Quebec Nationalism and Separatism: a Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis
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W&M ScholarWorks Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1983 Quebec nationalism and separatism: A study of a continuing Canadian crisis Robert Michael Berry College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd Part of the Canadian History Commons, and the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Berry, Robert Michael, "Quebec nationalism and separatism: A study of a continuing Canadian crisis" (1983). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625222. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-h3dx-5617 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM A Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis A Thesis Presented To The Faculty of the Department of Government The College of William and Mary in Virginia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Robert M. Berry 1983 This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Robert M. Berry Approved, May 1983 Margaret L. Hamilton my parents, Robert E. and Ruth W. Berry TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................... ........... v LIST OF T A B L E S .......... iv ABSTRACT................. vii INTRODUCTION . 2 CHAPTER I. QUEBEC AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS ........... 12 CHAPTER II. THE PARTI QUe'bBCQIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CANADIAN NATIONALISM ............... 32 CHAPTER III. FEDERALISM AND FRENCH CANADA ............. 69 CHAPTER IV. THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE PARTI QUEBE^OIS .............................. 132 CHAPTER V. TRUDEAU AND LEVESQUE: THE CLASH OF IDEAS . 172 CHAPTER VI THE PARTI QUEBEffOIS IN POWER ............. 209 CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM 233 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......... .250 ACKN OWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to express his deep appreciation and indebtedness to Dr. Alan Ward, under whose guidance this investigation was conducted, for his patience, his helpful suggestions, and his painstaking review and criticism of the thesis. The author would also like to thank Dr, George W. Grayson for his careful scrutiny of the manuscript, and Dr. Margaret L. Hamilton for her careful reading of the text and for her support, encouragement, and enthusiasm over the years. LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Comparison of Personal Income by Province. 27 2. Comparison of Education by Province •••••••• 28 v i ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to trace the origins of the Quebec separatist movement and to place the movement in the context of Canadian history from 1763 to 1983* The study concentrates on five principal aspects of Quebec separatism, 1) The culture and world-view of French Canadians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? 2) the origin and development of French Canadian nationalism; 3) French Canadian expectations concerning federalism, and how the Canadian federal system has responded to the demands placed upon it by the separatist movement; 4) the debate between Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque concerning the advantages and disadvantages of a separate state of Quebec; and 5) the rise of the Parti Quebe^ois in the context of twentieth century separatist parties. The study places heavy emphasis on historical developments in the belief that the Quebec separatist movement can best be understood in the perspective of time and by the analytical possibilities it offers. The study is based on the assumption that the American reader lacks a clear understanding of the forces which have shaped Canada--particularly French Canada— and that only by examining current events in an historical context can a thorough comprehension of Canada's present dilemma be reached. It is suggested that the primary goal of French Canadians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the survival of their language and culture through isolation. It is also suggested that, in modern times, the nationalism of survival changed to an aggressive and outward-turning nationalism that sought to protect French Canadian language and cultural rights not only in Quebec, but nationwide. It concludes that the Parti Quebecois is the latest manifestation of modern Quebec nationalism, and that the party seeks to secure French Canadian rights through the threat of the secession of Quebec if such rights cannot be achieved within the Canadian federation. QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM A Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis INTRODUCTION On a state visit to Canada in 1967 * French President Charles De Gaulle stepped on the balcony of the Montreal / City Hall.” Vivre le Quebec! h e proclaimed, "Vivre le Quebec libre.” ^ De Gaulle’s choice of words to end the speech had done more than excite a cheering crowd of enthusiastic French Canadian well-wishers. His use of a separatist slogan spar ked consternation in governmental circles in Ottawa, and many believed his visit would only foment a rising tide of separatist sentiment that called for the establishment of an independent Quebec. Nonetheless, while his speech angered some officials, and Prime Minister Pearson cut short De Gaulle’s visit, no one was expecting an immediate fulfillment of his prophecy. Indeed, in subsequent elections in 1970 and I973» separatists made a poor showing; if anything, people felt, demands for Quebec's independence had subsided. Nine years later, however, "Vivre le Quebec libre" would again be heard throughout Montreal and the rest of 1 Peter C. Newman, A Nation Dividedt Canada and the Com ing of Pierre Trudeau ( New York: Alfred K„ Knopf, 1969), n. A28. 2 3 La Belle Province, but this time not as a far-fetched, roman tic notion. The new Parti Quebecois, under the able leader ship of Rene* Levesque, had gained in stature. On November 15» 1976, it defeated the Liberal Government of Robert Bourassa by winning 7i seats in the 110 seat provincial par l i a m e n t ^ percent of the popular vote), a stunning upset which took the country by surprise. Prior to the election, P.Q. leader Levesque had announ ced the intentions of his party: to establish an independent »» Quebec, based on the principles of "sovereignty-association*, Although Levesque had no detailed manifesto of exactly what "sovereignty-association” entailed, he said that he envis^* ioned a state that would be autonomous in all respects— political, social,,and cultural— while retaining certain economic ties with the rest of Canada such as a common cur rency, certain defense ties, and trade relations based on the pattern of the European Common Marketc Levesque had stated that the implementation of "sover- eignty-association” would take place after he had achieved a consensus of the Quebec electorate. He declared, therefore, that within five years of his election to power, he would place a referendum before the people which would decide the issue of Quebec's independence from the rest of Canada. During the interim period between the election of the P.Q. and the referendum of I98O, separatists and federalists waged an intense battle in the province to win the; support of Quebec's electorate. Separatists argued that the time had long passed when Quebec's economic and social life should be controlled by a minority of English-speaking people. Federal ists argued with equal fervor that to separate from Canada in the fashion described by Levesque would bring about tremen dous economic hardships in the province that neither the government nor the French-speaking business community was pre pared to handle. The Quebec legislature, under P.Q. leader ship, tested the waters by passing various pieces of legis lation designed to ensure the use of the French language in schools and businesses in Quebec. It required that all per-* sons coming to live in Quebec send their children to French- speaking schools; it mandated that companies operating in Quebec be able to communicate with their employees and the public- in French or be fined. Further, companies were given until 1983 to meet the requirements s 1) that executives and personnel have a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that the number of French-speaking personnel at all levels be in creased; and 3 ) that French be used in all documents and in ternal communication. It authorized the establishment of a French language office to see that regulations were carried out and enforced. English Canadians in Quebec reacted sharply to the measures. Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "un acceptable" and a violation of the "human rights" of English- speaking Canadians. As a practical politician, Trudeau realized that he would have to negotiate a compromise with the separatists if he wanted to keep the confederation in tact. Declaring in an address before Parliament that his government was willing to consider constitutional changes to advance the cultural aspirations of the disaffected French-speaking minority, he announced the formation of a new governmental group to be called the Task Force on Canadian Unity, and declared that to save Quebec and halt the developing rift between the two language groups, English- speaking Canadians must become reconciled to more French in their lives. He urged Quebeckers to forsake the unilingualism of the PQ and to accept the argument for a truly bilingual Canada. Importantly, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a willingness to face the constitutional issue. "I cannot emphasize strongly enough," he said, "that the ques tion of unity is not confined to the issues of language nor confined geographically to the province of Quebec." He lis ted numerous dissatisfactions in other provinces, such as the feelings of westerners that their interests were under represented in a central government dominated by more pop ulous Ontario and Quebec, and the unhappiness of the once prosperous eastern provinces over their economic imbalance with the more affluent central and western areas.