, is Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. He has published on historical political economy, including Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan (California, 2006).

Ochiai Kō, Ph.D. (1996) in History, Chūō University, is Professor of Japanese History and Economic History at Hiroshima Shudo Univer- sity, Hiroshima. He has published on economic history and history in general, such as Kinsei no chiiki keizai to shōhin ryūtsū (Iwata Shoin, 2007).

Mark J. Ravina, Ph.D. (1991) in History, Stanford University, is Pro- fessor of History at Emory University in Atlanta. He has published on early modern political economy (Land and Lordship, Stanford Univer- sity Press, 1999), and the life of Saigō Takamori (The Last Samurai, John Wiley, 2004). He is currently working on a history of the Meiji Restoration for Oxford University Press.

Ethan Segal, Ph.D. (2003) in History, Stanford University, is Assistant Professor of History at Michigan State University. He has published on issues of gender and identity in premodern Japan as well as on the xxii list of contributors textbook controversy in modern Japan. His first book, with the working title Coins, Trade, and the State: Economic Growth in Early Medi- eval Japan, is forthcoming with the Harvard University Asia Center.

Jan Sýkora, Ph.D. (2002) in History and Culture of Asian Societies, Charles University, is the Director of the Institute of East Asian Stud- ies and Chair of Japanese Studies, Charles University, Prague. He has published on the economic history and economic thought in Toku- gawa Japan, including The World of Tokugawa Merchants [in Czech] (DharmaGaia, 2005) and Economic Thought in Japan[in Czech] (forthcoming).

Bettina Gramlich-Oka, Ph.D. (2006) in Japanese Studies, Tübingen University, is Assistant Professor of Japanese History at Sophia Uni- versity, Tokyo. She has published on shogunal trade regulations and women of the Tokugawa period, including Thinking Like a Man: Tadano Makuzu (1763–1825) (Brill, 2006).

Gregory Smits, Ph.D. (1992) in History, University of Southern Cali- fornia, is Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies at Penn- sylvania State University. He has published on the 1855 Ansei Edo Earthquake and the early modern Ryukyu Kingdom, including Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics (Hawai‘i, 1999). INTRODUCTION: THE AUTONOMY OF MARKET ACTIVITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF KEIZAI THOUGHT

Mark Metzler and Gregory Smits

Japan was probably the world’s most urbanized large country in early modern times. It was certainly one of the most literate. In 1700, Edo, the predecessor of Tokyo, was the world’s largest city, with a population of about one million. Much of Edo’s provisioning was managed out of Osaka, the merchants’ capital of western Japan, which had a population of close to half a million. Kyoto, the old imperial capital, had a population about one-third that of Edo. A network of local administrative centers and port towns formed a second tier of medium- sized urban centers. The existence of this large urban population was a novelty of the seventeenth century, and with it came the formation of socially and culturally autonomous urban spaces. In Europe, which was less highly urbanized, the formation of the ‘freedom of the city’ is the source of modern sociological theorizing concerning public spheres and autonomous social fields. Japanese townspeople did not enjoy the political autonomy of privileged western European bour- geoisies, yet something analogous happened with the elaboration of a kind of ‘separate spheres’ ideology in regard to economic activity. The present volume explores some early modern formations of economic thought and policy in a country that is regularly cited as having followed a unique, non-Western path to capitalism. Surpris- ingly little has been published in English on the emergence and development during the Edo period of political-economic, or keizai 経済, thought. Indeed, there is relatively little in English on the Edo-period economy in general.1 We aim in this volume to introduce some aspects

1 The translation of the important “Nihon keizaishi” compilation helps remedy this lack (Hayami, Saitō, and Toby 2004, translating chapters from Hayami and Miya- moto 1989 and from Shinbo and Saitō 1989). See also Smith 1979, Smitka 1998, and Hamashita et al. 2008 for the translated work of Japanese scholarship. Major publications on economic thought are Smith 1934, Honjō 1965, Najita 1987, and Najita 2009. 2 mark metzler and gregory smits of early modern keizai thought and to enlarge and deepen the analytical vocabulary used to describe early modern economic thought and policy. The subject has a significance that extends beyond the confines of Japan itself. Temporally, the chapters in this volume deal mainly with the Edo, or Tokugawa, period (1603–1867). Spatially they deal mainly with Japan, broadly defined. The Tokugawa period is also known as the early modern (kinsei 近世) period. This introduction describes some relevant contours of Tokugawa Japan and opens up for consideration some of our major themes and arguments.

A. Territories and Networks

Proprietary political claims over territorial space have structured our historical imaginations, often in implicit and preconscious ways. But the actual workings of both economic activity and of intellectual interaction are much better described by the analogy of a network. So too is much of the actual working of the various levels of state administration. Intra-territorial and inter-territorial networks are keys to understanding many of the topics discussed in this volume. Territorial entities themselves are highly relevant, but early modern territories worked in different ways from their modern namesakes and had complexities that can baffle modern analysts. As to the national territory that we discuss in this volume, what was early modern ‘Japan’? When eighteenth-century writers used the name Nihon (Nippon; Japan), they referred to a broad geographical entity encompassing the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and perhaps the southern shore of the island of Hokkaido. The island kingdom of Ryukyu had an ambiguous position between the Japanese and the Chi- nese realms. The gradual alignment—imagined and created—of geography, polity, ethnicity, and culture under the label Nihon or Nippon took place mainly during the nineteenth century. This is not to say that the entity ‘Japan’ did not matter during the eighteenth century or earlier, only that its early modern and modern configurations differed in important ways. Administratively, early modern Japan was a much more diverse and varied place than modern Japan.2

2 This has been the subject of considerable recent scholarship, including Howell 1994, 1998; Smits 1999, 2000; Wigen 2000; Walker 2001. introduction 3 4 mark metzler and gregory smits

Whether Edo can be called the capital of Japan depends on one’s definition of ‘capital.’ The world’s largest city in 1700 was little more than a fishing village in 1600. Edo grew so rapidly because in 1603 it became the capital of the shogun, the head of a military government commonly known in modern times by the Japanese term bakufu, or shogunate. Its officials themselves would more likely have used the term ‘kōgi’ 公儀 (public authority; government). The shogun’s government in Edo exerted degrees of influence throughout the geographical entity of Japan and even beyond, but it was not a centralized state in the modern sense. In significant ways, it was itself a kind of network state. The shogunal state directly administered about one-fourth of the land of the Japanese islands. Its direct territorial domains were non- contiguous but included a national network of major highways (and a postal system), major metropolitan centers including the three great metropolises (Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto), the major official foreign-trade port (Nagasaki), and other assets such as gold and silver mines. The shogunal state also issued national currency in the form of gold, silver, and bronze coinage. Approximately 250 lordly houses (daimyo 大名, literally “big names”) administered the rest of the territory of Japan. The holdings of these daimyo varied widely in size and in military or economic potential. In theory, daimyo houses were vassals of the shogun and bound by his decrees. In practice, many daimyo houses enjoyed high degrees of autonomy, according to their size, location, and history. The most common modern term for these daimyo territories is han 藩, usually translated as ‘domain.’ This usage, as Luke Roberts has pointed out, was intended to replace and obscure the former usage ‘kuni’ 国 (country), which was the usual term for daimyo territories during the Tokugawa period.3 The wordkuni now means country in the sense of a national state, and Japan is the only kuni in the Japanese islands. In Tokugawa times there were some 250 kuni, that is, 250 political entities that resembled countries to a greater or lesser extent. Political boundaries overlapped in both harmonious and dissonant ways. Early modern kuni maintained their own military forces, within limits established by the shogunate. These quasi-autonomous domains could also function as laboratories for different policy approaches to economic problems. The largerkuni , for example, often produced their own paper cur-

3 Roberts 1998, pp. 7–9. See also Ravina 1999, p. 28. introduction 5 rency and pursued a kind of mercantilist trade policy vis-à-vis other territories, a subject discussed in detail by both Roberts and by Mark Ravina, and treated in several aspects in the present volume. Shogunal policies affected the daimyo territories, and occasionally the government in Edo intervened directly in the affairs of thekuni or required services of them. In addition to its hegemonic claims, the shogunal government also created control systems to ensure that, as a ‘country’ among ‘countries,’ it remained overwhelmingly the most powerful entity. One of these systems was ‘alternate attendance,’ whereby the lords spent every other year in Edo while their wives and heirs remained there continually. Another was the shogunal state’s conduct of relations with countries outside of the Japanese islands, albeit often with the assistance of three designated daimyo houses. A prominent economic aspect of this multi-state system was the emergence in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century of a kind of domainal mercantilist practice often described by the neologism kokueki 国益. Kokueki meant profiting or benefiting the country—or ‘national interest,’ with the ‘national’ here referring, depending on context, to the local domainal kuni or to the larger Japanese realm governed by the shogun. This practice in some of the larger domains has been described in important recent books by Ravina and Roberts.4 Bettina Gramlich-Oka in this volume discovers the shogunal-level sources of kokueki thought. Jan Sýkora’s discussion of Saga domain revalidates Roberts’s argument for the merchant origins of specific kokueki policies, while Ochiai Kō’s chapter brings together the shogunal, domainal, and popular aspects of kokueki thought and practice. Our use of words such as mercantilism implies a comparative perspective in which the countries of early modern western Europe provide the terms of comparison. Such comparisons can be enlightening, but to prevent a possible over-reading of our meaning, it is important to note the lack of any clear direct influence of European mercantilist thought on Japanese kokueki thinking. What Japanese did know of European economic thought during the latter part of the Edo period really came down to little more than awareness of the existence of apparently wealthy and powerful monarchs and states (the Dutch, the Russian) who profited by overseas trade and colonization. This general

4 Roberts 1998 and Ravina 1999. 6 mark metzler and gregory smits knowledge could become a kind of model, for example, in the hands of thinkers such as Honda Toshiaki 本田利明 (1743–1821). The limitations of shogunal authority created spaces for the action of smaller-scale subordinate states. The domainal states had considerable fiscal and in many cases monetary autonomy. The shogunate asserted police powers over all of the Japanese islands but not the power to tax daimyo territories. Indeed, as Ravina has pointed out, the actions of the shogunate over the long run often increased its obligations, but not its power—a “mismatch of capability and responsibility.”5 The main focus of loyalty for patriotic Japanese who lived in the daimyo territories was likely to be their own kuni, or country, not that of the shogun. As new literary and scholarly circles took shape later in the period around the articulation of a national loyalty, this loyalty ultimately became focused upon the imperial institution in Kyoto, not the shogunal one in Edo.6 Ravina has aptly characterized early modern Japan as a “compound state” to acknowledge the presence of smaller states within an overall state system and the coexistence of multiple, sometimes conflicting, ideological traditions instead of a single state ideology.7 Just as the geography of political power and authority of early modern Japan was complex, so too was its social geography. The ordinary term for ‘society’ in Tokugawa Japan, shi-nō-kō-shō 士農工商, derived from ancient Chinese texts. The individual morphemes in this term mean roughly ‘gentry-agriculture-manufacturing-commerce.’ The general idea, of course, is that these realms cover all or most of society, even if during Tokugawa times much human labor did not fit easily into one of these categories. Porters and other service workers are one obvious example. That society was more complex than the morphemes of shi-nō-kō-shō suggest was generally not a problem. Contrary to the view of Tokugawa Japan found in some survey histories, shi-nō-kō-shō did not correspond to legally defined social classes. The major legally defined class distinction in early modern Japan was that of samurai (often, but not always, regarded as the shi of shi-nō-kō-shō) and com-

5 Ravina 1999, p. 25. 6 This intellectual attention to the imperial institution and its alleged origins was part of a broad movement that is usually called kokugaku (national studies, or nativism). Major studies of kokugaku include Koschmann 1987, Nosco 1990, Burns 2003, and McNally 2005. 7 Ravina 1999, pp. 27–28. introduction 7 moners. An equivalent term meaning ‘society’ was shimin 四民. It meant ‘the four social groups’ and was an abbreviation for shi-nō-kō- shō. To indicate ‘commoners,’ that is, non-samurai, it was fairly common to use the term sanmin 三民 (‘three social groups’). These terms should not be taken too literally, and Japanese writers at the time held a variety of views about society. Japanese intellectual, economic, and political systems functioned within broader networks of foreign relations, notwithstanding the survival (mainly among non-specialists) of the older view that Tokugawa Japan was economically and intellectually sealed off from the rest of the world. There is now a large literature on Tokugawa-period foreign relations, which were conducted through the port of Nagasaki, the island of Tsushima (a Japanese daimyo territory), the (doubly) subordinate Kingdom of Ryukyu, and the island of Hokkaido.8 These legal avenues of foreign relations brought different parts of Japan into contact with China, Holland, Korea, Ryukyu, and Russia. Illegal trade (mitsubōeki 密貿易) took place at points along the coast. Foreign relations were carefully controlled, but foreign trade continued to have an important impact, and foreign relations figured significantly in economic thought. Our modern, retrospective views of ‘early modern’ Japan are quick to perceive in the era a preparation for the high-speed assimilation of Western technical, intellectual, and organization models of modernity that we know to have begun in the mid nineteenth century. Such views, often combined with nationalist ones, too easily overlook the vital place of China and of the broader East Asian environment centered on China. Essays in this volume by Ethan Segal, Gregory Smits, Ochiai Kō, and Gramlich-Oka emphasize the prominent role of China as a source of money and goods. Not only did China affect the material conditions of Tokugawa Japan, but Chinese studies was a prominent area of intellectual endeavor for many educated Japanese. Indeed, for the first time in Japanese history, Chinese studies became something close to a popular practice. The vast corpus of Chinese literature was also a potential treasure trove of economic ideas. Even a more narrowly defined subset such as ‘Confucian thought’ or ‘Zhu Xi’ was capable of

8 During the 1980s, Tokugawa foreign relations became a thriving academic subfield. The seminal work in English is Toby 1991 [1984]. For recent studies, see Mitani 2006 and Hellyer 2009. 8 mark metzler and gregory smits providing useful ideas, as the essays by Smits and Ravina demonstrate. These Chinese-derived ideas also required creative adaptation. Commercial and intellectual networks across the Japanese islands were sustained by an extensive communications infrastructure. The most basic element of this infrastructure was a system of well-maintained highways linking the major cities. Rest areas, inns, post stations, and other facilities lined these highways to support the flow of people, goods, and information.9 Coastal sea routes, including the opening of a regular northern route from the Japan Sea coast to Edo, were vital arteries for the movement of bulk items. The typical mechanism for the dissemination of timely information was broadsheet newspapers, available in every urban area. By the nineteenth century, breaking news reached all areas of the Japanese islands within approximately two weeks. For example, news of the Ansei Edo Earthquake of 1855 reached Osaka, Kyoto, and other parts of the Kansai area within five to seven days. The news spread throughout northern Honshu in ten to twelve days. All parts of Shikoku had received the news within twelve days, and the various parts of Kyushu in thirteen to fifteen days.10 One need not even have been literate to know of major recent events because traveling news reciters, called yomiuri 読売, made the rounds of urban and rural areas.11 Bookstores and lending libraries disseminated a wide array of popular, technical, and scholarly information.12 The transportation and postal networks also facilitated the movement of money and credit. Currency in Tokugawa Japan circulated in many different forms. As Segal discusses in chapter 1, bronze coins of Chinese manufacture circulated well into the seventeenth century, when they gave way to coins mass produced for the shogun’s government. These zeni 銭 coins were the mainstay of daily currency use. To facilitate larger transactions, these coins, which had a square hole in the center, also circulated strung together in strings of 100 (or 96) and 1,000 (or 960). The shogunal gold coinage circulated mainly in the form of ichibu kin 一分金 (1-bu gold), four of which equaled a koban 小判 (gold piece = 1 ryō). The silver mint (ginza 銀座), also under strict shogunal control, issued a coinage of stamped silver bars and lumps valued by weight. The gold coinage tended to predominate in

9 On travel by highway, see Vaporis 1995. 10 Kitahara 1999, p. 157. 11 Groemer 1994. 12 Ikegami 2005, pp. 302–06; and Berry 2006. introduction 9

Edo and eastern Japan, and silver predominated in the Kyoto-Osaka area of western Japan. Silver was also the main currency used in trade with China and other foreign countries. As Mark Metzler discusses in chapter 9, the shogunate periodically increased the money supply by reducing the gold or silver content of its coins. One result was that in addition to the face value of a coin, the time of its manufacture was a major determinant of its value. This diversity of currencies gave rise to money exchange as a major service business utilized by ordinary people and business houses. Currencies fluctuated in value in what amounted to a domestic system of floating exchange rates. In addition to the national shogunate-issued coins, many domains issued paper notes denominated in units of shogunal silver, gold, or copper coins, or occasionally in units of rice. Indeed rice, usually measured in koku 石 (roughly 5 bushels), functioned like currency in many respects. Official (samurai) salaries, the assessed productivity of farmland, and some taxes, for example, were expressed as koku of rice. Even if a plot of farmland produced a crop other than rice, its official productivity would be expressed in rice units. After 1730 the shogunate occasionally reapproved issuing paper money in some domains as a way to supplement a shortage in the money supply and combat price deflation (of rice prices particularly). The details varied from domain to domain, but in general, the issuing of paper monetary instruments brought large daimyo houses and large merchant houses into close relationships. It was the large merchant houses that handled the logistics and backing of domain paper issues. A major concern of economic thinkers, emphasized in Kawagu- chi Hiroshi’s essay, was that wealth in all of its forms circulate freely through society. Tributary (taxation) transfers maintained a fundamental place in national circulation, but more and more, ‘the market’ was the basic mechanism of circulation and the mental model for social circulation. Market structures consisted in large part of networks. Bills of exchange, as Segal discusses in chapter 1, could function only within one or more trust networks of the kind Gramlich-Oka describes, following Charles Tilly. Non-state trust networks, cooperating with or occasionally opposing state actors at the domain and shogunate levels, helped maintain the delicate balance of freedom and control that Kawaguchi discusses. As active sites of political and economic activity, trust networks facilitated the development of de facto banking institutions as discussed by Ravina in chapter 7. As Ronald Toby points out elsewhere, in the early nineteenth century, rural lenders 10 mark metzler and gregory smits

relied on the growing network of interbank wholesale credit to finance their own local, retail lending. . . . By doing so, each network participant had access to larger pools of capital than he would have had on his own.13 This access to pools of capital provided “more efficient access to credit, at lower interest rates.”14 Such credit networks, whether the private interbank networks delineated by Toby or the domainally backed credit cooperatives described by Ravina, could function to concentrate, multiply, and distribute capital and to promote economic growth. Credit networks, trade guilds, news and information networks, and domestic trade networks all ultimately depended on transportation infrastructure, that is, networks of physical conduits such as roads, rivers, and harbors. The key role of the state in maintaining and upgrading such infrastructure is especially apparent in the ideas of the Ryukyuan politician Sai On described in the essay by Smits. Indeed, Sai On was aware of possible multiplier effects connected with infrastructure enhancement, and he regarded such projects as an ideal way for the state to promote economic activity. Likewise, human networks proved crucial for the advancement of economic ideas and projects, often under the banner of kokueki. In Ochiai’s chapter, we find the agronomist Ikegami Tarōzaemon exploiting an enormously influential social network that included the shogunate’s most powerful politician, Tanuma Okitsugu. Tarōzaemon came to know Tanuma through a shared interest in haikai poetry. Similarly, Gramlich-Oka explores the extensive and varied network of the physician and policy thinker Kudō Heisuke. As Anna Beerens and Eiko Ikegami have argued using different approaches, there were substantial overlaps between literary circles and circles of politicians and academics,15 loosely analogous to the contemporary role of diversions like golf as a catalyst for business transactions.

13 Toby 1991, p. 485. 14 Ibid. 15 Ikegami 2005, esp. 171–95, 204–20; and Beerens 2006. introduction 11

B. The Idea of Circulation and the Formation of the Political-Economic Field

To illuminate another dimension, and to employ different spatial metaphors, we can imagine the activity of keizai thinkers not as a network but as a dynamic and contentious field of positions shaped by the interaction of participants. In this view, the emergence of political economy as a distinct intellectual field reflected the actual increasing autonomy of the object of these thinkers, namely market-economic activity. At the same time, keizai thinkers formulated and asserted claims for the autonomy of market activity as a kind of program. Sometimes their assertions were self-interested claims, sometimes more matters of detached observation. Employing a semantically similar analytical terminology, we can also describe this process as the emergence of a public (or “enclave public”) concerned with political-economic questions, as described by Gramlich-Oka in chapter 5. Both the terminology of the “intellectual field” and that of the “enclave public” were developed by scholars in other contexts to highlight the emergence of zones of relative intellectual and cultural autonomy. These ideas fit well in describing the emergence of political economy. Like the idea of networks, they help us see aspects that have been missed in some of the more conventional history-of-ideas and individual-biographical approaches of the past. Intellectual, literary, and artistic networks flourished in Tokugawa Japan across a wide social spectrum, despite the absence of state- sponsored educational institutions. In fact, they may have flourished in part because of this absence. An older historical view holds that the early shogunate privileged one variety of neo-Confucian thought for the purposes of social control. But it was not until the late eighteenth century that the shogunal and daimyo houses began to establish formal educational institutions for their retainers. The core curriculum of these academies was Confucian.16 Well before this time, a wide variety of private elementary schools and academies could be found in urban areas. Samurai and commoners alike studied such topics as agriculture, military science, mathematics, medicine, Chinese philosophy, Chinese and Japanese poetry, and Japanese literature. Learning and the arts

16 Ooms 1985 and Watanabe 1985. 12 mark metzler and gregory smits became a basis for nationally extensive networks that cut across lines of political jurisdiction, status (samurai versus commoner), and of formal academic classifications and schools.17 Existing historical accounts frequently give undue weight to fixed scholastic categories whose supposed boundaries may not at all reflect actual intellectual activity, as Gramlich-Oka illustrates in chapter 5. Likewise, the ideas and policies of Sai On, as discussed by Smits in chapter 3, do not always fit a stereotypical image of a Confucian scholar or moralist. Like Shōji Kōki in Saga (chapter 6), Sai On addressed the problems of his society pragmatically. Beerens concludes in her prosopographical study of 173 eighteenth-century intellectuals that the labels and categories allegedly describing Tokugawa-period intellectual life may obfuscate actual social networks: We do not usually associate Ueda Akinari with Chinese classical texts, Shibano Ritsuzan with the study of the ancient imperial court nor Sugita Genpaku with waka and haikai, but, in fact, the prosopography abounds with individuals who combine activities that we have come to think of as ill-matched if not incompatible. The majority of the individuals under scrutiny did not limit themselves to specific circuits, neither in their activities nor in their contacts. In this way the network challenges the labels, classifications and boundaries we use to describe the intellectual discourse of the Tokugawa period.18 More generally, the still-prominent modern image of a Tokugawa period characterized by rigid social structures, clearly demarcated intellectual schools, and geographical isolation has gradually been giving way to a more realistic image of a dynamic society. Many of the essays in this volume contribute to this reassessment. In the realm of keizai thought, this reassessment is most relevant to the body of thought now known as Confucianism. The realm of statecraft, including economic thought, was generally dominated by or at least grounded in Confucianism, which itself emerged as an autonomous intellectual field over the course of the seventeenth century. Most of the economic thinkers described in this volume could be described as Confucians, broadly defined. Confu-

17 Ikegami 2005 and Beerens 2006. 18 Beerens 2006, p. 289. See pp. 220–72 for the data and other details. Not only were eighteenth-century intellectuals eclectic in their interests and activities, people of diverse social backgrounds interacted freely. Social background was often no barrier to intellectual and literary interaction. introduction 13 cianism evokes an image of rigidity and of a privileging of formalistic moral concerns over pragmatic ones. It is common, even in specialized studies, to assume that Confucian scholars were suspicious of commerce and the profit motive. That Edo-period Japanese thinkers would acknowledge the useful role of commerce might seem obvious, given the complexity of the society. Nevertheless, many views of early modern Japan are still conditioned by older notions claiming (a) that Tokugawa Japan was a Confucian society and (b) that Confucian thought ignored or denigrated commerce. Many of the papers in this volume explicitly or implicitly question this alleged Confucian hostility toward commerce. A survey of the statements regarding commerce of Tokugawa- period Confucian scholars, especially by members of the samurai class, suggests that “merchant” might be used as a pejorative modifier (e.g., “mind of a merchant”) to add rhetorical force to a critique of undesirable behavior. To take a typical example, in discussing the practice of samurai changing lords to obtain higher stipends, Nakae Tōju 中江藤樹 (1608–1648) stated that receiving a higher stipend as a reward for virtue, talent, or meritorious accomplishment is a legitimate instance of personal advancement. But advancement on account of favoritism and maneuvering was “merchants’ advancement,” and “to be concerned with self advancement is to have an unclean, greedy mind, like the profit-loving mind of a merchant.”19 But interestingly, as a young man Tōju resigned his post as a samurai and supported his mother by operating a small brewery. Notice that Tōju’s commentary says nothing about the social function of commerce. When Confucian scholars discussed commerce in a broader social context, pejorative statements were much less common. A standard Confucian metaphor for society was the human body, and in prevailing notions of medicine, bodily health was understood as a function of the unobstructed circulation of blood and ki 気 (material force). Car- rying this idea into the economic realm, it was obvious that commerce was the prime agent of circulation. In typical Confucian microcosmic- macrocosmic thinking, Kaibara Ekken 貝原益軒 (1630–1714) likened the flow of wealth in society to the flow of vital fluids through the body and the flow of vital energies through the cosmos:

19 From Nakae Tōju 1974, pp. 110–11. 14 mark metzler and gregory smits

If the flow of material force ki( ) through heaven and earth is stopped up, abnormalities arise, causing natural disasters such as violent windstorms, floods and droughts, and earthquakes. If the things of the world are long collected together, such stoppage is inevitable. In humans, if the blood, vital ether (ki), food and drink do not circulate and flow, the result is disease. Likewise, if vast material wealth is collected in one place and not permitted to benefit and enrich others, disaster will strike later.20 It was as circulators of wealth that merchants were essential to a well- functioning society. Samurai scholar Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622– 1685) explained the role of merchants in a typical manner: Since manufacturers of articles cannot go about selling their goods to people in distant districts, it becomes necessary to have people who act as intermediaries. . . . These middlemen are the merchants.21 Of course, practices like hoarding goods to drive up prices during times of scarcity might subject merchants to criticism for failing to perform their proper social function owing to personal greed. Never- theless, especially from the eighteenth century onward, it is rare to find political or economic analysis that regards commerce as a social ill or as an occupation less esteemed than others. Smits, Ravina, and other contributors to this volume point out a concern among policy makers for coordinating private profit and public good. What comes into focus here is the contrast between what Ravina calls the “visible hand” of the state, versus emerging claims for the naturalness of market movements, many of them advanced by merchant intellectuals. The first steps in this direction seem ten- tative and defensive. During the eighteenth century, an extensive discourse on keizai-related matters developed among merchants. The example of Ishida Baigan石田梅岩 (1685–1744) is well known because of Robert N. Bellah’s 1957 study. Bellah’s approach fits well with the ‘modernization theory’ approach to Japan that was popular at the height of the Cold War.22 Among other things, ‘modernization’ scholars sought examples in Tokugawa Japan to explain the success of later Japanese industrialization. Baigan’s notion of the ‘way of the merchant’ (shōnindō 商人道 or chōnindō 町人道), while interesting and important, was not necessarily typical of the merchant intellectual

20 From Kaibara Ekken 1911, p. 452. 21 Quoted in Honjō 1965, p. 25, with minor modification. 22 Bellah 1957. introduction 15 discourse on the economy that emerged by the late eighteenth century. Better examples are provided by the scholars of the Kaitokudō, an Osaka merchant academy studied by Tetsuo Najita,23 and by the Osaka financier Kusama Naokata草間直方 (1753–1831) studied by Gramlich-Oka.24 Of special interest here is Naokata’s conception of ‘circulation,’ or yūzū 融通, a word that can also mean ‘finance’ or ‘liquidity.’25 Naokata played down the idea that merchants govern trade and emphasized instead that merchants, like everyone else, depend on the impersonal action of Heaven: At times there is no virtue to money (kingin no toku nashi 金銀の無徳). The yang ( yō 陽) of Heaven circulates ( yūzū) through the yin (in 陰) of Earth, the virtue of Heaven and Earth circulates in humankind, humans circulate all things, the virtue of money is grand, but depending on how people use it, it is either good or bad.26 Money is a useful object, but only when it circulates. The natural (“heavenly”) order, not human will, is the force that animates markets: The fluctuation of the price of rice and the circulation ( yūzū) of money are part of the natural order (tenri no shizen 天理の自然), and one cannot do as one pleases by human force (jinryoku no mama 人力の儘).27 The implication for Kusama Naokata was a policy of laissez-faire. Administrative authority should not be used to forcibly adjust prices, nor should money be altered unreasonably. Markets adjust themselves. “Good and bad years of harvest and their resulting high and low prices are the way of the vicissitudes of heaven and earth (tenchi shōchō 天地消長).”28 The development of these ideas, contemporary with the enormously more famous European discussion, deserves to be more widely known. Naokata’s view bears some resemblance to that of the Ryukyuan statesman Sai On, who was also reluctant to intervene forcibly to alter market conditions. Sai On’s reluctance, however, was pragmatic,

23 Najita 1987. 24 Gramlich-Oka 2008d. 25 See also Ravina’s chapter in this volume. 26 Kusama Naokata 1914, vol. 1, Furoku 附録 3, p. 307. 27 Kusama Naokata 1914, vol. 2, Bukka no bu 物価の部 1, p. 3. 28 Ibid. 16 mark metzler and gregory smits not connected to a notion that markets are an extension of cosmo- logical forces. By justifying the operation of markets in this way, Naokata in effect argued for an autonomous space for the commercial sector, free from ‘unnatural’ attempts of the state to control market forces. His arguments resonate with points made by Kawaguchi in chapter 2. In his function as a banker, Naokata argued repeatedly via his writings that outside interference would bring a stop to economic transactions. Naokata’s linkage of markets and the natural order was an important move. Remarkably, it was also presaged by certain Chinese scholars during the late Ming period. Li Zhi 李贄 (1527–1602), for example, dismissed professions of conventional morality by insisting that “all personal relations resembled market relations.”29 Naokata’s view that the market naturally regulates and moderates itself (sōba wa tenzen to hodo yoku agari 相場は天然と程よく上がり) or that it should be left to the reason of Heaven tenri( ni makase 天理に任せ)30 can be compared to the views of the physician and policy thinker Kudō Heisuke (chapter 5), who argued twenty years earlier: “In truth the market between Heaven and Earth is not man-made but comes into being of its own accord.”31 Significantly, Naokata did not argue for the virtue of the merchant. Indeed, keizai discourse during the late eighteenth century shifted focus from the defensive assertion of merchants’ personal virtue to the analysis of market organization as an aspect of natural principle. A point to bear in mind is that the concepts at hand in eighteenth- century Japan were often inadequate to describe new social realities. New concepts evolved, but they were often cast in old terminology. The application of old terms to new situations, with de facto new meanings, may mislead historians who read the older meanings too literally into the newer contexts. This point applies to many of the matters discussed in this introduction and to many of the chapters in this volume. Kusama Naokata’s academic contemporary Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755–1817) argued that everything in society was a commodity with exchange value. During the late eighteenth century we find a tendency

29 Handlin 1983, pp. 129, 131. 30 Kusama Naokata 1811?, recto 12–verso 13. 31 Kudō 1968, p. 494. introduction 17 in keizai-related thought to regard the market as a model not only for economic transactions, but for society as a whole—a far cry from the older historians’ image of Tokugawa Japanese thinkers as rigid Con- fucian scholars who despised commerce. The size of the publics who interested themselves in these political-economic questions was also substantial. Kaiho Seiryō, for example, made his living by giving public lectures on these subjects during the early nineteenth century.32 To borrow and apply the concept of the “intellectual field” from the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, we can thus see Tokugawa-period political economy beginning to emerge as a semi-autonomous intellectual field, separating itself from the matrix of moral statecraft philosophy from which it originated. These intellectual acts of separation ran parallel to the increasing autonomy of political economy’s new intellectual object, the market economy itself, as was asserted by Kusama Naokata. With the retention by Kaiho Seiryō of the Confucian idea of ‘heavenly principle’ (tenri 天理) and its wide application to market functioning—while simultaneously dropping as superfluous much of the rest of the Confucian conceptual apparatus—this movement toward autonomy was close to realization.33 Notably, this transformation took place decades in advance of the actual (and tremendous) impact of Western liberal political economy in the 1860s and 1870s.

C. Policy and Conjuncture

In writing about household management, Sai On used the metaphor of waves, likening each household to a boat at sea. In explaining this me taphor he wrote that cycles of heavenly transformation make a complete round every decade. Likewise, the prosperity or decline of human households changes once every ten or twenty years.34 Like Kusama Naokata and others, Sai On linked social and economic fluctuations to those of the cosmic forces. His pragmatic argument was that nothing stays the same, so people must expect changes in fortunes and plan ahead to deal with them.

32 Kinski 1997, p. 118. 33 Kinski 1997, Ansart 2007. See Matsumoto 1972 for some related considerations. 34 Sakihama 1984, p. 194. 18 mark metzler and gregory smits

Sai On’s wave theory has points of similarity to modern theories of macroeconomic waves and cycles. Okinawa itself was an island microcosm in which resource constraints and self-limiting dynamics were all too evident to a politician whose thought ranged, as Sai On’s did, across centuries and continents. Hence the salience of reforestation and soil management in his sagely practice of statecraft. But also in Japan itself, a new set of resource limits became evident around the first third of the eighteenth century35—which was also when Confu- cian thinking was becoming the norm among intellectuals. The appearance of these limits had profound effects in thought and policy. As Metzler has argued, resource constraints, overall population stasis, and relatively stationary levels of prices and other key macroeconomic indicators during the second half of the Tokugawa period make wavelike, homeostatic fluctuations much more visible than they would be during a period of rapid secular growth.36 Thus, roughly speaking, levels of population, prices, land taxation, and other key macroeconomic indicators were stable (that is, fluctuated around a mean) from the first quarter of the eighteenth century to the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Remarkably, there was no long-run upward trend in any of these indicators. Not only do shorter-term fluctuations become highly visible in this context, so too do middle-range fluctuations on the scale of several decades. These conjunctural movements (to employ the term conjuncture in a stricter and older sense) are most visible in the alternation of multi-decadal trend periods of price inflation and deflation. These phases of inflation and deflation correspond with trend periods in taxation levels and in currency exchange rates. When one turns to the policy aspect of these macroeconomic movements, one sees a double movement in which policy reacts to the macroeconomic conjuncture while policy shifts themselves decisively reshape that conjuncture. Such conjunctural movements raise directly the question of the play of autonomous market forces (‘natural’ movements, in the sense asserted by Kusama Naokata and Kaiho Seiryō) versus conscious policy choices. One further potential venue is the investigation of late Tokugawa authors’ usage of the term ikioi いきおひ (the momentum, impetus, or tide of the time). By knowing the tide of the time, one

35 Totman 1989; 1993. 36 Metzler 1994. introduction 19 could participate actively in contributing to change (riding the wave), which carried political weight in the Bakumatsu period.37 As Metzler discusses in chapter 9, these conjunctural movements have hitherto received little formal consideration, but they bear in myriad ways on the content of economic thought and the conduct of economic policy. Successive phases of policy, which may correspond to the succession of political generations, can be understood as a series of policy regimes that mesh with and indeed shape macroeconomic phases. The transitions from one policy regime to the next are defined by moments of systemic crisis, exemplified by the ‘three great reforms’三大改革 and the ‘three great famines’ 三大飢饉 of the Kyōhō, Kansei, and Tenpō eras. This idea of policy regimes is a timed concept that complements the spatial (or spatialized) ideas of political-economic networks and fields mentioned above. The associated idea of a ‘space’ of policy possibilities highlights the question of policy choice. Consciously chosen as policies may be, in this view, the play of policy is also subject to its own sets of determinations.

Our aim in this volume is to raise new questions, suggest new approaches, and reveal some new vistas in the study of early modern Japan. There are also questions of world history more generally. It is appropriate that we begin by setting early modern Japan in its own deeper historical context, by surveying an even earlier ‘modernity’ of money, credit, and markets that goes back to medieval times.

37 For a brief discussion, see Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapter 3.

MONEY AND THE STATE: MEDIEVAL PRECURSORS OF THE EARLY MODERN ECONOMY

Ethan Segal*

A. Reflecting on the Medieval Economy

Edo intellectuals and writers, like their counterparts in many other societies, sometimes described the rural parts of their country as though those regions were backward, primitive relics of the distant past. Mon- etary matters were no exception. Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728), for example, wrote that “In olden days, the countryside had hardly any money and all the purchases were made with rice or barley . . . however, I have heard that from the Genroku 元禄 period (1688–1704) on, money economy has spread to the countryside. . . .”1 Others shared Sorai’s belief that money was a relatively new phenomenon. In his Sanka zu’i 三貨圖彙, the Osaka merchant-scholar Kusama Naokata 草間直方 (1753–1831) acknowledged earlier coinage but argued that the real history of Japanese currency began with the large-scale mint- ings of the Keichō 慶長 era (1596–1615).2 Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 (1680–1747), in his Keizairoku shūi 経済録拾遺, downplayed the significance of cash produced in ancient Japan. He held that it was only after the minting of coins increased in 1636 that people began to use them for small transactions. Shundai linked the growth in coin use to urbanization, as people used cash to pay for their expenses in the cities.3 Similar ideas can even be found in the haikai 俳諧 of popular

* I gratefully acknowledge the feedback and criticism of the participants in the meetings held at the University of Tübingen (2008), Columbia University (2009), and the Early Modern Japan Network meeting held in conjunction with the Chicago AAS (2009). My thanks also go to the editors and the anonymous reader for the press for their constructive suggestions. This chapter includes material also published in Segal 2009. Research was funded in part by the Michigan State University History Department Sesquicentennial Fund and the MSU Dean of International Studies and Programs. 1 Ogyū Sorai, Seidan (On Politics), as translated in Lu 2005, p. 229. 2 Kusama Naokata, Sanka zu’i, as translated in Najita 1987, p. 234. 3 Dazai Shundai, Keizai roku shūi (Addendum to “On the Political Economy”), as translated in Najita 1998, p. 143. 22 ethan segal poets. Consider, for example, the famous linked verse sequence “The Summer Moon,” in which Bashō 芭蕉 (1644–1694) wrote: kono suji wa Here in the boonies kane mo mishirazu they don’t even know what coins are, fujiyusa yo damned inconvenient!4 These writers quite clearly suggest that the rise of a money economy was a relatively recent, urban development of the Tokugawa period. There were good reasons for Edo-period writers to call attention to the importance of money. Monetization was one among several sweeping economic changes from the first century of Tokugawa rule that can be described as having transformed Japanese society. The growth of castle towns meant that a larger percentage of the population became urban residents who needed money to purchase daily necessities such as food in markets. Commerce flourished, and the government began issuing its own currency for the first time in centuries. Intellectuals and ministers of state such as Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657–1725) debated fiscal policy and currency reform, and the use of money reached all levels of society as goods and labor became commercialized. Japanese merchants developed sophisticated banking and credit instruments to facilitate trade, and urban commoners became prosperous enough to form a consumer class that paid money to shop at stores, eat at restaurants, and attend the theater. In fact, it is in part due to these signs of economic growth that many scholars refer to the Edo period as early modern rather than premodern. Certainly there were some specific developments unique to the seventeenth century that help explain its remarkable economic growth. For example, the Tokugawa bakufu brought peace and stability after almost 150 years of warfare, and the sankin kōtai 参勤交代 system led to improvements in infrastructure that helped merchants and pilgrims as much as daimyo. But what of Japan’s economy prior to unification? What was the state of the economy in the medieval period, and how did it resemble or differ from what followed? Did older medieval practices help or hinder early modern economic growth? As is well known, money did not first appear during the reign of Tokugawa Ieyasu or his successors. Japan’s medieval age—from the late twelfth to the late six-

4 Translated in Arntzen 2007. A similar translation in The Monkey’s Straw Raincoat reads: “but in this back country, the use of coins is not yet heard of, what a bother it is.” Miner and Odagiri 1981, p. 251. money and the state 23 teenth centuries—was also a time of expanding economy and increasing monetization.5 Medieval society never enjoyed the levels of growth found in the early modern era, nor did it inspire the great works of economic thought described in the other chapters of this volume. But there is no question that the medieval economy was expanding, trade was increasing, and more regions were becoming involved in markets. Studying these developments can help us not only appreciate medieval life but also better understand early modern economic growth. Medieval monetization has received less scholarly attention than its early modern counterpart, at least among those publishing in English. One early-twentieth-century scholar of Japan’s historical economy did not even acknowledge the presence of money in pre-1600 Japan.6 Others have emphasized the key role that commercialization played in transforming Edo society without discussing the earlier history of money in Japan. Thomas Smith, for example, described Edo-period growth in these terms: There were scattered islands of commercial farming in Japan from very early times, but as late as 1600 peasants still typically produced to feed and clothe themselves, to pay taxes in kind, and to store whatever surplus there might be in good years against the certain crop failures of the future. But rural life changed after the Tokugawa conquest . . . [T]he islands of commercial farming expanded, ran together, and began to fill in the surrounding sea of self-sufficient economy.7 More recent scholarship on the Tokugawa period seems to share such assumptions.8 Without a doubt, these authors quite correctly attribute important changes in Edo society to the monetization and commercial exchange that occurred in the early years of the Tokugawa regime.

5 “Medieval Japan” generally corresponds to the years of the first two warrior governments, the Kamakura (1185–1333) and Muromachi (1336–1573) bakufu. However, there is no clear scholarly consensus. Some historians apply the term “medieval” to the second half of the Heian period, when imperial rule began to be supplanted by the Fujiwara and/or the Insei. In contrast, Jeffrey P. Mass and others have persua- sively argued that Japan became “medieval” only in the fourteenth century, after the conservative Kamakura bakufu was destroyed (Mass 1997). Since the use of imported Chinese coins began in the twelfth century, it is convenient for a monetary historian to define “medieval” in the traditional manner even though it is for very different reasons. 6 Matsuyo Takizawa attempted to correct a misperception that money entered Japan only in the nineteenth century by (incorrectly) dating its appearance to the early Edo period. Takizawa 1927, pp. 1–3. 7 Smith 1959, p. 67. 8 Examples include Najita 1987; Sone 1999, p. 183; and Yokota 1999, p. 167. 24 ethan segal

And, to be fair, the primary focus of their research is early modern rather than medieval Japan. But by concentrating exclusively on post- 1600 developments, they risk missing the medieval customs, ideas, and institutions that helped shape the direction of Edo prosperity. This chapter highlights some aspects of medieval economic thought and practice in hopes of finding points of continuity between the Tokugawa age and the centuries that preceded it. Most of the chapter addresses the ways that elites as well as commoners used money and understood its place in medieval society. More specifically, it contends that groups outside of formal state government played important roles in promoting the use of Chinese copper coins and kawase 為替 (bills of exchange) because coins and bills helped reduce transaction costs. The significance of medieval money was not limited to the economic realm, however. It also influenced the intellectual milieu as monetary problems forced medieval Japanese to wrestle with questions of sovereignty, virtuous government, debt relief, and more. And, as the final section of the chapter proposes, coins bequeathed a very real legacy to early modern Japan by remaining in circulation well beyond the end of the medieval period, thereby facilitating the transition to Tokugawa currency.

B. Economic Growth and the Medieval State

For much of Japan’s medieval period, the economy was expanding. One reason for this expansion was the introduction of new, heartier strains of rice and improvements in agricultural and irrigation techniques. Iron tools became more widely available, and fertilizers helped enrich the soil. These developments promoted higher yields and, in some communities, allowed double cropping, especially from the late thirteenth century on.9 Another factor was the increasingly widespread use of coins. People used copper cash (zeni 銭) to pay estate rents, make donations to temples, and purchase everything from land to prayers to farm equipment. Provincial estates (shōen 庄園) began paying their taxes in cash, which allowed them to grow the mix of goods best suited to their lands and to sell surplus produce in new local markets.10 A third innovation that supported growth was the invention

9 Troost 1997; Farris 2006, especially pp. 71–78. 10 For a summary of key features of the medieval economy, see Yamamura 1990. money and the state 25 of new credit instruments to assist with the transfer of goods over long distances. Known as kawase or saifu 割符, they were in effect promissory notes that could be forwarded to urban landowners and redeemed for cash at specified locations. All three developments might be seen as precursors of the changes that took place in the seventeenth century, which witnessed even greater increases in agricultural yields, monetization, and the use of credit certificates similar to bills of exchange. Yet there were important differences between the medieval and early modern economies that must also be considered. Most notably, medieval money owed little to central government. Whereas the Edo bakufu issued gold and copper coins and took active steps to control and support the value of its tri-metallic currency, no single state authority succeeded in issuing its own official currency during medieval times. Instead, Japanese of the twelfth through sixteenth centuries used copper coins produced by foreign states and imported from the Asian mainland. The medieval state seems to have played a smaller role in supporting money than its early modern successor. It is curious that the medieval economy grew in the absence of a strong, unified central government. Effective central government is usually important to an expanding economy because it protects property rights, enforces contracts, provides a standard currency, maintains infrastructure, prevents domestic conflict, and more.11 In the Nara 奈良 (710–784) and early Heian 平安 (794–1185) periods, the imperial government performed many of those duties. It minted its own copper currency, supervised land sales and authorized legal agreements, ensured the safe collection of taxes from the countryside and provided for their redistribution through its two capital markets. Medieval governments, however, had much greater difficulty in carrying out those functions. Political power was splintered among the imperial court, the various bakufu, and the major temple-shrine complexes. In the later medieval period, regional daimyo also became important political and economic actors. This splintering of state authority and the competition among political power holders for economic resources limited the effectiveness of central government.

11 Only recently has this notion been challenged; see, for example, Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003. 26 ethan segal

In the absence of unified government, other groups took the lead in facilitating economic growth. Major temples such as Enryakuji 延暦寺 became the most important moneylenders of the day. Local warriors hosted markets, and merchants devised their own networks to bring goods from the countryside to the capital. Perhaps most interestingly, Japanese began importing their currency from the Asian mainland. During the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, Chinese copper cash came to replace rice and cloth as the primary medium of exchange and store of wealth. Japanese domestic minting was, for the most part, limited to counterfeiters who produced imitation Chinese coins or coins with no markings at all. It was not until the Edo period that central government had the power, resources, and desire to produce official currency again.

C. Copper Coins and the Imperial Court

Japan’s early monetary history was closely tied to state development. In the late seventh century, the Japanese court pushed through a series of reforms designed to bolster state power. Drawing upon Tang dynasty models, the court promulgated a new legal code, created a conscript army, instituted a census, and claimed ownership of all land. It also began making plans to issue its own metallic currency. Begin- ning with the Wadō kaichin 和同開珎 coins of 708 c.e., the court cast twelve different named coins over a period of 250 years.12 The Wadō kaichin were modeled on the Tang dynasty’s Kaiyuan tongbao 開元通宝 coins: both were made from copper alloys, had the same shape, and even shared a similar calligraphic inscription.13 The court actively promoted the circulation of its money by paying salaries partly in cash and by offering lower-rank officials the opportunity to purchase higher rank with its currency. These and other efforts appear to have been

12 Some even older coin types, known as fuhonsen 富本銭, have recently been dated to the 680s, but it is not clear who produced fuhonsen or whether the coins served as money or had some other, non-economic function. Tōno 1997, pp. 5–15; and Segal forthcoming. 13 TheWadō kaichin copies the Kaiyuan tongbao in size (approximately 2.5 cm in diameter), design, and the style of the four-character inscription on the obverse face. The Japanese court also minted small numbers of gold and silver coins, but it generally reserved those metals for Buddhist religious objects and trade with Chinese merchants. money and the state 27 moderately successful, for archaeological evidence has established that the imperial twelve coins circulated widely.14 Yet the government had difficulty in keeping the value of its currency stable. One reason may have been over-production. Wayne Far- ris has shown that the eighth-century court struggled with decreasing revenues as disease ravaged the population.15 The court attempted to compensate, Farris contends, by increasing coin production, since it found making coins to be profitable. Another reason for the coins’ difficulties, however, was that the supply of copper was inadequate. A report from one of the mints in the year 821 confirms this theory, explaining that little more than half of the mint’s four-year coin- production quota could be met due to a lack of copper.16 Faced with reduced output, the court began debasing its new issues. Visual inspection of the imperial twelve coins shows that their size and copper content steadily declined over time, and analysis using X-ray fluorescence (XRF) reveals increased lead levels in coins minted during the ninth and tenth centuries.17 The court attempted to compensate for these problems by melt- ing old coins, recasting them, and declaring newly issued coins to be worth ten times the value of older ones.18 Lacking any true basis (such as increased copper content) for the higher value, though, the government’s policies only further undermined confidence in its currency. Following the minting of the last new imperial twelve coins in 958, references to coins in historical documents become extremely rare. It is believed that people stopped using metallic money and turned to commodities such as rice and silk instead.

14 Excavations over the last thirty years have unearthed Wadō kaichin in all but ten of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures. In those few prefectures where Wadō kaichin have not been found, one of the other eleven types of imperial coin has been found. The fact that the largest numbers of coins have been found in the centrally located Kinai area, where government control was the strongest, suggests that there was a close relationship between court authority and coin use. A detailed breakdown is provided in the appendix to Sakaehara 1993. 15 Farris 1998, pp. 314–18. 16 Kobata 1958, p. 20. See also Kobata 1957. 17 Nara kokuritsu bunkazai kenkyūjo 1975. 18 For example, see Nihon kiryaku (Engi 7 [907] 11th month 3rd day), in which new Engi tsūhō 延喜通宝 coins are proclaimed to be worth ten coins of the older currency. The pronouncement suggests that all coin types were to circulate simultaneously, hence the need to make their relative values explicit. Some scholars believe such 10:1 edicts were quite common; see Tōno 1997, pp. 70–71. 28 ethan segal

Coins only begin to reappear in documents from the twelfth century. The first such document in the Heian ibun 平安遺文, for example, concerns the sale in 1150 of a private land parcel and villa for twenty-seven strings of cash.19 Next is a religious fund-raising register from 1151 in which parishioners donated 30– and 50–coin sums to the Hōraku Temple 法楽寺 in Tosa Province 土佐の国.20 The small sizes of their donations suggest that coins were available for everyday transactions rather than simply for large-scale purchases such as those involving land. These twelfth-century coins were Chinese imports, the type of currency that became widespread throughout the subsequent Kamakura 鎌倉 (1185–1333) and Muromachi 室町 (1336–1573) periods. Archaeological evidence as well as a Song Chinese ban on the export of coins from coastal regions in 1155 confirm this fact.21 Although copper coins appear to have quickly found acceptance in Japan, we know little about who imported the coins from China. Taira no Kiyomori 平清盛, known to have been heavily involved in trade with Song merchants, very likely played a key role, but the influx of Chinese coins continued well after his death and the destruction of his clan in the 1180s. One thing is clear, however: twelfth-century Japanese aristocrats opposed the new form of money. They referred to the use of cash as a “disease” (zeni no yamai 銭の病) that disrupted the social order and caused fluctuations in prices.22 A valuable source of information on this resistance is (Fujiwara) Kujō Kanezane’s 九条兼実 diary Gyokuyō 玉葉, which records the thoughts and delibera- tions of the policy-making high nobles. In Kanezane’s opinion, The private minting of coins (i.e., counterfeiting) is one of the eight severe crimes under the ritsuryō 律令 legal codes. Although the coins

19 Heian ibun, doc. 2707 (Kyūan 6 [1150] 8th month 25th day). The “string of cash” (kanmon) was supposed to include 1,000 coins, though often strings of 970 or even fewer coins circulated as strings. One kanmon usually consisted of ten strings of roughly 100 coins each. 20 Heian ibun, doc. 2736 (Ninpei 1 [1151] 8th month 4th day). 21 The Chinese coin embargo can be found in the compendium Jianyan yilai xi nian yao lu (Li 1968). Although the entry does not name Japanese as the exporting offenders, no other country is known to have imported more Song coins by sea. 22 Hyakurenshō, Jijō 3 (1179) 6th month. I contend that zeni no yamai was not an actual disease but rather a rhetorical flourish on the part of the writers to indicate that they considered this new use of money to be a serious problem. In this interpretation, I differ from Amino Yoshihiko, who argues thatzeni no yamai referred to real medical epidemics, “popularly called ‘the coin pestilence’ because of rumors that it was the use of coins that caused their outbreaks.” Amino, forthcoming. money and the state 29

currently being imported are not counterfeit, using them is the same as using counterfeit money. Truly the use of these coins should be banned.23 Kanezane viewed the problem of Chinese cash as a political rather than an economic issue. In most of premodern East Asia, the right to mint and set the value of currency was an imperial prerogative and a way of asserting kingly authority. Historian Richard von Glahn describes this thinking as follows: “In China, as elsewhere, the authority to issue money remained a closely-guarded sovereign privilege. The state exercised greater direct control over money than over virtually any other facet of the economy. . . .”24 The Heian court nobles shared this belief and equated coins produced by a foreign power with coins minted by counterfeiters—in either case, they were an affront to the authority of the Japanese government. Later discussions of coinage in Gyokuyō indicate that other nobles shared Kanezane’s opinion. For example, consider this account of a sengi 僉議, the highest administrative meeting of nobles, from the third month of 1192: Next, there was a sengi to determine whether or not to prohibit the use of currency. Although a final pronouncement was not written out, the nobles were of one mind in declaring that coins should be banned. Only the Palace Minister spoke up to advocate a different course of action, arguing “It is inexcusable that the imperial police have not enforced the price laws! First, we should order them to carry out the previous edicts that already address this problem. Only if this matter falls outside the existing laws would I then agree that we should forbid the use of coins.” The Minister of the Left replied, saying “Coins should be banned, but if we do not issue a new edict that includes a price law, then in the end, the problems will not stop with a halt in the use of coins. The merchants will use other goods as money and their law-breaking will go unpunished, which would be terrible.”25 This excerpt also suggests that the assertion of political authority was the nobles’ top concern. They appear to be united in their opposition to Chinese cash. Although the Palace Minister questioned the proposed ban, he did not defend coin use. Rather he argued that the police should be made to enforce previous edicts before new legislation was

23 Gyokuyō, Jishō 3 (1179) 7th month 27th day. 24 Von Glahn 1996, p. 1, pp. 24–26. 25 Gyokuyō, Kenkyū 3 (1192) 10th month 1st day. 30 ethan segal issued. The Minister of the Left shared his concern but felt that a new proclamation was needed to prevent the merchants from acting inap- propriately. The aim of both ministers was to ensure that the police and the merchants followed the will of the court. In the minds of these political leaders, control of currency was a mark of sovereignty.

D. Money and the Early Warrior Government

Chinese coins gained a foothold in Japan during the twelfth century. It was during the thirteenth century, however, that they become a primary medium of exchange. As Ōta Yukio 大田由紀夫 and others have shown, coins enjoyed a steady rise in popularity over the course of the Kamakura period. By the middle of the thirteenth century, they were used in over half of land-sale transactions.26 These were also the decades during which the Kamakura bakufu was starting to assert greater authority vis-à-vis the imperial court. Officially, the bakufu sanctioned the use of coins in nengu 年貢 payments in an edict from 1226. It did not, however, make a serious effort to issue its own money or limit importation.27 Kamakura did not share the court nobles’ concern over sovereignty, perhaps because the bakufu never saw itself as the sole governmental authority in the country. But the use of Chinese coins in Japan’s monetizing economy posed other problems for bakufu leaders. Samurai retainers (gokenin 御家人) became caught up in the transition to a monetary economy, and as a result felt the need to borrow money. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. Some fell into debt as a result of gambling, which appears to have been a widespread problem. Others may have found that their landed estate income, which was limited in some cases to one-eleventh of the estate’s produce, was insufficient to meet their needs. The reasons varied, and not all gokenin had financial problems or borrowed money. But many struggled to cover their expenses. One warrior told of being repeatedly ordered to travel to Kyushu and needing to borrow money. “Every time (I borrow from the moneylenders), they take interest (rizeni 利銭) from me,” he wrote. Another provincial figure described the urgent need to repay a creditor and told his subordinate

26 Ōta 1995, p. 23. 27 Azuma kagami, Karoku 2 (1226) 8th month. money and the state 31 that if funds could not be raised then they might be forced to sell off land holdings.28 These issues were of great concern to bakufu leaders since retainers often had to use their land holdings as collateral when they borrowed from moneylenders. If they defaulted on loans, or simply sold their property in order to raise cash, then the lands passed into the hands of people who had no affiliation with or obligation to the Kamakura bakufu. The bakufu could not demand services from such people, nor could it realistically expect its retainers to provide service if they had lost their lands. Kamakura expressed its concern over such problems in a number of legal decrees and judicial pronouncements such as this conveyance (kishinjō 寄進状) from 1243, which stated: This land was originally a gokenin holding that had been handed down for generations, but because of [financial] need, was sold to another person. After the sale, the gokenin became unable to support himself (musoku 無足). The shogun’s house has previously made pronouncements [condemning] the sale of lands that support gokenin service. In keeping with the [shogun’s] decree, this land shall be awarded to Ōsumi Daimyōjin 大隅大明神 so that it can support prayers for the prosperity of the Kantō 関東.29 As this document makes quite clear, the bakufu was willing to interfere in land transactions in order to ensure that it would receive some benefit from hereditary holdings. In this case, it did not restore the land to the gokenin but rather gave the holding to a temple that would offer religious service to the bakufu. Kamakura took other actions as well, such as trying to regulate the behavior of its vassals. In 1226 (and repeatedly thereafter) it tried to ban gambling, but the frequency of the prohibition is proof of its failure. And in 1239, the bakufu forbade its vassals from appointing as deputies “money-lending merchants” (shōnin kariage 商人借上) or “mountain monks” (sansō 山僧).30 These merchants and monks (referred to as “mountain monks” because of their affiliation with Mt. Hiei比叡山 ) were moneylenders

28 Among many examples are these two undated (but probably mid-thirteenth century) documents: Kamakura ibun, docs. 7180 and 7289. These documents are also found in Chibaken no rekishi, doc. 14, Bō shojō, on pp. 1028–29; and document 19, Saishin (?) shojō, on pp. 1090–91. 29 Kamakura ibun, doc. 6240, Kangen 1 (1243) 9th month. 30 Azuma kagami, Karoku 2 (1226) 1st month 26th day; Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū, vol. 1, doc. 120 (En’ō 1 [1239] 9th month 11th day). 32 ethan segal who sometimes sought to reclaim what was owed to them by becoming deputies to estate warriors and taxing the peasants directly. Another bakufu approach was to interfere directly in the dealings between moneylenders and warriors and allow the latter to reclaim lands without repaying debts. The earliest evidence of such policies can be found in the Jōei Formulary 貞永式目, a set of legal guidelines created by Hōjō Yasutoki 北条泰時 in 1232. The formulary bans the sale of lands that gokenin received from the bakufu (article 48) and declares that individuals must hold property for twenty years or more in order to establish unquestioned ownership (article 8). In 1240, Kamakura took a bolder stance, stating creditors could not confiscate warriors’ lands if the warriors repaid half or more of what they owed. But the most dramatic instance of such legislation was the Ei’nin tokuseirei 永仁徳政令 of 1297, in which the bakufu declared a debt amnesty— all outstanding gokenin debts were to be forgiven and gokenin could reclaim lands that they lost due to unpaid loans.31 The policy proved ruinous, as moneylenders lost land holdings, land transferred hands many times, and retainers found that no one was willing to lend them money. These problems led the bakufu to reverse itself by canceling the tokuseirei the following year. It continued to struggle with the financial difficulties of its retainers, and their dissatisfaction with economic matters is seen as one reason why some warriors turned against the bakufu in the 1330s. The 1297 edict left an enduring legacy, however. It was during the late thirteenth century that ideas of “virtuous government” (the literal meaning of tokusei) came to be equated with debt relief. In earlier times, virtuous government was associated with fair and benevolent administration, including, among other things, tax relief. But after the Kamakura period, the term was primarily associated with relief from debts. Warriors frequently appealed for tokusei in the Muromachi period, and the Ashikaga bakufu itself began charging fees to issue debt amnesties (or to enforce debt obligations) as a way of raising revenue. Peasants also came to use the term when they demanded cancellation of their debts to moneylenders and pawnshops. In some cases, they marched in support of their demands, even attacking their

31 The Jōei Formulary can be found inChūsei seiji shakai shisō, pp. 7–42. The decree allowing half repayment is in Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū, vol. 1, doc. 139 (En’ō 2 [1240] 4th month 20th day). Finally, the tokuseirei is in the Kamakura ibun, doc. 19416 (Ei’nin 5 [1297] 7th month 22nd day). money and the state 33 creditors or the city of Kyoto itself. Surely these patterns of behavior bequeathed a legacy that influenced the actions of later Tokugawa- period protests and uchikowashi 打壊し.

E. Economic Factors behind the Shift to Cash

Although neither the imperial court nor the Kamakura bakufu favored the use of Chinese coins, many other Japanese came to recognize the advantages of metallic currency. By the fourteenth century, centrally located estates such as Kamikuze 上久世庄 (in Yamashiro Province 山城国) as well as more distant estates such as Sōma mikuriya 相馬御厨 (in Shimōsa Province 下総国) were paying taxes in cash. Unlike rice, silk, or agricultural goods that were used in earlier times as forms of commodity money, coins presented no risk of spoilage and were not susceptible to the elements. Such concerns were very real when transporting other goods. For example, a document from 1341 relates the misadventures of a boat carrying tax rice to Tōdaiji 東大寺 from one of its estates in Chikuzen Province 筑前国. The hapless sailors encountered storms, high waves, and had to fight off pirates before finally reaching port, at which point they discovered that the rice had been ruined by seawater.32 Another advantage was that coins were less expensive to transport. Their compact size and convenient “stringability” presumably made them more affordable to transport than bulkier produce, though this position is surprisingly difficult to substantiate.33 Sasaki Gin’ya 佐々木銀弥 examined transportation fees paid by a number of Kyushu estates that switched their means of tax payment from rice to coin. He found that whereas earlier rice payments required spending up to 50% or more of the total amount being shipped for transportation, cash payments required only around 30%—a substantial savings.34 Finally,

32 Tōdaiji monjo ser. 3, vol. 5 (Ryaku’ō 4 [1341] 5th month 24th day). 33 Song and Ming copper coins (the types used in medieval Japan) were round with a square hole in the middle through which a string was run to bundle coins in units of hundreds and thousands. 34 Sasaki 1972, pp. 292–97. However, as Sasaki readily acknowledges, he is comparing estates over time. Earlier examples involve rice payments, and later ones involve cash. Consequently, other time-related factors, such as improvements in the transportation network, might explain the lower transportation costs of the later cases. Nonetheless, Sasaki’s findings at least suggest that it may have been cheaper to ship coins rather than other goods. 34 ethan segal coins had the advantage of fungibility: they were of relatively equal size and shape and rarely led to disputes over quality. Other goods that were not as fungible, such as silk, could lead to problems, as was reflected in a judicial pronouncement from 1298 which held that: Although there should be an inspection of the cloth, this has led to con- tinual arguments over its quality. Therefore from this point forward, in keeping with the agreement reached by the disputing parties in the twelfth month of 1280 . . . let payments be made in cash at a rate of 5,500 coins for every 1-tan 10-ryō of cloth.35 In order to avoid disagreements between the estate providing the silk and the elite proprietor to whom it was due, the parties agreed to switch to coins.

F. Monetization and Medieval Society

The switch to copper cash did more than just help lower transaction costs. It helped change the ways in which people conceived of their world. As was the case in medieval Europe, money led people to think about the objects they owned—and the debts that they owed—in very different terms. Warriors played a key role in this process. As part of their duties, Kamakura-appointed warriors were expected to investigate crimes and punish offenders. In cases of theft, jitō 地頭 (vassals assigned to police individual estates) were directed to punish guilty parties according to the monetary value of the goods stolen. A bakufu directive from 1231 declared that someone stealing goods worth less than 200 coins was to be treated lightly, but if the goods were valued at more than 300 coins then it was a “serious crime” (jūka 重科).36 This two-tiered system was expanded over time, with punishments ranging from repayment in double (for minor theft) to imprisonment (for grand theft). Perhaps more significantly, it forced people in the countryside to think about the value of their belongings in terms of cash. Warriors had additional reasons for thinking about the world in monetary terms. Although Kamakura did not levy any regular taxes on its vassals, it frequently insisted that they make cash “contributions” to help cover the expense of court or bakufu ceremonies, construction,

35 Kamakura ibun, doc. 19709 (Ei’nin 6 [1298] 6th month 12th day). 36 Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū, vol. 1, doc. 21 (Kangi 3 [1231], 4th month 20th day). See also Kasamatsu 1983, pp. 71–88. money and the state 35 or temple repair. Warriors were also subjected to monetary penalties for offenses such as showing up late for guard duty.37 In some cases, they used their need to travel to the capital for guard duty as a pretext to tax peasants. For example, the jitō Wakasa Tadakiyo 若狭 tried to levy just such a tax on the peasants of Tara Estate 太良庄 in 1269. He presented them with a list of goods including charcoal, rice bran, veg- etables, and more, but after each item he included a cash sum reflecting the amount that he wanted the peasants to pay him. Although Tadakiyo failed in that instance, the fact that he could so easily assign monetary values to different goods suggests that people had come to think of essential commodities in terms of their value in coins.38 Religious institutions also played key roles in promoting the use of money in medieval Japan. In some cases, Buddhist priests accepted cash in exchange for offering prayers, and wandering monks regularly collected alms in coin as part of religious fund-raising campaigns in order to support temple upkeep, prayers, and even the building of local infrastructure.39 Leading Buddhist institutions such as the Enryakuji temple complex and its affiliates became the most powerful moneylenders of their day, while merchants often sought and received affiliation with shrines and temples because such status gave them greater freedom to move about the country without interference from secular authorities.40 Finally, by the late thirteenth century, coins started to appear in religious tales and popular culture as aids to salvation. For example, the mid-Kamakura period setsuwa 説話 collection Kokon chomonjū 古今著聞集 includes several tales that deal with money and gambling.41 One episode tells the story of an older samurai too poor to participate

37 For more on the monetary problems of Kamakura warriors, see Segal 2009, pp. 331–62. 38 Kamakura ibun, doc. 10432, 10443, and 10476. 39 For example, the monk Insai received a 3-tan parcel of land from a Fujiwara woman to support readings of the Lotus Sutra on the anniversary of her death and then sold this land to his own disciple, receiving 30-kanmon for the property. Kama- kura ibun, doc. 221 (Bunji 3 [1187] 3rd month 19th day). For more on kanjin campaigns and their relationship to the economy, see Goodwin 1994. 40 On Enryakuji, see Gay 2001. Traveling merchants were known to seek the status of shrine sexton (jinin or jinnin), a title that originally reflected individuals who procured goods for the imperial family, or yoriudo, freemen who commended their services to religious houses. For more on these titles, see Toyoda 1982b, especially pp. 235–327 and Miura 1983. 41 Kokon chomonjū 1964. 36 ethan segal in the gambling that his fellow samurai love so much. When he reluc- tantly confesses to his wife that he wishes to play like the others, she takes pity on him and sells her robes for 500 mon so that he might have some money for gambling. The gods bestow their favor on the husband and help him turn the small sum into 30 kanmon in a single day. He then uses this money to retire, take religious vows, and devote himself to recitation of the nenbutsu 念仏.42 A similar story can be found in the Illustrated Scroll of the Wandering Priest Ippen 一遍上人絵伝. In one of the tales contained therein, a follower is rewarded for his faith in Ippen’s teachings by uncovering a large buried treasure of coins in his yard.43 As Barbara Ruch has argued, characters in medieval fiction tend to seek wealth rather than upward mobility. And it was medieval people’s concern for riches and success in business that led to the newfound popularity of the gods of good fortune such as Ebisu 恵比寿, Bishamon 毘沙門, and Daikoku 大黒 with his magical, coin- producing mallet.44 As these examples illustrate, copper coins became quite popular in medieval Japan even without the support of the state. Instead, groups ranging from temple estate proprietors and moneylenders to provincial warriors and urban merchants helped promote the switch to cash. Although demands on warriors to pay monetary levies and the use of cash values to determine the seriousness of crimes show that government officials came to appreciate the advantages of coins, neither the imperial court nor the warrior government proved capable of regulating money or determining its value. Those processes appear to have been left to non-elites and/or to the market.

