Tartu in the 1941 Summer War

By Major Riho Rõngelep and Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen*

he centre of Tartu city was heavily effort of the Army Group North was in land bridge between the Võrts Lake and damaged in July 1941 in a few days the axis east of the Lake Peipsi. the Lake Peipsi. of combat. The fighting took place because Only weak forces were initially detached It also took place because the Emajõgi the momentum of the German invasion for operations against Estonia. These Ger- River connecting the two lakes and di- of the northern part of the Soviet Union man forces had their objectives in North viding the town gave support to the hast- lapsed after the first couple of weeks of and Northwest Estonia, including the is- ily improvised Soviet defence. The fight- rapid advance, making it possible for the lands. That part of the country was used ing had three phases: Soviet forces to stabilise the front for bases by the Soviet air force and na- • Initially the Estonian liberation and temporarily in central Estonia, and val aviation bomber forces. An Army defence of the southern part of Tartu and thereby gaining more time to prepare the Corps of two infantry divisions attacked Tartu county south of the Emajõgi. defences of Leningrad. towards Pärnu and Viljandi respectively, • Thereafter the German-Soviet fight for The fighting in and around the town when determined Soviet resistance control of the river line, both sides rein- was a tactical sideshow in an operational stopped their lead elements. forcing their initially deployed forces, the sideshow of a strategic sideshow. The Ger- The fighting in Tartu took place be- engagements gradually moving away from man Army Group North offensive was cause an Estonian armed rebellion had the town. secondary to the main German effort, the liberated the Southeastern part of the • Finally the isolation and defeat of the strategic offensive of Army Group Cen- country, making it logical for the Ger- Soviet forces north of the river, between tre against Moscow. The operational main man forces to test the possibilities of the the two large lakes. * Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College. Major Riho Rõngelep is a Directing Staff member at the Baltic Defence College.

165 Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive Courtesy of Tartu Map of Tartu 1927 Map of Tartu

166 It is no longer easy to uncover what ac- to build a heavy industry that could sup- European war was close, Stalin realised tually happened that July in and around port a massive, modern military machine. that he had to do everything possible Tartu. To the Soviet and German military By the mid-1930s he had succeeded in to compensate for his self-inflicted mili- historians it was an insignificant episode in creating a huge and well-officered force, tary weakness. He needed time to re- the fighting, preceding the Siege of in some conceptual and equipment areas stabilise the army. He also decided that Leningrad. To the Estonians it was much leading in the world. However, in his he needed geographical buffer space to more; it was an important manifestation of general campaign to destroy all other cen- reduce the strategic vulnerability which their will to regain independence. However, tres of independent power, the Soviet was the result of the 1920 borders. The from the return of the Russians in 1944 dictator turned against the Red Army’s Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave him and until the late 1980s, the anti-Soviet ris- leadership and destroyed it in 1937-38, both. ing of 1941 could not be researched. After leaving the Independence in 1991, the reconstruction force without has been severely hampered by the very lim- its professional ited amount of sources left in Estonia. The brain and hav- main basis of the sources was the original ing lost the will interviews with surviving witnesses. to show initia- This is the first attempt to place the tive and inde- Estonian popular rising in South Esto- pendent action nia and Liberation of Tartu in early July on a battle- 1941 within the framework of the Ger- field, which is man operations, giving a more complete the core of picture of the “Summer War”. military effec- tiveness. Prologue When it be- The cornerstone of the Defence League building at the meeting of came clear in Võru and Riia Streets was laid 3rd September. Since the late 1920s Stalin had brutally spring 1939 Four weeks later the first Soviet troops had entered Estonia. mobilised and enslaved the Soviet society that a general Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive

