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The Battlefront of the ISIS-PYD Encounter Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani)

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The Battlefront of the ISIS-PYD Encounter Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani) NO: 15 PERSPECTIVE NOVEMBER 2014 The Battlefront of the ISIS-PYD Encounter Ayn Al-Arab (Kobani) CAN ACUN • HÜSEYİN ÖNER • When has the PKK and the PYD’s relation with the Asad Regime started and how has it evolved? • Why has ISIS begun to target the PYD? • What are the possible implications of the fall of Ayn Al Arab? Heavy clashes between the Islamic State of Iraq and afterwards, also the power struggle over Kobani will be Al Sham (ISIS or IS - Devlet’ul Islamiyye fil’l Irak ve’ş examined in this paper. Şam)1 and the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD, or in Kurdish, Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) BEGINNING OF THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION the YPG (People’s Defense Units, or in Kurdish, AND THE STATUS OF KURDS Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) and the power struggle in the Kurds make up around 10 percent of the total pop- region have taken a critical turn. Following the US-led ulation in Syria, and are concentrated in the regions airborne attacks against ISIS in Iraq, the operation has generally located in the north of the country. These re- been expanded inside Syria; and this has carried the gions have geopolitical importance since they form the conflict into a different dimension, therefore making Turkey-Syria borderline and Iraq-Syria border through an analysis necessary in the light of the latest develop- the regions controlled by the Kurdish Regional Gov- ments. This study aims to describe the series of events ernment in Iraq (KRG) via Rabea-Sinjar. It should be immediately after the revolt against the Asad regime noted, that significant oil reserves are located in the in the Kurdish regions in the north of Syria, and the Kurdish populated regions – eastern Syria in particular.2 PYD’s emergence and development, its relations with The Bashar al Asad regime regarded Kurds as a the Asad regime and controversy with the opposition threat not only due to the geographical importance groups will also be discussed Alliance between the of the region Kurds lived in, but also of demography PYD and ISIS, and the conflict in the environment of the Kurds, being the largest minority group and 1. For detailed information about ISIS, see: Can Acun, “Neo el-Kaide: Irak 2. Suriye, CIA World Fact Book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ ve Şam İslam Devleti (IŞİD)”, SETA Perspektif, Ankara, June 2014. the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html Can ACUN Can Acun is an RA at SETA Foreign Policy Department. He has received a BA from the International Relations Department of the Eastern Mediter- ranean University and an MA from the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at Yeditepe University. Acun also had education in Intercultural Dialogue in Canada, and conducted research for SETA at the Center for Turkey Research in Cairo, Egypt. Acun currently works at SETA-Ankara on Egypt and the Middle East. Hüseyin ÖNER Hüseyin Öner graduated from the Public Administration and Political Science Department at the Eastern Mediterranean University and is currently pursuing a master’s degree in the Department of International Relations at the University of Vienna. PERSPECTIVE TURKEY AYN ALARAB (KOBANE) AL QAMISHLI JARABULUS RAS ALAYN TEL ABYAD AZEZ SULUK HASAKAH IFRIN MANBIJ ALEPPO IDLIP RAQQA JISR ASH SHUGHUR AL TABQA LATAKIA DEİR AZ ZUR IRAQ HAMA SYRIA AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE PYD AND ISIS IN SYRIA AREAS UNDER THE PKK/PYD’S CONTROL AREAS CONTROLLED BY ISIS demands for rights, thus monitored them closely. To cording to some sources, 30 people, or over 100 this end, the regime associated with the Kurdistan according to some others, died due to police bru- Workers’ Party (PKK), supported it against Turkey tality.4 Naturally, Kurdish regions joined anti-Asad and tried to neutralize Syrian Kurds with the PKK’s protests that started under the influence of the help in return. Ironically though, the Asad regime Arab Spring, but the Kurdish participation in the hosted the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Syria demonratrations remained relatively low compared while pressuring Kurds up in the north, and adopted to those in other regions.5 Kurds were left out of discriminatory politics against them. In parallel to the riots against al Asad due to dominating Arab this, the regime tried to keep Öcalan close by as an identity as the anti-Kurdish propaganda launched advantage against Kurds in Syria. The regime, under by al Asad and the association with the PKK were heavy Turkish pressure, signed the Adana Agreement also quite effective. with Turkey in 1998, deported