G. Japanese Bills of Exchange

Coins offered numerous advantages over other materials for use in tax payments, but shipping them from rural estates to centrally located proprietors was still costly and risky. Sasaki Gin’ya’s figure (cited above) of 30% of the cash total shipped being required for transportation costs, although lower than the cost of transporting some other goods, is still a considerable expense. My own research shows that

42 Kokon chomonjū 1964, pp. 242–45. 43 Ippen shōnin eden 1978. 44 Ruch 1990, pp. 515–21. money and the state 37 shipping expenses in other regions of Japan sometimes reflected even higher percentages, and coins remained just as vulnerable to bandits and pirates.45 To help overcome such problems, temples, merchants, and estate managers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries devised a system of long-distance money remittance known as kawase or saifu, usually rendered into English as “bills of exchange.”46 These certificates allowed provincial estate managers to make payments to urban proprietors more safely and affordably. In the simplest type of transactions, traveling merchants took bills of exchange with them on their rounds of the countryside. An estate manager, looking for a safe way to ship cash or goods to his proprietor in the capital, sold some to the merchant in exchange for the bill. He then forwarded the bill to the estate’s proprietor, who redeemed it at a specified location, presumably an urban merchant house connected with the original issuer. But transactions were rarely this simple. There might be a specified date for redemption or a waiting period stipulated, or the bill might be traded among merchants many times before finally being sold to an estate manager.47 Sakurai Eiji 桜井英治, starting from that observation, contends that these bills actually circulated as a form of paper money.48 Sakurai supports his claim with an additional important observation: that merchants did not create individual bills for specific estates. In other words, a merchant did not arrive at a given estate and then write out a bill of exchange for a cash amount corresponding to the value of the goods he was receiving. Most Muromachi-period bills of exchange were for a fixed value of 10kanmon . Urban moneylenders and merchants issued the bills with no foreknowledge of how they would circulate or who would later redeem them. Although the final end user, usually an estate proprietor, would in fact “cash in” the

45 For example, in 1304 officials of Noda Estate in Bizen Province had to spend close to 40% of the value of the cash being forwarded as porters’ fees in order to get their taxes to Tōdaiji, the estate’s proprietor. Segal, forthcoming. 46 Other names include kaesen, warifu, and possibly kirizeni. The last term is commonly thought to represent a different phenomenon (that of damaged coins), but Hotate Michihisa makes a strong case in arguing that Kamakura-period references to kirizeni may have been to paper certificates along the lines of kawase. Hotate 1993, pp. 15–22. 47 More detailed explanations and analysis of this process can be found in Sakurai 1996 and Usami 1999. 48 Sakurai 1996, pp. 235–73. 38 ethan segal certificate for hard currency, the bill of exchange functioned as a form of paper money for all of the intermediate users. This medieval system of money remittance had certain obvious advantages. It was far easier and safer to ship a piece of paper than strings of coins, and the merchants who provided kawase charged as their fee around 15% of the amount of money being shipped—far less than the 30% or more sometimes spent to move equivalent values of coins or goods.49 Furthermore, bills of exchange were not as bulky, weighed much less than the equivalent amount of coins, and were more easily hidden in the event of a robbery. But bills of exchange also involved a considerable degree of risk. Estate managers often had to purchase bills from traveling merchants whom they did not know well. The long distances involved made it difficult to resolve problems if they arose. Furthermore, if the proprietor was not likely to be a repeat customer, then the merchant had an incentive to cheat. With- out a strong third-party guarantor (such as the state) to aid managers who received bad bills, the merchant had only minimal fear of repercussions. Medieval Japan had no such state authority to which estate managers or proprietors could turn. How could they trust that certificates would be honored? The earliest Japanese forms of long-distance money remittance did not have to wrestle with such problems. In the late Heian period, individuals associated with specific temples used certificates known as kaemai 替米 to convey rice among themselves. All of the parties involved were members of the same religious institution, so if problems arose with a transaction, the responsible individuals could be held accountable.50 This same system was also used in the second half of the thirteenth century, when temples began to issue bills to convey cash to their Kamakura representatives for use in lawsuits brought before

49 For example, Tōji conveyed 23 kanmon to the temple’s representative in Kama- kura by means of three kawase in the year 1291. The first certificate, valued at 10 kanmon, required a fee of 1 kan 500 mon (15%) to the moneylender, a merchant located on the street that sold needles. Tōji hyakugo monjo document, published in Toyoda 1982a, p. 272. Unfortunately for modern scholars, the fees for the other two kawase are not listed in that particular document, but later cases confirm a common fee rate of around 15%. 50 Rice certificates were most common in the late Heian period, but references to kaemai can be found in documents from as late as the first half of the thirteenth century. See, for example, Okayama kenshi 1981, doc. 1063, Jō’ō 4? (1224) 9th month 29th day (the document is inscribed with the month and day; the editors have attributed it to the year 1224). money and the state 39 the warrior government.51 In these cases, religious institutions handled concerns over trust by keeping transactions “in house.” But by the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Japanese were using bills to convey estate taxes over distances that made keeping transactions “in house” impossible. How, then, did they minimize the risks? One possibility is that similar economic instruments for money conveyance in other countries served as a model for the Japanese. The Japanese had the greatest contact with and respect for imperial China, and during the Tang dynasty, the Chinese created a system for long- distance money transfer known as “flying cash” 飛銭( feiqian) or “convenient exchange” (便換 bianhuan). This system functioned with the backing of state authority. The government of each circuit maintained an office in the capital, Chang’an. Merchants who sold their wares in the markets of the capital could give the cash they earned to the office of their home circuit and receive in exchange half of a credit certificate. The other half of the certificate was sent via government channels to the circuit office back in the provinces. When the merchants returned home, they could go to the office, match their half of the certificate with the half that was held by the government, and redeem it for the original amount of cash that they had deposited in the capital.52 Might this Tang system of “flying cash” have inspired the Japanese to develop their own bills of exchange? The use of imported Chinese cash by medieval Japanese proves their knowledge of Chinese monetary instruments, and one of the names for the Japanese system of money remittance, 割符 (saifu, meaning “divided tally”), suggests a possible parallel to the Chinese system. But there is no evidence that medieval Japanese certificates actually involved the matching of divided halves for authentication. More importantly, the state appears to have played no role in medieval Japanese bills of exchange. Merchants in

51 In one of the earliest examples, Kōyasan Monastery sent cash via kawase in 1278 to one of its monks in Kamakura so that he could represent the monastery in court; unfortunately, the document does not specify the amount being sent. Kamakura ibun, Kōan 1 (1278) 11th month 3rd day. In another example from 1293, Tōji sent money to its Kamakura agent to use for legal fees (Kamakura ibun doc. 18418, Ei’nin 1 [1293] 12th month 2nd day). Thekawase specified where the cash was to be redeemed and that the payment was to be made within five days of presenting the document. Bills of exchange in medieval Europe used similar waiting periods and specified redemption dates to allow verification. See De Roover 1942. 52 Peng 1994. 40 ethan segal

Japan, unlike their Tang counterparts, could not turn to government authorities—neither the imperial court nor the warrior government—to help carry out or enforce agreements in their long-distance transactions. The bill of exchange as developed by the Japanese differed significantly from what emerged in China. The danger that a bill would prove unredeemable must have kept many estate managers from using them. However, those who did opt to use kawase devised means of minimizing their exposure to bad bills. Consider the case of Niimi Estate 新見庄 and its temple proprietor, Tōji 東寺. Once a merchant was known to sell good certificates, managers trusted that individual with repeat business. When using the services of a merchant for the first time, though, the Niimi estate manager would send only a small portion of the taxes as saifu, either holding onto the rest or sending it as cash. Correspondence between the estate and the temple reveals this strategy: “We sent you two saifu but have not yet heard whether or not they were honored. If they worked, and you agree, then we will send more of the same type next spring. . . .”53 Niimi and Tōji sometimes had bad experiences in which they were unable to collect cash on a given saifu and were unable to get a refund from the merchant who had originally sold it to them.54 But they employed this “trial balloon” process to minimize their exposure to bad merchants and bills. The high costs of shipping cash directly, or the dangers of robbery, must have outweighed the risks of receiving a bad saifu for the Tōji.

H. Medieval Legacies and Early Modern Money

Although use of coins and bills of exchange does not conclusively prove that medieval Japan enjoyed a growing economy, references in documents to avoiding disputes and lowering transportation costs suggest that people recognized the advantages that these economic instruments presented. They also reflect a society that was becoming increasingly conscious of the monetary value of goods and concerned with success

53 Okayama kenshi 1985, doc. 916 (Ōnin 1 [1467] 12th month 18th day). 54 These problematickawase from the fifteenth century are analyzed in Usami 1999. Actually, the problem cases that Niimi and Tōji struggled with provide valuable information on fifteenth-century kawase since those cases generated the most written correspondence. money and the state 41 in business rather than advancement in status. Most interestingly, the absence of a stable, unified central government makes the use of coins and bills all the more remarkable. For both coins and bills, medieval Japanese found ways to get around the challenge of a weak, divided central government. But while the minimal reliance upon the state marks an important point of difference between medieval and early modern Japan, there were some significant areas of continuity as well. Medieval monetization laid the groundwork for the later, expanded use of coins by the people of the Tokugawa period. Contrary to Bashō’s poetic complaint cited at the start of this chapter, coins would not have been unheard of in rural villages because at least some people in many such villages would have been using coins since medieval times. The Tokugawa were well aware of this fact and consciously chose to model their new coins on the type of metallic currency that was already in common use—round, with a square hole, and an inscription on one face—so that the familiarity of look, shape, and feel would help the coins gain acceptance among the people. And while one might argue that coins throughout traditional East Asia took this form, Japanese in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries would have been familiar only with Song and Ming cash—that is, the imported coins that were used in medieval Japan. But medieval money did more than merely provide the model for Tokugawa bakufu copper coinage. It actually circulated during much of the seventeenth century as the accepted currency of the realm. This may be surprising information for those unfamiliar with Japanese monetary history, for the early Tokugawa shoguns are widely credited with having produced Japan’s first official domestic currency since the mid-Heian period. As is well known, they devised a tri-metallic currency system that used gold and silver for larger transactions and copper cash for smaller ones. But less well known is that for most of the first century of Tokugawa rule, people continued to use imported Chinese cash, especially Ming Eiraku 永楽 (Ch. Yongle) coins and pri- vately minted medieval counterfeit coins (bita sen びた銭), in their daily business dealings. The Tokugawa bakufu took numerous steps to assert its authority and legitimacy in the early seventeenth century, but its switch to new coinage was not as smoothly implemented as most of its other policies. Early attempts at producing domestic currency seem to have been half-hearted at best. In 1606 it produced small numbers of a new 42 ethan segal copper coin, the Keichō tsūhō 慶長通宝, and issued proclamations banning the use of Eiraku coins and coin shroffing. But the bakufu’s plans did not find acceptance in the marketplace, and use of the older coins continued. The Tokugawa were forced to recognize this just two years later, when they issued a new directive that decreed one ryō of gold to be exchangeable for one kan of Eiraku coins or four kan of medieval counterfeit coins.55 The bakufu made a similar attempt to unify currency in 1619 when it issued the Genna tsūhō 元和通宝, but again met with failure. In 1636, the third shogun, Iemitsu 家光, made the boldest attempt yet to introduce new currency with large-scale production of the Kan’ei tsūhō 寛永通宝. To facilitate a smooth transition to the new coinage, the bakufu declared that same year that the Kan’ei tsūhō should be treated as having exactly the same value as older coins already in circulation.56 Thus, the government officially recognized medieval coins and effectively sanctioned their use. Production of theKan’ei tsūhō was sporadic over the next few decades, and at least through the 1660s it appears that the new Tokugawa coins circulated at the same rates as Eiraku coins. It was not until 1670 that the bakufu felt confident enough in its new currency to finally proscribe the use of Eiraku coins. Archaeological evidence, particularly from the investigation of gravesites, confirms that both new and old coins were used until the 1670s. During the seventeenth century, it was common to bury the dead with coins known as rokudōsen 六道戦銭. Popular religious beliefs held that the spirits of the deceased would use the coins to pay the ferryman who transported them across the River Sanzu 三途の川. Suzuki Kimio 鈴木公雄 and other archaeologists have catalogued the types of coins found in seventeenth-century coffins. Particularly interesting for a study of monetization is the fact that some people were buried with Chinese coins, some with Tokugawa coins, and some with a mixture of the two.57 Thus, during the crucial decades when the bakufu was establishing its institutions and the economy was enjoying rapid expansion, medieval money continued to be an accepted currency of choice. Furthermore, as the bakufu began increasing its production

55 Yoshihara 2003, pp. 24–25. 56 Ibid., pp. 34–35. 57 Suzuki 2002, pp. 22–35. money and the state 43 of Kan’ei tsūhō, it collected medieval coins to melt and recast them, actually making the new money out of the old. Medieval coins quite literally became the new currency of early modern Japan.

I. Conclusions

There are several reasons that might explain why Edo intellectuals wrote of Japan’s monetization as a very recent phenomenon. One factor was volume, for there is no disputing that the level of coin use was far greater in the seventeenth century than in the fourteenth. Docu- ments from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries show that coins were used by estate managers and in local markets, but there is no evidence to suggest that ordinary peasants used cash to acquire their basic necessities. But in addition to volume, the relationship of the government to its critics also played a part. Ogyū Sorai and Dazai Shundai took issue with bakufu economic policy and sought to focus attention on the current poor state of the realm by comparing it with earlier times. Many saw commercialization and the rise of merchants as harmful to the samurai (and therefore to society as a whole). These thinkers looked back nostalgically on earlier times when the position of samurai seemed secure and, in their own minds, connected such times to a rice-based economy. Other writers might have adopted a more positive approach in hopes of currying favor with the bakufu by emphasizing the benefits that the Tokugawa had brought to Japan. In writing about the economy, they might have had an incentive to depict pre-Tokugawa people as backward, rural, and engaging in barter as opposed to the modern, urban, money-using Japanese of their own time. In addition, the Tokugawa recognized the prerogative to mint as a means of legitimizing their rule (just as the Heian nobles had, centuries earlier), and so would have been proud to claim that they brought/restored domestic currency to Japan. But there is good reason to think that medieval monetary practices played some part in laying the groundwork for seventeenth-century monetization. Other aspects of the early modern economy had a connection to earlier times as well. Medieval notions of tokusei as linking virtuous rule and debt amnesty also influenced Edo-period thought. Peasants called for tokusei even as they marched against—and sometimes attacked—their creditors in ikki 一揆 protests. The eighth shogun, 44 ethan segal

Yoshimune 吉宗, attempted debt amnesty as part of his reforms to help the financial positions of samurai. But like the Kamakura bakufu and its misguided tokuseirei of 1297, the result of such policies was that moneylenders were afraid to lend. In 1729, the Tokugawa shogunate had to reopen bakufu courts to moneylenders and their lawsuits in order to make it easier for samurai to continue borrowing.58 In addition, the early modern policy of tax contracting with villages— that is, placing the burden on an entire village and allowing the village community to work out how payments would be divided—originated as a sengoku daimyō response to the economically empowered villages of the late medieval era.59 Thus, although we cannot ignore the major differences between medieval and early modern Japan, there are some aspects of economic activity that reveal continuity along with change. For much of the twentieth century, scholars saw the Warring States period 戦国時代 (1467–1573) as a divide that separated premodern Japan from the Tokugawa era. During its long decades of warfare, patterns of political governance, economic institutions such as the shōen, and even the city of Kyoto itself were destroyed. It seemed to some that nothing prior to the Ōnin War 応仁の乱 was relevant to the development of later society.60 Yet few scholars today see the Ōnin War as marking so clear a division. Many of the artistic practices that we associate with “traditional Japan,” from Noh plays to tea ceremony, originated in the Muromachi period. And key political institutions, such as the sankin kōtai system, originated in the control policies of the Ashikaga shoguns. Susan Hanley’s research into material culture has shown that elements of everyday life such as housing, bedding, and clothing were Muromachi-period innovations that became com- monplace only in the Tokugawa era. More recently, William Wayne Farris has argued that population growth, previously thought to have taken off only in the seventeenth century, actually began its rise in medieval times.61 A similar argument may be warranted with regard to the economic realm as well. There was much that was new and unique in the Edo period: urbanization, peace, infrastructure, and a stable central gov-

58 Totman 1993, pp. 296–307. 59 Muromachi-period tax contracting is analyzed in Nagahara and Yamamura 1977, p. 118. 60 Hall 1977, p. 2. 61 Hanley 1997; Farris 2006. money and the state 45 ernment all allowed for economic growth at levels that far outshone the pace of economic activity in medieval times. But there were also some very real (if slender) threads of continuity in economic thought and practice that carried over from the medieval period. In some ways, the Tokugawa-period baku-han system—which allowed independent domains to issue their own paper money—might not be as strong or centralized as I have represented it in this chapter. Hopefully more collaborative work that looks at economic patterns across the medieval and early modern periods will help us better understand the nature of such institutions.

ECONOMIC THOUGHT CONCERNING FREEDOM AND CONTROL

Kawaguchi Hiroshi*

A. Introduction

My ultimate objective is to develop a hypothetical framework for understanding the economic consciousness of people in early modern Japan. Such a framework is necessary because without contact with the Western powers, Japan would not have changed into a modern, Western-style society. In a sense, the history of Japan progressed in an unnatural manner from the middle of the nineteenth century onward. Modern Japan minimized the influence of Edo-period society while at the same time making that society its foundation. Japan’s modern society differs from a Western-style liberal democracy or a socialist society like China. Therefore, Japan has features that cannot be understood from the perspective of Western history despite the common existence of a market economy. It is essential, therefore, to understand inherent features of the Edo period if we are fully to understand modern Japan. Here I advance general arguments about the understanding of freedom and control during the Tokugawa period because freedom and control contributed to the foundation of society. Understanding the dynamic of freedom and control is likely also to shed light on the interactions between the government and private sectors during the Meiji period. Throughout history, economic markets have existed as a function of both the free circulation of goods and various forms of control over economic activity. In this sense, freedom and control always accom- pany each other. The manner in which people have conceived and negotiated relations between free circulation and control is specific to time and place. From the viewpoint of economic thought, this paper

* This paper stems from research performed under a Waseda University Grant for Special Research Projects (Project number: 2003A-501). Paper adapted by Gregory Smits. 48 kawaguchi hiroshi examines the interplay of freedom and control in early modern Japan. Representative examples of early modern Confucian and Buddhist thought indicate the emergence of a viewpoint that valued economic activity as a social good and understood all economic actors in society as parts of an interconnected network. Ishida Baigan 石田梅岩 (1685–1744) was born to a farming family in Tōge Village (Tōge mura 東懸村), Tanba Province (Tanba no kuni 丹波国), the present-day city of Kameoka 亀岡 in Kyoto Prefecture. He did not inherit the family occupation, however, and in his boyhood he worked at a shop, later becoming a merchant in Kyoto.1 When he was forty-five years old, he began to teach his philosophy (“the Way” 道) to townspeople (chōnin 町人) based on his experience. Although in his private school lectures he explained the Way mainly in terms of Neo-Confucianism, his experience in commerce also informed his teachings.2 Baigan often incorporated principles of commerce into his lectures: Although a merchant laid in stock a commodity for 100 monme 匁,3 he might be able to sell it for only 90 monme depending on the market price at that time. He then suffers a loss. But, according to circumstances, he can sell a commodity with a stock value of 100 monme for 120–30 monme. Therefore it is possible to sell something acquired at 100 units for 120 or 130 units. When the market price rises, he becomes aggressive. When it falls, he becomes timid. It is not the volition (watakushi 私) of the merchant but Heaven (ten 天) that drives market trends. All prices, with the exception of some official prices, always go up and come down. . . . [Commercial activities] are not the act of a selfish individual who lacks regard for the greater society (ōyake 公).4 In Baigan’s view, price is a function of market trends. Therefore, a price fluctuates regardless of the intention or actions of individual market participants. Baigan’s view is that nobody can supervise markets, which implies that the control over the economic activities of commoners by the samurai authorities will have little or no effect. Such a view would suggest that participants in commercial activities should be free from

1 For details on Ishida Baigan’s life and work, see Kawaguchi 1992, Sakuma 2004, and Imai 2006. In English, see Takemura 1997. 2 Ishida Sensei Jiseki 1957, p. 616. 3 Unit for silver currency. 4 Ishida 1956b, p. 81. economic thought concerning freedom and control 49 artificial constraints. Furthermore, Baigan regarded commerce and wealth as righteous, as he indicates in the following: A merchant is familiar with money calculation and earns his living by it. Therefore, you must not say that “1sen 銭5 is little.” It is the Way of the merchant (shōnin no michi 商人ノ道) to accumulate wealth by piling up sen. . . . Do not call it avarice ( yokushin 欲心) even if wealth thereby becomes like a mountain. . . . Such wealth accumulation helps promote thrift ken’yaku( 倹約) in the realm (tenka 天下) and accords with Heaven’s will (tenmei 天命). It is proper, therefore, that merchants prosper.6 Here Baigan regards commercial activities and accumulation of wealth as natural acts for a merchant. What is remarkable is that these commercial activities are connected with thrift and the will of Heaven. Here, both of these terms carry a moral meaning in Baigan’s usage. In other words, commercial activities are one way to effect the realization of moral value. Indeed, Baigan sees in commercial activity the potential “to restore people to inborn honesty.”7 For him, ‘thrift’ and ‘Heaven’s will’ are interconnected with commercial activities and accumulation of wealth, which are natural and moral. It is in accordance with moral principles, therefore, that merchants prosper. Despite his view of the self-regulating market, Baigan acknowledges samurai attempts to control the price of certain commodities. Of course, not everyone observed the official price. What is noteworthy is that for Baigan, freedom and control coexist without a serious sense of incongruity. They are not contradictory. The validity of economic activities and accumulation of wealth are not absolute for Baigan because human beings do not exist absolutely: People accept Heaven’s will. All members of society should consider Heaven’s will to be their own law (hō 法). They also should be satisfied with their own family business. . . . Those who know the Way will be content with their current situations without aspiring to something else. This contentment is attained by virtue of study. . . . People should know that their present situation is Heaven’s will. . . . Knowing this point, they will not neglect the duties of their stations in life (shokubun 職分).8

5 Low-value copper coin. Its unit is mon 文. 6 Ishida 1956b, pp. 32–33. 7 Ishida 1956a, p. 217. 8 Ishida 1956b, pp. 37–38. 50 kawaguchi hiroshi

According to Baigan, Heaven’s will is an absolute value that affords human beings concrete social existence. That a person is a merchant is not because of the person himself but because of Heaven’s will, and the Way of merchant activity also derives from Heaven. There is no autonomy vis-à-vis Heaven’s will, and all human affairs derive from it. Edo-period intellectuals did not conceive of an isolated individual, freed from all outside limitations, making his own decisions and taking responsibility for them. If such autonomous activity is the meaning of freedom, then it was not present either for commoners or samurai. Samurai also exist as a function of Heaven’s will, and thus their control was not absolute. Freedom and control were relative and codependent. During the Edo period, the word jiyū 自由 indicated a state without stagnation, not the autonomous agency implied by the modern sense of ‘freedom.’9 So the issue, not only with respect to Baigan but more generally, was the nature of the coexistence of social control and free circulation. I consider this coexistence from two viewpoints: 1) interdependent relations based on division of labor between social statuses and regions, and 2) Japanese interpretations of Confucian thought as it pertains to economic matters. In discussing the coexistence of freedom and control from these two viewpoints, I strive to provide an adequate account of how the people of Edo-period Japan actually viewed social and economic relations.

B. Interdependent Relations Based on the Division of Labor between Social Categories and Geography

1. Division of Labor within Society and between Geographic Regions The basis of early modern society was formed by the Toyotomi豊臣 and Tokugawa 徳川 government policy of the separation of warriors and peasants (heinō bunri 兵農分離).10 Implicit in this arrangement was a separation of those who governed from those who produced the basis of economic wealth. A common term for society in early modern Japan was shimin 四民—the ‘four types of people’, also known as

9 See Kawaguchi 2001. 10 See Takeyasu 1966, Yoshida 2000, and Ochiai 2006. economic thought concerning freedom and control 51 shi-nō-kō-shō 士農工商. Although the term has its roots in ancient China, in the context of early modern Japan these broad social divisions of warriors (bushi 武士), peasants (hyakushō 百姓), artisans (shokunin 職人), and merchants (shōnin 商人) encompassed most of society. Notice that this conception of society was based, at least in part, on occupation. Geography, however, also entered the picture. For example, those who lived in villages and had to pay land tax were therefore hyakushō for administrative purposes. Non-farming households were thus included as hyakushō because of the place of their residence. By contrast, samurai, artisans, and merchants usually resided in urban areas. Therefore the Edo-period economy consisted of two kinds of division of labor. One was the division of labor among four broad occupational categories: government, agriculture, manual industry, and commerce. Another division was based on geography, which in turn had two aspects. One aspect was the urban versus rural distinction within a comparatively narrow geographic territory. The other aspect of geographic division was macro-regions, a topic outside the scope of this paper. Each component of these divisions of labor depended on the others and was unable to function without the others. No individual component possessed complete autonomy, and no component could reject, defy, or act capriciously toward another component. This situation may be one reason that “Pax Tokugawa” was able to prevail for about 250 years.

2. Edo-Period People’s View of the Economy Today we recognize the economy as a set of interdependent relations based on a division of labor, and people of the Edo period possessed a similar understanding. For example, military science and kogakuha 古学派 Confucian scholar Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685)11 explained: Human beings and living things are born by mysterious union (myōgō 妙合) of two manifestations of material force (ki 気) within heaven and earth (tenchi 天地). Humankind is the master of all creation, and all things reach their ultimate in humans. Living people make food by farming, make various devices from skillful technology, and satisfy social needs by commerce. This is the inevitable social function of farmers,

11 See Maruyama 1952, Tahara 1967, and Kawaguchi 1992. 52 kawaguchi hiroshi

artisans and merchants. Unlike them, warriors do not engage in farming, production and commerce. Why? My ancestors were warriors from generation to generation, so I was born in a warrior house. I am in a position to serve a lord as warrior who does not engage in farming, production and commerce. Warriors must have their own social function. Those who obtain food and necessities without performing their social function are called idlers ( yūmin 遊民). Warriors ought to reflect on themselves. . . . Warriors must consider their proper social function so that their occupation will finally become clear.12 Sokō’s concern with warrior self-awareness reflected mid-seventeenth- century social reality that necessitated a reassessment of their social function. The disturbances of war were already a distant memory in what had become a time of peace. Sokō was concerned about the occupation of warriors because of his view that each person must engage in a socially useful occupation. Moreover, he recognized that the uniting of occupations appropriate to one’s social status and group constitutes society. Commoners (sanmin 三民) engage in socially useful occupations and constitute interdependent relations. In this sense they are not idlers. By contrast, the nature of samurai occupations became unclear in the peace that followed the turbulent times of the Genna 元和 era (1615–1624). In other words, after the establishment of Tokugawa hegemony, the social significance of samurai-as-warriors became insufficient. Consequently, Sokō harbored misgivings over samurai functions within the interdependent relations constituting society. Therefore, it is necessary, he argued, to find new roles in peacetime. Since it is paradoxical to advocate a role for combatants in the peaceful world, however, Sokō’s military learning dealt not only with military affairs in the narrow sense but also enlightened rule and succor of the people (keisei saimin 経世済民). For instance, he says “the governance of the realm, along with ritual forms and music (reigaku 礼楽) are duties (waza わざ)” of samurai.13 By means of this Confucian notion, he was able to posit a role for warriors in times of peace. In Sokō’s view, the place of warriors in society was the same as those of farmers, artisans, and merchants. In this respect, warriors did not occupy a position of privilege.

12 Yamaga 1970b, pp. 31–32. 13 Yamaga 1970a, pp. 336–37. economic thought concerning freedom and control 53

In Sokō’s view, the gap between warriors and commoners (sanmin) is small, and we would expect that commoners themselves might well regard the gap as smaller. For example, Nishikawa Joken 西川如見 (1648–1724),14 a wealthy merchant from Nagasaki 長崎 and famous astronomical geographer, glorified his social position as a townsman. Joken’s claims appear similar to those of Sokō: According to the books of the sages (seijin no sho 聖人の書), there are five social gradations, called the moral talent of five grades (gotō no jin- rin 五等の人倫). First is the son of Heaven (tenshi 天子), second are lords (shokō 諸侯), third are higher officialskei ( taifu 卿大夫), fourth are bureaucrats (shi 士), and the fifth are the common peopleshojin ( 庶人). In Japan, the son of Heaven is the emperor (tennō 天皇), lords are daimyo, higher officials are hatamoto, and senior samurai holding high officekan’i ( 官位), and bureaucrats are normal samurai. . . . Samu- rai, except the direct retainers of the shogun, are undervassals (baishin 陪臣) and constitute one part of the common people. . . . Low-ranking samurai in various parts of Japan are the common people. On the other hand, there are four varieties of common people, called shimin 四民, or shi nō kō shō 士農工商. Shi are low-ranking samurai. Nō are farmers. . . . Kō are artisans. Shō are merchants. The previously-mentioned five social gradations and the shimin constitute moral talent based on the self-evident principle of Heaven (tenri 天理). If there are no shimin, the moral talent of five grades is not able to become manifest. Therefore, all over the world, there are no countries without shimin. It is essential to know that those other than shimin are called idlers, and are useless for society.15 For both Joken and Sokō, the stress is on the useful social functions of the common people, and it is noteworthy that these two thinkers see society in similar ways. Moreover, Joken regarded most samurai as commoners. Joken here has managed to specify what Sokō was groping for a quarter-century earlier: a useful function for samurai in peacetime. For Joken, the occupation of samurai was politics and administration. Samurai sometimes regulated economic activities in their capacity as government officials. Because the social division between samurai and commoners was rigid, however, samurai were outside the spheres of economic activity of the sanmin. Samurai were not able to replace sanmin, and therefore the commoners possessed a high degree of

14 See Kawaguchi 1992. 15 Nishikawa 1942, pp. 13–14. 54 kawaguchi hiroshi freedom in their economic activities despite the control of the formal apparatus of government. Herein lies the basic structural logic of control and freedom. Samurai controlled the apparatus of government, which potentially impinged somewhat on the economic activities of commoners. There was, however, a high degree of commoner autonomy. Intellectual trends in the Edo period tended to acknowledge this structural feature of society. In both Buddhist and Confucian thought there was a tendency to acknowledge interdependency among social groups and to affirm the value of commoner economic activity as socially useful. Let us now examine the major trends in thought as it pertained to economic activity.

C. Japanized Confucianism

1. Background Both Confucianism and Buddhism originated outside Japan, and both arrived during the sixth century. Of the two, Buddhism was more influential during ancient times and the medieval period. The vital- ity of Confucianism increased after the Warring States Era Sengoku( jidai). It is difficult, of course, to generalize about a period of over 1000 years, but the following morality tale (setsuwa) from the beginning of the ninth century reflects some basic tenets of early medieval Buddhism: In Kawachi province there was once a melon merchant whose name was Isowake. He would load huge melons on his horse, far in excess of what it could carry. Then, if it would not move, he would get furious and drive it on by whipping it. The horse would then move along with its burden, but tears would fall from its two eyes. When the man had sold all his melons, he would kill the horse. He, in fact, killed a good number of horses this way. Later, however, this fellow Isowake happened to be just looking down into a kettle of boiling water one day when his own two eyes fell out of his head and were boiled in the kettle. Manifest ret- ribution comes quickly. We ought to believe in karmic causality. Even though we look upon animals as mere beasts, they were our parents in some past life. In fact, it is passage through the six courses and according to the four modes of birth that constitutes our real family. Therefore, it will not do to be merciless.16

16 Quoted in LaFleur 1983, pp. 34–35. See also Keikai 1975, pp. 105–06. economic thought concerning freedom and control 55

The melon merchant’s parents were born as human beings in the past, but now they might exist as horses or other animals. This tale illustrates, in simple terms, a view whereby boundaries are porous. A firm boundary between the past and the present, a human being and a horse, and parents and animals does not exist in this worldview. All creation moves through and within the Six Courses (rokudō), with only a fine line between categories. Humans, although in a relatively high category, do not possess privileged status vis-à-vis the rest of creation. In comparison with this Buddhist view, Yamaga Sokō argues within a Confucian framework that heaven and earth were created by the mysterious union of yin and yang, the two forms of material force. The realms of heaven and earth are not a relative domain, like the Buddhist Six Courses, but an absolute space. Moreover, for Sokō the formation of mankind and other things is firm. Human beings in particular are lords of all creation, clearly distinguished from a horse or brutish animals. Compared with earlier eras, early modern Japanese tended to focus their attention on the concrete human world, not otherworldly realms. During the late medieval period, Japanese thinkers began to shift from a focus on otherworldly realms (higan 彼岸) in which humans held no special status to a focus on concrete human society (shigan 此岸), that is, to a focus on this world. Confucianism both informed and promoted this revolution in the basic outlook on the world. At a minimum, when the prevailing Buddhist sensibility began to break down, people looked to the Confucian tradition as the obvious intellectual tool for ordering their world. In this way, Confucianism gradually became a living tradition in Japan toward the end of the medieval period.

2. Confucianism in Early Modern Japan Although Confucianism was the dominant intellectual tradition during early modern times, it had not penetrated Japanese society very deeply in the seventeenth century.17 For example, although Ishida Baigan, Yamaga Sokō, and Nishikawa Joken were strongly influenced

17 See Maruyama 1952, Bitō 1961, Tahara 1967, Minamoto 1972, Watanabe 1985, Maeda 1996, Sawai 2000, and Kurozumi 2003. In English, see Ooms 1985, Boot 1983, Ooms 1987, Kurozumi 1994, and Nakai 2002. 56 kawaguchi hiroshi by Confucianism, their methods of integrating Confucianism into their systems of thought were different in each case. Baigan, in particular, reveals a synthetic tendency: It is heaven and earth (tenchi 天地) that create all things, which later acquire their names after coming into existence. Thereafter, people wrote names using characters. . . . The Way of Heaven tendō( 天道) existed prior to names or characters. Even “Way of Heaven” is a name that people later assigned to it. So setting aside the issue of names, here is the situation: The sages considered benevolence (jin 仁) to be the root (moto 本). On the other hand, Laozi considered the Great Way (daidō 大道) to be the root of benevolence. So there are two names called the Way and Benevolence. Is it reasonable to argue that one is more basic than the other simple because the names are different? The silent and odorless substance which becomes the embodiment (tai 体) of everything is, for the present, named alpha (ken 乾), Heaven (ten 天), the Way (michi 道), principle (ri 理), destiny (mei 命), nature (sei 性) or benevolence.18 Here, Baigan combines terms from Daoism, medieval Japanese thought, and Confucianism. His ultimate point is that there is one profound reality, but with different names. The names are of little consequence compared with this reality. Samurai were originally not literati but warriors, and academic study was not their custom. On the contrary, they tended to regard learning as effeminate, illustrated, for example, by Nakae Tōju中江藤樹 (1608–1648) who was ridiculed by another samurai. In 1629 when Tōju was a retainer of the Ōzu 大洲 domain, this warrior colleague called him ‘Confucius’ by way of a back-handed compliment.19 Relatively few samurai had a serious interest in Confucianism until the middle of the eighteenth century. In the realm of political ideology, the legitimacy of the samurai government was irrelevant to the study of morality. Its basis was the military authority (bui 武威) of the shogunate. Because the Confucian classics were written in classical Chinese, they must have seemed remote to most samurai and commoners. This situation began to change in the late nineteenth century when the shogunate began to take some interest in Confucian learning. In the 1790s, for example, the shogunate took over the Shōheikō, the Hayashi family academy, and administered it directly as a school for the train-

18 Ishida 1956b, pp. 71–72. 19 Tōju Sensei Nenpu 1974, p. 288. economic thought concerning freedom and control 57 ing of hatamoto and other leading retainers. The shogunate also specified the curriculum and prohibited teachings outside that curriculum at the Shōheikō (in the Kansei igaku no kin).20 The shogunate also instituted examinations for retainers at this time. This shogunate interest in institutionalizing Confucianism influenced the domains, which began founding schools one after another throughout Japan. Private academies also flourished as Japanese society began to acknowledge the importance of study and scholastic attainments.21 Reading of the Confucian classics, once a specialized skill, became a routine part of the education of samurai and affluent persons.22 Even at the end of the eighteenth century, however, most Confucian concepts would have been difficult for ordinary people to grasp. But society had come to value the importance of basic reading, writing, and arithmetic for ordinary people. The number of students attending private elementary schools (terakoya 寺子屋) gradually increased. A book entitled Shōbai ōrai 商売往来 (Survey of Commerce), written around the end of the seventeenth century by Hori Ryūsuiken 堀流水軒 (dates unknown), became a widely read elementary school textbook in the nineteenth century.23 Basic Confucian virtues in simplified form were also taught at these schools.24 Although it began as an elite intellectual tradition, as time went on during the early modern era, Confucianism or at least a Confucian way of thinking gradually spread to all levels of society. One reason is that Confucianism suited the merchant-dominated values of early modern society better than Buddhism did. That said, however, the widespread adoption of Confucianism required certain modifications to the original Chinese ideas. We will now examine this point in more detail.

3. Occupation When the emphasis shifted to this-worldly concerns, the question of how to live became prominent, even among some Buddhists. Suzuki Shōsan 鈴木正三 (1579–1655) is an example of this point. He was a

20 Backus 1979a and 1979b. 21 Ooms 1975. 22 See Kasai 1960, Tsujimoto 1990. 23 See Miyoshi 1987. 24 An excellent example is the widely used moral primer Rikuyu Engi 六諭衍義, brought from China to Ryukyu by the Confucian diplomat Tei Junsoku 程順則 and translated into Japanese by Muro Kyūsō 室鳩巣 during the eighteenth century. 58 kawaguchi hiroshi retainer of Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康 (1542–1616) and later became a Buddhist priest. He preached a way of life as a person in this world as follows: An artisan asked me as follows: I believe in the importance of the here- after (goshō 後生) and Bodhisattvas (bosatsu 菩薩). However, I manage my family business to earn my living night and day, so I do not have free time. How do I attain Buddhahood (bukka 仏果)? I answered him as follows: All actions are Buddhist deeds (butsugyō 仏行). You have to enter Nirvana (jōbutsu 成仏) through ordinary actions (shosa 所作). There is no work sagyō( 作業) that is not a Buddhist deed. You ought to know that all actions might benefit the world. A person, who has received Buddha’s body (buttai 仏体) and possesses the Buddha-nature (bushō 仏性), should not engage in improper ways of life owing to an evil mind. The spiritually awakened honkaku( 本覚) and absolute (shin- nyo 真如) Buddha divides innumerably and benefits the world. If there is no artisan, implements of the world are not created. If there is no samurai, the world cannot be governed. If there is no farmer, the world lacks food. If there is no merchant, the world becomes inconvenient. Moreover, all the various businesses (jigyō 事業) appear and benefit the world. . . . They are moral functions tokuyō( 徳用) of a singular Buddha (ichibutsu 一仏).25 Here Shōsan demonstrates a way of thinking common in early modern Japan regardless of formal affiliation with one tradition or another. These words of a Buddhist priest in the middle of the seventeenth century remind us of Yamaga Sokō and Nishikawa Joken because of the similarity of their views on engagement with society. Like Sokō and Joken, Shōsan regarded the existence of human society—samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants—as a self-evident premise, and he declared that their businesses benefit the world. To use the terminology of Sokō and Joken, the shimin are not idlers. The stress on the social usefulness of theshimin corresponds to the early modern Japanese economic structure. In short, through divisions of labor in an increasingly complex society, people were interdependent. They all benefited one another. Viewed from the standpoint of a person’s way of life, it is reasonable to expect that people should take up a variety of occupations. The usefulness of an occupation, however, was not the sole criterion for determining a positive or negative moral judgment in particular cases. For a person’s life to be virtuous, his or her occupation must be

25 Suzuki 1962, pp. 70–71. economic thought concerning freedom and control 59 useful to society, but the occupation must also be carried out with a benevolent mind. Isowake, in the above-mentioned Buddhist morality tale, is an obvious example of a man whose occupation is useful to society but who carries out his work in a cruel manner. Merciless deeds, even if socially useful, were subject to criticism. Shōsan argued that all human actions are religious practices in that they fall within the purview of Buddhism. Moreover, people can attain Nirvana via such actions because all people receive the Buddha’s body and possess Buddha-nature. According to Shōsan, human nature is the same as Buddha who benefits the world. It was possible, therefore, to assess every occupation of the shimin on two grounds: social usefulness and human nature. Therefore, early modern Japanese morality texts stressed reliability and diligence in performing one’s occupation according to one’s social status. But, of course, Shōsan was a Buddhist priest. How did Confucians discuss and interpret this matter?

4. Theory of One’s Duty shokubun( ron 職分論) As we have seen, the grounds for a positive valuation of shimin occupations were social usefulness and identification of occupation with ethical practice. The basis of social usefulness is the early modern Japanese economic structure. In other words, the criterion of social usefulness reflects the actual conditions and structure of early modern Japanese socioeconomic life. However, social usefulness is insufficient grounds for occupational affirmation because many people were too proud to pursue economic gain for its own sake. A social atmosphere suspicious of economic gain for its own sake is suggested by Ishida Baigan, who explicitly emphasized that the formation of wealth is righteous if acquired by following the proper Way of merchants. Ordinary people, as opposed to theorists, however, were not so diffi- dent about pursuing economic gain. In the sensibility of the common people, money-making was an obvious matter of course. Significantly, by the late eighteenth century it is possible to find a similar sensibility among samurai as well as commoners. Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755– 1817) is one example.26 In Seiryō’s lucid explanation:

26 See Aoyagi 2008. In English, see Najita 1978, pp. 23–34. 60 kawaguchi hiroshi

It is efficient to look at the root of things. Why are rice fields delivered to farmers and rice is paid by them? What is the logic (rikutsu 理屈) to take rice from farmers? . . . All things between heaven and earth are goods (shiromono シロモノ), including rice fields, mountains, seas, money and rice. It is a principle (ri 理) that goods repeatedly give birth to goods. That rice fields give birth to rice is no different from money yielding interest. It is the principle of the universe (tenchi 天地) that mountains give birth to wood, that seas contain fish and salt, and that money or rice yields interest. Rice fields produce nothing if left unat- tended. Money yields nothing if set aside. Rice fields are lent to farmers, and a ten percent land tax is paid by them. This is the same as collecting ten percent interest. . . . Taxes on rice fields, mountains and the sea are the same as interest. Taxation is the equivalent of lending goods and taking interest. It is natural that interest must be taken. . . . It is the principle of the universe. . . . This is the situation with lower-status merchants, and it is not bad. From the earliest times, it has been said that the relations between lord and retainer conform to the way of the market (shidō 市道). A lord lets a retainer work by giving him an annual stipend, and a retainer obtains rice by selling his own power to a lord. A lord buys a retainer and a retainer sells oneself to a lord. That is just buying and selling. Buying and selling is good.27 According to Seiryō, all things have economic value, and this economic value proliferates. Moreover, all human relations follow an economic logic. The relations between lord and retainer are relations of buying and selling of work. Market forces provide incentives. When samurai lend rice fields to farmers, land tax is the equivalent of rent. The pursuit of an economic gain is an ordinary principle of the world. Signifi- cantly, many economic bureaucrats adopted a similar view during the latter part of the Edo period.28 Despite the increased prominence of thinkers like Seiryō, the profit motive remained potentially problematic, even very late in the Edo period. Yokoi Shōnan 横井小楠 (1809–1869), for example,29 advocated active government intervention in the economy. But he was uneasy about government profit-making from such interventions: So far, merchants have bought all products that are produced in nongovernmental circles (minkan 民間). Therefore, their prices are low. Dishonest merchants (kanshō 姦商), especially, depress prices by half

27 Kaiho 1970, pp. 221–22. For the English translation, see Kinski 1997, pp. 158–59. 28 See Fujita 1966 and 1998. 29 See Yamazaki 1981. economic thought concerning freedom and control 61

through fraud. Government (kan 官) should buy these products at a price whereby people make a profit and the authorities do not have a loss. If government refrains from economic profit, people will naturally obtain benefits. . . . There are a lot of people who expect an increase in production. However, their hope is not often realized because of their lack of ability. At first government lends money or rice to such people, afterward purchases their products, and lastly liquidates their debts by those sale profits. In such cases, if government refrains from making a profit, ordinary people will benefit greatly. . . . If there is a useful method or machine in nongovernmental agriculture and industry, government should first test it by experiment, and sincerely inform the people of the result.30 Shōnan’s view contrasts with Seiryō’s in some respects. For Seiryō, the profit motive powered the economic engine of society. Shōnan did not necessarily condemn profit-making, but in the case of government intervention into the economy, the state should seek only to break even. Whatever potential profit it forgoes would then, in effect, help raise the standard of living of ordinary people. Other grounds were necessary to eliminate discomfort about profit, namely the identification of occupation and ethical practice discussed previously. Shōnan’s arguments here are similar to those of Suzuki Shōsan discussed earlier. Recall that Shōsan equated human nature with the Buddha nature and thus argued that all human acts are, or could be, Buddhist acts. People’s occupations, of course, are a subset of such acts. If even Buddhism were able to offer world-affirming logic, Confucianism was potentially more effective because one’s occupation pertains to the realm of this world. According to the doctrines of Zhu Xi (shushi gaku 朱子学),31 1) principle (ri 理) is inherent in all human beings by nature. In other words, a human being is absolutely good in terms of one’s inborn nature (honzen no sei). As far as their innate natures are concerned, all human beings are homogeneous regardless of social attributes. On the other hand, Zhu argued 2) that the actual degree of moral character of human beings is heteroge- neous. Moreover, a person’s social position often correlates closely with an individual’s moral character—or at least it should. The classic example, of course, is that the ruler of a society should be a person of great virtue.

30 Yokoi 1977b, pp. 33–34. 31 See Shimada 1967, Tsuchida 2002. 62 kawaguchi hiroshi

Early modern Japanese scholars seem to have accepted the notion that the innate nature of humans is absolutely good, regardless of whether they were scholars of the Zhu Xi school. For instance, although Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728)32 severely criticized the doctrines of Zhu Xi, and argued that the Way of ancient sages (sennō 先王) exists outside of individuals,33 he also considered the basis of the Way to be benevolence (jin 仁), an inherent attribute of human nature.34 Sorai’s ‘benevolence’ refers to the inclination of people to be cooperative and differed from Zhu Xi’s concept of the innate nature. Nevertheless, Sorai would have agreed with most other Confucians of his day that human inborn nature is fundamentally good. Recall the previous point that the legitimacy of samurai government was grounded in military authority. Therefore, the highest ranked person of the government, the Barbarian-quelling Generalissimo (Seii tai shōgun 征夷大将軍), need not be a particularly virtuous person. This view was at odds with Zhu Xi’s view that differential moral attainment in people should correlate with social status. How did people in Edo- period Japan understand the relationship between a person’s social position and moral character?35 One approach was to sever any kind of link between a person’s level of moral attainment and that person’s social status. Another argument was to regard innate nature as all that really mattered, rejecting the idea of differential moral attainment in individuals or at least minimizing its importance. This direction was agreeable to commoners because it acknowledged their potential for virtue. Moreover, because the legitimacy of samurai government depended on military authority, not moral character, samurai need not be concerned that virtuous persons exist among commoners. Thus there was a tendency for Confucian thought in Japan to affirm the goodness of innate nature while overlooking or downplaying Zhu Xi’s idea of differing levels of moral attainment. This issue was related not only to moral character but also to ideal social action. In other words, if all segments of society are capable of becoming virtuous, their acts—including their occupations—could be seen as moral practice, as a manifestation of their innate moral nature.

32 See Maruyama 1952, Tahara 1967, Koyasu 1990. 33 Ogyū 1973a, p. 47. For the English translation, see Tucker 2006. 34 Ogyū 1976, p. 586. 35 For a discussion of human nature and social status, see Ooms 2002. economic thought concerning freedom and control 63

If so, not only samurai but also commoners of each occupational group should contribute to governing society (chikoku 治国) and bringing about a state of peace (heitenka 平天下), thereby joining and assisting in the creative powers (zōka 造化) of heaven and earth. Returning to the previously discussed matter of social usefulness of occupations and the moral character of those conducting them, at least theoretically, social utility would not inhere within a specific social function and could extend to the entire realm or even the universe. Of course, such abstract theory was for intellectuals, not ordinary people. However, this way of thinking seems to have gradually infil- trated Edo-period society. One of many examples is the logic found in a book on agriculture entitled Nōgyō zensho 農業全書 (Compendium of Agriculture).36 Its author, Miyazaki Yasusada 宮崎安貞 (1623– 1697), writes as follows: Mankind is the noblest among all things that are generated by heaven. The reason is that human beings inherit the mind of heaven and naturally have benevolent and nurturing minds. If so, before all undertakings, they should serve the way of birth and nurturing (seiyō 生養) in secular society. This way begins with cultivation, and its basis is also cultivation. . . . Farmers should work hard with both their minds and bodies.37 A mind of heaven is the true character of human beings. On this basis, Yasusada exhorts peasants to be industrious in cultivation as a socially useful occupation. Moreover, it became gradually more common for samurai to understand their duty in connection with not only military prestige but also moral standards. We have previously introduced Yamaga Sokō as a major theorist who linked samurai duty with moral behavior, but Sokō was unusual in his day. A later example is the mid-eighteenth-century magistrate (daikan 代官) Mino Masataka 蓑正高 (1687–1771),38 who wrote: Though Confucianism, Buddhism and Shintoism are different respectively, in any case the fundamental value is sincerity (makoto 誠). It is the teachings of rewarding good and punishing evil (kanzen chōaku 勧善懲悪), governing the state and effecting universal peace, and setting the people at ease (anmin 安民). Unselfishness, honesty, sympathy,

36 See Furushima 1980. 37 Miyazaki 1972, pp. 84–85. 38 See Kawaguchi 1995. 64 kawaguchi hiroshi

and mercy are all good attributes. If society is characterized by unselfishness, honesty, and avoiding harm to others, people pass peacefully through life. This is called making the will sincere seii( 誠意), rectifying the mind (seishin 正心), governing the state, and effecting universal peace . . . In a country there are generally three treasures, namely land, people, and politics. If even one of these is lacking, a country is not a country. People cannot live if there is no land because they cannot be fed if there is no land. Furthermore, a country cannot remain stable for long if politics is bad, even if land and people exist. If politics is good, it is a treasure. But if politics is bad, it is harm. . . . Life and death is one thing that seems always to be just. Is there anything to fear? . . . Death is dependent on the way of heaven (tendō 天道). . . . Persons have to be in charge of property from an ancestor and to worry about bringing up parents, wives, children and the whole family. And they must work hard at official affairs without complaining of adversity. Consequently, they have no spare time to be glad for their lives, to fear death, or to enjoy amusements indoors.39 In Mino Masataka’s view of society, politics was closely linked with a moral duty to ease the burdens of the people.

D. Conclusion

In conclusion, owing to the interdependent nature of social relations that resulted from a division of labor, it is not reasonable to view freedom and control as binary opposites. Although samurai took charge of politics and administration, economic activities were generally in the hands of commoners. Therefore, many samurai lacked sufficient experience or understanding for close regulation of economic activities. Commoners accepted samurai political administration as a matter of course, pushing back only in extreme attempts at micro-management. From the viewpoint of regional geography, most samurai, artisans, and merchants lived in cities and towns, whereas peasants inhabited villages. Urban areas and villages were, therefore, interdependent. Moreover, self-sufficiency in a comparatively narrow area with a small number of towns and villages was impossible. Nationwide interdepen- dence was the result. Confucian thought, and even some Buddhist thought, gradually came to reflect this interdependent social pattern. Japanese writers

39 Mino 1967, pp. 599, 616, 633–34. economic thought concerning freedom and control 65 altered imported Chinese ideas to fit early modern Japanese society. One key modification was to decouple links between moral attainment and social status or occupation. In the emerging Japanese view, all people could become virtuous, moral subjects. All such virtuous people should engage in wise household regulation (seika 斉家), which would further governance of the state and universal peace as outlined in the Great Learning (Daigaku). Of course, one’s actions should take the form of suitable method for one’s social station based on occupation (one’s shokubun 職分). But there were no sharp value differences in the moral character and occupation of the major component groups of society, the shimin. In Edo-period Japan, Confucianism functioned as both a theory of morality and of occupation. Of course, in practice it was often not the case that all social statuses and occupations related to one another harmoniously. However, there was no conception of inextricably confrontational relations. Indeed, the very word ‘jiyū’ in Edo-period usage usually indicated a state without stagnation. Commoners aspired to avoid stagnation in their economic actions. In cases where samurai political administration brought about stagnation in the family business of commoners, they resisted it both overtly and covertly. Such resistance was not, however, an indication of a desire to minimize the realm of politics and administration. In other words, there was no idea corresponding to ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’ in Western languages in early modern Japan. Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉 (1835–1901) made this point immediately before the Meiji Res- toration: “This is called ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’ in English. There is not yet a proper Japanese equivalent for these words.”40 Therefore, it is important for historians to avoid applying a modern conception of Edo-period society whereby ‘freedom’ and ‘control’ constituted a zero- sum game. Of course, diligent samurai administrators moved to tighten control under certain circumstances, and it is well known that some ideas to increase production and trade during the latter part of the Edo period depended on government-managed business. Yokoi Shōnan, as we have seen, advocated an interventionist economic policy. Moreover, he acknowledged the possibility of moral transformation from above to the effect of “making hundreds of thousands of wicked people

40 Fukuzawa 1958, p. 290. 66 kawaguchi hiroshi

(kanmin 奸民) into good people (ryōmin 良民).”41 But he did not deny the essential value of commoner occupations. Moreover, he criticized the samurai of his day, saying “There is the deterioration of discipline and decadence among samurai now. They have no authority over townspeople. The townspeople feel contempt for samurai.”42 We have examined the interdependent relations due to division of labor among the shimin, and we have also examined the notion of doing one’s duty as informed by Confucian theory. Both the actual economic conditions and Confucian theory legitimized the work of commoners and weakened the potential for mutual confrontation. Freedom coexisted with control, and it is not surprising that productivity increased over time under such conditions.

41 Yokoi 1977a, p. 27. 42 Yokoi 1977c, p. 837. GUIDING HORSES WITH ROTTEN REINS: ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY KINGDOM OF RYUKYU

Gregory Smits*

Thin smoke floats up into the blue skies from a grass hut Amidst the mountain peaks the smoke looks no different from wisps of white clouds The power to extract salt from sea water derives from the wondrous mechanism of the cosmic creative process (乾坤造化) – Sai On, “Salt Hut at Gabu” 我部塩居1 Sai On 蔡温 (1682–1761) most likely composed “Salt Hut at Gabu” in 1710 while touring the northern areas of Okinawa to survey economic conditions in and around the heavily forested Kunigami 国頭 region. Throughout his long government career he returned several times to this area surveying forests, asking local peasants about agricultural conditions, and implementing what would become a sophisticated and effective resource management system.2 Although the poem attends to stock aesthetic requirements in the form of mountain peaks and clouds, what really seems to strike Sai On’s sensibilities is the process of humans beneficially harnessing the creative forces of nature. Throughout his adult life, Sai On strove to improve the material basis of Ryukyuan society, in large part by devising ways to harness natural processes more effectively. Sai On was a Confucian scholar who became the Ryukyu kingdom’s most powerful politician and most prominent intellectual. In addition to the typical genres of his day—poetry, technical instructions, and history—he wrote extensively about the principles and methods of

* I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments on this essay by discussant David Howell and the other members of the Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan conference, June 26–27, 2009. 1 Yonekura 1993. 2 For a biography of Sai On, including his various titles and offices, see Smits 1999, pp. 71–80. 68 gregory smits government. In so doing, he frequently addressed economic matters both in terms of theory and practice. This paper focuses on the economic thought of Sai On, with particular attention to his essay Essentials of Governance 図治要伝 (Ch. Tuzhi yaoquan, Jp. Toji yōden, approximately 1750). I describe the main features of Sai On’s economic thought and situate it in the context of the conditions in Ryukyu, Sai On’s economic policies and pro jects, and debates at the time in China. Major themes include the extent and nature of state intervention in the economy, supply and demand, and the profit motive. My general argument is that economic prosperity was an essential and integral component of Sai On’s vision of an ideal Confucian society. Moreover, although Sai On might have been distinctive in the degree to which he emphasized the material health of society as the basis for its moral health, he was hardly unique. Indeed, Sai On seems to have been part of a broad trend toward pragmatic Confucian statecraft that was also evident in China and Japan.

A. Overview and Background

During the fourteenth century, three principalities emerged on the Island of Okinawa, and early in the fifteenth century, Shō Hashi尚巴志 (r. 1422–1439) unified all of Okinawa under his rule. For the next century and a half, the Chūzan 中山 kingdom of Okinawa fought a series of wars, gradually expanding to become a small-scale empire consisting of most of the Ryukyu Islands.3 The economic basis of this expansion was far-reaching maritime trade. Ryukyuan traders dealt with parts of South and Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and Japan. Under pressure from European traders from the middle of the sixteenth century, the kingdom entered a period of economic and military decline. The low point occurred early in the seventeenth century, for several decades immediately following Ryukyu’s defeat in 1609 by an army from Satsuma. The status of Ryukyu after 1609 has long been a contentious issue in both academic and popular writing because of its modern and contemporary significance for national identity. It is common for advocates of various positions to force modern categories onto seventeenth- or

3 For details on Ryukyuan military affairs during this time, see Smits 2010. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 69 70 gregory smits eighteenth-century Ryukyu instead of attempting to explain Ryukyu’s historical status via concepts relevant to that time. An explanation of the political status of early modern Ryukyu is beyond the scope of this paper, but there are some points we should bear in mind. First, after 1609 Satsuma ostensibly controlled Ryukyu’s foreign relations. It could do so effectively, however, only with Ryukyuan cooperation because of the need for Ryukyu to appear as a fully independent kingdom in Chinese eyes. The number of Japanese residing in Ryukyu sharply decreased after 1609, and many forms of Chinese culture flourished from the middle of the seventeenth century onward. Satsuma encouraged this general Sinification of Ryukyuan culture to facilitate diplomacy and trade between Ryukyu and China.4 In the long run, Satsuma derived some economic benefit from the Ryukyu-China trade. Until the eighteenth century, however, complications often prevented Satsuma from realizing significant profits. These complications included pirate attacks, policy changes in China, Ryukyuan passive resistance, and shogunal decrees aimed at limiting competition from Satsuma products in Japanese markets. Ryukyu’s royal government constantly “borrowed” silver from Satsuma for use in trade and diplomacy in China, and rarely paid all of it back. Infor- mation was perhaps as valuable a commodity as material products. Satsuma was able to serve as a broker of useful firsthand information about conditions in China because Ryukyu maintained regular diplomatic relations with the Qing court, and Ryukyuan envoys periodically traveled to Beijing.5 In terms of social structure, there were two broad, legally defined divisions in eighteenth-century Ryukyu: aristocrats, known by such terms as yukatchu 良人, keimochi 係持, or samurei 士, and commoners, typically known as hyakushō 百姓 in official documents. Because of the prevalence of Japanese terms in documents and the superficial resemblance to the legally defined samurai versus commoner distinction in Japan, it is easy to overlook significant differences. The Ryukyuan aristocrats were defined by possession ofkafu 家譜, house-

4 Regarding the political status of Ryukyu, see Smits 1999, pp. 15–49. For a thorough study of this issue, see Tomiyama 2004. 5 For details on Ryukyu–Satsuma trade with China, see Uehara 1981 and 1989. Regarding Ryukyu and Satsuma as information brokers, see Maehira 1990 and 1997, and Toby 1991, esp. pp. 143–44, 147–50. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 71 hold records indicating ancestors who had served as government officials. Throughout the seventeenth century, the government at Shuri gradually certified what it regarded as legitimatekafu and established an office specifically to maintain records of aristocratic households. Aristocratic status in Ryukyu was theoretically linked with government service, but by the eighteenth century this connection had become problematic because there were too few government jobs to employ all the aristocrats. Moreover, wealthy commoners began purchasing aristocratic status from a cash-starved government, thus creating a group known as shinzanshi 新参士 or kōisamurei 買い士. After 1609, aristocratic status gradually became linked with residence in urban areas. One result was that local government officials in the countryside became “commoners.” To make matters more complex, as a result of one of Sai On’s policies, destitute aristocrats began establishing their own agricultural villages, known as yaadui 宿取. Although doing the same kind of work, yaadui villages maintained rigid social separation from surrounding commoner villages. Aristocratic status in Ryukyu was subject to many gradations all the way up to the king, who was not part of a separate nobility, as the Japanese emperor was. During the eighteenth century, many elite aristocrats began to see themselves in the manner of Chinese scholar-officials. In early eighteenth-century Ryukyu, the realm of agriculture, broadly defined to include such activities as forestry, sugar and salt production, and animal husbandry, had become the most important and problematic part of the economy. Ryukyu’s tribute trade with China, although essential for political reasons, was a net loss for the government, and the sugar monopoly had become the major source of government revenue.6 Although the kingdom could no longer rely on trade as its economic foundation, throughout the seventeenth century the government made little effort to reform agriculture beyond establishing the sugar monopoly. Because of Ryukyu’s circumstances, improving the material basis of society required particular attention to agriculture. Sai On also sought to improve the material basis of society because he regarded economic security as a prerequisite for more advanced social development.

6 Sakihara 1975; Araki 1980, pp. 121–29; Tasato 1987, pp. 13–14; Kamiya 1990, p. 24; and Smits 1999, pp. 34–35. 72 gregory smits

Although Sai On was interested in a variety of agricultural endeavors, his most intense focus and his greatest accomplishment was in the realm of forestry. The following passage fromEssentials of Governance is typical of a point Sai On made repeatedly: Wooded mountains are the source of timber resources and are essential for our country. Beautiful and vast, in years past these timber resources have always been sufficient and their use was not regarded as a form of agricultural production. Those who seek prosperity for the country should not allow the grief of Ox Mountain (Niushan 牛山) to occur. This is what I call “long-term planning.”7 After a detailed study of Ryukyu’s dwindling forests that required him to reside in mountainous areas for months at a time, Sai On created and implemented a system for managing Ryukyu’s forest resources. One reason that Sai On placed such importance on forestry was that he regarded wood, literally, as the material foundation of Ryukyu as a state. Similarly Sai On undertook a massive survey of all of the kingdom’s productive land as a prerequisite for managing it more efficiently.8 Owing to such experience and knowledge, it is hardly surprising that Sai On repeatedly stressed the importance of long-term economic planning by government officials in his economic thought.

B. Sai On’s Economic Thought

This section examines Sai On’s economic thought as found inEssen- tials of Governance and other of his writings. My intention is to show that although in some respects Sai On’s ideas about society and the economy appear to be boilerplate Confucianism of no particular interest, a closer look reveals distinctive ideas well suited to Ryukyu’s situation at the time. For example, although Sai On expected government officials occasionally to intervene in economic matters, he opposed any state prohibitions that would hinder economic activity. The main reason for his opposition was an awareness of the power of demand to stimulate supply as a potential buffer against emergencies.

7 Sakihama 1984, p. 146. “Ox Mountain” refers to Mencius: “Mencius said, ‘There was a time when trees were luxuriant on Ox Mountain. As it is on the outskirts of a great metropolis, the trees are constantly lopped by axes. Is it any wonder that they are no longer fine?” Lau 1970, p. 164. 8 For a detailed explanation of Sai On’s theory of the Ryukyuan state and his implementation of the Genbun Survey, see Smits 1999, pp. 80–86, 103–12. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 73

Sai On respected market forces. Nevertheless he expected government officials, ideally, to devise ways gently to guide these forces in beneficial directions. He also expected government officials to possess a broad vision of society and its long-range goals that would harmo- nize with and transcend the allegedly more narrow visions of specific occupations and subgroups. Sai On wrote Essentials of Governance in classical Chinese. Its intended audience, therefore, was elite Ryukyuans, particularly the residents of Kumemura 久米村 who specialized in Chinese studies and were especially powerful during Sai On’s time in office. Sai On rose to power as a tutor to King Shō Kei 尚敬 (r. 1713–1751). Well aware of his own importance, by the time Sai On wrote Essentials of Governance he would have expected that elite Ryukyuan society from the king downward would pay attention to it. Sai On also compiled a lengthy set of classified quotations from Chi- nese sources, Yaowu huibian 要務彙編 (Jp. Yōmu ihen, Compilation of Essential Excerpts, 1735), for the king’s education. There is nothing particularly striking about Yaowu huibian except perhaps for its length and the breadth of sources it includes. It consists mainly of typically lofty Confucian rhetoric with an emphasis on personal moral development. In Yaowu huibian, wealth is a potential hindrance to moral or social development, and indeed one section is entitled “Keeping Wealth under Control” 節財類 (Ch. Jiecailei, Jp. Setsuzairui). This section begins with a short quote attributed to Confucius that “Governing is a matter of keeping control of wealth” and also contains a portion of the well-known exchange between Mencius and King Hui of Liang 梁惠王 regarding “profit”利 (li): If Your Majesty says, “How can I profit my state?” and the Counselors say, “How can I profit my family?” and the Gentlemen and Commoners say, “How can I profit my person?” then those above and those below will be trying to profit at the expense of one another and the state will be imperiled.9 In a brief commentary soon after this passage, Sai On posits the following general principle: “Amidst heaven and earth all people and all things have limits, which we must not seek to exceed. To do otherwise constitutes reckless misuse of our talents and an offense against

9 Sai On 1719. Passage from Lau 1970, p. 49, with minor modification. 74 gregory smits

Heaven.”10 In short, Sai On’s message to the king was to maintain strict control over his desires, a typical neo-Confucian message. In this context, the profit motive is a source of disorder, especially when manifested in the monarch. As we will see, however, Sai On’s view of the profit motive within the broader society was more nuanced than his royal anthology would suggest. Many passages in Essentials of Governance similarly suggest a stereotypical Confucian outlook. For example, Sai On likened society to the human body and stressed the importance of good circulation and the interconnected functioning of its parts. In this context he espoused a classical sense of the ideal division of labor: Those above should labor with their minds, while those below should labor with their physical strength. This is the natural principle of Heaven. . . . The enlightened ruler’s government can be viewed like the human body. The ruler is like the head, the officials are like the arms, and the common people are like the legs. Looking merely at the body’s individual parts— the head, arms, and legs—they are not the same in terms of exalted or base functions. But good government consists in putting the parts together and viewing the body as a whole, looking at it objectively and loving all of it equally, and putting benevolent government into practice widely. This is the blessing of lasting good government.11 Likening society to a human body and pointing out that all of its parts should function in harmony is boilerplate Confucianism. But this passage suggests something more, namely that good government depends on a certain type of vision. This vision is the objective clarity that comes from a lack of bias— the penetrating, integrative vision of a sage. It can occur only in those who have transcended desires associated with their social niche and who strive for the good of society as a whole. Therefore the monarch, especially, should be on guard against material desires (“profit” in the previous passage), because indulging those desires could easily lead to an unbalanced allocation of resources to the detriment of society. Similarly, major government officials must eliminate any thought of private gain if they are to possess the required sage-like capacity to grasp current trends, anticipate problems before they become manifest,

10 Sai On 1719. 11 Sakihama 1984, pp. 115, 116. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 75 react calmly to unexpected developments, and create and implement long-term plans. Guiding something as complex as an entire society, said Sai On in Essentials of Governance, was “like guiding six horses with rotten reins.”12 In light of their ideal function as sagacious, objective managers of society, government officials, like the monarch, must cultivate themselves in a way that banishes any thought of personal profit. In some contexts Sai On discussed such thoughts using the “private” (si 私) versus “public” (gong 公) dichotomy. More commonly, he relied on the term keqi 客気, which suggests the impingement of material force from without. In Sai On’s usage, keqi is always a disruptive force that causes confusion and prevents the true sagely nature that is the birth- right of humans from becoming manifest. In many contexts “rash emotions” is a reasonable translation of Sai On’s keqi. “The fundamental message of the many sagely writings,” he argued, “is surely nothing other than the necessity to eliminate rash emotions.”13 Sai On was not so naive as to think that simply by virtue of being in high office government officials were themselves morally upright. Indeed “Numerous are ministers who pursue only their personal contrivances (wei qi shen zhi ying 唯其身之営), giving no thought to prosperity and decline or the safety and danger of the country.”14 Depending on the context, Sai On used terms such as “profit” li( 利) or “contriving” ( ying 営) in both a positive and negative sense. At the level of individuals, especially social elites, possessing these qualities leads to corruption, confusion, and malfeasance. At the level of the entire society, however, it is possible for wise officials to create systems that accommodate and rely on the motivations of ordinary people and direct such energies to a beneficial outcome. Sai On frequently discussed different aspects of the self-serving tendencies of ordinary people. Although he did not celebrate such attitudes, he typically took a matter-of-fact posture toward them. For example, Sai On explained that expanding the size of the farmland a family or village cultivates does not necessarily increase production because the increased acreage reduces the need to farm intensively: “the peasants will not employ proper methods, will seek pleasurable

12 Ibid., p. 150. 13 Ibid., p. 114. 14 Ibid., p. 113. 76 gregory smits diversions, and become negligent. This is the psychological state of ordinary people.”15 More proactively, Sai On’s system of forest management relied on building into it sufficient incentives for peasants that that they would take an active role in policing forests near their villages. For example, there was a 300 kanmon 貫文 fine for any unau- thorized cutting of certain particularly valuable trees. When violators were apprehended, half of the amount of the fine went to the person reporting the offense, and the other half went into the coffers of a reforestation program.16 Sai On accepted that most people would act in ways that benefited the broader society only if they could see profit for themselves in such actions. Similarly, in his 1749 essay One Man’s Views (Hitori monogatari 独物語), written in Japanese (sōrōbun) and thus aimed at all government officials, Sai On advocated a project involving state-sponsored development of infrastructure. His plan began with construction of small harbors around Okinawa to facilitate the movement of both ships and smaller boats. If the harbors were in place, people with small boats could get into the business of transporting goods such as fire- wood, rice, and sugar. Moreover, “It is natural to expect that the boat owners would charge fares and all the occupations involved would prosper.”17 The harbor system and small boats would also make it profitable for local peasants to cultivate certain types of trees in untaxed lands that had hitherto been going to waste. In short, although Sai On seems to have held out hope that government officials could be motivated by loftier sentiments than personal profit, he was well aware that most ordinary people would act only to the extent that they profited from doing so. It was the task of government, therefore, to create systems that channeled such profit-motivated actions toward the common good. Supply and demand were of great interest to Sai On. He explained the basic principle as follows: “If money is plentiful and goods are few, the price will necessarily rise. If goods are many and money is scarce, the price will necessarily fall. This is the constant truth of mercantile activity.”18 Although here Sai On refers to the money supply, currency was not one of his major concerns. Moreover, the basic idea

15 Ibid., p. 139. 16 Smits 1999, p. 105. 17 Sakihama 1984, p. 85. 18 Ibid., p. 141. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 77 of supply and demand had become part of East Asian discourse on government and the economy, and leading into an argument with a statement like Sai On’s had become a common rhetorical procedure in Chinese arguments about economic policy.19 More interesting than a statement of the basic principle of supply and demand was Sai On’s emphasis on the power of demand to increase supply. He opposed any government regulations whose effect was to reduce the demand for important items because the result would be a decrease in supply. A decrease in supply of important commodities would reduce society’s ability to deal with sudden emergencies. In the case of grain, for example, Sai On explained in Essentials of Gover- nance that: If the general public competes to make use of the various grains, the peasants will reap a profit li( 利), and their productive power will be stimulated. If the public does not make use of the various grains, the peasants will tire of their labor and disregard their duty. This principle applies to all agricultural products, which is the reason liquor, noodles, and so forth should not be prohibited.20 Sai On was much concerned about the well-intentioned prohibitions backfiring. InOne Man’s Views, he explained the same principle—that demand must not be artificially restrained because doing so reduces supply—in nuanced detail. He began the argument by pointing out that drunkenness was a great harm to society. Prohibiting the manufacture of liquor, however, would be the wrong move on the part of the state because it inhibited the production of grain by suppressing demand. Similarly, the prohibition of luxury food items would be a counterproductive move even though frugality is a desirable social virtue: Prior to twenty years ago, even in times of famine, the manufacture of shōchū 焼酎 [a type of distilled liquor], noodles, and tofu was constantly prohibited, and more than 50,000 koku of rice, barley, wheat, and beans that could have been produced remained, in effect, buried within the earth. Nobody realized the harm such a move caused throughout the

19 For example, Hanlin academician Hui Shiqi 恵士奇 (1671–1741) began his ca. 1738 essay criticizing price ceilings with “Whenever things are plentiful, their value will be low; whenever they are scarce, their value will be high.” He then goes on to argue that this basic law cannot be overridden by government fiat. Quoted in Dunstan 2006, p. 107. 20 Sakihama 1984, p. 139. 78 gregory smits

country. . . . The farmers produce very little grain except for the amount needed to pay their taxes. Throughout the country they have come to rely on sweet potatoes for their own consumption. Therefore, when a typhoon arose twenty years ago and destroyed the sweet potato crop, a great famine swept through society. Needless to say the treasury was extremely hard pressed, and although people starved to death there was nothing that could be done to save them. . . . Because since that time the free production and sale of shōchū, noodles and tofu has been permitted, potentially 50,000 koku is now in fact produced. Even though the sweet potato crop was damaged by a recent typhoon, there was surplus grain. Although the treasury did have to distribute most of its famine relief rice, no major problem occurred. Yet at the present time I am very concerned about the possibility of future prohibitions on shōchū, noodles, and tofu.21 “Twenty years ago,” here and in a subsequent passage, is almost certainly a reference to 1728. That year Sai On became a member of the Council of Three and was thus formally in a position forcefully to promote his views. If intended as an annual (not cumulative) figure, then 50,000 koku seems high by almost any measure, because the total productivity of Ryukyu at the time was roughly 120,000 koku. It is probably best to read “50,000” here as “a large quantity.” Following the passage quoted above, Sai On continues the anti-prohibitionist argument at length, countering a variety of possible reasons prohibition advocates might offer. The efficacy of banningshōchū as a famine relief measure was also a major issue in China during Sai On’s day, as we will see. Sai On was well aware of the subtlety of his approach and the potential for different agendas to work at cross purposes. Indeed, the example of shōchū and grain production brought forth another iteration of a metaphor we have already seen: To give an impetus to the production of grain, the sale of shōchū is allowed, but we have the duty to see that the custom of drunkenness will not arise. This is why even the ancient sages characterized the way of government, which day and night we strive to carry out, as like guiding a horse using a rotten rope.22 The tension of which Sai On seems so acutely aware in this passage resembles the dilemma Jan Sýkora describes elsewhere in this volume