167 Late September the eastern half of Po- was winning the European war, and that risen to more that 500.000, increasingly land was absorbed, and when demands for he could ignore any – sentimental – French concentrated in the South, close to the bases in the Baltic states were backed by a and British support to the Baltic states’ German border. Thus the 11th Rifle Di- massive deployment of troops towards independence. The three states were in- vision, which arrived at Tartu in Febru- their borders, the three governments gave vaded mid June following an ultimatum ary from Kuressaare, moved on to Vilnius in to the pressure. By 28 September, Es- to each country and annexed into the in May (again according to the Swedish tonia entered a Pact of Mutual Assistance Soviet Union after rigged elections. Esto- intelligence). with the Soviet Union, accompanied by nia was invaded by 80.000 troops on 17 The situation in Estonia had become the deployment of 30.000 Soviet troops June. According to the Swedish intelli- disastrous. The Soviet Union controlled on its national territory (twice the Esto- gence, Tartu became the garrison of the all the institutions of the state, all areas of nian Defence Force total). The Soviet 90th Rifle Division. life. During that spring the pressure Union had gained rights to create naval The Estonian military leadership dis- against the Baltic peoples grew dramati- and air bases on the Saaremaa, the Hiiumaa appeared as a result of deportations and cally, with its peak in massive and well- and at Paldiski as well as the right to use death in prisons or camps. The army was prepared deportations on 14 June. Tallinn Port for two years. However, the transformed to form the main part of the Around 10.000 persons were picked up arriving generals also demanded air bases 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps of the Red in Estonia alone, including the families inland, and the Estonian government was Army (with the 180th, 181st and 182nd Rifle of those already deported or killed dur- in no position to reject that demand. Divisions, the first and last with head- ing the previous months. The pressure Where the Red forces established their quarters in Estonia). The surviving cadre and the risk of deportations led many to bases, Estonia lost all control. Thus, when was exposed to pressure and brainwash- hide in the woods to avoid being picked- the Soviet demands for bases in Finland ing. The voluntary defence force, Kaitseliit up, becoming “Forest Brothers”. were rejected by the Finns, and the Win- (Defence League) was disbanded and dis- The Baltic peoples had had their expe- ter War followed, the air bases in “inde- armed. The Baltic Sea Fleet moved its rience of what Soviet rule under Stalin pendent” and “neutral” Estonia were used headquarters to Tallinn, and the 8th Army meant. The naivety about what could be by the Soviet bomber forces. established itself in Rakvere. expected which had contributed to the In the early summer of 1940 it became In the late spring of 1941, the number decisions not to resist had gone. It was clear to Stalin that his partner, Germany, of Soviet troops in the Baltic states had concluded that only Germany could help.

168 June, splitting the defending Soviet 8 th the Finnish Gulf along the Luga river 22 June to 9 July – the framework and 11 th Armies. The Baltic Sea Navy ending at the Ilmen lake was now selected started to evacuate its bases in Latvia on as the main forward defence of the city. The German invasion came as a sur- 29 June. On that day Manstein broke out All construction work in the city stopped prise to Stalin, but his subordinates had of the Daugavpils bridgehead in spite of and 30.000 workers were sent to develop continued and intensified preparations for hard and aggressive resistance by the So- the defences in a special Rear Lines Con- war in the weeks of May and June. Even viet forces, and continued towards struction Administration created for that if the 14 June deportations may have been Ostrov. Other German forces captured purpose on 29 July. A special operational unconnected to the defence preparations, Riga on 1 July. group for the control of the defence line they added to the pressure on the Baltic The 18 th German Army1 that followed was established one week later. On 30 June populations and removed potentially dis- the Panzer Group and covered its West- the decision was taken to raise a locally loyal elements. ern flank, also attacked with its main ef- drafted militia army. Without training On 20 June followed the announce- fort East of the Lake Peipsi via Pskov. this loose mob was sent to man the Luga ment of General Mobilisation in Estonia, The Germans – correctly – did not expect line, only armed with light weapons – and including both the former national army, the Soviets to deploy large forces in de- slaughtered by the advancing Germans on now the 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps, and fence of Estonia, and the 18 th Army only their arrival. Everything had to be done young conscripts. The invasion of the sent the XXVI Army Corps2 with the 217 to gain time and weaken the German of- Soviet Union followed two days later. th and 61st Infantry Divisions up the coast fensive. Army Group North attacked into of the Riga Gulf, crossing into Estonia at The Soviets also attempted to stabilise Lithuania from East Prussia with the main Ikla on 7 July. Forces of the defending the situation by shuffling the command- effort in the direction via Kaunas and Soviet 8 th Army met the German advance. ers. On 4 July Lieutenant General P.P. onwards to the River Daugava. Kaunas The 10th Rifle Corps was used to delay Sobennikov, the commander of the 8th was liberated by the Lithuanians ahead of and stop the German corps. Army responsible for the defence of the the arrival of the Germans, and the lead- The threat to Leningrad was already Baltic coast – and Estonia – was moved ing elements of the Panzergruppe 4 un- clear one week into the war. The defence up to command the Front. Lieutenant der General Erich von Manstein succeeded preparations became desperate. A line 100 General F.S. Ivanov became the 8th Army in capturing bridges at Daugavpils on 26 kilometres southwest of Leningrad from commander.

