2011 No. 5 (39)
Elections in Russia: what prospects does the new political cycle offer?
Justinas Pimp÷
An overview of the process and results of the State Duma elections
On December 4, the State Duma elections were held in Russia. Prior to the elections, the attention to processes inside the country was as low as never before. The Kremlin made sure that the electorate did not have any real alternatives to the current ruling party, which is why the political campaign proceeded in a particularly idle way. Perhaps the only intrigue at the elections was the question of how many seats the ruling United Russia party would lose (on the eve of the elections, its approval rating dropped from 62 % to 51 %).
The results have demonstrated that the losses are greater than was expected. 49.32 % of the electorate voted in favour of the ruling party; therefore, United Russia will have 238 mandates in the sixth State Duma. Four years ago the respective results were 64.3 % of the electoral votes and 315 mandates in the State Duma. Considering the reported violations and instances of falsification, United Russia‘s share of the vote could actually be a few per cent less than the official count showed. Analysts regard the performance of the ruling party as a loss and a grave signal to Vladimir Putin before the upcoming Russian presidential elections due in March 2012. The message sent is as follows: the current political elite as well as Putin and the “power vertical“ he has built are all losing legitimacy and societal support. In the absence of a real alternative, a large part of Russian society still supports the current authorities; however, keeping up with the policy of “stability” will only fuel public dissatisfaction.
As united Russia loses its positions, the opposition will get stronger in the State Duma. The Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and A Just Russia will share about half of the mandates. On the other hand, these parties do not constitute an opposition as it is perceived in the West: they are in one or another way associated with the Kremlin and are all dependent on its financial support.
Independent and explicitly opposing political forces (such as Yabloko or PARNAS) were left behind the systemic opposition and outside the State Duma. Therefore, despite certain pluralistic tendencies, the State Duma will remain
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under the Kremlin‘s rigid control. The results of the 2011 and the 2007 State Duma elections are given below 1.
Parties Votes received Votes received (%) in 2011 (in %) in 2007 United Russia 49.32 64.3 The Communist Party 19.19 11.57 A Just Russia 13.24 7.74 The Liberal Democratic Party 11.67 8.14 Yabloko 3.43 1.59 Patriots of Russia 0.97 0.89 Right Cause 0.6 Did not participate The Agrarian Party of Russia Did not participate 2.3 Civilian Power Did not participate 1.05 The Union of Right Forces Did not participate 0.96 The Party of Social Justice Did not participate 0.22
As compared to the previous elections, the just completed State Duma elections may be characterised by several positive aspects. First of all, for the first time since 2004, the observers of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe were allowed to come to the country and assess the transparency and democratic course of the elections. Besides, all seven registered parties were allowed to take part in the elections. To facilitate political competition between smaller parties, certain minor amendments to Russian electoral law have been made.
On the other hand, these aspects were dimmed by gross violations and systematic measures hampering political competition and oppositional activities. PARNAS, a union of liberal parties headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, was denied registration. The political party was thus prevented from participating in the elections. Western mass media provided extensive coverage of the Kremlin‘s actions against the independent election monitoring group Golos , which fights for free elections in Russia. On election day, a number of independent online media portals and websites of other civic organisations did not operate as they were targeted by Kremlin affiliated cyber attacks.
Protests – the herald of civil society in Russia?
On the weekend following the elections, tens of thousands of Russians flooded Moscow streets. They protested against the falsified election results and demanded new elections. There were instances of falsification of the results
1 Rusijos Vyriausiosios rinkimų komisijos duomenys. Available at:
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indeed although apparently they were not decisive. According to exit poll data of the Public Opinion Foundation, which conducts sociological surveys, United Russia was to score 46 % of votes (the official result is 49.32 %). Nevertheless, the protest actions which took place after the elections are to be primarily perceived not as a protest against the violations during the elections, but rather as the disillusionment of Russian citizens with Putin‘s system. After it had become clear that Putin was to regain his position as president while Dmitry Medvedev would most likely become prime minister, the reaction shared by many Russians was “not for another 12 years”. As a result, the support for the tandem and the ruling party dropped sharply. Part of the society expressed their position in street protests, spoilt the ballots or voted for anyone, but the current authorities.
According to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, the election results and the subsequent rallies mark certain irreversible changes taking place in Russia‘s society. The social contract which followed the principle “the state does not interfere with our lives, we do not interfere with the authorities” is cracking. Russian citizens, especially the middle class, demand respect for civil rights, independent courts, the police which would protect its citizens, combating corruption which is deep rooted in the bureaucracy system, etc 2. In the future, the citizens‘ involvement in the political life of the country will be stipulated by the fact that, given relative decrease in revenues from resource exports, the state budget will increasingly rely on the taxes paid by the country‘s residents.