21 Ibid., pp. 80–81. 22 Ibid., p. 80. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 79 with respect to the Saga domain: a desire to curb unnecessary local spending on the one hand, while also developing one or more distinctive local products for sale outside the domain. In any case, Sai On’s overall pragmatic point here is that superficial attempts to change behavior through prohibitions or other ill-considered interventions by the state might produce all manner of negative consequences as they reverberate through a complex society. Even though Sai On favored beneficial state intervention in society, he opposed any policies or moves that suppressed economic activity. A tax on merchants is a good example: In the past, four or fivekanme of silver was collected as a tax on merchants, but the merchants were not able to do business freely and they gradually declined. Twenty years ago, the tax was removed, and merchants were told to work as they wanted. This move encouraged commerce, and the number of people engaged in trades increased and expanded. Indeed, along with skilled crafts, various products are made and sold, and this flourishing of trades is good, needless to say, and a treasure for society.23 Similarly, Sai On explained elsewhere in One Man’s Views that government regulations limiting the number of pig farmers had caused a shortage of pork so serious that it interfered with the ability to host Chinese investiture envoys. Lifting restrictions on pig farmers greatly increased the quantity of pork (or potential pork).24 Sai On realized that simplistic attempts by the state to regulate economic activity often caused more problems than the supposed benefit of the intervention. The job of government was gently to nudge market forces in certain directions—as if guiding a horse with a rotten rope—or to establish infrastructure to support market activities. As the previous quotation suggests, Sai On did not regard commercial activity as lowly or less noble than other occupations.25 He

23 Ibid., p. 80. 24 Ibid., p. 82. 25 The notion that Confucian scholars tended to oppose commerce is often mentioned in writings on China and Japan, but I have seen little evidence of it, at least during the early modern period. In discussing a 1728 proposal by Wang Guodong, Helen Dunstan points out that his words “seem imbued with an appreciation for commerce and material prosperity themselves. How far Wang is from the old-fashioned image of the Confucian scholar-official, with his eyes closed to the world of profit!” Dunstan 1996, p. 295. Sai On’s statement that a “flourishing of trades is good, needless to say, and a treasure for society” is of a similar tone, and this pro-commerce tone is easy to find in the writings of Confucians in both China and Japan. Other examples include 80 gregory smits repeatedly made the point that all occupations are essential for society. For example: Peasants’ work is to put their full effort into agriculture, which is the basis of the country’s material wealth. The work of craftsmen is to produce well-built items, which provides the country with useful objects. The work of merchants is to open shops and sail the seas, which circulates the material goods of a country.26 Although he expressed no animosity toward commerce, Sai On did not regard merchants as a potential resource in either formulating or executing economic policy. The main reason was that he regarded nearly all commoners as biased and shortsighted. This is not to say that government officials could not learn from commoners. On the contrary, Sai On himself spent months in rugged mountain villages consulting with local residents about agricultural matters. But the main difference was the scope of one’s vision. A villager in Kunigami might possess expert knowledge of tree diseases, but he lacked the breadth of vision needed to create a forest management system throughout the country. Although Sai On saw all the commoner occupations as equally important, government administration was potentially nobler than the work of commoners because, ideally, government officials would be free from bias and would submerge their private interests in favor of public welfare. In One Man’s Views Sai On called this ideal, sagacious vision on the part of government officials “the greater object and the greater function” (daitai-taiyō 大体大用). As we have seen, Sai On was well aware that most officials fall short of this lofty standard. Nev- ertheless he stated that as society advanced materially and as educational institutions developed—including a government university and examination system proposed by Sai On but not put into practice until after his death—officialdom would incline toward sagacity.27 For Sai On, the most important function of elite government officials was for them to use their special, unbiased insight into the whole of society to identify impending problems before these problems actu-

Dazai Shundai, Nakai Chikuzan and other Kaitokudō scholars, and Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755–1817), all of whom are mentioned later in this paper. 26 Sakihama 1984, p. 133. 27 For Sai On’s view of the establishment of schools and examinations see ibid., p. 84. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 81 ally become manifest. Then they should chart a long-term course for the country by careful planning. Here is a short explanation: Those who govern a country well must anticipate and distinguish downward or upward tendencies before they make themselves manifest. They must anticipate stability and danger before it arrives. Doing so is known as long-term planning or planning before a problem forms.28 Also connected with this process of planning was a concern with proper timing and establishing priorities: “Amidst the myriad affairs in society, one must select and deal only with those whose timing is right . . . and officials must consider the proper priority and order.”29 Most basically, those who govern should have a sage-like capacity to respond perfectly to change. To have such a capacity is to be capable of situational weighing (quan 権, sometimes better translated as “expediency”): Those who govern a country must understand the standard (jing 経) and situational weighing. That which is conducted in response to established patterns is the standard, and that which is interacted in response to changing conditions is called situational weighing.30 I have discussed Sai On’s uses of situational weighing at length elsewhere.31 Perhaps the best example of his uses of situationally appropriate, expedient measures was his enactment of the yaadui system.32 The very definition of ayukatchu was an urban dweller who worked as a government official or functionary. Maintaining even the appearance of this definition had become so difficult, however, that Sai On created incentives for unemployed yukatchu to work as farmers—nearly the precise opposite of their official social niche. Theyaadui system was ostensibly a temporary measure, but it lasted until the end of the kingdom and even, unofficially, into the twentieth century.33

28 Ibid., p. 127. 29 Ibid., p. 126. 30 Ibid., pp. 126–27. 31 Smits 1996. 32 For a detailed discussion of the yaadui system see Tasato 1980. 33 Theyaadui system was a bold measure, but it was not unique. Satsuma was home to rural samurai (gōshi 郷士), and the domain of Yonezawa began encouraging impoverished samurai households to take up cloth weaving starting in the late seventeenth century. Soon after the creation of the Ryukyuan yaadui system, the Hirosaki domain in northern Honshu resettled impoverished samurai, putting them to work in agricultural land reclamation. Regarding Yonezawa and Hirosaki, see Ravina 1999, esp. pp. 104–07, 136–41. 82 gregory smits

C. Sai On’s Thought in a Broader Context

Even though the eighteenth century was a relatively prosperous time for Ryukyu, financial problems dogged the government, and many peasants barely made a living. By the standards of neighboring countries the kingdom was not wealthy. One result was that artistic and academic activities in Ryukyu usually served concrete social or political ends. For example, the elite Kumemura community produced much Chinese poetry, some of which even circulated in Chi- na.34 Although poetry composition might well have been enjoyable for some individuals, overall it served a serious purpose: facilitating trade and diplomacy with China. Ryukyuan elites often resided in China for formal study, and mastery of poetry was an essential skill. Beyond that, Ryukyuan students tended to focus their attention on technical subjects such as sugar manufacture, surgery, other aspects of medicine or the calendar. For example, aided by financial assistance provided by the poet Sō Eki 曽益 and other Ryukyuans in Fujian, Gi Shitetsu 魏士哲 studied a surgical procedure to repair a harelip under the physician Huang Hui- you 黄会友. Returning to Ryukyu, he successfully operated on Crown Prince Shō Eki 尚益.35 The poems of Tei Junsoku程順則 were known in China, and he also wrote a book on maritime navigation, Shinan Kōgi 指南広義, for use by Ryukyuan pilots sailing between Naha and Fujian. My point in mentioning these examples is that the literary arts in Ryukyu, and the people who produced them, were interconnected with “real world” technical, political and economic issues. Sai On’s wide-ranging writings were no exception. Even essays of a philosophical nature were closely connected with advancing his political and economic agenda. The greatest influence on Sai On’s economic thought was the specific conditions in Ryukyu. It is also possible to speculate on influences from previous Confucian scholars and on debates occurring in China at approximately the same time Sai On was in office. A prominent feature of Sai On’s Confucian economic thought was the close link between morality and material prosperity. Bringing about

34 For example, a 1707 compilation of poetry from China and fourteen other countries, the “Imperial Qing Poetry Anthology” 皇清詩選 included approximately seventy poems by twenty-five Ryukyuans. See Ikemiya 1993, p. 194. 35 Uezato 1993, p. 184. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 83 the latter required close attention to laws, regulations, taxation, infrastructure projects, bureaucracies, efficient methods of farming, and the other details of government administration. In describing the career of the late Ming scholar-official Lü Kun呂坤 (1536–1618), Joanna Handlin points out a tension between “the very preoccupation with rules and regulations that characterizes statecraft” and “the official’s self-image as a moral leader.”36 We have seen that Sai On was keenly aware of the contradictory forces at work in the practice of government administration, but there is no indication in his writings of any tension between moral leadership and the particulars of governing. After all, for Sai On it was the duty of morally superior people to concern themselves precisely with such details. Lü Kun’s writings were widely available during the Qing period, both in China and Japan. It is likely that Sai On was familiar with Lü’s work, and some scholars of Ryukyu have been struck by the close resemblance between Essentials of Governance and Lü’s Groaning Words 呻吟語 (1593).37 If Sai On was not familiar with Lü’s essays, then it is a remarkable coincidence that these two scholar-officials were so similar in their views. A systematic comparison is beyond the scope of this study, but I will mention a few examples. In Heiji kanai monogatari 平時家内物語 (Ordinary Household Management, 1731), a morality and lifestyle guide that Sai On wrote for the residents of Gushichan District 具志頭間切, we find the following passage: Regarding the extensive use of fertilizer on areas of poor soil, there are specific agricultural guidelines. Fertilizer is particularly effective when mixed with urine, but in this place, though several varieties of fertilizer are used, urine is not collected in very high quantities. It is for this reason that the use of fertilizer is often ill-informed and ineffective. Fertil- izer should be prepared with much effort and thought because if only the fertilizer is well prepared, one can expect a bountiful harvest with relatively little labor.38 Similarly, though in greater detail, Lü provided specific instructions to farmers on how to use urine and excrement in fertilizing their fields.39 Regarding this matter and many others, both Lü and Sai On wrote

36 Handlin 1983, p. 105. 37 Maeda 1972, pp. 152, 197. 38 Sakihama 1984, p. 13. 39 Lü 1971, pp. 152–78. 84 gregory smits detailed explanations about how to attend efficiently to the work of daily life. Sai On also resembled Lü in emphasizing the functional importance of all members of society and thus putting less emphasis on differences in status. “There are no high and humble duties,” wrote Lü in this connection.40 Lü and Sai On were also alike regarding the use of situational weighing (quan) in unusual circumstances. As Handlin points out, “Lü condoned those who bent rules of conduct to cope with emergencies.” Like Sai On, Lü opposed taxation of market goods, officially fixed prices, and other policies that interfered with economic activity and the free exchange of goods.41 Moreover, Lü “tried to accommodate rather than conquer or escape man’s greed.”42 As we have seen, although Sai On demanded moral excellence in officials, he acknowledged the need to accommodate the self-interested motivation of ordinary people. Finally, like Sai On, Lü appreciated the complexity of society and thus the difficulty of regulating it. Even well-crafted laws, for example, produced undesirable side effects: It is indeed the case that when a law is established something harmful is born. But it is not correct to say that because something harmful is born no laws should be established. The attempt to create laws without harmful side effects is like trying to control water with a levee. . . 43. Although it is likely Lü’s writings influenced Sai On, my broader point here is that Sai On’s ideas were not radically new. Even if the precise lines of influence are unclear, Sai On certainly drew on Chinese pre- decessors. Moreover, he was probably aware of major Japanese intellectual trends and of recent debates over economic policy in China.44 The economic thought of Sai On’s Japanese contemporary Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 (1680–1747) shared some similarities (and some differences) with both Lü and Sai On. Although not a merchant himself, Dazai discussed trade in great detail and advocated it as a way to increase society’s wealth. Dazai’s basic formula for wealth enhancement was for local areas to produce what most suited their resources and environment and then, because all items had cash value in the

40 Handlin 1983, p. 128. 41 Ibid., p. 136. 42 Ibid., p. 134. 43 Hikita 1977, pp. 234–35. 44 For a discussion of Sai On’s intellectual environment and influences, see Smits 1999, pp. 76, 79–80. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 85 marketplace, to sell these locally produced items for things that were lacking.45 Sai On’s view of Ryukyu’s forestry resources was precisely the same, and both men regarded vigorous commercial activity as a boon for the economy.46 Another point of broad convergence between Sai On and scholars in Japan and China was the idea that proper statecraft involves attempts to channel the personal profit motive to socially beneficial ends. A good example would be the Kaitokudō scholars of the late eighteenth century. As Mark Ravina points out elsewhere in this volume, Nakai Chikuzan 中井竹山 (1730–1804) and many others saw the goal of statecraft as ensuring that individual pursuit of profit contributed to the common good. Clearly the notion that Confucian-oriented elites in Tokugawa Japan, or throughout East Asia, tended to despise commerce needs re-evaluation. As Ravina points out in his essay on Confucian banking, institutions like the shasō 社倉 helped legitimize money-lending even in conservative intellectual circles. More radically, the likening of social relations and the workings of society in general to the workings of the economic marketplace had been available since the late sixteenth century, if not earlier. Sai On was part of a broad trend in Confucian circles to rethink older ideas and ground them in the realities of the marketplace or the complexities of government administration.47 Scholar-officials in China during the first half of the eighteenth century debated economic policies with close attention to social conditions and market forces. In 1728, for example, Hunan governor Wang Guodong 王國棟 proposed renovating and flooding a former river course to create a mooring place for commercial boats. After pointing

45 For Dazai Shundai’s views, see Najita 1972, especially p. 834. A generation later, Kaiho Seiryō further developed the views of Shundai, arguing that everything in society was a commodity with exchange value. Seiryō’s basic insight, however, was not really new. The Chinese scholar Li Zhi李贄 (1527–1602) insisted that “all personal relations resembled market relations,” and even the relations between Confucius and his students fit this model. “Only Confucius had what the students wanted,” argued Li. See Handlin 1983, pp. 129, 131. 46 On Sai On’s idea of a surplus of wood purchasing metal, which Ryukyu lacked, see Smits 1999, pp. 80–86. 47 The scholars of the Kaitokudō merchant academy constitute another example of such trends. See Najita 1987. My only complaint about this otherwise fine study is that Najita repeatedly claims that “neo-Confucian thought” assigned merchants a lowly status without providing supporting evidence. 86 gregory smits out that this area would be a perfect, safe mooring place for many types of boats, he said: Moreover, merchant ships would gather from the four directions. If one attracts the hundred crafts, finance will be sufficient; if one causes the hundred wares to circulate, livings will be abundant. As for the people who live by their strength, carrying burdens upon their shoulder-poles, once there is merchandise to come and go and be lifted up and down, even these will gain the opportunity to take load after load, which means that the waterside will also be a hunting-ground for food and clothing for the poor.48 Although the geographical details are of course different, this proposal is otherwise almost identical in conception and tone to the system of harbors Sai On proposed in One Man’s Views. The longest discussion of economic issues inOne Man’s Views is Sai On’s arguments against government prohibition of shōchū, often called “burnt liquor” or “white liquor” by scholars writing about China. Dur- ing the 1730s and 40s there was vigorous debate about the effects of the production and consumption of burnt liquor on grain supplies in times of famine, particularly in the northern provinces. The range of views was wide, and the social context was more complex than was the case in Ryukyu. Moreover, prohibitionists carried the day in China, although Sai On, too, claimed that he had once been pressured against his will into enacting a ban on shōchū, noodles, and tofu.49 In the Chi- nese cases, opponents of a ban on burnt liquor advanced arguments similar to what Sai On put forth ten or fifteen years later. These arguments included the impossibility of thwarting the profit motive by law, the impossibility of controlling prices by fiat, and specific conditions in peasant households. Chinese writers also discussed burnt liquor as an impetus for demand, although not to the extent of Sai On’s argument that allowing such liquor to be produced actually brings forth grain hitherto shut up within the earth.50 Regular Ryukyuan embassies to Beijing kept diplomatic officials informed of major developments in Chinese politics and other matters. Given the scope and length of the Chinese debates over the banning of liquor, it is highly probable that Sai On and other Ryukyuan officials from Kumemura were aware of the Chinese situation. Sai On’s

48 Quoted in Dunstan 1996, p. 309. 49 Sakihama 1984, pp. 81–82. 50 For the details of these debates in China, see Dunstan 1996, pp. 203–45. economic thought in the 18th-century kingdom of ryukyu 87 unnamed prohibitionist opponents were almost certainly other officials from Kumemura. The issue of banning liquor was not the only conflict between Sai On and his supporters and Kumemura-based opponents.51 More broadly, during the 1720s–40s in China we find fairly widespread acceptance among officials of the profit motive as an inevitable fact of life and as something that could potentially be managed to produce socially desirable results. There was also a general trend in the direction of less state intervention and greater reliance on market forces. Blunt state intervention often came under criticism for being counterproductive, although no major Chinese officials argued for zero government intervention in economic matters. Like Sai On, the relative anti-interventionists in China often argued for subtle, low-key guidance. For example, in discussing the views of Celeng, a Manchu governor-general of Guangdong and Guanxi, Helen Dunstan points out that “Celeng did not think that local officials should do nothing when grain prices rose. . . . What they should do was make some unob- trusive ‘adjustments’ while they calmed the populace.”52 In short, we find indications of Sai On’s overall approach to economic matters, and even some of his specific policy arguments, in the memos and memo- rials of Qing officials at precisely the time that Sai On was coming into prominence in Ryukyu. Sai On’s Confucian-inspired economic thought was not unique, even if the details of its implementation were specific to Ryukyuan circumstances.

D. Conclusions

Looking broadly at his economic thought and related political agenda, we could regard Sai On as a concrete example of the balance of freedom and control that Kawaguchi Hiroshi discusses at a general level in the second chapter of this volume. In practice, Sai On tended to favor the “freedom” side of this polarity. He had no deep ideological commitment to small government or free markets in the contemporary sense of these terms. Instead, he was keenly aware of the practical limitations of heavy-handed attempts by the state to regulate the

51 There was, for example, a major dispute over moving the capital to Naha that was expressed in terms of geomancy. See Smits 1999, pp. 128–32. 52 Dunstan 2006, pp. 96–97. 88 gregory smits economy. All too often such attempts failed to work as planned and spawned additional, unexpected problems. Instead, Sai On envisioned three broad roles for the state. One was to gently nudge the economy in certain directions that sagacious prior planning had deemed desirable. The second role was to create or tweak laws and regulations so that individual profit-seeking ended up contributing to the common good. Finally, the state should use its resources to create economically beneficial infrastructure, such as the network of harbors Sai On proposed. Ultimately, the role of the state was to help promote the optimal production and circulation of wealth. Two factors that undoubtedly sharpened Sai On’s views were the poverty and small size of Ryukyu. Poverty was not only something afflicting the common people, but had become a major problem among yukatchu as well. Ryukyu’s poverty added a sense of urgency to Sai On’s political agenda, and the small size of Ryukyu generally allowed fairly rapid feedback regarding the effects of state policies and interventions. For these reasons Sai On’s location in Ryukyu was a significant component of his economic thought, even if many of the basic ideas he advocated were already available from Chinese and Japanese sources. In the conclusion of her detailed study of grain policy during the early Qianlong era, Dunstan makes the point that the economic discourse she has analyzed, though produced by Confucian-trained scholar-officials, was largely independent of the Confucian textual tradition.53 Much the same could be said of Sai On’s economic thought and the specific policies he advocated. He was grounded in general Confucian notions of state paternalism, and he used specific Confucian concepts such as situational weighing to justify some of his policies. Overall, though, Sai On was concerned with pragmatic, real-world problems, not with advancing an academic agenda or conforming to some notion of ideological purity. This sort of pragmatic Confucianism, light on ideological formulas and grounded in empirical observations, seems to have been common in China at the same time, and—albeit with less overlap between intellectuals and policy makers—in Japan as well.

53 Dunstan 2006, p. 468. THE SHIFT TO DOMESTIC SUGAR AND THE IDEOLOGY OF ‘THE NATIONAL INTEREST’

Ochiai Kō*

This chapter is an introduction to the changes caused by shifting from imported sugar to domestically produced sugar in Japan in the latter part of the Tokugawa era (1600–1867). It also assesses the historical significance of this change in policy, especially regarding the ideology of ‘the national interest’ (kokueki 国益), and how this ideology was conceived by the Tokugawa shogunate, by leaders in the domains (han 藩), and by the general populace. Kokueki shisō 国益思想, or the ideology of the national interest, refers to a system of thought that appeared around the mid eighteenth century and presaged the modern concept of the state economy. As opposed to the earlier feudal systems of economic thought from which it grew, it focused on reducing imports and actively encouraging domestic economic growth, and drew a close connection between enriching the population and enriching the state. Although modern terms like ‘citizen’ (kokumin 国民) were not yet in use, the seeds of the later idea of ‘citizen consciousness’ (kokumin ishiki 国民意識) can be discerned within this economic mindset. As will be discussed further in this paper, the rise of domestic sugar production is closely related to the formation of this conception of national interest. Sugar was regarded as a luxury item, not as an essential, as was salt. For instance, in Kōeki kokusan kō 広益国産考 (Thoughts on the Broad Benefits of National Production, 1859), Ōkura Nagatsune大蔵永常 (1768–?) said that 200 years ago sugar was only known to people of high rank. People of low rank never had a chance to see it.1

* Translation by Enoki Miyuki and adapted by Jennifer Guest. I appreciate the comments by participants of the Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan conferences held at Tübingen University (May 29–June 1, 2008) and Columbia University (June 26–27, 2009). Particular gratitude goes to Enoki Miyuki and Jennifer Guest. 1 Ōkura 1859. Ōkura was an agriculturalist in the second half of the Tokugawa era who researched and taught agricultural techniques during his travels around Japan. 90 ochiai kō

In the early Tokugawa period, sugar was a medicine that was handled by medicine wholesalers (yakushu ton’ya 薬種問屋). Sugar production was nearly nonexistent in Japan, and almost all sugar was imported from overseas; the one, but minor, exception was brown sugar production in Satsuma domain (today’s Kagoshima prefecture).2 Domestic cultivation and production of sugar began to increase in the eighteenth century, and in the first half of the nineteenth century became widespread in southwestern Honshu and in Kyushu, reflecting a shift toward domestic sugar production. Even though sugar was still a luxury item and Japan continued to import it, sugar had become widely known to the general population. The domestic sugar policy not only influenced the development of cash crops, but also changed the economic thought held by the population and even affected the foundations of the shogunal government. In the following I will show the historical significance of these events.3

A. Sakoku, Seclusion Policies, and the Domestic Sugar Policy

Two related terms are now used to describe policies of protection- ism during the Tokugawa era: sakoku 鎖国 and kaikin 海禁. Sakoku emphasizes isolation from other countries in terms of diplomatic relations and the closing of borders, whereas kaikin emphasizes prohibition against the free exchange of people and goods by sea. It is well known that the Tokugawa shogunate traded with China (Ming and Qing dynasties) and the Netherlands, as well as conducting diplomatic relations with Korea and the Ryukyu Kingdom (today’s Oki- nawa prefecture).4 In a sense, it is therefore inaccurate to say that the

He wrote the piece toward the end of his life, and the manuscripts were published in 1844 (Tenpō 天保 period), after he had died. 2 Sugar produced in the Satsuma domain was mainly brown sugar. Later, as will be discussed below, white sugar began to be produced as well, first in Sanuki province and spreading throughout the country (especially western Japan) by the Bakumatsu period. 3 This research, while incorporating information on factors like currency changes, also draws on the conclusions of my earlier book; see Ochiai 2007. 4 The expressionsakoku , referring to a government policy, conveys the erroneous idea that Japan was an isolated country, a country without international relations. But there were four ports open for trade with some countries, namely Matsumae for Ezo (today Hokkaido), Tsushima for Korea, Nagasaki for the Netherlands and China, and Satsuma for the Ryukyu Kingdom. See Arano 1992, Yamamoto 1995. the shift to domestic sugar 91 borders were closed, as sakoku might suggest. However, since various factors, like the locations where trade could take place and the countries permitted as trading partners, were all restricted, I will continue to use the term sakoku. During the time of sakoku, the main Japanese exports were gold, silver, and copper. Mines in some parts of Japan yielded gold and silver until the seventeenth century;5 in fact, in this period Japanese mines even produced enough silver to match Mexico, which was famed for its silver.6 However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Japan exported silver, gold, and copper, the supplies of these metals began to dry up.7 To cope with the scarcity of precious metals on the one hand and the expansion of economic activity on the other, the shogunate adopted two measures. One involved granting each domain the right to issue paper currency, called hansatsu 藩札. Unfortunately, the over-issue of hansatsu led to a loss of trust in paper currency; ultimately there was a rise in prices and a financial crisis. The other shogunal measure was re-coinage, which changed the content of gold or silver currencies. The precious metal content of coins had been high (87%) since the beginning of the Tokugawa era; now the gold and silver coins that had been issued in 1695 (Genroku 元禄 8) were re-coined with a purity of 57%. The profit from the reduced purity of gold and silver coins, called deme 出目, became revenue for the Tokugawa shogunate. The person who urged the re-coinage of Genroku gold and silver 元禄金銀 was Ogiwara Shigehide 荻原重秀 (1658–1713), who held the position of kanjō ginmiyaku 勘定吟味役 (official in the finance and tax department)8 and was responsible for currency reforms at that time. The re-coinage made up for a deficit in the shogunal finances,

5 Silver and gold were continuously mined, and some of the mines actually had new boosts in output after 1800. Marco Polo had earlier included a highly colored account of Japan as an ‘El Dorado’ of unparalleled mineral wealth in his travel record; see Polo 1971. 6 Mexico began to produce silver in the mid sixteenth century, and by the mid nineteenth century Mexican silver was in use as an international currency. See Flynn and Giráldez 2002. 7 See Kobata 1966. 8 Ogiwara Shigehide 荻原重秀 (1658–1713) became kanjō kumigashira 勘定組頭 in 1678; he was promoted to kanjō ginmiyaku in 1687 and then to kanjōbugyō 勘定奉行 (superintendent of the finance and tax department). In 1696, he lost his position because of conflict with Arai Hakuseki新井白石 (1657–1725). 92 ochiai kō with a profit of over 4,500,000ryō 両.9 Ogiwara Shigehide’s request of the people to accept the new currency at face value, like re-coined coins and hansatsu, rather than the old coins whose metal content set its value, should be appreciated. Unfortunately, these measures led to inflation. Circulation of currency became stagnant because people saved the old coins and few were exchanged for the re-coined coins (Gresham’s Law). Although the Tokugawa shogunate ordered the use of hansatsu to cease in order to actively help the circulation of the new coins, this measure proved ineffective. As a consequence, the shogunate issued new coins, called Shōtoku kingin 正徳金銀, in which the content of gold and silver was the same as before re-coinage. The re-coinage government ordinance by Ogiwara Shigehide was condemned alongside the Shōrui awaremi no rei 生類憐みの令 (a protection law for animals, deserted children, et al. by Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 徳川綱吉 [1641–1680], who was the fifth shogun in the Tokugawa era) as one of the worst shogunal laws ever passed.10 After the failure of these measures, the next attempt to slow the flow of precious metals out of the country involved a move toward domestic production of goods that were currently being imported. During the 250 years from the first half of the seventeenth century until Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858)11 arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century, the most representative goods targeted in this way for increased domestic production were raw silk and sugar. The amount of imported raw silk increased because the demand for it by famous silk fabric producers, such as Nishijin in Kyōto, increased after the sixteenth century. Raw silk was a very important import item, especially in the seventeenth century, with groups of raw silk traders called itowappu nakama 糸割符仲間 being granted the exclusive right

9 A ryō is a gold coin. At that time a ryō could buy the amount of rice consumed by a person in a year. 10 This law was generally criticized for a perceived privileging of animals over people. However, recent research has reevaluated the law as expressing a general concern with preserving life, emphasizing its protection for travelers and abandoned children. Similarly, Shigehide’s policy has also recently been viewed more favorably. See Tsu- kamoto 1983. In English, see Bodart-Bailey 2006. 11 Matthew C. Perry was the commodore of the U.S. Navy at the end of the Toku- gawa era who demanded the opening of Japan. the shift to domestic sugar 93 for raw silk trade in certain areas.12 However, raw silk production was later developed throughout Japan, and when the economy of Japan opened to the West in the middle of the nineteenth century raw silk actually became an important export product. Although sugar production never was so high that it became an export product, there was also a shift to domestic sugar production in many areas. Sugar was one of three important sources of revenue for the Takamatsu 高松 domain in Sanuki 讃岐 (today Kagawa prefecture), where sugar, salt, and cotton were such important sources of revenue in the middle of the eighteenth century that they were called Sanuki sanpaku 讃岐三白 (Sanuki’s three whites).13 Sugar was imported by Chinese merchants and by the VOC, the Dutch East India Company. The main types of import sugar were brown, white, rock candy, and the highest quality sugar called sanbonzatō 三盆砂糖.14 Sanbonzatō, which was increasingly imported in the second half of the Tokugawa era, was a chunk of snow-white crys- tals of highly refined white sugar.Sanbonzatō , also called wasanbon 和三盆, was an ingredient of confectionary. Popular consumption of white and brown sugar gradually increased over the course of the Tokugawa era, but rock candy and sanbonzatō remained such luxuries that only people of the samurai class or court nobles could use them for gifts. White sugar remained the main type imported from China throughout the Tokugawa era, although the amount imported decreased during the middle period of the era. Brown sugar was imported until the first half of the era, but imports of high-grade, refined sugar, like rock candy or sanbonzatō, increased gradually beginning in the second half of the Tokugawa era. From 1651 until 1682, the amount of brown sugar imported from China exceeded 600,000 kg. It was between 660,000 kg and 1,000,000 kg

12 Itowappu nakama were groups of special raw silk traders who had the exclusive right to trade it and who could set its price in Sakai (in today’s Osaka prefecture), Osaka, Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Edo (today’s Tokyo). See Nakada 1984. 13 According to Ichihara, sugar from Sanuki province became famous in the 1810s. Ichihara 1960, pp. 56–72. 14 Brown sugar was unrefined, dark-brown sugar, a chunk of sugar cane juice boiled down by evaporation. White sugar was refined sugar made from sugar cane juice. Rock candy was a big chunk of crystallized sugar made by slow evaporation of good quality sugar dissolved in water. 94 ochiai kō

1516Table 1. Sugar imports from China, arranged by year (unit: kg)15 Year Brown White Rock Sanbon Sugar16 Total sugar sugar candy zatō 1641 60,240 572,310 94,260 726,810 1646 54,600 210,000 15,600 132,600 412,800 1651 158,790 113,280 10,050 282,120 1656 342,990 809,286 2,940 1,155,216 1660 227,436 274,036 20,970 522,441 1663 275,286 905,232 27,492 1,208,010 1682 661,574 689,632 109,466 1,460,672 1725 99,180 244,020 8,220 351,420 1735 57,020 556,204 25,848 639,072 1740 201,238 889,907 177,296 38,400 1,306,841 1745 42,828 544,272 145,590 732,690 1750 176,490 246,660 57,564 720 481,434 1755 36,300 443,614 49,680 31,020 560,613 1760 3,420 606,234 35,220 644,874 1765 1,801,480 256,178 8,832 2,066,489 1770 1,341,322 243,358 79,560 1,664,240 1775 1,041,124 108,475 4,264 1,153,863 1780 694,050 141,476 835,525 1785 340,740 175,541 297,600 813,880 1790 1,382,880 196,414 114,000 1,693,294 1794 965,628 70,585 1,036,213 1799 73,841 499,380 52,776 117,276 743,273 1804 712,164 40,693 214,674 967,530 1809 314,790 14,031 74,580 403,401 1814 26,989 232,758 259,746 1819 0 81,900 867,810949,710 1823 48,000 126,840 435,600 610,440 1829 213,298 395,357 608,655

in almost every year from 1650 to 1682, for about thirty years. After the import of luxury items was prohibited in 1683, brown sugar import decreased and there was no import of brown sugar in some years after the Kyōhō 享保 period (1716–1736).17 The amount of imported white sugar first exceeded 570,000 kg in 1641. The amount grew to over 800,000 kg after 1655, and it was over 700,000 kg constantly from 1739 on. By 1765 it was 1,800,000 kg, and similarly large amounts

15 Data are drawn from Nagazumi 1987. 1 kin 斤 is converted to 600 g. 16 The data refer to sources where sugar was not specified in kind. 17 Ochiai 2001. the shift to domestic sugar 95 were imported for a while. But later the amounts began to fluctuate a great deal, so that in some years the amount imported was not large. In the Bunka 文化 period (1804–1818) imports decreased until they were around 400,000 kg. The amount of imported rock candy rarely exceeded 100,000 kg until 1739. At that point it began to consistently exceed 100,000 kg, and in 1763 it was 660,000 kg. Then it started to decrease to less than 100,000 kg in many years.18 What were the characteristics of the VOC sugar imports? According to Yao Keisuke, the VOC shipped sugar, which was mainly produced in Java, to Japan or Persia. The sugar unloaded from the Dutch ships was sent to the Dutch factory at Deshima in Nagasaki. The amount of imported white sugar was over 500,000 kg in almost every year

Table 2. Amounts of sugar imported each year by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) (unit: kg)18 Year White sugar Rock candy 1689 22,006 22,044 1694 475,600 50,249 1697 393,483 98,826 1702 603,502 85,069 1707 537,641 101,917 1712 557,779 67,581 1717 314,818 12,442 1722 191,832 6,855 1726 325,594 22,500 1737 517,749 0 1742 318,608 933 1747 900,813 1,359 1752 810,134 919 1757 774,700 45,104 1759 1,147,700 90,194 1761 810,200 44,591 1765 337,511 813 1774 400,583 917 1778 495,165 1,019 1785 340,053 844 1790 361,842 0 1795 405,009 0 1798 112,500 0

18 The data are from Yao 1996. 1 Dutch pound equals 450 g. 96 ochiai kō from 1702 to 1712. Then, after a temporary decrease, it again increased and was over 500,000 kg in almost every year between 1749 and 1761. In 1759 the amount of white sugar imported was especially high: 1,147,700 kg. It decreased to under 400,000 kg in 1765. The amount of imported rock candy was over 50,000 kg in many years from the Genroku period (1688–1704) to 1712, and it was the largest in those years. After that the amount was generally less than 10,000 kg. The trends in the amount of sugar imported correlated with the regulations for control of imports. For example, the two laws Sadamedaka shihō 定高仕法 of 1685 and Shōtoku shinrei 正徳新例 of 1715 specifically controlled imports from the Netherlands and Qing China. Because of the controls, the idea of shifting from imports to domestic production was conceived. It probably caused a decrease in the amount of sugar imported in the Kansei period (1789–1801). Brown sugar imports decreased in the second half of the Tokugawa era, indicating that the shift to domestic brown sugar production was successful. As mentioned above, brown sugar had been produced in the Satsuma domain. In 1777, a policy was established ordering that sugar cane be planted on three islands within the domain, Amami-Ōshima, Kikaijima, and Tokunoshima to enhance revenues. Sugar produced there would be bought by the domain under a policy called sōkaiiresei 惣買入制. The Satsuma government provided all basic living supplies to these islands, supporting the nascent industry; sugar from the sugar cane grown on the islands was ultimately also shipped to Osaka and sold there. Under this policy, domestic brown sugar production became feasible. The amount of white sugar imported did not decrease by much, though various sources suggest that domestic production was nevertheless increasing. Brown and white sugar were sometimes used as gifts to sick people from those in the community; documents called mimaichō 見舞帳, which record these gifts, show that sugar consumption began to increase, largely in the second half of the Tokugawa era. In addition, a report in the book titled Hōkoku igen 報国以言, which Kudō Heisuke 工藤平助 (1734–1800) submitted during the Tenmei period (1781–1788) to Tanuma Okitsugu (1719–1788) (who will be introduced later), said “One third of sugar consumption is for sweets, two thirds is for general food.”19 Sugar consumption increased a great

19 See Kudō 1968, p. 490. Kudō Heisuke (1734–1800) was an economic thinker who was interested in matters pertaining to naval defense and trade. For an analysis, see Gramlich-Oka in this volume. the shift to domestic sugar 97 deal, although the amount of imported white sugar had not changed between the first and the second half of the era. This indicates that the amount of white sugar produced domestically was higher than the amount imported. It is clear that although sugar was a classic example of an import good in the early Tokugawa period, in the late Tokugawa period a shift to domestic production of sugar was carried out with considerable success. The following section will describe how this shift was achieved.

B. The Process of the Shift to Domestic Sugar

Research on how to establish domestic sugar production by planting sugar cane, called kansha (甘蔗), was initiated in the first half of the Tokugawa era. A book on agriculture called Nōgyō zensho 農業全書 (first published in 1697)20 stated clearly that The project, planting sugar cane, if widely implemented, will stop the drain of Japanese wealth overseas (moshi sono jutsu o tsukushite, sejō ni ōku tsukuraba, midari ni wakoku no zai o gaikoku e tsuiyashi torarezaru hitotsu no tasuke taru beshi 若其術を尽して、世上に多く作らば、みだりに和国の財を外国へ費しとられざる一つの助たるべし).21 Thus the purpose of sugar production was to prevent bullion outflow. Moreover, already at this early stage it was proposed that this enterprise be managed from above: The task of spreading this initiative widely throughout the provinces, if not carried out by domain lords, will be difficult to implement quickly; the efforts of the populace alone will not sufficeKore ( o shokoku ni hiroku tsukuru koto wa, kokugun no shu ni arazuba, sumiyaka ni okonawarega- takaru beshi, shojin no chikara ni wa oyobigatakaran 是を諸国に広く作る事ハ、国郡の主にあらずは、速やかに行はれがたかるべし、庶人の力には及びがたからん).22 These excerpts from theNōgyō zensho indicate that domestic sugar production was seen from early on as a vital initiative for halting the

20 See Miyazaki 1972. Miyazaki Yasusada (1623–1697) was an agriculturalist born in Hiroshima. While traveling he coached people in techniques for agricultural improvement. 21 Miyazaki 1972, p. 208. 22 Miyazaki 1972, p. 208. 98 ochiai kō drain on precious metals and promoting economic growth, a view that certain reform-minded politicians put into practice. Eighth shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune 徳川吉宗 (1684–1751),23 well known as a drastic reformer who initiated the Kyōhō reforms, and Tanuma Okit- sugu 田沼意次 (1719–1788),24 the tenth shogun’s grand chamberlain (sobayōnin 側用人), who took the helm of the government, both advanced the production of sugar. Yoshimune’s policies were intended to stop the drain on gold and silver currencies as well as copper, while Tanuma Okitsugu’s policies were aimed at stimulating the economy. Although their fundamental reasons for promoting domestic sugar production were different, they both perceived the necessity of producing domestic sugar as the basis of their policies. In practice, herbalists, called honzōgakusha 本草学者, were leaders in growing sugar cane and producing sugar. Herbalists researched and studied natural products from animals, plants, and minerals, and hence had a deep knowledge of medical science. Herbalists and medical doctors planted sugar cane; sugar was thought to be a painkiller, and it was treated as a medicine and marketed by wholesale medicine stores. The Kyōhō period (1716–1736) saw great advances in the investigation of medicinal herbs and the spread of that knowledge. For example, the herbalist Niwa Seihaku 丹羽正伯 (1691–1756)25 grew medicinal herbs at a place called Takidaino 滝台野 in Koganeno 小金野 (today in Chiba prefecture) in 1722. He traveled throughout Japan to research naturally growing medicinal herbs in various environments. Based on his success growing Asiatic ginseng in a garden at one of the shogun’s residences, Fukiage enchū 吹上園中, he expanded the cultivation of Asiatic ginseng to many other locations. The plan for production of

23 Tokugawa Yoshimune, called the rice shogun, carried out various reforms, such as reform of disorganized government offices and of the government itself, reform of the economy by promotion of the development of new rice fields, by strict economies, etc., and currency reform. 24 Tanuma Okitsugu carried out political reform and made use of merchants in his reforms. He thought there was a limitation to reforming the economy by raising “land tax by rice” (nengu 年貢) from farmers, so he gave permission to certain merchants to form monopolies, called kabunakama 株仲間, from which he requested a business tax; this was one of his major accomplishments. About Tanuma in English, see Hall 1955. 25 Niwa Seihaku was an herbalist who has been credited with growing Asiatic ginseng. He set up sites for exchanging medicine in order to facilitate distribution. the shift to domestic sugar 99 domestic sugar grew from the trend toward domestic production of such commodities as Asiatic ginseng. Tamura Ransui 田村藍水 (1718–1776),26 who was a doctor and an herbalist, researched sugar cultivation. He was originally known as an expert on Asiatic ginseng; at age twenty, he received samples of Asi- atic ginseng from Yoshimune, and he then succeeded in growing it, writing about the process in a book titled Ninjinfu 人参譜 in 1737. He and his student, Hiraga Gennai 平賀源内 (1728–1779),27 who will be mentioned later, held an exhibition of medical products to raise public awareness;28 not only did he thus possess deep knowledge as an herbalist and medical doctor, but he also contributed to the spread of medical products, including Asiatic ginseng. The task of growing sugar cane was also entrusted to Tamura Ran- sui. After he learned how to grow it through many trials, he recom- mended Ikegami Tarōzaemon 池上太郎左衛門 (1718–1798), the headman (nanushi 名主) of a village in the vicinity of Edo, to spread the knowledge of sugar cane cultivation. In addition, according to Tokugawa jikki 徳川実紀 (A History of the Tokugawa Shogunate),29 Lord Shimazu Tsugutoyo 島津継豊 (1702–1760) of the Satsuma domain, where brown sugar was already produced, was ordered in 1727 to plant and grow sugar cane in one of the shogun’s residences, a place called Edojō hamagoten Nishinomaru yashiki 江戸城浜御殿、西の丸屋敷, with a view toward promoting the domestic sugar industry. Based on this success, sugar cane cultivation began to spread from Satsuma to Suruga (today in Shizuoka prefecture), Nagasaki, and elsewhere.

26 See Fujita 1986. Tamura Ransui was a general practitioner who became a doctor for the Tokugawa shogunate in 1763. 27 Hiraga Gennai was an herbalist, a physicist, and an author of popular stories who also experimented with various new technologies. 28 The exhibition of medical products by leader Tamura Ransui, organized by Hiraga Gennai, was held at Yushima in Edo in 1757. 29 Tokugawa jikki 徳川実紀 (A History of the Tokugawa Shogunate) was a record of the shogun’s acts from the first to the tenth Tokugawa shogun, and also includes information on the policies, administration, and personal management of the shogunate (Tokugawa jikki 1998–1999). The eleventh to fifteenth shoguns are cov- ered in Zoku Tokugawa jikki 続徳川実紀 (A Continued History of the Tokugawa Shogunate). 100 ochiai kō

C. Ikegami Tarōzaemon, the Central Figure in the Growth and Cultivation of Sugar Cane and the Success of Domestic Sugar Production

Ikegami Tarōzaemon was born in Daishikawaramura 大師河原村 village in Musashinokuni 武蔵国 (today’s Kanagawa prefecture in the Kantō area) in 1718. He worked on the sugar project from 1761 until he died in 1798, researching methods for the cultivation of sugar cane as well as techniques for the refinement of brown and white sugar; later in his life he was also able to successfully produce rock candy. Tarōzaemon dedicated his whole life to spreading sugar cultivation and production.30 Tarōzaemon had a vast social network, including people who were related to his position as a village head of Daishikawaramura. He was closely associated with Tanuma Okitsugu through their common interest in haikai poetry. Because of his close association with Tanuma Okitsugu, Tarōzaemon preferred private appeals to him, such as behind-the-scenes consensus-building to get support for his petitions, rather than submitting public petitions. For instance, when he submitted petitions for the production of sugar to a government office (daikansho 代官所), he also informed Tanuma that he had submitted a petition for sugar production, written in another paper, to one of the Tokugawa shogunate’s offices, but it was difficult to see that it would be approved. Confiding his concerns to Tanuma, he indirectly sought his help. He sent a letter of thanks when his request for a location to grow sugar cane was granted: “The land was given to me the other day, so I received a place to plant sugar cane. Thank you very much.”31 One commonly heard evaluation of Tanuma Okitsugu’s politics is that he acted from self-interest, promoting influential merchants and local land-holders into government service because of the gifts he received from them rather than employing samurai of the supposed ruling class. However, this kind of judgment is not unbiased; it was generally put forward by samurai who had lost their positions in the government. Tanuma Okitsugu needs to be reassessed as a politician who not only sought to find new business, such as new cash crops and

30 See Matsuyoshi 1955; Sengoku 1976a, 1976b, 1979, and 1986; and Mochizuki 2003–2004. 31 See Ikegamike monjo 1994, p. 143. the shift to domestic sugar 101 industries, but also actively adopted ideas from local areas through the influence of highly motivated people like Ikegami Tarōzaemon. Tarōzaemon received technical support for promoting the cultivation of products such as sugar cane because of his relationships with people who were doctors or herbalists, like Tamura Ransui and Hiraga Gennai. The relationship between Gennai and Tarōzaemon started from an introduction by Tamura Ransui; since the beach of Daishikawaramura village, where Tarōzaemon worked as an official, was a good place to produce the sodium sulfate needed for another of Gennai’s research projects, their relationship was one of mutual benefit. In this way, Tarōzaemon relied on figures like Tamura Ransui and Hiraga Gennai for technical help, and on Tanuma Okitsugu’s government for practical political support. Tarōzaemon started to be interested in the cultivation of sugar cane when, after the success of the initial trial planting at Edojō Fukiage, it was planted in a place called Musashinoshinden. Tarōzaemon knew one of the local officials, Isono Masatake磯野政武（ 1716–1776),32 who was a member of his haikai poetry group. Isono Masatake gave Tarōzaemon six sugar cane seedlings, which comprised his first planting trial. After various attempts he found a way to grow sugar cane effectively. Following the success of his research, he asked to be allowed to introduce sugar cane to all of Japan, and based on the dedication he had already shown, he obtained Ransui’s endorsement. Tarōzaemon tried to spread sugar cane cultivation by distributing sugar cane seedlings and giving lectures on growing techniques to people who wanted to plant it. The charge for his lectures was twobu , a half of one ryō. The small charge shows his actions were not for personal profit. Tarōzaemon initiated the cultivation of sugar cane both through his travels and at home. He traveled on three different occasions, mainly to visit some of the towns and villages along some of the major highways through shogunal lands in the present-day Kantō and Kansai areas. However, Tarōzaemon initiated the cultivation of sugar cane not only on shogunal land, but also wherever other domains were interested in sugar production. He gave lectures at his home to people who came from all over Japan, especially those from two domains that were interested in sugar, the Takamatsu domain in Sanuki province, where white sugar production flourished in the second half of

32 Isono Masatake was a secretary for the eighth shogun, Tokugawa Yoshimune. 102 ochiai kō the Tokugawa era (as mentioned above), and the Kishū domain (in today’s Wakayama prefecture). The cultivation of sugar cane spread to many parts of Japan. There were 152 people from 131 villages, mainly in western Japan, who heard his lectures. Tarōzaemon was instrumental in the growth of sugar cane cultivation and in the success of domestic sugar production, throwing all his energy into the venture without considering his private interests. His actions were based on the ideology of ‘the national interest,’ and he insisted that the success of domestic sugar would be in ‘the national interest’ (kokueki).33 Tarōzaemon started to use the expression ‘the national interest’ in the middle of the eighteenth century. This shows that he had a progressive attitude, because at that time it was a very uncommon expression. The words began to be used often in many Japanese documents from the second half of the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. It is worth asking, then, what was his idea of ‘the national interest’?

D. The Ideology of ‘The National Interest’ According to Ikegami Tarōzaemon

In 1768, Ikegami Tarōzaemon finally obtained government permission to initiate people into the secrets of sugar cane cultivation. He had applied more than three years earlier, but his application was refused. When he first applied he used the expressiontamesuji 為筋 “a beneficial method.” Also, he proposed to charge initiates tworyō each, and some of this money would go toward the development of new rice fields, which was the project of most interest to him at that time. Apparently, permission was refused because he included his own private interests in this way. In the successful 1768 application, the expression he used changed from tamesuji to kokueki 国益 “the national interest,” and he set the initiation fee as two bu. That is to say, Ikegami Tarōzaemon had come to understand sugar production not as a simple matter of producing goods and exchanging them for money by which individual farmers could become rich, but as a more meaningful process by which the

33 See Ikegamike monjo 1994. the shift to domestic sugar 103 importation of sugar and the drain of wealth overseas could be prevented in the interests of the state. How then did the shift to domestic sugar influence the economic system? What was the purpose of planting sugar cane? The shift to domestic sugar was first given encouragement in the middle of the eighteenth century, the same period when the term ‘national interest’ was starting to be used in Japan. As previously stated, sugar was a luxury item in Japan in the beginning of the eighteenth century and later became more common; during this period, sugar consumption rose sharply. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, use of sugar as gifts for sick people increased; as discussed above, in the early Edo period sugar was sold as medicine, but later specialized shops were introduced that sold only sugar. Examples like these illustrate the spread of sugar throughout the country. The rising demand for imported sugar fed the drain of gold and silver overseas, which was a serious problem for the shogunate. Domestic sugar cultivation was one measure designed to alleviate this problem.34 Once domestic sugar cultivation had become widespread, however, it took on broader economic implications. Under feudalism, the basis of the tenant-farmer system was that farmers had to pay their “land tax in rice” (nengu 年貢). Farmers usually grew only five main cereal crops—rice, wheat, foxtail millet, beans, and barnyard millet—that were necessary for their livelihood. Under a village head, land was recorded by a cadastral survey, and land taxes in rice were exacted from the farmers. In Osaka or Edo a village head exchanged for money the rice collected from all parts of his lands, except for the tax, as a revenue source for the domain. Kokudaka 石高 (the volume of the specified rice yields) was used to show the value of the fiefdom lands under the Tokugawa shogunate. The rice that was paid as land tax was based on historical economic behavior. Simply put, the tax on the farmers required growing only the five main cereals, whereas the task of the leader lord of the domain was the delivery of the land tax in rice to the shogunal government. Successful delivery of the land tax

34 For similar reasons, the shogunate placed restrictions on raw silk imports in 1685, ordering that any extra consumption be made up with Japanese-produced silk. On the other hand, as the silk-weaving industry began to grow in various parts of the country, the steady demand for raw silk was guaranteed. In this way it came about that raw silk production flourished throughout Japan, such that when trade opened up in the late nineteenth century raw silk actually became an export good. 104 ochiai kō was evidence that the leader governed farmers well. In contrast to this, cultivation of sugar cane in fields where the five main cereals had been planted was meant to encourage the growing of more beneficial cash crops. Thus, a system different from the feudal system of the Toku- gawa shogunate and domains was devised. That system was based on the ideology of ‘the national interest,’ under which tax revenues were not for the benefit of the leaders, but for the benefit of the nation. This type of thinking is also linked to the shift in farmers’ consciousness, from making the submission of yearly tax the sole focus of their lives to planting crops for sale and working to increase their personal wealth. This concept of enriching the population tami( tomeba kuni tomu 民富めば国富む, lit. “if the people grow rich, the nation will become rich”), led to the ideology of ‘the national interest.’ In practice, as seen in the Kōeki kokusankō in the discussion above, growing sugar cane produced a harvest worth three times more than growing rice on a similar scale; through growing sugar cane, the burden of paying yearly tax therefore became lighter, and fewer farmers were unable to make the deadline. How did Ikegami Tarōzaemon come across the ideology of ‘the national interest’? Narushima Dōchiku 成島道筑 (1689–1729),35 Ike- gami’s teacher of waka (a form of classical poetry), introduced his ideas to Tarōzaemon in his writings. According to Dōchiku: While we keep the laws of China and the teachings of India, incorporating them into our customs, we lack a deep understanding of how to use our natural resources.36 Dōchiku also suggested that “making effective use of water and soil” (mizu ya tsuchi o yūkō ni riyō suru 水や土を有効に利用する) would be to the benefit of the whole country tenka( no tame 天下の為). Fol- lowing Dōchiku, Tarōzaemon’s idea for industrial training changed to ‘the national interest.’ Thus the ideology changed from a feudalistic policy, which required farmers to pay land tax from the growth of the five main cereals, to a policy based on the idea of national interest (becoming a rich nation), which encouraged farmers to grow cash

35 Narushima Dōchiku 成島道筑 (1689–1729) was a Confucian scholar for the Tokugawa shogunate under the eighth shogun, Tokugawa Yoshimune. 36 See Ikegamike monjo 1994. the shift to domestic sugar 105 crops, like sugar cane or rapeseed, that were suited to regional natural features or soils.37 Tarōzaemon was in fact interested in rice field development before he started to make positive efforts for the sugar project. His rice field development project was unique, because he was interested in making new rice fields not on public land in villages, but on reclaimed land on the foreshore, called kaichū shinden kaihatsu 海中新田開発. The sand that accumulated on the bottom of rivers was used for reclamation of the foreshore, with Japanese lawn grass or Japanese pampas grass planted to prepare new rice fields. The new rice fields he named giden 義田, literally “fields of virtue.” The name suggested an underlying idea of disinterested private benefit, which was based on public benefit. His concept of public benefit involved working in the interests of local people and power-holders alike, not conceiving of profit as simply private gain or the gain of specific figures in power. As opposed to the conception of public policy under the feudal regime in past eras, which was constructed around non-scientific acts like praying for rain during drought and which took the populations of specific areas (like the people of a domain under a particular lord) as its target, this new idea of public benefit was broader in scope and involved concrete, practical responses to particular problems. The foreshore reclamation project, through expansion of state lands, not only gave jobs to unemployed people inside and outside the village but also gave people a place to live in the village. Tarōzaemon conceived of the project as bringing aid to the people (tami no osukui 民の救い) and profit to the state (tenka daiichi no on’eki 天下第一の御益).38 From this foreshore reclamation project, he had already conceived the basis of the ideology of ‘the national interest.’ To return to our main topic, the cultivation of sugar cane spread throughout Japan. The harvest from fields used to grow sugar, compared with rice harvested from the same area, could be sold for three times as much. The successful spread of sugar cultivation, however, did not benefit the feudal system of the shogunate. A book of essays

37 Another, similar example is Korean ginseng; originally, both sugar and ginseng were treated as medicines, but amid growing concerns about the overseas flow of precious metals caused by ginseng imports, ginseng too became an important cash crop. 38 See Ikegamike monjo 1994. 106 ochiai kō titled Shisō zasshiki 祠曹雑識, published in the closing days of the Tokugawa era, complained that: The people of today tend toward luxury in their food and drink; though they value sugar and look on salt as if it were mud, without realizing that it is like rice; one can live without sugar to the end of one’s days, but one should not go without salt even for a single day (ima no hito wa inshoku shashi ni nagare, tada satō o tattonde shio o miru koto deido no gotoku, sono beikoku to onajiki o shirazu, satō wa shūnen nakutomo yamu beku, shio wa ichinichi mo nakaru bekarazu 今ノ人ハ飲食奢侈ニ流レ、唯砂糖ヲ貴テ塩ヲ見ル事泥土ノ如ク、其米穀ト同シキヲ知ラス、砂糖ハ終年ナクトモヤムヘク、塩ハ一日モナカルヘカラス).39 Alarmed that so many farmers were abandoning rice cultivation and switching to cash crops like sugar cane, the Tokugawa shogunate sent out official notices to strictly prohibit sugar cultivation on lands with cadastral surveys.40 As a result of the distribution system for handling sugar, some medicine wholesalers had specialized as sugar wholesalers (satō ton’ya 砂糖問屋), who then became independent of medicine wholesalers. Because sugar was delivered to Edo from Osaka, the cost of transportation increased. Also, as sugar cane cultivation spread in Japan it had a negative impact on the sales of brown sugar by the Satsuma domain, where the production of brown sugar had started before the general spread of sugar cane cultivation; the Satsuma domain therefore submitted petitions to the Tokugawa shogunate to stop the publishing of books or materials on the methods of sugar production.41 On the one hand, domestic sugar production was necessary to halt the drain of precious metals overseas, and in that sense was in the national interest. On the other hand, however, it also became part of a trend toward growing more profitable crops based on local conditions, resulting in the widespread production of cash crops in place of the five essential grains. This was a way of thinking that conflicted on a fundamental level with the land tax that formed the basis of the feudal order. The shift to domestic sugar, which had begun as a solution to economic problems facing the shogunate, ultimately caused the

39 See Shisō zasshiki 1981, p. 550. 40 See “Shinmachimura nanushi Yoshinoke monjo Bunka 14 nen Goyōdomechō” 1985. 41 See “Hansei kaikaku ni kakaru ken shorui oyobi Zusho Shōzaemon Hirosato rireki gairyaku.” Cited in Oka 1983, p. 292. the shift to domestic sugar 107 decline of the land tax system based on the five main cereals and thus undermined the foundations of the feudal regime.

E. Conclusion

The shift to domestic sugar, which was actively promoted from the middle of the eighteenth century onward, was a measure to prevent the overseas drain of gold, silver, and copper. In the early part of the Tokugawa era, output from the gold and silver mines in some parts of Japan was dwindling, with implications for overseas trade. After this national problem became evident in the second half of the seventeenth century, the shift to domestic sugar production was initiated in the beginning of the eighteenth century as an experimental attempt to decrease imports. Sugar production then spread to many areas in Japan in the middle of the eighteenth century. The policy of shifting to domestic sugar production was applied as a means to promote industry; with this policy, the national interest became established not as an abstract ideal of government, but rather as a practical mindset based on the idea of systematically enriching the state. The ideology of ‘the national interest’ that appeared in the mid eighteenth century, broadly speaking, was the theoretical basis that provided justification for the scientific progress that began with medical science in the seventeenth century and for the development of cash and goods economies. These developments also brought about important changes in the public policies of domain governments; for example, methods for coping with drought shifted from the religious and non-scientific to more practical and scientific responses, as with Satsuma domain’s promotion of drought-resistant crops like sweet potato, sugar cane, and cotton. Similarly, from the nineteenth century onward, policies for promoting industry were implemented as a means to rebuild the economies of various domains. The ideology of ‘the national interest’ thus began as the logical underpinning of the Tokugawa regime, but ultimately caused changes that radically shook the feudal order of the shogunate. How did the ideology of ‘the national interest’ arise? According to Fujita Teiichirō 藤田貞一郎,42 it arose during the process of aban-

42 See Fujita 1966 and 1998. 108 ochiai kō doning the ideal of a static balance, by which was meant a stable economy fostered by benevolent government (suggested by the term osukui お救い, “aid”) and making the transition to the ideal of an active balance, based on an aggressive economy and with shokusan 殖産 (the promotion of industry to increase production and become rich) at its core. In other words, the concept of ‘the national interest’ arose from the shift from the perspective of kimi tomeba tami tomu 君富メバ民富ム (“when the nation becomes rich, the people become rich”) to tami tomeba kimi tomu 民富メバ君富ム (“when the people become rich, the nation becomes rich”).43 On the other hand, Shōda Ken’ichirō 正田健一郎 has suggested that the ideology of ‘the national interest’ was the unified symbol of four ideologies, the view of human beings, politics, society, and the economy, which were established in the closing years of the Tokugawa era, though the ideas came from the middle of the Tokugawa era.44 The ideology of ‘the national interest’ was also the symbol of the economic policy for the people, whose political goal was ‘national enrichment’ or fukoku 富国, the slogan of modern Japan. In his research, Fujita Teiichirō claims that ‘national interest,’ which came from economists of each clan government, was accepted between the Hōreki and Tenmei periods (1751–1789). He says that ‘the national interest’ became an ingrained ideology when the clan governments made some policies independent of the Tokugawa shogunate system. Those policies were for self-sufficient production from the land and for economic independence from the central market of exchange in Osaka. Fujita described ‘the national interest’ as arising through the development of mercantilism by strong and powerful clans, based on ‘the clan’s interests.’ Because some powerful clans had independent economic systems, they could be thought of as nations. Western influences were also a big factor in changing ‘the domain’s interest’ to ‘the national interest as a whole.’ Fujita focuses on ‘the national interest’ in the areas of ryōkoku 領国, areas that were under the control of the Tokugawa shogunate but also had a specific leader, like ahanshu , a domain lord. He also mentions the relationship between ‘the national interest’ and the policy of shifting to domestic production of crops like sugar cane. According

43 See Fujita 1966. 44 See Shōda 1992. the shift to domestic sugar 109 to Yabuta Yutaka 藪田貫 there were also references to ‘the national interest’ in documents in the areas called hiryōkoku 非領国, which were under the control of the Tokugawa shogunate but which did not have a specific lord and were not thought of as an independent nation.45 For example, there was awareness of ‘the national interest’ in hiryōkoku areas like the Kinai area (Settsuno kuni, Kawauchino kuni [both today’s Osaka prefecture], Izumino kuni [today’s Osaka and Wakayama prefecture], Yamatono kuni [today’s Nara prefecture], and Ōmino kuni [today’s Shiga prefecture]). As Yabuta’s conclusion is different from that of Fujita and others, Yabuta recommends a review of their research. Consider, for example, the cultivation of sugar cane. In 1767 Ike- gami Tarōzaemon claimed that sugar cane cultivation in Osaka, which was a hiryōkoku area, was done in ‘the national interest.’ There were also expressions of ‘the national interest’ in what is today the Kantō area, which was a hiryōkoku area from the 1750s on (Hōreki period). The expression of ‘the national interest’ was influenced by the shogunal policy of shifting to domestic sugar. In this way, the idea of ‘the national interest’ was generated not only in clans, which had their own government but were under the government of the Tokugawa shogunate, but also in the hiryōkoku, which did not have their own government and were under the government of the Tokugawa shogunate. The idea of ‘the national interest’ was generated in both areas between the Hōreki and Tenmei periods (1751–1789). Ikegami Tarōzaemon was a practical thinker who consciously carried out a concrete plan of action in order to realize the national interest. When a principle for guiding people’s lives, society, or worldview is discovered, it is important to examine the thinkers of the time in which it appeared. But even if an idea were novel and original, it would be difficult to implement in its historical setting unless concrete social conditions were met. Therefore, considering the role of practical thinkers who were aware of ideological developments and were also in a position to respond to the needs of the times by promoting ideologies based on practical concerns is one key to truly understanding an era. When thinking of a figure like Ikegami Tarōzaemon, there are two angles from which to approach the economic ideology he promoted.

45 See Yabuta 2000. 110 ochiai kō

One is to consider that the idea of national interest provided the moral support for Tarōzaemon to act, and the other is to examine the source of his idea of national interest. The concept of national interest theorized by Fujita involved promotion of industry to increase production and become rich at the domain level, providing the ideological underpinnings of ‘domain nationalism,’ specific feelings of loyalty and support for a domain; but Ikegami Tarōzaemon lived in a village in the Kantō hiryōkoku area, which did not belong to any domain. Rather, his idea of national interest grew out of a situation where control over land was fragmented and it was difficult to impose uniform economic policies as in a domain. It is therefore important to note that Tarōzaemon nevertheless understood the importance of ‘the national interest,’ suggesting its broader impact beyond the domain system and on a popular level. A DOMAIN DOCTOR AND SHOGUNAL POLICIES

Bettina Gramlich-Oka*

Is there a way to reconstruct the decision-making underlying shogunal economic policies, or the economic thought behind these policies?1 Since written sources do not illustrate the processes and reasoning leading up to these policies, circumvention may be a strategy for approaching the many closed gates of Edo castle. Recently, sociologist Eiko Ikegami has suggested that we view social networks as ‘enclave publics,’ which combine and integrate the pleasure quarters, the theater, private academies, and poetry salons.2 In my research I take this concept further and argue that these public enclaves, or networks, were also the sites of political and economic discussion and, by extension, of political and economic thought. Public spheres are closely connected to the notion of public politics, as Charles Tilly has recently demonstrated.3 To analyze and understand this politics, Tilly advocates the investigation of ‘trust networks,’ which consist of “lively, changeable

* The research for this article is part of the project “Money and Monetary Policies of the Shogunate and Domains in Late Tokugawa Japan: Discourses and Practices,” funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG). I presented my research on four occasions and would like to express my gratitude to David Howell, Mark Metzler, Gregory Smits, the participants in our two conferences, and the members of the Keizai shisōshi kenkyūkai (July 2008) and of the Early Modern Japan Network meeting held in conjunction with the AAS (Chicago, March 2009), who all helped in clarifying my arguments and improving the various stages of this article. Special thanks also to the anonymous reader, whose input was most valuable, and to Jennifer Guest. Shortcomings, of course, remain my own. 1 For some insight in English into the workings of political decision-making, see Anna Beerens’s translation of interviews of shogunal officials and ladies-in-waiting in the Bakumatsu period (Beerens 2000; 2002; 2008). For a listing of offices and functions in the administration of the shogunate, see Sasama 1999. 2 Ikegami 2005. For recent discussion of the public sphere, see also Berry 2006, or for a narrower focus, see Hirano 2004. In Japanese, see Miyachi Masato and his analysis of fūsetsudome 風説留 (records of correspondence), which create a space for public opinion close to Habermas’s public sphere (Miyachi 1993). For earlier research pointing in the same direction, see also Iwasaki 1984, Harootunian 1989. 3 Charles Tilly divided public politics into contentious politics (visible interactions among the rulers, government and political actors) and noncontentious politics (most political interaction, tax collection, censuses, military service, and diffusion of political information). Tilly 2005, pp. 4–5. 112 bettina gramlich-oka political actors.”4 Tilly suggests focusing on transactions among persons rather than on the cultural consciousness of the actors.5 In this chapter I focus on one political actor, Kudō Heisuke 工藤平助 (1734– 1800), his network, and the significance of his network in shogunal politics. By highlighting Heisuke’s writings in light of concurrent shogunal politics, we gain insight into the interactions among officials, the government and political actors.6 In the fifth month of 1784, perhaps the most powerful man in the shogunate, Tanuma Okitsugu 田沼意次 (1719–1788), took up a proposal called Akaezo fūsetsu kō 赤蝦夷風説考 (Thoughts on Rumors about Kamchatka, 1781–1783).7 In the proposal, the author, Heisuke, advocates the development and colonization of Ezo 蝦夷 or Ezochi 蝦夷地 (today Hokkaido),8 which would indeed change the future of the northern frontier.9 The Sendai domain physician Heisuke expressed his economic thought further in another account concerning foreign trade in Nagasaki, in which he calls for immediate reform. By examining Heisuke’s political and economic ideas of ‘national’ political and economic boundaries as they are exposed in the proposals, the actors with whom he shared them and associated political practices, I call

4 Ibid., p. 12. 5 Ibid., p. 26. 6 Anna Beerens delivers an important study on the prosopography of scholars who lived roughly during the same time period as my main protagonist. Her innovative approach for the Japanese case showcases 173 intellectuals and their relations analyzed via their biographical data (Beerens 2006). One recent study that combines Pierre Bourdieu with network studies for an analysis of Ōtsuki Gentaku is Jackson 2004. 7 Usually the account is translated as “Report on the Land of the Red Ainu (i.e. Russia),” but from the source’s content it becomes clear that Heisuke identifies Akaezo 赤蝦夷 (Land of the Red Barbarians) as Kamchatka. See also the title of the second volume, called “Personal Thoughts on Kamchatka and Russia,” where Heisuke clearly distinguishes between the land and its conqueror. Kudō 1969, p. 288. Another indication is the manuscript called Kamusukatoka-ki held by the former Matsudaira Sadanobu collection, today Tenri library (Satō 1980, pp. 125–26). For a brief introduction to the variety of terminology for Russia and Russians, see Yamashita 2003, p. 681. For a short recent discussion in English, see Ikuta 2008, pp. 14–15. Soon, the term akaezo 赤蝦夷 (red barbarians), akahito 赤人 (red people), or okuezo 奥蝦夷 (remote barbarians) would become euphemisms for Russians. 8 In the sources under investigation there is no real distinction between the two terms. Heisuke refers to “Ezo,” which includes today’s Hokkaido, as well as the Kuril Islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Uruppu (Kudō 1969, p. 285). 9 The events are recorded in a collection of documents regarding the shogunate’s policies toward the Ainu between 1784 and 1790, called Ezochi ikken 蝦夷地一件 (Land of the Ainu Affair). There were originally seven volumes, but only five are preserved (Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 278). For an overview, see Terui 2001, Gramlich-Oka 2006. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 113 attention to the particular site of the network in which shogunal policies during the Tanuma period were formed. This chapter is a preliminary analysis of what we can learn about shogunal policies and political economy when we consider the brief encounters of political decision-makers that are often overlooked in grand narratives. From here I hope to locate the ideological underpinning of these policies. Thereby we can develop a more nuanced and complex picture of the late Tokugawa period, in which shogunal policies from the 1780s proved especially influential. Scholars agree that the intellectual culture of the 1750s through the 1780s was rich and diverse. The usual explanation for this diversity is the particular liberal political culture under the administration of Tanuma Okitsugu. In economic terms, the “Tanuma period” is marked by new economic and political endeavors (in domains and in the shogunate) often framed within the rationale of the vague term kokueki 国益 (‘prosperity to the country’ or ‘national interest’), which had strong ramifications in the development of nationalism in the Meiji period.10 Where opinions differ is in the description of the man Tanuma: he was either a man of low morals—bribery and corruption are his middle names—or a visionary, a forerunner of modernity.11 The divergent descriptions of his character are based largely on the lack of personal writings by Tanuma himself. To better understand the political vision among the higher ranks of the shogunal administration during Tanuma’s reign as Senior Councilor (rōjū 老中), I will examine shogunal foreign trade policies and the question of Ezo. In the social networks of high-ranking officials and scholars, intellectual culture and shogunal policies come together; this suggests a new notion of political economy whereby kokueki rhetoric legitimated a new political economy of international affairs.