169 Beyond the mobilisation of the former erated by Estonians before the arrival of In early summer of 1941 the young re- Estonian army that was going to be used the German units. In the Southwest, the sistance movement gathered information in the defence of the Soviet Union, the rebellions gained control up to the line about the communists and their move- authorities established ”Destruction Bat- over Viljandi-Pärnu, where the 8th Soviet ments, established contacts with the now talions” to remove or destroy everything Army was deployed in an attempt to stop growing number of “Forests Brothers” and that could be used by the advancing Ger- the German onrush. investigated the possibilities to get weap- mans: assets that could not be moved such From the first contacts, the relations ons. Some members of the organisation as infrastructure and industry. Estonian between the Estonians and German sol- infiltrated Soviet organisations and there- communists and everyone whom the So- diers were good. The invader was seen as after served as information sources. The viet authorities had succeeded in attract- a partner in the fight against a common resistance meeting place was in the previ- ing during the year of occupation manned enemy. The German High Command was ous Estonian Healthcare Museum just op- these units. approached several times with the requests posite of the NKVD (National Commit- The mobilising Estonians realised that for additional weapons and the Germans tee of Internal Affairs/Narodnij Kommi- their units would be used outside the responded positively to those requests even sariat Vnutrennih Del) building in Kindral country and against what most saw as their before their main units actually arrived. Põdra Street3 . national interests. They were to be sent to During early July of 1941 the activi- Leningrad, Pskov and Ostrov, and many Events up to 9 July preparing the fled and joined the ”Forest Brothers”, rebellion in Tartu ties of the organisation intensified fur- including a significant number of regu- ther, inspired by news from the Finn- lar officers who had not been removed Organised resistance in Tartu had al- ish radio about the approaching Ger- by the initial purges and the deportations. ready started in mid March 1941. One of man troops. The group decided to lib- The number of persons willing to risk the student groups took the initiative to erate the town and developed plans of and able to participate in an armed rebel- co-ordinate its actions with other similar action. It was understood that in order lion had thus been rising at the same time groups known to be active at the time. to avoid Soviet destruction of key in- where possibilities of success grew day by Like in most early resistance movements, frastructure, the liberation should take day. Thus during the first ten days of the initial aim was to collect and spread place prior to the arrival of the Ger- July practically all South Estonia was lib- information. man units.

170 Different groups were tasked to pre- severely damaging build- pare taking control over key objects: tele- ings in the old town cen- phone relay stations, postal offices etc. As tre with the falling large it was foreseen that the Soviets would granite stones. On that destroy the bridges over Emajõgi, it was day, 9 July, the only So- decided to concentrate all action and all viet armed elements re- forces in the parts of Tartu, south of the maining in Tartu were a river. The start of the operations against destruction battalion and the different objects would be co- some of the NKVD spe- ordinated. In June, agreement had been cial groups that had to reached between the resistance and Tartu destroy the town imme- University Hospital about the treatment diately prior to the ar- The Stone Bridge in 1939 seen from the South of casualties. rival of the Germans. On 6 July a squadron of German Liaison was estab- fighter aircraft attacked Raadi air base lished to the “Forest North of the river. That day the last mem- Brothers” to ensure their bers of the communist party left the town support for uprising. followed by the NKVD and the remain- Ensign Olev Reintalu was ing Red Army units. The pontoon bridge appointed as overall near the Market Hall was also demolished leader of the resistance, on that day. and during a meeting in On 8 July preparations started to blow- Estonian Healthcare Mu- up the Stone Bridge at the North end of seum on 09th of July it the City Hall Square. At 0637 the follow- was decided to start open ing morning a 1-ton charge was detonated, operations to liberate from the same place after the demolition. destroying the northern end of the 157 Tartu the next morning, Both photos are from Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp: years old bridge, and at the same time 10 July, at 0730. Tartu Kivisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941; Tallinn 1997

171 Ensign Olev Reintalu Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

Tartu City Centre 1938. Map: courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive.

