LEBANON’S POLITICS: THE SUNNI COMMUNITY AND HARIRI’S FUTURE CURRENT Middle East Report N°96 – 26 May 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE SUNNI COMMUNITY IN THE AGE OF THE FUTURE CURRENT ............. 2 A. RAFIC HARIRI: THE GENESIS OF A CURRENT AND A PROJECT ....................................................... 2 B. SAAD HARIRI AND THE SUNNI COMMUNITY’S REPOSITIONING..................................................... 5 1. Breaking with Syria ..................................................................................................................... 5 2. Turning inward............................................................................................................................. 7 3. Turning toward the West ............................................................................................................. 7 4. Joining the “moderate” axis ......................................................................................................... 9 5. Sectarian divisions ..................................................................................................................... 10 C. A PARADOXICAL NEW BALANCE OF POWER .............................................................................. 13 D. THE FUTURE CURRENT’S POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES .................................. 17 III. THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF SUNNI POLITICAL DIVERSITY ........................ 19 A. LOCAL PERSONALITIES .............................................................................................................. 19 B. SUNNI ISLAMISM ........................................................................................................................ 21 1. Dar al-Fatwa (House of Religious Edicts) ................................................................................. 22 2. Jamaa Islamiyya ......................................................................................................................... 23 3. Salafis ......................................................................................................................................... 24 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 30 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LEBANON ........................................................................................................................... 31 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 32 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2007 .......... 33 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 34 Middle East Report N°96 26 May 2010 LEBANON’S POLITICS: THE SUNNI COMMUNITY AND HARIRI’S FUTURE CURRENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The June 2009 swearing in as prime minister of Saad ability. The result was a massive, overwhelming instinct Hariri, leader of the Sunni Future Current movement, of communal solidarity among Sunnis, who rallied around marks a turning point, the end of a period of exceptional Rafic’s son and dramatically shifted national, regional domestic political turbulence and regional tensions that and international alliances. The community joined forces began with the 2005 murder of his father, Rafic; led to with its historical foes, anti-Syrian Christian parties. It institutional paralysis; and culminated with the violent turned against a traditional ally, Damascus, now seeing its May 2008 showdown between government and opposi- struggle with Syria as a conflict between two incompati- tion. It also presents the new leader with a host of novel ble visions for the country. And, for the first time in its challenges. The man who took the helm of a once deeply history, it turned toward the West, partners in a perceived divided Sunni community must discard much of what life-or-death battle against Syria, Hizbollah and Iran. enabled his rise, if he is to succeed now that he is in power. With Hizbollah, the principal Shiite movement, he Of all, the most striking transformation in Sunni attitudes must move away from the sectarianism that has become since 2005 has been the exacerbation of sectarian feelings Lebanon’s political stock-and-trade. The Future Current and hostility toward Shiites, nurtured by deepened re- should initiate the process of becoming a more genuine, gional sectarian divisions following the fall of the Iraqi institutionalised party, breaking from the clientelism that regime. Tensions existed in the past, but for the most part will otherwise inhibit the prime minister’s transition from they had remained dormant or, if expressed, quickly con- community leader to statesman. And Hariri must continue tained. There were several turning points: Hariri’s assas- to navigate the difficult normalisation with Syria, over- sination; subsequent expressions of pro-Syrian sentiment coming deep mistrust among his constituency toward by Hizbollah and Amal; the 2006 war with Israel, which Damascus. many Sunnis blamed on Hizbollah and which highlighted the Shiite movement’s troublesome military might; and, Upon his father’s assassination, Saad inherited an almost finally, Hizbollah’s swift May 2008 takeover of the capi- impossible task. Rafic Hariri was larger than life: at once tal, which Sunnis suffered as a humiliating defeat. successful businessman, diplomat, politician and states- man. As Lebanon awoke from years of a bloody civil war, The net effect was to solidify the Future Current’s he- he strove to be the nation’s saviour. He was not without gemony over the Sunni community and Hariri’s control his critics or his failings. Many chastised his propensity to over the Future Current. Stunned by Hizbollah’s decision mingle private dealings and public affairs. But few chal- to turn its weapons inwards, Sunnis rallied as one behind lenged his leadership qualities or his ability to rise – for the movement. Dissent was tantamount to betrayal. In the most part – above confessional politics and to juggle June 2009, the Future Current – buoyed by a large Sunni contradictory international relations. turnout – triumphed in the parliamentary elections. The vote, a reflection of a powerful communal solidarity, sig- In death as in life, Rafic was an outsized character whose nalled Hariri’s emergence as the virtually unchallenged influence extended far beyond Lebanon’s borders. Syria, Sunni leader. widely viewed as responsible for the murder, faced in- tense international pressure. Unprecedented demonstra- But the Future Current’s clear victory also contributed to tions forced the withdrawal of its troops after an almost important domestic and regional changes. Syrian accep- 30-year presence. His death stirred deep, lingering Sunni tance of the results and Hariri's selection as prime minis- resentments and anxieties: anger at Syria’s heavy-handed ter removed important impediments to a Saudi-Syrian domination and unease stemming from a sense of vulner- rapprochement, which had begun earlier that year. Riyadh encouraged normalisation of ties between Syria and Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current Crisis Group Middle East Report N°96, 26 May 2010 Page ii Lebanon, notably by pressing Saad Hariri to visit Damascus Competition from Sunni rivals and loss of hegemonic – a trip brimming with emotional and political signifi- control almost certainly will be one consequence, but – cance. Once selected as prime minister, Saad reached out assuming a lessening of confessional tensions – it also is to the opposition, which responded in kind. He now leads an inevitable one. If the goal is to stabilise Lebanon, pro- a national unity government whose ability to function will mote its welfare and avoid any sectarian backsliding, it is depend on consensus. a price Saad Hariri will have to pay. It also would be the best way for him to honour the most promising elements Ruling successfully will require that he takes this evolu- of his father’s legacy. tion a step further. More will be needed to reverse sec- tarianism and deepen the process of Syrian-Lebanese Beirut/Brussels, 26 May 2010 normalisation. Hariri will have to relinquish his de facto position as Sunni leader and devolve that role to a more institutionalised Future Current – in effect turning it into a party with clear and accountable decision-making mecha- nisms, an identifiable political platform and professional cadres – as well as to reformed and strengthened religious bodies better able to manage the community and prevent a radical drift. In the same vein, he gradually will need to break with the type of community-based, patron-client style of politics that, over the past five years, the Future Current has more fully embraced. Middle East Report N°96 26 May 2010 LEBANON’S POLITICS: THE SUNNI COMMUNITY AND HARIRI’S FUTURE CURRENT I. INTRODUCTION Hariri’s third challenge is that he leads a unity govern- ment which, in many ways, is unprecedented and thus whose sustainability is unknown. Historically, Lebanon Saad Hariri, who inherited from his father the mantle of has tended to be ruled by broad coalitions. But these have leader of the country and of the Sunni community, faces involved