10 See Roberts 1998 for an excellent study on kokueki thought in the Tosa domain, Ravina 1999 in three domains, and Ochiai in this volume for kokueki thought in shogunal territory. 11 For biographies of Tanuma Okitsugu, see Tokutomi 1983a, Ōishi 1991, Tsuji 1991, Fujita 2007, and in English, Hall 1955. I usually address the historical figures by their personal names (Kudō Heisuke = Heisuke), with the exception of Tanuma and Ishigaya, where it is more conventional to call them by their family name (Tanuma Okitsugu = Tanuma). 114 bettina gramlich-oka

A. Kudō Heisuke and his Network

Among historians, Kudō Heisuke was once known for his expertise on foreign affairs. More recently he has become known as the father of Tadano Makuzu 只野真葛 (1763–1825), one of the few female scholars of the Tokugawa period who sought to make her political and economic opinions known to a broader audience.12 It is also through Makuzu that we know more about Heisuke and his life. In her autobiographical work Mukashibanashi むかしばなし (Sto- ries from the Past, 1811–1812) Makuzu offers a glowing portrayal of her father.13 Heisuke was tall (6 shaku, about 180 cm), and his language and conduct were that of a samurai.14 He was as handsome as an actor, as strong as a country samurai, and a connoisseur of fine cuisine, the theater, and exotic gadgets. Heisuke served the Date 伊達 family of Sendai 仙台 in Edo as their physician. Born into the Nagai 長井 household, he was adopted in his early teens by Kudō Jōan An’yo 工藤丈庵安世 (d. 1755/2/20).15 The ex-samurai-turned-physician Jōan had found employment with the retired lord of Sendai, Date Yoshimura 伊達吉村 (1680–1751, r. 1703–1743).16 This appointment raised Jōan’s status from a town physician to that of an attendant physician (gokinju 御近習) with permanent duties in Edo (Edo-jōzume 江戸定詰), and a generous stipend of 300 koku.17 When Jōan died, Heisuke inherited his position and his thriving medical practice.18 For the most part, unemployed former samurai like Jōan took up the medical profession. Such a move typically halted a decline in social status rather than rais-

12 For a biography and analysis of Tadano Makuzu, see Gramlich-Oka 2006. 13 For a more detailed biography of Kudō Heisuke, see Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapters 1 and 2. 14 Shichinomiya 1977, p. 108. 15 Adoption was a common practice in both samurai and non-samurai families during the Tokugawa period, which evidently offered ample room for choosing one’s lineage. Heisuke and Makuzu both identified themselves with the Nagai family, who were once castle owners, perhaps since the Kudō ancestors were only retainers. Pater- nal heredity may have been one of the decisive factors, but I assume there are many instances that can prove the opposite. For a discussion of some responses by Japanese Confucian scholars to Chinese norms of family rites, see Nakai 2002, pp. 258–91. About Kudō Jōan, see Sendai jinmei daijisho 1933, p. 328. 16 Yoshimura was the fifth lord of the Date clan, and known for his reforms in the domain. He retired in 1743 because of illness. Jōan started in his service at the end of 1746. Tadano 1994b, p. 25. 17 One koku of rice was supposed to feed one man for one year. 18 See Juihyōrin 1764, leaf 16, recto. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 115 ing one’s social standing. Heisuke’s status and position, too, were thus in a grey area of the status system. He was an attendant physician to a lord,19 which was more prestigious than belonging to the general administration (omote 表), but he was also a lay physician who treated other patients.20 Owing to his financial independence, Heisuke could offer his highly regarded residence in Tsukiji築地 (today Chūō-ku 中央区) as a site where people from the highest to the lowest standing could meet freely without jeopardizing or compromising their own positions.21 After following in his father’s footsteps, Heisuke became deeply involved in the politics of the Sendai domain.22 One interest that Heisuke pursued, and for which he is known today, was keizai 経済, a term that applied to both political and economic affairs, but that is commonly translated today as economics or economy.23 His status as a physician gave Heisuke access to gates that would otherwise have been closed, which is why his lord Date Shigemura asked Heisuke to make inquiries in his stead.24 At the height of his career in the 1770s,

19 Heisuke probably first served lord Date Munemura伊達宗村 (1718–1756, r. 1743–1756) but soon thereafter served Munemura’s son and heir Date Shigemura 伊達重村 (1742–1796, r. 1756–1790) with the same stipend of 300 koku (Nakayama 1936, p. 47). 20 The divide between lay physicians and physicians in the employ of domain lords or the shogunate is pertinent. The position of a physician who was employed hereditarily by a domain was more prestigious than that of a lay doctor (machi isha 町医者), but could be less profitable since it was based on a fixed income. 21 Heisuke was certainly not an exception. Indeed, a comparison with other physicians’ houses used for social gatherings would be valuable. For example, Heisuke’s acquaintance and shogunate physician Katsuragawa Hoshū was known as one of the eighteen connoisseurs (tsū 通) of his time, and his younger brother Morishima Chūryō 森島中良 (1756–1810) became a writer of popular fiction (gesaku 戯作). See Imaizumi 1963, p. 258; and Winkel 2004. 22 Heisuke was first called Shūan周庵 , as was the custom due to the priest-like status and appearance of a doctor. Later, when his lord asked him to become a layper- son, he was called Heisuke, according to Makuzu. His official namemei ( 名) is Kyūkei 球卿, his penname (ji 字) Genrin 元琳, and his posthumous name (gō 号) is Shūan, according to Suzuki 1994, p. 544. Heisuke’s common name (tsūshō 通称) was Bankō. Suzuki spells it 万光. Heisuke also signed one book with Bankō 万幸, and his school name was Bankōdō 晩功堂. 23 Politics and economics were one and the same, as I will discuss in more detail below. The work by Heisuke’s teacher Aoki Kon’yō (Aoki 1992) lets me apply the term for Heisuke, even though he did not use the term in the few of his writings that have been transmitted to us. Furthermore, Hayashi Shihei, with whom Heisuke was particularly close, used the term keizai in Hayashi 1978, preface. 24 This assumption is not unfounded since Shigemura once wrote that in order to improve his court rank, “he would have to buy off” Senior Councilors Matsu- 116 bettina gramlich-oka

Heisuke participated regularly in the financial policies of the domain, first as the head of the pages (koshōgashira 小姓頭), then in the post of a deirishi 出入司, a unique office maintained by the Sendai domain that dealt with its financial affairs.25 Although we do not know much about Heisuke’s medical or scholarly apprenticeship, his daughter Makuzu provides in Mukashibanashi a dynamic description of a group of people surrounding him who were engaged in scholarship, poetry, and the arts at the peak of Heisuke’s career.26 His network consisted of fellow physicians, Dutch interpreters, and scholars such as Ōtsuki Gentaku 大槻玄沢 (1757–1827), Kat- suragawa Hoshū 桂川甫周 (1751–1809), Maeno Ryōtaku 前野良沢 (1723–1803),27 Yoshio Kōgyū 良雄耕牛 (1724–1800),28 and Hayashi Shihei 林子平 (1738–1793). It also included poets, such as Murata Harumi 村田春海 (1746–1811), and domain lords and high officials, such as the daimyo of the Izumo Matsue 出雲松江 domain, Matsu- daira Harusato 松平治郷 (1751–1818), the lord of the Mikawa Kariya domain 三河刈谷藩, Doi Toshinori 土井利徳 (1748–1813, r. 1767– 1787),29 and Junior Councilor (wakadoshiyori 若年寄) Hotta Masaatsu 堀田正敦 (1755–1832). In short, Heisuke associated with the kind of men who appear in history books.30 Makuzu gives us snapshots of what these men were interested in when they came to the Kudō house. Though restraining herself from appearing to have excessive interest in political matters, she often amuses her reader with anecdotes. Some of the visitors were interested in newly imported Dutch books, such as

daira Takechika 松平武元 (1714?–1779) and Tanuma Okitsugu. Cited by Tsuji 1991, p. 461. 25 Sendai jimbutsu shi 1909, p. 63. See also Satō 1984, p. 30. About the office of deirishi (also called shutsunyūtsukai), see, for instance, the contemporary source by the Sendai retainer Tamamushi Jūzō 玉虫十蔵 (1744–1802), Tamamushi 1992, pp. 233–34. 26 For details, see Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapter 2. 27 Maeno Ryōtaku, who studied at the age of forty-seven under Aoki Kon’yō just before the latter died, may have met Heisuke at their teacher’s house, or perhaps through Yoshio Kōgyū. 28 The friendship between Heisuke and Yoshio Kōgyū must have developed during the latter’s repeated sojourns in Edo with the Dutch delegates. Kōgyū was also known as Kōzaemon 幸左衛門, or Kōsaku 幸作, as Makuzu calls him. Kōgyū went to Edo about twenty times beginning in 1748. 29 Doi Toshinori was the third son of Date Munemura, and half-brother to Hotta Masaatsu and current lord Shigemura. He instructed Heisuke’s son in the tea ceremony (Tadano 1994b, p. 17). 30 About Heisuke’s network, see Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapters 1 and 2. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 117 the Cruydt-Boeck by Dodonaeus,31 or Adam Kulmus’s Ontleedkundige Tafelen (Anatomical Tables);32 on the other hand, Matsudaira Haru- sato visited with his favorite onnagata 女形 (woman impersonator) to enjoy Heisuke’s culinary expertise and the cypress bath on the second floor of the Kudō residence.33 Despite Makuzu’s attempt to demonstrate the personal and intimate relationship between Heisuke and his network, she also reveals in her narrative that these men shared common interests in economic reforms and foreign trade, both hot topics at the time. Her own political treatise Hitori kangae (1817–1818), too, is a testament to the economic and political debates that occurred in her household.34 The Kudō household was the site of a network of politically powerful men. Matsudaira Harusato, Doi Toshinori, and Hotta Masaatsu are all known for implementing economic reforms in their domains.35 Hotta Masaatsu, in his position as Junior Councilor, was also directly involved in shogunal policies through the 1780s along with Senior Councilor Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信 (1759–1828).36 In fact, Heisuke’s network consisted of members close to both Tanuma Okit- sugu and Sadanobu, giving us a concrete sign that the political rivalry

31 Tadano 1994b, pp. 46–47. The Cruydt-Boeck (first edition 1554) by Rembert Dodoens (1516/7–1585) remained a standard botany reference for many centuries. See Van de Walle 2001. 32 At least two copies of this work are known to have existed in late-eighteenth- century Edo. One belonged to Maeno Ryōtaku. 33 See Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapters 1 and 2, for details. 34 Tadano 1994a. For an English translation, see Goodwin 2001a and 2001b. 35 For instance, although Doi Toshinori was not too successful, his friend Matsu- daira Harusato, together with his chief retainer, restored domain finances from the late 1760s onward through drastic cuts, higher taxes, and innovations in specialized cultivation (ginseng, silk, paper, and wax). Hotta Masaatsu was not a daimyo, but when his half-brother’s son Date Chikamune 伊達周宗 (1796–1812) ascended as the lord of the Sendai domain as an infant, Masaatsu represented him. The close relations among the group are also reflected in the establishment of stronger kin relations. In 1764 Toshinori adopted his half-brother, the fifteen-year-old son of Hayashi Shihei’s 林子平 (1738–1793) older sister Kiyo キヨ and Sendai lord Date Munemura. The second child of this union, a daughter, became the wife of Matsudaira Harusato in 1774. See Shinpen Hayashi Shihei zenshū, vol. 5, Appendix. 36 Makuzu does not mention Sadanobu as being a direct acquaintance of Heisuke, yet her sister was in service to his niece, and after her mistress died she moved to the grounds of the Matsudaira mansion in Reiganjima, whence Sadanobu had retired. This connection explains why some of Makuzu’s manuscripts are listed in Sadanobu’s catalogue (see the entries in Matsudaira 2005, p. 275). Also, Ōta Nanpo borrowed a manuscript called Kyūryū setsu 求竜説 (Theory on Dragons, fall of 1787) by Sadanobu on 1787/10/20 from Kuwabara Takatomo 桑原隆朝 (1744–1810), Heisuke’s brother- in-law. The text is reproduced in Ōta 1985–1990, vol. 12, pp. 366–67. 118 bettina gramlich-oka between these two powerful personalities did not necessarily extend to their acquaintances or political allies. At the core of discussion among the members of Heisuke’s network lay issues of economic development, a path Tanuma chose, and maritime defense, Sadanobu’s choice.37 Heisuke’s close friend, Hayashi Shihei, whose relationship to him is often described as that of a younger brother, was concerned with the defense of Japan.38 Heisuke’s involvement in the publication of Shihei’s Kaikoku heidan 海国兵談 (Discussion on the Military Problems of a Maritime Nation, 1784–1786), for which he also provided a preface, reflects their common concern.39 Heisuke’s interest in economic affairs at large was stimulated by his teacher Aoki Kon’yō 青木昆陽 (1698–1769), who offered various reform plans to daimyo and the shogunate.40 Makuzu mentions Kon’yō’s attention to economic issues like peasant taxes and foreign trade. Kon’yō, for example, took an interest in the shogunal policy during the 1760s to counteract the increasing dependence on

37 Dazai Shundai in chapter 5 of Dazai 1972a had already explained that wealth and a strong army ( fukoku kyōhei 富国強兵) are components of ideal governance. “If food and wealth is provided, there is no scarcity for the army.” Translation by Kirby 1908, p. 119. Original in Watanabe 1971, p. 168. 38 Matsudaira Sadanobu and Hayashi Shihei met in 1789 before Sadanobu began his defense plans. Both Sadanobu and Shihei certainly shared their preference for the slogan bunbu 文武 (letters and swords or civil and military), a term that Shihei mentions in his introduction to Kaikoku heidan at least ten times. Shihei’s punishment with house arrest due to his work Kaikoku heidan was not because of its content but because it was published without official permission. About the publication of Kaikoku heidan and Shihei’s punishment, see Hayashi 1978, pp. 79–80; Kornicki 2001, p. 341. 39 See Heisuke’s preface to Hayashi 1978. See Ōtomo 1943, p. 141, for the abbrevi- ated kakikudashi version of the kanbun text. 40 Aoki Kon’yō wrote on agricultural improvements, such as introducing the sweet potato. Kon’yō’s treatise Banshokō 蕃薯考 (Thoughts on the Sweet Potato, 1735), which offers a dietary alternative for times of famine, later brought him the name Master Sweet-potato (Kansho-sensei 甘藷先生). He also wrote widely circulating works on the various currencies: Kokka kinginsenpu 国家金銀銭譜 (Record of Cur- rencies in Our Country, 1746) (reproduced in Aoki 1978, pp. 349–432), and Senpei ryakki 銭幣略記 (Short Record of Currencies, 1739) (Aoki 1914). Further, Kon’yō delivered to the shogunate Aoki Kon’yō mōshiage shotsuki 青木昆陽申上書付 (Aoki Kon’yō’s Notes, 1746), which takes up current economic issues. According to Makuzu, Kon’yō was asked to give advice in regard to the new land distribution in Sodegasaki after the retired lord Date Yoshimura, Kudō Jōan’s first employer, passed away in 1751. The peasants were worried about how the land would be declared, either as upper or as lower fields, which were taxed differently (Tadano 1994b, p. 112). The above-mentioned Keizai san’yō also has a lengthy discussion of the various types of fields and taxing as recorded in Chinese sources, among many other topics. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 119 the import of ginseng root. Heisuke took up the same issue in one of his proposals discussed below.41 Heisuke submitted his proposals to the highest ranks of the government. Even though these proposals reflect Heisuke’s own ideas, they were in part an outcome of the political space that his social circle generated. It was in this space that the function of the shogunate as a central government responsible for the economic and political well- being of the realm was defined. Today only a few of Heisuke’s writings have been preserved. Lost is Heisuke’s memo, Kankenroku 管見録 (Records of Insignificant Opin- ions), to his lord, which contained his views on reforms in the domain.42 One medical treatise is preserved,43 and a few of his poems appear in Makuzu’s collection.44 Heisuke’s active participation in contemporary events is attested to in an early account by Daikokuya Kōdayū 大黒屋光太夫 (1751–1828), the famous castaway who returned in 1792 in the company of naval lieutenant Adam Laxman (1766–1796) of Impe- rial Russia.45 Heisuke’s student Maita Gentan 米田元丹 (no dates), who was at the time a physician in the employ of his native domain of Matsumae 松前, was one of the first to interview Kōdayū before he was taken to Edo. Gentan drafted a report for his teacher in Edo, which Heisuke quickly supplemented with some of his own thoughts and circulated among his friends.46

41 Tadano 1994b, pp. 111–12. About the ginseng monopoly (the za were actually divided in three: Korean, Chinese, and domestic ginseng monopolies), see Koyama 1996, pp. 141–86, in particular, pp. 157–58. 42 Nakayama 1936, p. 33. 43 Heisuke’s medical book is called Kyūon sode goyomi 救瘟袖暦. The book, of which one still extant copy was in the possession of Mishima Kageo, describes a “warm disease therapy” that Heisuke taught his students. The book was written in 1797 (Kansei 9) but was published in 1815, long after Heisuke’s death in 1800. 44 Gramlich-Oka 2006, p. 119. 45 Maita 2003. The text is included in Ōta Nanpo’s collection Enkai ibun 沿海異聞 (Strange News from the Shores, completed in 1804), with commentary by Shiba Kōkan (Ōta 1985–90, vol. 19, p. 669). 46 Heisuke’s text is called Kudō Bankō monjo 工藤万幸聞書 (Kudō Bankō’s report, 1793) and can be found in Daikokuya Kōdayū shiryōshū, vol. 2, adjacent to Maita Gentan’s Matsumae han-i Maita Gentan monogatari no omomuki. See also Kudō 1996. TheKokusho sōmokuroku cites Heisuke’s text as being read Kudō Mayuki kikigaki (Number 2412580). Usually Katsuragawa Hoshū is remembered as the first scholar to interview Kōdayū, which resulted in his written record of this interview: Hyōmin goran no ki 漂民御覧之記 (Report of the Castaway’s Observations, 1793). Later, Hoshū delivered to the shogunate his official report, calledHokusa bunryaku 北槎聞略 (Brief Account of the Northern Drift, 1794). For a detailed discussion of Hoshū’s texts, see Winkel 2004, chapter 3. 120 bettina gramlich-oka

Heisuke’s two main works that deal with shogunal politics are extant. He finished the two-part workAkaezo fūsetsu kō in the first month of 1783 (Tenmei 3). One part, written earlier, in 1781, and called “Per- sonal Thoughts on Akaezo (Kamchatka) and Oroshiya (Russia),”47 serves as an appendix for the “interested reader.”48 Heisuke argued there that the geopolitical reality in the north was quite different from what had been in general assumed.49 He concluded that Oroshiya ヲロシヤ even had various trading posts on its border with China, and had conquered and colonized the territories from the northwest to the east of Ezo; a dreadful thought.50 In 1783 he added another part, called “Rumors about Akaezo [Kamchatka]” (Akaezo fūsetsu no koto 赤蝦夷風説の事). Compared to the earlier account, which gave primarily geographical, historical, and cultural details on Kamchatka and Oroshiya, the new volume displays in more detail Heisuke’s concrete political and economic ideas.51 At the same time that he wrote the preface to Akaezo fūsetsu kō, Heisuke signed another proposal, Hōkoku igen 報国以言 (Loyal Utterances, 1783/1/11).52 In this piece Heisuke took up Nagasaki. The trade situation in Nagasaki was deplorable and in need of an expansive overhaul. Owing to his network, with vast connections and informants from the Matsumae domain and Nagasaki, Heisuke was able to draw a theoretical map without ever going to Ezo or Nagasaki.53 The pieces

47 Also called Kamusasuka, Oroshiya shikō no koto カムサスカ､ヲロシヤ私考の事. See Kudō 1969, p. 288. 48 Kudō 1969, p. 279. The text may have found additional distribution under its other title: Sangoku tsūran hoi 三国通覧補遺 (Addendum to Hayashi Shihei’s An Illustrated Survey of the Three Countries). It was apparently attached to Hayashi Shi- hei’s Sangoku tsūran zusetsu 三国通覧図説 (An Illustrated Survey of the Three Coun- tries, written in 1785–1786). About Shihei’s annotated maps, which discuss Korea, Ryukyu, the Bonin Islands, and in particular Ezo, see the detailed discussion by Win- kel 2004, pp. 235–50. 49 Kudō 1969, pp. 280–81. 50 Ibid., pp. 291–92. Heisuke repeats this later, when he lists all the conquered lands. He asserts that Russia is indeed pushing eastward (p. 296). 51 Kudō 1969, pp. 280–88. 52 Kudō 1968, pp. 485–504 (without a preface). The only known manuscript (including the preface) is held by Kōga city. For a discussion of the text, see Yajima 2003. 53 Even though it is often claimed that Heisuke went to Nagasaki to study Dutch- style medicine, this is a myth. The person to blame for this myth is probably the scholar Honda Toshiaki, who wrote that Heisuke, while sojourning in Nagasaki, spoke to the Dutch opperhoofd (Jap. kapitan) Arend Willem Feith (1747–1781) on a regular basis. Ōtomo points out this myth and cites from Honda Toshiaki’s text, called Hokuhen kinbiroku 北辺禁秘録 (Secret Record of the Northern Region) (Ōtomo 1943, p. 40). Heisuke did not need to go anywhere; he had, in his house, direct informants from a domain doctor and shogunal policies 121 create a good picture of how an Edoite considered the economic and political borders of Japan (Nihonkoku). At the heart of Heisuke’s concern regarding foreign trade lay his conviction that trade was beneficial when handled appropriately.54 By hinting at the lack of awareness and understanding on behalf of the Edo government, Heisuke laid out a political economy based on economic profit. Whether he referred to Ezo and prospective trade opportunities with the Russians or to Nagasaki and the continuous trade relations with the Dutch and Chinese, his advice aimed to promote economic well-being for the shogunal government and also the larger Tokugawa regime.55 I will discuss later in more detail the idea that profit was a desirable political goal for the shogunate. First, however, I will consider the practical side of his proposal, namely how Heisuke in Hōkoku igen offered improvements for the management of the Naga- saki trade.

B. The Nagasaki Trade

Nagasaki and foreign trade policies were of ongoing interest to officials and scholars alike.56 That the Tokugawa shogunate, despite its so- called seclusion policies (kaikin 海禁), was actively involved in foreign trade is well known. However, only Nagasaki, the southernmost out- post of shogunal land, was selected as the location from which foreign trade (with Chinese and Dutch merchants) was conducted under the direct supervision of the shogunate. The domains of Tsushima対馬 gateways to other countries, namely the Dutch interpreter Yoshio Kōgyū, and his medical students Higuchi Shiba (no dates) from Nagasaki and Maita Gentan from Matsumae. Both are mentioned in Tadano 1994b, p. 46 and pp. 51–52 respectively. The only trip Heisuke ever took toward the west led him as far as the Kansai region. Makuzu mentions that the lord Doi Toshinori asked Heisuke to go there to cure his mistress. But she died before he arrived, so he had time to do some sightseeing for a total of about fifty days (Tadano 1994b, p. 85). 54 Tanuma Okitsugu definitely readAkaezo fūsetsu kō, but we can only conjecture that he read Hōkoku igen. 55 ‘Shogunate’ and ‘shogunal government’ refer to kōgi 公儀; see Kudō 1968, p. 503. I translate Heisuke’s term kokka 国家 or wagakuni 我国 as ‘Tokugawa regime’ or ‘Tokugawa state.’ See, for instance, Kudō 1968, pp. 501 and 502; for the latter, see p. 487. 56 For a brief historical outline of shogunal policies of the administration of Naga- saki and foreign trade, see Gramlich-Oka, forthcoming. Makuzu does not directly mention Heisuke’s interest in the Nagasaki trade, although various ideas of his resonate in Hitori kangae. 122 bettina gramlich-oka

(Korea), Satsuma 薩摩 (Ryukyu), and Matsumae 松前 (Ezo), the other three windows to foreign countries, were in the hands of local lords (daimyo). Heisuke, whose loyalties lay with the shogunate as well as with the Sendai domain, regarded foreign trade as the most important element of the political agenda of the Tokugawa shogunate, something that should be placed directly and firmly in shogunal hands.

1. Smuggling Heisuke built his political economy around a permanent concern that was guaranteed to garner attention: the financial interests of the shogunate were undercut and imperiled by chronic smuggling and mismanagement. Illicit trade (nukeni 抜荷) was an affront against shogunal authority, and by suggesting reforms to remedy it Heisuke made use of a reliable device. The subject of smuggling had long been a favorite of aspiring scholars in order to attract attention from the higher ranks of the shogunate. Especially famous are the views of Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657–1725), the advisor to two shoguns at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and by the Nagasaki magistrate Ōoka Kiyosuke 大岡備前守清相 (1679–1717). Both men reported at great length about the ongoing smuggling in Nagasaki and its surrounding waters around 1700.57 Despite being a Sendai retainer, by referring to Hakuseki— who still enjoyed a reputation as a great thinker and expert on trade at Nagasaki—and by crafting his piece to resemble an urgent political matter for the shogunate, Heisuke proved his allegiance to Edo. He was therefore able to lash out with harsh judgments about current trade conditions and propose stronger views than would otherwise have been possible. Right from the start and throughout Hōkoku igen, Heisuke reminds his readers that dealing with smugglers ought to be the foremost concern of the shogunate.58 Smuggling had to be stopped. The trade situation in Nagasaki was so deplorable, Heisuke lamented, that despite the strict shogunal regulations smuggled wares took up about twenty-five

57 The two proposals by Arai Hakuseki are Arai 1912a and 1912b. The former is in Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 383–90; the latter, in Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 407–12. The work by Ōoka Kiyosuke is Ōoka 1974. 58 See for instance, Kudō 1968, pp. 485 and 503. In the former section, Heisuke suggests that Christianity has been successfully oppressed, and smuggling should be dealt with similarly. In Akaezo fūsetsu kō, Heisuke also addresses the highly political nature of smuggling, discussed below (Kudō 1969, pp. 285 and 292). a domain doctor and shogunal policies 123 percent of all imports.59 As a physician he was especially concerned with the procurement of medical supplies: Medicine is the most important Chinese import commodity and thus the prevention of its smuggling should be a priority. . . . Besides smuggling off shore, there are even ships sailing to Chinese borders. With a list of ordered things they conduct clandestine trade, just as if it were an open sea route.60 Heisuke continues with concrete examples of pharmaceuticals that are almost impossible to purchase via official channels.61 Despite smuggling becoming a capital offense in 1718, so far not even one smuggler convicted of this crime had received the death penalty.62 Therefore, laws and regulations alone were not enough. The shogunal cities of Osaka and Nagasaki should be investigated more thoroughly, since even when Edo officials carried their orders to the respective magistrates, there were no visible improvements.63 Suspicion of illicit trade and mistrust of Nagasaki officials and citizens were an old story.64 They gave Edo a reason to tighten its grip over Nagasaki. When we trace the administrative reforms of Nagasaki from 1685 onwards, we observe how the many (but relatively unsuc- cessful) attempts by Edo to reform the city’s administration were

59 Kudō 1968, p. 488. Smuggling had been a major concern, which in 1775 even led to body searches of the Dutch opperhoofden. Hakuseki complained back then, too, about smuggling, as did every other author I have looked at in this context. Smuggling meant that someone other than the shogunate profited, and that shogunal authority was undermined. 60 Kudō 1968, pp. 487–88. 61 Kudō 1968, p. 488. Heisuke mentions that he tried to purchase for his lord Ryūganniku (from South China), but had difficulties. Thenunikōru (“unicorn”) was only available for a price seven times higher than usual. Taifūshi (from Indonesia) and hakutō had been impossible to purchase for decades through official channels. Yet both medicines were available in large quantities on the open market, which led Heisuke to assume that 1/4 of the products coming to Nagasaki ended up as contra- band on the market. 62 Kudō 1968, p. 486. When the horn of a “unicorn” (narwhale) was discovered in Osaka, the smugglers were punished with exile, but not with death. 63 Ibid., pp. 487 and 489. Heisuke states that smuggling occurred in Ryukyu, Korea, and Ezo as well: all locations where trade was run by domains. Kudō 1968, p. 502. 64 This logic also worked well for Ezo. In his workTōyūki , 1784, Hezutsu Tōsaku reveals the open corruption among officials of Matsumae in their transactions with the Ainu. See Winkel 2004, p. 252. When Edo removed the Matsumae lord temporarily from control over Ezo, the same rhetoric can be found. 124 bettina gramlich-oka framed in this mode.65 Heisuke, too, offers his proposal for increasing Edo’s control. It should be our priority to regulate smuggling and trade, but not only by the Nagasaki magistrate’s office. Capable bureaucratschūshoku ( no o-hito o-kakari nite 重職之御人御掛りにて) should be sent [from Edo to Nagasaki] to investigate up close.66 After all, Heisuke was a physician-scholar who was interested in promoting his own position. He ended his proposal by saying that these capable bureaucrats should be “learned in Japanese and Chinese knowledge, be familiar with the foreigners’ intentions, and should understand the reasons for all things,”67 essentially pointing to himself. Besides enforcing laws and structural reforms that involved Edo officials in Nagasaki, Heisuke promoted a rethinking of foreign trade in Nagasaki in general. Trade should be reformed, not stopped. Heisuke, again echoing earlier political discourse, asserted that foreign trade was not profitable when precious metals were exported in such large quantities that domestic supplies were insufficient. The condemnation of the outflow of bullion had been part of political rhetoric for a century—famously argued by Arai Hakuseki, who proposed a decrease in the volume of foreign trade.68 Even though silver and gold were still mentioned,69 it was copper that had become the main focus of anxi- ety by the 1780s. Official regulations reflected this concern,70 as did

65 See Gramlich-Oka, forthcoming. 66 Kudō 1968, p. 502. 67 Ibid., p. 504. 68 Hakuseki was branded the first bullionist by Shimada Ryuto (Shimada 2006). Literature today often refers to bullionism as the justification for shogunal decisions concerning foreign trade throughout the eighteenth century. The shogunate’s direct involvement in the amount and/or type of outflow of precious metals in Nagasaki goes back to the beginning of the Tokugawa period, when the export of refined silver was officially banned in 1607. Although the famous proposals by Arai Hakuseki express a continuation of former regulations, their essence became the point of reference in textbooks for explaining the leading economic thought behind foreign trade policies. This view expressed in textbooks needs revision. 69 See, for instance, Aoki 1992, vol. 4, p. 50, where he gives numbers for Sino– Japanese bullion trade from Chinese sources; or Miura Baien 三浦梅園 (1723–1789): Miura 1955a; see German translation by Schefold 2001, pp. 193–94. Or see Yamagata Bantō in Kinginrekishi 金銀歴史, in Suenaka 1976, where he offers numbers for bullion exports. 70 See, for instance, the regulations in Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 136–48, pp. 307–08, p. 320, and p. 323. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 125 writings by scholars like Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 (1680–1747)71 and Nakai Chikuzan 中井竹山 (1730–1804),72 or Matsudaira Sadanobu.73

2. The Copper Trade Copper, in great demand by Dutch and Chinese merchants alike, was a crucial commodity for trade and for domestic currencies.74 By 1783, when Heisuke wrote the proposals, management of copper had been a sore point for Edo for a century. Making large amounts of copper (in peak years up to 500 tons) available from the various shogunal and domainal mines was an undertaking that required political and logistic maneuvering. Moreover, the distribution agencies for copper were continuously tested for their efficiency and profitability.75 When Ishigaya Bingo no kami Kiyomasa 石谷備後守清昌 (1715?–1782) was Nagasaki magistrate (Nagasaki bugyō 長崎奉行), he established in 1766 the third copper officeMeiwa ( dōza 明和銅座) in Osaka to collect and purchase all copper from shogunal and domainal land, which was to be sent to Osaka for refining. From there export copper (goyōdō 御用銅) was sent to Nagasaki to pay for imports. Repeatedly, we encounter edicts that call out to the domain lords and deputies (daikan 代官) to activate old mines and to search for new deposits.76 The official explanation for opening the copper office, however, was not the real reason. Officially, there had been no progresssusumazu (

71 Dazai Shundai, translated in Kirby 1908, p. 171: “In these present times, in exchanging merchandise with foreign countries (China), a great deal of copper goes abroad.” Original in chapter 5 of Dazai 1972a. 72 Nakai Chikuzan 1992, p. 416. Nakai Chikuzan wrote the treatise for Matsudaira Sadanobu soon after the latter came to Osaka. In this particular section Chikuzan complains that there is much talk about gold and silver being exported, although copper should be of equal concern. For the letters from Sadanobu’s officials to Chikuzan asking him to visit, see Ōsaka shishi 1911, pp. 20–25. For the exchange of letters when Chikuzan delivered his treatise to the Osaka city magistrate, see ibid., pp. 133–36. For a brief discussion of Sōbō kigen in English, see Najita 1987, pp. 171–80. For a discussion of Chikuzan’s thought, see Ravina in this volume. 73 Matsudaira Sadanobu, grandson of Yoshimune, was concerned about the export of copper when he was still the daimyo of Shirakawa 白川 (110,000 koku). See Ma tsudaira Sadanobu, Shoyūhen 庶有編, 1786, reproduced in Matsudaira 1914, pp. 435–46. 74 For the intra-Asian copper trade, see Shimada 2006. 75 See Gramlich-Oka 2008a and Gramlich-Oka, forthcoming. For copper export charts and tables, see Gramlich-Oka 2008a, p. 76; Gramlich-Oka 2008b, p. 16; Gram- lich-Oka 2008c, pp. 13–14. 76 See, for instance, in 1763/3 and the following year, 1764/5. Ofuregaki Tenmei shūsei, # 814, reproduced by Tokutomi 1983a, pp. 357–58. 126 bettina gramlich-oka

不進) in copper output from the mines, which prevented efficient delivery to Nagasaki.77 The agency thus came under direct shogunal management.78 For Ishigaya, though, monopolization ought to avert disruptions in the domestic copper market and thwart further illegal trade. Yet the low purchase price offered by the copper office precluded its success.79 Considering the uninterrupted admonitions by the shogunate, continued by Tanuma’s political successors, sellers apparently found better prices on the black market. Moreover, as Honda Toshiaki 本多利明 (1744–1821) pointed out in 1798, mines were simply abandoned for their unprofitability.80 Ishigaya Kiyomasa, and certainly Tanuma Okitsugu as well, did not intend to expand the Nagasaki trade or to pay for imports with more copper.81 Rather, they encouraged a search for alternatives. Thus they monopolized marine products, which the Chinese merchants desired.

77 See appendix to this chapter for copper prices. In 1760 the Dutch in Batavia ordered the opperhoofd in Nagasaki to inquire whether the mines in Japan indeed were exhausted, or whether it was simply an excuse to keep the trade volume low. The interpreters delivered a (secret) report of current mining conditions: 3,600,000– 4,000,000 kin of refined copper of which 1,100,000kin were exported by the Dutch, 1,500,000 kin by the Chinese, 900,000 kin went to the governors and private individuals, and 1,000,000–1,300,000 kin for domestic use. Still not convinced that mining was at such a low level, Batavia meant to ask for more, but the Gentlemen XVII, the Supreme Board of the Company in the Netherlands, expressed in a letter of 29 Sept. 1783 that an expansion of trade was not desired. The market would otherwise be over- supplied and prices would drop (Meylan 1861, pp. 109–11). 78 Even so, the long-lasting efforts to operate the copper agency more strictly continued. In 1797 the dōza came under the control of three officials: the Nagasaki magistrate, the Osaka city magistrate, and Edo’s superintendent of finance Ōsaka( shishi, 1911, p. 392). 79 Shogunal interference is closely connected to the finalization of monopolies over metals, such as gold, silver, copper, iron, and brass, which would also assist the overall aim of establishing a gold standard for the archipelago’s multiple currencies. During the copper refining process silver was extracted, which was used for the new silver coins: go monme gin 五匁銀 (1765), nanryō nishūgin 南鐐二朱銀 (1772). 1765 also marks the start of the minting of copper coins, and in 1768 brass copper coins. On 1767/5/22 a new position was announced: the superintendent of mines (ginzan bugyō 銀山奉行), who would travel the country to investigate; see Ofuregaki Tenmei shūsei 1958, p. 817; Tsuji 1991, p. 190. 80 In 1788, Matsudaira Sadanobu issued a renewed order that all copper had to be sold to the dōza. See Tokutomi 1983b, pp. 225–26. For Honda Toshiaki, see Honda 1970, translation in Keene 1969, pp. 164–65. 81 One source mentions that Tanuma Okitsugu read Arai Hakuseki’s Honchō hōka tsūyō jiryaku 本朝宝貨通用事略 (Studies of Japanese Coins), which explains how much bullion had already left the country by 1700 and contains estimates for the future if the outflow continued (Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 5, p. 248). Deserving of further investigation is Korea’s permission to export copper in 1786 (Sasama 1999, p. 430). a domain doctor and shogunal policies 127

Marine products were substitute commodities for bullion exports, a shogunal intervention similar to what occurred with copper, or, for that matter, with rapeseed oil.82 In the early eighteenth century, copper made up approximately eighty percent of all exports at Nagasaki. By 1745 marine products composed roughly half of all sales to Chinese merchants, with copper making up the remaining half. Following a similar pattern, gradual monopolization took place, which had taken one hundred years in the case of copper. In 1757 fixed export prices were established for kelp, shark fins, sea cucumbers, and abalone, and in 1763 the shogunate dispatched officials to coastal areas to assess production potential. With these estimates the shogunate made calculations and contracted with Nagasaki merchants to assure the delivery of the marine products to Nagasaki, and they were then sold for gold and silver to China. The various attempts by Edo to collect marine products efficiently were continued under Ishigaya Kiyomasa. It was not until 1785, however, that the shogunate assumed direct control by establishing its monopoly over the marine products trade via the Nagasaki kaisho 長崎会所 (Nagasaki Accounting House), thereby eliminating middlemen.83 However, just as in the case of copper, we can assume that the forced low price that the shogunate paid to the producers through its offices enabled easy competition. For instance, the Satsuma domain was able to trade in marine products despite the shogunal monopoly.84 The regulations of foreign trade in Nagasaki were often based on trial and error, reflecting the changing economic conditions in and outside of the archipelago.85 In general the rules were moving toward stronger shogunal management, yet, as Heisuke observed, many structural flaws remained. Almost twenty years after Ishigaya began working on copper monopolization, Heisuke offered information about

82 For the beginning of shogunal intervention in the copper trade, see Gramlich- Oka 2008a. For tawaramono see Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 127–31. For rapeseed oil, see Hayashi 1994, p. 222. See Ravina 1999 for domain policies of intervention, and Roberts 1998, pp. 178–89 for the similar struggles of the Tosa domain with its monopolization policies regarding paper. 83 Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, p. 128. The office was calledtawaramono kaisho 俵物会所. About the relations between this office and thedōza , see Ōsaka shishi 1911, pp. 392–99. 84 Robert Hellyer states that Satsuma was able to purchase marine products for a higher price and then sell them (Hellyer 2005, pp. 90–91). Source: Nagasaki kaisho gosatsu mono II, pp. 41–42. 85 See Gramlich-Oka 2008c. 128 bettina gramlich-oka the reality of the copper market. Heisuke demonstrated with a comparison of various copper prices that the prices of domestic copper (chiuridō 地売銅) and of trade copper deviated too much. He declared that since copper, as the main export commodity, decided the price level for all commodities in Nagasaki, the price should be the same as domestic copper. According to Heisuke this price was 352 monme (silver currency) for 100 kin of copper (100 kin about 60 kg) in 1783.86 The Nagasaki Accounting House, to his dismay, had to record arrears of 200,000 ryō of gold pieces,87 and yet the price of trade copper for the VOC (Dutch East India Company) was still only 150 monme per 100 kin, i.e., 200 monme less than what copper was sold for on the domestic market.88 Heisuke does not disclose his sources, and his numbers do not match those of other sources.89 Regardless of the accuracy of

86 Kudō 1968, p. 493. 87 Ibid., p. 495. 1 ryō of gold was at the time exchanged for 60 monme of silver. 1 kan of copper was about 22 monme of silver. The official exchange rate ofkan 4 of copper for 50 monme silver for 1 ryō was only in theory. 88 In 1701 the Chinese merchants paid about 121 monme per 100 kin while the VOC paid only 115.9 monme. After a rise in price over some years, in 1752 the purchase price of copper for the VOC was reset at the former cost of 125 monme (12.5 tael) for 100 kin (Deshima Diaries 2004, p. 168; Meylan 1861, p. 104). By 1768 the Chinese paid 240 monme for 100 kin, which is the same price the Dutch had to pay for their private trade, and which comes closer to the domestic market price of copper (Münsterberg 1896, pp. 280–81; Gramlich-Oka 2008a). For the year 1783 opperhoofd Isaac Titsingh was able to negotiate new regulations under which the import prices should be raised (Meylan 1861, pp. 126–29; also Deshima Diaries 2004, p. 474). See appendix for copper prices. For instance, Heisuke states that in 1780 the price the dōza paid for export copper to the mines was 217 monme per 100 kin (unjō nedan 運上値段) of unrefined copper. Heisuke explains that the former price of 150monme was raised in 1757 to 210 and in 1780 to 217 monme per 100 kin and that for additional copper in times of insufficient supply thedōza in Nagasaki would pay 190 kanme per 100 kin (Kudō 1968, pp. 494 and 495). While this is close to Ōsaka shishi 1911, p. 392, which lists the price for 100 kin unrefined copper as 223monme in 1797, this can only be an approximate number, since the amount varied depending on the mine. In 1718 the shogunal mines of Besshi and Tatsukawa sold their copper for about 122 and 156 monme respectively (Imai 1988, p. 52). Between 1768 and 1803 Tatsukawa/ Besshi mines received an additional 12.5 monme, which raised the purchasing price to 151.98, and from 1804 to 1842 another 8.333 monme, thus 160.333, rising steadily so that by 1863 the purchase price of the dōza from the mines was 314.48 monme per 100 kin unrefined copper (Nagazumi 1960, pp. 412–13).Ōsaka shishi 1911, pp. 392–99 describes the various reforms with regard to buying and selling domestic copper. 89 The domestic market price of 352 monme is rather high when considering various sources that give 223 monme as the average auction price for 1789. See appendix to this chapter. Domestic copper used to be sold monthly by the dōza, but this was reduced to three times a year in 1805. Beginning in 1819 the fixed price for domestic copper was abandoned and instead it was auctioned off. For instance, the bid in 1819 for copper was 240 monme. The price for domestic copper would rise immensely in a domain doctor and shogunal policies 129 his figures, more reliable figures still support his argument that the disparity between domestic and export copper was too great, and that trade in Nagasaki was unprofitable and even harmful to the economy at large.90 In his view, if the price for export copper were set more realistically, and the import goods also had a fixed price rather than varying year by year, both trading partners would know what to expect for their commodities.91 Since the price for export copper had been set a long time ago, the discrepancy was growing and clearly disadvanta- geous for Japan.92 The efforts of the copper miners and thedōza were in vain,93 and although copper was needed for minting copper coins for the domestic economy there was not enough available.94 The new course that Heisuke advocated to avoid the export of copper involved an overhaul of existing structures as well as wide-ranging shogunal intervention and control over markets. On the whole, Heisuke’s counsel was in accord with shogunal policies of the time. Market interventions, domestic as well as foreign, had arguably been Tanuma Okitsugu’s most effective means for ensuring greater political power for the shogunate for quite some time prior to the 1780s. Tanu- ma’s reign as Senior Councilor to the tenth shogun Ieharu was marked by social and economic changes and opportunities. Tanuma embodied these opportunities by rising from a simple page to senior councilor.95 It was a path similar to that of his friend Ishigaya Kiyomasa, who

the 1840s, where it reached an all-time high of 460 monme (Nagazumi 1960, p. 413). For Chinese merchants, Heisuke gives a quote of 115 monme per 100 kin, which is too low. The actual fixed price was 240monme (Kudō 1968, p. 494). Perhaps, if Heisuke obtained his information from the Dutch interpreters, he may have been referring to the total sum, when all the taxes and costs were added for the Dutch. In regard to the Chinese copper price he may have echoed the Dutch complaints of being disadvan- taged, or he may simply have been misinformed. 90 Kudō 1968, p. 497. 91 Ibid., p. 496. 92 Ibid., p. 498. 93 As mentioned above, Honda Toshiaki, who acknowledges having read Heisuke’s Akaezo fūsetsu kō, complains that the low export prices of copper destroyed the mining industry. Many mines were deserted because of their unprofitability. Yet, Toshiaki argues, the fixed price system was necessary because otherwise, precious metals would be exported in high amounts, damaging the strength of the country (Honda 1970; see Keene 1969, pp. 164–65). 94 Kudō 1968, p. 496. Heisuke also points out the higher domestic price of copper in Kudō 1969, p. 284. 95 In 1767 Tanuma Okitsugu became soba yōnin 側用人 (chamberlain), and in 1769 rōjūkaku 老中格 (equivalent to Senior Councilor); in 1772 he became Senior Councilor. 130 bettina gramlich-oka in his function as Nagasaki magistrate and Commissioner of Finance (kanjō bugyō 勘定奉行) changed the ways of the Nagasaki trade.96 The close relation between Ishigaya and Tanuma is often mentioned and is further supported by their similar political agendas. Although their ideological underpinnings in terms of political economy are less clear,97 one straightforward political maneuver that the two employed was shogunal intervention.

3. Monopoly Plans As we have seen, both Tanuma and Ishigaya advocated the monopolization of commodities. Although the establishment of monopolies (za 座)98 goes back to the early seventeenth century, they were more rigorously implemented from the 1750s onwards.99 Politically the monopoly policies allowed the shogunate to overrule the interests of the domains and strengthen its own power. And the unpopularity of Shogun Ieharu demonstrated the need for strengthening the shogunate’s position.100 Thus, when Heisuke suggested the direct management of imports as one efficient way of extending shogunal control in a distant place like Nagasaki, he supported the current political course.101 Heisuke proposed that the imports of medicines, silk, and sugar should be regulated under shogunate-run monopolies. He advocated giving high priority to creating a guild for medical supplies, because of their lifesaving purpose and the fact that they were not obtainable in Japan. Theza should in particular play the role of

96 Ishigaya Kiyomasa had held the position of Commissioner of Finance since 1759; then he was appointed to Nagasaki, where he served the rather long period from 1762 until 1770. 97 We can only conjecture what the climate of economic thought was in Tanuma’s political economy. The official policies are silent about their ideological underpinnings. We have only a few written records by Tanuma, and I have not seen one in which he described his economic views. In the Deshima Diaries, there are only three insignificant entries on Tanuma Okitsugu. 98 As Herman Ooms argues, the plan backfired, since the merchants could build up capital, which was not taxed (Ooms 1975, p. 5). 99 The monopolies on copper and marine products are just two examples. Monop- olies established under Tanuma Okitsugu include: camphor (monopolized in 1768; dissolved in 1782), brass and iron (established in 1780), cinnabar and ginseng, etc. (Tsuji 1991, pp. 191 and 196). For a listing, see Hall 1955, pp. 74–79. For the laws, see Tokutomi 1983a, pp. 363–65. 100 For a description, see Screech 2000, pp. 17–19. 101 Kudō 1968. p. 490. Heisuke participated in a popular shogunal policy, which was implemented under Tanuma Okitsugu in particular. See Hall 1955, pp. 74–79. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 131 quality inspector and should also order specific pharmaceuticals. The existing za were apparently not well managed and, most importantly, did not operate in the interests of the shogunate.102 The guilds for silks and medicines should stamp seals on the products indicating their place of origin. Over time smuggled goods (without the stamp) would be forced from the market.103 The quality and corresponding prices should be decided by officials in Osaka and Edo and not by merchants and locals in Nagasaki. Strict price regulation for medicines, Heisuke assumed, would make illicit trade untenable.104 Sugar, too, should be monopolized.105 Sugar, as Heisuke explained, being simply a luxury that the lower ranks should not enjoy as much as they did, should be regulated, because sugar was traded for copper, and the more sugar the people consumed, the more precious copper left the country.106 The lower ranks did not trouble to think about it, but the government ought to: Our precious copper leaves the country so that the lower ranks can eat sugar. They do not give a second thought to the fact that 1,000,000 kin of copper leave our country annually for sugar. . . . Yet, while the sugar import should not be stopped, it should be controlled tightly by a monopoly (za). Thereby the lower ranks would not consume sugar, or fancy it, so much.107 By giving quantities for the various types of sugar, Heisuke emphasized the squandering of such a luxury item for precious metal. 1 kin (600 g) of high-quality crystal sugar cost the country about 144 monme: this means that more than 100 kin (60 kg) of copper would be sold to the VOC for 1 kin of crystal sugar. Again, as with the case of

102 Kudō 1968, p. 489. In 1722, 124 shops formed a protective association (kabu nakama) with monopoly rights over the sale of all pharmaceuticals imported from the Asian continent. See McClain 1999, p. 65. Heisuke, however, envisioned tighter management of the za, with strong links between Osaka and Edo officials. About the itowappu guild, see Innes 1980. 103 Kudō 1968, p. 499. 104 Ibid., p. 490. 105 For an excellent analysis of contemporary sugar cultivation under the auspices of Tanuma, see Ochiai in this volume. 106 Kudō 1968, pp. 490–91. The popular image of Shogun Ieharu was that he was lazy and loved sweets and would not get out of bed (Screech 2000, p. 93). 107 Kudō 1968, p. 491. Heisuke’s daughter Makuzu picked up this argument with much vigor: “How shameful to be looked down upon by people of other countries for the shallow outlook that leads us to trade copper that lasts for ten thousand generations for sugar that melts when you lick it.” Tadano 1994a, p. 275; English translation in Goodwin 2001a, p. 32. 132 bettina gramlich-oka pharmaceuticals, control of pricing and quality should be handled by officials in Osaka and Edo and not in Nagasaki.108 Heisuke’s advice was close to the designs that high-ranking officials had been working on in the preceding decades to improve Nagasaki trade, just as his reform plans reflect much of what other members of his network had proposed.109 In 1791 new, stricter regulations for trade in Nagasaki were imposed, in addition to the overhaul of its administration.110

C. Colonization Plans for the North

Heisuke’s involvement in politics is more clearly delineated in his writings on “Ezo,” which includes today’s Hokkaido, as well as the Kuril Islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Uruppu.111 Nagasaki trade had a rather difficult history, and the concern of its citizens who depended on trade had to be taken into account, but the northern frontier offered a comparatively fresh venue for all kinds of opportunities, political as well as economic. What is most striking in the argument put forward by Heisuke is the development and colonization of Ezo.112 This idea of colonizing Ezo for economic as well as defensive reasons was at the center of discussion in Heisuke’s network. Since Moritz Ala- dar von Benyovszky (1746–1786), the mysterious Hungarian who had come to Japanese shores in 1771, planted the rumor that the Russians were planning raids on Ezo, Russia and the northern frontier were a matter of debate among intellectuals, writers, and officials in Edo.113

108 Kudō 1968, p. 491. 109 For instance, ginseng was another import commodity that was widely discussed. The domestic production of ginseng did not prove to be a great success, thus regulations for its various types were constantly an important issue. As mentioned above, see the writings of Aoki Kon’yō, the reforms by Matsudaira Harusato, and Heisuke in Kudō 1968, p. 500; Tadano 1994b, p. 112. The same can be said about sugar. Matsu- daira Sadanobu briefly banned sugar imports (Screech 2000, p. 93). See Ochiai in this volume. 110 See Gramlich-Oka 2008c, pp. 8–10; Taigaikankeishi sōgō nenpyō 1999, pp. 820–21. 111 Kudō 1969, p. 285. 112 Ibid., pp. 285–86. 113 See Lensen 1959, pp. 71–89, and Keene 1969, pp. 31–37, for a more detailed discussion. Also see Ikuta 2008, pp. 13–14. In Kaikoku heidan, Hayashi Shihei, too, repeatedly referred to Benyovszky to point out the current defenselessness of the state (Lederer 2003, pp. 101, 111, 129). The explosion of writings on Russia and Ezo and exhibitions of the belongings of returning castaways generated broad interest in the a domain doctor and shogunal policies 133

After analyzing the history of Russian expansion, Heisuke determined that Russia was a powerful country owing to its ever-expanding world trade and not to military force alone.114 It made sense to Heisuke to subjugate other countries by expanding the realm via trade, a policy long pursued by China and sometimes by Japan. Certainly, military action was another alternative, as in the case of Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea. Since the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate, however, commercial relations with Korea, Ryukyu, and Ezo had become a well-established means of securing the realm.115 According to Heisuke, what differed from the Japanese or Chinese approach and thus made the Russian empire more menacing was that the Russians settled their people in unpopulated regions to expand their realm. Heisuke explained what to him and his fellows was a novel policy, namely colonization: To colonize (hito o maku 人をまく) is something that foreign countries (gaikoku 外国) do. It is as if human seeds (hito no tane 人の種) are being sent to desolate islands. Convicted men and women are dispatched to open the land (kuni o hiraku 国をひらく).116 Therefore, in his opinion, the information that people from Russia “give Japanese people shelter and make their own children into interpreters of Japanese” was quite unsettling and suspicious, and might be evidence that the next victim of the Russian expansionist policy would be Japan.117 For Heisuke, the development of Ezo would solve many problems. It would stop the Russian advance and would bring various economic

northern regions. Already in existence was the work by Matsumae Hironaga 松前広長 (1737–1801) called Matsumae shi 松前志 (Matsumae Record) written in the fifth month of Tenmei 1 (1771). Hironaga, the fifth son of the daimyo, was adopted into the Murakami 村上 household, and implemented financial reforms in Matsumae as chief retainer (see Ōtomo 1943, pp. 95–316). Another early account is by the poet and writer Hezutsu Tōsaku 平筒秩東作 (1726–1789), who visited Matsumae and Ezo in 1783. His Tōyūki 東遊記 (Journey to the East, 1784) was known to Heisuke’s extended network. Various people were common acquaintances. For instance, Tōsaku was a student of Hiraga Gennai 平賀源内 (1728–1780), and so was Katsuragawa Hoshū’s brother Morishima Chūryō. About Tōsaku and his work, see Winkel 2004, pp. 250–67. About an exhibition of Russian clothing and objects, see Oroshiya kibutsu ヲロシヤ器物 (Russian Utensils, 1795), in Yamashita 2003, vol. 3. 114 Kudō 1969, p. 285. 115 For an overview, see Walker 2002, in particular pp. 50–51. 116 Kudō 1969, p. 290. 117 Ibid., p. 289. 134 bettina gramlich-oka benefits. InAkaezo fūsetsu kō, Heisuke advised the government to undertake a thorough and direct inspection of the overall conditions in the northern regions, which were up to then largely unknown territory.118 Then, to thwart a southern advance from Russia, the shogunate should create a magistrate to control Russian trade and the development of Ezo. The result would be great profits to Japan as a whole (kuni no uruoi 国の潤).119 Even if there were no passage to Russia, which was a possibility because the north had not yet been explored, Heisuke suggested that Ezo should be developed anyway, since its hidden metal deposits would bring great profit to the country.120 We know that there is much gold in Ezo. A friend of my father told me about it, and I have seen gold sand from there. . . . Not only gold but there is also silver and copper. . . . Once the gold, silver, and copper are brought out of the mines they can be used for trade with Russia. With the profit rijun( 利潤) from that trade we can mine more.121 . . . with the trade we will have the strength to be able to exploit the land (kaihatsu 開発). Through development and trade we can colonize Ezo and make not only gold, silver, and copper, but actually all the resources our own.122 Moreover, Heisuke continues, the prices of imports in Nagasaki would fall, and eventually Nagasaki would become redundant and Chinese goods could be traded for less via the northern route. His disapproval of the Nagasaki trade comes out in this piece, too. By taking the gold, silver, and copper of Ezo to purchase our necessary medicines, we can avoid the need to export our copper and have rules against smuggling. Within a few decades our country will be prosperous. To fix our country, first we need to strengthen our country’s power (chikara). To do so we have above all to make other countries’ treasures (takara 宝) ours.123 A large country like Russia, he claimed, had all the commodities the Japanese desired.124 In return, Russia would also become interested in

118 Ibid., p. 285. 119 Ibid., pp. 284 and 285. A magistrate for Ezo was established in 1802. See my discussion of benefits to the country in Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapter 8. 120 Kudō 1969, p. 284. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid., p. 285. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid., pp. 282–83. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 135

Japanese products, such as rice, sake, and salt, even though the czar was probably more interested in gold, silver, and copper.125 The rationale behind conducting foreign trade was the accumulation of wealth, which brought greater political power. Trade with Russia, he argued, would enrich and strengthen the country. Heisuke’s Akaezo fūsetsu kō reflected political views of society’s highest ranks. A set of documents describes some of the conversation and communication among key players after Tanuma Okitsugu received Akaezo fūsetsu kō. Heisuke’s proposal was submitted to Tanuma in the fifth month of 1784 (Tenmei 4).126 On the sixteenth day of the same month, Tanuma asked Commissioner of Finance Matsumoto Hidemochi 松本秀持 (1730–1797) to start inquiries about the situation in the north.127 Hidemochi was then supposed to submit his report directly to one of the actual power-holders in the shogunate, Mizuno Tadatomo 水野忠友 (1731–1801).128 An investigation into conditions in Ezo began among the officials in the shogunate. According to the Ezochi ikken, Hidemochi ordered Tsuchiyama Sōjirō 土山宗次郎 (d. 1787), an official of the Bureau of Financekanjō ( kumigashira 勘定組頭), to help him with this investigation. Sōjirō, who socialized with literati such as Ōta Nanpo 大田南畝 (1749–1823) and the head of the Mitsui trading house, was well connected. Sōjirō had previously made the acquaintance of the financial official of the Matsumae domain, Minato Genzaemon 湊源左衛門 (no dates), who was also Heisuke’s informant.129 Since he himself was under investigation for insider trading, Genzaemon was more than willing to give information to the shogunate that would cause trouble for Matsumae.130 The key information he provided concerned smuggling, since uncontrolled foreign trade

125 Ibid., p. 284. 126 For details, see Hall 1955, pp. 37–39; Gramlich-Oka 2006. 127 The following steps are recorded in the collection of documents regarding the shogunate’s policies toward Ezo between 1784 and 1790, called Ezochi ikken 蝦夷地一件 (The Ezo Affair), mentioned above.Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 273. Hidemochi’s title is Izu-no-kami 伊豆の守 (Nakayama 1936, p. 38; Ōtomo 1943, p. 33). Hidemochi’s career rose in tandem with Tanuma’s (Hall 1955, pp. 52–53). 128 Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 273. Tadatomo had held rank equivalent to Senior Coun- cilor since 1781. About the ranks, see Hall 1955, pp. 28–29. About the power structure under Tanuma, see Hall 1955, pp. 50–56. 129 Iwasaki 1984, pp. 180–81. See also Ōtomo 1943, p. 38; Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 277; Kōno 1975, pp. 124–25. Nanpo was also an acquaintance of the Kudō’s (see above). 130 Ezochi ikken 1969, pp. 278–79. 136 bettina gramlich-oka was a source of alarm for the shogunate.131 Sōjirō wrote his report based on earlier inquiries and gave it to Hidemochi. Sōjirō pointed out that it was difficult to know the circumstances in Ezo without a more thorough investigation, which had also been Heisuke’s suggestion.132 This rush of initiatives shows the high priority that Ezo suddenly assumed. Under the pretense that there was no one else who could investigate—in the meantime one other informant had died and Gen- zaemon had been exiled—Hidemochi asked Tanuma for permission to initiate a direct inquiry with the Matsumae domain.133 Having received Tanuma’s consent, Hidemochi set out to meet with the rusui 留守居 (keeper) of Matsumae on the following day (1784/6/3). Matsumae rusui, Shimonokuni Toneri 下国舎人, arrived together with Yokoi Kan’zaemon 横井関左衛門 to see Hidemochi.134 The latter explained to them what he had learned, namely, that Japanese merchants were trading in the far North with foreigners, although the government had explicitly selected Nagasaki as the only port for conducting foreign trade. Apparently these merchants operated without the domain’s consent; therefore, instead of starting a public investigation, which would create much commotion and embarrassment for the domain, Hidemochi said that he had decided first to conduct discreet interviews throughout the domain. He offered the help of the shogunate in case Matsumae needed support in its supervision (torishimari).135 Toneri, taken by surprise and certainly aware of the threat, took the official letter from Hidemochi and left right away for Matsumae. Hidemochi added the request that the Matsumae domain should investigate the potential of gold and silver mines in Ezo and report upon the possibility of lucrative trade with the Russians, as suggested by Heisuke.136 Without much delay, Hidemochi gave the six parts of

131 Ōtomo 1943, pp. 36–37. 132 Ezochi ikken 1969, pp. 298–305. Sōjirō was supposed to report about Ezo, but since he was sick, Hidemochi first spoke to Kanazawa Yasugorō金澤安五郎 from the same officeEzochi ( ikken 1969, p. 275). Sōjirō was an acquaintance of the above- mentioned Hezutsu Tōsaku through his poetic interests (Yamashita 2003, vol. 1, p. 721). For a discussion of the execution of Sōjirō and of Hezutsu’s severe reprimand, see Yamashita 2003, vol. 1, pp. 720–21. 133 Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 278. 134 The daimyo of Matsumae were not requested to leave their family in Edo, nor was their presence in the capital required every other year. 135 Ezochi ikken 1969, pp. 305–06. 136 Already by 1737 Sakakura Genshirō and Gotō Tōsaburō had gone to Ezo to search for the legendary mines. After digging in several places they returned to Edo a domain doctor and shogunal policies 137 the Ezochi ikken, including Heisuke’s proposal and Sōjirō’s report, to Mizuno Tadatomo.137 Tanuma’s dispatch of an official expedition to the north was not a personal decision on his part, but a move supported by other shogunal officials.138 Although George Lensen and John W. Hall conclude that Tanuma and his advisors demonstrated farsighted objectives in opening another window for foreign trade, and “forestall[ing] Rus- sian expansion,” the documents in the Ezochi ikken show no evidence of foresight, at least not at the outset.139 It is evident from the documents that the biggest concern among the politicians was not Russian encroachment, or the potential colonization and development of Ezo, but smuggling.140 This concern had been of secondary importance to Heisuke, who used it only to draw attention to his other views.141 When, two months later, the Matsumae delivered their report, Hidemochi was not satisfied.142 The report denied any kind of foreign trade with or without the consent of the domain, nor did it mention the potential of mining in Ezo. In Hidemochi’s assessment, therefore, the domain had provided a vague answer to conceal its own private trade with the northern islands.143 After seeing the discrepancy between Heisuke’s empty-handed. In 1739 they wrote a book called Hokkai zuihitsu or Ezo zuihitsu 蝦夷随筆, which gave their opinion about developing Ezo. Then in 1771 the shogunate again sent an expedition to Ezo under the leadership of Kawai Echizen no kami, which also came back without gold (cited by Ōtomo 1943, pp. 50–51). According to Heisuke, a Matsumae retainer called Nomura Yogōemon 野村與五右衛門 had recently told him that the earlier Matsumae domain expeditions requested by the shogunate came back empty-handed because the people in charge were ignorant of how to conduct such a search (Kudō 1969, p. 288). 137 These six parts were given on 1784/6/22 to Mizuno Tadatomo (Ezochi ikken, 1969, p. 273). 138 The expedition began in the fourth month and lasted until the twelfth month of 1785 (see Terui 2001, pp. 51–76; see also the introduction to Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 261). For analyses of the Ezo expeditions, see Terui 2001; Fujita 2007, chapter 3. 139 Hall 1955, pp. 63 and 90; Lensen 1959, p. 178. 140 There had already been an earlier shogunal investigation of the Santan trade in the 1760s, out of fear that illicit trade was being carried out despite the strict regulations of the shogunate (Walker 2001, pp. 138–42). 141 Heisuke claims in Akaezo fūsetsu kō that he initially became interested in the North because of smuggled merchandise. Smuggling could explain why in 1780 a Dutch ship carried large quantities of salted salmon and salmon roe as provisions; after his investigation he understood that these goods were imported from the northern regions. Within his economic reform plans the control of smuggling was one desirable effect but was not his central objective (Kudō 1969, p. 292). 142 This occurred on 1784/9/6 (Ōtomo 1943, pp. 57–58). A messenger from Mat- sumae arrived on 8/29 in Edo. Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 307. 143 Ezochi ikken 1969, pp. 310–11. 138 bettina gramlich-oka memo and the report by the Matsumae daimyo, Tanuma decided a couple of months later to dispatch a shogunal expedition with two large vessels to inspect the area of Ezo and the northern islands.144 The shogunate flexed its political muscle toward the Matsumae by interfering directly with domainal affairs. As Brett Walker points out, “shogunate-controlled trade in Ezo was emerging as part of the financial schemes of Tanuma.”145 However, this scheme was not Tanuma’s alone, but the result of discussion among a social network that included men such as Heisuke. One participant in the expedition, the shogunate official Satō Genrokurō佐藤玄六郎 (no dates), reported in the middle of the twelfth month of 1785 to Matsumoto Hidemochi that illicit trade indeed took place, even if not on a large scale. Since Genrokurō had found out from his interviews that Matsumae and the merchant house Hidaya “tapped in” to the secret trade conducted in Ezo, the shogunate decided to confiscate the trading license from Hidaya for the Kuril Islands for one year. In doing so, the shogunate punished the domain as well, even if only indirectly. It overruled Matsumae’s exclusive right to give out trading permits, enjoyed since 1604, and hurt the domain’s most valuable financial credit institution.146 Another result of Genrokurō’s report was the decision to colonize Ezo. He claimed that the Matsumae domain did not allow, and in fact actively forbade, the Ainu to cultivate their land themselves, forcing them to hunt and fish for tribute instead. Genrokurō calculated that the unfarmed land could bring a yield of about 5,830,000 koku. In Genrokurō’s opinion, the area offered a glorious opportunity for agriculture. In the second month of 1786 Hidemochi quickly drafted a proposal for colonization to Tanuma. The plan was to send over 70,000 outcasts (hinin and eta) as colonists to Ezo. Hidemochi listed all the domains from which these subjects were to be drawn and informed Tanuma that he had already spoken to outcast head Danzaemon, who guaranteed that he would provide the quota and thereby ameliorate

144 The expedition was decided on on 1784/10/21, but left from Shinagawa in 1785/4/29 with two ships. Among the officials were Satō Genrokurō佐藤玄六郎 and Mogami Tokunai 最上徳内, a student of Honda Toshiaki, whose physical condition would not allow him to participate (Ōtomo 1943, pp. 58–59). The expedition went as far west as Sakhalin (Karafuto 樺太) and east to the Kuril Islands (Chishima 千島). 145 Walker 2001, p. 164. Walker is not clear whether shogunal policies toward Ezo and Matsumae were interested in trade or in foreign policy or in control over Mat- sumae, or in all three. See ibid., pp. 166–68. Further investigation is warranted. 146 Ezochi ikken 1969, pp. 329–30. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 139 conditions in overpopulated and famine-stricken areas of the Kantō region. After Tanuma’s approval, Genrokurō was instructed to go ahead with the plan and to arrange affairs with the lord of Matsumae.147 One of Heisuke’s main ideas seemed to have been realized, and it may have been then that Heisuke thought his promotion to magistrate was certain. However, in the tenth month of the same year, everything was put on hold and with it the planned migration.148 The suspension of the Ezo project was due to a political sea change in Edo. When in the eighth month of the year 1786, Shogun Ieharu died, Tanuma, his patron now gone, was forced to resign only a few months later (12/27), after rival officials, who had rejected his policies for some time, seized their chance.149 The second expedition was forced to return from Ezo. Shogun Ienari 家斉 (1773–1841), though only fifteen years old, commenced his rule, and in the following year, on 1787/6/19, Matsudaira Sadanobu became Senior Councilor at the young age of thirty.150 The Kansei reforms that he inaugurated froze the costly development plans for Ezo for the moment.151 Sadanobu may have put the major component of Heisuke’s proposal on hold, but Heisuke’s other agenda, defense (kokubō 国防), became the new focus of attention. Sadanobu met in 1789 with Hayashi Shihei, which may have strengthened his conviction that defense plans were to become a priority.152 In 1792 Sadanobu was named kaihen osonae goyō gakari 海辺御備向御用懸 (official in charge of coastal preparedness), and

147 Ibid., pp. 330–31. 148 Shin Hokkaidō shi nenpyō 1989, p. 80. A few years later, the Nakai brothers gave Matsudaira Sadanobu similar advice about sending criminals to Ezo. Nakai Chiku- zan, in Sōbō kigen, sees them as developers, whereas Riken in Hensaku 辺策 (written between 1799 and 1802), however, simply means to get rid of them. For a discussion of the two views, see Takahashi 2006, pp. 44–49. 149 Backus 1974, p. 98; Terui 2001, pp. 199–213. 150 Backus 1974, p. 98; Ooms 1975, pp. 10 and 71. 151 Ooms 1975, pp. 119–20; Ōguchi 1995, p. 223. The last official documents about the expedition are from the third month of 1787. After a gap of two years, however, the records resume in Kansei 1 (1789/9), due to an uprising in the north (see Ezochi ikken 1969, pp. 437–507). Sadanobu’s thoughts in regard to Ezo need to be studied more thoroughly. Yamashita Tsuneo includes Sadanobu’s papers in his compilation of Daikokuya Kōdayū-related sources (Yamashita 2003, vol. 1; see also Terui 2001, in particular chapter 6). Edo’s riots may have helped Sadanobu to become rōjū, and it made sense for him to focus first on domestic problems. For the Edo riots, see Walthall 1994. 152 See Lederer 2003, p. 62. 140 bettina gramlich-oka soon after, he became responsible for the Ezo region.153 Sadanobu’s vision of Ezo was that of a buffer zone between Tokugawa hegemony and the Russian empire, and economic aspirations were therefore rejected. However, the reports from the expeditions also did not bring encouraging news for a quick and lucrative development of Ezo.154 Views on Ezo were not unified and mainly diverged in stressing either economic or political factors. A network linked to Heisuke but centered on scholars from Osaka, such as Nakai Chikuzan, his brother Nakai Riken 中井履軒 (1732–1817),155 and Yamagata Bantō 山片蟠桃 (1748–1821), cautioned Sadanobu.156 For instance, Chikuzan, who expresses overall the same economic ideas as Heisuke, acknowledged that the colonization of Ezo would bring great profit for the country (kokka no ō-eki 国家の大益),157 but qualified this view in Sōbō kigen 草茅危言 (Frank Words by a Rustic, 1788): Ezo is outside shogunal rule (ikigai 域外). . . . Japan should only station officials there to attend to matters of trade. If the Northern barbarians assume a more aggressive attitude, these officials could be withdrawn without comprising Japan’s honor in any way.158

153 Mitani 2006, pp. 9–11. Sadanobu toured the region around Edo himself to decide what kind of coastal defense would be best for the capital. His three-point defense plan for daimyo whose domains had coastlines exemplifies his seriousness. 154 See Sadanobu’s compilation of exchanges of communication around the arrival of Laxman in 1792. Accordingly, after taking office, Sadanobu sent Honda Danjō 本田弾正 to investigate matters in Ezo. His report made him decide to leave Ezo up to Matsumae (Roshiajin toriatsukai tedome 魯西亜人取扱手留, in Yamashita 2003, vol. 4, pp. 147–59). Sadanobu also did not neglect to inquire in Osaka about the handling and administration of the copper monopoly. On his tour to Kyoto as part of what is today called the Title Incident, he also visited Osaka in 1788/6, where he met with the copper refiners, Kinkadō Kenzan (who was a friend of the Katsuragawa family), and Nakai Chikuzan, teacher at the Kaitokudō (Imai 2005, pp. 55–72). See footnote above for their meeting and the resulting treatise, Sōbō kigen. 155 The connections between Nakai Riken and Miura Baien are well known (Taka- hashi 2006, p. 44). Baien borrowed from Riken Arai Hakuseki’s Ezoshi, and in return wrote Ezoben 蝦夷辨 (1777), which later became part of Miura 1955b, p. 16. 156 See Takahashi 2006. 157 Nakai Chikuzan 1992, chapter 4, p. 426. Nakai Chikuzan shares Heisuke’s positive view of the golden opportunities for Edo, including sending the misfits of society to Ezo to colonize the land. Luke Roberts argues that scholars of the Kaitokudō were not interested in kokueki thought (Roberts 1998, pp. 200–01), since as merchants of Osaka they were not interested in policies of domainal countries. This deserves further investigation, since many of the merchants of Osaka were advisors to domains, and as we see in this example, Chikuzan envisioned a larger economic unit of “Japan” (kokka 国家) versus other countries (Najita 1987, pp. 171–80). 158 Nakai Chikuzan 1992, chapter 4, p. 427. Translation is adapted from Honjō 1965, p. 114. Nakai Riken and Yamagata Bantō also advised against extending shogunal rule to Ezo; see Honjō, ibid. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 141

Chikuzan’s view differs from Heisuke’s on the issue of shogunal rule along the border.159 For Chikuzan, Ezo was politically outside of Japan and should remain this way. On the other hand, Honda Toshiaki, Hayashi Shihei, and Satō Nobuhiro 佐藤信淵 (1769–1850) all supported Heisuke’s view;160 Shihei, in particular, advocated colonization in Sangoku tsūran zusetsu 三国通覧図説 (An Illustrated Survey of the Three Countries, written in 1785–1786) when claiming that the process of civilizing the Ainu was the best way to make the region “Japanese.”161 The economic and political decisions to expand or protect the country were related to networks of political actors. After Sadanobu was dismissed from the senior council in 1793 the political actors changed again, and the shogunate returned to earlier expansionist policies.162 In his stead Matsudaira Takechika’s son Toda Ujinori 戸田氏教 (1756– 1806) (in his position as kattegakari rōjū)163 and Hotta Masaatsu (as wakadoshiyori), both appointed under Sadanobu in 1790, were now empowered to deal with foreign matters.164 Heisuke knew both well, and was particularly close to Hotta Masaatsu, as mentioned above.165 The political flip-flopping regarding the North is, however, also related