172 On 9 July, the 61st German Infantry Captain Glasenapp, in Võru Street close The information about German units Division attempted an attack to the north to the down town. The German armoured in town caused the Soviets to withdraw close to Viljandi from Western side of the cars were part of the reconnaissance unit hastily across the river. Some of the Sovi- Võrts lake in order to reach Tartu with a that reached Võru4 . There was a short ets tried to hide in buildings to attempt reconnaissance patrol, but failed. engagement and this event triggered the an escape later. actual fighting for Tartu. Without meeting further resistance the 10 July – German reconnaissance element continued the Estonian liberation of Tartu to the centre of town, where one of the armoured cars continued along the At the time agreed, the activists gath- Emajõgi river, firing at the Soviet trenches ered at the museum. Shortly thereafter the across the river. first prisoner was taken, who was a mem- As the Germans moved deeper into the ber of a destruction battalion. Then the town, an increasing number of the Esto- situation got more difficult, as a combined nian resistance fighters joined them. The Soviet force of around 300 took up a po- appearance of the armoured cars was a sition close to the railway line on Riga great moral support for the members of Street, one of the most likely access routes resistance. The fact that German forces had into the town for the Germans. In addi- arrived to Tartu made the initially weak tion to this force, a number of NKVD Soviet forces cautious. They did not cross and destruction battalion members moved the river, therefore they could not imple- across the remaining Western-most “Lib- ment the destruction of Tartu. However, erty” Bridge” to the southern part of Tartu. the small unit left the town again the same Thus by early afternoon the Soviets had evening, around 1800. It had only lasted re-established control over the town. long enough to make the Soviets react The situation developed further, when Captain Kurt von Glasenapp and encourage the resistance. during afternoon a Soviet truck met three Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Thereafter the members of the resis- German armoured cars, commanded by II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957 tance discussed the implications of the

173 event during the meeting on Riga Hill. sectors along the river to stop possible of the town announced the return of The situation was critical. The Soviet Soviet attempts to cross. Others were used regular troops of the Red Army. What troops were still just across the river, and to “clean” the southern part of the town, probably had happened was that the news as the Liberty Bridge was still intact, noth- getting rid of the small groups or single of the German arrival had promted the ing kept them from returning. As the persons that had been left behind when Soviet 8th Army send the 16th Rifle Divi- number of organised resistance members the appearance of the German troops sion, the only available formation, to Tartu was still far too small to defend the town, caused panic among the Soviets. This took to meet the threat. That division was the recruiting amongst the remaining male the character of individual resistance mem- first element of the 11th Rifle Corps, which population started immediately. At the bers going hunting with pistols or rifles later got responsibility for holding the same time messengers were sent to Võru and delaying the proper organisation in area between the lakes of Peipsi and Võrts. where German units were stationed with units of many of the potential fighters. Together with the 10th Rifle Corps of the requests for weapons. In order to make it possible to distin- 8th Army it defended the approaches to Then information spread that a Soviet guish friend from foe (and as a result also Leningrad via Narva. attempt the night before had failed to to form the members of the resistance This Soviet reaction was matched by a destroy the armoury of the former 2nd into combatants under international law) parallel German decision. On that evening Estonian Division completely. It had been they were issued with white emblems with the 18th German Army placed the I Army abandoned, and the local population had the crest of the Estonian Republic or an Corps Reconnaissance Task Force succeeded in salvaging 300 rifles with armband with the Estonian national “Burdach”5 under command of the XXVI ammunition. The leader of the resistance colours. Corps for use in the axis via Tartu. Why made sure that the weapons were collected, The evening on 10 July brought the that decision was taken is not completely and that stroke of luck saved the situa- first phase of the battle and the first ele- clear. The most likely causes are the re- tion. ments of the second to an end. At 2040 ports of the armoured car patrol from The now better-armed members of the the Soviets blew up the remaining Lib- Võru and the contact thereafter made by resistance were organised close to the newly erty Bridge to avoid it being taken by the Estonian Resistance groups from built, former Defence League building on the Germans or the Estonian resistance. Tartu. Riga Hill (where the Baltic Defence Col- However, shortly thereafter the start The liberation of Tartu was meant to lege is today). Groups were dispatched to of artillery fire against the southern part protect the town against destruction by