As a matter of fact, the authorities do realize that the current “power vertical” and the petro state model (a state heavily dependent on gas and oil exports) are not stable in the long term. Sooner or later the objective economic, social and demographic challenges will bring about the necessity of a political modernisation, which will also open gates for reforms in other spheres. The point in Russia’s evolution when political advancement and social modernisation gain momentum (traces of the latter are already observable) will constitute the essential prerequisite for further modernisation of the entire country, says Trenin 3. It is clear that these processes should be viewed in a long term perspective as they will only take shape during the next political cycle.
Scenarios of Russia‘s political and economic development
In a short term perspective, protests that have already taken place on the political arena will not bring about any remarkable changes. Most Russian citizens, residents of urban areas in particular, still support Putin‘s principle of “governed democracy”. The opposition remains weak and divided, currently
2 Dmitry Trenin, “Duma elections: Expert Analysis”. Available at:
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unable to produce a strong leader who could challenge Russia’s governing elite and initiate changes.
The Kremlin‘s consent to allow rallies is most likely just part of a peculiar strategy. The authorities, Putin primarily, perceive it is an opportunity to demonstrate that the public opinion is taken into consideration. During the annual “telemarathon” on December 15, Putin acknowledged that Russia must overhaul its political elite. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin may become one of such “renewals”. Putin’s long standing associate, Kudrin resigned from his post as Finance Minister in September 2011, the official reason being his disapproval of Medvedev’s expenditure policy, primarily due to an increase in military spending. After his resignation from the government, Kudrin has expressed rather harsh criticism of the authorities and has advocated reforms and liberalisation. It is not impossible that it is Kudrin who will become the new Russian prime minister rather than Medvedev, who has exhausted himself and whose popularity has been waning.
An assessment of Russia‘s trajectories of political and economic development on a broader scale brings to light three possible scenarios:
1. Status quo – political stagnation. This would almost invariably result in certain strengthening of authoritarian tendencies. This scenario is feasible bearing in mind the level of entrenchment of Russia‘s current elites, the merge of large business and politics as well as a fragile system of “checks and balances” developed by the Kremlin. Attempts at reforming or changing part of the system (for instance, reforming management of energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft, combating systemic corruption in the system, etc.) might no longer serve as lubricants for the system’s mechanisms. The success of maintaining the status quo will depend on whether the Kremlin will manage to at least temporarily offset challenges faced by the economy and the society. This will largely depend on energy prices. The latter will be hard to forecast, while, given further stagnation in the global economics, it is likely that the dynamics of energy prices will not be sufficient to ensure the Kremlin‘s “stability“. As time goes by, maintaining the status quo would imply further tightening up belts and screws. This kind of scenario is not stable in the long term due to the fact that there will not be enough resources and political will to implement it. Therefore, although political stagnation and increasingly authoritarian tendencies may continue for a certain period of time (possibly until the next State Duma elections), it is unlikely that the status quo will be able to sustain much longer.
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2. “Mild modernisation“. This is arguably the most likely scenario in the foreseeable political cycle. The recent State Duma election has proved that the current political apparatus is exhausting itself and is losing support among the people 4. Economic difficulties increasingly push for measures aimed at modernising the country’s economy. To remain a legitimate ruler, Putin will have to introduce certain measures or at least to succeed in imitating them. It is likely there will be attempts to renovate the political elite, introducing a more pluralistic system and providing the opposition with certain opportunities. According to some Russian experts, these tendencies have already been observable following the State Duma elections 5 and will probably become more apparent in the future. The resignation of Boris Gryzlov, the speaker of the State Duma, in response to election results may be perceived as an introduction of broad scale changes. Nevertheless, major efforts of “mild modernisation” will be directed toward the economy. Due to the fact that the rule of law is the prerequisite for the essential modernisation of the country to take place, the latter is impossible given the present political model. Therefore one may expect only technical changes and certain liberalisation of economy, including the energy sector. An important aspect of this kind of cosmetic modernisation is the expansion of the infrastructure intended for the development of science and technology, such as the Skolkovo Innovation Centre near Moscow.
3. “Perestroika 2”. Analysts of the Carnegie Moscow Centre do not exclude the third scenario although they acknowledge that it is very unlikely. Under Perestroika 2 the reforms implemented would sneak out of the Kremlin‘s control and would predestine the collapse of the current system, as it happened in the case of Mikhail Gorbachev‘s pursued reconstruction. Putin will do his best to escape this kind of scenario, which is one of the reasons why reforms in general are avoided. Putin knows well that attempts to change even technical parameters of the system may be destructive 6. Though unlikely, this scenario is nevertheless possible, especially if Putin was forced to introduce more profound reforms given an upsurge in citizens‘ distrust of the authorities,
4 The Economist: “Russia’s Future: The cracks appear”. Available at:
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unstable energy prices and imminent economic, demographic and other related problems.