159 Chikuzan’s brother Riken, too, suggested in Hensaku that the barren plains of Ezo should be left as is, since they were a buffer zone. The costs for development (men and money) were too high (quoted by Takahashi 2006, p. 44 and p. 48 respectively). 160 Honjō 1965, pp. 115–17. 161 Hayashi 1979, pp. 41–43. “I personally think that if we transmit our manners and smoothly alter their customs, we can turn [Ezo] into a province and take the gold and silver to enrich our country.” Translation in Winkel 2004, p. 248. For Heisuke, see Kudō 1969, pp. 289–90. For instance, Heisuke advises the government to rule Ezo with buiku 撫育 (tend with benevolence), as the Russians do in their colonies (Kudō 1969, p. 289). Heisuke does not explain the term buiku, but Honda Toshiaki does: “the cultivation of a national spirit (kokujō 国情) to complement the martial strength of the country is called ‘paternalism’ (buiku 撫育)” (Honda 1970, p. 22). The slow but steady integration of Ezo in the nineteenth century into the Tokugawa realm was based theoretically on the concept of buiku. See Walker 2001, pp. 229–35. 162 In 1793 Sadanobu, removed from power, received a politically insignificant post within the Edo castle (Mitani 2006, p. 12). Again, the various papers compiled by Sadanobu require further attention, since on a superficial reading, Sadanobu, too, was contemplating the resources of Ezo, and only after he had learned that the development was not profitable did he focus on political concerns. 163 Toda was also a reformer of the Ōgaki domain 大垣藩 and was involved in financial reforms of the shogunate. His personal connection to the Kudō household was his poetry teacher Katō Enao, father of Katō Chikage. 164 Mitani 2006, p. 12. 165 Tadano 1994b, p. 99. See Gramlich-Oka 2006, p. 38. According to Makuzu, Heisuke visited former rōjū Matsudaira Takechika’s mansion, and Hotta, a half- brother of the Date lord, came often to visit the Heisuke household. 142 bettina gramlich-oka to external factors, such as the disturbances in the Ezo regions among Japanese merchants and the Ainu in 1789 and the more frequent arrivals of foreign ships to the archipelago’s shores. These issues probably were more influential than the ideological divide between officials concerned with political economy.166 As with the trial and error policies to regulate Nagasaki trade, defense was high on the priority list only when matters were urgent. In particular, the arrival during Sadanobu’s time in office of the Russian ship under the command of the naval lieutenant Adam Laxman (1766–1796) in the ninth month of 1792 reopened the debate over Ezo.167 Heisuke, too, even though he remained a supporter of developing Ezo and conducting trade with the Russians, sounded cautious ten years after writing Akaezo fūsetsu kō. After receiving reports by returning castaway Daikokuya Kōdayū via his student, Heisuke argued in Kudō Bankō monjo that it was hard to believe that the Russians, as Kōdayū claimed, were interested in trading rice rather than gold and silver.168

D. Heisuke and Kokueki Thought

Most of Heisuke’s suggestions were thus neither outside the main- stream nor original. His counsel to monopolize key commodities, to reform the Nagasaki trade, and to develop the North had been considered and discussed since the time of Arai Hakuseki.169 What makes Heisuke’s texts appealing then and today, however, is the economic thought that underlies his arguments. In Hōkoku igen Heisuke argued that foreign trade was strongly desirable, not only because it allowed Japan to obtain necessities such as books and medicines, but also because trade would strengthen the political power of the country (go-kokka 御国家)170 in the new international world order of imperial- ism. The comparison between Dutch and Japanese rule illustrates his position:

166 A former city magistrate also mentioned in an interview that success or failure of reforms, such as the Kansei or Tenpō, depended largely on the times regardless of good intentions (Beerens 2002, pp. 191–92). 167 Laxman had learned from Daikokuya Kōdayū about Japan’s trade relations with the Dutch. He, too, considered the advantages of trade. See the citation by Ikuta 2008, p. 24. 168 Kudō 2003, p. 171. 169 Arai Hakuseki’s Ezo shi 蝦夷志 1720, Arai 1979. 170 Kudō 1968, p. 485. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 143

The Dutch enrich their country through trade. Since they lack precious metals, they import gold, silver, and copper by which they became strong and rich. This is the most important duty of a ruler kuni( o osame sōrō daiichi no seiji 国を治め候第一之政事). From the king down to the lowest, everyone is resolved to act according to this task. [The Dutch] speak the languages of all countries, are foremost in learning, have explored the seas of the world, and are able to sail thousands of miles. They harbor only this one desire: to bring home the precious metals of other countries, since they have no resources of their own. This is the primary objective of government (kokka seiji daiichi 国家政事第一). Thus, those who come to Japan to trade think only of their profit (ritoku 利徳). On their return they are promoted for their extraordinary service (kinkō 勤功). . . . Our country differs from others. We have the five metals in abundance for our use. But since we export them, and moreover, because we export more than we mine, without realizing it our country’s strength (kokka no chikara 国家のちから) has been weakening.171 Heisuke’s argument is clear: the Dutch were winning the struggle over economic and thus political power on an international stage, of which many of his contemporaries were not even aware. Heisuke knew that he was stepping into political territory that was not part of the public discourse. Since his information could cause apprehension among his readers, Heisuke thus refers cleverly to the highly respected Arai Hakuseki: Among the five metals, gold and silver are in particular the bones of our country. Since we trade them for foreign commodities, we impoverish ourselves more year by year.172 Hakuseki’s metaphor of the bones that won’t grow back once broken was well known and often cited.173 Hakuseki meant to bring trade to a halt with the exception of medical supplies. Taking up a pressing problem of the shogunate, Hakuseki argued that if more bullion remained in the country, there would be no shortage of currency.174

171 Ibid., pp. 501–02. 172 Ibid., p. 486. See also Makuzu, who argues similarly in Tadano 1994a, p. 281; Goodwin 2001a, p. 37. For a full discussion of Makuzu’s thoughts on foreign trade, see Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapter 8. 173 Hakuseki gave primacy to the importance of precious metals. He compared money to the bones of a body. “Gold and silver are the ‘bones of the earth,’ and ‘once removed, they will not grow again’.” Kate Nakai calls Hakuseki’s notions “a philosophy of metallism” (Nakai 1988, p. 97). 174 Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 383–90. 144 bettina gramlich-oka

Heisuke, who agreed that foreign trade with the Dutch and the Chi- nese in Nagasaki was handled in ways that were harmful for the country’s wealth, addressed the recurring concerns about currency outflow and dependence on foreign sugar and silk using similar rhetoric, but proposed something very different. The divergence between Hakuseki and Heisuke is in the details. Heisuke declared that precious metals were the key to national wealth.175 Therefore, the shogunal practice of negative mercantilism (hindering the outflow of precious metals) was wise, yet trade nevertheless should be continued if not expanded, which is the opposite of what Hakuseki had suggested.176 Just as the Dutch imported metals to strengthen their power in relation to other countries, Japan, too, Heisuke argued, ought to find ways—and Ezo’s hidden wealth was the golden egg—to import other countries’ treasures.177

E. Kokueki Thought and the Shogunate

To bring wealth in precious metals to the country via trade was actually one of Ishigaya Kiyomasa’s policies. Even though Heisuke refers to the ongoing reverse bullion trade only in passing,178 Ishigaya is remembered today for this radical shift in trade policy.179 He finalized the ces-

175 Honda Toshiaki also explains that an end to metal exports is desirable to maintain the country’s permanent worth (Honda 1970, translated in Keene 1969, p. 165). 176 Although he argued similarly to Ishigaya Kiyomasa, who started the import of silver and gold in 1763, Heisuke differed in advocating the expansion of trade: “Most important goods to be imported are medicines and books, things that are not available in our country. Thus we have to conduct foreign trade” (Kudō 1968, p. 501). This is another area where Heisuke and Hakuseki diverge: to stop foreign trade in both directions, Hakuseki, for instance, suggested starting domestic sugar production in Shikoku, as well as keeping precious metals from flowing out of the country. 177 Dazai Shundai argues in a similar way in Keizairoku (“On Political Economy”), Dazai 1972a, p. 51: “In order to get more gold and silver there is nothing closer than the profit from trading on the market. Instead of reducing the volume of gold and silver, it is necessary to increase it. The only way is to trade. Just as is done in Nagasaki. And some other domains do so already.” Since his advice is to a domain, Shundai, of course, is referring to the domestic market. 178 “The Chinese bring money calledmajōkin 馬城金 [meaning unclear] with which they trade copper, the Dutch use silver coins called Dukaton. Also they bring tin and lead.” Kudō 1968, p. 495. 179 For a new quantitative study on the reverse bullion trade, see Shimada, forthcoming. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 145 sation of the export of silver for the Chinese merchants and gold for the VOC, an undertaking that had begun one hundred years earlier!180 Accordingly, in 1763 gold and silver ceased to be exported, at least officially.181 What is of greater importance, though, is Ishigaya’s decision to encourage the import of foreign silver and gold.182 With this innovative move Ishigaya opened an additional source of income for the shogunate, supported by crafty trade regulations. Ishigaya’s clever design required additional reductions in official trade volume.183 Yet, as Suzuki Yasuko argues, via this reduction the shogunate had copper available for the “extraordinary trade,” which included the import of silver bullion.184 By ultimately exporting the same amount of copper, silver imports were guaranteed, boosted by the payment in precious

180 For the Dutch this had occurred in 1668, but for the Chinese only in 1763/4 (Suzuki 2007, p. 253). In 1754 Tsushima was prohibited from minting silver currency for export, which practically meant that exports were forbidden (Tashiro 1981, pp. 323 and 329). 181 In regard to gold: until 1752 the Dutch exported koban (gold coins) under official trade regulations; from 1753 to 1763 the trade was carried out as payment for private trade (wakini 脇荷), amounting to the considerable sum of 1,000 ryō of koban annually (Yao 1998, chapter 6). 182 Nakamura 1988, chapter 9, discusses the extra trade (in Dutch Aparten Handel; jp. betsudan shōhō 別段商法). Nakamura 1988, pp. 452–55, lists the gold and silver imports from 1763–1811. See also Suzuki 2007, p. 261, table 13, for bullion imports by Chinese merchants between 1763 and 1781. Kiyomasa made a contract with the Chinese state merchant Wang Lüjie 王履階 for the next twenty years to import 300 kanme of silver ( yuansi yin 元糸銀 [silver of yuan-bao fineness]) for 300,000kin of copper. Five other types of silver were also imported. In the first year, the Chinese received for the 300 kanme of silver 210,000 kin of copper and 90,000 kin of marine products. When in 1763 not enough marine products were available, 300,000 kin of copper were paid. In 1766 another 100 kanme were permitted. Suzuki 2007, pp. 255–56. For a more complete set of data, see Shimada, forthcoming; Gramlich-Oka 2008b and 2008c. 183 For the Chinese merchants this meant only thirteen instead of fifteen ships were allowed to anchor. The Chinese had the option of choosing between a reduction in copper quota or ships; they opted for the latter. Suzuki 2007, p. 259. The Dutch had to face a reduction of 300,000 kin from 1,100,000 kin for a total of 800,000 kin of copper. The reason given for the reduction was the plunge in production in the Akita domain’s copper mines (Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei, 228, cited by Suzuki 2007, pp. 262, 258). 184 Extraordinary trade was outside of the official trade limit. Private tradewakini ( , VOC) had probably always existed, but was officially sanctioned in 1685. The trade was abolished in 1721 but was reestablished under a different name with a 25% increase in trade volume (see Gramlich-Oka 2008a). 146 bettina gramlich-oka metal and additional royalties that the shogunate was able to collect.185 In 1765, the shogunate issued its first silver coins by tale (fiat money denominated in gold), which contained some of the imported silver.186 The importation of foreign silver and gold may reflect a certain line of economic thought shared by Ishigaya, Tanuma, and Heisuke. Whereas Tanuma’s meager extant writings disclose no vision, Ishigaya’s writings offer some limited insight into the political and economic thoughts among the leading actors of the government at the time. Ishigaya also draws on Arai Hakuseki to frame his reforms of the Nagasaki trade.187 Just as Hakuseki had emphasized that the well-being of the sixty provinces of the country weighed more than the eighty districts of the city,188 Ishigaya, employing similar language, declared frequently that when Nagasaki enjoyed profits, the country lost out on them, since bullion needed for currency was exported.189 We might note how he compared kokueki (sometimes also kunieki) with ekisuji 益筋.190 The meaning of the two terms is not clear, however. In fact we can often observe how the character eki 益 (profit, benefit) has to be combined with something else to sound morally acceptable, as Ochiai Kō in this volume, too, has demonstrated. In Suzuki Yasuko’s interpretation of the sources, Ishigaya implied that pursuing measures that bring kokueki would be beneficial for the realm’s economy (i.e., by avoiding bullion exports), whereas ekisuji would limit the benefit to the city and the shogunate’s coffers.191 However, when considering

185 The shogunate refers to it simply as “payment.”Nagasaki kaisho jōnōkin ikken 長崎会所上納金一件 (Incident of Royalties by the Nagasaki Accounting House). Cited by Suzuki 2007, p. 255. This side trade, which involved the Dutch as well as the Chinese, has only lately been scrutinized, but deserves more attention. 186 Ofuregaki Tenmei shūsei 1958, 814–17. For a superb discussion of shogunal monetary policies, see Metzler in this volume. 187 In particular the two proposals: Hakuseki jōsho and Hakuseki shiki. Recent scholarship supports the argument that placing a ceiling on trade volume was never intended to cut trade, but rather to assess the realities of trade. This refers to the first ceiling of 1685, but also to the Shōtoku Shinrei 正徳新令. When the Shōtoku regulations were established, the outflow of silver was already down to a small percentage. For details about the Shōtoku Shinrei, see Gramlich-Oka 2008a. 188 Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 383–90. 189 Ibid., p. 156. 190 See ibid., pp. 155–60, for the various orders beginning in 1764. In 1759 Ishigaya Kiyomasa did not mention kokueki in his reforms of Sado, only the term ekisuji, which he used in the negative meaning of self-interest. 191 Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, pp. 153–55; Suzuki 2007, pp. 164–68. Nakamura Tadashi, too, contends that Ishigaya intended with his plans to create a balance between kokueki 国益 (benefit for the country) andekisuji 益筋 (profits for the city a domain doctor and shogunal policies 147

Ishigaya’s reforms, kokueki, too, often implied simply profit for the shogunate more than anything else.192 Unlike Hakuseki, Ishigaya had no intention to reduce trade, nor did he plan to increase the trade volume in Nagasaki, but rather to replace copper with other products as a way of importing precious metals.193 Filling the coffers of the shogunate thereby was arguably his main objective.194 In the shogunal orders of 1764 pertaining to Nagasaki, the new term kokueki deserves particular attention. Even though Ishigaya was not the first to use the term, he used it often in the context of Nagasaki, as did Heisuke, but to argue that they both have the same vision is difficult. Usuallykokueki ideology stands in modern scholarship for the new vision of the ruler’s relationship to economic activities that put commercial gain in the service of the state’s moral ends.195 The term became a signifier for economic thought that mainly evolved among merchants and low-ranking officials in the eighteenth century, who would appropriate the term to express their moral uprightness in their function as traders for the benefit of the country.196 Ochiai shows one

and shogunate), since prioritizing only the former implied economic losses for the shogunate and the city. From Hayashi 1912–1913, vol. 4, p. 156; pp. 153–54. 192 See also Fujita Satoru’s discussion of Tanuma Okitsugu’s policies, which overlap with Kiyomasa’s pursuits. Fujita 2007, chapter 2. 193 The imported gold and silver would be delivered straight to Edo. According to Suzuki 2007, p. 21, Ishigaya Kiyomasa inherited Hakuseki’s economic philosophy and intended to stop the outflow of gold, silver, and copper as much as possible. See also Suzuki 2007, p. 293, where she introduces a statement by Kiyomasa in which he shows his dissatisfaction with the current Nagasaki bugyō’s decision to allow a second Dutch vessel each year, mentioned above. However, a great intellectual distance certainly remains between Hakuseki and Ishigaya when we consider the implications of Ishigaya’s bullion imports. 194 For this purpose, his regulations were aimed at firmer control by the shogunate over the local administration, for which, according to the Dutch, the citizens very much disliked him. For instance, “[July 27, 1766:] The news [of the reappointment of Ishigaya] has caused great consternation and grief among the population of Naga- saki.” Deshima Diaries 2004, p. 303. 195 Sagers 2006, p. 10. 196 About kokueki 国益 (national interest) or hito no eki 人の益 (benefit to others), see, in particular, Roberts 1998. About the logos of kokueki, see Toby 2001, pp. 214–16. See also Fujita Teiichirō, who labeled Japanese mercantilism as kokueki thought, which means country’s interest, profit, or advantage (Fujita 1998). The term is a neologism without precedent in classical Chinese. Fujita means by the term a doctrine of supplying one’s own needs through one’s own production, or self-sufficiency; the thought also stressed the accumulation of precious metals rather than agricultural production as the root of wealth. Economic nationalism was a departure from the Confucian, agrarian view of the economy toward a greater emphasis on commerce (Sagers 2006, pp. 4–5). Luke Roberts argues that mercantilist thinking arose from 148 bettina gramlich-oka such instance in his investigation of sugar cultivation in this volume. Yet, as Luke Roberts has shown, the term was also used as a “container for old Confucian wine.”197 The flexibility and ambiguity of the term due to its lack of philosophical content is important, thus the term resists a precise definition but conveys a wealth of connotations. Heisuke’s Akaezo fūsetsu kō and Hōkoku igen advance various agendas, some on a small scale, directly related to current incidents and crises at hand, and some larger in scale that offer plans to bring “wealth to the country” (kuni o yutaka ni suru 国をゆたかにする).198 The broad concept that informs his argument can be branded kokueki ideology. By the 1780s the term, with all its ambiguity, was widely known and was invoked quite frequently in the context of discussions about Ezo (Ezochi ikken).199 The term’s connotation is vague, however, as we have seen in the case of Ishigaya Kiyomasa’s promulgations of 1764. It could mean either profit or prosperity for a government, on the local or state level, or benefit for the entire country. Heisuke proposed kokueki—even using ekisuji and eki alongside it200—in the same hazy meaning of benefiting the country as a whole and/or the shogunate when discussing trade with Russia and the colonization of Ezo, an approach that resonated positively in government rhetoric.201 The key point is that kokueki implies a vision of Japan versus other countries,

members of the merchant class whose concept of kokueki allowed them to think in terms of profit to the domain rather than to their lord. Therefore personal profit and community profit would come together; mercantile and state interests overlapped in domains (Roberts 1998, pp. 1–3). See also Ravina 1999; Toby 2001, pp. 197–237. As Ochiai in this volume also demonstrates, kokueki thought was not limited to domains. Although it may be fruitless to search for the origin of the term, it might be more worthwhile to look into the practice of political economy, in which government intervention in the economy was actively pursued. 197 Roberts 1998, p. 135. 198 Kudō 1969, p. 284. See also my discussion in Gramlich-Oka 2006, chapter 8. 199 Ezochi ikken 1969, p. 277. 200 See Kudō 1968, p. 502. 201 During the Ezo Affair, smuggling appeared to be one of the more urgent concerns of the shogunate, and hence kokueki signified the notion of bringing profit to the government. Other economic policies initiated by Tanuma Okitsugu (such as wholesale monopolies to control fluctuations in prices, the reorganization of Nagasaki trade, and land development) can be interpreted both ways, namely to bring benefit to the entire country or to benefit the shogunate (e.g. through additional taxes) Ezochi( ikken 1969, p. 304). The former Matsumae retainer Minato Genzaemon informed the shogunate official Tsuchiyama Sōjirō about the many islands that could becomekokueki , which are not under the control of Matsumae, thereby ostensibly using the same rhetoric as Heisuke did (ibid., p. 277). About Tanuma’s policies, see Hall 1955, pp. 65–66; Yamada 1988, p. 50; Totman 1993, pp. 344–45; Koyama 1996, pp. 158–63. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 149 and not the narrow view of a domain vis-à-vis other domains or the shogunate. When Heisuke demonstrated that Russia used trade for international expansion and colonizing for national needs, he showed how economic profit led to benefit for the country. In his opinion, the obvious success of Russia’s expansionist policy deserved to be taken as a model by Japan.202 Under the broad umbrella of kokueki, Heisuke suggested the active participation of the shogunate in foreign trade in order to accumulate wealth and thus power.203 The wealth of a country, according to Heisuke, was measured in quantity of bullion. Throughout society, currency (gold, silver, and copper) replaced grains and other agricultural products as the basic standard of wealth, and its accumulation should be the primary goal. Heisuke’s position, advocating that the shogunate should embrace the economy of precious metals and money to the fullest, is represented most radically by Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755–1817) and Honda Toshiaki,204 and more moderately by Dazai Shundai and Yamagata Bantō.205 What they envisioned was a Tokugawa state that had to define its political and economic boundaries. Kokueki became the justification of the ruler’s concern with economic affairs.206 Trade became vital to the survival of a domain or (as Heisuke points out) to the Tokugawa shogunate. Heisuke’s two proposals are mercantilist, and his recurrent references to the Dutch and Russian Empires support this assumption. Yet Heisuke also called for a new form of political economy, under an ethical concept that stipulated the duty of the government to rule and to order its people with benevolence.207 In ancient China, bureaucrats called gushi 賈師 were appointed as officials of trade (sōba yakunin 相場役人). From then on, the emperor

202 “There are books that advise how to produce more commodities that could be used for export in order to reduce the outflow of copper, which will be the foundation for a plan to enrich the country (kokka no tosaku 国家の富策).” Kudō 1968, p. 502. 203 In Kudō 1968, p. 503, Heisuke uses the term explicitly; see also Kudō 1969, p. 286. His friend Hayashi Shihei uses the term kokueki as early as 1765 in a memorandum to the lord of Sendai (Roberts 1998, p. 134). 204 Honda Toshiaki suggested the colonization of the islands near Japan for military as well as economic reasons to strengthen Japan (Keisei Hisaku, translated in Keene 1969, p. 170). 205 For a discussion of Bantō’s thought, see Najita 1991, pp. 653–56. 206 For a discussion of kokueki rhetoric, see Roberts 1998; Roberts 2005. 207 Heisuke does not use the terminology “order the country and save its people” (keisei saimin), but as mentioned above, members of his network do. 150 bettina gramlich-oka

(tenshi 天子) would oversee the office, asking bureaucrats (kanpu 官府) to act in his stead in the management of the grains and other markets (sōba 相場).208 Virtuous rule in ancient China extended to the supervision of commerce by the emperor. Although this is certainly an overstatement of the original source, which does not require the emperor to play any active part, his critique of the Tokugawa shoguns who established the divide between rulership and commerce is clear. Yet Heisuke situates his argument with an example from ancient China, the standard reference point, to enable the reader to understand his ideas better. In case the reader was not inclined to be impressed by classical Chinese examples, Heisuke added, “For the Dutch, too, [commerce] is part of the function of the king.”209 Ten years later, in Kudō Bankō monjo, Heisuke, now informed by Daikokuya Kōdayū, reports that Russian officials were also business owners; there was no discrimination between the sword or trade, all were merchants (shishō no betsu naku kotogotoku shōnin nari 士商の別なく尽く商人なり).210 Makuzu repeats much from this piece in her own treatise, as for instance: The father of the Russian called Adam [Laxman], who sent ship- wrecked Japanese all the way back to Ezo, is said to have held a position comparable to that of Japan’s junior councilors, and he was also the head of a cabinetry shop and a seller of glass.211 Livestock wholesalers are appointed senior councilors and sake wholesalers are chosen for other posts. Officials are thus the heads of this wholesaler or that, and since they engage in trade as gentlemen (kunshi 君子), prices are appropriate, and the country is not racked by strife. It is their wish, I hear, to enrich the country (kuni o tomasen 国を富ません) by engaging in trade.212 Makuzu echoes Heisuke’s requests and advice to the shogunate, which implied a certain image of the political ethics of rulers, with a changed

208 Kudō 1968, p. 495. In the Zhouli 周禮 (Rites of the Zhou) 2:31 it says that the gushi (official) are in charge of managing the prices for certain markets, in particular in times of natural disasters and warfare. 209 Kudō 1968, p. 495. 210 Kudō 2003, p. 170. Heisuke continues that they all serve in their office with bunbu 文武 (brush and sword), the slogan of the time. 211 Adam Laxman’s father was actually a Finnish-born professor of natural science at the St. Petersburg Academy (see Lensen 1959, p. 97). 212 Tadano 1994a, pp. 276–77; Goodwin 2001, p. 33. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 151 paternalistic role, found everywhere in the world but Japan.213 Heisuke no longer envisioned good government as the result of the ruler’s moral cultivation. Instead, political economy came into focus as a method of government. Since in the Chinese classics profit-seeking was not the act of a benevolent ruler,214 scholars had to build a plausible link between profit and virtue, arguing that a lord’s duty was to extend benevolence to the people, but that—and this is the key—sufficient revenue and hence economic involvement were required in order to do this successfully. The lord had to be a policy-maker with regard to economic activities for the benefit of the country. One of the first intellectuals to demand government involvement in commerce was Dazai Shundai, who claimed famously: To govern the whole nation under heaven is keizai. It is the virtue of ruling society and relieving the sufferings of the people.Kei is wise statesmanship. . . . Sai means the virtue of salvation. . . . It is also the virtue of bringing relief. . . . Moreover, it may be interpreted as meaning ‘accomplishment’ or ‘bringing to fruition.’ Therefore the term keizai[ 経済] has many meanings, but the essential point of those meanings is simply this: in short, to manage affairs and to bring these affairs to a successful conclusion.215 Shundai makes extensive use of the term ‘virtue’ (toku 徳) to stress that the importance of morality in the economic endeavor of profit- making (toku 得) would not be forsaken. This view of profit is similar to that of Sai On discussed by Gregory Smits in chapter 3. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki has argued, the moral obligation of keisei saimin 経世済民, or keikoku saimin 経国済民 (shortened to keizai, administering the nation and relieving the suffering of the people),216 and the drive to promote the domains via kokueki together indicate

213 Kaiho Seiryō wrote two decades later in 1813, “The warrior laughs when told that the King of Holland engages in commerce.” Keikodan, quoted in De Bary 1965, p. 493. 214 See, for instance, Mencius 6A–B in Lau 1970, pp. 135–36. 215 Dazai Shundai 1972a, pp. 227–28. Translation in Morris-Suzuki 1989, pp. 13–14. See also Najita 1972, p. 831. 216 Morris-Suzuki 1989, pp. 13–14. While the origin of the terminology of keisei saimin is unclear, Dazai Shundai uses it and so do other intellectuals of the early eighteenth century, among them Aoki Kon’yō. Nevertheless, the concept that the duty of the ruler is to govern with benevolence is ancient. See, for instance, The Great Learn- ing 4 and 5, in Legge 1971, pp. 357–59. See, for a discussion of keisei saimin, Najita 1987 and Kinski 1997, pp. 115–98, neither of whom mentions the origin of the term. 152 bettina gramlich-oka an ideological shift. Kokueki ideology certainly enhanced the argument for keizai.217 Honda Toshiaki, who admires Empress Catherine II (1762–1796) in his Secret Plan of Governance, 1798, for demonstrating the “sign of great benevolence,”218 claims that “the ruler’s duty to the nation requires him to secure profit for the nation regardless of the expenses involved.”219 In Ishigaya’s and Heisuke’s time, however, the term kokueki could be used to support anything from personal profit (domain or shogunal treasury) to public good. Luke Roberts has argued that the creation of kokueki thought in domains in the eighteenth century and its emergence into public rhetoric represented the beginning of a key shift away from an economic vision based upon service between heads of households, where relationships between the ruling samurai lords functioned as the primary legitimating structure of economic activity.220 Although in general I agree with Roberts, it is difficult to trace the historical, linear progress from the level of merchant ideology, to the domain administration level, to later appropriation by the shogunate. Recent discussion has focused mainly on domains, and the shogunate is commonly seen as reacting belatedly to this ideological transformation of political economy. As I have demonstrated here, and as Ochiai has shown elsewhere in this volume, we encounter earlier instances in which kokueki is explicitly in the center of shogunal policies as early as the 1760s. The politics in which Heisuke was involved saw the protection of the Tokugawa hegemony as vital. Yet a change in the administration of its rule and thus its ideological foundation was just as vital. In this way Heisuke is an example of how theory is modified to encompass existing reality. His economic vision was designed to contribute to the cohesiveness of the social fabric and the political order, but it also put Japan on the international map to an unprecedented extent. The

217 As, for instance, Satō Nobuhiro argued: “Keizai means managing the nation, developing its products, enriching the country and rescuing all its people from suffering. Thus the person who rules the country must be able to carry out his important task without relaxing his vigilance even for a single day. If this administration of keizai is neglected, the country will inevitably become weakened, and both rulers and people will lack the necessities of life.” Translation by Morris-Suzuki 1989, p. 35. 218 Cited by Ikuta 2008, p. 19. 219 Honda 1970, translated in Keene 1969, p. 165. 220 Roberts 1998, p. 9. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 153 reformist concept of kokueki, which has trade as a source of wealth, would soon after become a stable notion. Moreover, the flexibility of the term, which encompassed for some the mercantilist concept of “prosperity of the country,” already entailed the concept of “national interest,” the vision of an economic unit of the state.

F. Some Concluding Remarks

The shogunate was certainly not a monolithic and constant authority, especially in regard to economic vision. I began this article by suggesting the need to reevaluate the Tanuma period with respect to the economic thought among the higher officials of the shogunal administration. In showcasing Nagasaki and Ezo as points of economic and political interest, I introduced the new notion of political economy that was integral to social networks of high-ranking officials, daimyo, doctors, and scholars. The agendas of expanding foreign trade and military defense to strengthen and enrich the country became, by the 1790s, stock rhetoric among a small but growing group connected to the shogunate, a network of which Kudō Heisuke was part. Policies and reforms need to be seen within the context of social networks. The traffic across social strata and positions has ramifications not only in Heisuke’s work, but is well documented in the works of scholars such as, for instance, Hayashi Shihei and Honda Toshiaki, who take up the same issue about ‘Japan’ and international trade and policy.221 Thus, trust networks are the active ‘sites’ of political and economic

221 Even though Akaezo fūsetsu kō was never published until the Meiji period, when Kōno Tsunekichi 河野常吉 introduced Heisuke’s text (Shichinomiya 1977, p. 130), Aizawa Seishisai cites Heisuke in his unpublished manuscript Chishima ibun 千島異聞 (Strange Tales of the Kuril Islands, written 1801 or 1804). See appendix in Waka- bayashi 1986, pp. 281–82. Also, in Ezo shūi 蝦夷拾遺 (Ezo Miscellany, 1789, not to be confused with the famous Ezo shūi by Aoyama Shunzō 青島俊蔵, 1786) Honda Toshiaki writes almost identically what Heisuke stated about Oroshiya (Ōtomo 1943, pp. 47–48). Ōtomo’s claim that Miura Baien cites from the work in his Kisanroku 帰山録 (Record of Return, 1778) is not convincing, because it was written earlier (Ōtomo 1943, p. 15). However, Baien was part of Heisuke’s larger network, and shares many of his thoughts. For instance, Baien was an acquaintance of Kudō Jōan, Heisuke’s father, and Yoshio Kōgyū was a common acquaintance (Miura 1955c, p. 9). Even if Baien does not refer directly to Heisuke, Ōta Nanpo does so in Enkai kibun 沿海記聞, where Akaezo fūsetsu kō is part of his collection, copied in 1792/10/27. The collection ended up in the library of no other than Watanabe Kazan (Ōta 1985–90, vol. 19, p. 665). 154 bettina gramlich-oka interaction. The public sphere of an informed intellectual elite, such as Heisuke’s network, does not work to counteract and eventually undermine the dominant power, but functions as an integrated part of the political structure. In future work, I intend to illustrate the interconnection among men (rarely women) who advanced ideas in various fields and interests, exploring the sites of these relations as a new way to understand the political and intellectual history of early modern Japan. To understand the public sphere in the early modern context, we need to move away from the bottom-up view as well as the outsider-insider view. Instead I propose envisioning a public sphere that is more transient and not delineated clearly. Eiko Ikegami’s investigation of enclave publics that exist parallel to and independent of official authority but eventually undermine and erode it is thus only partially helpful.222 It is important to bear in mind that the structures laid out by the Tokugawa government were not fixed and clear. For instance, as Mary Elizabeth Berry has shown, “the shogunate established no direct tie with subjects and exacted no paramount loyalty from them. While demanding obedi- ence from those subjects, the shogunate inculcated no sentiment of attachment to the person or the office of the shogun.”223 The divide between private and public remains vague and ambiguous and needs further investigation.224 The public sphere is not a neu- tral space between state and society, but a site reserved for articulation of a critical public and elite. Eiko Ikegami’s view of a civil society that includes multiple publics and aesthetic enclaves where individuals met voluntarily based on common interests, creating alternative identities and participating in various enclaves concurrently, is thus still useful. These enclaves served more than literary and aesthetic pursuits. They were also sites of public politics from which political and economic policies emerged. With this approach we are able to move away from a top-to-bottom or bottom-up approach to political thought. As long as we do not have sources that explain to us how decisions were made

222 In the public enclaves, Ikegami argues, people debated the news and proposed policy. Ikegami means to show how these public enclaves could erode the feudal hegemony of the Tokugawa state. The result is civilized knowledge (cultural literacy) (Ikegami 2005, p. 19). 223 Berry 2006, p. 230. 224 Ikegami 2005, p. 10. a domain doctor and shogunal policies 155 concretely in the shogunate, this focus on social networks may serve as an alternative.225226227

Appendix

Copper prices (average per 100 kin in silver monme)225 Cost of export Purchase price for VOC price Domestic copper paid to Chinese merchants market price mines226 in Nagasaki 1697 ca. 92 104 106 1698 107 110.5 1700 113.5 115.9 1701 103–105 121 115.9 121 1708 136 1711 115.9 191–193.5 1712 135 116.4 251–253 1714 135.5 120.4 1717 141–174 195–240 1746 140–156227 1751 130–145 1752 125 130–146 1753 139–145 1754 143–197 1755 150–176 1756 153–164 1757 210 150–160 1758 150–153 1759 150–194

225 For VOC and Chinese copper prices, see Kobata 1980, pp. 30 and 64. For more details on VOC prices, see Yao 1998, pp. 140–41, who lists the copper prices for the VOC from 1691–1725. He compares three different sources with different amounts. Table 7 lists the refiners’ price for the VOC, not including other costs, such as taxes and levies. For domestic prices, see Nagazumi 1960, pp. 412–13; Kobata 1980, p. 106f.; Imai 1988, 52–53; and Iwasaki 1995, p. 26, who has a table of the price from 1751– 1766. Iwasaki has the best listings for copper purchases of the dōza between 1751 and 1769. I also added data from Meylan 1861, p. 104, pp. 126–29; Münsterberg 1896, pp. 280–81; Ōsaka shishi 1911, p. 392, pp. 392–99; Kudō 1968, pp. 494, 495; Deshima Diaries 2004, pp. 168 and 44; and Gramlich-Oka 2008. 226 The price was at first for refiners in Osaka, and later, from 1765 onwards, for the copper officedōza ( ), which purchased all mined copper centrally. Also, the price can only be an approximate number, since the amount varied depending on the mine. 227 For Tatsukawa/Besshi and Nambu mines: 139.4 monme; Akita mines: 156.52 monme. Nagazumi 1960, pp. 411–12. 156 bettina gramlich-oka

(cont.) Cost of export Purchase price for VOC price Domestic copper paid to Chinese merchants market price mines in Nagasaki

1760 160–195 1761 190–240 1762 194–248 1763 233–258 1764 242–276 1765 ~216.3 1766 ~200 1768 ~152228 240 1774 217 1780 217 1789 223229

228 Between 1768 and 1803 the Tatsukawa/Besshi mines received an additional 12.5 monme, which raised the purchasing price to 151.98, and from 1804 to 1842 another 8.333 monme, thus 160.333, rising steadily so that by 1863 the purchase price of the dōza from the mines was 314.48 monme per 100 kin of unrefined copper. Nagazumi 1960, pp. 412–13. 229 Nagazumi 1960, p. 413. See note 89. THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF SHŌJI KŌKI AND THE TENPŌ REFORMS IN SAGA DOMAIN

Jan Sýkora*

In the first part of the nineteenth century the Tokugawa regime was confronted with both political and economic crises that resulted in political and social disorder. Moreover, the foreign threat stemming from the concerted activities of the Western powers, whose ships frequently appeared offshore in unprecedented numbers, was an unmis- takable omen of the coming crises of shogunal foreign policy. The series of attempts undertaken in the early 1840s by both shogunate and individual domains to stabilize the political, economic, and social systems and strengthen military capabilities did not produce satisfac- tory results. Compared to both the shogunate government and the majority of domains, however, Saga domain coped with the problems in a relatively successful way. The reforms that had been implemented by the young domain lord (hanshu), Nabeshima Naomasa 鍋島直正 (1814–1871), since 1835 contributed to economic stabilization and became a platform for constructing and operating the first reverberatory furnace (hansharo 反射炉) in Japan in 1850. New technology for mobilizing and managing economic resources became necessary for successful manufacturing of heavy artillery and for opening the door for implementing the policy of “the rich country with the strong army” in the early Meiji period. Although the leading role in sketching and elaborating these plans was played by a group of domainal intellectuals of samurai origin, with Naomasa’s advisor Koga Kokudō 古賀穀堂 (1776–1836) as the central figure, one cannot omit the partial role of the commoners represented by the wealthy merchant from Arita, Shōji Kōki 正司考祺 (1793–1857). In this chapter I will focus on three main topics: first, analysis of the broader intellectual and social network through which Kōki introduced his main economic ideas to the representatives of Saga domain; second, part of his economic thought

* I greatfully acknowledge the helpful comments on this essay by participants of the Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan conferences held at Tübingen Univer- sity (May 29–June 1, 2008) and Columbia University (June 26–27, 2009). 158 jan sýkora concerning the main causes of the economic stagnation in Saga domain in the first quarter of the nineteenth century; and third, how much of his practical advice was actually implemented in the Tenpō Reforms in Saga domain. Although no one disputes Japan’s fascinating economic development during most of the twentieth century, there has been less agreement about the degree and ingenuity of the intellectual modernization that accompanied it.1 Part of the assessment problem stems from the general difficulties inherent in any intellectual history: the scope of new ideas in the given intellectual milieu is actually to some extent formed and limited by the intellectual heritage from which these ideas spring. In this respect, the Meiji Restoration should be viewed as a culmination of broad intellectual discourse on political and economic issues rather than as the mere starting point of modernization. Such a view, generally accepted in the realm of political thought, has been uncommon in the realm of economic thought. In the study of the history of economic thought in the last quarter of the Tokugawa period, research efforts have been focused primarily on the narrative about how the main schools and leading persons viewed, discussed, and reflected the crucial economic problems of the Tokugawa regime.2 The huge number of academic studies published during the last two decades in both Japanese and in Western languages has, however, proved that the intellectual ferment of Tokugawa society (particularly in its last stage of development) was more complex, comprising many local scholars who were active on the periphery.3

1 Sugihara 1998, p. xi. 2 A general overview of the history of economic thought in Western languages can be found, for example, in Honjō 1965; Najita 1987; Morris-Suzuki 1989; or Komuro 1998. 3 The masterful analyses of the patterns of local economic history provided by Philip C. Brown, Mark Ravina, Luke S. Roberts, and other historians represent the new line of approach to the economic thought and political economy of early modern Japan. For comprehensive discussion on the formation of local autonomy, see Brown 1993; Roberts 1998; and Ravina 1999. One cannot omit the pathbreaking, eight-volume series Nihon keizaishi (The Economic History of Japan, 1988–1989), the abridged English version of which has been appearing since 2004 under the title Economic History of Japan 1600–1990. The economic issues of early modern Japan are discussed in the first volume: Hayami et al. 2004,Emergence of Economic Society in Japan 1600–1859. Although this work is focused mainly on economic history, its significance for the study of economic thought is obvious. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 159

One such provincial intellectual was the self-educated, local wealthy merchant Shōji Kōki 正司考祺 (1793–1857), whose main writings are included in both Nihon keizai sōsho 日本経済叢書 and Nihon keizai taiten 日本経済大典. He elaborated the thoroughgoing analysis of the main economic problems, namely the financial distress the Saga domain suffered in the early nineteenth century, and proposed a plan for a remedy consisting of a set of concrete countermeasures. Although the scope of his intellectual discourse was inevitably shaped and limited by the Tokugawa social order, his practical knowledge of real economic life and his moderate pragmatism threw a fresh light on domain reforms, particularly in their initial stage during the early 1830s.

A. Shōji Kōki: His Life, Social Network, and Economic Thought

The ancestor of the Shōji family was supposed to have been of samurai origin, serving as a vassal of Amago Tsunehisa 尼子経久 (1458–1541), a powerful warlord of Izumo Province. His descendant, Shōji Jibei 庄司次兵衛, however, for unknown reasons became a rōnin, changed his family name to Shōji written in different characters 正司( ), and settled in Hizen Province, first in Takeo, Nishiyama-mura武雄西山村, and later moved to Arita 有田, Sarayama 皿山. Koki’s great- grandfather Genshichirō 正司減七郎 set up a family business dealing mainly in brushes used for manufacturing colored Arita porcelain. Kōki was the second son of Shōji Seishichirō 正司正七郎, but his elder brother Girokurō 正司儀六郎 having established his own ceramic kiln, it was Kōki who followed in his father’s footsteps. Since the records in the family assets register Eidaichō 永代帳 written in Kōki’s handwriting date back to 1804, he most probably took over the family business in the very beginning of the Bunka era (1804–1818). Although he gained only a basic formal education in a terakoya (the village school), he proved to be enthusiastic about scholarship, taking full advantage of his business trips, mainly around Kyushu, for establishing a wide network of close personal contacts with many leading intellectuals. Thanks to his friend and admirer Kusaba Haisen草場佩川 (1787– 1867), an eminent neo-Confucian scholar and vassal of Taku fief 多久領, Kōki was introduced to the group of intellectuals associated 160 jan sýkora mainly with Koga Kokudō 古賀穀堂 (1776–1836), a professor at the domainal academy Kōdōkan 弘道館, who drew deep inspiration from Kōki’s economic writings. Kōki, however, did not limit his interests to the economic and business agenda only, but became an active agent in discussions about military strategy and Western technology. He was supposed to have had a friendly relationship with the gunnery expert and pioneering authority in Western military science Takashima Shūhan 高島秋帆 (1798–1866), dating back to his visit to Takeo. Takashima Shūhan was invited to Saga domain in 1835 by Hirayama Junzaemon 平山醇左衛門, who became his disciple by order of Nabeshima Shigeyoshi 鍋島茂義 (1800–1863), Lord of Takeo fief武雄領 . In 1830 Shigeyoshi, a brother-in-law of Nabeshima Naomasa, was called to serve as a chief adviser to the young Lord Naomasa in the field of financial reform, but since he strictly opposed the travel of the former domain lord Nabeshima Narinao to Edo, he was forced to resign from his position, retired to his fief, and devoted himself to the study of Western learning, particularly military science.4 Shūhan traveled widely around northern Kyushu (Takeo, Saga, Ureshino, Dazaifu, Kurume, Kuma- moto) and established a strong social network, including the wealthy merchant Shōji Kōki. When Egawa Tarōzaemon 江川太郎左衛門 (1801–1855),5 local administrator in Nirayama 韮山 in Izu Province, invited Takashima Shūhan to Nirayama for a demonstration of West- ern technology, Shūhan encouraged Kōki to travel with him; unfortunately, Kōki had to refuse the invitation due to his ill health. In 1833 Kōki set out for a long journey to Edo, mainly for business. However, he took full advantage of that trip to strengthen his contacts with the leading intellectuals of that time. The pivotal position in his social network in Edo was occupied by neo-Confucian scholar and principal teacher at the official shogunate academyShōheikō 昌平黌, Satō Issai 佐藤一斎 (1772–1859). As a official shogunate scholar, Issai was obliged to teach the Zhu Xi school of neo-Confucianism (shushi-

4 Shigeyoshi collected more than 140 foreign books, mainly written in Dutch, on natural science, medicine, Western military arts, and industrial technology, which are now in the possession of the Takeo Historical Archive 武雄市歴史資料館. 5 Known also as Egawa Hidetatsu 江川英龍 or Egawa Tan’an 江川担庵, he had studied Western gunnery under Takashima Shūhan in Edo since 1841. In 1844 he moved back to his birthplace, Nirayama in Izu province, in order to pursue experiments with the reverberatory furnace and in casting the material for manufacturing heavy artillery. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 161 gaku 朱子学), but his personal leanings were toward the teaching of the Ming Chinese, idealist, neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), in Japan known under the name Yōmeigaku 陽明学. Later, in 1841, Issai was appointed as a teacher of Shōheikō, and his students included the prominent scholars of Western learning Sakuma Shōzan 佐久間象山 (1811–1864), Watanabe Kazan 渡辺崋山 (1793–1841), and Yokoi Shōnan 横井小楠 (1809–1869). Shōji Kōki deepened his keen interest in “practical learning” (jitsugaku 実学) on the way back to Kyushu in Osaka, where he spent several months staying in the house of his contemporary, Ōshio Heihachirō 大塩平八郎 (1793–1837), an ardent proponent of Yōmeigaku teaching. Heihachirō emphasized particularly the universality of virtue, which transcends all social distinctions, and the idea of the moral commitment to act in the name of popular justice. Moved by the suffering of the people after the famine of 1836–1837, he first sold his superb library to help the poor, and then, only four years after Kōki’s visit, organized a revolt against rich merchants and Osaka officials. Although the rebellion was crushed and Heihachirō took his own life, the impact of his act on Tokugawa intellectuals was of immense importance. During his stay in Osaka, Shōji Kōki also took the opportunity to meet the leading members of Osaka merchant society, including the intellectuals of merchant origin associated with the Kaitokudō academy 懐徳堂.6 After returning to Arita he won a reputation as a respected scholar and expert in military science. He was frequently invited by lords of Hirado domain 平戸藩 and Ōmura domain 大村藩 to deliver lectures on military strategy based on the knowledge he acquired through his broad social network. His proficiency and “quali- fication” for such activity might be inferred from his deep interest in Western military science and industrial (casting) technology. In the Shōji Family Records Collection (Shōjike monjo 正司家文書), there is a book entitled Sēaru terurerī セーアルテルレリー, which is the Japa- nese translation of J. N. Calten’s book on maritime artillery “Leiddraad bij het Onderrigt in de Zee-Artillerie.” The book, originally published in Delft (no date) was translated into Japanese and published in Japan

6 For a discussion on the intellectual heritage of the Kaitokudō (Osaka merchant academy), see Najita 1987. 162 jan sýkora in 1832.7 The fact that Kōki possessed this translation of a Western book on a topic quite removed from his business interests shows not only his willingness to spend a considerable amount of money for such a rare book, but also his deep interest in military affairs and his ability to understand the topic. Intense relations with the academic milieu or with political representatives, however, did not drag Kōki away from his business. Thanks to his business experience, managerial skills, thrift, and diligence, he managed to accumulate great wealth, much of which he devoted to encouraging public education in Arita and vicinity. On August 9, 1828 the northern part of Kyushu was struck by an extremely violent typhoon,8 which destroyed half of Arita and caused a disastrous fire. Shōji Kōki expended more than 300 ryō in immediate relief aid and funded several public undertakings in Sarayama focused on development work (land reclamation, opening new ceramic kilns, and so on). He died at the age of 64, and his tomb is situated only a couple of hundred meters from his former residence in Arita.9 The basic principles of Shōji Kōki’s discourse on economics and politics can be traced mainly in Keizai mondō hiroku 経済問答秘録 (Confidential Memorandum on the Dispute over [Political] Economy, 1831), Kenpō fukyōroku 倹法富強録 (Memorandum on Economy, Prosperity, and Power, 1832),10 and partly in Tenmeiroku 天明録 (Records of Tenmei Era, 1856),11 whereas his views on trade and com-

7 The group of translators consisted of Sugita Seikei杉田成卿 (1817–1859), the grandson of a physician and eminent scholar of Western learning Sugita Genpaku 杉田玄白 (1733–1817), his father Sugita Rikkei 杉田立卿 (1786–1845), Mitsukuri Genpo 箕作阮甫 (1799–1863), Shinagawa Umejirō 品川梅次郎 (1808–1857), Take- nouchi Gendō 竹内玄同 (1805–1880) and Udagawa Yōan 宇田川榕菴 (1798–1846). For a brief discussion on Western learning in Saga domain, see Goodman 2000, pp. 154–60, and for the translation of Calten’s book, which was published in 1843 under the title Kaijō hōjutsu zensho 海上砲術全書 (Complete Book of Maritime Gunnery), see p. 181. 8 The typhoon was called “Siebold typhoon”シーボルト台風 since it occurred in the same year as the Siebold Incident シーボルト事件. 9 His lifelong friend Kusaba Haisen composed and carved in his own hand an epigraph on the tombstone enumerating Kōki’s achievements and contributions. 10 The original of the “Memorandum” is in the possession of the Arita History and Folklore Archive 有田町歴史民族資料館, and several copies are deposited at Saga Prefectural Library 佐賀県立図書館. For the printed version, see Shōji 1989. 11 Shōji 1916b. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 163 mercial activities are discussed particularly in his Kashoku yōdō 家職要道 (Important Teaching on Family Business, 1851).12 His most important work, Confidential Memorandum on the Dis- pute over [Political] Economy, consisting of thirty chapters, is written in the classical dispute form, that is, as a dialogue between a visitor (a disciple) and his host (a master). It begins with the definition of “economy.” To the visitor’s question about the concept of keizai (economy), Kōki provides the following answer: In this world there is a fallacy that economy consists in increasing the amount of money and realizing a profit. . . . Such understanding is quite adequate, if you strive for enriching the family. But if you govern the whole nation under heaven, it might finally bring great disaster. Econ- omy means administering the country through benevolent rule. The Great Learning says: “Profit for the country does not lie in [pursuing] profit, but it consists in [pursuing] humanity.” This phrase represents the essential point of how to enrich a country.13 Kōki’s vision, in principle, corresponds with the Dazai Shundai’s concept of economy (keikoku saimin 経国済民) as “administering the nation and relieving the suffering of the people.”14 It does not differ much from the standard Confucian idea of economy as a philosophical system inescapably bound up with questions of law and morality, and should not be confused with “business” (ie wo tomasu 家ヲ富マス), which is reserved for merchants.15 Compared with the view of “classical” proponents of keikoku saimin theory, in Kōki’s interpretation wise government does not mean simply practicing the traditional virtues of charity and justice, but actively intervening in the system and striving to promote prosperity through the introduction of new techniques and new types of production. The greatest profit for the country results from domestic products. These products come from sea, ponds, paddies, and fields. In other words, there is no other way [to profit] but to manufacture various products, draw gold and silver money from other countries, and not allow the flow of even one piece of gold to the outside.16

12 Shōji 1916c. 13 Shōji 1916a, p. 6. 14 Dazai 1972a, p. 16. 15 For comprehensive discussion on Kōki’s ideas on political economy versus the business activities of merchants, see Matsuyoshi 1932; Azuma 1951; Miyamoto 1977; and Sýkora 1998. 16 Shōji 1989, p. 77. 164 jan sýkora

Thus, as his ideas unfold, his concepts are less and less reminiscent of the benevolent feudal lord, and increasingly suggestive of a centralized, development-oriented body (that is, the domain-state). For successful implementation of such a policy, however, a set of prerequisites must be met. The first is the rearrangement of the social structure, particularly the redefinition of the hierarchical order based on the division of society into four classes, shi-nō-kō-shō. To avoid misunderstanding, Kōki was neither a social reformer nor a proponent of thoroughgoing egalitarianism. He advocated the preservation of the existing Tokugawa class system with samurais—as the political elite—at the top of the social hierarchy (kimi wa shimin no fubo nari 君ハ四民ノ父母ナリ), but he criticized the still generally accepted dualistic theory of the “natural” division of society into warriors and peasants.17 He called for the transformation of society into a more rational and flexible order that would better reflect the division of labor, arguing that each class had its own unsubstitutable role (seijin shishiki no michi 聖人四職ノ道) in society and should be treated equally (nō-kō-shō, sanbō 農工商、三宝). In accordance with physiocratic thought (nōhonshugi 農本主義), which was the prevailing doctrine through the whole Tokugawa period, he recognized the significant function of agriculture as a fundamental economic activity nō( wa kuni no moto nari 農ハ国ノ本ナリ). However, his view was far from the policy of “promoting agriculture and restraining commerce” (jūnō yokushō 重農抑商), which identified the merchant as an economic parasite who, in Ogyū Sorai’s wording, “unlike the craftsman or farmer earns money just by sitting there without moving a muscle.”18 Kōki, on the contrary, explained the function of the merchant as an intermediary whose activities helped to balance supply and demand for the specific products at the market called, in his terminology, “heaven’s circulation” (tendō junkan 天道循環). Thus, economic affairs, meaning business and financial transactions, should be entrusted exclusively to merchants who follow the “Way of business” (chishō no michi 治商ノ道), which is nothing more than pursuing their “heaven’s calling.” Kōki’s “Way of business” is, however, quite different from

17 See, for example, Ōyama Shigenori’s Notes: “From medieval times peasants had been separated from soldiers; from ancient times soldiers governed peasants and peasants always fed soldiers. Today, the farmers’ duty is to cultivate land and support samurai.” (Ōyama 1916, p. 138). 18 Ogyū 1973b, p. 333. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 165 the “Way of the merchant” (chōnindō 町人道), the merchant ethos promulgated particularly by the eclectic religious philosopher Ishida Baigan 石田梅岩 (1685–1744) and his disciples. Baigan’s “Way of the merchant” involved the cultivation of insight into the merchant’s true nature. When this insight is achieved, merchants will understand that “their real interests lie not in the instant gratification of avarice but in diligence and frugality.”19 Baigan proposed the way of enlightenment through self-restriction focused on ensuring for merchants an honored place within the existing social order.20 Unlike Baigan, Kōki attempts to advance the vision of a proto- laissez-faire system in which merchants are endowed with relative economic liberty. He gives the example of Chōshū (Hagi) domain, where the free business and financial activities of the merchant family called Kumaya, under the supervision of domain authorities (ue yori kinko no ban 上ヨリ金庫ノ番), brought not only handsome profit for the merchant family but substantially benefited the whole domain as well.21 Needless to say, Kōki was not the first figure to point out the positive role of commerce (including financial services) and accepted it as an essential part of domain economic activities, particularly in domain monopolies. The idea of domain monopolies on the sale of specific local products emerged early in the Tokugawa period and was advocated by such philosophers as Dazai Shundai. His support for the promotion of commerce did not, however, imply direct support for the profit-making activities of the merchant class. The merits of the domain monopoly lay, in his eyes, in its ability to limit the power of merchants to build fortunes on the profits of trade.22 Kōki was an enthusiastic advocate of the view that political authorities should be directly involved in wealth-creating activities by setting up the rules and demarcating the “space” for the relatively free economic, that is, business activities of the merchant class. However, under such conditions the supervision conducted by domain or shogunal political authorities was extremely important, particularly in the realm of financial affairs, because the well-considered intervention that reflects the actual business situation kuni( no seisui 国ノ盛衰) may

19 Morris-Suzuki 1989, p. 29. 20 For Ishida Baigan’s ideas on the social order, see the Kawaguchi chapter in this volume. 21 Shōji 1916a, pp. 225–27. 22 Dazai 1972a, pp. 48–51. 166 jan sýkora stabilize the market and contribute to “national prosperity” (kokueki 国益).23 In sum, Kōki made a clear distinction between the “political” economy as a process of governing “economic” issues, and the economy in the sense of practical business activities. The former should originate in public ethics with its paragon of the virtuous ruler, represented by the domain (government) administrators; the latter is based on the profit-making activities of merchants who have perfect knowledge of the actual business situation in the market. However different these spheres seem to be, they are completely intertwined and represent two sides of the same coin. This reasoning and its conclusions became the main axis of the economic reforms in Saga domain, at least in their second phase beginning in 1836.

B. The Economic Situation in Saga Domain at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century

The economic problems that Saga domain had to tackle at the turn of the nineteenth century were neither unique nor unprecedented. Although all regions faced their individual problems arising from their considerable topographical, climatic, and economic diversity, several common features were shared by all domains: declining tax revenue and other income, huge expenditures related to the duty of alternate attendance (sankin kōtai 参勤交代) and the necessity of maintaining a mansion in Edo, rising loans resulting in a self-destructive spiral of indebtedness, the harmful effect of domainal paper currency hansatsu( 藩札), and so on. However, in the case of Saga domain, at least two additional factors aggravated its economic situation. The first was the relatively close relations of the Nabeshima family to the Tokugawa clan. In 1590 Nabeshima Naoshige 鍋島直茂 (1538–1618) was recognized by Toyotomi Hideyoshi as daimyo of Saga with the considerably high income of 357,036 koku. His son Nabeshima Katsushige 鍋島勝茂 (1580–1657) fought for the Toyo- tomi faction in the Battle of Sekigahara, but after its defeat he swore loyalty to Tokugawa Ieyasu, who confirmed him in his position and domain. Although the three collateral branches of the Nabeshima clan

23 Shōji 1916a, pp. 19–20. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 167 were originally enfeoffed as meretozama daimyō 外様大名 in Hizen province, in 1648 the members of the main branch were granted the shogunal family name Matsudaira, and almost 200 years later, in 1825, the eleventh Shogun Tokugawa Ienari 徳川家斉 (1773–1841), mainly for political reasons, married off his daughter Morihime盛姫 to young Lord Nabeshima Naomasa 鍋島直正 (1814–1871).24 Since Naomasa’s father could not afford to lag behind the splendor of the shogun “court,” he rebuilt the Nabeshima mansion in Edo and substantially increased the expenses of its maintenance. The data on the expenses of Nabeshima domain in Edo in those days provide vivid evidence of this adverse trend. While the average sum of the domainal expenditure in Edo during the Bunka era (1804–1818) was about 200 kan of silver per year, in 1818 it suddenly increased to 1,886 kan, in 1820 to 2,204 kan, and in 1825 it reached 5,909 kan.25 Although the shogunate made, on the other hand, a substantial contribution and “extra loan” of 20,000 ryō to Saga domain after the second enclosure of Saga castle was completely destroyed by fire in 1835, the “necessity” of demonstrating luxury and sumptuousness posed a serious problem and represented an extremely heavy burden for domain finances.26 The second factor was the hereditary duty of securing the Naga- saki defense, which had been carried out by Saga domain together with Fukuoka domain 福岡藩 (Kuroda family 黒田家) since 1641. The problem of coastal defense had become extremely serious since the beginning of the nineteenth century when Russian, British, and American ships had begun to frequent Japanese waters, and the country was confronted at first with their demands for provisions, followed by more or less aggressive demands for trade or other relations. The threat from the south increased with the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars in Europe. In August 1808 the British frigate Phaeton succeeded in entering Nagasaki harbor by flying the Dutch flag and seized several Dutch merchants. The city commissioner Matsudaira Yasuhide松平康英 (1768–1808) assumed full responsibility for failing to defend the

24 To reinforce close relations between Saga domain and the shogunate, his father- in-law Shogun Tokugawa Ienari allowed him to use the character 斉 from his name. Thus, instead of Naomasa直正 he used the name of Narimasa 斉正 until the end of the Tokugawa period. 25 Nagano 2000, p. 70. 26 Sugitani 1992, p. 4. 168 jan sýkora city and escaped punishment by committing suicide the night after the ship’s departure. The other magistrate’s subordinates were punished for negligence, and Lord Nabeshima Narinao 鍋島斉直 (1780–1839) was placed under temporary house arrest. Moreover, the shogunate ordered the improvement of the defense system, demanding that more cannon emplacements be readied. Although it was obvious that without radical economic reforms the domain would not be able to comply with these requirements, Nari- nao implemented nothing more than the “traditional” remedies, that is, cutting expenditures by reducing retainers’ stipends, and raising revenue through additional taxes or special levies, new loans, and by issuing new domain paper currency. Such a financial policy was, however, focused not on the broader economic health of the domain, but only on short-term income. It had a devastating effect on the whole domain. The amount of land tax in rice, which averaged 90,000koku , did not change almost through the Bunsei era 文政期 (1818–1830), but the yield of its sale was very unstable and oscillated between 6,500 kan and 10,700 kan, partly due to unfavorable trends in rice prices. Moreover, the value of new loans was increasing considerably year by year during the Bunka era 文化期 (1804–1818), and in 1818 qua- drupled the average yield of rice sales (for data on changes in the amount of land tax collected during the Bunsei era and the value of loans obtained in the same period, see Table 1). Finally, the special levies, such as ninbetsugin 人別銀 imposed in 1814, which amounted to four mon of copper per capita, provoked widespread discontent and had to be eliminated in 1825. In February 1830, Naomasa officially succeeded his father Narinao as the new lord of Saga domain and moved from Edo to his fief accompanied by his tutor Koga Kokudō, who was appointed as his adviser and senior officerotoshiyori ( 御年寄), responsible for domainal reforms. First, Naomasa carried out a short inspection trip to Nagasaki to review a situation in the defense system and discussed the crucial problems of domainal finance with the leading intellectuals whose activities were mainly related to the Kōdōkan. He soon realized that the only way to strengthen Saga both financially and militarily would not be through the cosmetic changes to ineffective domain management but via sweeping and drastic economic reforms. The desperate economic situation and mismanagement, however, were not the only enemies he encountered. His plans for radical reforms clashed with the interests of conservative, high-ranking retainers of his father, who had nominally shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 169

Table 1. Amount of land tax, yield of rice sales, and loans of Saga domain in the Bunsei era Year Amount of land tax Yield of rice sales in Loans in silver paid in rice (koku) silver pieces (kan) pieces (kan) 1818 90,042 8,182 35,421 1820 91,158 8,748 18,903 1822 92,554 10,353 29,575 1824 81,753 6,438 19,627 1826 94,153 8,247 10,558 1828 58,547 3,804 18,485 1830 90,263 9,146 11,438

Source: Data from “Omononari narabi ni gin oyarikata ōmeyasu” cited in Nagano 2000, p. 64.27 27 retired from his position of liege lord but who was actually pulling the strings behind the scenes.28 Young Naomasa had to wait until 1835 when, due to the disastrous fire that completely destroyed the secondary enclosure of the Saga castle, he was forced to move to the donjon and smashed the opposition represented by the former administrative elite. Thus, the period from 1830 to 1835 can be characterized mainly by a passive policy focused on stabilizing income and cutting or restricting useless expenditures. It was also a period of intense prep- arations for the second stage (1836–1843), which is usually described as a period of implementation of growth policy and encouragement of domain monopolies in the name of “national prosperity” (kokueki 国益). The reforms were finally accomplished in the mid-1800s when Saga domain introduced and successfully operated the first reverberatory furnace in Japan with which it manufactured heavy artillery and opened the door for implementation of the policy of “the rich country with the strong army” ( fukoku kyōhei 富国強兵).

27 The extremely small amount of land tax and yield of rice sales in 1828 was due to the above-mentioned violent Siebold typhoon that damaged 35,364 houses and killed 10,282 people in Saga domain. 28 Naomasa called for fixed and strict rules for administration of the special fund, kakesuzurikata 懸硯方, which was originally intended as a military reserve fund of the Saga domain. For this “strategic” reason, fund management was exclusively under the control of the lord and his closest high-ranking vassals. Naomasa’s father Narinao, however, used this money for his own purposes, including luxury articles. Naomasa, on the contrary, designed this fund exclusively for the construction of a reverberatory furnace and for the purchase of guns, cannons, and other military equipment. 170 jan sýkora

C. Shōji Kōki and the Tenpō Reforms in Saga Domain

Formulating the reform goals, instruments, and policies and putting new ideas into practice was not a straightforward and smooth process. As mentioned above, political and economic reforms in Saga domain were realized in two stages: the first, preparatory one, between 1830 and 1835, consisted mainly of stabilization policy, and the second, “proactive” one, from 1836 to 1843, focused on economic growth. The pivotal role in sketching and elaborating the initial steps toward the reform plans was played by a group of domain intellectuals of samurai origin with Naomasa’s advisor Koga Kokudō as the central figure. In 1831 he drew up Saikyū fūji 済急封事 (Proposal for Emergency Relief, 1831) and submitted his report to Nabeshima Naomasa. However, it is a less known fact that in many respects his views and recommendations were inspired by Kōki’s Kenpō fukyōroku, the first draft of which was written in the first part of 1831 and sent to Koga Kokudō through Kusaba Haisen. The Shōji Family Records Collection includes the correspondence between Koga Kokudō and Shōji Kōki. In the letter sent to Kōki and dated the first day of the ninth month Kokudō writes: “[First day of the ninth month] I have received [your] Memorandum on Prosperity from Kusaba, found it phenomenal and copied several valuable points from it.”29 In the next letter, dated the twenty-first day of the ninth month, Kokudō reports that he “[Twenty-first day of the ninth month] sent back the tractate On Prosperity via Kusaba.”30 Although the year is omitted in both letters, we can infer the precise date from the other evidence stated in both letters. In the former, Kokudō informs Kōki about his journey to Edo: “[Twenty-first day of the ninth month] On the twenty-third day of this month I will leave this place for Edo and will be back in the fourth month of the next [year]”;31 in the letter, Kokudō expresses his gratitude for the farewell gifts that he received from Kōki on the occasion of his trip to eastern Japan. According to the biography of Lord Naomasa, he left Saga domain for Edo in the eleventh month of the second year of the Tenpō era accompanied by Koga Kokudō.32 Therefore, there is a high probability that both letters

29 The letter is a part ofSen’ō yūjin shokan. 30 Sen’ō yūjin shokan. 31 Ibid. 32 Kume 1920–1921, p. 50. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 171 were written in 1831, and thus Kokudō adopted several ideas from Kōki’s recommendations. This finding provokes two core questions: First, to what extent did Koga Kokudō actually borrow Kōki’s ideas and include them in his Proposal for Emergency Relief ? In other words, what was the real role of Shōji Kōki in defining the main axis of the policy aimed at the economic recovery of Saga domain? Second, which of his ideas (if any) actually materialized in the reforms implemented by Nabeshima Nao- masa in the late 1830s? In his Memorandum on Economy, Prosperity, and Power, Shōji Kōki further elaborates the central tenet of his economic thought as he defined it in the above-mentionedConfidential Memorandum on the Dispute over [Political] Economy. He applies the general principle of economic policy to the actual cases and problems of Saga domain. The text consists of five volumes, which can be divided into two groups. The first three volumes, called “Dispute on Profit and Loss of the Domain,” “Dispute on Currency,” and “Query about Regulations,” discuss mainly problems relating to economic issues, particularly to the question of how to construct economies (kenpō 倹法) and enrich the domain by producing “wealth” ( fu 富). The topic of the last two volumes is rather different and focuses on the problem of strengthening the military power of the domain (kyō 強). Since only the first three volumes are relevant to our inquiry into Kōki’s ideas on economic policy in Saga domain, we put aside his view on military affairs for the moment. Kōki commences his analysis of the economic problems of Saga domain by pointing out two main sources that are closely interrelated: the broad luxury that causes the outflow of currency from the domain and the lack of specific domainal products that could be sold outside the domain. In these days people are extravagant in housing, property, and clothing, . . . spend money for offerings in Honganji temple, and recently have expended huge sums of money for traveling to Osaka without permission, or traveling as far as Kanazawa; the total amount of 2.7 million golden ryō flows off from Kyushu per year.33 In his Proposal for Emergency Relief, Kokudō identifies the two major causes of financial distress and economic crisis of Saga domain, which

33 Shōji 1989, p. 81. 172 jan sýkora almost correspond to Kōki’s arguments summarized in his Memoran- dum. The first is rampant luxury and uncontrolled bad manners; the second is the lack of specific domestic products that could provide stable ground for prosperity of the domain (kokueki). He complains about the limited range of existing products that might be “exported” from Saga to neighboring domains. As for [our] domain products, there is nothing but rice followed by ceramics and porcelain. It is said that there are other kinds of such products but none, when sold, yields any benefit.34 Although Kokudō scornfully labels ceramic and porcelain production in Saga domain as a domestic product, Nabeshima ware (Nabeshima- yaki 鍋島焼)—blue and white, celadon, and polychrome porcelain— seems to have been a true state industry and must be considered one of the greatest original models of “national interest” (kokueki) resulting from foreign trade. The origin of the porcelain industry in Arita goes back to the early seventeenth century when immigrant Korean potter Yi Sam-pyeong 李参平 (ca. 1579–1655)35 discovered kaolin deposits on Izumiyama mountain 泉山 in Arita.36 Since 1675, production organized under the patronage of the Nabeshima family had been carefully supervised and guarded, and represented an important source of domainal revenues. Nabeshima ware was sold not only in Japan; under the name of Imari ware (Imari-yaki 伊万里焼) or Arita ware (Arita- yaki 有田焼), it was frequently exported to Europe by the Dutch East India Company, particularly in the late seventeenth century when the Chinese kilns in Jingdezhen 景徳鎮, due to political chaos, were damaged and the new Qing dynasty 清朝 (1644–1911) stopped trade from 1656 to 1684. However, the situation drastically changed in the early eighteenth century. Foreign trade in Imari and Arita ware through the Dutch East India Company was slowly replaced by products from Chinese kilns and almost ended around the mid-eighteenth century, as political, social, and economic conditions in the Qing Dynasty settled down. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, porcelain was still viewed as one of the most important domain products, but as Kokudō

34 Koga 1831. 35 In Japan he is known under his Japanese name Ri Sanpei or under his naturalized name Kanagae Sanpei 金ヶ江三兵衛. 36 The historical sources give different dates, but most of them put the discovery of kaolin between 1615 and 1625. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 173 pointed out, Saga domain rested mainly on its past export success and lagged behind other domains in the kokusan 国産 policy.37 In his proposal Kokudō thus enumerated many examples of neighboring domains that had succeeded in active kokusan policy, particularly Kurume domain and Yanagawa domain. This part seems to have been based on Kōki’s comprehensive analysis of the potential products suitable for manufacture and “export,” like cotton cloth, kitchen utensils, caskets, shōji (sliding paper screens), fusuma (sliding paper doors), drugs, sweet potatoes, tobacco, and so on. Kōki, as a merchant involved in day-to-day business dealings, kept good track of the actual economic situation, and considered the highest priority countermeasures that should be taken to improve the economic and financial position of Saga domain. Eventually, both authors associated potential economic growth and “national prosperity” (kokueki) with the concept of the kokusan (local production) policy. The idea of economic growth encouraged by the development of local industries, and a broad discussion about the essence of kokueki, was not entirely new in Kōki’s days. The first systematic attempt to implement the domain monopoly for specific products in order to contribute to “national” prosperity was made by Lord Nabeshima Haru- shige 鍋島治茂 (1745–1805). In 1783, just before the Kansei reforms, he established a special officeroppukata ( 六府方) for the promotion of development work (consisting mainly in the exploitation of new land) and the manufacture of specific products (particularly porcelain). The office was placed under the direct control of Lord Nabeshima, and the day-to-day management was entrusted to two inspectors and three officers. The other problem closely related to economic reform was land ownership, and in this regard the other person who made a great contribution to the formation of the intellectual background of domain reforms was without a doubt the Confucian scholar Koga Seiri 古賀

37 Kokusan (local production) was the policy of encouraging the production of specialized local goods and gaining more complete control over production operations in order to increase the domainal revenues. The whole process was managed and controlled by kokusan kaisho 国産会所, also called bussan kaisho 物産会所 (local production associations). Most of the associations were staffed by chartered merchants for their business experience, particularly in financial transactions. In order to strengthen its own finances, in 1842 the shogunate prohibited domainal monopolization of products that began to appear in the 1760s, but plans to regulate the operation of kokusan kaisho never materialized. 174 jan sýkora

精理 (1750–1817), the father of Koga Kokudō, flatteringly called one of “three sages of the Kansei era” (Kansei san hakase 寛政三博士). He followed mainly Sorai’s teaching, but came under the strong influence of the Wang Yangming school of “practical” thought as well. Although he leaned toward the orthodox Zhu Xi doctrine after being appointed a professor at the official shogunal academy Shōheikō 昌平黌 in 1796, in questions of economics he favored practical teaching. Still as an adviser (sobayōnin 側用人) to Nabeshima Harushige, he submitted his proposal for radical reform, entitled Jūjikai 十事解 (Clarification of Ten Things, 1789),38 in which he focused on the thorny situation of land ownership, particularly on the desperate position of tenants, and called for abolishing the system of equal partition of paddies (kindensei 均田制), which was a great obstacle to economic activity and growth, and for assigning the land to individual peasants. This argument was adopted by Kōki, who harshly criticized this system as a cause of the widening gap between the rich and the poor. This system produces several harmful effects: first, it destroys the good people and delights the lazy ones; second, it causes disturbance all over the country; third, it forces poverty-stricken people to pay high interest and drives them more and more into dire poverty; fourth, it encourages the people to engage in misconduct, which gradually causes problems for the government; fifth, it provides nothing for hard work; . . .39 Kōki opposed the ordinance prohibiting the sale and purchase of farmland (denpata eitai baibai kinshirei 田畑永代売買禁止令) issued by the Tokugawa shogunate in 1643 to check the accumulation of land by rich peasants and to prevent pauperization of the poorest ones. Kōki contended—in accord with Ogyū Sorai’s argument—that because the land belonged to the peasant, it was therefore at his disposal. He argued that the ordinance had become almost meaningless and would have the reverse effect from the one desired, although for most of the peasants their land represented a last resort, since selling it in the days of bad harvest could save the peasants from the starvation.40 Further- more, there was another solid argument for giving the peasants the right to dispose of their land. In Kōki’s view, wealth and prosperity on

38 Koga 1916. 39 Shōji 1916a, p. 489. 40 Ibid., p. 473. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 175 the one hand, and poverty or business failure on the other, have nothing to do with administrative restrictions or with social status. Poverty and wealth are exclusively based on the diligence and laziness of the man. . . . This is the ordinary principle of Heavens ten( no jōri 天理ノ常理).41 In Kōki’s reasoning, restriction on the possession of land and its free disposal is against the natural principle (ten no ri 天ノ理), which, in Confucian thought, imparts order and harmony to human society. Success and prosperity, Kōki argues, results from the individual engagement and free competition of all classes. If the wet and dry fields are not cultivated under the competition of all four classes (shimin tomo ni arasoi 四民共ニ争ヒ), one cannot prosper and gain affluence. Therefore it is necessary to allow it to anybody with the exception of eta caste.42 To avoid misunderstanding, Kōki was not a proponent of the free mobility of all people. As mentioned above, he advocated the existing Tokugawa class system and strictly opposed the commercialization of the countryside. In his view the participation of farmers in manufacturing and proto-industrial activities could produce harm rather than positive effects. Therefore, he urged that Saga domain should return to the “natural state” of separation of farmers and merchants (nōshō bunri 農商分離). This policy of social separation, however, was not politically or ideologically motivated but motivated mainly by economic rationality. Each social class has its own “economic” duty and if mixed living is prohibited, the merchants and the artisans do not reside together, they do not feel inferior, have an incentive [for their activities] and are diligent in their work. . . . This is the most important element of the “national” wealth ( fukoku 富国).43 The same argument was used for prohibiting the free settlement of farmers in the cities or in their vicinities in order to prevent them from engaging in any non-agricultural activities. The reasoning seems to have been simple and obvious: specialization in a particular activity may produce maximal economic effects and contribute to national prosperity.