174 demolition. However, now the southern medical kit for the fighters. The defence part of town centre along the river be- was continuously reinforced with the par- came exposed to an increasingly intense tisan groups arriving from all over South artillery barrage, as well as to the Soviet Estonia. On that day Major Kurg, another efforts to clear fields of fire by torching regular officer, arrived to town with his buildings on the northern side of the group. He thereafter, as the senior mili- river. During this first night, the artil- tary officer in Tartu, took over command lery fire was relatively light. It was prob- of the resistance forces. His command ably only meant to harass the deployment post with security elements was established of German troops. next to the Defence League Building. During the evening and night the Re- Contact was established with other resis- sistance deployed its forces in defensive tance groups East and West, thereafter groups along the river. Armed groups, forming an Estonian armed presence all which arrived from the surrounding along the river line. The forces in Tartu, counties reinforced the defence. The first a mix of the town resistance and arrived regular Estonian Army officers arrived to “Forests Brothers”, were now organised Tartu with their armed groups. Among as the “Tartu Partisan Battalion” with four first of them was captain Karl Talpak. normal and one “Guard” company. The The arrival of experienced officers in- strength increased gradually to around 700. creased the morale significantly. The night Captain Karl Talpak The total strength of the Resistance in the was relatively quiet. The Soviets tried once Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Tartu area is estimated to have been around to cross the river in the new workers resi- II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957 1000. The companies were assigned the dential area of Karlova around one following tasks: the 1st and the 3rd Compa- kilometre southeast of the town centre. During 11 June the Estonian effort nies were deployed to defend the South Captain Talpak’s group forced the at- took an increasingly organised form. The river bank in the town; the 4th Company tempt, probably a combat patrol, to re- members of Women Defence League took positions in Western Tartu where treat. organised field kitchens and prepared the North bank dominates the South bank

175 making the risk of crossing significant; rived in Tartu on the morning of 11 July, interpreters. The German units took po- the 2nd Company took positions 10 km capturing the town in a “daring raid”. sitions close to the Tähtvere manor house southeast to Tartu (probably covering the The Estonian Resistance is not mentioned. and park in the north western part of the area at Luunja and towards the East). The According to the Estonian sources, the town. Guard Company was responsible for Germans only arrived on the next day6 . guarding stocks and emerging town in- The liberation and defence of south- stitutions. ern Tartu is one of the most important The effort to “clean” the town of the achievements of the 1941 “Summer War”. remaining Soviet elements continued, It advanced and eased the German cap- when they made movement on the streets ture of Estonia, and her oppressed people dangerous by sniping at the members of hoped, in vain, that it would lead to a the Resistance. Now the incidents were renewed independence. It was initiated by taken care of by reaction groups com- a small group of patriotic students with- manded by an officer or a non-commis- out military expertise. Their action be- sioned officer (NCO). This was, as always, came an issue of national pride in the a very time consuming activity as build- long dark decades ahead. ings had to be searched completely. During the day the artillery barrage From 12 July – the escalation to intensified, resulting in some serious dam- larger scale German-Soviet fighting age. Soviet agents contributed to the de- struction by setting fire to a large num- On 12 July the first stronger German Major Friedrich Kurg ber of buildings with Molotov cocktails. elements from the Task Force “Burdach Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Other Soviet agents were found control- came to the support of the Tartu Partisan II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957 ling the artillery fire, hiding on high Battalion. It consisted of anti-tank gun ground or in church towers. platoons7 . German speaking students and On the arrival, the German units were According to the German narrative, Estonian army officers were assigned to met by accurate artillery fire, an indica- elements of the Task Force “Burdach” ar- anti-tank guns crews as liaison officers and tion of the effectiveness of the Soviet ar-

