Us, Them, and Others: Reflections on Canadian Multiculturalism and National Identity at the Turn of the Twentyfirst Century

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Us, Them, and Others: Reﬂections on Canadian Multiculturalism and National Identity at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century

ELKE WINTER University of Ottawa

La Conf´erence John Porter, effectuee´ lors de la rencontre annuelle de la Societ´ e´ canadienne de sociologie a` Victoria en 2013, se base sur le livre Us, Them and Others : Pluralism and National Identity in Diverse Societies (Winter, 2011). En integrant´ les resultats´ d’une analyse discursive des journaux canadiens en langue anglaise pendant les annees´ 1990, et a` travers un cadre theorique´ inspiredelasociologiew´ eb´ erienne,´ le livre propose d’envisager le pluralisme comme une serie´ de relations triangulaires dynamiques, ou` le compromis entre des groupes inegaux´ – “us” et “other”- est amene´ afairesens` a` cause de la confrontation avec l’autrui reel´ ou imagine´ (“them”). La conference´ debute´ par un resum´ ede´ la contribution theorique,´ puis explique comment le multiculturalisme a et´ e´ consolide´ en tant que discours dominant au Canada dans les annees´ 1990. Par la suite, les changements subis par l’identite´ canadienne multiculturelle au debut´ du 21e siecle` sont discutes.´

The John Porter Lecture at the annual meeting of the Canadian Sociological Association in Victoria 2013 draws upon my book Us, Them, and Others: Pluralism and National Identity in Diverse Societies.

The author underlines how very honored and grateful she is for having received the Canadian So- ciological Association’s 2012 John Porter Book Award! She is indebted to too many people to be able to thank them all in person here. She acknowledges the colleagues who volunteered their time to serve on the jury, and her interlocutors in three book symposia (published or forthcoming in Canadian Ethnic Studies (2011), Journal of International Migration and Integration (2014),Soci- ologieS (forthcoming); cf. bibliography). She is speciﬁcally thankful to the three anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of this paper, whose second part has been fundamentally revised in response to their suggestions. Finally, she is happy to acknowledge the funding received for both research projects mentioned in this paper from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The author is solely responsible for all remaining errors of fact or interpretation. Porter Lecture at the Canadian Sociological Association, Victoria, June 4, 2013. Submitted for publication in the Canadian Review of Sociology (November 19, 2013). Elke Winter, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Ottawa, 120 University Private (#10059), Ottawa, ON, Canada K1N 6N5. E-mail: [email protected]

C 2014 Canadian Sociological Association/La Societ´ e´ canadienne de sociologie Us, Them, and Others 129

Incorporating the ﬁndings from an analysis of Canadian English-language newspaper discourses during the 1990s into a theoretical framework inspired by Weberian sociology, the book argues that pluralism is best understood as a dynamic set of triangular relations where the compromise between unequal groups—“us” and “others”—is rendered meaningful through the confrontation with real or imagined outsiders (“them”). The lecture summarizes the theoretical contribution and explains how multiculturalism became consolidated in dominant Canadian discourses in the late 1990s. The lecture then discusses changes to Canadian multicultural identity at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century.

MY MAIN MOTIVATION for writing Us, Them, and Others: Pluralism and National Identity in Diverse Societies (Winter, 2011) was to find answers to the following questions: How does a national majority come to view itself as “multicultural?” What brings it to integrate a positively connoted conception of diversity into its self-definition of who “we” are and want to be? Put yet in another way, under which conditions are binary us/them relations broken up to include the recognition of others within our midst? Concentrating on Canada, the book pays particular attention to the complex relations between the national majority, historically recognized ethnocultural or “national” minorities, and immigration-related diversity. The empirical study incorporates the findings from an analysis of English- language newspaper discourses during the 1990s into a theoretical framework inspired by Weberian sociology. It was this combination of empirical findings and a dynamic theory of interethnic group relations that led me to develop a model that defines pluralism as changing sets of triangular social relations, where the compromise between unequal groups—“us” and “others”—is rendered meaningful through the confrontation with real or imagined outsiders (“them”). The analysis in the book sheds a new light on the resilience of Cana- dian multiculturalism in the late 1990s—at a time when multicultural policies in other countries had come under heavy attack. It also develops a theoretical model of analyzing unequal ethnic relations that strives to go beyond the revelation of binary us/them relations. It does so by shifting the focus of observation away from processes of exclusion (constructions of “them”) toward processes of conditional inclusion, namely the constructions of “others” next to “us.” It is my hope that the study, and the model of pluralism in particular, provide a template for analyzing the relations between different ethnocultural collectivities and their pluralist accommo- dations in other contexts and time periods both in Canada and elsewhere in the world. For the purpose of this paper, I will go one step backward, and start by discussing the “classical” sociological opposition of the concepts of community and society. The next two sections are exclusively based on Us, 130 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014

Them, and Others. I will ﬁrst explain how I came to develop the model of pluralism as triangular relations. I will then summarize my interpretation of pan-Canadian multiculturalism in the 1990s. Let me clarify right from the outset that multiculturalism can refer to a demographic reality, to a government policy, as well as to a national ethos and identity. It is the latter that I am mostly interested in here. Finally, giving this lecture in 2013, I also want to comment on what has happened to multiculturalism and Canadian national identity in the ﬁrst decade of the new century. I should admit that at the moment of writing this paper I have not conducted systematic research on this issue and will therefore only present a handful of observations and offer some tentative interpretations that will need to be developed in future studies.1

Community versus Society?