41 Ibid., p. 484. 42 Ibid., p. 371. 43 Shōji 1989, p. 82. 176 jan sýkora

It seems to be an exaggeration to say that in Kōki’s writings the Tokugawa social hierarchy is reinterpreted into a new system com- plying with the requirements for more effective division of labor. However, the ordinance separating farmers, artisans, and merchants promulgated by Nabeshima Naomasa in 1844 was without a doubt an important step toward the consolidation of the economic conditions of the rural communities in Saga domain and helped to stabilize agricultural production and land tax income as well. This policy, accompanied by the reduction of “imports” and systematic promotion of the local production of a broad range of commodities, resulted in the economic health of the domain and facilitated investment in the development of the new industry, namely the building of the first reverberatory furnace in Japan, which began operation successfully in 1850. Because of its economic performance (particularly relative fiscal stability) and technological achievements, Saga domain was able to undertake military modernization and to play a major role in the political movement toward the Meiji Restoration.

D. Conclusion

The life of Shōji Kōki seems to be a story of an ordinary local merchant who—as a self-made intellectual—met the challenge of the economic problems of his domain. Although there is a little evidence that his proposals for economic improvements were directly implemented by domain government, it is obvious that he discussed his ideas and visions with middle-ranking domain officials and merchant intellectuals not only in Saga domain but in various regions in Japan, and played a part in preparing the intellectual background for the profound economic and political changes that were to take place about ten years after his death. Last but not the least, there is another good reason for evaluating his economic thought. Kōki was an active actor in a broader social and intellectual network through which the economic ideas inspired by the practical experience of merchants and other commoners were disseminated to the leaders of new political movements.44 Thus, his

44 For other examples of the role of personal linkages and informal social networks in sketching, planning, and implementing economic measures on various levels of the Tokugawa polity, see the Gramlich-Oka and Ochiai chapters in this volume. shōji kōki and the tenpō reforms in saga domain 177 story provides solid evidence that the phenomenon that Luke S. Rob- erts called “the merchant origins of economic nationalism”45 may be found in peripheral domains (seinan yūhan 西南雄藩) other than in Tosa. Kōki’s approach to the economic policy of Saga domain can be interpreted as an inquiry into the core problem of how the merchants helped to promote “national prosperity.” His close personal contacts prove that the formation of the new economic thought and ideology was not limited to the samurai intelligentsia but came from the broader discussion among intellectuals of various origins.

45 Roberts 1998.

CONFUCIAN BANKING: THE COMMUNITY GRANARY (SHASŌ) IN RHETORIC AND PRACTICE

Mark J. Ravina*

A. Introduction

Few pairings of ideology and institution would seem as unlikely as the writings of Zhu Xi 朱子 (1130–1200) and early modern Japa- nese finance. Beginning in the 1650s, however, the writings of Zhu provided the justification for a common form of Tokugawa financial institution, the “community granary” (社倉 Jp. shasō, Ch. shecang), a reserve storehouse that provided famine relief to farmers, but that, in many instances, also offered commercial loans and underwrote both public and private development projects. Proponents of the shasō in Japan often cited Zhu Xi and Chinese precedent in their writings, but they paid little heed to the broader political economy debate about the shasō in Song China, where Zhu conceived of the granary program as a voluntary, private alternative to the state-directed economic institutions of Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086). Divorced from this broader context, several Japanese shasō came to resemble exactly what Zhu Xi had opposed: semi-governmental, rural development banks. By the late Tokugawa era, Japanese proponents of the shasō were advocating, in the name of Zhu Xi, state activist policies that he had explicitly rejected. Despite their departure from Zhu’s vision, Tokugawa shasō were often successful institutions, providing credit to rural communities and supporting public works. Indeed, in the late Tokugawa era, advocates of the shasō stressed their value as financial institutions rather than as simple relief granaries. Under the veneer of Song-era, neo-Confucian precedent, Tokugawa economists and administrators

* I wish to thank Ari Levine for his thoughtful reading of this manuscript and for his careful explications of twelfth-century Chinese thought over many hours at the Brick Store. Both Ari Levine and Ho Wan-li helped me with reading classical Chinese. Mark Metzler and Gregory Smits made valuable comments at the New York meeting, as did the other panelists. Bettina Gramlich-Oka was a dogged and astute editor throughout. 180 mark j. ravina engaged in a vigorous debate over the role of loans and financing in a prosperous society. Tokugawa shasō encompassed a striking range of institutions. Some were little more than village-level disaster-relief storehouses, whereas others were primarily lending institutions. To complicate matters further, Tokugawa terminology was remarkably inconsistent. In theory, the terms Ever-Normal Granary (changping cang 常平倉), Charity Granary ( yicang 義倉 or guanghui cang 廣恵倉), and Community Granary referred to three distinct Chinese institutions, but in practice the terms were used with only loose connection to Chinese precedent. Thus, as Kokushō Iwao observed, Tokugawa-era relief granaries with the same name often had different functions, and institutions with different functions often had the same name.1 For this reason, attempts to provide a comprehensive survey of Tokugawa shasō have often produced results that are encyclopedic rather than illuminating. A 1915–1916 survey of shasō by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, for example, came to the following comprehensive but unhelpful conclusions. Shasō were designed for at least twelve different functions, including providing relief from harvest failures, providing relief from natural disasters, providing seed rice and grain, stabilizing commodity prices, providing credit to merchants, providing credit to farmers, providing fertilizer to farmers, and providing funds to allow branch families to establish independent households. Shasō were run either by government officials, independent commoner authorities, or by some combination of the two. Shasō held their assets in either rice, barley, foxtail millet (Setaria italica, 粟), sanwa millet (Echinochloa frumentacea, 稗), precious metals, eggs, or seaweed.2 Some economic historians, such as Honjō Eijirō and Miki Masatarō, have focused on institutions close to the formal definition ofshasō as non-governmental relief storehouses supported by voluntary contributions.3 Within this framework, however, innovative shasō appear as transgressive failures. Miki, for example, interpreted the gradual transition of shasō from holding reserves in grain to holding them in cash as a loss of

1 Kokushō 1923a, pp. 134–35. 2 Nōshōmushō Nōmukyoku 1915, esp. pp. 15–16, 18. 3 Honjō 1925, pp. 3–4, 8–10, 15–17, 99–101. Honjō’s focus was primarily on the Ever-Normal Granary system of Mito, and he treated the shasō only as a related institution. confucian banking 181 their “original significance” and “a major barrier to the continuation of the shasō system.”4 My analysis of the shasō reverses this approach. In this essay I will show that the significance of theshasō for the Tokugawa economy and for Tokugawa economic thought lay precisely in the ambiguity of the shasō concept. Because even the most restrictive interpretations of Zhu Xi’s writings on the shasō allowed for interest-bearing loans, advocates of the shasō were able to engage questions of commercial finance within the ambit of the government-sanctioned, neo-Confu- cian orthodoxy. In this essay I will first review the historical background to Zhu Xi’s essays, and show that Zhu himself was wrestling with questions of state activism in market economies. Next I will discuss early Tokugawa writings on the shasō and two examples, the shasō of Aizu 会津 and Okayama 岡山. I will then explore how Nakai Chikuzan 中井竹山 (1730–1804), citing the precedents of Aizu and Okayama, developed the role of the shasō as an independent financial institution. Finally, I will explore two late Tokugawa proposals for shasō: one from Okayama, which cited Nakai Chikuzan’s writings and treated the shasō primarily as a bank, and one from the famous statesman Saigō Takamori, which treated the shasō primarily as a relief granary, but praised how it restored the finances of farmers. These two proposals show how, across considerable differences in political philosophy, late Tokugawa reformers agreed on the role of the shasō as a semi- governmental bank.

B. Zhu Xi and the Song-Era Context

Although later accounts of the shasō commonly attribute the idea to Zhu Xi, Zhu himself explicitly gave credit to his friend Wei Shanzhi 魏掞之 (1116–1173). In 1150, during a harvest failure in Fujian, Wei persuaded the intendant of the local Ever-Normal Granary to make interest-free loans to indigent peasants. When the crisis had passed, and the peasants repaid the loans, Wei kept the funds and used them to create an independent relief granary. Inspired by this precedent, Zhu Xi advocated a similar approach during a harvest shortfall in

4 Miki 1950, quotation from pp. 31–32. 182 mark j. ravina

1167, and in 1169 he wrote a formal proposal for the establishment of a “community granary” as a permanent institution for rural relief. In a series of essays over the next three decades, he expanded on the idea of the shasō as a necessary complement to established forms of rural relief: the Ever-Normal Granaries and Charity Granaries.5 Zhu Xi’s advocacy of the shasō was rooted in a widely shared sense that the existing institutions of rural relief were no longer adequate. The Ever-Normal Granaries were designed to prevent famine by stabilizing grain prices, but in Zhu’s view they had become corrupt and sclerotic and commonly responded too slowly to crises. Granary officials were late to purchase grain when prices were low and late to release it when prices soared. These delays meant that the state’s efforts helped primarily speculators and stockpilers, who responded to shortages more quickly than the state, and did little to moderate the prices paid by farmers and consumers. The Charity Granaries were designed to provide support for the indigent, including both the chronically poor (orphans, widows, invalids, and the homeless elderly), as well as those rendered needy by famine or natural disaster. These granaries were, according to critics, plagued by corruption. Local officials compiled fictitious claims for relief, pocketing the proceeds, and higher administrators misdirected funds to other government enterprises. An 1156 edict allowing granary intendants to sell stockpiles in danger of spoilage provided legal cover for such misdirection, which plagued the Ever-Normal Granaries as well. As a result, both institutions were chronically short of resources.6 Zhu Xi’s solution to these problems was to shift responsibility for relief from the state to local gentry. Zhu Xi thought that transferring responsibility from the center to community leaders would make the granaries more responsive to local needs and less prone to bureaucratic delays. But Zhu’s ultimate concerns were moral rather than administrative. Community granaries would succeed because men of good character would understand their responsibilities to the society as a whole. “The upper-grade households,” he wrote, “apart from extending aid to their tenants, for any such rice as they have left over, must at once show forth hearts of fairness and broad humanity and love. Do not raise prices.” The success of the granaries thus assumed the

5 Von Glahn 1993, pp. 223–24. 6 Ibid., pp. 227–31; and Smith 1993, pp. 90–94. confucian banking 183 restoration of a moral ethos, and a commitment by superior men to the welfare of the lower orders. More than this: it provided members of the local elite with an autonomous space for political action. In this way Zhu Xi’s approach was emblematic of Song daoxue 道学 thought and its emphasis on character, self-cultivation, and moral obligation.7 Zhu Xi’s approach to famine relief was also a response to radical reform, specifically, to the New Policies xinfa( 新法) of Wang Anshi.8 From his position as prime minister 主席宰相 (1170–1176), Wang began using the resources of the Ever-Normal Granaries to provide credit to distressed rural households. Endemic rural poverty, he believed, was a result of “engrossers” (jianbing 建并), private lenders who charged ruinous interests rates and used harvest failures as an opportunity to seize land from the poor. Wang’s rural credit system, known as the “Green Sprouts” (qingmiao fa 青苗法) program, used the assets of the Ever-Normal Granaries to make loans to rural farmers at roughly 20% interest per annum. Since “engrossers” reportedly charged rates as high as 100%, the “Green Sprouts” program could provide credit to farmers at relatively low interest rates, while also generating revenue for the state. Like other programs of the New Policies, such as monopolies on tea and horses, the Green Sprouts program used state power both to promote overall economic activity and to increase state income. Wang openly advocated using state power to supplant private economic activity, such as loans by “engrossers,” that did not advance broader prosperity. This followed his contention that state involvement in the economy was a moral duty: “governing is for managing resources, and managing resources is what is meant by moral duty” 政事所以理財、理財乃所謂義也.9 Zhu Xi agreed with Wang that insufficient credit was one cause of rural poverty, but he contested Wang’s assertion that state intervention was the answer. Indeed Zhu’s insistence that good governance required the independent actions of a morally superior independent gentry (shi 士) was a cornerstone of Daoxue thought. Constraining the gentry with regulations would undermine, rather than advance, good

7 Von Glahn 1993, esp. pp. 222, 237, 246–54. Quote from Hymes 1993, 303. The broader Song debate over the proper role of gentry is discussed in Bol 1993 and Hymes 1993. 8 The bibliography on Wang and the New Policies is large. For this essay I have relied on Bol 1993 and Smith 1991; 1993. 9 Smith 1993, esp. pp. 83–86. 184 mark j. ravina governance. Zhu was also inclined to see profit 利( ) as antithetical to principle (理), and it would thus have been problematic to have either the state or the local gentry acting as commercial bankers. Indeed, Zhu Xi was criticized by daoxue thinkers, including his friend Wei Shanzhi, for suggesting that the granaries charge interest. In response, Zhu agreed that community granaries should make interest-free loans whenever possible, although he insisted that some interest charges would be necessary to cover the cost of administration and defaults. Overall, Zhu sought to distinguish his project from commercial activity. Community granaries were to make loans solely in grain, unlike Green Sprouts loans, which could be incurred and repaid in either grain or cash. His efforts to downplay the commercial aspects of community granary loans extended to his word choice: he avoided the character li 利 in the term interest, lixi 利息, referring instead simply to xi 息 (increase).10 In short, the community granary project was an attempt to solve a crisis in public welfare without emphasizing state action. Zhu sought to reconcile his project with daoxue moral philosophy, but his concern with practical demands of credit made it impossible to avoid unsavory topics such as money-lending.

C. The Community Granary in Early Tokugawa Thought

The broader intellectual context of Zhu Xi’s proposals was lost on Tokugawa commentators. Indeed, rather than examine Zhu’s struggle both with Wang Anshi and daoxue thought, Tokugawa writers described a storied lineage of classical institutions. Zhu’s shasō was seen as a natural successor to the ancient “well field” system 井田( ), the Ever-Normal Granaries, and the Charity Granaries. Tokugawa authors emphasized continuities with Zhou, Sui, and Tang precedents, rather than Zhu Xi’s opposition to Wang’s statist economic interventions. For this reason, Tokugawa accounts of the shasō tended to miss key aspects of his proposal: his emphasis on the private rather than public

10 For Zhu Xi’s attempts to distinguish community granaries from the Green Sprouts see von Glahn 1993, pp. 234–54. For Zhu Xi’s essays on community granaries see Zhu, Yan, and Liu 2002, pp. 3720–22, 3765–67, 3775–80, 3798–99, 3804–05, 3808–09, 3814–16. confucian banking 185 nature of the institution, as well as his conflicted attitude toward interest-bearing loans. Zhu Xi’s writings became known in Tokugawa Japan primarily through two sources: Yamaga gorui 山鹿語類 (1667) by Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685) and Shushi shasō hō 朱子社倉法 (undated) by Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇斎 (1618–1682). Yamaga Sokō examined the shasō as part of a broader discussion of lordship (君道) and public policy 民政, quoting extensively from Zhu Xi and adding his own observations in both Japanese and literary Chinese.11 Yamazaki Ansai’s work consisted of nine essays by Zhu Xi, an introduction 朱子社倉法序, and an overview based loosely on Zhu’s 1181 imperial memorial. The impact ofShushi shasō hō was extensive. It was enthusias- tically received by Hoshina Masayuki 保科正之 (1611–1672), the daimyo of Aizu, who had it published and distributed to domain officials in 1668. Perhaps because of this endorsement,Shushi shasō hō was widely cited by later authors, including Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信 (1758–1829), Asami Keisai 浅見絅斎 (1652–1711), and Nakai Chikuzan.12 Yamazaki Ansai treated the shasō as a part of a long lineage of agrarian institutions, dating back to the well field system. Zhu’s great achieve- ment was his success in reviving a classical institution by adapting it to the concerns of his day. Ansai compared Zhu to his predecessor, Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), who had unsuccessfully promoted the revival of the Zhou-era “well field” system. Unlike Zhang, Zhu realized that the simple reenactment of historical practices was unlikely to succeed. The meaningful use of historical precedent required attention to contemporary circumstances. For Ansai, this meant adapting the shasō to recent changes in Japanese history: “In ancient times taxes were one in ten, and now they are four in ten. In ancient times soldiers came from [among] the farmers 農 and one in ten was enough, but since then the farmer and the soldier have been separated and so this four

11 See Yamaga 1910–1911, vol. 1, pp. 210–13 (五巻君道五民政). 12 Miki 1950, pp. 19, 33. I have used the copy of Shushi shasō hō published by Fujii Gorōemon 藤井五郎右衛門 in the Waseda University Library available at http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kotenseki/html/yo07/yo07_00961/index.html (accessed December 30, 2009). The text is also reproduced in Yamazaki 1978, vol. 3, pp. 492–07. A partial translation of the 1181 memorial can be found in de Bary and Bloom 1999, pp. 746–49. 186 mark j. ravina in ten is like the ancient one in ten.”13 Ansai further emphasized that adapting Chinese agrarian institutions to Japanese circumstances had ample precedent. He reported that the forty-second emperor, Monmu 文武 (r. 697–707), had instituted Charity Granaries and that the forty- seventh emperor, Junnin 淳仁 (r. 758–764), (also known as Awaji-tei 淡路帝), had established Ever-Normal Granaries. It was thus natural that Japan would adopt the community granaries as well.14 This gloss on Zhu Xi was true to many of his ideas, but also substantially changed his understanding of the shasō. Ansai’s implicit suggestion that the shasō would need to be adapted to Japan was true to Zhu Xi’s sense of history. Zhu had sought to distance himself from the “classical revivalism espoused by the eleventh-century luminaries of Tao-hsueh [daoxue],” who sought to replicate ancient institutions.15 But Ansai was less true to Zhu Xi’s moral philosophy. Ansai was most impressed by the potential of the shasō to raise capital through interest charges rather than taxation. He emphasized how Zhu had raised 2,500 koku 石 for his shasō by charging interest on 600 koku advanced from the Ever-Normal Granary in Liangzhe Eastern Circuit 兩浙東路. Ansai was thus most impressed by the revenue enhancing potential of the shasō, the aspect about which Zhu was most ambivalent.16 At the same time, however, he was unabashed about treating the shasō as a financial institution, dropping Zhu Xi’s circumlocutions about revenue and referring to interest charges as risoku 利息.17 Ultimately many of Zhu Xi’s concerns were untranslatable into a Tokugawa context. Ansai reproduced Zhu Xi’s insistence that the shasō be entrusted to “local gentry and gentlemen” (郷人士君子) rather than government officials (官吏). In a Tokugawa context, however, “local gentry and gentlemen” did not convey Zhu Xi’s understanding of the shasō as a private rather than governmental institution. To Tokugawa readers, “gentlemen” could refer only to samurai: wealthy rural commoners might be described as kyōjin 郷人 but never as shi 士 or kunshi 君子. Zhu Xi’s distinction between state activism and gentry voluntarism was thus effaced. Zhu’s concern with decentraliza-

13 Yamazaki and Zhu undated, preface p. 1. For Zhang Zai see de Bary and Bloom 1999, pp. 605–06. 14 Yamazaki and Zhu undated, preface p. 2. 15 Von Glahn 1993, p. 251. 16 Yamazaki and Zhu undated, preface p. 1. 17 Yamaga 1910–1911, vol. 1, pp. 209–11. confucian banking 187 tion was equally foreign. In Japan, there was no national system of granaries to reform, so Zhu’s suggestion that a failing system might be improved through local control had no practical import. In this context, many Tokugawa readers understood Zhu Xi to be suggesting that samurai establish and manage lending institutions.18

D. Neo-Confucian Banking: The Operation of Japanese Shasō in the Early Tokugawa

The firstshasō in Japan was founded in Aizu in 1654 at the behest of the daimyo, Hoshina Masayuki. The lord was reportedly inspired by Yamazaki Ansai’s Shushi shasō hō, which he later had published.19 The Aizushasō was initially capitalized with 961 ryō of gold and 7,015 hyō (1 hyō = ca. 60 kg) of rice and was authorized to make loans to farmers in either gold or rice. The loans were targeted at the poor and at victims of natural disaster, but were also available for those seeking to reclaim or develop farmland.20 In addition, loans were available to local officials for expenses related to their official duties, including public works. The interest rate on loans was 20%, considerably below the market rate. The program was expanded in 1663, when a granary with 24,000 hyō of rice was established in each of the domain’s twenty- three districts. In 1668, Masayuki highlighted the shasō project in his instructions to his heir (kakun 家訓), explaining that “the shasō was established for the people and [their] enduring benefit. It should be used for relief in times of famine, and not for other reasons.”21 This description obscured the lending functions of the shasō, but highlighted its connection to Zhu Xi’s project. The Aizushasō thus encompassed two competing visions of the institution: first as a simple relief storehouse, and second, as a source of capital for a range of lending practices. In practice, administrators struggled to find a balance between the narrow goal of disaster relief and the broader goal of economic development. A 1663 edict reveals a concern with the practical aspects of famine relief: it detailed, for example, the merits of unhulled rice 籾

18 Yamazaki and Zhu undated, p. 9. 19 Ageta 1947, p. 79; Miki 1950, p. 19. 20 Ageta 1947, pp. 79–82. 21 Yamaguchi 1978, pp. 20–21. 188 mark j. ravina over polished rice in reducing losses to vermin.22 But the shasō also had a clear financial dimension. It held assets in specie as well as grain and directed these toward projects such as riparian works on the Ōkawa River 大川.23 As early as 1670, however, an edict warned that using shasō assets for public works reduced the ability of the shasō to make loans and thereby constrained its growth. The use of theshasō to pay labor expenses on public projects also opened the door for more dubi- ous uses of funds, such as the construction of a temple hall to com- memorate Keishōin 桂昌院 (1627–1705), the mother of Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 徳川綱吉 (1646–1709).24 The domain repeatedly enjoined against such misuse, reminding retainers to follows Masayuki’s wishes (御家訓・神君之御尊), but this tension between the multiple purposes of the shasō was present from its inception under Masayu- ki.25 Despite these problems the Aizu shasō was still in operation as late as 1845, when shasō grain was released in response to a harvest shortfall.26 By contrast, the other major shasō of the early Tokugawa era was more explicitly a financial institution. The project was promoted by Tsuda Nagatada 津田永忠 (1640–1707), an advisor to the daimyo Ikeda Mitsumasa 池田光政 (1609–1682), and a dogged proponent of economic development projects, including transportation and irrigation canals, flood control, land reclamation, and pleasure gardens, such as Kōrakuen 後楽園. So sophisticated were Tsuda Nagatada’s pro j- ects that several are currently being promoted as potential UNESCO World Heritage sites, including the Kurayasugawa Yoshii locks 倉安川吉井水門, which connected the Yoshii 吉井川 and Asahi rivers 旭川. Local boosters claim the locks, which include two sluices and an elliptical boat-turning basin, are the oldest surviving mechanisms of their kind.27 In its prime, the Okayama shasō system was instrumental in providing capital for such public works projects. Between 1682 and 1703 the shasō made loans totaling almost 180,000 koku, nearly half to the domain itself for dams, canals, locks, schools, and other construc-

22 Ageta 1947, pp. 81–82. 23 Ibid., pp. 83–84. 24 Ibid., pp. 85–87. 25 Ibid., pp. 87–88. 26 Ibid., pp. 81–82. 27 For the Okayama UNESCO campaign see http://www.okayama-world-heritage. com/(accessed December 30, 2009). confucian banking 189 tion projects.28 As the pioneering economic historian Kokushō Iwao observed over eighty years ago, the “purpose of the shasō in Okayama domain was to accumulate silver and grain and contribute them to the government” so it functioned “primarily as a profit-making, financial institution” (貨殖営利を行う所の一の融通機関) and secondarily as a relief agency.29 As a result, the establishment of shasō in Okayama prompted a debate within Okayama over the equity and legitimacy of money-lending. Tsuda Nagatada presented his initial proposal for a shasō in 1671, offering four major reasons. First, he presented a quasi-mercantilist justification. Farmers were borrowing at 30% to 40% for rice and 20% to 30% for silver, and many of these loans were from merchants outside the domain. If the shasō made loans at 20%, the domain could save farmers from this high-interest lending and keep silver from flowing out to other domains. Second, the shasō could have a counter-cy- clical effect, compensating for commoners’ lack of economic foresight. Commoners did not save enough during bumper crops, and suffered during harvest failures, and ideally the domain should raise taxes during good years and cut taxes in bad times. Because this would be problematic, instead the shasō could raise interest rates in good times and lower interest in lean times. Since the shasō would be able to offer very low-rate loans, this would be popular with the people. Third, low interest rates from the shasō would reduce farmers’ expenses and be the equivalent of a tax cut, but without costing the domain any revenue. Finally, the revenue from the shasō could be used to pay for rural schools (tenarai dokoro 手習所). Such schools had become necessary because of Mitsumasa’s hostility to Buddhism: between 1666 and 1675, Mitsumasa closed over 600 of the domain’s 1,044 temples, creating a shortage of rural schools. Without addressing this background, Tsuda Nagatada claimed that after three years the shasō would be able to provide 10,920 koku for the schools. Remarkably, he said little about famine relief.30 As initial capital, Nagatada requested that the lord’s eldest daughter Naako 奈阿子, recently married to Honda Tadahira 本多忠平 (1632– 1695), lend her dowry of 1,000 silver kanme 貫目 to the shasō. The

28 Shibata 1971, pp. 92–93. 29 Kokushō 1923a, p. 135. 30 Shibata 1971, pp. 67–71, 83–88. Tsuda Nagatada’s outline of his own proposal can be found in Okayama-ken Naimubu 1915, pp. 5–9. 190 mark j. ravina shasō would set aside 250 kanme and pay Naako 50 kanme, or 20%, per year. The remaining 750kanme would be converted into 15,000 koku of rice, and lent at 20% interest per annum. Nagatada calculated that, over five years, this 15,000koku , if reinvested, would generate 16,104 koku in interest. Nagatada would then be able to return Naa- ko’s initial investment, and use the 16,104 koku to capitalize the shasō. Nagatada’s interest calculations were accurate if somewhat eccentric: rather than offer Naako a 5% return on the full 1,000kanme , Nagatada describes the yield as a 20% return on one-quarter of Naako’s contribution. Nonetheless, Nagatada’s overall approach was clear: he was treating the lord’s wife as an investor in a profit-making enterprise.31 Tsuda Nagatada’s bold proposal drew objections from the domain supreme council (hyōjōsho 評定所) and from Mitsumasa’s son Ikeda Tsunamasa 池田綱正 (1638–1714), who questioned whether the domain should be involved in money-lending. Nagatada successfully defended his proposal by citing the example of Zhu Xi and the support of Mitsumasa. Nagatada’s account of Zhu Xi’s shasō is so garbled, however, it seems doubtful he actually read Zhu Xi, or even Yamaga Sokō or Yamazaki Ansai’s glosses. Rather he understood the shasō only vaguely, as an ancient precedent of the Great Tang 大唐.32 It was, however, precisely this confused interpretation of the shasō that gave Nagatada such latitude in introducing the institution to Okayama. The shasō began making loans in 1672, but the project soon ran into difficulty. Nagatada’s calculations assumed that the entire 1,000kanme would earn 20% per year: he made no allowances for capital reserves, defaults, or lower rate loans. Since 1673 and 1674 were poor harvest years, Nagatada appeared to be unable to meet his repayment schedule, and the chief retainer (shioki karō 仕置家老), Hioki Iemon 日置猪右衛門, suggested raising interest rates. Nagatada objected, noting that “lending was fundamentally for the sake of the people” and warn- ing that raising rates might undermine the ability of farmers to pay nengu. Hioki Iemon relented, and Nagatada proved able to repay the 1,000 kanme startup loan on schedule. A major client of the shasō was none other than the new lord Tsunamasa, who borrowed over 13,000 koku and repaid his debt with interest.33

31 Okayama-ken Naimubu 1915, pp. 5–9; Shibata 1971, pp. 83–84. 32 Kokushō 1923a, pp. 140–43. 33 Shibata 1971, pp. 89–90. confucian banking 191

The Okayama shasō was remarkable in several ways. First was its distinct articulation of different administrative functions. Nagatada insisted that the determination of loans be made entirely by local officials, such as shōya. In 1676 he argued that one granary be established in each district (郡) and that the district magistrates entrust lending to village officials. This would please the people and would reflect that the shasō was a local institution. Even if the shogun moved the Ikeda house to a new investiture, Nagatada claimed, the shasō storehouses would remain in their districts in Okayama.34 At the same time, Naga- tada wanted access to the assets of the shasō for his development plans and in order to increase the shasō’s assets. This meant keeping the shasō’s assets liquid or available for sale. For that reason, the shasō held its reserves in rice and barley, which were readily sold, rather than unhulled rice, which was less marketable but more resistant to spoilage. In 1677 Nagatada also had grain holdings, beyond those necessary for relief, sent to three central granaries in Kawasuji 川筋, Kaneoka 金岡, and Katagami 片上, presumably for better market access. By 1709 the domain was using bills of exchange in addition to the physical transfer of grain. A 1709 memo told district officials (郡方) to honor checks (御米御銀渡り切手) issued by the Okayama merchant Ishimaru Heishichirō, converting them into either rice or silver. The memo specifically ordered district officials to cash checks brought to them by other rural officials在方諸役人 ( ). Based on this evidence, Kokushō Iwao concluded that the shasō was financed, in part, through grain trading on the Osaka market by Okayama castle town merchants. In early summer, after the barley harvest, they sold the previous year’s rice harvest for silver. Then in the fall, when the new rice harvest pushed down rice prices, they purchased rice. In this way the financial strategy of theshasō was roughly analogous to a modern insurance company, keeping minimal reserves on hand in order to meet claims, but investing the remainder in order to increase its assets.35 Second, the Okayama shasō gave priority to major investments over simple relief work. This was possible, in part, because Okayama had an independent relief system, known as the nishōmugi 二升麦 or ikubaku 育麦. The nishōmugi granaries were located at the village level and

34 Ibid., pp. 90–91; Kokushō 1923b, pp. 128–30. 35 Kokushō 1923b, pp. 128–30. 192 mark j. ravina controlled by shōya. The shōya was authorized to collect a small tax of two shō (1 shō = approximately 1.8 litres) of barley per tan (反, approximately 991.74 m2), and this was used solely for poor relief.36 During harvest shortfalls, the nishōmugi granaries and the shasō both made loans to help the domain’s poor. In the first four months of 1681, for example, the shasō made relief loans of 5,471 koku and the nishōmugi of 4,236 koku for a total of 9,707 koku to 68,388 people.37 It seems clear from the small size of the mean loan (0.14 koku per person) that these measures were designed to keep struggling farmers alive until the autumn harvest. Because the nishōmugi system was cov- ering nearly half the burden of the poor relief, Nagatada could focus on his major concern: the survival of large landholders. Large farmers (大百姓), he argued, could not recover with small sums, and he had the shasō make larger loans, up to twenty koku for four years at 5% per annum.38 Nagatada was interested in the survival of large farmers because his focus was not on famine relief but on increasing the overall productive capacity of the domain. Nagatada therefore drew heavily on the shasō’s assets for a range of land reclamation projects. The most prominent project was the development of three villages, all named indirectly for the shasō: Kurata 倉田, Kuratomi 倉富, and Kuramasa 倉益. The development of these villages, known collectively as Kurata shinden, required the creation of the Kurayasu River, a canal connecting the Yoshii River and the Asahi River and controlled by the Kurayasu gawa Yoshii locks discussed above. The Kurayasu River afforded both irrigation and transportation, and the resulting three villages totaled almost 300 chō (町, 1 chō = approximately 9,917 m2) with an annual yield of over 5,000 koku.39 The costs of developing Kuratashinden are unclear, but there are better records for later projects. In 1684, the domain developed Kōjima shinden 幸島新田, with 5,621 tan and an annual yield of 10,241 koku. In 1707 the shasō invested 965 silver kanme in developing the Oki shinden 沖新田 and borrowed another 500 kanme from Osaka and Kyoto merchants. The resulting arable land was 15,396 tan and with an annual yield of 28,039 koku. The finances of both proj-

36 Kokushō 1923a, pp. 137–40. 37 Okayama-ken Naimubu 1915, p. 3; Kokushō 1923b, pp. 136–37. 38 Shibata 1971, pp. 91–92. 39 Okayama-ken Naimubu 1915, pp. 2–3. confucian banking 193 ects were fairly similar: the newly reclaimed land was of high yield, and the domain levied a one-time surcharge of thirty silver me (1000 me = 1 kanme) per tan. This surcharge, combined with the annual tax yield, meant that the development costs of both projects could be recovered within the first two years. Because the surcharge raised the effective tax rate for the first year to roughly 80%, this land was settled predominantly by wealthy farmers relying on laborers (奉公人). In the Kurata shinden development, for example, nearly half the farmers held over fivechō , and the smallest holding was one chō. In 1694 the domain set special terms to make reclaimed land more affordable to poor farmers, allowing them to pay the thirty me over five years without interest, but the problems of smallholders were clearly a secondary consideration. The goal of theshasō was large-scale development.40 Nagatada died in 1707, and the investment activities of the shasō slowed after the completion of his last project, the Oki shinden development. This reflected both the importance of Nagatada’s personal initiative and the increasing complexity of land development projects. In the 1710s, for example, land development on the Takahashi River 高梁川 prompted litigation from upriver villages that claimed dam- age from the project, and the shogunate ordered Okayama to destroy a newly constructed system of dikes. The domain was able to have the opinion reversed on appeal, but the conflict helped discourage major reclamation projects until the early 1800s.41 Theshasō was formally dissolved in 1788, although the dissolution notice was almost celebra- tory: as a reward for their service, two officials in the finance office (勘定方) were given two silver mai 枚 each, while nine merchants were each paid 500 gold hiki 匹 (ceremonial gold unit, 100 of which was approximately 0.25 ryō). Theshasō had not failed, but had simply outlived its original purpose, or, in the words of the 1788 edict, “there is currently no business for the shasō” (社倉方御用向当時無之).42 The Okayama shasō was thus deemed a success even at its termination, and this positive assessment was reflected in period discourse.

40 Taniguchi 1964, pp. 400–01, 410. 41 Ibid., pp. 401–02. 42 Kamihara 1973, pp. 43–44. Documents in the Masamune collection 正宗文庫 in Okayama suggest that some of the lending functions of the shasō were continued by an agency called the “city loan office”machikata kashitsuke 町方貸付. See Moriya 1945, pp. 423–26. 194 mark j. ravina

E. Mid-Tokugawa Economic Thought and the Shasō

The shasō was discussed in a wide range of mid-Tokugawa texts, including works by high-ranking officials, such as Matsudaira Sadano- bu’s Kokuhonron furoku 国本論附録 (1781) and by independent scholars, such as Shasō kō 社倉考 (1772) by Usami Shinsui 宇佐美水 (1710–1776), a disciple of Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728). Among the most influential works on theshasō were two short essays by the Kaitokudō scholar Nakai Chikuzan: Shasō shigi 社倉私議 (1774), and an addendum to that work, Shasō shigi furoku 社倉私議附録 (1794). Chikuzan is perhaps best known for Sōbō kigen 草茅危言 (1789), a policy recommendation to Sadanobu. In that work, Chikuzan proposed the radical reform of the Tokugawa order, including a merito- cratic reform of samurai stipends and a reduction in sankin kōtai, with a corresponding reduction in the size of Edo.43 Compared to works such as Sōbō kigen, or his gloss on the classics, Keizai yōgo 経済要語 (1796), Chikuzan’s essays on the shasō are rather slight, but these works gave philosophical support to the Tokugawa-era reconceptual- ization of the shasō. Indeed, Chikuzan accomplished something of a synthesis of Tokugawa practice with Song thought: he was aware of the shasō in Aizu and Okayama and deeply versed in the Confucian classics and the writings of Zhu Xi. Chikuzan’s vision of the shasō was rooted in his broader understanding of political economy. For Chikuzan, as for many Kaitokudō scholars, the goal of statecraft was to insure that the pursuit of advantage or profit by individuals advanced the common good. This meant, in the first instance, using state power and merchant experience to moderate excessive swings in prices. Interventions that reduced spatial and temporary price differences and achieved “common prices throughout the realm” (天下公共ノ価) were essential to the common good (公私ニ便・公共益). Chikuzan thus advocated not an “invisible hand” but a highly visible, activist hand that helped insure steady economic growth by guaranteeing the smooth circulation of commodities.44 Chikuzan reinterpreted the shasō in this context. Although he attested to Zhu Xi’s brilliance, he also insisted that it was necessary to adapt Zhu’s policies to current local conditions, and he praised

43 Najita 1987, pp. 151–86, esp. pp. 171–72, 178. 44 For an overview of Chikuzan’s thought see Najita 1987, pp. 151–86, and Nishioka 2006, pp. 183–87. confucian banking 195 the “sage lords” of Aizu and Okayama for their ability to follow Zhu Xi while taking account of “differences in the region and the times.”45 For Chikuzan, the pressing crisis was not widespread hunger, but the underlying problem of underdeveloped credit markets. As a rule, marginal farmers somehow survive each year, but after a harvest failure they can’t pay nengu or support themselves, and then, because this weakens domain finances 国用乏敷( ) tax collection is inevitably very strict. Therefore people pawn their fields and homes and take out high interest loans, or they sell household goods and survive the present crisis but with the consequence of greater distress. In short order they are on the verge of fleeing the domain.46 This situation was exacerbated because farmers were borrowing outside their domain, and lenders were more likely to be severe when they were unfamiliar with their borrowers. Because this was a gradual process, it might not seem urgent, but it was a crisis nonetheless: Chi- kuzan argued, by way of metaphor, that even droplets from a patch of moss, feeding a tiny stream, would eventually breach a high dike.47 In order to save farmers from ruinous loans, the shasō would function as a local bank, offering low-interest or interest-free loans to the needy. This would save farmers from losing their homes and stop money from leaving the domains as interest payments. Theshasō could also lend to the domain itself, provided the government paid interest. By “keeping the gold and grain (金穀) wasted elsewhere,” the shasō would “be of benefit not to one person alone, but would strengthen the entire country (全体御国).” The subsidized loans would “relieve poverty within the domain; strengthen the foundations of the country; eliminate the problem of farmers borrowing at high interest rates, losing their land and homes, and absconding; naturally improve public morals 風俗; and benefit both high and low together as a whole.”48 Chikuzan was adamant that the shasō be funded through the joint contributions of the state and farmers, and then be run as an independent institution. The lord could easily implement a new tax in order to fund the shasō, argued Chikuzan, but this would undermine commoners’ faith in the institution: “there will be those who already do not trust the lord, and if they are noisy, no one will accept [the

45 Nakai 1915b, pp. 508–09. 46 Nakai 1915a, p. 491. 47 Ibid., pp. 491–92. See also Najita 1987, p. 194. 48 Nakai 1915a, pp. 500, 502. 196 mark j. ravina shasō].” Alternately, the daimyo could fund the shasō with his own resources, but that would generate equally little popular involvement.49 Rather, the shasō needed to be a “union of high and low” (上下合体); a fund to which both commoners and the lord contributed equally.50 He therefore argued that the domain should institute a 2% tax surcharge for five years, which, in a 50,000koku domain would generate 1,000 koku per year. The lord would match this with 1,000koku per year on his own, and the combined contributions would reach 10,000 koku after five years. The shasō would lend out these assets, starting at 7% in the first year and dropping to 5% in year five. These interest charges of roughly 2,000 koku would become the shasō’s permanent capital, and after the fifth year the managers would repay the 10,000 koku provided by the daimyo and commoners.51 Chikuzan was deeply concerned that the shasō win the trust of the people, and he connected popular support with local control. Chiku- zan was insistent that the shasō be independent of the domain, managed by a council of twelve or thirteen village-level officials, carefully screened for their probity and rectitude. Theshasō would need peri- odic external audits, and while these might be conducted by samurai, this should not be in their official capacity as servants of the domain. Because “the shasō is for the benefit of the people, not for the use of the lord 上の御用,” the ideal auditor would be an independent Confu- cian scholar.52 Chikuzan’s thinking reflected a combination of existingshasō practices and his own political and philosophical convictions. He asserted, for example, that because of shasō autonomy, a storehouse should remain in place even if the shogunate elected to relocate a daimyo.53 This echoes Tsuda Nagatada’s claim to the same effect. But Chikuzan’s insistence on shasō autonomy also stemmed from his administrative concerns as director of the Kaitokudō. Chikuzan was a passionate advocate of the autonomy of the academy, insisting that its charter exempted it from oversight by the Osaka town council. His ultimate

49 Nakai 1915b, pp. 508–09. 50 Ibid., p. 503. 51 Nakai 1915a, pp. 496–99, 503. Chikuzan was remarkably cavalier about these calculations. He did not take into account compound interest, used round numbers (or made calculation errors), and did not take into systematic account the shasō’s need to provide reduced interest loans to distressed farmers. 52 Ibid., pp. 504–06. 53 Ibid., p. 500. confucian banking 197 goal was to make the Kaitokudō a national academy for commoners, parallel to the shogunal Shōheikō in Edo, but managed by its commoner headmasters.54 Overall, Chikuzan changed the definition of theshasō in two ways. First, he connected the shasō to systemic problems in credit markets, rather than subsistence crises. The problem was not sudden widespread misery, but relentless economic pressure on smallholders. Second, he reinterpreted shasō autonomy as an institutional rather than a moral concern. The autonomy of theshasō was part of Zhu Xi’s original plan, but, for Chikuzan, this meant fiduciary independence rather than the fulfillment of a moral duty. Theshasō managers (社倉掛り) were more like a board of directors than a group of gentry exemplars. As Tetsuo Najita has observed, Chikuzan’s pragmatic policy prescriptions often contained iconoclastic consequences.55 In the case of the shasō, while paying homage to Zhu Xi, he redefined the institution as a non-profit corporation, charged with both the economic welfare of smallholders and the prudent management of its own assets.

F. Late Tokugawa Shasō

The impact of Chikuzan’s essays can be seen in a remarkable 1855 proposal for the revival of the shasō in Okayama. The proposal was drafted by Takata Teijirō 高田貞次郎 (c. 1808–1878), a local merchant who served as head of the Okayama lumber cartel (材木問屋頭). Teijirō reportedly studied with the Confucian scholar and literati Shinozaki Shōchiku 篠崎小竹 (1781–1851), but otherwise we know little about his life and education.56 Whatever his background, Teijirō’s proposal received widespread endorsement and was co-sponsored by over a dozen officials, including a city magistratemachi ( bugyō 町奉行), a comptroller (tsukurimawashikata 作廻方), a building magistrate (sakuji bugyō 作事奉行), and two town superintendents (machi metsuke 町目付). The proposal was accepted by the domain in 1855/6 and the shasō began functioning almost immediately, moving to an independent office in the Amase天瀬 district of Okayama in 1856/12.

54 Najita 1987, pp. 152–53, 178–79. 55 Najita 1987, pp. 174–75. 56 Kamihara 1973, p. 39. 198 mark j. ravina

Records of the operations of the shasō are fragmentary, but it functioned as a lending institution in Okayama until the early Meiji era.57 Takata Teijirō explicitly cited Chikuzan in his proposal, and his understanding of the shasō reflects Chikuzan’s conceptual intervention. He understood the shasō as an independent financial institution that would serve the common good. In keeping with this logic, Teijirō advocated the formation of a shasō in response to a liquidity crisis. On 1854/11/5, Okayama domain announced the reissue of its currency, converting ten monme 匁 notes into one-monme notes. This reissue was a response to the devaluation of Okayama silver notes (銀札) and was aimed at restoring the convertibility of the currency by recognizing market values. Over the long term, such a policy might have helped the Okayama economy, but the immediate effects were a severe contraction of the money supply and a collapse of financial markets.58 Remarkably, Teijirō emphasized the impact of the reissue rather than a coincident natural disaster, the Ansei Nankai earthquake (1854/11/4), which caused extensive losses in Okayama, wrecking over 700 buildings and damaging locks, dikes, and other public works. Although he mentioned the earthquake in passing, he was most concerned with the panic caused by the currency revaluation (国寶改革之事而人情恟々).59 This allowed dishonest merchants to charge exorbitant interest rates, and this was forcing borrowers either to raise prices or go out of business. What Okayama needed were alternative sources of finance, and Teijirō treated this as a question of national survival: The key to a strong country is to have prosperous people 富民( ). If one wants prosperous people, then one needs the circulation of money and goods. The circulation of money and goods requires trade. This was observed by men of old. At present, the existence of trade requires financing 金銀融通( ), without which trade shrinks, the people are bent low, and, in the end, the country (国) cannot stand.60 In order to provide credit to local merchants, Teijirō suggested that the domain provide 600 bundles (苞) of grain to start the shasō. Because Teijirō wanted to begin lending immediately, he did not propose a multi-year plan for building reserves, or specify a mechanism

57 Ibid., pp. 41, 44–45, 48. For records showing the 1855/6 start of the shasō, see Moriya 1945, pp. 427–29. 58 Taniguchi 1964, pp. 550–53. 59 Kamihara 1973, p. 47. 60 Ibid., p. 49. confucian banking 199 for matching contribution by commoners. He simply asserted that merchants would want to contribute to the shasō, and left the details for future discussion. Beyond merchant contributions, Teijirō claimed that the shasō would be able to build its assets by attracting deposits (預り金) on which it would pay interest. In addition, Teijirō thought the shasō would hold collateral from borrowers. He cited the example of the Murozume kaisho 室積会所 in Chōshū 長州, which, he claimed, held merchant inventory as collateral against loans (入船の品にても預り上より金御貸付に相成り). Teijirō proposed different protocols for different types of collateral. The Okayamashasō would treat grain as a liquid asset, and lend it out, but would not circulate other goods without special approval. Theshasō was not to lend documents, buildings, or tools under any circumstances.61 There is limited surviving documentation on thisshasō , but it seems to have received robust support from the local merchant community and to have grown rapidly from a wide range of revenue sources. An 1855/6 ledger shows seventy-one kanme in assets: the majority, fifty- nine kanme, from property rentals, and an additional nine kanme from loans bearing 5% per annum.62 This is intriguing; since the city magistrates approved the shasō only in 1855/6, it must have carried over loan obligations from other semi-official agencies. Two co-sponsors of Teijirō’s proposal, for example, appear on the account ledgers of the Okayama town rental office町方貸付 ( ).63 This sort of relationship would explain Teijirō’s confident but vague assertion that local merchants would financially support theshasō . Later records show sundry income sources, including fees paid to harvest lotus root from three canals, and a rental payment from the Kōrakuen office後楽園御 ( 用所). By 1867 the shasō’s total assets had reached 345 silver kanme and 723 gold ryō.64 Teijirō’s vision of the shasō had little connection to famine relief, instead combining elements of a modern bank or credit union with those of a pawnshop. The robust support for his proposal in Okayama suggests that, in highly developed regions, the shasō came to be seen primarily as a commercial institution, and that insuring liquidity

61 Ibid., pp. 50–51. 62 Moriya 1945, pp. 427–28. 63 Ibid., pp. 423, 425–28. The officials were Wadaya Hachiemon和田屋八右衛門 and Kunitomi Genjirō 国富源次郎. 64 Ibid., pp. 427–28. 200 mark j. ravina for commerce was understood as a legitimate government function. Indeed, this emphasis on liquidity over relief is unsurprising given the importance of lending to the origins of the Okayama shasō in the seventeenth century. What is striking is how this sense of the shasō as a financial institution appeared in more remote and relatively impoverished parts of Japan, such as the Amami islands 奄美諸島.

G. Saigō Takamori’s Shasō Proposal

Among the most remarkable shasō is an institution established in 1870 on Okinoerabujima 沖永良部島, a tiny island in the Amami archipelago, roughly 250 miles southwest of Kagoshima city. Theshasō was founded based on a proposal by Saigō Takamori 西郷隆盛 (1827– 1877), the Meiji Restoration leader, who spent roughly a year and a half on the island (1862/i8 to 1864/2) as punishment for his affiliation with radical imperial loyalists.65 Saigō Takamori was an unlikely advocate of a bank: he was profoundly uninterested in the details of institutional reform, and his policy recommendations tended to emphasize moral restoration over practical concerns. In one of his earliest surviving policy statements, an 1856 memorial on rural reform, for example, Taka- mori explained how immoral government leadership had promoted corruption in the countryside. Because earlier tax reform efforts had focused on increasing government revenue, the domain had tolerated corrupt and abusive officials so long as they increased domain income. In doing so “not only did the government lose the people’s hearts, but it taught them deception.” The only way to restore good government was through a renewed focus on morality: “without a change in the hearts of both commoners and all devoted servants of the court (満朝人), and without [a movement for] purity and unselfishness, even the most deliberate consideration will be in vain.”66 Takamori voiced similar sentiments as a member of the Meiji government. In 1871/12, for example, he wrote a detailed opinion paper on a range of policy questions, including taxation, civil administration, international relations, and military reform. On each point, Takamori emphasized

65 For an overview of Saigō’s time on Okinoerabujima, see Nobori 1977, pp. 137–95 and Ravina 2004, pp. 98–108. 66 Saigō Takamori Zenshū Henshū Iinkai 1976–1980, vol. 1, pp. 71–77, quote from p. 71. confucian banking 201 moral clarity over any specific policy choice. The basis of government was righteousness, so the key to good government was to “govern the people with impartiality and sincerity and without deception.”67 Takamori’s shasō proposal was suffused with this concern about morality. The mechanics of hisshasō amounted to a fairly conventional reworking of Zhu Xi. Theshasō would collect grain from each household and lend it out at 20%. After five years, Takamori claimed, a mere fivekoku would have grown to over thirteen koku, and the shasō could then return the principal and keep the interest as its relief fund.68 But Takamori saw in the shasō the potential for a moral revitalization of the samurai. He asked rhetorically if the shasō would not allow the samurai to help in many ways, aiding those who have suffered untimely calamities or showing compassion for the disabled (廃疾)? If there is a bad harvest, might the people see relief from the shasō as a gift from Heaven? At that moment, instead of regret for years of hard work, how happy will they be? Can we know the extent of this hidden virtue? Officials (役) are naturally above farmers, [but] what purpose do they serve? If their purpose is not, first and foremost, to revive the finances融通 ( ) of farmers, then during bad harvests officials will observe the hunger and death of farmers and merely stand by idly (安閑と), blaming it on the weather, saying “It’s because of the weather, so there’s nothing we can do.” Surely Heaven will visit punishment on officials for that evil: after all, the ancients repeatedly criticized such actions. In any case, it is essential to prepare beforehand. It is the will of Heaven that farmers serve through their physical labor, and officials serve through the labor of their minds, and officials should therefore work to the limit of their mental abilities.69 Takamori’s interpretation of the shasō as a moral obligation of the ruling elite, and his concern with winning the hearts of the populace, reflected the origins of theshasō in Daoxue thought. Theshasō would not only keep farmers from hunger, but would rectify relations between the gentry and the peasantry.70 This emphasis on the moral rectitude of the ruling elite is far from Takata Teijirō’s proposal for the shasō as a bank. Yet Takamori’s pro-

67 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 84–85. 68 Saigō Takamori’s figures are slightly off. Fivekoku , with compound interest, would be 12.44 koku after five years. 69 Saigō Takamori Zenshū Henshū Iinkai 1976–1980, vol. 1, pp. 269–72. 70 Ibid. 202 mark j. ravina posal also reflects an appreciation of the shasō as a financial institution. Takamori was concerned not only with the minimal survival of the peasantry but with their finances 融通( ), and he understood this financial health as a duty of government officials. It is because of this emphasis on finance thatTakamori ’s shasō proposal readily became the basis of a local development bank. The Okinoerabujima shasō was promoted by Tsuchimochi Masateru 土持正照 (1835–?), a local official who became close friends with Takamori during his exile. Tsuchimochi Masateru attempted to start a shasō soon after receiving Takamori’s proposal, but the project was beyond his private efforts. A shasō was started with government support in 1870, but the institution began to thrive only after it received a large infusion of capital from the Meiji government: in 1874 and 1875 the government provided the shasō with over ¥7,500 in long-term, interest-free loans.71 The Okinoerabujimashasō needed external support because of the severe underdevelopment of the island economy. Beginning in the 1700s, Satsuma domain began promoting sugar production on the Amami archipelago and in 1777 it established a state monopsony on sugar. The government also monopolized other commodities, demanding payments in sugar for products such as vegetable oils. These policies dramatically retarded the development of a commercial economy, including wage labor. In addition, cane cultivation was labor-intensive, dangerous, and exhausting, and the most productive farmers were plantation owners who could mobilize scores of unfree workers. By the 1800s the island elite, the district chiefs, and local officials were all slaveholders. By the mid-1800s nearly one-third the populace were yanchu, the island term for chattel slave.72 In this environment, capitalizing a local bank, even with the support of the local elite, was a daunting project. After his initial failure to capitalize the shasō locally, Tsuchimochi Masateru devoted his efforts to lobbying members of the new government, such as prefectural governor Ōyama Tsunayoshi 大山綱良 (1828–1877) and future finance minister Matsu- kata Masayoshi 松方正義 (1835–1924).73 Takamori’s influence in the Meiji government helped win initial support for the shasō, but Tokyo’s

71 Hiratsuka 1937, pp. 9–22; Saigō Takamori Zenshū Henshū Iinkai 1976–1980, vol. 1, pp. 271–72, vol. 6, p. 390. 72 Naze-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai 1963, vol. 2, pp. 9–18; Haraguchi et al. 1999, pp. 215–17. 73 Hiratsuka 1937, pp. 19–22. confucian banking 203 contributions were part of a broader attempt to promote economic development on the Amami islands. Tokyo’s major contributions thus came after Takamori quit the government in 1873. With its new assets, the shasō supported a range of projects. In addition to providing low-interest loans to islanders, the Okinoerabujima shasō underwrote school construction and school scholarships, as well as public health efforts, including cholera containment. A proposed local hospital project failed, but the shasō helped underwrite the improvement of port facilities at Wadomari.74 In 1891, the shasō received a detailed formal charter, which fused aspects of Zhu Xi’s moral philosophy with modern corporate management practices. The charter specified the purpose of theshasō as helping widows, orphans, the elderly, and the sick (鰥寡孤独老病); providing disaster relief; and supporting public health, educational, commercial, and industrial projects that advanced the public good (公益). For its individual loans, the shasō was directed to target lending to those who had borrowed little in the past. The charter also specified the governance of the shasō in great detail, separating governance and ownership from management. The islanders were to elect one representative for each ten villagers to serve on the shasō general assembly, which approved major loans and capital expenditures. The day-to-day affairs of the shasō, however, were handled by its employees.75 By the 1890s, however, the Okinoerabujima shasō had begun to out- live its usefulness. The establishment of regular steamship service from the main islands in 1891 made the island feel less remote, and this made national institutions of public finance more accessible. In 1895, the governing council of the shasō voted to effectively dissolve the institution. Theshasō ’s capital reserves were used to buy government bonds, and the shasō began to call in its outstanding loans. The shasō’s assets were allocated to the governor of the archipelago (大島島司) and were managed by eighteen island mayors (村戸長). New institutions of local self-government had thus effectively replaced the public welfare functions of the shasō.76 The assets of theshasō were by now considerable, with over ¥21,000 and 760 koku in outstanding loans. The exact disposal of these assets is unclear, but theshasō council felt

74 Ibid., pp. 30–32. 75 Ibid., pp. 22–30. 76 Ibid., pp. 33-36. 204 mark j. ravina affluent enough to give Tsuchimochi Masateru a gift of ¥500 and to dedicate ¥1,500 to a Saigō Takamori memorial fund.77

H. Conclusion

It is tempting to compare the shasō to modern institutions, and to describe it as a proto-credit union or forerunner of development banks. As early as 1911, commentators were tracing the origins of credit unions to the Tokugawa shasō.78 My argument here is related, but distinct. Many Tokugawa financial practices, such as bills of exchange and fiat money, can be seen as forerunners of modern economic institutions. But these practices were commonly viewed as heterodox innovations and departures from a natural economy. Academies such as the Kaitokudō, as well as Ogyū Sorai and his disciples, promoted alternative visions of the economy, but these were understood as challenges to the shogunal orthodoxy of the Shōheikō. The significance of the shasō in Japanese economic history lies in how it legitimized discussions of lending and credit within state-sponsored orthodoxy. Because the shasō originated with Zhu Xi, it appealed to even conservative thinkers such as Saigō Takamori. In this way, discussions of the shasō helped to legitimize money-lending in unexpected intellectual circles.

77 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 78 Usami 1911, pp. 45–54. FROM TOKUGAWA TO MEIJI: THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF A LOCAL ENTREPRENEUR IN THE EARLY MEIJI ERA

Ishii Sumiyo*

In an era known for famous, even heroic, historical figures, Itō Yōzō 伊東要蔵 (1864–1934), a rural entrepreneur in Shizuoka Prefecture, may not stand out. In part for this very reason, however, a study of his life and career can shed important light on the transition from the Tokugawa period to the Meiji period. Yōzō was a man with a foot in two different worlds, yet he seems to have negotiated the gap between them smoothly and astutely. The historical importance of the famous actors of the early Meiji period is obvious. But it was people like Yōzō who worked on the front lines of Japan’s transition. This chapter is a close examination of the intersection between Yōzō’s socioeconomic thought and his business activities. Through this examination I shed light on some of the intangible but important causes of economic growth early in the Meiji period. Specifically, I argue that Yōzō blended indigenous ideas and practices with new ideas and practices imported from abroad to reconcile three realms: the individual, the household, and the broader society. He did so not only in theory, but in practice. Moreover, I argue that we can find other examples of local entrepreneurs whose outlooks and approaches were similar to those of Yōzō. Although further research in this realm is necessary, the results of my research suggest that Yōzō was typical of many or even most local entrepreneurs in the early Meiji period. Most studies of Japanese economic thought in the Meiji era seek primarily to explain the introduction, reception, diffusion, and establishment of Western economic thought in Japan. Such research has generally focused on intellectuals who played prominent, active roles in the realms of politics, academia, and economic policy.1 These

* Paper adapted by Gregory Smits. I am grateful for the comments by participants of the Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan conferences held at Tübingen Uni- versity (May 29–June 1, 2008) and Columbia University (June 26–27, 2009). I particularly appreciate the assistance of Gregory Smits. 1 For example, see Sakasai and Fujiwara 1990, Fujii 1991. 206 ishii sumiyo

studies are essential, but much is left out of the total picture by focusing so intensely on elites. To enhance our understanding of the early Meiji era, we need to examine local entrepreneurs and other economic agents who actually did the day-to-day work of managing economic enterprises.2 This essay is a preliminary attempt to fill in our picture of the Meiji era from the ground up. One point that is often overlooked in discussions of Meiji-era economic development is the key role played by indigenous industries, that is, those industries that carried over from the Tokugawa period largely unchanged. During the latter half of the 1880s, indigenous industries employed twelve times the number of people that were employed in new industries adapted from abroad. Indeed, even as late as the 1930s, approximately twice as many Japanese worked in indigenous industries, compared with workers in industries that originated outside Japan in the modern era. Between 1890 and 1930, indigenous industry functioned as a buffer that provided a pool of workers for modern industries during economic booms and absorbed many of these workers back into the indigenous sector during reces- sionary periods.3 Recent scholarship has pointed to the importance of local corpora- tions and the local economy in Japan’s modern economic development.4 Very few studies, however, have explained the economic thought of local entrepreneurs who took initiatives in developing indigenous industry in the districts, which became the engine of local economic growth. This chapter is a step toward rectifying this lack of attention by examining the relation between economic thought and entrepreneurship. The indigenous industry that supported the progress of economic growth during the Tokugawa period diverged into two types during the Meiji era. One type continued to rely on indigenous management practices, and the other type introduced new, modern management methods.5 With these points in mind let us now turn to examining the life and thought of Itō Yōzō.

2 For example, see Ishii 2003, Ishii 2004, Kawaguchi 2004, Niki 2004, Takahashi 2004, Ishii 2007, Kenjō 2008, Ōmori 2008. 3 See Nakamura 1971, pp. 17–18, 56–57. 4 Ibid., pp. 89–96. 5 Abe and Tanimoto 1995, pp. 131–33. from tokugawa to meiji 207

A. Biography of Itō Yōzō

Itō Yōzō was born in Tsuzuki village of Fuchi district in Tōtōmi province 遠江国敷知郡都筑村 (now Mikkabi-machi, Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka 静岡県浜松市三ケ日町) as the third son of Yamada Kiuemon 山田喜右衛門 on March 17, 1864.6 After graduating from Hamamatsu lower secondary school in November 1879, he entered Keio-gijuku 慶應義塾, which is now Keio University 慶應義塾大学. In 1881 he graduated and started teaching at Mita English School 三田英学校, a foreign-language preparatory department of Keio-gijuku.7 At this time, Yōzō published a translation, Eikoku kenpōron 英国憲法論 (On the Constitution of England), with Keio classmate Shibue Tamotsu 渋江保.8 Next, Yōzō worked as a teacher at Keio-gijuku and as a teacher and head teacher at Ōsaka Shōgyō Kōshu-jo 大阪商業講習所, which is now Osaka City University. During this time, he was adopted into the Itō family, whose paterfamilias was Itō Isoheiji 伊東磯平治 (1832–1901), a large landowner in Nakagawa village of Fuchi district in Tōtōmi province 遠江国敷知郡中川村 (now Hosoe-chō, Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka 静岡県浜松市細江町), where Yōzō later ran a business. Then Yōzō returned to his hometown from Osaka in 1884, succeeded to head the estate, and engaged in family businesses such as agriculture, sericulture, and money-lending. Moreover, he took over the management of the banks that Isoheiji had established. In 1884 Yōzō founded a private school for secondary education, Keisei-sha 経世社. He also established the Silk Promotion Institute 養蚕伝習所 in 1887, Inasa Agricultural School 引佐農業学校 in 1902, (now Inasa High School), Hamamatsu Gas & Co., Ltd. 浜松瓦斯 in 1910 (now Chubu Gas Co., Ltd.), Hamamatsu Railway & Co., Ltd. 浜松鉄道 in 1912, and Hamamatsu Commercial Bank 浜松商業銀行 in 1922 (now Mizuho Bank, Ltd.). Yōzō engaged in his family businesses; established and participated actively in founding educational institutions, banks, railroads, gas companies, the silk industry; and

6 Regarding Itō Yōzō’s background, see Keio-gijuku kinda hyō 1879 and 1881, Itō 1884, Hosoe-chō-shi Hensan Iinkai 1909, Mita Shōgyō Kenkyūkai 1909, Uchiyama 1934, Shizuoka Shinbunsha Shuppankyoku 1991, and Matsuzaki 2001, pp. 1–64. Regarding Itō Isoheiji’s background, see Hosoe-chō-shi Hensan Iinkai 1909, Shizuoka Shinbunsha Shuppankyoku 1991. 7 Regarding Mita English School, see Keio-gijuku 1960, p. 830. 8 The original is Amos 1877. On Shibue Tamotsu’s background, see Keio-gijuku 2000, pp. 351–52. 208 ishii sumiyo from tokugawa to meiji 209 more. Moreover, he worked as an inspector at the Fuji Cotton Gas- Spinning Company 富士瓦斯紡績 (now Fujibo Holdings, Inc.) and as a director of the Fuji Electric Power Company 富士電力 (now Chubu Electric Power Company, Inc.). He also took part in the conduct of local affairs as a member of village, district, and prefectural assemblies and eventually of the lower house of the Diet. Yōzō was a major economic actor in his region and was deeply engaged with local society on many levels. He possessed expertise in indigenous industries, and he promoted new industries that were essential for creating modern infrastructure, transportation, and financing. In this sense, Yōzō bridged the past, present, and future. The Itō family was well known as a large landowner and taxpayer since the Tokugawa period. Its main enterprises were agriculture, sericulture, and money-lending.9 As of 1890, profits from the land accounted for about eighty percent of net profit of about 2,067 yen that Yōzō realized by managing the property. The return on land- related investments, such as rice from his tenants, gave Yōzō the opportunity to develop his family business and the chance to branch out into other businesses.10 Only one study of Itō Yōzō and the Itō family has been published to date. It analyzes Yōzō’s career and his association with Fukuzawa Yukichi.11 It explains that Fukuzawa and Yōzō corresponded avidly, and on occasion they provided monetary aid for each other. In 1881 Yōzō and Fukuzawa maintained close contact and worked together on choosing a teacher for a secondary school. When Yōzō left for his new post at Ōsaka shōgyō kōshū-jo, he turned to Keio-gijuku Press 慶應義塾出版社 for financial assistance. In 1886, when Fukuzawa visited Hamamatsu, Yōzō came out to meet Fukuzawa upon his arrival and held a friendship party. During the same year, when a new assembly hall was established in Keio-gijuku, Yōzō supplied Sanshū tiles 三州瓦, which were made in the Mikawa District, and also offered to contribute to the Keio-gijuku Maintenance Fund 慶應義塾維持金. In 1898, when Yōzō was contemplating whether to run for election to the Diet, Fukuzawa advised him to run.