176 tillery observers who stayed behind. nian nor German narratives mention this Effective artillery fire led to a hunt for Heavy artillery fire against the area around – they both ignore the effort of the other the observers, and a vast number was the Riga Hill forced Major Kurg to move - there probably was division of respon- found and killed that day. Thereafter the his command post to the south eastern sibility leaving the Estonian Resistance to bombardment became less well-directed, part of the town, close to an exhibition defend the central and eastern parts of still, however, destroying a large number ground here. Even if neither the Esto- the town8 . of buildings. The destruction of Tartu was also continued in the northern part of the town, which was controlled by the Soviets. Buildings were burned down sys- tematically, street by street. The German narrative mentions that the Soviet air force bombed their positions in the Tartu area on that day. During the following days, the Task Force “Burdach” carried the main bur- den of fighting the 16th Soviet Rifle Di- vision. The Estonian narrative mentions a “stabilisation” of the situation, whereas the German narrative underlined how difficult it became to contain the Soviet formation’s aggressive forays across the river. On 12 July Army Group North ac- knowledged that the Soviets would fight hard for Estonia, not withdraw quickly The damaged town centre south of the river. as they had from Lithuania and Latvia. Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive. The German 18th Army realised now that

177 the 8th Soviet Army in Rakvere was de- From 18 to 20 July the pressure of the of Burdach’s force on their arrival on 21 ploying two Rifle Corps in the defence 11th Rifle Corps’ two divisions against the July10 . of North Estonia, and the 254th Infantry Task Force “Burdach” developed into a From 20 July, the 18th Army concentrated Division was sent from Võru to join the critical situation, and the 18th Army was its attention in Estonia. The mission was to 61st Division near Viljandi. The 291st In- forced to send the 93rd Infantry Division keep the Soviet forces in Estonia from rein- fantry Division was given orders to move to the Tartu front. Seconded elements forcing the defence of Leningrad. Its head- from Kurzeme (Kurland) to join the 217th from that division doubled the strength quarter (HQ) was now in Võru. Division North of Pärnu. Two more Soviet rifle divisions, the 48th and 125th were assembled by the 11th Rifle Corps in North Estonia on 14 July, and two days later they appeared on the northern side of the Emajõgi9 , relieving the 16th Division. The 48th Division had deployed to the West and the 125th had deployed to the East of Tartu. On that day the good summer weather was re- placed by rain and thunderstorms, wors- ening the road conditions and hamper- ing operations. On 16 July, the 18th Army also decided to employ its last reserve, the 93rd Infantry Division, in Estonia. XXVI Corps now resumed its offen- sive operations in Western Estonia on 17 July, but no significant progress was pos- sible until significant parts of the two The view of Soola Street towards the river. additional divisions became available. Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

178 the artillery left, leaving only a The last phase of the Tartu couple of rifle battalions as a screen. fighting, the destruction of The 93rd Division had created a the 11th Rifle Corps small flotilla of fishing boats and combat engineer assault boats. It On 21 July, the 18 Army decided to was now used to occupy the island accomplish its mission by an operation of Piirisaar in the Lake Peipsi and from the Viljandi area, initially cutting to land forces on the coast North off the 11th Rifle Corps by an advance in of the Emajõgi, and during the its back to the Peipsi Lake, thereafter cut- next days elements of the division ting of the rest of the 8th Army in North- advanced up the shore of the lake. west Estonia by an advance to the Finn- Forward elements of the 61st ish Gulf. Division reached the lake 7 Early next morning the offensive kilometres south of Mustvee on the started with the 61st, 217th and 254th Divi- night 24-25 July, and on the fol- sions. The 61th Division captured two lowing day the 254th Division oc- bridges in Põltsamaa intact at noon and cupied the town. Parts of the 11th continued towards Jõgeva, where Soviet Rifle Corps that had not escaped forces on 23 July fought to avoid the were surrounded, and the follow- Germans cutting the main road out of ing days the German forces had to Tartu to the North. The 11th Rifle Corps meet several attempts to break out. had realised the threat to the 125th and On 25 July, the 93rd Division got 48th Rifle Divisions. The Task Force command of all forces advancing “Burdach” and the 93rd Division found north from Tartu. that the resistance of the forces in front On 29 July, the 18th Army of them lessened. During the night 23-24 started the next part of the offen- July, the bulk of the Soviet forces with sive, the advance to the Finnish