In the early 1990s, it was common to oppose Queb´ ecois´ “ethnic nationalism” to Canadian or the Rest of Canada’s “civic nationalism.” Michael Ignatieff (2000), for example, argued that Queb´ ecois´ nationalism—in contrast to Canadian nationalism—has an “ethnic heart” (p. 132), Ramsey Cook (1995) added that it hosts the dangers of “ethnic cleansing” (p. 245). These terms go back to Friedrich Meinecke’s (1922) distinction between the French Staatsnation and the German Kulturnation.Inpartic- ular, civic nationalism has been associated with the writings of Voltaire, the Encyclopaedists, and later the writings of AbbeSiey´ es,` all emphasizing republican self-determination (i.e., civil society and demos). The idea of a nation based on culture, by contrast, derives from the philosophy of Herder ([1773] 1968) and the historicist, romanticist tradition in the early nineteenth century (Delannoi 1991). Germany’s cultural nation only became “ethnic” in the early nineteenth century due to a series of concomitances. These changes are reflected in Fichte’s concept of the German nation as linguistically defined Urvolk (Fichte [1808] 1978:106, cf. 7th Address). The duality of both concepts had been reinstated through Brubaker’s (1992) influential book Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. The opposition of ethnic and civic nationhood strongly reminds us of another dualism that has marked sociology since its beginning, namely the famous opposition of Community and Society by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies¨ ([1897] 1991). It cannot only be found in the writings of many early sociologists, such as Durkheim and Weber, but has remained influential until the postwar period (e.g., Popper 1950).

1. Acaveat:Us, Them, and Others is based on the analysis of mainstream media articles (Toronto Star, Globe and Mail). For the methodology, please consult chapter 6 in the book. By contrast, in the last section of my paper, I draw upon government discourses that were examined for a project on the alleged backlash against multiculturalism and the new politics of citizenship. There is thus a discrepancy in the type of data that is being used for interpretation. I strive to acknowledge and account for this on the relevant pages. Us, Them, and Others 131

Sure enough, we ﬁnd those terms also applied to the French/English dualism in Canada. In 1999, the distinguished Canadian political scien- tist John Meisel borrows Ferdinand Tonnies’¨ Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy to describe the difference in societal organization and self- understanding between Francophone Quebec and English Canada:

In reviewing [the Quebec/ROC debate], I am vividly reminded of the insightful analysis of social structure developed during the 19th century by Ferdinand Tonnies.¨ He made a fundamental distinction between Gemeinschaft (communal society) and Gesellschaft (associational society). In the former, people feel that they belong together because they are of the same kind; ties are warm, informal and self-evident. In the latter, bonds are voluntary and largely based on the rational pursuit of self-interest. While the analogy is not perfect, to my mind, francophone Quebec still exhibits many of the characteristics of Gemeinschaft, despite the fact that it is now a much more heterogeneous and textured society than it once was. The history of Quebec has left a ves- tigial sense of shared community. The rest of the country is held together less by emotional ties (although these cannot be dismissed altogether) and more by rational pursuit of self-interest. (Meisel in Meisel, Rocher, and Silver 1999:113)

As a student of Max Weber—who rigorously deconstructed the static duality of both concepts (Winter 2010)—I am suspicious of taking this dichotomy at face value and of imposing it onto the empirical world. First of all, ideal types are analytical concepts of heuristic value only and can never be found in their purity in empirical reality. Thus, it is highly debatable whether the claim that Quebec’s society is held together by emotional ties as opposed to a rational interest-based nationhood project in the rest of Canada would withstand any rigorous empirical investigation. This is cer- tainly not true for the past (Breton 1988; Lacombe 2002) and it is doubtful for the present (Resnick 1994), although it has become popular to assert that English-Canadian nationhood and identity are eroding (Grant 1965; Gwyn 1995). Second, the normative connotations of these oppositions have varied drastically over time. Tonnies¨ ([1897] 1991) expressed nostalgia for community. Durkheim (1978), in contrast, associated community with the unsophisticated “mechanical solidarity” based on resemblances in inter- nally undifferentiated groupings. He valued the “organic solidarity” of the modern society instead. Third, the ideal types of community and society obtain their relevance precisely from being constructed as opposing poles. They can only exist in a relationship. As with many oppositions, they gain their meaning from being relational: there would be no (concept of) community without society, no ethic nation without civic nation, no femininity without masculinity, no Blacks without Whites, and so on. Fourth, the attributes that have come to “mark” these opposites are constructed in unequal power relations, where the dominant group constitutes itself as the norm—and is even often perceived as such by the subordinate group—and 132 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014 projects “difference” and usually all bad or “exotic” attributes onto the subordinate group. In Us, Them, and Others, I describe this process in detail (Winter 2011a, chap. 4). This being said, the citation from Meisel demonstrates that the dualism between community and society still has a lot of traction in popular descriptions of Quebec and English Canada. Thus, my original starting point for this project was a deconstruction of the community/society opposition. In an approach reminiscent of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1994), I assumed that English Canada’s (self-)representation of an open, tolerant multicultural national identity depended, in part, on projecting ethic closed-mindedness, backwardness, monoculturalism upon Queb´ ecois´ nationalism. To put it differently, my hypotheses stated, the “ethnicization of Queb´ ecois´ nationalism” plays a role for the successful multiculturaliza- tion of Canadian “national” identity. Specifically, in the 1990s, Queb´ ecois´ nationalism served as a counterimage (“them”) facilitating the conditional inclusion of ethnically diverse immigrants (“others”) into a multicultural Canadian “we” (Winter 2001). I therefore agreed in part with authors like Richard Day (2000) and Eva Mackey (1999), who argue that immigrants were first coopted and then subdued into a “multicultural Canada” without being integrated on equal terms. At first sight, Canada’s alleged multicultural society seems to be “simply community written large,” as Robert Nisbet (1966:84) has called Durkheim’s attempt to reconceptualize society. In society as community written large, solidarity is still based to a fair amount on ethnocultural resemblances, holism, and repressive laws—although less so than in more traditional communities. Hence, Canadian multicultural society as community written large appears more progressive and liberal than it actually is because it compares itself to Quebec, saying “while we may be not perfect, it’s (seemingly) worse elsewhere.” To put it in the words of one of my students, “Toronto is a pretty racist city, but at least they do not force us to speak French.”2