Öcalan from Syria, closed down the PKK camps, finally arresting and THE PYD’S DOMINANCE IN KURDISH REGIONS prosecuting the PKK members and its proxies in Kurdish groups too have supported the Syrian Rev- Syria. During the process, the PYD was founded in olution; Islamist Kurds along with the leader of the 2003 as an offshoot of the PKK.3 ‘Kurdish Future Movement’ Mishaal al Tammo have The Syrian Kurds’ democratic struggle has con- become part of the revolt against the regime. Howev- tinued despite the PKK. Before the anti-Asad pro- er, al Tamma was shot dead by masked gunmen in a tests began in Syria in the town of Qamishli, which targeted killing and his supporters held the Asad re- is heavily populated by Kurds, the demonstrations following a football game turned into a riot. Ac- 4. James Brandon, The PKK and Syria’s Kurds,Terrorism Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 3, February 21, 2007. 3. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party, Carnegie Middle East Center, 5. Michael Weiss, New Republic: Will Kurds Determine Syria’s Fate?, No- March 1, 2012. vember 16, 2011. 2 setav.org THE BATTLEFRONT OF THE ISIS-PYD ENCOUNTER AYN AL-ARAB (KOBANI) gime responsible.6 The PYD has been accused of, tac- and Hasakah, all military bases and state institutions itly cooperating with the Syrian regime in the mur- of the Asad regime remained untouched, but the Asad der of al Tamma according to some sources.7 As the regime and the PYD ruled these cities together. The Kurds against the regime have begun to lose ground, Asad regime currently controls 10 percent of Qamishli the PYD having good relations with the regime has including the Airport, Security units and intelligence taken the center stage; and as the PYD’s leader Salih buildings; pays the salaries of civil servants and pro- Muslim says, the impression of a de- facto agreement vides services to the city.13 As the PYD easily took the between the Asad regime and the PYD has been cre- Kurdish regions under control and had almost no fight ated.8 In June of 2012, the PYD and the groups close with the Asad regime in this period, it was claimed to Massoud Barzani signed an agreement in Erbil, that both sides had reached an agreement.14 This pe- but it failed.9 Political organizations close to the KDP riod, however, ended with heated encounters between were liquidified by the PYD elements. The KDP lead- the Syrian opposition and the YPG forces. er Barzani, in an address in the southeastern Turkish province of Diyarbakır in 2013, targetted the PYD THE YPG-SYRIAN OPPOSITION CONFLICT and implied that the regime in Syria agreed to leave Early clashes between the PYD’s armed wing, the YPG, some regions to the PYD. Barzani as well interpret- and the Syrian opposition started on July 16, 2013 when ed the PYD’s move for a temporary government as the YPG took over the town of Ras al Ayn in the prov- collaboration with al Asad to push Kurds into the ince of Hasakah after pushing out the Syrian opposition fight. The KurdWatch Internet site has posted abun- groups.15 Skirmishes which initially took place between dance of human rights violations, such as: The PYD the YPG and Al Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra, Al Qae- dissident Kurdish groups’ opening fire on the dem- da affiliate in Syria) continued with the YPG expelling onstrators in Amude and killing civilians, the torture the Syrian opposition from the town first, and then tak- of activists who were arrested, pressure against Azadi ing control of the border crossing with Turkey.16, 17 Fol- and Yaqidi groups, and cooperation with the regime lowing the clashes, opposition groups withdrew from militia and the intelligence.10 Ras Al Ayn to Tel Halef, Asfar and Najar where they The PYD’s newly formed armed group, the YPG, were in control. The Syrian opposition tried to take Ras took over Amude and Afrin on July 20 and Ayn al Al Ayn back; however, the YPG managed to repel the Arab on July 19 without a serious encounter upon the opponents’ attack just at the outskirts of the town. In withdrawal of the regime forces from the Kurdish re- August 2013, opposition groups mostly consisting of gions in northern Syria.11 The YPG militants proceed- Islamists announced the siege of Ayn Al Arab (Kobani), ed around Qamishli, in the north of Hasakah, and where the YPG headquarters are located, and deployed took over al Maliki and Ras al Rayn in west Hasakah. militants to the town from Manbij and Jarabulus.18 Again, an easy encounter occured against al Asad forc- Towards the end of August skirmishes concentrated es in these regions.12 In the downtowns of Qamishli on the Yarubiya border crossing on the Syria-Iraq border; 6. Syria security forces ‘open fire at Kurd’s funeral’, BBC, October 8, 2011. 13. Barfi, Barack. The Fractious Politics of Syria’s Kurds. The Washington 7. PYD, Carniege Middle East Center, 1 Mart 2012. Institute, December18, 2013.
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