179 Gulf to cut off and destroy the Soviet 58th Infantry Division east of Lake Peipsi, is estimated to have been around 100, forces in Northwestern Estonia. The XXVI the XXVI Corps offensive could swing mainly as a result of artillery fire. Army Corps commanded the 254th, 93rd, Northeast, after reaching Tapa and 61st and later the 291st Division in the Rakvere on the same day. The 254th Divi- offensive towards the Finnish Gulf. The sion reached Kunda and the coast two newly arrived XXXXII Corps would later days later. The continued offensive by command the offensive to capture North- the Corps met hard resistance that involved western Estonia and the islands. the survivors of the 125th and 48th Rifle Destruction of the surrounded rem- Divisions. It took 12 days of intense fight- nants of the 11th Rifle Corps was left to ing to capture Narva, and the XXVI Corps the 93rd Division and a task force from only crossed the 1920-1940 Estonian-So- the 61st Division. That mission was ac- viet border on 20 August. complished four days later, on 31 July, The XXXXII Corps with the 61st, 217th, Tartu south of the Emajõgi after the fight- bagging 8.794 prisoners, 68 artillery and 254th Divisions remained in Estonia. ing (a view along Aleksandri Street). Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive. pieces, 5 anti-tank guns, 5 tanks and 3 On 27 August, Tallinn was surrounded, and armoured cars captured. Thus the 1941 the following day the Soviets in the town The reason why the Estonian human fighting in the Tartu area ended, three gave up and surrendered, even if evacua- losses were relatively limited seems to be weeks after it was started by a small group tion of the communists and others from that after 10-12 July the fighting moved of Estonian students. the port was still ongoing. Haapsalu was away from the town centre toward the captured on 31 August. The German inva- river east and west of the town. That Aftermath sion of the Estonian Islands started 14 Sep- would also explain the very different Ger- tember and ended on 27 September. man and Estonian impressions of the In the offensive towards the coast, on In Tartu 1007 buildings had been de- events. That the Estonian picture of the 5 August, the 61st Division at Järva-Jaani stroyed. Purely Estonian part of the fight- period 12-24 July is less than complete is destroyed the 16th Rifle Division that had ing had been intense, but short. Only 19 confirmed by the interacting Soviet-Ger- fought the first days in Tartu. As a result resistance fighters had been killed and 23 man escalation in force build-up during of a successful advance towards Narva by wounded. The number of civilians killed that second phase, making it possible for