PLURALISM AS TRIANGULAR SOCIAL RELATIONS

As I advanced both theoretically and empirically with my research, it became clear that reality was more complex. The representations of Cana- dian society in the media under investigation were not simply “community written large” or, to paraphrase Richard (Day 2000), the “‘simulation’ of assimilating Self to Other” (pp. 184–99). Rather, something else seemed to

2. A caveat: Whether and to what extent Queb´ ecois´ nationalism does contain elements of “ethnic nationalism,” and potentially even more so than “Canadian” nationalism cannot be discussed in this paper. Not only is this a controversial issue, which has generated a huge body of literature. A current answer to this question would also need to address a recent initiative by the Parti Queb´ ecois,´ who proposed the introduction of a “Quebec Charter of Values.” This would obstruct from the focus of this paper: the construction of multicultural nationhood in English Canadian discourses. Us, Them, and Others 133 be taking place, which I eventually identified as the construction of a multicultural national identity that was not merely “society” in disguise. But this new phenomenon also needed more nuanced theoretical and method- ological tools. Most importantly, the us/them binary did not fully capture what I was observing in the empirical data. Let us first agree that the representations that are constructed by the mainstream media are an approx- imation of the representations held by the dominant group. In that case, we can say my observations showed that the speaking “us” was aware of “others”—and not merely other individuals, but also other groups within society. And while these “others” were not equal (neither culturally nor in terms of social status) to “us,” they seemed to be closer than some other groups that were represented as outsiders or “them.” Take a look at the following two excerpts from the Globe and Mail. In the first case, it is newcomers who are represented as “outsiders” to the culture and history of English Canadians, as well as French Canadians and Aboriginal peoples:

No one rationally is going to suggest that Canada establish Islam’s sharia law alongside the English common law, the Quebec Civil Code and whatever the nation’s aboriginal justice systems evolve. [ . . . ] Multiculturalism—for now, at any rate—does not mean that everyone’s culture is on the same institutionalized footing as English, French and aboriginal cultures. [ . . . ] Everyone’s history is not Canada’s history. The history of settlement, of how the instruments of social existence were constructed—the law, government, commerce, education and so forth, is the history of Canada and should be the history of every one of us who lives here. (Valpy 1993)

In the second example, immigrants are represented as having become part of the Canadian tradition of “unity in diversity,” which is put at risk, allegedly, by “tribal” Quebec separatists:

Since 1950, the diversity of people coming to Canada has grown, and the capacity of Canada to accommodate that diversity has been remarkable only to those who do not understand the essence of our history. Living “at some distance together” has been a condition of Canada’s existence. [ . . . ] That is why the project of Quebec separatists to leave Canada rings so hollow, when its true nature is exposed. Quebec separatism is an essentially 19th-century nation-state movement in a late 20th-century “community of communities” called Canada that has effectively set the standard for statehood in the modern world. (Globe and Mail 1999)

The representations of intergroup relations in these citations do not seem to be justly captured by either the ideal-typical representation of “society” or that of “community.” Rather, we need an understanding of the social where communal and associative relations are interrelated, con- stitute each other mutually. Max Weber proposed such an understanding, when he suggested to replace the “strictly conventional” term “society” by 134 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014

“societal relations and societal institutions” (Weber 1969:153, my transla- tion). Weber thereby “offers a ‘view of society’ as constituted from an array of moving, even dynamically interacting ‘parts’” (Kalberg 2000:178). This interpretation of the social dissolves the static difference between “community” and “society,” without, however, throwing the analytical value of these terms over board. In Us, Them, and Others, I draw on Weber’s theory of group closure (Winter 2011a, chap. 4) to explain the theory of majority/minority power relations. According to this theory, the cultural specificity of the dominant group—the “majority” which is defined in terms of power and not in terms of demography—is usually masked, as it is conceived as incarnating the social norm. It is, therefore, represented in universal terms (Guillaumin 1972; Juteau 1999) and as an open society composed of individuals. Indeed, the “we” of the society is imagined as an infinite agglomeration of individual “I.” In a schematic way, we can describe this relationship as follows:

Society: we = I + I + I + I ...

By contrast, minority categories are usually constructed as “different” with respect to a referent, a dominant category that remains unmarked or is vaguely deﬁned. They are “always ‘more’ or ‘less’, [and] never the term of reference” (Guillaumin 1995:222). The attributes that are imputed onto the minority are generally particularized and devalued in comparison to the social norm. As such, they are usually represented as collectivities that are characterized by the idea of a closed holistic community, where the individual is subdued to the collective. Put differently, what characterizes the community’s “we” is its opposition to a real or imagined “them.” Put schematically, this relationship can be described as follows:

Community: we ࣔ them

Let us recall that we are dealing here with social representations and not with empirical facts. Certain attributes of the social relations of society and community tend to be overrepresented to the detriments of others. In the case of society, these attributes include openness and individualization; in the case of community, boundedness and closure are emphasized. These representations or imaginations, as Anderson (1991) would put it are real in the sense that they can be observed (e.g., through media analysis) and in that they often have material consequences for those involved. However, in their ideal-typical form, neither the representation of society nor that of community is able to adequately describe how social relations would look like in a pluralist society/collectivity, that is, a collectivity that encourages the public expression of collective identities. I therefore turn to the works of Ian Angus from Simon Fraser University. Us, Them, and Others 135