9 Regarding properties, estates, and the amount of taxes, see Shibuya 1984, pp. 217 and 227; Shibuya 1985, pp. 13, 58, 78, 118, 150, 207–08; Shibuya 1997, pp. 268–69. 10 Itō 1890a and 1890b. 11 Matsuzaki 2001, pp. 1–64. 210 ishii sumiyo

B. The Thought of Itō Yōzō

Just as Yōzō’s career reflects a mixture of indigenous business activities and an engagement with new enterprises, his thought was the product of ideas from both the Tokugawa and the early Meiji periods. It is unlikely that Yōzō was an original or distinctive thinker; his general outlook and ideas would have been fairly common among well educated men of his generation. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that Yōzō was not primarily an intellectual. The purpose of presenting an outline of his major ideas here is to contextualize his economic activities. The main emphasis, therefore, will be on Yōzō’s view of society, and the main source of his views will be manuscripts of speeches he gave during the 1880s. In a nutshell, Yōzō’s view of human beings was that “the heart-mind” (shin 心) and wisdom (chi 智) animate the physical body (keitai 形体), thereby enabling the body to function (hataraki 働) in a potentially useful way. Formal education (gakkō kyōiku 学校教育), he argued, was the best way to nurture the heart-mind and wisdom, thereby moving people closer to perfection.12 It was ultimately the body’s function (hataraki) that Yōzō regarded as important. He did not prize reclu- siveness or the perfecting of one’s inner self while withdrawn from social engagement. Yōzō’s view of society was structurally analogous to his view of individuals: “society consists of principle (ri 理) and sympathy (jō 情, also ‘consideration’ or ‘concern’).” Therefore, the heart-mind in individuals is analogous to principle at the level of society, a view that resonates with the classical neo-Confucian idea that the heart-mind is the locus of the cosmic pattern (ri 理, often translated “principle”) in microcosm. But there is also a modernist element in Yōzō’s conception of principle, a broad category that for him included “physical science” (yūkei rigaku 有形理学, natural science) and “abstract sciences” (mukei dōrigaku 無形道理学) such as psychology and economics. Yōzō, in other words, regarded “principle” as modernistic knowledge that came to Japan during the Bakumatsu/Meiji period, not as the cosmic pattern of classical neo-Confucian metaphysics. Likewise, Yōzō regarded wisdom at the individual level to constitute “sympathy” at the societal level. Sympathy for Yōzō meant “the moral

12 Itō 1885, unnumbered pp. 5–8. from tokugawa to meiji 211 mind” (dōtokushin 道徳心). Concretely, “the moral mind consists in the practice of filial piety and brotherly love kōtei( 孝悌), fidelity (chūshin 忠信), and taking into consideration the needs of the entire country. Regarding the relationship between individuals and society, Yōzō explained in the mid 1880s that: The reason a human being is called the lord of creation depends on a person’s disposition. Certainly, people cannot lead solitary lives. They are meant to form groups and organize societies (shakai 社会). So, organizing society is the primary nature (tensei 天性) of humans. For this reason, a human being is the lord of creation. Accordingly, a person should cultivate his disposition for unity with others (danketsu no sei 団結ノ性), and he must promote the growth and development of society. This is the most important work of our lives.13 This emphasis on social nature as a fundamental component of human nature is common to most forms of premodern Japanese thought. Indeed, it is common throughout East Asia and was a core concept in Confucius’s conception of human development. Western-style indi- vidualism does not seem to have influenced Yōzō’s views strongly. Notice also that in the parallelism of Yōzō’s thought, the “function” (hataraki) of individuals corresponds to the social functions of filial piety, brotherly love, and concern for the country. In this way, the basic components of human nature find their natural expression in worthy deeds at the level of society. The most important manifestations of human nature, seen in the passage quoted above, are deeds that advance society. The idea that all individuals exist to move society forward along some implied path surely reflects the influence of ideas that had become current during the early decades of the Meiji era. Moreover, Yōzō’s conception of “principle” was significantly different from the neo-Confucian idea of a cosmic pattern, closer to the scientific rationalism of Western thought. Again we see Yōzō bridging the gap between the Tokugawa past and the Meiji present and future, and doing so with apparent ease. From what we have seen of Yōzō’s career, it closely accords with the view of human beings and society described above. Yōzō developed himself as an individual through formal education, including time spent as a teacher. Then he applied his talents in a filial manner,

13 Itō 1880s?, unnumbered pp 3–4. 212 ishii sumiyo

managing the Itō household’s businesses. Brotherly love and fidelity were manifest in Yōzō’s extensive work on behalf of the local community. Through his service in the Diet, he put his accumulated talent to work for the benefit of the whole country. Moreover, for Yōzō, although the scope of these various levels of action was different, they were fundamentally the same in terms of quality. Each was a manifestation of well-nurtured human nature in a social context. Formal education was a key component of Yōzō’s thought as well as of his professional activities. Why did he attach such importance to education? One reason is that he thought of formal education as an efficient vehicle for the dissemination of knowledge. Although his advocacy of formal education may seem obvious by contemporary standards, in early Meiji Japan there was still considerable resistance to the idea that formal education is useful for all members of society. “Many people have opinions I cannot imagine,” said Yōzō. “They say that even if children receive education, some cannot succeed in their occupations, some become idlers, and some ruin their fortune, so education is not always necessary.” “I think these opinions lack prudence,” he said by way of understated criticism.14 For Yōzō, formal education was not only a key component of personal development but a key component in society’s economic development. The emphasis on the role of schools in the nation’s economic development, of course, reflected what for him were relatively recent ways of thinking inspired by the example of powerful Western countries.

C. Itō Yōzō’s Economic Activities as a Reflection of his Views of People and Society: The Case of Private Property

We have already seen the broad outline of the correspondence between Yōzō’s understanding of human beings and society and his economic activities. In this section we examine the specific case of private property and its relationship to the individual and society. In 1889, Yōzō took over the management of a substantial portion of the Itō household’s assets and enterprises. The terms under which he accepted this duty clearly specified that Yōzō would manage the

14 Itō 1889b, unnumbered pp. 1–2. from tokugawa to meiji 213 household enterprises as household property, not personal property— at least for the most part: Article 1. The way of managing property is as follows: We add together the estate and the residential land in the adoptive father’s name and those being in Yōzō’s name. Yōzō will manage all this estate, all the residential land, and ten thousand yen of a loan owned by the Itō household. The rest of the property remains under the control of the adoptive father. Article 2. Yōzō is to maintain the Itō family on proceeds gained by managing the property under his control. Yōzō should make a profit of about two thousand yen a year and save such profits year in and year out. Yōzō must take measures to increase receipts. Article 3. The right of managing the property means the property of the Itō family (Itō-ke no zaisan 伊東家ノ財産). So Yōzō must not regard the property as his private possession (shiyū zaisan 私有財産). There is a proviso: Yōzō can acquire some private property as a bonus (shōyo 賞与). The bonus is based on one third of the net average profit that he earns as a result of managing the property.15 According to the financial statement and the note of a final settlement in fiscal 1889 that Yōzō executed, he gained a net average of 2,067 yen through managing the property of which he took charge. Therefore he earned a bonus of sixty yen, which was three percent of the 2,067 yen.16 Yōzō’s personal bonus was an unprecedented development. Although the individual manager, Yōzō, acted mainly on behalf of the group enterprise, we see the influence of modernist ideas in that he profited personally as a result of his successful endeavors on behalf of the group. Yōzō saw no contradiction in managing both family and private property. He once wrote that he managed both types of property in the same way and that doing so was fully in accord with the intention of his adoptive father.17 Moreover, he understood individuals and society as existing in a harmonious relationship. Conflicts might arise, of course, but they could be regulated with mutually beneficial results. Yōzō did not regard his bonus as inflicting a loss on the Itō household because he benefited as an individual only to the extent that the household benefited from his management. By taking over as manager, Yōzō worked to advance the household’s economic standing, just

15 Itō 1885, unnumbered pp. 8–10. 16 Itō 1889b, unnumbered pp. 1–2. 17 Itō 1890a and 1890b. 214 ishii sumiyo as individuals naturally should endeavor to advance society. Here we see a close contention between Yōzō’s ideas and his economic activity. Contributing to the advance of society did not mean helping only the Itō household to advance. Yōzō took his private earnings from managing household property and invested them in his community. As we have seen, Yōzō helped to launch educational organizations, railways, banks, gas companies, and other enterprises that constituted the infrastructure of a modern economy. Indeed, part of Yōzō’s broader significance is that he is an excellent example of the type of citizen in the early Meiji period who was ideally situated to contribute to Japan’s advancement by acting locally. It was large landowners like Yōzō and the Itō household who were capable of taking the profits from their indigenous industries and investing them in emerging modern industries. Herein lies part of the significance of studying Yōzō and other local entrepreneurs. Through their activities we are able to see an important engine of economic growth during a crucial transition period for Japan.

D. Conclusions

Narratives of early Meiji Japan often stress tension and conflict as Japan was transformed from a compound state into a nation-state and under- went a cultural clash with imported ideas from abroad. By contrast, the case of Itō Yōzō points to a different possibility: a smooth, successful transition across the Tokugawa–Meiji divide. Yōzō’s conception of human nature and society derived from classical Tokugawa-vintage sources and from relatively new, imported ideas. He envisioned individual development taking place within a social context whereby individual advancement aided social progress and development. For Yōzō, individuals, households, and the broader society, including Japan as a whole, could pursue their interests in a mutually beneficial manner. In this respect his views resonate with those of Sai On described by Smits in this volume and with the rationale behind some of the shasō described by Ravina. Yōzō put this vision into practice during his career. Yōzō was personally able to negotiate the Tokugawa–Meiji transition with success and apparent ease. Moreover, his business and political activities went a long way toward enabling his local community to move forward into the new world of modern Japan. from tokugawa to meiji 215

The broader narrative of the early Meiji period would benefit from more study of local entrepreneurs like Yōzō. All indications are that he was not exceptional, but instead was typical of a key group of Japanese well positioned to become local entrepreneurs. In the early Meiji era there were many local entrepreneurs who devoted themselves to indigenous industry locally, on the one hand, and also undertook promoting the economic growth of their region and Japan as a whole, like Yōzō, on the other. Examples include Katō Rokuzō 加藤六蔵 (1858–1909, Aichi Prefecture, the soy-brewing industry), Isaka Naomoto 井坂直幹 (1860–1921, Akita Prefecture, the lumber industry), Kogure Budayū 木暮武太夫 (1860–1926, Gunma Prefecture, management of inns at hot-spring resorts), Kōzu Kunisuke 神津国助 (1859–1921, Nagano Prefecture, dairy farming), Ueyama Eiichirō 上山英一郎 (1862–1943, Wakayama Prefecture, cultivation of mandarin oranges and Dalmatian pyrethrum), and others. In many cases, such entrepreneurs engaged in their fathers’ occupations, that is, in indigenous industries. While thus employed, they developed local businesses such as educational institutions, railway enterprises, and banks, thereby contributing, as Yōzō did, to the economic growth of the region and of Japan. Moreover, many of these entrepreneurs’ career trajectories resemble Yōzō’s. Their basic education was based on indigenous forms of knowledge. Then, in their adolescence, they went to Tokyo for formal education, where they were exposed to new ideas. After returning to their home areas and devoting themselves to their fathers’ occupations, they invested in key local businesses. Jitsugyōjin Ketsuden 実業人傑伝 (Biography of Businessmen, 1895–1898) describes the careers of such local entrepreneurs.18 Many local entrepreneurs, at least during the early decades of the Meiji era, developed their economic thought from a synthesis of indigenous ideas and ways of thinking that came to Japan from abroad. For example, Katō Rokuzō mentions that “A human being ought to shape society and cause it to make progress. People can do so by such knowledge as mathematics, physics, and chemistry which are derived from the West.”19 Oka Jūrō 岡十郎 (1870–1923, Yamaguchi prefecture, whaling industry) said, “My business policy, that is, my ethos, is strictly

18 For details, see Hirota 1895–1898. 19 Katō 1882, unnumbered p. 18. 216 ishii sumiyo based on a Japanese mode, even though I have adopted a Norwegian whaling system.”20 Yōzō was a model of a local entrepreneur during the early decades of the Meiji period. As his case demonstrates, a pragmatic combination of native and foreign ideas, combined with local investment in modern infrastructure from capital accumulated in native industries, became a significant engine of economic growth during late nineteenth century.

20 Tōyō Hogei Kabushiki Kaisha 1910, p. 9. POLICY SPACE, POLARITIES, AND REGIMES

Mark Metzler*

In the background of movements in economic thought, and often in the foreground, lie fluctuations and structural shifts in the larger macroeconomy. Conversely, economic thought, applied as policy, shapes macroeconomic movements. In order to theorize this double movement, and to bring the contributions in this volume into a single view, this chapter outlines some conjunctural (or fluctuating) and developmental aspects of Japanese macroeconomy over the long run. It first offers an account of macroeconomic trend periods, referring especially to monetary movements in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It then connects this chronology to a hypothesized picture of a shifting policy space and shifting policy polarities within it. One classic policy polarity is found in the alternation of austerity-oriented (‘negative’) policies and expansion-oriented (‘positive’) policies. The latter have some historical association with market-directed kokueki policies. One finds a related tension between market-controlling and market- conforming policies. These considerations lead to some new methodological observations on how to conceptualize the oppositions—and the timing—of economic policy thought. The departure point for this chapter is the idea that macroeconomic history can be joined with the history of economic policy and policy thought by employing the chronologizing concept of policy regimes. A regime in this sense is a middle-range, temporal construct identify- ing a relatively stable configuration of policy ‘rules’ (and rulers) that lasts for one or more decades. The Tanuma era of the 1760s–1780s, discussed by several contributors to this volume, would be an example of such a period. To analyze the character of successive policy regimes, a spatializing metaphor of a bounded, dynamically structured policy space becomes useful. Sections A and B of this chapter briefly introduce this theoretical language. Section C begins to instantiate it by tracing out trend periods in land-tax receipts and other government

* For comments on this chapter, I am grateful to Professor Ōshima Mario and to the members of the Conference on Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan, New York, 2009, particularly to Bettina Gramlich-Oka. 218 mark metzler revenues, gold:silver exchange rates, zeni 銭 exchange rates, and commodity prices in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. On a time scale of decades, the movements of these various indicators are closely correlated. In the course of this survey, I suggest some ways that the insights developed by other contributors to this volume can be integrated into this macroscopic picture. Arguing on a more inferential basis, I also suggest a chronology of systemic debt crises in line with major turning points in medium-term fiscal and monetary trends. Can we identify these macroeconomic trend-periods with distinct policy regimes? Heuristically, I try out this idea in section D, returning to some more general considerations concerning policy spaces and policy regimes. Multidecadal policy regimes unfold within a longer, slower succession of long-term constitutional orders. Taking in this wider view, one can better consider how Japan’s national monetary order has been articulated with the worlds of international monetary circulation within which it has always operated in more and less insulated ways.

A. Policy Spaces and Polarities

In order to characterize and typify policy positions, policy fluctuations, and the development of policy, it is helpful to turn to a spatial metaphor of an invisible field of forces wherein a ‘policy space’—a shifting field of policy possibilities—is structured by a durable set of ‘policy polarities.’1 This idea emerges from an ongoing study of the alternation of so-called ‘positive’ (expansionary) and ‘negative’ (contractionary) policies across the economic-policy landscape of modern Japanese history. These paired terms, in Japanesesekkyoku seisaku 積極政策 and shōkyoku seisaku 消極政策, go back to the beginning of the twentieth century at least. The consciousness of such an opposition is older than that and fits easily withyin–yang dialectical conceptions that were well known among Edo-period intellectuals. (To avoid any

1 This usage is more or less new. The termpolicy space has also recently been used as part of an effort on the part of third-world countries to assertmore space for their own conduct of economic policy against the constraints of the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’—that is, to support the current shift away from the neoliberal regime that became internationally dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. The termpolicy space has appeared in another, non-historical sense in esoteric mathematical models in the operations research field that have since been translated into the ‘rational choice’ subfield of political science. I have not yet located a presentation of this latter usage that is written to enlighten outsiders to the field. policy space, polarities, and regimes 219 confusion, I note that I use these terms here as objectivizing terms of theory, not as a claim concerning the subjective consciousness of the policy actors.) To the very limited extent that these paired terms have occurred in English, it is to translate the Japanese terms.2 This ‘positive–negative’ terminology itself suggests the metaphor of a field of forces, wherein swings in macroeconomic policy can be thought of as happening within a historically shape-shifting field structured around opposing poles. (The Chinese character極 jí [Jp. kyoku], as in sekkyoku, itself signifies pole or extremity.) The ‘positions’ of these poles and the actual content of the policies identified with them also shift over time. The ideas of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu concerning intellectual fields, although different in their focus, share enough with this conception to be productive of new insights. To anticipate the argument, an intellectual field in Bourdieu’s sense is conceived to be a network of relationships within which people (agents) take up various intellectual positions. These positions are in many ways given by the structure of the field itself. That is, the intellectual field is understood as a constitutive field of forces. The relevant insight here is that ideas are inherently positional and relational, “so thoroughly interdefined that they can be adequately characterized only in their complementary or oppositional relationships to each other.” It is particularly the opposed positions within an intellectual field that condition each other: “their interaction is dialectical in the strictest sense of that term.”3 These ideas are taken up further below. This chapter highlights two types of policy–intellectual opposition. The primary focus is on the play of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ policies. These are connected to a second subject, that of market-conforming versus market-controlling policies, or alternatively imagined, of ‘freedom’ versus ‘control’ in the sense introduced by Kawaguchi in chapter 2 of this volume. This tension is touched on in different ways by most of the other authors. The remainder of this section introduces some

2 For ‘positive–negative’ policy swings across the first third of the twentieth century, see Metzler 2006, and for policy swings during post-1990 deflation, see Metzler 2008. Three fundamental analyses of this question, on which I have relied, are Hara 1981, Nakamura 1985, and Kamiyama 1989. A brief discussion generalizing this kind of policy tension in Western economic history is Kindleberger 1985, particularly the chapter “Keynesianism vs. Monetarism in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France.” Eagley 1969 reveals a similar pattern of partisan policy swings in eighteenth-century Sweden. 3 Bourdieu 1969 [1966]; quotation from Ringer 1990, p. 270. 220 mark metzler preliminary considerations concerning these two sets of polarities. A fuller account would consider other, associated policy polarities: commercially-oriented (‘mercantilist,’ 重商) policies versus agrarianist (‘physiocratic,’ 農本) policies; shogunal-centralizing (‘absolutist’) policies versus the domains’ maintenance and assertion of their own ‘feudal/federal’ (封建) autonomy; policies to promote foreign trade (‘kaikoku’ 開国) versus policies to restrict trade (‘sakoku’ 鎖国); and so on. Clearly, these various antinomies overlap, and tend to be bun- dled together in understanding and in actual practice.

1. Expansionary and Contractionary Policies The basic polarity between budgetary expansion and contraction is in some wise present in any revenue-expenditure system. Any state exemplifies such a system at what we may call a macro level of social organization, as do business firms at a meso level of organization and households at the micro level. Stated in these simplest of terms, the idea is banal, but when descriptively substantiated and theorized in practice—which means chronologized—it becomes a powerful organizing idea. To describe this polarity, I borrow the terms ‘positive policy’ and ‘negative policy’ from Japan’s more recent policy history. (To avoid misunderstanding, this sense of positive as expansionary and negative as contractionary has nothing to do with Bourdieu’s occasional use of the terms to signify dominant and dominated positions within a social field.) In the twentieth century, this ‘positive–negative’ vocabulary was applied to such classic oppositional pairings as the expansionary ‘Keynesianism’ of Takahashi Korekiyo versus the contractionary ‘monetarism’ of Inoue Junnosuke. Referring to the Edo period, scholars have used these terms to describe, for example, the opposition between the monetary expansion of Ogiwara Shigehide between 1695 and 1713 and the deflationary policies of Arai Hakuseki and Tokugawa Yoshimune between 1714 and 1736. One sees it again in the swing from the expansive kokueki policies of Tanuma Okitsugu (ca. 1764–1787) to the restorationist stabilization-oriented policies of Matsudaira Sadanobu. On a local scale, Sýkora in chapter 6 of this volume presents the opposition in Saga domain between contractionary retrenchment policy and expansionary kokueki policy during the crisis of the 1830s. In practice, these policy polarities involve a wider set of moral, social, and political concerns that go far beyond the seemingly nar- policy space, polarities, and regimes 221 row question of budgetary policy. To turn the point around, this is a reminder of the under-regarded centrality of budget-making: the budget as the outline of a state’s functioning in its actuality, stripped of misleading ideologies.4 Regardless of longer-term growth trends or other developmental dynamics, in the year-to-year course of budget-making it is in the nature of things that the scale of budgets will fluctuate and that expansionary and contractionary policies will, at some time scale, alternate. This basic alternation is the systole and diastole of policy. Such fiscal and monetary pulsations run parallel to the more ungoverned macroeconomic processes of the business cycle, by which businesses in general experience alternating phases of prosperity and recession. Manifestly, governmental fiscal-monetary policy cycles and general business cycles are closely connected to each other, though investigation shows these connections to be frequently non-obvious and unpre- dictable.

2. Market-Conforming and Market-Controlling Policies Another classic policy polarity, adumbrated in this volume by Kawa- guchi, is that of market ‘freedom’ versus ‘control.’ This concern might appear to be a modern one retrojected onto earlier times. As is so often true, a look toward Chinese history will confound such constructions of modernity. This opposition was elaborated in some of the most famous economic-policy debates of ancient and medieval China, already well worn by the time of the Han-dynasty ‘salt and iron’ debate 塩鉄論 over state enterprise.5 One sees it again a millennium later in Zhu Xi’s critique of Wang Anshi’s state-enterprise program, which forms a starting point for the community-granary program described by Ravina in chapter 7 above. When we turn from historical policy- formation to modern scholarly stances, we see in historians’ recon- structions a similar opposition of views. Thus T. C. Smith in the 1950s discovered the entrepreneurial market dynamism of the Tokugawa economic order, and E. S. Crawcour in the 1980s rediscovered its

4 Cf. Goldscheid 1925, p. 203. Government economic concern, primarily fiscal, was secondarily social, the latter characteristically understood in moral terms. This critical subject (left out of this chapter) was structured by its own policy polarities, interconnected with those described here. 5 Huan 1934. 222 mark metzler statist and ‘industrial-policy’ dimensions.6 As Kawaguchi indicates in this volume, these terms are not the mutually exclusive opposites that twentieth-century economic ideologies made them out to be. Markets were contained, constrained, and empowered by states, while states were contained, constrained, and empowered by markets. The consideration of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ policies in this context raises a further question. Do ‘positive’ expansionary policies tend to be paired with ‘statist’ ones (because budgetary expansion means state expansion)?7 Do budgetary and monetary contraction conversely mean the giving up of functions formerly taken on by the state? Here we must also reconsider the point emphasized in Ravina’s Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan, that in the compound Tokugawa order there was not one state but a hierarchy of multiple states.8 Unlike the opposition ‘state versus market’ as it came to be conceived in the age of modern liberalism, here the relative extension or retreat of the central shogunal state did not happen vis-à-vis business firms. Rather, it happened mainly vis-à-vis the undertakings of the lordly domains. As domainal states, pursuing kokueki policies, behaved increasingly as profit-seeking enterprises, this opposition took on a commercial aspect. Thus, as Gramlich-Oka suggests in chapter 5, the Tanuma new policies, within this dialectic of centralizing and decentralizing policies, were consistently national in orientation. This poses the question, ‘Whose kokueki?’—to the profit of whose state? If we conceptualize a policy space shaped by these polarities, how did the shape of this policy space shift over the course of the period? Recognizing that both market and state ‘capacities’ increased over the course of the period, how did central and local economic policies and policy thinking oscillate between the poles of accepting market determinations and imposing state controls? When did they do so? These questions concern the long-term development of market institutions, to which modern historians have given much thought. They also concern conjunctural fluctuations in the short and medium term, which have often been left out of recent scholarly considerations. Both

6 Smith 1959, Smith 1988, Crawcour 1989, Ōshima 1995. 7 In fact, the Chinese terms that translate as ‘positive policy’ and ‘negative policy’ (積極政策 jījí zhèngcè and 消極政策 xiāojí zhèngcè) have in distinction to the Japanese usage more the sense of state activism versus laissez-faire (Professor Huaiyin Li, personal communication). 8 Ravina 1999. policy space, polarities, and regimes 223 points may be clarified by reference to the macroeconomic periodiza- tion advanced in section C below. A further structuring conception, that of a succession of policy regimes, is also useful in organizing this material.

B. Multidecadal Policy Regimes

If the idea of a policy space is a spatial metaphor, the idea of a succession of policy regimes is an essentially temporal and periodizing one. In most current political-economic usages, the idea of regime signifies a multidecadal system that endures (in the case of a modern constitutional political system) across multiple changes in cabinets or presidential administrations. Concerning post-World War II Japan, for example, analysts from various disciplines now routinely structure their thinking around the idea of a ‘1955 system’ or ‘High-Speed Growth regime’ that took shape around 1955 and lasted into the 1990s, when a new phase of institutional dissolution and regime reconstitution began.9 To use regime in this sense highlights a chronology of informal, systemic shifts and continuities within an enduring formal (constitutional) structure. Temporally speaking, this is a meso-level construct, indicating shifts on a multidecadal timescale that is nested within the macro-level secular shifts occasioned by major revolutions in the constitutional order (examples of the latter occurred in 1600, 1868, and 1945).10 Translated into the history of despotic/dynastic systems, a regime in this meso sense corresponds to one or more autocratic reign periods or to major divisions of a long reign period. The idea of a policy regime is suggestive for present purposes, but its historical theorization has been weak. In part this is because the idea has been developed by political scientists and political economists who have usually applied the idea only to the limited timespan of the regime they see being superseded (in the mid twentieth century, ‘Fordism’ or ‘the New Deal’ or ‘the 1955 system’) and to the regime they see replacing it (‘neoliberalism,’ ‘globalization,’ and so on). If these analysts go further back, it is usually only to the extent of a rough sketch of the regime they imagine to have preceded that of the

9 Pempel 1998; or for a different dating and argument on a similar timescale, see Noguchi 1995. 10 For monetary transitions on this longer scale, Metzler 2002. 224 mark metzler mid-to-late twentieth century. Plainly, a convincing picture of multidecadal regimes requires a view of multiple successive regimes. This means taking in a view of centuries. To connect this question to that of policy polarities, we can expect a regime to be structured by its own characteristic types of policy swings, which are an essential, dynamic aspect of any given regime. Within the four decades of the 1955 system, for example, one can chart more than a dozen swings between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ fiscal-monetary policies. Many of these policy turns were associated with cabinet changes or midterm cabinet shuffles; others were associated with shifts happening at formally lower levels within the bureaucratic hierarchy; others with changes of mind on the part of leaders who implemented successive ‘contradictory’ policies in response to changing circumstances. I repeat these probably obvious and seemingly off-topic points to indicate that the opaque worlds of shogunal and domainal governing circles had their own analogues to these modern processes, often sur- misable only by reading their visible policy outputs. Lest this approach seem too presentist, I hasten to add that I am applying constructions from a densely known, densely theorized period to a less known, less theorized period because it is in reference to more recent times that the available useful constructions are there for the taking. Well specified and grounded theories of politics and policy derived from early modern dynastic systems could equally well illuminate the nature of contemporary political/policy systems. The discovery of similarity across widely separated subjects of analysis enlightens; to the extent that one can apply common (and non-obvious) descriptions to widely separated subjects, those descriptions achieve higher levels of theoretical significance. A first step toward understanding this question is to survey policy ‘outputs’ (conduct) as reflected in macroeconomic trend periods.

C. Macroeconomic Trend Periods and Policy Turns

This section traces meso-scale (multidecadal) trend periods and identifies key policy turns in:

• shogunal land-tax receipts and other revenues; • gold:silver rates; • zeni rates (and copper prices); • commodity prices (inflationary and deflationary trend periods). policy space, polarities, and regimes 225

It also suggests a connected chronology of systemic debt crises. These trends and their turning points imply shifts in business conditions generally. They thus point to a still unknown history of business cycles (or credit/debt cycles) during the period.11 The primary focus is on the period after the Kyōhō Reform of 1716–1736, because of the fuller availability of annual data series and because it is the focus of most of the chapters in this volume. This does not imply that such shifts did not happen before then, only that we still lack the kind of high-resolution data that allows us to chart them.

1. Bakufu Revenues Fiscal functioning—most visibly as the delivery of food grains—is the metabolism of the state. Before there was a well developed understanding of a national economy or of officials’ ability to govern general macroeconomic movements, official economic concern was primarily fiscal. The movement of revenues and expenditures and the shifts in fiscal policy thus form a kind of rhythmic ‘bass line’ in the conduct of economic policy.12 Fiscal concerns drove monetary policies and kokueki policies. Along the way, through policy trial and error, people also formed an understanding of the social and developmental effects of such policies. The logic of giving analytical primacy to fiscal concerns is shown further in the fact that the Tokugawa order, at both the shogunal and domainal levels, ended in a generalized fiscal crisis in the 1860s, which also threw monetary policies and samurai income- maintenance policies into chaos.

1.1. Land-Tax Revenues In the fundamental domain of fiscal policy, the most fundamental institution was the agricultural land tax. Furushima Toshio describes trend periods in shogunal land-tax receipts as follows:13

I. 1716–1736: low. During the Kyōhō period (1716–1736), tax receipts averaged between 1.4 and 1.5 million koku 石 per year (in theory sufficient to maintain the same number of people).

11 Mirowski 1985 provides a methodological example of how business cycles in early modern times might be reconstructed via the close study of company business results. 12 Cf. Furushima 1978. 13 Ibid., pp. 268–69, 331; Tsuji and Matsumoto 1964, pp. 183–95; see also Ōguchi 2004. 226 mark metzler

II. 1737–1764: increasing and high. Land taxes were raised substantially in the decade after the Kyōhō Reform, to around 38 percent of the assessed yield. Land-tax receipts remained at a historically high level high from the mid-1740s to the mid-1760s (around 1.6 to 1.7 million koku annually). This high level proved to be a historical limit. III. 1765–1786: decreasing. In the face of widespread and intense peasant resistance, land-tax receipts fell back after 1764, trend- ing downward to a point below 1.4 million koku during the great famine of the 1780s.14 IV. 1787–1819: increasing and high. In the decade after 1786, land-tax receipts increased again to the level of the 1770s, around 1.5 million koku. They maintained this level until the beginning of the Bunsei period. V. 1820–1843: decreasing and low. Land-tax receipts again declined in absolute terms in the 1820s, even as other revenues soared. They fell to a new low point around 1.3 millionkoku during the great famine of the 1830s.

As shogunal land-tax receipts reached their historical limits in the mid eighteenth century, land-tax rates in many of the lordly domains were also fixed and not raised thereafter.15 This was the fiscal context of the turn to more market-oriented kokueki policies in the second half of the eighteenth century. The early modern (compound) Japanese state, if defined by its fiscal boundaries, extended to include its stipendiary retainers and their households. The compound state was in this sense very large, including some six to seven percent of the population (that is, the samurai class) as its direct dependents and thereby also constituting the core urban markets of the burgeoning market economy. In line with this, Japanese land-tax levels were very high in international comparison. Assessed tax rates in the shogunal domain averaged about thirty-four percent across the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They were much higher in some of the lordly domains. The Meiji state continued to take about thirty percent of the harvest in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a taxation level “out of all proportion higher

14 Furushima 1978, p. 341. 15 Smith 1988, pp. 50–70. policy space, polarities, and regimes 227 than it is in any other civilized state”—double to seven times the rate of agricultural land taxation in Central and Western Europe—according to Paul Mayet, who undertook a series of surveys in the employ of the Meiji government.16 By contrast, land-tax rates in contemporary Qing-dynasty China were very low, about two to four percent of the harvest.17 That is, in the world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Tokugawa state system, ‘compound’ as it was, presents a fiscal picture of ‘big government’ (notwithstanding the claims of some prominent historians, made during the first flush of deregulation and privatization in the 1980s, that the Tokugawa and early-to-mid Meiji eras were times of ‘small government’).18 Thus, once the Meiji government had fiscally cut loose the hereditary military retainers and their households, it had considerable fiscal leeway compared to most mid nineteenth-century states. Seen from another direction, the fiscal expansion and contraction of the ‘big’ Tokugawa state had big macroeconomic effects.

1.2. Non-land Tax Revenues Contrary to the long-run decline of land-tax revenues after 1764, other shogunal revenues tended to increase. Non-land tax revenues, derived from such sources as profits on recoinages, interest on loans, and commercial fees and taxes, also varied much more dramatically by subperiod. To an extent, these revenues moved inversely to land-tax revenues. (As one might expect: declining land-tax revenues, for example, in the Tanuma period, motivated the hunt for other sources of revenue.) Non-land tax revenues were, roughly speaking, ‘commercial’ revenues. Hence, shifts in the ratio between land-tax and other revenues can be interpreted as shifts between a relatively more agrarian-physiocratic fiscal model and a relatively more mercantilist one. (Again, this is to speak of relative tendencies, not of achieved states.) Trend periods:

I. 1716–1736: low. Annual non-land tax revenues remained under 1 million gold ryō 両 (roughly equivalent in value to the same number of koku of rice) during the Kyōhō Reform, when the shogunate

16 Mayet 1893, pp. 229–30. 17 Li 2005, pp. 34–40. 18 E.g., Nakamura 1985, p. 5; Nakamura 1990, pp. 4–8. 228 mark metzler

ended the former policy of currency debasement, forewent recoinage revenues, and returned to primary reliance on land taxes. II. 1736–1787: increasing and high. From the recoinage of 1736 to 1787, non-land tax revenues remained relatively high, coming to as much as 2 million ryō. Non-land tax revenues increased con- spicuously from 1772, when the new gold-standard coinage was introduced, until the termination of the Tanuma policy in 1787. III. 1788–1818: declining and lower (slow increase again after ca. 1800). During the great reform of the Kansei era (1787–1793), non-land tax revenues were cut back drastically, to the lowest levels since the Kyōhō Reform. The land tax again, temporarily, became the primary source of shogunal revenue. Non-land tax revenues increased slowly after about 1800 and regained parity with land-tax receipts in the early 1810s. IV. After 1818: increasing and high. Non-land tax revenues shot up to new heights after the Bunsei recoinage of 1818, temporarily surpassing 3 million ryō in the mid 1820s.19

A full account would face the difficult task of correlating fiscal trends in the domainal states and explaining how and to what degree these movements were coordinated with fiscal movements at the shogunate level. It bears repeating that the shogunal state borrowed no money and had no national debt. Domainal governments tended to be heavily indebted, and cycles of ‘sovereign lending’ (that is, by Osaka bankers to the domainal lords) served to link fiscal, monetary, and credit-market dynamics. From the side of the domainal governments, the conditions of borrowing and payback at times enabled, at times constrained local fiscal policies and spurred fiscal innovations.

2. Phases of Monetary Expansion and Restraint After 1695, seignorage profits derived from currency creation formed an important part of non-land tax revenues. This fiscal recourse to recoinages meant monetary expansion, and monetary expansion stimulated commerce (as was noticed at the time). The shogunate could profit from currency creation during periods of rapid monetization and commercialization without imposing immediate losses on the

19 Tsuji and Matsumoto 1964, pp. 183–95. The data series compiled by Tsuji and Matsu- moto ends in 1841, so it does not reveal the effect of the shogunate’s Tenpō Reform. policy space, polarities, and regimes 229 people through currency depreciation, as long as money use grew as rapidly or more rapidly than the money supply.20 When the expansion of the money supply outpaced the growth of the money economy, as evidently happened in the 1710s and again in the 1770s and the 1820s, the prices of goods rose (that is, money depreciated), and the recoinage policy became a visible ‘inflation tax.’ Waves of monetary debasement (expansion) and restoration (contraction) thus linked fiscal trend movements with exchange-rate trends, price trends, debt cycles, and business conditions more generally. Monetary ‘retrenchment’ in most instances meant relative restraint and plateauing of money creation rather than actual contraction of the money supply. (Exceptionally, the money supply was severely contracted for twenty years during the Kyōhō Reform, with economically depressing results.) In conditions of ongoing commercial growth, these periods of relative restraint produced a long-run deflationary effect. Trend periods:

I. Genroku-Hōei monetary expansion, 1695–1713. The silver and gold coinages were both debased repeatedly after 1695 in a great wave of monetary expansion that went on for eighteen years, to 1713.21 II. Kyōhō monetary contraction, 1714–1736. The debasement policy was reversed and the pre-1695 (Keichō-era) hard-money standard restored during the Shōtoku and Kyōhō periods (1714–1736). This deflationary policy was integral to the restorationist, anti- mercantile thrust of the Kyōhō Reform. III. Genbun monetary expansion, after 1736. The Kyōhō deflation ended in 1736 with the deliberately reflationary Genbun recoinage, which returned the coinage to the moderately debased Gen- roku monetary standard of 1695. IV. Tanuma-era monetary expansion, ca. 1764–1787. Monetary policy under the administration of Tanuma Okitsugu has been understood as a third wave of debasement. Functionally, this is the case, in that the new coinage substantially increased the money supply. The zeni coinage was also expanded via the issue of debased zeni

20 A point of view emphasized by Miyamoto Matao, who sees shogunal expansion of the money supply over the course of the period as more or less appropriate to the growth potential of the economy (Miyamoto 1989, 2004a, 2004b). 21 Taya 1973. 230 mark metzler

and via the creation of multi-denomination zeni coins. The greatest novelty of the Tanuma reforms was to create a tokenized silver coinage denominated in terms of the gold-coinage system—that is, a gold standard—as mentioned further below. Unlike previous (and subsequent) debasements, the specie content of the gold coins and of the silver chōgin 丁銀 coinage was not reduced. V. Kansei monetary retrenchment, after 1787, bringing a relative restraint (but not abolition) of the issue of the new coinages. VI. Bunsei monetary expansion, after 1818. A fourth wave of currency debasement began with the Bunsei recoinage in 1818 and continued into the 1830s.

The Tokugawa order came to an end in the midst of a final great wave of monetary expansion and price inflation after 1860, when the Man’en recoinage came as a response to forced monetary integration with the wider ‘containing’ field of the international trading world. Again, at the level of the lordly domains the picture is much more varied and complex. A total national monetary history would need to identify and correlate movements in domainal monetary policies, money supplies, and local-currency exchange rates (rates of depreciation vis-à-vis shogunal money), and clarify the articulation of these movements with the better understood movements in the national standard money. Private credit and credit-money (checks, bills of exchange) add further layers of complexity. Shogunal money-creation policies were also the most powerful determinants of the movement of exchange rates among the various domestic currencies.

3. Domestic Exchange Rates The analysis of exchange-rate regimes is a core part of the analysis of modern monetary regimes generally. Under the Tokugawa order, there was no foreign exchange market in the modern sense, and currency when used to settle foreign trade was valued as bullion.22 On the other hand, there was an active and efficientdomestic exchange of currencies that has many points of resemblance to modern foreign- exchange markets.

22 But see Gramlich-Oka 2008 for some of the complexities. policy space, polarities, and regimes 231

Currency standards in their variation have profound implications for fiscal, monetary, and macroeconomic management. They have equally profound implications for the pace and character of public and private capital formation. Changes in the exchange rates of currencies both reflect and generate shifts in the distribution of wealth between currency regions and social groups. In line with this, exchange rates both reflect and generate shifts in the agro-industrial structure of currency regions. To find modern illustrations, one need only think of recent ‘high yen’ (endaka 円高) recessions, ‘industrial hollowing’ (off- shoring), and so on. The ‘three-coinage system’ sanka( seido 三貨制度) established between 1601 and 1636 consisted of gold-, silver-, and bronze-coinage subsystems that each functioned more or less independently. Although the shogunate tried to fix rates of exchange between them, they fluctuated widely in the markets and in actuality took on the character of a floating-rate system. The picture is further complicated by the existence of local paper monies issued by private merchant houses and by many domainal governments. The latter were often not really convertible and depreciated severely relative to their face value, which was usually denominated in terms of one of the central government’s metallic coinages. A full account of the monetary dynamics of the period would compile and consider these fluctuations also.

3.1. Gold:Silver Rates The silver-by-weight monme( 匁) system consisted of stamped silver bars and lumps; the gold-by-tale (ryō 両)23 system consisted of gold koban and fractional gold coins. Over the course of the eighteenth century, gold:silver exchange rates departed widely from international gold:silver rates, as the exchange came to be governed more by domestic supply/demand conditions. The most critical of these factors was the ratio of the minting of gold (later gold-standard) coinage to the minting of silver coinage. Exchange-rate trend periods:24

23 The Sino-Japanese termryō 両 (Chinese liang, pidgin tael) referred in China to a weight of silver (which had many variations) and in Japan to the basic currency unit in the gold coinage system (equivalent to one koban 小判 coin). 24 Turning points are given by highs and lows in a nine-year moving average of high and low rates. 232 mark metzler

I. 1736–1772: gold appreciation, silver depreciation, or in a more convenient (modern) Japanese phrasing, ‘kindaka, ginyasu’ 金高銀安. On the eve of the Genbun recoinage in 1736, gold rates went as low as fifty silver monme per gold ryō; thirty-six years later, on the eve of the enactment of Tanuma’s gold-standard reform in 1772, rates touched a high of seventy-four monme per ryō. II. 1772–1789: silver appreciation, gold depreciation (銀高金安). The issue of the gold-standard subsidiary silver coinage (the nanryō nishuban 南鐐二朱判) in 1772 initiated a fall of the value of the gold-standard currency. (The ‘gold’ supply was now augmented by the inclusion of these token silver coins within the gold system and the silver supply diminished by their withdrawal.)25 The gold exchange again reached points as low as fifty monme per ryō in 1786, at the end of the Tanuma period (the lowest average yearly price came in 1789). III. 1789–1807: gold appreciation, silver depreciation (金高銀安). The Kansei Reform brought a renewed increase in gold prices, indicating the moderation (but not termination) of the issue of the new gold-standard coinage. IV. 1807–1837: silver appreciation, gold depreciation (銀高金安). Moderate trend. V. After 1837: gold appreciation, silver depreciation (金高銀安).

The fluctuation of gold:silver rates also had a regional dimension due to the use of silver in the west and gold in the east. An important further question is, to what degree did gold:silver rates reflect (or affect) the regional balance of payments between the Edo-centered economy of eastern Japan and the Osaka-centered economy of western Japan?

3.2. Zeni exchange rates The Chinese-style bronze coinage (Sino-Japanesezeni or sen 銭, Chi- nese qian, pidgin cash) can be considered the most basic type of currency. This was so in terms of historical priority (as Segal’s chapter discusses), and it was so socially in that this was the coinage of daily transactions. Zeni:silver rates moved as follows:

25 With the Tanuma new policies, Japan actually established the first modern system of tokenized gold-standard coinage system; more detail is given in Metzler forthcoming. policy space, polarities, and regimes 233

I. 1768–1786: silver appreciation, zeni depreciation (銀高銭安). The value of zeni rose to a peak in 1760. Zeni rates then declined sharply after 1768, falling more than forty percent over the course of the next eighteen years (from more than fifteen silver monme per 1,000 zeni to around nine monme per 1,000 zeni). II. Stability until the late 1830s. The new level of thezeni :silver exchange established from the time of the Kansei Reform lasted until the crisis of the 1830s.26 (The rate of silvermonme per 1,000 zeni fluctuated in a band between nine and ten, rarely moving more than a fraction of that range in a given year). Within that half-century of stable rates, there was a very modest decline of zeni rates from 1787–1788 to ca. 1820. III. Zeni appreciation after 1839. A trend reversal came as zeni rates began to increase after 1839. The appreciation of zeni (= depreciation of silver and gold-standard coinage) became very rapid from 1851 to 1865, when zeni rates spiked to levels last seen in the 1760s. The value ofzeni crashed again in the final years of the shogunate.

Further indicating a major shift in the regime for managing copper trade and zeni production in the mid 1760s was the reestablishment of a shogunal copper monopoly (dōza) in 1766. This reform established an enduring system of governance over the copper trade that lasted until the end of the shogunate.27 It happened at the time of a historic spike in copper prices. The partial series of copper prices given by Gramlich-Oka shows a high level in the market price of copper around 1712 (followed by a gap in the data between 1718 and 1750). Another peak came in 1764, at the point when the new monetary policies associated with Tanuma Okitsugu began to be introduced. It was also in 1765 that the shogunate first tried to circulate a silver coin by tale (which was received by merchants as a kind of debasement). The fluctuation ofzeni rates had important social effects due to the highly differential use of currency by social class. (This was also true for domainal paper currencies.) The depreciation ofzeni in the 1770s meant an increase in the zeni price of goods. To the degree that zeni wages were not raised correspondingly, the cost of this inflation was

26 Ōishi 1991, pp. 113–15. 27 Gramlich-Oka 2008b, pp. 7, 9. 234 mark metzler borne by ordinary people as consumers who lived in the zeni economy. The stability of thezeni exchange from the 1780s to the 1830s was unprecedented in the previous record, and after the crisis of the 1780s, it surely contributed to the stabilization of the livelihoods of ordinary people.

4. Price Movements Major inflation and deflation trend periods are closely connected to the currency movements schematized above.28 Trend periods are as follows:

I. Ca. 1695–1717: inflation (accompanying the currency debasements of 1695–1713). This movement culminated in an inflationary bubble in 1714–1717.29 II. 1717–1736: deflation (monetary restoration and economic depression). III. 1736–1739: inflation (or reflation) after the 1736 recoinage. IV. 1739–1770: deflationtrend. V. 1770–1787: inflation trend (currency debasement/reform after 1764 culminating in inflation and crisis in the 1780s). VI. 1787–1818: deflation trend. VII. 1818–1838: inflation following the 1818 recoinage.

After the 1830s, violent ups and downs of prices followed one another in close succession. This turbulence culminated in the inflationary price revolution of the 1860s, which raised prices to a permanently higher level. Although I leave the question to one side here, it would be informa- tive to periodize the movements of prices for various kinds of goods relative to one another, including the relationship of rice prices to other prices and the terms of trade between prices of agricultural crops and manufactured goods.30 The moral and gendered dimensions of these ‘positive–negative’ policy dialectics are some of the most interesting of all. Conservative, masculinist commentators and officials have often blamed excessive

28 Iwahashi 1976, 1981; Shinbo 1978; Harada and Miyamoto 1985; Miyamoto 1989. 29 Metzler 1994. 30 See Miyamoto’s careful study of the subject (Miyamato 1989, 2004a, and 2004b). policy space, polarities, and regimes 235 fiscal spending and monetary expansion for the rise of upstartnou- veaux riches and the upsetting of social hierarchy. For less obvious reasons they have also frequently coded these rhetorically as feminine. Conversely, deflation has been connected to the restoration of established hierarchies and masculinist discipline.31

5. Interest Rates and Systemic Debt Crises In comparison to price history, the history of interest rates in the Edo period is much less well known. On the model of the history of later, more fully documented times, one approaches this subject with two strong expectations. First, one would expect interest rates to vary directly with inflation rates. Price inflation quickly leads lenders to increase the rates of interest that they charge. Otherwise they may lose money, as the ‘heavier’ money they lend out is later repaid with ‘lighter’ money. Price deflation conversely will lead to a reduction in interest rates, but with more of a lag. Second, one would expect systemic debt crises to arise especially out of periods of credit inflation. They might break out at moments of widespread crop failures and famine. They might also break out at a point when sustained inflation (also meaning high rates of interest) gives way to deflation, especially if the transition is sudden. At such moments, the combination of high debt loads at high interest and falling sale prices (for farmers, merchants, or for ‘exporters’ of commodities, which included many domainal governments) results in a classic debt-deflation crisis, as described by Fisher.32 Loans will be locked in at high interest rates, and the reduction of interest rates will lag significantly behind the downward movement of commodity prices. The clearest example of such a case in the history of the period came in the sudden deflation of prices at the beginning of the Kyōhō Reform. Debt crises can suddenly magnify the importance of movements at the margin in prices and other business conditions: when a household or business house reaches a certain point of financial strain, small movements can make the difference between solvency and default. Default is thus a kind of threshold effect—the build-up to it may be gradual, but the onset is abrupt—and debt defaults can cas- cade through a system. In the record of late Tokugawa history, such

31 See Metzler 2004 for some examples from various periods and places. 32 Fisher 1933. 236 mark metzler moments of debt crisis can be seen, for example, at the times of the Kyōhō, Kansei, and Tenpō reforms, when they are flagged for us by shogunal debt-relief orders. These expectations concerning interest rates and debt crises can be posed as verifiable hypotheses subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation.

6. The Political Reform Cycle The fiscal and monetary movements summarized so far can all be connected to a political-economic cycle of innovation and (relative) restoration of former governing modes, alluded to already at numerous points in this volume. These ‘Three Great Reforms’三大改革 form the fundamental system-reconstitutive events of late Tokugawa history.33 The conservative ‘reform’ model was established with the Kyōhō Reform of 1716–1736. As a counter-model, the new policies of the Tanuma period constitute the most famous ‘mercantilist’ innovations attempted at the shogunal level before the Western-influenced innovations of the 1860s. Most of the Tanuma-regime innovations were reversed or curtailed in the second great reform, that of the Kansei era (1787–1793), directed by Matsudaira Sadanobu. A new phase of monetary expansion and more commercially oriented government came in the Bunsei period (1818–1829) and extended into the crisis years of the 1830s. The shogunate’s Tenpō Reform of 1841–1843 was again presented in a Kyōhō-Kansei-style rhetoric but was less successful in restoring the system to its former balance. Significantly, it was also delayed compared to a wave of Tenpō-era reforms in the lordly domains, many of which had significantkokueki elements. This ‘great reform’ cycle was also, in aggregate national terms, a demographic cycle, whose decisive Malthusian moments were the great famines of the 1730s, 1780s, and 1830s. A full account would need to articulate the dynamics of both demographic and climate history with social-historical analysis.34 In the polarity of expansive ‘positive’ and contractionary ‘negative’ policies, the Three Great Reforms constitute the ‘negative’ poles, as

33 For which see the now classic treatment of Bolitho 1974. Of course, the rhetoric of restoring traditional governance may also mask new policy departures. 34 Metzler 1994. For the social history of famine, see Arnold 1988. Concerning climate history, Davis 2001 provides one model of some of the questions to ask. policy space, polarities, and regimes 237 extreme moments of fiscal austerity and monetary contraction. How- ever, this was less fully the case with each iteration. A closer look naturally reveals complex policy dialectics within each reform. As Sýkora’s chapter in this volume shows, the Tenpō reform in Saga domain thus went through its own two-phase policy cycle. First, from 1830–1835, policy adhered to a classic austerity line. This was followed in 1835– 1843, in conjunction with a shift in domainal leadership, by a ‘positive’ policy characterized by the implementation of activist kokueki policies of developing domainal monopolies and experimenting with European technology.

D. Summation and Synthesis

Taking in all of the above, we can now construct a composite chronology of policy trend periods. More tentatively, these periods can be identified with shogunal-level policy regimes and regime shifts. Changes in shogunal reigns in most cases meant a shift in policy regime. Several major shifts in policy regime are also flagged by a decision to change nengō 年号 era names. One point that emerges in comparing shifts in various policy areas is the existence of in-between or transitional periods during which a new set of policies is taking form (for example, 1713–1716 and arguably 1764–1772). For reference, some other major economic-policy decisions of the period are also listed.

I. Genroku-Hōei regime, 1695–1713 (Ogiwara zaisei 荻原財政). ‘Positive’ fiscal-monetary policy. Monetary expansion (through 1713); price inflation (through 1717). II. Shōtoku transition, 1713–1716. Inflationary price bubble of 1714–1717. (1715 turn to deflationary coinage policy, new trade restrictions.) III. Kyōhō regime, 1716–1736. ‘Negative’ fiscal-monetary policy. Mon- etary contraction; fiscal stringency; price deflation (after 1717) and economic depression; debt relief for the samurai class; anti-mercantile policies. IV. Genbun transition, 1736–1739. Reinflation (‘positive’ policy) following the 1736 Genbun recoinage. Tokugawa Yoshimune’s reign period as shogun (1716–1745) 238 mark metzler

thus divides into two distinct periods, the deflationary reform regime of his youth and the higher-price era of his later years. V. Kanpō-Hōreki regime, ca. 1740–1764. ‘Negative’ fiscal-monetary policy relative to the preceding Genbun period and the subsequent Tanuma period, though policy was notably less contractionary than during the Kyōhō Reform. After the increase in price level of 1736–1739, there was a trend period of renewed moderate deflation from the new, higher price level. From this point, further quantitative indicators are available: 1737– 1764, land taxes increasing and high; 1737–1787, non-land tax revenue increasing and high (that is, extending through this policy regime and the next); 1736–1772, gold appreciates, silver depreciates. VI. Meiwa-Tenmei regime (‘Tanuma period’), 1764–1787. ‘Positive’ fiscal-monetary policy, kokueki‘ ’ policies. Monetary expansion leading to inflation (especiallyzeni inflation). 1765–1786, land taxes decreasing and non-land tax revenues increasing; 1768–1789, zeni depreciation; 1772–1789, silver appreciates, gold-standard coinage depreciates. VII. Kansei–Bunka regime, 1787–1817. ‘Negative’ fiscal-monetary policy. The general crisis of the 1780s culminated in policy reversal and reform, 1787–1791. Monetary contraction followed by controlled re-expansion; deflation trend (1787–1818). 1787–1819, land taxes increasing and high; non-land tax receipts declining and low to ca. 1800, increasing and higher thereafter; 1789–1807, gold-standard coinage appreciates, silver depreciates; 1788–ca. 1820, stabilization of zeni rates (very modest decline). VIII. Bunsei–Tenpō regime, 1818–1841 (Mizuno Tadaakira 水野忠成 zaisei). ‘Positive’ fiscal-monetary policy (terminated with the shogunate’s Tenpō Reform in 1841). 1818–1836, monetary expansion and price inflation; 1820–1843, land tax receipts declining and low, non-land tax revenues increasing; 1807–1837, silver appreciates, gold-standard coinage depreciates (moderate trend).

The relatively coherent patterning of late Edo-period policy swings breaks down in the final two decades of the period. The macroeconomic turbulence and rapid policy reversals of the Bakumatsu period policy space, polarities, and regimes 239 indicate a systemic crisis not susceptible to a stative, regime-oriented type of analysis. To condense this information still further, we can identify two alternating types of policy regime in the period after the Kyōhō Reform: a. 1740s–1760s and 1790s–1810s: land taxes high; gold coinage appre- ciating; tendency toward price deflation. b. 1760s–1780s and 1810s–1830s: land taxes declining (increased non-land tax revenues); gold coinage depreciating; inflationary tendency.

These policy phases correspond to broader policy/political complexes that have been identified by many historians using various kinds of labels: a. Traditionalist; agrarianist; tendency toward political federalism; government by what Bolitho describes as an ‘old guard.’35 b. Mercantilist; centralizing; government by ‘new men,’ suggesting a picture of expansionist ‘positive policy’ arising in response to the limits of the agrarian fiscal paradigm.

The specific timing of these movements suggests a long-wave movement. As I have argued elsewhere, these movements appear congruent in both their duration and their turning points with long waves posited by other scholars for early modern Europe. They are also continuous with international long waves in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.36 This international congruence and the temporal persistence of this pattern are remarkable, but how can we explain it? One cannot easily assign a ‘transmission belt’ role to the slim international monetary flows that did persist through the eighteenth century, because Japanese phases of inflation and deflation in the latter part of the eighteenth

35 Bolitho 1974. 36 Metzler 1994; see Batten 2003, pp. 230–31, and Watanabe 2003, pp. 151–53, for further discussion and criticism of this schema. Contrary to my 1994 statement (which presents the results of my MA research), I would now interpret the commercially oriented policies of the Tanuma period not as the policy aspect of an economic upswing but rather as a reaction to the fiscal deadlock that developed in the 1760s. That is, if it was a ‘capitalist boom,’ then that boom was highly sectoral and came as a by-product of the deepening systemic crisis of the 1770s and 1780s. 240 mark metzler century differed widely from those outside of Japan. Between 1790 and 1835, trend periods of inflation and deflation were if anything in reverse phase to those in the Europe-centered international economy. This is not to rule out the importance of international monetary factors in Japan’s domestic price movements—they may have been vital, but if so, their working was indirect. In other words, this is a matter of big questions rather than of a worked-out theory. Can kokueki policies, as discussed by other contributors to this volume, thus be identified with the ‘positive’ pole of the ‘negative– positive’ polarity? The cases at hand suggest so. It was in the policies of Tanuma Okitsugu that the new term kokueki became associated with the new (overseas) mercantilist policies and with the new monetary policy.37 Kokueki policies in the domainal states were institutional innovations that tended to persist through conjunctural phases of budgetary expansion and retrenchment. That is, they had much less of a fluctuating aspect than the fiscal and monetary policies delineated above. There is nonetheless a conjunctural aspect in that the moments when kokueki policies were adopted and extended do seem frequently to correspond with episodes of ‘positive’ fiscal and monetary expansion. One mechanism of connection becomes clear when we recall that kokueki policies were commonly associated with domainal money-creation (hansatsu 藩札) projects. Does this conjunctural polarity between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ policies in the fiscal and monetary fields map onto the dialectic of ‘freedom’ and ‘control’? Activist monetary-expansion policies do seem in general to have been market-friendly (merchant-friendly) or ‘liberal.’ Gramlich-Oka in this volume writes of the diverse intellectual culture that scholars associate with the “liberal political culture” of the Tanuma administration. Sýkora considers a “proto-laissez-faire system,” pointing to new ideas of wealth creation and the realization that allowing space for autonomous merchant activity could also profit the domainal state. On the other hand (again following Sýkora), this mercantilist/export orientation seems less expansive than defensive in inspiration when we listen to Shōji Kōki on the encouragement of domainal products: “There is no other way but to manufacture the various products, draw gold and silver money from other countries

37 See Gramlich-Oka and Ochiai in this volume. policy space, polarities, and regimes 241

[within Japan], and not allow the outflow of even one piece of gold to the outside.”38 Is it anachronistic to use the term liberal to describe developments in Japan before the 1860s or 1870s? In a strict sense it may be, yet the word captures the aspects of these outward-oriented, market-directed policies that extend beyond the narrower field of economic thought and action. If the word is to be avoided, we will need suitable substitute terms to capture the wider totality of this cultural complex.

1. Polarities in Play Bourdieu’s idea of the intellectual field offers insights helpful for thinking about the formation of an Edo-period economic-policy field, which would be an alternative way to describe the networks and publics discussed by Gramlich-Oka, Ochiai, and Sýkora. The idea offers a more general kind of inspiration in considering an economic policy space as discussed here, which turns attention from the actors who constitute the social field to the policies and policy ideas themselves. In considering the Edo-period intellectual field, one of the remarkable developments discussed in this volume is the formation of a distinct ‘keizai’ subfield within it—that is, an interacting, self-conscious group of institutionally embedded actors who concerned themselves with and engaged each other concerning economic policy. Gramlich- Oka in particular suggests a similar picture. Bourdieu’s own concerns were with the relative autonomy of a social field, the processes of gaining and maintaining autonomy, and the connected questions of cultural production and cultural capital. This line of thinking is close to the ideas of historical sociologist Eiko Ikegami concerning aesthetic networks and enclave publics.39 Indeed, one is struck, when reading Bourdieu’s analyses, by the Japan-applicability of this abstraction of French cultural-historical experience. This is especially so in regard to the aesthetic ‘worlds within walls’40 of Edo-period Japan: multiple cultural fields with their own autonomously reproduced hierarchies, within which the hierarchies of the containing political ‘field of power’ are substituted, in the context of the contained field, by other, context-specific hierarchies with their own formalized rules and sources

38 Sýkora, this volume; compare also Sagers 2006. 39 Ikegami 2005. 40 Keene 1976. 242 mark metzler of authority.41 One fascinating avenue for investigation is the overlapping of aesthetic and policy networks, suggested by Gramlich-Oka. The poet-agronomist Ikegami Tarōzaemon exemplifies such an overlap, as recounted by Ochiai in this volume. As Gramlich-Oka also suggests, these field-specific worlds are not necessarily subversive or oppositional to the field of political power; their existence may rather increase its flexibility and ideological capacity. As opposed to this idea of a social field as a map of the individuals involved, my use of the term policy space identifies a different, interpenetrating dimension of ideas. The point here is not to understand the distribution of political or cultural capital and to describe how actors within the social field profit in this game. Rather, the focus is on the policy ideas and actual policies (that is, operationalized ideas) themselves. The term has the virtue of suggesting a ‘space of possibilities.’ It also suggests the possibility of multidimensionality (multiple axes of policy polarity). It should not be taken to suggest an empty or unstructured space. Rather, this policy space shares key generative and dynamic attributes with the idea of field in Bourdieu’s sense. The policy positions in a policy space are defined by their content, not by who espouses them nor by the social position from which they are espoused (though actors may identify themselves closely with particular policy positions).42 To be concrete: a fiscal policy does not become expansionary or contractionary by virtue of who directs it; it is not socially relative in this sense. It is instead policy-relative, defined in relation to foregoing and subsequent fiscal policy. Thus, in certain policy dimensions, the content of policy positions is non-arbitrary to a significant extent. Only so many policy positions

41 Some of the applicable ideas can be seen from Fritz Ringer’s summary: a field is a configuration or network of relationships within which people (agents) take up various intellectual positions. A field is structured also by a distribution of power, with differential ‘weight’ or authority assigned to different positions within it. Agents in the field are in relationships of cooperation and conflict, competing for the right to define and co-define what counts as established and legitimate; they form groups, schools, and disciplines. Within the broader intellectual field of a whole (national) society are smaller subfields containing their own field-like relationships (Ringer 1990). 42 In later statements (e.g., Bourdieu 1993), Bourdieu comes closer to this usage himself, describing a field as a “space of positions”; i.e., suggesting a structural character to positions as such, as distinguished from the positions that actors actually take among the ‘space of possibles.’ My argument is that in the case of certain ‘pole positions,’ (e.g., in the case of the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ policies discussed below) it is more a question of logically necessary rather than simply possible positions. policy space, polarities, and regimes 243 may be possible, and these positions will consistently reappear (be recreated) in practice, demanded as it were by their opposites. Again to put it concretely, ‘austerity,’ as a policy, is a relative term—it means less—and one cannot logically have an ‘austerity policy’ unless it is in reaction to more (whether conceptualized as ‘luxury’ or ‘excessive spending,’ etc.). This is to speak in tautologies, but some of the cor- ollaries may be less obvious. Austerity policy, for instance, routinely comes packaged with a stereotyped set of moral justifications (self- control, often framed in masculinist terms; a return to basics; and so on). This is so whether the prevailing political discourse is Confucian, or ultranationalist, or neoliberal. Again, it is hard to avoid the feeling that in some domains of human activity, only so many ‘possibles’ are possible. On the other hand, creative novelty may come disguised in the language of existing forms and positions. To summarize, policy positions may be given by the nature of the policy question itself, which yields a set of possible (necessary?) positions to be advocated, if not by one person or group then by another. As in Bourdieu’s conception, these positions are defined by their oppositions, which frequently take on a virtually binary, either-or character. A further specification is that in a despotic and authoritarian system, no one may openly advocate the policy position that is currently out of official favor, yet it remains constitutive, intellectually present in its actual absence. Thus, for example, no one may have dared to openly advocate Tanuma’s policies at the height of the anti-Tanuma reform led by Matsudaira Sadanobu. But because the thrust of the Kansei Reform policy was to reverse the Tanuma policies, a slackening of the reform effort, almost in its nature (that is, in the context of the constituted polarities of the policy space), would mean a relative swing back in the direction of the former policies. Like the intellectual field, the policy space is a mediating structure, as external influences (external shocks) tend in ‘normal’ circumstances to be translated into the logic of existing policy positions. (Normal here meaning times when the policy field/space itself is not undergoing a crisis of dissolution and reconstitution.) Again, these policy positions tend to have a binary (and factional) logic. A severe policy-discrediting crisis (a famine, urban rice riots) will tend to discredit the currently regnant policy, whichever it is, and may impel a swing to the other policy pole, especially in conditions of tense factional balance. The policy space is, like the social field within which it is embedded, a ‘field of struggles,’ and the struggle is the generative force that 244 mark metzler constitutes the policy space. The policy ‘space’ in this sense is an active system. Expressed in another way (by Bourdieu), “the generative, uni- fying principle of this ‘system’ is the struggle, with all the contradic- tions it engenders (so that participation in the struggle—which may be indicated objectively by, for example, the attacks that are suffered—can be used as the criterion establishing that a work belongs to the field of position-takings and its author to the field of positions).”43 To this can be added the methodologically useful specification that in considering an intellectual (or policy) field, the attacks suffered (and their sources) can be used to establish where a work or an actor belongs in the social field of positions. The same can be said about a policy idea in the intellectual space of positions. For it to be adequately historicized, Bourdieu’s idea of intellectual fields needs to be connected to a theory of crisis, which means also a conjunctural view of history in the strict sense of the term.

2. Policy Regimes A shift in policy regime, for example, from the Tanuma policy to the Kansei Reform, implies a shift in the shape and structure of the (sociological) policy field and in the (ideational) policy space. The idea of successive regimes overlaps with the spatialized constructions of field and space, but it also offers a timed analytical framework that directs attention to points that are under-theorized in the ‘field’ view. A policy regime as defined above is a meso-level period of relative stability during which policy (including perceived sets of possible options) operates within an established, slowly evolving set of rules. Such meso-level regimes can be seen to be operating within longer- enduring macro-level regimes or constitutional orders, yielding a picture of a temporally nested hierarchy of regimes. Policies that last only a few years are better described as experiments or reforms than as regimes, as the term conveys a certain temporal duration. ‘Micro- level’ policy swings within a regime period (not analyzed here) happen within a framework of expected norms. These norms include the use of certain recognized intellectual authorities and bodies of vocabulary. Methodologically, the tracking of policy language, particularly of key

43 Bourdieu 1993, p. 34. policy space, polarities, and regimes 245 words (such as kokueki in this volume) may offer a useful handle for tracking these larger movements. Practically by definition, regimeshifts are moments of crisis. Such crises in the late Edo period typically involved various combinations of fiscal crisis, monetary-inflationary crisis, famines, and popular upris- ings. Regime shifts (and associated shifts in policy thought) also tend to have a strongly generational aspect. This is especially the case in a system structured along formal hereditary lines. A transition of political generations—even a leap-frogging of generations—is indicated, for example, in the transition from the old men of the Tanuma government to the young men of the Kansei Reform government, which happened at a moment of severe famine, fiscal crisis, price inflation, and food riots.44

3. Some Challenges for Future Research To sum up major themes of this volume, one sees the ‘modernity’ of Japan’s early modernity on display. We have revelations of a very early early modernity (medieval markets and money economy); developmental finance; mercantilist policy, including import substitution and export promotion; the conceptualization of an autonomous market sphere; entrepreneurship in policy and in commerce. These discover- ies highlight the political and economic dynamism of the period and reveal the temporal depth of modern economic achievements. Less visible here—and representing a pendulum swing in scholarly (and popular) perceptions of the Edo period—are the once salient ‘late feudal’ themes of poverty and backwardness, demographic and economic stagnation, subsistence economy, feudalistic systems of control and extraction. The thrust of the present chapter is to suggest how some of these histories, when it comes to policy thought and practice, can be assembled into a whole. When historians seek to integrate the history of the period, the most common approach has been to delineate long-run developmental processes such as the expansion of markets and the extension of market logic. The approach taken here directs attention more to the medium-term back-and-forth swings of policy through which such longer-term developments unfold.

44 Ooms 1975; Soranaka 1978. 246 mark metzler

3.1. The Importance of Timing in Locating Economic Thought The spatial metaphors offield (in Bourdieu’s sense), space (as discussed here), and network (as advanced by Gramlich-Oka) direct attention to distinct but interpenetrating aspects of a total process: respectively to the social field (of actors), to ideational spaces and polarities, and to the networks of social pathways that connect actors. In connection with these ideas, this essay argues for the need to consider formally the question of historical timing. The developmental aspect of the story is, at least implicitly, the focus of most history-writing (even if in the negative sense of motivating the revision of existing developmental narratives). The focus here is rather on some core conjunctural aspects of fiscal and monetary policy. This is to speak of conjuncture (French conjoncture, German Konjunktur) in the old-fashioned sense, best translated into Japanese as keiki 景気, to signify business cycles and analogous fluctuating processses.45 Stated as a desideratum, historians should bear in mind the conjunctural aspect of the story. Because of the salience of fluctuation in the economic world, thinking about economic questions may be the least timeless and most conjuncturally specific field of social thought. A seemingly trivial methodological requirement, but one often overlooked by historians of culture and ideas, is the need to indicate the date of the writings or utterances that they analyze. (Surprisingly often, historians cite only the date of the compilation from which they have taken a text.) The implied assumption when a historian neglects to give the date is that specific dates do not matter much and that there is a seamlessness to the thought of any one person. A moment’s reflection will show how mistaken such an assumption can be. Is the author writing on the inflationary upside of a speculative market movement (say, in 1714), or on its deflationary downside (say, 1717)? If the author is male and samurai, as ‘keizai’ writers mainly were, have recent market movements caused his stipend to gain or to lose in value? Have fiscal pressures caused his stipend to be cut? Is the author receiving income from money lent out at interest? Or has he had to bow his head to a moneylender and add a fresh debt to an already heavy burden? Indi- vidual human life-time and social time collectively have their seams and ruptures, and close-up economic-conjunctural realities will deeply

45 I.e., not as a vague, unneeded synonym for conjunction, as it is sometimes used in recent scholarship (including that of Bourdieu). policy space, polarities, and regimes 247 color one’s sense of one’s own social position and one’s thought about wider questions. In stable times, a few years more or less may not matter very much. At other, critical moments, economic sensibilities and realizations can shift dramatically even from one month to the next. To return to the theme at hand, it is precisely at moments of a more general regime shift—say, during the inflation crisis of the 1710s or during the famine crisis of the 1780s—that both economic turbulence and new realizations are most likely. There are various ways that we know social time to have been ‘slower,’ by orders of magnitude, in early modern times, but the foregoing survey suggests that macroeconomic movements were not necessarily among them. The assumption that time in the world of thought does not matter very much is likely to be incorrect in other intellectual domains also, even in ones that on the face of things are far removed from day-today concerns.

3.2. The Articulation of Spatial Levels The question of spatial hieararchy appears when we consider the compound Tokugawa state itself, which makes for a compound policy space of great complexity.46 A full description of the interaction of shogunal and domainal policy spaces can only be a collective task. The policy worlds of the large outer domains could be expected to be more autonomous and idiosyncratic (one thinks of Satsuma). The Tokugawa collateral domains, particularly Mito, also have a history of independent, nationally oriented policy thought owing to their special position. Other domains depended closely upon the shogunal policy field. The circulation of ideas and of individual traveling experts between and among the various domainal policy fields itself constituted an emerging national (network) field. That is, we are not dealing yet with a uni- tary national administration, but national fields and networks existed in multiplicity, whether we speak of aesthetic fields and networks or of political economy. Between the shogunal and domainal levels, the relationship was hierarchical in the literal sense, with the higher (shogunal) level as a rule exercising a strong, often determinative influence on the lower. The reverse situation, in which the lower level affected the higher, happened only in special circumstances. Thus, uncontrol- lable factionalized crises or radical departures from orthodoxy at the

46 For the compound character of the bakuhan state order, see Ravina 1999. 248 mark metzler lower level were systematically ‘corrected’ by intervention from the higher level, which in this way exercised a conservative or homeostatic influence that tended to push things back into established pathways.47 Policy innovation at the higher level can also be a source of innovations that are adopted at the lower level. (Although after the Tanuma era, policy innovations seem increasingly to have come from the domainal level and to have circulated among the domains with less reference to the shogunal level, even if this circulation was through the medium of a national network of policy experts.) As mentioned, in the right circumstances—at the crisis phase of a shogunal policy cycle—impulses from lower levels can penetrate to the higher level. Tokugawa Yoshimune and his grandson Matsudaira Sadanobu both rose to national power during crises, in the role of reformers who had already experimented with and developed their policies as domainal lords. A revolutionary instance of this dynamic, throwing the entire national order onto a fundamentally new developmental path, was the final overthrow of the shogunate by the coalition of southwestern domains, all of which had developed remarkable new policy ideas and innovations, mainly along kokueki lines. Here, the state-led, market- conforming, outward-oriented developmentalism of Satsuma men such as Ōkubo Toshimichi and Maeda Masana is especially worthy of note.

3.3. Measurable, Non-arbitrary Definition of Policy Polarities The idea that idealized, typified policy positions—that is, ideas themselves—constitute the policy space may seem an excessively idealist construction. To clarify how these typical positions are created by actual social relations, it is important to reemphasize that these ideas are always contextual and relational. The dialectic of expansionary and contractionary policies particularly has the character of movements along an axis; this scalar logic is given by the quantified (monetized) policy domains to which they refer. Thus, for example, government revenues and expenditures in their overall dimensions can change only in the direction of being more or less. Money creates a system of quantified equivalences; methodologically, this can allow us to grasp

47 This idea of the hierarchical relationship of levels yields an image not unlike (and taking some inspiration from) the model of spatially and temporally nested cycles offered by the ecologist C. S. Holling (1986), who himself took some indirect inspiration from the model of long economic cycles proposed by the economist J. A. Schumpeter (1939). policy space, polarities, and regimes 249 the timing and scale of dynamic movements that would otherwise be hard to see. Thecomposition of revenues and expenditures is obvi- ously enormously more complex, but for the whole of a revenue- expenditure budget or for any given part of it, the budgetary possibilities (dimensions of choice) are scalar, whether it be the amount of land tax demanded of a village or the funds given to an experimental agricultural project. In monetary policy also, a scalar logic applies when it comes to reducing or increasing the bullion content of the coinage (which means increasing or lowering government seignorage revenues and increasing or reducing the total money supply). Hence, in the view of these decisive quantitative determinants of fiscal and monetary policy, one is presented with a set of one-dimensional policy axes and a choice of more expansionary or more contractionary policies. The question becomes essentially unquantifiable and much more arbitrary in its methodological operationalization when we consider ‘polarities’ that are less given by objective circumstantial logic and more imaginatively constructed, such as those between market-conforming and market-controlling policies. This is shown by the endless debate over the boundaries and contents of the ‘polar’ terms themselves. On one hand, market-conforming and market-controlling policies appear to us to present a polarity—yet they can also be (usually are?) ‘both’ at once. How, for example, should we consider state encouragement of commerce by means of a grain bank (shasō) that issues land-development loans to farmers, as described in Ravina’s chapter? Or how should we consider the encouragement of commerce via a state commodity-trading monopoly that also issues loans to farmers? What of the state issue (conducted by delegated merchant specialists) of paper money connected to such projects? Each of these innovations, happening in a historical context in which both states and markets were extending and ramifying, was at once ‘more’ state and ‘more’ market compared to what went before. Yet a polarity is nonetheless there, and people have long observed and contended over the tensions between state control and market freedom (or the freedom of powerful market-involved actors).