180 the Germans to bag most of two rifle di- evacuated Estonian communist leadership • Lars Ericson: “Buffert eller hot? De visions in the third phase. succeeded in getting permission to use baltiska staterna i svensk militär planering The Soviet choice to fight for Estonia the members of the construction battal- år 1941” in Bo Hugemark (ed.): I Orkanens that led to the fighting in Tartu did not ions to form the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps. öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet; Stockholm 1992. change anything. The terrain in the main It came to consist of 27.000, including • Germany and the Second World War. Army Group North axis did not allow around 23.000 Estonians. The Corps was Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union. much additional deployment of German used in the fighting of 1942 and 1943 Oxford 1998. forces, so the use of 5 infantry divisions and suffered massive losses, due to un- • Germany and the Second World War. in Estonia rather than in the main effort professional leadership. Between 1.200 and Volume IV. Maps. Stuttgart 1983. made no difference. Leningrad would 2.000 succeeded in surrendering to the • Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp: have survived anyway. Germans. The Corps was used in 1944 in Tartu Kivisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941; For the Estonians, however, that choice Estonia, especially in the hard fighting at Tallinn 1997. led to tragedies, far beyond the destruc- the Saaremaa at the foot of the Sõrve pen- • Werner Haupt: Baltikum 1941. Die tion and losses of the “Summer War”. The insula in the end of November. Here the Geschichte eines ungelösten Problems; Soviets used the time to “evacuate” ma- soldiers of the Corps fought against their Neckargemünd 1963. chinery, cattle, and vehicles as well as countrymen in German uniform – none • Vello Helk: Estlands Historie – kort fortalt. 25.000 Estonians to the East. On top of of them with a chance to escape. Thereaf- Odense 1993. that, 33.000 young Estonian men were ter more Estonians were mobilised into • Koguteos: Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Teises mobilised and transported to Russia. The the Corps before it was sent to Kurzeme Maailmasõjas IV; Stockholm 1957. mobilised 22nd Estonian Territorial Rifle (Kurland), ending the German-Soviet • Herbert Lindmäe: Suvesõda Tartumaal; Corps of about 7.000 Estonians was de- fighting for the reoccupation of Latvia. Tartu 1999. stroyed while fighting for the Soviets in • Tiit Noormets: “The summer War: 1941: 2.000 were killed, and 4.500 taken Bibliography the 1941 Armed Resistance in Estonia” in prisoner by the Germans. The rest, the The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States; recruits, were initially used in the “Con- • John Erickson: The Road to Stalingrad. Vilnius 1999. struction Battalions”, which were really Stalin’s War with Germany. Volume 1. Lon- • Erik Norberg: “Sjökrig i Östersjön. mobile forced labour camps. Then the don 1975. Sovjetiske planer och tysk aktivitet inför

181 uppgörelsen 1941” in Bo Hugemark (ed.): numbers of the units indicate that they were some 10 The 93rd Division (commanded by General I Orkanens öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet; of the original and thus best manned and Otto Tiemann), detached an infantry battalion equipped of the German army units. (II/ Infantry Regiment 270), one anti-tank battal- Stockholm 1992. 6 The Estonian sources identify the Germans as ion (number 193), one combat engineer company • Romuald Misiunas and Rein troops from the 93rd Infantry Division. This is a and one bicycle company to the task force. Taagepera: The Baltic States. Years of Depen- mistake. That division was still in Latvia, on the dence 1940-1990. Expanded and Updated way forward. It had been freed from the pool of reserve formations of the German Army and was Edition. London 1993. now the last reserve of the 18th Army. It was • “Estonia in World War II”, part of released for deployment to Estonia on 16 July. Tõnu Tannberg, Ain Mäesalu, Tõnis Lukas, The decision to use it in the Tartu area followed a Mati Laur and Ago Pajur: History of Esto- couple of days later, probably on 20th July, at the same time as the 18th Army established its HQ to nia; Tallinn 2000. Võru to concentrate its operations in Estonia. • Third Reich Factbook (www.skalman. On 21 July the division detached units to the nu/third-reich). Task Force “Burdach “ that doubled its strength. But the 93rd Division did not get command over the German forces in the Tartu sector until 25 1 Commanded by General Georg von Küchler July. (1881-1968) 7 The two Reconnaissance Battalions of the Task 2 Commanded by General Albert Wodrig Force consisted each of a horse cavalry squadron, 3 Named after General Ernst Põdder (1879- a bicycle squadron, and a heavy squadron with 1932), one of the War of Liberation commanders. one troop with three 37 mm anti-tank guns, a Now “Pepleri Street”. troop with two 75 mm infantry guns and a troop 4 This was probably a forward patrol from the with two armoured cars. There is no informa- later arriving I Army Corps Reconnaissance Task tion that the infantry battalion from Infantry Force “Burdach”. On the 10th it was still em- Regiment 2 was reinforced with anti-tank guns. ployed as a screen, linking the main force of the 8 The map of the official German history indi- 18th Army attacking east of the Peipsi, to its XXVI cates that the German line initially was extended Corps, attacking in Western Estonia. from the town towards the West along the river, 5 The task force under Major General Karl and only later to the East. Burdach (1891-1976) thereafter consisted of the 9 Both divisions had originally been based in Reconnaissance Battalions 1 and 11, as well as the Riga, had apparently been withdrawn via Pskov, First Battalion of Infantry Regiment 2. The low and were returning to the front via Narva.

182