According to Angus, in a pluralist society like Canada the typical an- tagonist us/them relation, which characterizes the establishment of group boundaries, is transformed into an us/we relation where “the ‘us’ [refers] to one’s ethnocultural group and the ‘we’ [refers] to the multicultural context” of the larger society (Angus 1998:84). The multicultural context trans- forms the role of ethnic tradition, since it presents cultural membership from the outset as one possibility among others, thereby generating (1) an understanding of the particularity/uniqueness of one’s culture, and (2) an appreciation of the multicultural context that validates this particular way of life/culture (as it validates all others). As a consequence, “in the passage from the perception of uniqueness to its justiﬁcation, the ‘us’ is constituted. In the passage from the ‘us’ to a multicultural context that includes many ethno-cultures, the ‘we’ is formed” (Angus 1998:84). In the Canadian context, the us/we relation expresses “how one can partici- pate in English Canada through participation in an ethnocultural group” (Angus 1998:84). In a schematic way, the constitution of Angus’ model of a pluralist society can be described as follows:

Pluralist Society: we = us + us + ....

Angus’ political philosophy of multiculturalism is intriguing as it claims that the inclusion of a culturally different other within a collec- tively imagined pluralist we-group is possible. In fact, in the perspective proposed by Angus, the pluralist society is constituted through individuals’ membership in and belonging to particular collectivities within society. This being said, from a sociological point of view, the model of “us/we” social relations suffers from two flaws. First, his model fails to reflect power relations. If difference is (re)produced within unequal power relations then even we/us relations within the multicultural context can never involve entirely equal participants. Although pluralism aims to remedy power relations between groups, it cannot eliminate them entirely. Second, Angus’ multicultural philosophy is a normative model of pluralism, which wants to be universal and therefore fails to recognize its boundaries. The sociological constitution of “normative” pluralism (in the sense of a prescriptive idea of society-building), by contrast, requires the construction of group boundaries through the confrontation with (real or imagined) “them.” Put differently, the analytical distinction between “society” and “community” only obtains its meaning from the dichotomy. There cannot be inclusion without exclusion. We only know who we are by comparing us to (real or imagined) third persons. Thus, in a first step, Angus’ theory must be transformed in the following way:

Pluralist Society: we = us + us + ...... ࣔ them

This schematic transformation shows that, in a second step, we have to develop an understanding of inclusion/exclusion that goes beyond binary 136 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014 relations. Rather, what we need is (at least) a triangular relationship. By adding a couple of modest changes to the formula above, we end up with our ﬁnal schematic equation describing a pluralist society:

= + ࣔ Pluralist Society: multicultural we us others1 − n them1 − n Let us recall that in pluralist societies the relation between the par- + ticipating members of a “multicultural we” (us others1 − n)mustnot necessarily be one of equality (Winter 2010). “Us” designates the speaking collectivity. I use the term “others” to designate the included—but never on entirely equal terms—minority group(s). Despite these considerations, I assume that construction of a “multicultural we” is possible in much of the same way that other group formations occur, that is, by downplaying (but not erasing) salient differences between individual/collective group members for the purpose of group closure. This downplaying of internal heterogeneity is only possible through the confrontation with third persons. This model helps us to better understand pluralism as a negotiated compromise. It reveals that the “multicultural we” is, in fact, constructed as a triangular relation where the compromise between two, often unequal, groups becomes meaningful only through the presence of third persons. Pluralism is thus best understood as overlapping and dynamic sets of triangular relations, where the conditional association between “us” and “others” is rendered possible through the exclusion of “them.” Put differently, two or more groups come together—that is, enter in negotiation processes about pluralist collaboration—not because they are equal in terms of power or similar in terms of “culture,” but because they are confronted with a (real or imagined) third group that forces the national majority to give concessions to minority groups—or to attempt their cooptation, as the glass is always either half full or half empty. The triangular relation is a minimum requirement, which allows for a theoretically easy and empirically applicable model. Obviously, reality is more complex and can involve many more “players.” The notion of “overlapping sets of triangular relations” speaks to this complexity. In the next section, I will show how the conceptualization of pluralism as triangular social relations can help us better understand what has happened to the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity in Canada at the end of the twentieth century.

THE 1990s: THE CONSOLIDATION OF MULTICULTURALISM IN DOMINANT DISCOURSES

The conducted newspaper analysis in Us, Them, and Others traces a multitude of triangular relations with numerous “players” (such as Francophones, immigrants, English Canadians, the United States, Aboriginals) with changing attributes (such as, for French speakers, Us, Them, and Others 137 separatists, nationalists, members of a linguistic minority, etc.) in various positions (e.g., included as “others” within Canada or excluded as “them” outside the multicultural nation). Within these triangular relations, in the Canadian case, national minorities play an important role. In addition to Canada’s traditional point of comparison, the United States (Winter 2011a, chap. 7), speciﬁcally the rights granted to/claimed by Queb´ ecois´ Francophones serve as points of reference within both legitimizations and delegitimizations of pan-Canadian multiculturalism. In short, contrary to my original hypothesis, Quebec is neither univocally situated inside nor outside the Canadian multicultural nation (Winter 2011a, chaps. 7 and 8). The problem, however, with any easy-to-grasp formula is that it is limited in what it can tell us about social reality. For example, one thing that remains open with the formula “pluralist society: multicultural = + ࣔ we us others1− n them1− n” is the insight about what characterizes the relationship between “us” + “others”: Is it a compromise between (almost) equals? Are these players perceived in collective or individualist terms? Or, on the contrary, is the “glue” between “us” + “others” rooted in the cultural competences of one particular group? In Chapter 9 of Us, Them, and Others, I therefore distinguish between three divergent interpretations of multiculturalism, namely a liberal-pluralist, liberal- multiculturalist, and a republican perspective. I will brieﬂy present them here by means of examples. Take a look at the following citation from the Toronto Star:

For 350 years, aboriginal peoples, French Canadians, English Canadians and people from every quarter of the globe have together made a country that at its ﬁnest moments deﬁnes itself through its diversity. Were it not for English and French together, such moments would not have been imaginable on the continent. (Janda 1995, my emphasis)

This example describes the liberal-pluralist discourse that promotes some kind of multinational multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is here rooted in compromise, individual human rights, and the acknowledgment of existing “societal cultures” (groups). The following citation from the Toronto Star insinuates a different understanding of multiculturalism:

Newer minorities are not transplanting “old country” troubles here, as the old ones did. Nor are they narrow regionalists. They strongly identiﬁed with PierreTrudeaupreciselybecauseofhispan-Canadianvision[...]Formost [immigrants], coming to Canada is a contract; they trade their talents for membership in a great nation. (Siddiqui 2000, my emphasis)

In (neo-)liberal multiculturalism, multiculturalism is deﬁned in individualist, liberal terms with a tendency toward economic rationality. This perspective was only present in the articles found in the Toronto Star;that is, I did not ﬁnd this understanding of multiculturalism in the articles 138 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014 selected by key-word search from the Globe and Mail. By contrast, the next type of representation, here cited from the Toronto Star, was found in both newspapers:

Canada’s monarchy, along with her British parliamentary and judicial systems, have caused us to take a different political course than our republican cousins to the south, a course for which most Canadians, especially those very groups which push for its abolition, should be grateful. (Reid 1993, my emphasis)

This is an example of what I have coined republican discourse, that is, a discourse that promotes some kind of English Canadian nationalism. Multiculturalism is here rooted in British/English-Canadian values and institutions. Further below, I will argue that this type of discourse has gained even more traction in the first decade of the new century than it had during the 1990s, when it was still kept at bay by the other two discourses. Overall, until the early 1990s, Quebec tended to be represented as a national minority that is at the heart of Canadian identity and that needs to be accommodated by “typically Canadian” pluralist compromise and concessions (Winter 2009a). Both were said to distinguish the “Canadian” way of dealing with ethnic diversity from the “American” one. With respect to multiculturalism, Quebec was then overwhelmingly represented as a predecessor of diversity proliferation with contradictory normative connotations. Commentators endorsing a liberal-pluralist perspective tended to argue that the historical compromises reached to accommodate Quebec’s cultural and linguistic difference have helped to prepare the rest of Canada to deal with the challenges of newer sources of ethnocultural diversity, particularly those that are produced through immigration at a time of globalization (i.e., the “cultural distance” and variety of sending countries, cf. Cameron 2007). By contrast, for commentators closer to the republican perspective, all group rights, whether relating to Francophones or immigrants—such as “official bilingualism and its fraternal twin, official multiculturalism” (Thorsell 1992)—were suspect, as they are seen as being at the heart of cen- trifugal powers undermining social cohesion. The image evoked is that of a deadly spiral toward fragmentation/identity politics and the destruction of society. In the years leading up to the second Quebec referendum on independence in 1995, Queb´ ecois´ separatist nationalism—as opposed to the simple notion of “the French fact” in Canadian society—became increasingly re- garded as the enfant terrible of Canadian multiculturalism. References to Quebec started to serve not only to point out the “root cause” for social disin- tegration, but also operate as an “awful example” of what multiculturalism Us, Them, and Others 139 as a normative framework for dealing with ethnocultural diversity may lead to. Commentators upheld that “if an ‘ethnic’ community becomes larger than the European-descended community [ . . . ], it might decide to make its language official and have it spoken in the legislature, placed on public signs, and compulsory in schools” (Stoffman 2002:134–35). Hence, it was feared that “our multiculturalism may be turning into multinationalism” (Gwyn 1993b). While multiculturalism was thus under heavy attack in the early 1990s (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992), the public mood started to change in the mid-1990s. The potential scenario of a separating Quebec and the undeniable presence of immigrants “from all over the world” produced a situation where English Canadians were in desperate need of rethinking their national identity beyond expressions of monoculturalism (Resnick 1994). In the period that followed the second Quebec referendum on independence, English Canadian attitudes vis-a-vis` Quebec hardened (Lacombe 1998; Potvin 2000). The referendum’s narrow defeat sent a shock wave through the rest of Canada. The “Parizeau gaffe”—Quebec’s premier blaming “money and the ethnic vote” for the loss of the referendum—reinforced the image of a fundamental difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada. While Quebec was increasingly described as a narrow-minded “ethnic nation” (Globe and Mail 1995b), the rest of Canada became increasingly portrayed as an open, tolerant “multi-ethnic World Nation” (Gwyn 1993b). Canadian scholars and policy makers “exported” multiculturalism, the federal government touted multiculturalism as fostering business (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Fleras and Elliot 1992), Toronto presented itself as the “most multicultural city” in the world (Doucet 2001). In this context, the notion of a “multicultural Canada” gained new appeal. It seemed to be something that Canadian citizens were ready to consider as distinctly “us” and could also be proud of internationally. For this representation to emerge it was necessary that a seemingly ethnoculturally oppressive Quebec was no longer viewed as a predecessor or aberration of multiculturalism. Rather, Quebec’s treatment of ethnocultural diversity became increasingly constructed as the mirror image of the multicultural nation that English Canada wants to be and/or stands for (Winter 2009b). For example, in the aftermath of the narrowly defeated Quebec referendum and the Quebec premier’s rant against the “ethnic vote” the Globe and Mail (1995a) writes:

What do we stand for as a nation? [ . . . ] We are against the idea that people should be treated differently because of their skin colour, language, religion or background. We are for the idea that all Canadians should be treated as full citizens. [ . . . ] We are against ethnic nationalism, in which people of 140 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014

common ethnicity rule themselves—masters in their own house.3 We are for civic nationalism, in which people of different backgrounds come together under the umbrella of common citizenship to form a community of equals. Ours is a modern nationalism: liberal, decent, tolerant and colour-blind. (my emphasis) Furthermore, compared with a hostile, French-speaking, and potentially separating Quebec, the claims for cultural maintenance and nondis- crimination by ethnocultural groups of immigrant origin did indeed appear harmless and “integrative.” As the following quote from the Toronto Star demonstrates, immigrants do not only appear to be better Canadians than nationalist Queb´ ecois,´ they also become cast (and cast themselves) as the glue for a fractious country:

[T]he biggest challenge to Canadian citizenship comes not from the new minorities but our oldest ones- the aboriginals and the English and the French. [ . . . ] “National minorities,” in the words of Will Kymlicka of Queen’s Univer- sity[...] insistonnation-to-nationnegotiationsinthe“multi-nationstate” that is Canada. But immigrants, Canadians by choice rather than the acci- dent of birth, make no such demands. They don’t ask for self-government. They are not potentially secessionist; in fact, those in Quebec are in the forefront of fighting separatism. (Siddiqui 2000, my emphasis) The publication of Will Kymlicka’s influential Multicultural Citizen- ship (1995) gave academic authority to the widely shared impression that the multicultural rights demanded by immigrant groups and ethnic associations were indeed fundamentally different from the “self-government rights” claimed by the Franco-Queb´ ecois´ and, in a less threatening way, by Canada’s First Nations. The paradigm change within the academy was echoed in public discourse: in the second half of the 1990s, references to Queb´ ecois´ separatism as “multiculturalism gone wrong” slowly disappeared from both academic scholarship and the mainstream media. In the academia, Kymlicka’s theory was criticized for privileging minority nations over ethnic groups (Parekh 2000; Walker 1997). In Canadian public discourse, by contrast, his distinction was increasingly used—specifically by commentators adopting the liberal-multiculturalist discourse—to distance immigrant groups from the potentially secessionist intentions of minority nations. This is shown in the quote above. Used in this specific way, the analytic distinction between minority nations, on the one hand, and ethnic groups made of made of immigrants and their descendants, on the other, mitigated the common reproach that

3. Echoing the slogan maˆıtres chez nous, introduced by the Parti liberal du Quebec´ under Jean Lesage 1960 to 1966, the reference to “masters in our own house” refers to directly to Quebec and Quebec’s Quiet Revolution. Us, Them, and Others 141 ethnic minorities’ requests for recognition would result in ethnic enclaves, parallel societies, and, ultimately, the fragmentation of the Canadian social fabric (Winter 2011a, chap. 8). Still more importantly, and also demonstrated by the quote above, Kymlicka’s scholarly distinction was forcefully underlined by Canadi- ans’ experience with the so-called “ethnic vote” in the 1995 Quebec referendum on independence. While Quebec’s premier had to resign over his ill-suited comments in the referendum night, 95% of Quebec’s non- Francophone population voted indeed against separation (as opposed to 60% of Franco-Queb´ ecois).´ The voting pattern in the 1995 referendum revealed the “destructive” potential of a minority nation demanding self- government rights. It was also powerful example of the “unifying” pan- Canadianism expressed by Canadians of immigrant origin.4 In sum, the book argues that in Canada, during the 1990s, multiculturalism acquired a different meaning, from a seemingly group rights based approach to a much stronger and openly acknowledged emphasis on individual choice. This reduced multiculturalism’s imputed divisiveness and rendered it socially acceptable, even to many of its critics—albeit not all, as Phil Ryan (2010) convincingly documents. Constituted in opposition to—rather than in extension of—French/ English “dualism” and its seemingly obsolete communitarian underpin- nings, multiculturalism became invested with legitimacy and moved from a discourse that was mostly marginal until the late 1980s (Karim 1989) to a social imaginary that is now widely endorsed by Canadians (Envi- ronics Institute 2012). This interpretation helps to explain the strange “coincidence” that multiculturalism became a publicly endorsed dominant discourse (Karim 2002) at the very time when Canada was also characterized by a profound conflict between its two linguistically defined “founding nations.” It also helped to explain why public support for multiculturalism merely “dipped” in the early 1990s (Winter 2011a:18), while it was on a steady downward slope in other countries, specifically in Europe (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009).5 There are two important qualifications to my claim that the idea of a “multicultural Canada” became consolidated in dominant discourses during the second half of the 1990s. These two qualifications pertain to the “containment” of Quebec separatism and the “decommunitarization” of