In applying these framing ideas of policy space, polarities, and regimes to intellectual history, the following further observations can serve in place of a definitive conclusion: 250 mark metzler

1. People’s positions (their expressed ideas) may move within an intellectual (social) field or an ideational policy space over time; and the containing field (or space) moves around them. That is, conjunctural context matters, and biographical time matters. 2. A person’s thought over the course of a career can itself be thought of as constituting a kind of field, an inner reflection and refraction of a social field, within which (again) the person at different times or in different social contexts occupies different positions. 3. The space of policy ideas tends to be structured by fairly simple or stereotyped polarities. These often (or usually) imply a relationship to a system of political factions. 4. Policy tends to swing back and forth between poles. The timing of these swings is contingent but non-random. 5. Policy swings tend to be connected to factional swings (factional succession or alternation). Especially in primarily hereditary or bureaucratic systems, these factional/policy swings tend to be associated with generational transitions. Within the context of the policy space, these swings frequently display a near binary character, more a sudden mode-shifting than a smoothly continuous transition from one policy pole to another. GLOSSARY

A. Names

Aoki Kon’yō 青木昆陽 (1698–1769): Confucian and Western-learning scholar who wrote on Dutch currency, the Dutch language, and sweet potato cultivation Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657–1725): Confucian scholar and shogunal advisor who wrote widely, e.g., on history, Western geography, and economic policy Asami Keisai 浅見絅斎 (1652–1711): Confucian scholar, student of Yamazaki Ansai [Matsuo] Bashō 芭蕉 (1644–1694): famous Haikai poet Daikokuya Kodayū 大黒屋光太夫 (1751–1828): castaway who returned in 1792 to Japan Date Munemura 伊達宗村 (1718–1756, r. 1743–1756): sixth lord of the Sen- dai domain Date Shigemura 伊達重村 (1742–1796, r. 1756–1790): seventh lord of the Sendai domain, son of Munemura Date Yoshimura 伊達吉村 (1680–1751, r. 1703–1743): fifth lord of the Sendai domain Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 (1680–1747): scholar and student of Ogyū Sorai Doi Toshinori 土井利徳 (1748–1813, r. 1767–1787): lord of the Mikawa Kariya domain 三河刈谷藩 and brother of Date Shigemura Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉 (1835–1901): writer and educator, founder of Keio Gijuku (now Keio University), who wrote widely read accounts of Western civilization Gi Shitetsu 魏士哲 (1653–1738): Ryukyuan medical pioneer Hayashi Shihei 林子平 (1738–1793): scholar and retainer of the Sendai domain Hiraga Gennai 平賀源内 (1728–1780): scholar, writer, and naturalist, known for his comic prose and studies of materia medica Hori Ryūsuiken 堀流水軒 (?–?): writer, author of an educational text on trade and business (Shōbaiōrai 商売往来, 1694) Hoshina Masayuki 保科正之 (1611–1672): lord of Aizu domain, known for his reform efforts Hotta Masaatsu 堀田正敦 (1755–1832): Junior Councilor, half brother to Date Munemura Ikegami Tarōzaemon 池上太郎左衛門 (1718–1798): village headman of Dai- shikawaramura 大師河原村, Musashi; agronomist Ishida Baigan 石田梅岩 (1685–1744): merchant, scholar, and educator Ishigaya [Bingo no kami] Kiyomasa 石谷備後守清昌 (1715?–1782): official of the shogunate, magistrate of Sado, Nagasaki, etc. 252 glossary

Isaka Naomoto 井坂直幹 (1860–1921): local entrepreneur in Akita Prefec- ture Itō Isoheiji 伊東磯平治 (1832–1901): Itō Yōzō’s adoptive father Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627–1705): merchant, educator, and Confucian scholar Itō Yōzō 伊東要蔵 (1864–1934): local entrepreneur in Shizuoka prefecture Junnin 淳仁 (r. 757–764): also known as Awaji-tei 淡路帝, the forty-seventh emperor of Japan according to official genealogies Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755–1817): Confucian scholar and advisor to domains Kanagae Sanpei 金ヶ江三兵衛: see Yi Sam-pyeong 李参平 Katō Rokuzō 加藤六蔵 (1858–1909): local entrepreneur in Aichi prefecture Katsuragawa Hoshū 桂川甫周 (1751–1809): physician of the shogunate Keishōin 桂昌院 (1627–1705): mother of Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, the fifth Tokugawa shogun Koga Kokudō 古賀穀堂 (1776–1836): neo-Confucian scholar Koga Seiri 古賀精理 (1750–1817): neo-Confucian scholar, professor at the Shōheikō 昌平黌 academy Kogure Budayū 木暮武太夫 (1860–1926): local entrepreneur in Gunma Pre- fecture Kōzu Kunisuke 神津国助 (1859–1921): local entrepreneur in Nagano Prefecture Kudō Heisuke 工藤平助 (1734–1800): physician of the Sendai domain Kudō Jōan An’yo 工藤丈庵安世 (d. 1755/2/20): father of Kudō Heisuke Kujō Kanezane 九条兼実 (1149–1207): aristocrat and poetic patron who served as regent Kusaba Haisen 草場佩川 (1787–1867): neo-Confucian scholar Kusama Naokata 草間直方 (1753–1831): banker of Kōnoike house Laxman, Adam (1766–1796): Russian naval lieutenant who came to Japan in 1792 Maeno Ryōtaku 前野良沢 (1723–1803): physician to the lord of Nakatsu domain Matsudaira Harusato 松平治郷 (1751–1818): lord of Izumo Matsue domain Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信 (1759–1828): lord of Shirakawa domain and Senior Councilor, crafter of the Kansei reforms Matsudaira Yasuhide 松平康英 (1768–1808): Nagasaki magistrate from 1807–1808 Matsukata Masayoshi 松方正義 (1835–1924): Meiji-era statesman and finance minister Matsumoto Hidemochi 松本秀持 (1730–1797): Commissioner of Finance who worked with Tanuma Okitsugu on policies for the development of Ezo Mino Masataka 蓑正高 (1687–1771): local magistrate of the shogunate Miyazaki Yasusada 宮崎安貞 (1623–1697): scholar of agriculture Monmu 文武 (r. 696–707): forty-second emperor of Japan according to official genealogies Murata Harumi 村田春海 (1746–1811): poet and scholar in Edo Nabeshima Harushige 鍋島治茂 (1745–1805): lord of Saga domain glossary 253

Nabeshima Katsushige 鍋島勝茂 (1580–1657): lord of Saga domain Nabeshima Naomasa 鍋島直正 (181–1871): lord of Saga domain Nabeshima Naoshige 鍋島直茂 (1538–1618): lord of Saga domain Nabeshima Narinao 鍋島斉直 (1780–1839): lord of Saga domain Nabeshima Shigeyoshi 鍋島茂義 (1800–1863): lord of Takeo domain Nakae Tojū 中江藤樹 (1608–1648): samurai, educator, and Confucian scholar Nakai Chikuzan 中井竹山 (1730–1804): teacher, headmaster at the Kaitokudō Nakai Riken 中井履軒 (1732–1817): teacher at the Kaitokudō, brother of Chikuzan Nishikawa Joken 西川如見 (1648–1724): merchant and astronomical geographer Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728): educator and Confucian scholar Oka Jūrō 岡十郎 (1870–1923): member of Yamaguchi prefectural parliament and entrepreneur who worked to modernize the whaling industry Ōoka [Bizen no kami] Kiyosuke 大岡備前守清相 (1679–1717): Nagasaki magistrate Ōshio Heihachirō 大塩平八郎 (1793–1837): proponent of the work of the Chinese Confucian Wang Yangming Ōta Nanpo 大田南畝 (1749–1823): writer, painter, and shogunal official Ōtsuki Gentaku 大槻玄沢 (1757–1827): doctor and educator of Dutch Studies Ōyama Tsunayoshi 大山綱良 (1828–1877): Meiji Restoration activist from Satsuma and prefectural governor of Kagoshima Ri Sanpei 李参平: see Yi Sam-pyeong 李参平 Sai On 蔡温 (1682–1761): Ryukyuan Confucian scholar and powerful politician Saigō Takamori 西郷隆盛 (1827–1877): leader of the Meiji Restoration from Satsuma, key government official until his resignation in 1873, and leader of the Satsuma Rebellion (War of the Southwest) in 1877 Sakuma Shōzan 佐久間象山 (1811–1864): scholar and educator who wrote on Western military science Shinozaki Shōchiku 篠崎小竹 (1781–1851): Osaka poet and Confucian scholar Satō Issai 佐藤一斎 (1772–1859): neo-Confucian scholar Shōji Kōki 正司考祺 (1793–1857): wealthy merchant of Arita Sō Eki 曽益 (1645–1702): Ryukyuan poet Suzuki Shōsan 鈴木正三 (1579–1655): samurai and Buddhist priest Tadano Makuzu 只野真葛 (1763–1825): daughter of Kudō Heisuke, poet and writer Taira no Kiyomori 平清盛 (1118–1181): warrior clan leader and prime minister Takashima Shūhan 高島秋帆 (1798–1866): pioneer in gunnery and Western military science Takata Teijirō 高田貞次郎 (c. 1808–1878): Okayama merchant, served as head of the Okayama lumber cartel 材木問屋頭 Tamura Ransui 田村藍水 (1718–1776): physician 254 glossary

Tanuma Okitsugu 田沼意次 (1719–1788): Senior Councilor during the Ten- mei era Tei Junsoku 程順則 (1663–1734): Ryukyuan poet, diplomat, scholar of Chi- nese literature, and student of navigation Tokugawa Ieharu 徳川家治 (1737–1786, r. 1760–1786): tenth shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu 徳川家光 (1604–1651, r. 1623–1651): third shogun Tokugawa Ienari 徳川家斉 (1773–1841, r. 1787–1837): eleventh shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康 (1542–1616, r. 1603–1605): first shogun Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 徳川綱吉 (1646–1709, r. 1680–1709): fifth shogun, best known for his interest in learning and laws of compassion Tsuchimochi Masateru 土持正照 (1835–?): Okinoerabujima official who befriended Saigō Takamori during his exile and developed a shasō on Oki- noerabujima Tsuda Nagatada 津田永忠 (1640–1707): advisor to the daimyo Ikeda Mi tsumasa 池田光政 (1609–1682), pioneered the shasō in Okayama Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 (1861–1930): Christian scholar Ueyama Eiichirō 上山英一郎 (1862–1943): local entrepreneur in Wakayama prefecture Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086): political leader under the Northern Song, advocate of radical, market-based economic reforms Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529): Chinese idealist, neo-Confucian philosopher Watanabe Kazan 渡辺崋山 (1793–1841): painter, scholar of Western studies, and advisor in Tahara domain Wei Shanzhi 魏掞之 (1116–1173): Song-era philosopher and official, friend of Zhu Xi Yamada Kiuemon 山田喜右衛門 (?–?): Itō Yōzō’s father Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685): scholar of military science, educator, and Confucian scholar Yamagata Bantō 山片蟠桃 (1748–1821): banker and student of the Kaitokudō Yi Sam-pyeong 李参平 (ca. 1579–1655): immigrant Korean potter Yokoi Shōnan 横井小楠 (1809–1869): samurai, statesman, and Confucian scholar Yoshio Kōgyū 良雄耕牛 (1724–1800): Dutch interpreter and surgeon Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077): Song-era Confucian moral philosopher, major influence on Zhu Xi Zhu Xi 朱子 (1130–1200): major intellectual of the Song era, founder of a metaphysical approach to the Confucian classics often described as Neo- Confucianism

B. Terms and Units bakufu 幕府: shogunate bu 分: currency unit for gold; a bu is a half of one ryō glossary 255 chōnindō 町人道: Way of merchants/townspeople Chūzan 中山: the central principality on the Island of Okinawa during the fourteenth century; later the name of the entire kingdom of Ryukyu Daoxue 道学: school of Confucian thought, developed in the Song dynasty that focused on the elucidation of timeless and natural moral forces governing objects, actions, and events. Daoxue thinkers created a metaphysical vocabulary to describe the structure of these transcendent forces. Major Daoxue thinkers include Zhu Xi, Zhang Zai, and the Cheng brothers: Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107). denpata eitai baibai kinshirei 田畑永代売買禁止令: ordinance prohibiting the sale and purchase of farmland, issued 1643 Edo-jōzume 江戸定詰: retainers’ permanent duties in Edo Ei’nin tokuseirei 永仁徳政令: debt abrogation decree of 1297 ekisuji 益筋: profit Ezo 蝦夷: the northernmost of present-day Japan’s main islands; present-day Hokkaido fukoku kyōhei 富国強兵: policy of creating a rich country with a strong army gokinju 御近習: attendant physician to shogun or lord han 藩: modern term for kuni, domain hansatsu 藩札: domainal paper currency hansharo 反射炉: reverberatory furnace hiryōkoku 非領国: areas controlled directly by the Tokugawa shogunate, without a local lord hyō 俵: bushel; measure for baled goods; one hyō is about sixty kg gokenin 御家人: warriors affiliated with the Kamakura and Muromachi bakufu itowappu 糸割符: guild for silk imports jing 経 (Jp. kei or kyō): a technical term in Confucian thought, referring to rules, standards, or procedures that apply in ordinary circumstances. It is usually translated as ‘standard’ and contrasts with quan 権 (expediency or situational weighing) Junior Councilor: see wakadoshiyori 若年寄 kabu nakama 株仲間: protective trade association licensed by the shogunate or daimyo, which permitted membership rights for being subject to taxation Kaitokudō 懐徳堂: An Osaka academy, founded in 1724 by local merchants, and recognized by the shogunate in 1726. The academy was distinctive for its focus on the education of commoners. Leading intellectuals affiliated with the school include Nakai Chikuzan, his brother Nakai Riken, Tomi- naga Nakamoto 富永仲基 (1715–1746), and Yamagata Bantō. Chikuzan, in his capacity as headmaster, sought to style the Kaitokudō as a commoner counterpart to the Shoheikō in Edo kakesuzurikata 懸硯方: special military reserve fund of Saga domain kan 貫 or kanmon 貫文: a unit of copper cash; in medieval times, 1,000 coins (usually strung together), though in practice 970 or fewer coins might circulate as a kan. In the Tokugawa period kanmon would normally consist 256 glossary

of ten strings of copper cash corresponding in weight to 3.746–3.747 kilo- grams. Kan was also a unit for silver currency. See also kanme kanjō bugyō 勘定奉行: Commissioners of Finance; supervised tax collection and the shogunal budget; reported to the rōjū kanjō kumigashira 勘定組頭: officials of the Bureau of Finance kanme 貫目: weight measure; one kanme is about 3.75 kg or 1,000 monme. See also kan kawase 為替: bills of exchange in the medieval period used to remit money over long distances keikoku saimin 経国済民: see keizai 経済 keisei saimin 経世済民: see keizai 経済 keizai 経済: a term that applied to both political and economic affairs, but is commonly translated now as economics (and economy). Shortened from the Confucian phrase keikoku-saimin 経国済民 or keisei-saimin 経世済民 keqi 客気 (Jp. kakki): the impingement of desires, emotions or other destabi- lizing material force (Ch. qi, Jp. ki) on one’s inborn nature. For Sai On, the major goal of personal cultivation is to mitigate or eliminate the effect of keqi, which might be translated as ‘rash emotions’ in many instances kin 斤: unit for copper; 100 kin is about sixty kg kindensei 均田制: system of equal partition of paddies koku 石: measure for rice, sometimes translated as ‘bushel’; corresponds to approximately 180 liters or 150 kg in the case of Tokugawa Japan. Roughly the amount of rice one adult might eat in a year kokueki 国益 (sometimes also kunieki): benefit/prosperity to the country, national interest kokusan 国産: domainal/local product/production Kōdōkan 弘道館: Saga domain academy li 利 (Jp. ri): profit, both in a general and financial sense. Although classically li carried negative connotations of greed and selfishness, in Tokugawa-period writings it could carry a morally positive or negative meaning depending on the context. Similarly, ying 営 (Jp. ei; contriving, endeavoring) monme 匁: weight measure; unit for silver currency, approx. 3.75 g. Nabeshima-yaki 鍋島焼: Nabeshima ware; blue and white, celadon, or polychrome porcelain Nagasaki bugyō 長崎奉行: Nagasaki magistrate Nagasaki kaisho 長崎会所: Nagasaki Accounting House ninbetsugin 人別銀: special levy imposed in Saga domain nōshō bunri 農商分離: separation of farmers and merchants otoshiyori 御年寄: senior officer quan 権 (Jp. Ken): actions or policies that deviate from normal rules or principles but that bring about a desirable result in the face of unusual or extreme circumstances. In classical Confucian thought, only a sage or person of high moral attainment could, or should, carry out quan, which can be translated as ‘expediency’ or ‘situational weighing’ and contrasts with jing (standard) rokudōsen 六道銭 (also rikudōsen): coins buried with the dead glossary 257

Roppukata 六府方: special office for the promotion ofkokusan 国産 policy in Saga domain ryō 両: gold coin. In the Tokugawa era a ryō could buy the amount of rice consumed by a person in a year ryōkoku 領国: areas under the control of the Tokugawa shogunate that had a specific leader, like ahanshū , a domain leader rōjū 老中: Senior Councilor; officials, appointed from amongfudai daimyo, constituted the highest policy-making board in the shogunal bureaucracy rōjū-kaku 老中格: equivalent to Senior Councilor sankin kōtai 参勤交代: alternate attendance; policy under which local lords alternated between Edo and their local seats of power, while their wives and heirs remained in Edo continually sanmin 三民: commoners; non-samurai members of society Sanshikan 三司官: also Hōshikan 法司官; the Council of Three, the highest governing body in the Kingdom of Ryukyu, directly under the king and prime minister. Hōshikan and Sanshikan are names that would have appeared in written documents, but in ordinary speech the Council of Three was known as Yuasutabi世あすた部 and by a variety of other local terms sen 銭: in ancient and classical Japan, a term for copper currency produced by the imperial government. In medieval times, a term for imported Chinese copper cash or domestic counterfeit currency; in Toku- gawa times, a low-value coin. In each period, its unit was mon 文 Senior Councilor: see rōjū shi-nō-kō-shō 士農工商: literally ‘gentry, farmers, artisans, merchants,’ i.e. society shimin 四民: society; the four ancient social estates (samurai, farmers, artisans, merchants) shinzanshi 新参士: low-ranking Ryukyuan aristocrats (yukatchu) whose family purchased formal elite status. Also kōisamurei 買い士 shioki karō 仕置家老: a type of domain elder 家老 responsible for political and economic affairs shōchū 焼酎: literally ‘burnt liquor’ distilled from rice or other grains Shōheikō 昌平黌: an Edo academy, founded by Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583–1657), and sponsored by the Tokugawa shoguns starting in 1690. The school’s interpretation of the Confucian classics was rooted in Hayashi Razan’s readings of Zhu Xi, an approach sometimes called Tokugawa Neo- Confucianism. Although its teachings were widely criticized throughout the Tokugawa era, the academy became the shogun’s arbiter of intellectual orthodoxy in 1797, which led many domain academies to adopt Hayashi school teachings shōya 庄屋: a village-level commoner official, responsible for civil administration, including tax collection soba yōnin 側用人: chamberlain, advisor to the shogun toshiyori 年寄: senior official, elders 258 glossary tozama daimyō 外様大名: ‘outer’ daimyo (domain lords), descended from those who pledged allegiance to Ieyasu on or after 1600 tsubo 坪: square measure; 1 tsubo is about 3.306 square meters yaadui 宿取 (Jp. Yadori): a program that began early in the eighteenth century for relocating impoverished Ryukyuan aristocrats (yukatchu) to rural areas to make their living as farmers. Yaadui villages helped alleviate rural labor shortages caused in part by the reclamation of farmland. ying 営 (Jp. ei): see li (Jp. ri) yukatchu 良人: Ryukyuan aristocrats defined by the possession of household registers (kafu 家譜) that indicated ancestors who had served as government officials. As a formal social status recognized by the state, yukatchu came into existence during the middle of the seventeenth century. Also keimochi 係持, or samurei 士 wakadoshiyori 若年寄: Junior Councilor; usually three to five officials to constitute the second most important board in the shogunal bureaucracy za 座: monopoly, guild zeni 銭: generic term for round copper alloy coins with square holes

C. Texts

Akaezo fūsetsu kō 赤蝦夷風説考 (Thoughts on Rumors about Kamchatka, 1781–1783) by Kudō Heisuke Azuma kagami 吾妻鏡 (Mirror of the East, late thirteenth century) by Kama- kura bakufu officials Gyokuyō 玉葉 (Jeweled Leaves, 1164–1203) by Kujō Kanezane Hitori kangae 独考 (Solitary Thoughts, 1817–1818) by Tadano Makuzu Hitori monogatari 独物語 (One Man’s Views, approximately 1750) by Sai On Hōkoku igen 報国以言 (Loyal Utterances, 1783/1/11) by Kudō Heisuke Jūjikai 十事解 (Clarification of Ten Things, 1789) by Koga Seiri Kaikoku heidan 海国兵談 (Discussion on the Military Problems of a Mari- time Nation, 1784–1786) by Hayashi Shihei Kashoku yōdō 家職要道 (Important Teaching on Family Business, 1851) by Shōji Kōki Keizai mondō hiroku 経済問答秘録 (Confidential Memorandum on the Dis- pute over [Political] Economy, 1831) by Shōji Kōki Keizai san’yō 経済纂要 (Concise political economy, 1736) by Aoki Kon’yō Kenpō fukyōroku 倹法富強録 (Memorandum on Economy, Prosperity and Power, 1832) by Shōji Kōki Mukashibanashi むかしばなし (Stories from the Past, 1811–1812) by Tadano Makuzu Saikyū fūji 済急封事 (Proposal for Emergency Relief, 1831) by Koga Kokudō Sangoku tsūran zusetsu 三国通覧図説 (An Illustrated Survey of the Three Countries, written in 1785–1786) by Hayashi Shihei Sōbō kigen 草茅危言 (Frank Words by a Rustic, 1788) by Nakai Chikuzan glossary 259

Tenmeiroku 天明録 (Records of the Tenmei Era, 1856) by Shōji Kōki Tuzhi yaoquan 図治要伝 (Jp. Toji yōden; Essentials of Governance, approximately 1750) by Sai On Yaowu huibian 要務彙編 (Jp. Yōmu ihen, Compilation of Essential Excerpts, 1735), excerpts from Chinese literature compiled by Sai On with brief commentary

D. Eras

Nara period 奈良時代 (710–784) Heian period 平安時代 (794–1185) Kamakura period 鎌倉時代 (1185–1333) Muromachi period 室町時代 (1336–1573) Tokugawa period 徳川時代 (1603–1868) Bunka 文化 period (1804–1818) Bunsei 文政 period (1818–1830) Genbun 元文 period (1736–1741) Genna 元和 period (1615–1624) Genroku 元禄 period (1688–1704) Hōreki 宝暦 period (1751–1764) Kan’ei 寛永 period (1624–1644) Kansei 寛政 period (1789–1801) Keichō 慶長 period (1596–1615) Kyōhō 享保 period (1716–1736) Meiwa 明和 period (1764–1772) Shōtoku 正徳 period (1711–1716) Tenmei 天明 period (1781–1789) Tenpō 天保 period (1830–1844) Meiji period 明治時代 (1868–1912)

REFERENCES1

A. Primary Sources

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INDEX academies, private, 57, 111, 160, 168. See Berry, Mary Elizabeth, 154 also education; Kaitokudō Academy; bills of exchange (kawase; saifu), 9, 24, Shōheikō 25, 36–40, 204, 230; and community agrarianism, 147n196, 220, 227, 239 granaries, 191; and moneylending, agriculture, 11, 51, 61, 63, 81n33, 83, 37–38; and risk, 38–39 164, 207, 209; commercial, 23; in Bolitho, Harold, 239 Ezo, 138; and government regulation, Bourdieu, Pierre, 17, 112n6, 219, 220, 77–78; improvements in, 24, 25; 241–44, 246 in Ryukyu, 71, 81; and scientific Buddhism, 35, 48, 61, 63; vs. methods, 107 Confucianism, 55, 57; hostility to, Ainu, 112n9, 123n64, 138, 141, 142. See 189; and interdependent society, also Ezo 64–65; on occupation, 57–59; on Aizawa Seishisai, 153n221 society, 54–55 Aizu domain, 181, 185, 187–88, 194, 195 bullionism, 124n68 Akaezo fūsetsu kō (Thoughts on Rumors Bunsei period (1818–29), 168, 169, 226, about Kamchatka; Kudō Heisuke), 228, 230, 236, 238 112, 120, 134, 135, 148 business cycles, 221, 225, 246 Akita domain, 145n183 Alcock, Rutherford, xiii Calten, J. N., 161 Amago Tsunehisa, 159 The Capital of the Tycoon (Alcock), Amami islands, 96, 200–204 xiii Amino Yoshihiko, 28n22 cash, Chinese copper (zeni; qian), Ansei Edo earthquake (1855), 8 8, 24–26; debasement of, 229–30; Ansei Nankai earthquake (1854), 198 exchange rates for, 218, 224, 232–34; Aoki Kon’yō, 115n23, 116n27, 118, opposition to, 28–30; and policy 132n109, 151n216 regimes, 238; shift to, 33–36; in Arai Hakuseki, 22, 91n8, 220; and Kudō Tokugawa period, 41–43. See also Heisuke, 142–44; on precious metals, currency 124, 126n81; on smuggling, 122; on cash crops, 100, 104–7; vs. rice, 103–6 trade, 146, 147 castaways, 119, 132n113, 142 artisans, 51, 58, 80, 175, 176. See also Catherine II (empress of Russia), 152 class system Celeng, 87 Asami Keisai, 185 China: and bills of exchange, 39–40; Ashikaga bakufu, 32, 44 community granaries in, 179, 181–84; autonomy: of commoners, 53–54; of copper prices for, 155–56; currency community granaries, 196–97; of of, 26, 29; economic thought in, 84, daimyo, 4, 6, 25, 26; vs. Heaven’s will, 86–87; and Ezo, 134; foreign trade of, 50; of markets, 11, 15–19, 17, 53–54; 133, 149–50; gentry (shi) of, 182–84, monetary, 6 186–87; ideas from, xii, 7–8, 65, 185–86; Japanese trade with, xii, 90, baku-han system, xiv, 45. See also 93, 94, 96, 121, 126–27, 145; domains; shogunate land-tax rates in, 227; policy polarities banking institutions, 9–10, 22, 85, 207, in, 221; and porcelain trade, 172; and 209. See also credit; debt Ryukyu, 68, 70, 71, 82, 86–87, 88; and Bashō, 22, 41 smuggling, 123; state monopolies in, Beerens, Anna, 10, 12, 112n6 183. See also cash, Chinese copper Bellah, Robert N., 14 Chinese language, classical, 56, 73 Benyovszky, Moritz Aladar von, 132 Chinese studies, 7, 73 288 index

Chōshū (Hagi) domain, 165 Nakai Chikuzan on, 195–97; networks Christianity, 122n58 for, 9–10. See also debt Chūzan kingdom (Okinawa), 68 Cruydt-Boeck (Dodoens), 117 class system: and currency, 233–34; culture, xi, 112; intellectual, 113; and division of labor, 50–54; and popular, 35–36 feudalism, xiv; four classes currency, 21–45, 118n40; vs. barter (shi-nō-kō-shō) of, 6–7, 51, 53, system, 27; cash, 21, 24–30, 33–36, 164; and historical time, 247; and 39; and centralized government, intellectual networks, 11–12; and 25, 26; Chinese, 26, 28, 29, 39; monetary policy, 235; and morality, circulation of, x, 8–9, 40, 217–18; and 61–63, 65; and occupation, 58–59; class system, 233–34; and copper, physicians in, 114–15; of Ryukyu, 125, 129; counterfeit, 26, 41; and 70–71; Sai On on, 84; Shōji Kōki on, credit, 230; devaluation of, 27, 198; 164, 175–76; and social networks, 153 domainal, 4, 91, 145n180, 166, 230, colonization, 5, 149; of Ezo, 133, 233, 240; Edo-period, 25, 26, 41–42, 138–41, 148 231; exchange rates for, 18, 229, 230; commercialization, 22, 23, 43, 175, 228 expansion vs. restraint in, 228–30; commoners, 7, 52–54, 56, 66, 80, 157, gold standard for, 126n79, 228, 230, 176, 186, 189, 195–97, 199–200; and 232, 238; government-issued, 4, 21, Buddhism, 58–59; and Heaven’s will, 22, 26–27; Heian-period, 26–28, 48–50; and intellectual networks, 29, 43; Kudō Heisuke on, 143, 144; 11–12; and money, 22, 24; morality imported, 28, 29–30; and inflation, of, 62–63; of Ryukyu, 70–71; and 92, 229, 230; international circulation samurai, 64, 65. See also artisans; of, 218; Kamakura-period, 30–33; and merchants; peasants kokueki, 146, 149; and legal codes, Confucianism, 7, 55–57; vs. Buddhism, 26, 28–29; and legitimacy, 41, 43; 55, 57; on duty, 59–64, 66; vs. and modernity, 245; Nara-period, economic nationalism, 147n196; and 26–27; opposition to foreign, 28–30; economic thought, 12–13, 17, 18, paper, 9, 45, 91, 166, 168, 231, 233, 48, 50, 88; hostility to commerce of, 249; and policy regimes, 237, 238, 13, 17, 79n25, 85; on human nature, 239; re-coinage of, 91–92, 228, 230; 61–62, 211; and intellectual networks, reforms of, 91–92, 168; rice as, 9, 33; 11; on land ownership, 175; and silk as, 33, 34; silver, 4, 8–9, 41, 48, morality, 63; on occupation, 66; in 91–92, 98, 126n79, 229–31, 240; and Ryukyu, 82; of Sai On, 68, 72, 73, 74, sovereignty, 29–30; and taxation, 24, 87; and Shōji Kōki, 163; on society, 33–34; and trade, 9, 146, 228, 230; 52, 54, 64–65 tri-metallic, 4, 41–42, 149, 231. See conjuncture, 17–19, 246 also bills of exchange; cash, Chinese copper: exports of, 124–25; mining of, copper 125–26, 129, 134, 145n183; monopoly of, 126, 140n154, 233; prices of, Daikokuya Kōdayū, 119, 142, 128–29, 155–56, 224, 233; and sugar, 150 131; trade in, 125–30, 135, 145, 147. daimyo, 9; alternate attendance policy See also cash, Chinese copper (sankin kōtai) for, 5, 22, 44, 166, 194; cotton, 93, 107 autonomy of, 4, 6, 25, 26. See also Crawcour, E. S., 221 domains; samurai credit: circulation of, 8–9; collateral Danzaemon, 138 for, 199; and community granaries, Daoism, 56 179–81, 183–84, 185, 187, 198–200, Daoxue thought, 183–84, 186, 201. See 203, 204; and currency fluctuations, also neo-Confucianism 230; cycles in, 225; and domains, 228; Date Chikamune, 117n35 and interest, 181, 183–84, 185, 186, Date Munemura, 115n19, 117n35 187, 189–90, 235; in medieval period, Date Shigemura, 115 19, 24–25; and monetization, 22; Date Yoshimura, 114, 118n40 index 289

Dazai Shundai, 43, 80n25, 125, 144n177, production, 89, 92–97, 98, 103, 151; on money, 21, 149; and Sai On, 104, 172–73, 176; in Edo vs. Osaka, 84–85; and Shōji Kōki, 163 232; fluctuations in, 18–19, 217–18; debt: and cash, 34; crises of, 218, 225, freedom vs. control in, 47–66, 87; 236; and currency fluctuations, 229; and international economy, 240; domainal, 168, 169, 228; relief for, local, 206; medieval, 21–24, 40–43; 32–33, 43–44, 237; of samurai, 30–33, and modernity, 245; and national 44 interest, 107–8; planning of, 88; policy Deshima, 95. See also Nagasaki on, 4, 18–19, 217–18; and political- Diet, 209, 212 economic field, 11–17; reforms of, Dodoens (Dodonaeus), Rembert, 117, 117, 123–24, 168–76; in Saga domain, 117n31. 168, 170–76; Sai On on, 72–81; and Doi Toshinori, 116, 117, 121n53 smuggling, 123–24; and the state, 79, domains (han; kuni): and Confucianism, 88, 89, 147, 149–50. See also credit; 57; currency of, 4, 91, 145n180, 166, currency; debt; markets; trade 230, 233, 240; debts of, 168, 169, 228; Edo, 1, 4–6, 9, 99, 232 economic reforms in, 168, 170–76; Edo period. See Tokugawa (Edo) period innovations in, 248; and kokueki, education: and community granaries, 140n157, 149, 152, 169, 222, 237, 189, 203; and Confucianism, 56–57; 240; monopolies of, 165, 169, 173, and intellectual networks, 11–12; Itō 237; nationalism towards, 110; and Yōzō on, 207, 210, 211, 212, 214; in policy regimes, 240; vs. shogunate, Meiji transition, 215; Sai On on, 80. 5, 220, 222, 228, 247; and state See also academies, private monopolies, 130; Tenpō reforms in, Egawa Tarōzaemon (Hidatatsu, Tan’an), 236, 237 160 Dunstan, Helen, xii, 79n25, 87, 88 Eikoku kenpōron (On the Constitution Dutch East India Company (VOC), 93, of England; trans. Itō Yōzō), 207 95, 128, 145, 155–56, 172. See also Ei’nin tokuseirei (1297), 32 Netherlands elites, 24, 28–30, 154; Chinese, 182–84, Dutch learning, 116–17, 120n53 186–87; of Ryukyu, 70–71, 82. See also daimyo; samurai economic development: of Amami emperor (tennō), 6, 33, 53; Chinese, islands, 202–3; and community 149–50 granaries, 187–93; and credit, 10; and enclave publics, 11, 111, 154, 241 domestic sugar production, 98, 103; Enryakuji Temple, 35 in early Meiji, 205; in Edo period, entrepreneurs, local, 205–16, 44–45; and education, 212; and 245 indigenous industry, 206, 214, 215, Essentials of Governance (Tuzhi 216; and land reclamation, 192–93; yaoquan; Toji yōden; Sai On), 68, 72, vs. maritime defense, 118; in medieval 73, 74, 75, 77, 83 period, 22–26; and monetization, estates, provincial (shōen), 24, 30, 33, 44; 22–23; and the state, 24–26, 89, 119; managers of, 37–39, 40, 43 and taxes, 168, 193; and Western Europe, xiii–xiv, 1, 5, 39n51. See also science, 215 the West economic-policy field, 241.See also Ever-Normal Granaries, 180, 181–82, political-economic field 183, 184, 186. See also granaries, economic thought: Chinese, 84, 86–87; community Confucian, 12–13, 17, 18, 48, 50, exchange rates, 9, 18, 188, 229, 230–34; 88; and historical time, 246–47; and gold: silver, 218, 224, 231–32; for zeni, Kaitokudō Academy, 204; of Sai On, 218, 224, 232–34 72–81; Western, 17, 205. See also exports: domainal, 172, 173; and keizai (political-economic) thought modernity, 245; of precious metals, economy, Japanese: vs. business, 166; 91, 97–98, 103, 106, 107, 124–25, 145; crises in, 166–69, 171–72; and prices of, 127, 128–29; of silk, 93, currency reform, 91; and domestic 103n34 290 index

Ezo (Ezochi; Hokkaido), 112, 113, on, 194–97; in Okayama, 188–93; 132–42, 148, 153; colonization of, 133, terms for, 180 138–41, 148; Kudō Heisuke on, 121, Great Learning (Daigaku), 65, 163 144; and trade, 122, 136 Green Sprouts (qingmiao fa) program, Ezochi ikken (The Ezo Affair), 135, 137, 183 148 Groaning Words (Lü Kun), 83 Gyokuyō (Kujō Kanezane), 28–29 famines, 19, 236; relief for, 78, 179, 182, 187, 189, 192, 199 haikai poetry, 10, 21–22, 100, 101 Farris, William Wayne, 27, 44 Hall, John W., 137 feiqian (flying cash; Chinese bills of Handlin, Joanna, 83, 84 exchange), 39 Hanley, Susan, 44 Feith, Arend Willem, 120n53 Hayashi Shihei, 115n23, 116, 117n35, feudalism, 245; vs. cash crops, 104, 118, 132n113, 139, 141, 149n203, 105–7; in Europe vs. Japan, xiii–xiv; 153 and land tax, 103–4 Heaven’s will, 15–18, 53, 56; and Fisher, Irving, 235 freedom vs. control, 48–50; and foreign relations, 5, 7, 70. See also trade markets, 15–16, 17 forestry, 18, 72, 76, 80 Heian ibun, 28 freedom vs. control, 219, 221–23, 240, Heian period, 25, 38; currency in, 249 26–28, 29, 43 Fujita Teiichirō, 107–8, 110, 147n196 Heiji kanai monogatari (Ordinary fukoku (national enrichment), 108 Household Management; Sai On), fukoku kyōhei (rich country, strong 83 army), 118n37, 157, 169 Hezutsu Tōsaku, 123n64, 133n113, Fukuoka domain, 167 136n132 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 65, 209 Higuchi Shiba, 121n53 Furushima Toshio, 225 Hioki Iemon, 190 Hiraga Gennai, 99, 101, 133n113 gambling, 30, 31, 35–36 Hirayama Junzaemon, 160 gender, 234–35, 243 Hirosaki domain, 81n33 gentry, Chinese (shi), 182–84, 186–87 hiryōkoku areas, 109, 110 ginseng, 98–99, 105n37, 119, 132n109 Hitori kangae (Tadano Makuzu), 117 Gi Shitetsu, 82 Hōjō Yasutoki, 32 gokenin (samurai retainers), 30–33 Hokkaido, 7. See also Ezo gold: exchange rates for, 41–42, 103, Hōkoku igen (Kudō Heisuke), 96, 120, 124, 127, 218, 224, 231–32; coinage, 121, 142, 148 8–9, 25; mining of, 4, 91, 107, 134, Holling, C. S., 248n47 136; and policy regimes, 239; as Honda Danjō, 140n154 standard, 126n79, 228, 230, 232, 238. Honda Tadahira, 189 See also currency; metals, precious Honda Toshiaki, 6, 120n53, 126, Gotō Tōsaburō, 136n136 129n93, 138n144, 141, 144n175, 149, Gramlich-Oka, Bettina, 5, 7, 9–12, 15, 152, 153 111–56, 222, 233, 240, 241, 242, Honjō Eijirō, 180 246 Hōraku Temple, 28 granaries, community (shasō; shecang), Hori Ryūsuiken, 57 85, 179–204, 214, 221, 249; autonomy Hoshina Masayuki, 185, 187, 188 of, 196–97; in China, 179, 181–84; Hotta Masaatsu, 116, 117, 141 and credit, 179–81, 183–84, 185, 187, household management, 17, 65, 83 198–200, 203, 204; and interest on Huang Huiyou, 82 loans, 186, 189–90, 195, 196, 199; as Hui (king of Liang), 73 investment, 189–90; in Japan, 184–87; Hui Shiqi, 77n19 as joint public-private venture, human nature: Confucianism on, 59, 195–96; and morality, 182–84, 186, 61–62, 66n35; Itō Yōzō on, 211, 212, 197, 200–201, 203; Nakai Chikuzan 214 index 291

Ikeda Mitsumasa, 188, 189, 190 Itō Yōzō, 205–16; biography of, 207–9; Ikeda Tsunamasa, 190 and private property, 212–14; thought Ikegami, Eiko, 10, 111, 154, 241 of, 210–12 Ikegami Tarōzaemon, 10, 99, 100–101, 109, 110, 242; and kokueki, 102–7 Japan: “1955 system” in, 223, 224; as Illustrated Scroll of the Wandering Priest compound state, 6, 214, 222, 226, 247; Ippen, 36 early modern geography of, 2–3; vs. imports: of currency, 28–30, 125, 126, feudal Europe, xiii–xiv; isolation of, 176; domainal, 176; vs. domestic xii, 7, 12, 90–91, 121, 220; resource production, 92–97; and Ezo, 134; of limits in, 18 medicine, 130, 144n176; of precious Java, 95 metals, 145–46, 163; restrictions Jingdezhen porcelain, 172 on, 96, 132n109; of silk, 103n34; of jiyū (state without stagnation; freedom), sugar, 93–97, 132n109. See also cash, 50, 65 Chinese copper Jōei Formulary (1232), 32 import substitution, 245 Jūjikai (Clarification of Ten Things; industry, indigenous, 172, 206, 209, 210, Koga Seiri), 174 214, 215, 216 Junnin (emperor of Japan), 186 inflation: and class, 233–34; and currency, 92, 229, 230; fluctuations Kaibara Ekken, 13–14 in, 234–35; and policy regimes, 237, Kaiho Seiryō, 16–17, 18, 59–60, 61, 238, 239 80n25, 85n45, 149, 151n213 infrastructure: Edo-period, 22, 44; and Kaikoku heidan (Hayashi Shihei), Itō Yōzō, 209, 214; modern, 216; and 118 networks, 8–10; Sai On on, 83, 88; Kaitokudō Academy, 15, 80n25, 85, and the state, 10, 25, 76, 79. See also 140n157, 161, 194; autonomy of, transportation 196–97; economic thought of, 204 Inoue Junnosuke, 220 Kamakura period, 23n5, 28, 30–33, 44. intellectual field, 11, 17, 219, 241, See also medieval period 242n41, 243–44, 250 Kanazawa Yasugorō, 136n132 interest: and community granaries, 186, Kankenroku (Records of Insignificant 189–90, 195, 196, 199; fluctuations in Opinions; Kudō Heisuke), 119 rates of, 235–36 Kansei reforms (1787–93), 19, 139, 228, interventionism, state, xi, 65–66, 68, 232, 233, 243, 244–45; and crises, 236, 85, 248; Chinese view of, 87; and 245 community granaries, 179, 181, Kantō region, 109, 110 182–84; and economic prohibitions, Kashoku yōdō (Important Teaching on 77–79; vs. gentry voluntarism, Family Business; Shōji Kōki), 163 186–87; and policy regimes, 240; and Katō Chikage, 141n163 prices, 60–61, 84, 86, 87, 194; in Saga Katō Enao, 141n163 domain, 237; Sai On on, 72, 88; Shōji Katō Rokuzō, 215 Kōki on, 163–66; Zhu Xi on, 182–84. Katsuragawa Hoshū, 115n21, 116, See also freedom vs. control 119n46, 133n113 Ippen, 36 Kawaguchi Hiroshi, 9, 16, 47–66, 87, Isana Naomiki, 215 219, 221, 222 Ishida Baigan, 14, 48–50, 55–56, 59, Kawai Echizen no kami, 137n136 165 keikoku saimin (administering the Ishigaya Kiyomasa, 127, 144–48, 152; nation and relieving the suffering of and copper, 125, 126; and foreign the people), 163 trade, 129–30 Keizai mondō hiroku (Confidential Ishii Sumiyō, 205–16 Memorandum on the Dispute over Ishimaru Heishichirō, 191 [Political] Economy; Shōji Kōki), 162, Isono Masatake, 101 163, 171 Itō Isoheiji, 207 Keizairoku shūi (Dazai Shundai), 21 292 index keizai (political-economic) thought, 1–2, Kudō Jōan An’yo, 114, 118n40, 153n221 11, 12, 16–17, 115, 246; in intellectual Kujō Kanezane, 28–29 field, 241; and morality, 151–52; Kulmus, Adam, 117 and social networks, 153. See also Kurayasugawa Yoshii locks, 188, 192 economic thought Kuril Islands, 132, 138 Keizai yōgo (Nakai Chikuzan), 194 Kurume domain, 173 Kenpō fukyōroku (Memorandum on Kusaba Haisen, 159, 170 Economy, Prosperity, and Power; Kusama Naokata, 15–16, 17, 18, 21 Shōji Kōki), 162, 170, 171, 172 Kuwabara Takatomo, 117n36 ki (material force, ether), xi, 13–14, 51, Kyōhō reforms (1716–36), 19, 98, 225, 55 229, 235, 236; and policy regimes, Kinkadō Kenzan, 140n154 239; and revenues, 226, 227 Kishū domain, 102 Kyoto, 1, 4, 9, 44 Kōdōkan academy, 160, 168 Kyūon sode goyomi (Kudō Heisuke), Kōeki kokusan kō (Thoughts on 119n43 the Broad Benefits of National Production; Ōkura Nagatsune), 89, labor, division of, 50–54, 74; 104 geographical, 51 Koga Kokudō, 157, 160, 168, 170–73, laissez-faire policy, 15–16, 165, 222n7, 174 240 Koga Seiri, 173–74 land: fragmented control of, 110; Kogure Budayū, 215 ownership of, 173–75; reclamation Kokon chomonjū (setsuwa collection), of, 105, 188, 192–93; sales of, 30–33; 35–36 taxes on, 51, 103–4, 106–7, 168, 169, kokueki (national interest) thought, 176, 217, 225–27, 238, 239 5, 10, 89, 113, 142–53, 245, 248; Land and Lordship in Early Modern vs. contractionary policy, 220; in Japan (Ravina), 222 domains, 140n157, 149, 152, 169, 237, Laozi, 56 240; and domains vs. state, 222; and Laxman, Adam, 119, 140n154, 142, domestic production, 172, 173; and 150 Kudō Heisuke, 142–53; and policy legal codes, 26, 28–29, 84, 88, 92, 96 polarities, 217; and policy regimes, legitimacy, 41, 43, 62 238, 240; and profit, 14, 146–47, Lensen, George, 137 148n196; and revenues, 225, 226; and Lin Man-houng, xii shogunate, 144–53; and Shōji Kōki, liquor, prohibition of, 77–78, 86 166; and sugar production, 102–7, Li Zhi, 16, 85n45 109–10; in Tenpō reforms, 236 Lü Kun, 83–84 kokugaku (national studies), 6n6 Kokuhonron furoku (Matsudaira Maeda Masana, 248 Sadanobu), 194 Maeno Ryōtaku, 116 kokumin ishiki (citizen consciousness), Maita Gentan, 119, 121n53 89 markets, x–xi; autonomy of, 11, 15–19, kokusan (local production), 89, 92–97, 17, 53–54; and cash, 24, 36, 43; 98, 103, 104, 172–73, 176 Chinese view of, 87; freedom vs. Kokushō Iwao, 180, 189, 191 control in, 47–66; and Heaven’s will, Korea, 7, 68; trade with, xii, 90, 121–22, 15–16, 17; and innovative policy, 133 248; medieval, 19, 23; as model for Kōzu Kunisuke, 215 society, 16–17; and modernity, 245; Kudō Bankō monjo (Kudō Bankō’s as natural force, 14, 15–16; and report; Kudō Heisuke), 119n46, 142, networks, 9; and policy polarities, 150 217, 219, 221–23, 226, 249; and policy Kudō Heisuke, 10, 16, 96, 112–56; regimes, 240, 241; Sai On on, 15–16, and kokueki thought, 142–53; on 73; self-regulating, 49; and the state, Nagasaki, 112, 120, 121–32; network 16, 53–54, 222; supply and demand of, 114–21 in, 76–77 index 293

Mass, Jeffrey P., 23n5 Metzler, Mark, 1–19, 217–50 Matsudaira Harusato, 116, 117, 132n9 Mexico, 91 Matsudaira Sadanobu, 125, 185, 194, Miki Masatarō, 180 220, 236, 248; and Ezo, 139–40, 141; military, Japanese: and coastal defense, and Tanuma Okitsugu, 117–18, 243 118, 139, 140n153, 142, 167–68; Matsudaira Takechika, 115n23, 141, modernization of, 176; and Saga 141n165 reforms, 169; and Shōji Kōki, 160, Matsudaira Yasuhide, 167–68 161–62, 171; and social networks, 153; Matsukata Masayoshi, 202 vs. trade, 133; and the West, 167 Matsumae domain, 122, 133n113, 136, Minato Genzaemon, 135, 136, 148n201 138, 139, 148n201 Mino Masataka, 63–64 Matsumae Hironaga, 133n113 Mito domain, 247 Matsumoto Hidemochi, 135, 136, 137, Miura Baien, 140n155, 153n221 138 Miyamoto Matao, 229n20 Mayet, Paul, 227 Miyazaki Yasusada, 63, 97n20 medicine, 123, 134, 144n176; state Mizuno Tadaakira, 238 monopolies on, 130, 131, 132; sugar Mizuno Tadatomo, 135, 137 as, 90, 98, 103, 106 modernization, 14, 113, 157, 213, 216, medieval period, 21–45; decentralized 221; economic, 245; intellectual, 158; government in, 25–26; economy of, and medieval period, 19; military, 21–24; influence of, 40–43 176; Western-style, 7 Meiji period, 47, 226; modernization Mogami Tokunai, 138n144 in, 158, 176; and technology, 157; monetization, 21–45; and economic transition to, 205, 210, 211, 214 development, 22–23; in Edo Mencius, 72n7, 73 period, 25, 26, 41; effects of, 34–36; mercantilism, 147n196, 149; vs. intellectuals on, 43; in Kamakura agrarianism, 220, 227; and period, 30–31; in Muromachi period, community granaries, 189; in 23n5, 28, 32, 37, 44; and urbanization, Europe, 5; and kokueki, 108, 153; and 21–22. See also currency modernity, 245; and policy regimes, money-lending: and bills of exchange, 236, 239, 240 37–38; and cash, 35, 36; and merchants, xi, 51; Ishida Baigan on, community granaries, 184, 189, 190, 48–50; and bills of exchange, 37–40; 204; and Confucianism, 85; and debt and Buddhism, 58; and cash, 22, relief, 44; and Itō Yōzō, 209; and 29–30, 35, 36; and community samurai debt, 30–33; by temples, 26, granaries, 189, 198–99; Confucianism 35, 36 on, 13–15, 16, 57; and decentralized monks, 31, 35, 36 government, 26; Dutch, 167; and Monmu (emperor of Japan), 186 economic nationalism, 177; and monopolies (za), 130–32, 142, 249; kokueki, 148n196, 152; money- Chinese state, 183; on copper, 126, lending, 31; and morality, 59, 163; 140n154, 233; domain, 165, 169, 173, of Osaka, 161; and paper currency, 237; on marine products, 126–27; on 9; and policy regimes, 237, 240; and silk, 130, 131; on sugar, 71, 130, 131, reforms, 98n24, 100; Russian, 150; Sai 202 On on, 79, 80; and samurai, 13, 43; morality, xi, 17; and class, 61–63, 65, separation of, 175, 176; Shōji Kōki on, 161; and commerce, 16, 49, 59, 163; 164, 166; Way of (chōnindō), 14, 59, and community granaries, 182–84, 164–65 186, 197, 200–201, 203; Itō Yōzō metals, precious, 124, 125, 126n81; on, 210–11; and keizai, 151–52; and and Dutch, 143, 144; exports of, 91, occupation, 58–59, 61; of officials, 75; 97–98, 103, 106, 107, 124–25, 145; and policy, 220–21, 234–35, 243; and in Ezo, 134, 136; and kokueki, 149; profit, 59–61, 147, 151–52, 184; of monopolies of, 126n79; and Russia, ruler, 151; Sai On on, 68, 73, 84; and 135; trade in, 127, 134–35, 142, 143, samurai, 56, 62–64; and Shōji Kōki, 144–46, 147 163, 166; and wealth, 82–83 294 index

Morishima Chūryō, 115n21, 133n113 networks, social, 10, 12, 153, 155; and Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, 151 Ezo policy, 138; of Kudō Heisuke, Mukashibanashi (Stories from the Past; 114–21; of Shōji Kōki, 159–62, Tadano Makuzu), 114, 116 176–77 Murata Harumi, 116 Nihon keizai sōsho, 159 Muro Kyūsō, 57n24 Nihon keizai taiten, 159 Muromachi period, 23n5, 28, 32, 37, 44. Niimi Estate, 40 See also medieval period Ninjinfu (Tamura Ransui), 99 Nishikawa Joken, 53, 55, 58 Nabeshima Harushige, 173, 174 Niwa Seihaku, 98 Nabeshima Katsushige, 166 Nōgyō zensho (Compendium of Nabeshima Naomasa, 157, 160, 167, Agriculture; Miyazaki Yasusada), 63, 168–69, 171, 176 97 Nabeshima Naoshige, 166 Nomura Yogōemon, 137n136 Nabeshima Narinao, 160, 168 Nabeshima Shigeyoshi, 160 occupation: Buddhism on, 57–59; Nagasaki, 4, 7, 153; copper prices in, Confucianism on, 66; and morality, 155–56; defense of, 167–68; and Ezo, 58–59, 61; Sai On on, 79–80; and 134; Kudō Heisuke on, 112, 120, social usefulness, 57–64 121–32, 142, 144; and kokueki, 146, Ochiai Kō, 5, 7, 10, 89–110, 146, 147, 147; and Saga domain, 167–68; sugar 152, 241, 242 production in, 99 Ogiwara Shigehide, 91–92, 220 Najita, Tetsuo, 15, 197 Ogyū Sorai, 21, 43, 62, 164, 174, 194, Nakae Tōju, 13, 56 204 Nakai Chikuzan, 80n25, 85, 125, 140, Oka Jūrō, 215–16 141; and community granaries, 181, Okayama domain: community 185, 194–97, 198 granaries in, 181, 188–93, 194, 195; Nakai, Kate, 143n173 relief system in, 191–92; revival of Nakai Riken, 140, 141n159 community granaries in, 197–200 Nara period, 25, 26–27 Okinoerabujima (Amami archipelago), Narushima Dōchiku, 104 200–204 nationalism, 6, 7, 113; domain, 110; Ōkubo Toshimichi, 248 economic, 147n196, 177 Ōkura Nagatsune, 89 neo-Confucianism, 48, 74; and One Man’s Views (Hitori monogatari; community granaries, 179, 181–84, Sai On), 76, 77, 79, 80, 86 186, 201; and intellectual networks, Ōnin War, 44 11; and Itō Yōzō, 210, 211; Zhu Xi Ontleedkundige Tafelen (Anatomical school of, 160–61, 174. See also Zhu Tables; Kulmus), 117 Xi Ōoka Kiyosuke, 122 Netherlands, 5; and copper, 126n77; Oresme, Nicolas von, ix Dutch learning from, 116–17, 120n53; Osaka, 1, 4, 9, 123, 125, 140n157, 161; Kudō Heisuke on, 144, 149; Japanese vs. Edo, 232 relations with, 7, 142–43; role of king Ōshio Heihachirō, 161 in, 150; and smuggling, 137n141; Ōta Nanpo, 117n36, 135, 153n221 trade with, xii, 90, 96, 121, 142–43. Ōta Yukio, 30 See also Dutch East India Company Ōtsuki Gentaku, 116 networks: credit, 9–10; and outcasts (hinin, eta), 138, 175 economic-policy field, 241; and Ōyama Shigenori, 164n17 freedom vs. control, 48; information, Ōyama Tsunayoshi, 202 8, 10; and infrastructure, 8–10; intellectual, 11–12; policy, 242, 246, peasants, 50, 51, 80; and Buddhism, 58; 247; and territories, 2–10; trust, 9, and cash, 35, 43; and cash crops, 104; 111–12, 153 and community granaries, 201, 202; index 295

incentives for, 75–76; separation of, quan (situational weighing, expediency), 175, 176 81, 84, 88 Perry, Matthew C., 92 Persia, 95 Ravina, Mark J., 5, 6, 14, 85, 222; on Phaeton (British frigate), 167 community granaries, 8, 10, 179–204, poetry: haikai, 10, 21–22, 100, 101; and 214, 221, 249 networks, 12, 111; and policy, 242; in relief: and community granaries, Ryukyu, 82; waka, 104 179–83, 187, 189, 191–92, 199–200, policy: and conjuncture, 17–19; and 203; debt, 32–33, 43–44, 237; famine, economic fluctuations, 18–19, 217–18; 78, 179, 182, 187, 189, 192, 199; in expansionary vs. contractionary, Okayama, 191–92; tax, 32–33, 43–44, 220–21; innovations in, 248; language 192 of, 244–45; market-conforming vs. rice: vs. cash crops, 103–6; certificates market-controlling, 219, 221–23, 249; (kaemai) for, 38–39; and community polarities in, 218–23, 224, 241–44, granaries, 191; as currency, 9, 33; and 248–49, 250; positive vs. negative, 217, land reclamation, 105; prices of, 168, 219–22, 224, 234–37, 239, 240; trends 169; taxes in, 9, 60, 103–4, 169 in, 224–37 Ringer, Fritz, 242n41 policy regimes, 19, 217–18, 223–24, Roberts, Luke, 4, 5, 140n157, 147n196, 244–45, 250; list of, 237–38 148, 152, 177 policy space, 217, 218–23, 241, 248, 249, Ruch, Barbara, 36 250; and compound state, 247; and rural areas: cash in, 21, 41, 43; intellectual field, 243–44;vs. social commercialization of, 175; samurai field, 242 in, 81n33; and urban areas, 51, 64. See political-economic field, 11–17 also peasants Polo, Marco, 91n5 Russia, 5, 7, 121, 152; expansion of, population growth, 44 134, 137, 149; and Ezo, 132–35, 140; porcelain industry, 172 trade with, xii, 134–35, 136, 142, 148, practical learning (jitsugaku), 161 150 prices: Ishida Baigan on, 48, 49; and Ryukyu, kingdom of, 2, 67–88; and community granaries, 180, 182; of China, 68, 70, 71, 82, 86–87, 88; copper, 128–29, 155–56, 224, 233; foreign relations of, 7, 70; literature and currency, 91, 229; of exports, in, 82; resource limits in, 18; trade 127, 128–29; fluctuations in, 18, with, xii, 90, 122, 133; yaadui system 234–35; and imported cash, 28, 29; in, 71, 81 and interest rates, 235; international, 240; of marine products, 127; and Sadamedaka shihō (law; 1685), 96 monopolies, 131–32; of rice, 168, 169; Saga domain, 5, 12, 78; economic crisis and state intervention, 60–61, 84, 86, in, 166–69, 171–72; and Nagasaki, 87, 194 167–68; policy polarities in, 220; private property, 212–14 reforms in, 170–76; technology in, profit: Chinese view of, 85, 87; from 169, 237 community granaries, 189, 190; Saigō Takamori, 181, 200–204 from Ezo, 134; and foreign trade, 121; Saikyū fūji (Proposal for Emergency and kokueki, 146–47, 148n196; and Relief; Koga Kokudō), 170, 171 land reclamation, 105; and morality, Sai On, 10, 12, 67–88, 151, 214; 59–61, 147, 151–52, 184; Nakai economic thought of, 17–18, 72–81; Chikuzan on, 197; and public good, on markets, 15–16, 73 14, 85; Sai On on, 68, 73–75, 76, 85, Sakakura Genshirō, 136n136 86, 88; and Shōji Kōki, 165, 166 sakoku (seclusion policy), 90–91, 121, protests, 33, 43 220 public vs. private spheres, 75, 154; Sakuma Shōzan, 161 and community granaries, 184–85, Sakurai Eiji, 37 186–87; and social networks, 111 salt, 93 296 index salt and iron debates, 221 Shō Eki (crown prince of Ryukyu), 82 “Salt Hut at Gabu” (Sai On), 67 shogunate (bakufu): and cash crops, samurai, 6–7, 226; and Buddhism, 58; 105–7; centralized power of, xiv, 4; and cash, 34, 35, 36; vs. Chinese vs. domains, 5, 220, 222, 228, 247; gentry, 186–87; vs. commercialization, and kokueki thought, 144–53; limits 43; and commoners, 53–54, 64, 65, of, 6; loyalty to, 154; revenues of, 224, 66; and community granaries, 201; 225–28. See also the state and Confucianism, 56–57; and debt, Shō Hashi, 68 30–33, 44; and Heaven’s will, 48–50; Shōheikō (shogunal academy), 56–57, and intellectual networks, 11–12; and 160, 174, 197, 204 merchants, 13, 43; and morality, 56, Shōji Family Records Collection (Shōjike 62–64; and policy regimes, 237; and monjo), 161, 170 profit, 59–60; and reforms, 100, 194; Shōji Jibei, 159 role of, 51–54, 164; rural, 81n33 Shōji Kōki, 12, 157–77; on domainal Sangoku tsūran zusetsu (An Illustrated products, 240–41; life of, 159–62; and survey of the Three Countries; Saga reforms, 170–76; thought of, Hayashi Shihei), 141 162–66 Sanka zu’i (Kusama Naokata), 21 Shōji Seishichirō, 159 sankin kōtai (alternate attendance) Shō Kei (king of Ryukyu), 73 system, 5, 22, 44, 166, 194 Shōrui awaremi no rei (protection law), Sasaki Gin’ya, 33, 36 92 Satō Genrokurō, 138, 139 Shōtoku shinrei (law; 1715), 96, 146n187 Satō Issai, 160–61 Shushi shasō hō (Yamazaki Ansai), 185, Satō Nobuhiro, 141, 152n217 187 Satsuma domain, 107, 127, 247, 248; Siebold typhoon (1828), 162n8, 169n27 rural samurai in, 81n33; and Ryukyu, silk, 103n34, 144, 207, 209; as currency, 68, 70, 122; sugar production in, 96, 33, 34; domestic production of, 99, 106, 202 92–93; state monopolies on, 130, Schumpeter, J. A., 248n47 131 science, 107, 210, 215 silver: exchange rates for, 128, 218, Sēaru terurerī (Leiddraad bij het 224, 231–33, 238; loans of, 70, 169, Onderrigt in de Zee-Artillerie; Calten), 189; mining of, 4, 91, 107, 134, 136, 161 141n161; monopolies of, 126n79. See Segal, Ethan, 7, 8, 9, 232 also currency; metals, precious Sendai domain, 114–16, 122 slavery, 202 shasō. See granaries, community Smith, Thomas C., 23, 221 Shasō kō (Usami Shinsui), 194 Smits, Gregory, 1–19, 67–88, 151, 214 Shasō shigi (Nakai Chikuzan), 194 smuggling, 7, 131, 148n201; and Ezo, Shasō shigi furoku (Nakai Chikuzan), 134, 135–36, 137, 138; Kudō Heisuke 194 on, 122–25 Shibano Ritsuzan, 12 Sōbō kigen (Frank Words by a Rustic; Shibue Tamotsu, 207 Nakai Chikuzan), 125n72, 140, 194 Shimada Ryuto, 124n68 society: Buddhism on, 54–55, Shimazu Tsugutoyo, 99 64–65; classes of, 6–7, 51, 53, 164; Shimonokuni Toneri, 136 Confucianism on, 52, 54, 64–65; Shinan Kōgi (Tei Junsoku), 82 division of labor in, 50–54, 74; shi-nō-kō-shō (four classes; society), 6–7, as human body, 13–14, 74; and 51, 53, 164. See also class system individual, 211, 212, 213–14; Shinozaki Shōchiku, 197 interdependent, 64–65; Itō Yōzō on, Shinto, 63 210, 214; market as model for, 16–17. Shisō zasshiki, 106 See also class system Shōbai ōrai (Survey of Commerce; Hori Sō Eki, 82 Ryūsuiken), 57 the state, xi, xiv, 9; administration of, Shōda Kenichirō, 108 80–81, 83; and bills of exchange, index 297

38–39; centralized, xiv, 4, 25–26, 41, and credit, 195; and economic 44; and Chinese bills of exchange, development, 168, 193; vs. interest, 39; and Chinese gentry, 182; 186; in Kamakura period, 34–35; on and community granaries, 179; land, 51, 103–4, 106–7, 168, 169, 176, compound, 6, 214, 222, 226, 247; 217, 225–27, 238, 239; and policy decentralized, 186–87; and economy, regimes, 18, 238, 239; and reforms, 24–26, 79, 88, 89, 119, 147, 149–50; 98n24, 168, 200; relief from, 32–33, and infrastructure, 10, 25, 76, 79; 43–44, 192; in rice, 9, 60, 103–4, 169; legitimacy of, 41, 43, 62; and markets, Sai On on, 78, 79, 83, 84; and state 16, 53–54, 222; and money, 21–45; power, 6, 25 and morality, 62–64; and private technology, 51, 157, 160, 161, 169, 176, profit vs. public good, 14; vs. private 237 sector, 47–66; prohibitions by, 77–79, Tei Junsoku, 57n24, 82 86–87; Sai On on, 80–81, 88. See also temples, 24, 28, 38–39, 189; interventionism, state money-lending by, 26, 35, 36 statecraft philosophy, xi, 12–13, 17, 18, Tenmeiroku (Records of Tenmei Era; 68, 83, 85, 194 Shōji Kōki), 162 sugar, 89–110, 148; consumption of, Tenpō reforms (1841–43), 19, 157–58, 93, 96–97; domestic production of, 236, 238; in Saga domain, 170–76 92–99, 103, 202; Kudō Heisuke on, Tilly, Charles, 9, 111–12 144; imports of, 93–97, 132n109; and Toby, Ronald, 10 kokueki, 102–7, 109–10; as medicine, Toda Ujinori, 141 90, 98, 103, 106; monopolies on, 71, Tokugawa (Edo) period, xiii, 2; currency 130, 131, 202 in, 25, 26, 41–42, 231; economic Sugita Genpaku, 12, 162n7 development in, 44–45; economic “The Summer Moon” (Bashō), 22 stability in, 22; role of samurai in, Suruga domain, 99 52–53; urbanization in, 44 Suzuki Kimio, 42 Tokugawa Ieharu, 130, 139 Suzuki Shōsan, 57–59, 61 Tokugawa Iemitsu, 42 Suzuki Yasuko, 145, 146 Tokugawa Ienari, 139, 167 sweet potato, 78, 107, 118n40, 173 Tokugawa Ieyasu, 22, 58, 166 Sýkora, Jan, 5, 78, 157–77, 220, 237, 240 Tokugawa jikki (A History of the Tokugawa Shogunate), 99 Tadano Makuzu, 114, 116, 117, 118, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, 92, 188 119, 131n107, 150 Tokugawa Yoshimune, 44, 98, 99, 220, Taira no Kiyomori, 28 237, 248 Takahashi Korekiyo, 220 tokusei (virtuous government; tax or Takamatsu domain, 93, 101 debt relief), 32, 43–44 Takashima Shūhan, 160 townspeople (chōnin), 1, 48, 53, 66 Takata Teijirō, 197–99, 201 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 50, 133, 166 Takizawa, Matsuyo, 23n6 trade: in ancient China, 149–50; Ishida Tamura Ransui, 99, 101 Baigan on, 48–50; with China, xii, 10, Tanuma Okitsugu, 10, 96, 116n24; and 90, 93, 94, 96, 121, 126–127, 145; as economy, 98, 100–101; era of, 113, circulation (yūzū), 11–17; Confucian 153, 217, 227, 228, 230, 236, 245, 248; hostility to, 13, 17, 79n25, 85; in and Ezo, 112, 135–39; and foreign copper, 125–30, 135, 145, 147; and trade, 126, 129–30; and kokueki, credit, 198; and currency, 9, 10, 146, 148n201, 220, 222; vs. Matsudaira 228, 230; and division of labor, 51; Sadanobu, 117–18, 243; and monetary and Ezo, 122, 134, 135–38; Kudō policy, 146, 229, 232, 233; policy Heisuke on, 112, 121–32, 142, 143, regime of, 217, 227, 228, 229, 230, 144; and kokueki, 148, 149; with 236, 240, 245, 248 Korea, xii, 90, 121–122, 133; medieval, taxes: and bills of exchange, 39; and 23, 28; with Netherlands, xii, 90, 96, cash, 24, 33–34; and community 121, 142–143; policies on, 113, 220, granaries, 189; contracting of, 44; 237; in porcelain, 172; in precious 298 index

metals, 127, 134–35, 142, 143, 144–46, Wei Shanzhi, 181, 184 147; reverse-bullion, 144; with Russia, well field system, 184, 185 xii, 133, 134–35, 136, 142, 148, 150; the West: influence of, 5–6, 17, 47, 108, of Ryukyu, 68, 71, 82; with Ryukyu, 205, 212, 236; and Japanese policy xii, 90, 122, 133; and seclusion policy, regimes, 239–40; modernization in, 90–91, 121; and smuggling, 7, 122–25, 7; and Ryukyu, 68; and science, 215; 131, 148n201; and social networks, and Shōji Kōki, 160, 161; as threat, 153; and Tanuma, 126, 129–30; 157, 167 Western, 5, 167 trade guilds, 10 yaadui system (Ryukyu), 71, 81 transportation, 8, 10, 36, 40, 106, 188, Yabuta Yutaka, 109 209; of cash vs. commodities, 33–34 Yamada Kiuemon, 207 Tsuchimochi Masateru, 202–4 Yamaga gorui (Yamaga Sokō), 185 Tsuchiyama Sōjirō, 135–36, 137, Yamaga Sokō, 14, 51–53, 55, 58, 63, 185, 148n201 190 Tsuda Nagatada, 188–93, 196 Yamagata Bantō: well field system, Tsushima domain, 7, 90n4, 121–22, 124n69, 140, 149 145n180 Yamazaki Ansai, 185–86, 187, 190 Yanagawa domain, 173 Ueda Akinari, 12 Yao Keisuke, 95 Ueyama Eiichirō, 215 Yaowu huibian (Yōmu ihen; urban areas, 11, 51, 64, 71. See also Edo; Compilation of Essential Excerpts; Sai Osaka On), 73 urbanization, 1, 21–22, 36, 44 yin and yang, 55, 218 Usami Shinsui, 194 Yokoi Kan’zaemon, 136 Yokoi Shōnan, 60–61, 65–66, 161 VOC. See Dutch East India Company Yōmeigaku (teachings of Wang Von Glahn, Richard, 29 Yangming), 161 Yonezawa domain, 81n33 waka poetry, 104 Yoshio Kōgyū, 116, 121n53, 153n221 Wakasa Tadakiyo, 35 Walker, Brett, 138 zeni. See cash, Chinese copper Wang Anshi, 179, 183, 184, 221 Zhang Zai, 185 Wang Guodong, 79n25, 85 Zhu Xi, 7, 61–62, 160, 174; adaptation Wang Lüjie, 145n182 of policies of, 185, 194–95; Wang Yangming, 161, 174 and community granaries, 179, Warring States period (Japan), 44 181–86, 190, 201, 203, 204; on Watanabe Kazan, 153n221, 161 decentralization, 186–87; Nakai the Way (michi), 56; of business (chishō Chikuzan on, 194–95, 197; and policy no michi), 164–65; of merchants/ polarities, 221 townsmen (shōnindō/chōnindō), 14, 49, 59, 164–65