4. It should be noted that Canada’s First Nations were also united in their opposition to a separate Quebec. On October 24, 1995, the Cree held a separate referendum on the issue. They voted 93.6 percent to stay within Canada (Wherrett 1996:5–6). 5. There are numerous factors that facilitate the persistence of multiculturalism in the Canadian context, such as Canada’s history of immigration, its geographical location, and the type of immigrants it attracts (Kymlicka 2004). We should also not forget Canada’s minority “rights revolution,” its increasing “reality” of ethnic and racial diversity, as well as intergenerational change (Harell 2009). My research in Us, Them, and Others adds to this by revealing the changing semantics pertaining to multiculturalism and its relation with Queb´ ecois´ nationalism. Obviously, I do not claim that semantics are the only reason why public support for multiculturalism generally fares much better in Canada than in Europe. 142 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014 multiculturalism. The “containment of Queb´ ecois´ separatism” started with the Clarity Act adopted by Parliament in June 2000, which defines the pa- rameters for what a “clear” referendum question would have to look like. It was continued through the “sponsorship program” (1996–2004) that was established as an effort to promote national unity and to raise the profile of the federal government, particularly in the province of Quebec. It was reinforced through the motion that “the Queb´ ecois´ form a nation within a united Canada” accepted in Parliament on November 27, 2006. Finally, it involved the decline of Queb´ ecois´ nationalism during the first decade of the new century. The “de-communitarianization” of multiculturalism acknowledges that the type of multiculturalism that is promoted publicly is no longer encouraging group identities and institutionally supported diversity. To be clear, Canadian multiculturalism never subdued the individual to the group and never guaranteed group rights. However, during the first 20 years of its existence, the policy was couched in the language of ethnocultural communities. In the fourth volume of their report, the Royal Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism recommended to take into account “the cultural contributions of other ethnic groups” (Canada 1969). Announcing the 1971 multiculturalism policy in parliament, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously stated that “there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other” (Canada 1971). This language was abandoned the early 1990s. In the 1997 Brighton Report and in Canadian Heritage’s subsequent Multiculturalism Program Review (Canada 1996), the language of communities is missing and ethnocultural associations are no longer invited by the federal government to contribute in a “full and equal partnership” to the national enterprise (Kordan 1997:140). During this time, multiculturalism becomes increasingly defined in liberal and even neoliberal terms. It relates to individual actors and their cultural capital. Put differently, to the extent that Quebec and Aboriginal peoples, whose demands for recognition are oriented along communitarian ideals and needs are (rightly or wrongly) distanced from multiculturalism, which latter became viewed as “integrative” and gained appeal. Constituted in opposition to—rather than in extension of—French/English “dualism” and its “outdated” communitarian understanding, multiculturalism became consolidated as a dominant discourse that casted it as an essential element of Canadian national identity (Winter 2008).

THE EARLY 2000S: FROM MULTICULTURAL NATIONAL IDENTITY TO A NEW POLITICS OF COMMUNITY?

I am confident that the argument made in Us, Them, and Others about the consolidation of pan-Canadian multicultural identity in the late 1990s is sound and can be upheld. However, questions must be raised to what Us, Them, and Others 143 extent this consolidation has been sustained into the twenty-first century. In fact, in recent years, one of the dominant discourses identified in Us, Them, and Others seems to have become much more visible than the other two. This discourse, which I identify as republicanism in the book, rep- resents multiculturalism as being dependent on English-Canadian values and institutions. It contents that “the glue that is holding Canada together [ . . . ] is the culture and the values of English Canadians” (Gwyn 1993a). This discourse is associated with conservative-leaning authors such as Rudyard Griffith, Andrew Cohen, and Jack Granatstein. With the election of a Conservative federal government in 2006, it has gained more political clout than it had under the Liberals during the 1990s and even more than it had in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York on September 11, 2001. More research is necessary to examine the exact nature of this change in tone (and policy) at the federal level and its impact on Canadian national identity. Here, I do not have the space to provide a detailed analysis. However, I will point out a few observations and areas that, I believe, deserve more attention in future studies. For a couple of years now, we can observe a move away from multiculturalism as an essential marker of Canadian national identity. As the Globe and Mail (2010) puts it, Canadians should “strike multiculturalism from the national vocabulary.” The new trend is best described as a language of Community (with a capital C) that no longer refers to minority groups but circumscribes the pan-Canadian nation (Winter 2011b). This language can clearly be observed in government discourses. With the introduction of the Citizenship Action Plan in 2009, it also found its way into policy and programming. Under the banner of “strengthen[ing] the value and meaning of Canadian citizenship by promoting civic memory, civic participation and sense of belonging to Canada” (Canada 2013), the government has, in fact, invested in areas that are not merely “civic” in the strict liberal-democratic sense. Rather, recent politics clearly promote a culturally circumscribed meaning of Canadianness. To give some examples of this trend: the 2009 citizenship study guide places considerable weight on Canadian history, specifically military history. It stipulates that “serving in the regular Canadian forces (navy, army and air force) is a noble way to contribute to Canada” (Canada 2011:10). Furthermore, the government spent almost $30 million to commemorate the War of 1812; roughly the same amount ($25 million) will be spent on transforming Canada’s largest museum, the Canadian Museum of Civi- lizations into the Canadian Museum of History (Canada 2012). The Conservative government has also gone out of its way to un- derline the role of the monarchy. Initiatives included the request that all Canadian embassies and missions abroad must display a portrait of the Queen (in 2009), the removal of modern artworks by Quebec painter Alfred Pellan from the lobby of the Department of Foreign Affairs and their 144 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014 replacement with a portrait of Elizabeth II (July 2011), and the restora- tion of the word “royal” in the front of the names of Canada’s navy and air force (August 2011). A number of commentators have raised concerns about this “conservative rebranding” of Canadian national identity (Ivison 2009) and about “retrofit[ting] Canada for the 1950s” (Simpson 2011) when Anglo-conformity and “speak white” ideology had not yet been replaced by normative pluralism. Furthermore, standardized language tests in English or French have become mandatory for skilled immigrant applicants since June 2010 (Keung 2010), and for citizenship candidates since November 2012. Recent changes in naturalization policy align the Canadian system increasingly with the European one, where language skills are predominantly viewed as a prerequisite for integration rather than the latter’s “natural” and progressive outcome (Winter 2014). Finally, let us recall that that there now exists a new act that encourages everyone to fly the Canadian flag (Government of Canada 2012).6 Elsewhere, I have argued that the rise of this new cultural nationalism in federal government discourses came indeed at a time when Queb´ ecois´ nationalism was at a weak point in the early years of the new century (Winter 2013).7 It is well documented that the fear of separatism and the focus on national unity definitely stalled the implementation on changes pertaining to the “thickening” of citizenship in discourse and practice (changes to the Act itself, the citizenship study guide, and the ceremony including the pledge of allegiance to the monarch) that we have been observing since 2006 (Garcea 2006; Winter 2014). This observation correlates with the claim in Us, Them, and Others that real or imagined third persons are necessary to forge a pluralist alliance among the dominant group and its minorities and that pluralism is at risk once the real or perceived need for making concessions is diminished. However, it would be reductionist to view this as the only or even just as a main cause for the disappearance of multiculturalism as dominant discourse and the new language of national Community. Canada may simply be following the widespread international trend where the political leaders of France, Germany, and Britain have become known for blaming “multiculturalism” for failures in immigration and integration policy. We must also take into account the change in government at the federal level. A number of recent policy changes—for example, a more comprehensive citizenship study guide, a more demanding citizenship test,

6. Admittedly, the Act respecting the National Flag of Canada does not threaten to punish with up to two years in prison anyone who prevents another citizen to fly the Canadian flag, as originally proposed the private member’s bill C-288. 7. Between 2003 and 2012, the Liberal Party was in power in Quebec; since then, the Parti Queb´ ecois´ governs the province, but only as a minority government. In the federal election of 2011, the Bloc Queb´ ecois´ was reduced to four seats. Us, Them, and Others 145 mandatory language tests for skilled immigrant applicants, new require- ments asking citizenship candidates to prove fluency in either of Canada’s two official languages, and to remove their facial veil when pronouncing the citizenship oath—can be traced back to the anti-immigrant roots of Conservative Party’s predecessor, the Reform Party. While government discourses may not reflect representations held by the media and the wider public, reducing changes to Canadian national identity on Conservative party ideology alone does not do the trick either. None of the recent policy changes has stirred up public opinion. On the contrary, in the case of the new citizenship study guide, the conservative rebranding of Canada was condoned quickly by both the Anglophone and Francophone media (Winter and Sauvageau 2012). Finally, the silent disappearance of Canada’s multicultural identity in official discourses does not mean that the current situation is devoid of triangular social relations. However, the representation of the main group(s) and their affiliation(s) with the speaking “us” seems to have changed. What we are observing recently is not the construction of a “pluralist we,” namely the discursive inclusion of some “others” as part of a more comprehensive and diverse national “we” in opposition to others. On the contrary, what seems to be going on over the past couple of years in Canadian dominant discourses is better described as socio-ethnic leveraging, where one or more groups are valorized with the purpose of distancing and delegit- imizing another. Socio-ethnic leveraging occurs as political elites exploit the competing claims that are generated through the mobilization of dis- empowered groups. However, here, the effects of the dominant group’s confrontation with a third party seem to be exclusive rather than inclusive and the collective “we” is no longer pluralist. To give an example, in Canada as in many European countries, gender is now being used as a form of leverage against men of immigrant and “ethnic” origin. Gender equality, by contrast, is being staged as an inherent characteristic that nationally share nonnegotiable “common values.” To quote from the recent citizenship study guide:

In Canada, men and women are equal under the law. Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, “honour killings”, female genital mutilation or other gender-based violence. (Canada 2011:9)

Speciﬁcally, Muslim men are portrayed as being backward-oriented, patriarchal, and unstoppably violent. Muslim women, on the other hand, can still be “saved” (Razack 2007)—on the condition that they are will- ing to remove their face veil while swearing allegiance to the Queen (Winter 2014). Furthermore, the (former) Minister of Citizenship, Immi- gration, and Multiculturalism warns all immigrants, men, and women 146 CRS/RCS, 51.2 2014 about “end[ing] up being stuck in any kind of cultural enclave” (Canada 2009). We are clearly outside the realm of normative pluralism here. In short, at the time of writing, it looks as if the consolidation of multiculturalism as an inherent part of Canadian national identity during the late 1990s is increasingly being undermined. While an analysis of the current situation can still beneﬁt from an interpretation through the prism of triangular relations, pluralist inclusion seems to have been replaced by ethnic leveraging and other groups have supplanted alleged “ethnic nationalists” as the dominant contrast conception in public discourse. As one observer has put it: the pairing of gender equality and concerns about immigrants’ radicalization in “ethnic enclaves” leaves no doubt: “the European Islam debate has fully arrived in Canada, testing the limits of its fabled multiculturalism” (Joppke 2012:8).

CONCLUSION

To conclude, let me make a final pitch for the model of triangular relations as it is developed in Us, Them, and Others. While unpacking processes of othering is important, I am deeply dissatisfied with approaches that content themselves with revealing unequal us/them relations. Thus, I argue that opening the “lens” to include triangular relations (rather than binary oppositions) in the investigation and shifting the gaze away from processes of exclusion (constructions of “them”) toward processes of conditional inclusion (constructions of “others” next to “us”) allows for a more meaningful interpretation of social reality. While the boundary between “us” and “them” continues to exist, the focus of investigation is now a multilayered process. On the one hand, the model of triangular relations can show that some “others” become part of a more inclusive “we” on a temporary, permanent, conditional, and/or context-dependent basis in opposition to others. This is what happened in Canada at the end of the 1990s, when multiculturalism became consolidated as an inherent element of national identity. On the other hand, the model can also reveal processes of socio-ethnic leveraging, where the dominant group uses one minority (others) to further distance another (them) while not including either into a pluralist definition of shared identity. This seems to be the preferred strategy to delimitate Canadian national identity in recent years. More research is necessary to better identify the groups and processes at stake, as well as to distinguish between pluralist inclusion and socio-ethnic leveraging. Finally, the model of triangular relations allows for the examination of group alliances and, potentially, of minority empowerment. A caveat is necessary: As a sociological concept, rooted in empirical observation and not in normative reasoning, the model merely shifts our perspective to those processes that are deemed to be significant by the researcher. It Us, Them, and Others 147 neither changes these processes, nor does it provide in itself the tools to make the world a better place.

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