Challenges facing Russia in the new political cycle
Whatever the most immediate scenario of the political and economic development, the “new” Russian authorities will be confronted with immense challenges and problems tormenting the country. Some of them deserve a closer attention.
Economy. In 2009, Russia‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank 7.9 %. The recovery is rather slow: in 2010 and 2011, the GDP increased 3.8 % and 4.1 % respectively. Its growth prospects are rather weak, since they largely depend on the external factors, which are not favourable for Russia: global economic stagnation, the eurozone crisis and unstable energy prices. Large capital keeps flowing out of the country. Throughout 2011, foreign investors withdrew about US$80 bn from Russia. Banking sector regulation remains weak, which may affect the collapse of some banks and the need to recapitalize them in the case of impending economic crises 7. Taking all of the above into consideration, the International Monetary Fund has cut forecast for Russia‘s GDP growth in 2012 from 4.1 % to 3.5 %8. As economic problems aggravate, Putin‘s administration may have to resort to saving measures by cutting authority spending, reducing subsidies for ineffective business entities, raising taxes and eliminating their benefits. Many of the saving measures would be socially sensitive and affect large numbers of the country‘s citizens. Therefore economic issues will prevail both during the elections and the upcoming political cycle.
Infrastructure and the country‘s economy. Aging infrastructure, which is largely made up by the Soviet heritage, may become one of the most relevant issues in the nearest future.
Currently Russia‘s industrial machinery is on average 30 years old. In the West, the respective indicator is about 10 years. Within the period from 1995 2007, as few as 5000 km of roads were laid in Russia, which increased the country‘s road network by 0.07 %, while about two thirds of all roads remain unpaved. Railway lines shrank by 1000 km, and about 40 % of run down railway carriages and locomotives should be replaced. Due to old machinery used in industry and other business entities, the number of breakdowns and accidents grows. Investments in infrastructure are stalled by corruption and red tape: to lay 1 km of road in Russia costs US $12.9 mln (to compare, in China and Brazil this
7 Sergei Aleksashenko, “Russia: Stable but Critical”. Available at:
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would cost US $2.9 mln and US $3.6 mln respectively) 9. The country‘s work force lacks expertise and education. All these factors lead to a decline in industrial competitiveness while the budget loses a potential source of income. About 85 % of the Russian export is made up by raw materials and commodities.
However, what should really alert the political elite of the country is the aging oil and gas extraction infrastructure. The current oil and gas fields are exhausting while new fields are located in northern and eastern regions of Siberia, where oil and gas extraction is more costly and harer to access. In order to satisfy the demand for energy resources of domestic and foreign power economies and to be able to use new fields and extraction technologies, Russia should invest about US $100 bn on an annual basis. Attracting foreign investment as one of the possible sources of funding will not be easy due to the unfavourable investment climate. At present foreign investment in Russia constitutes about 22 % of the GDP. To compare, in developed economies, the respective indicator amounts to 25–30 % of the GDP.
Corruption and bureaucracy. One of the main factors hampering the development of the infrastructure and stalling foreign investments is the plague of corruption, which is deeply entrenched at all levels of power. Transparency International‘s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Russia 143rd out of the 185 states surveyed. According to President Medvedev‘s estimates, due to corrupted officials, about US $33 bn leak out every year in the implementation of state contracts. In order to obtain a construction permit in Russia, it is necessary to go through 53 procedures, which take 540 days 10 . Many of these procedures are officially free; however, in to complete them, the petitioner has to give a bribe. For these reasons, in the Doing Business Report elaborated by the World Bank, Russia ranks 123rd out of 183 surveyed countries.
It is notable that Russia‘s red tape is systemic, i.e. it constitutes a habitual part of life for the power sector. As business and power structures merge, politics becomes a tool for satisfying one‘s personal interests. A number of the country‘s top officials hold executive positions in state enterprises. Racketeering is widespread at lower levels as well as in regional areas. Companies which dare to compete with business groups associated with power structures are closed due to alleged violations of hygiene or security standards. Owing to the fact that corruption is part of the present political system, traditional measures of fighting corruption, e.g., the “single window“ principle, introduction of e- government , cutting the number of procedures, etc. cannot resolve the problem.
9 Encyclopaedia of the Nations, “Russia – Infrastructure, power, and communications”. Available at: < http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Russia INFRASTRUCTURE POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS.html >. 10 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “Russia struggles with lengthy construction permit procedures”. Available at: < http://en.rian.ru/papers/20110513/164006819.html >.
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To obtain tangible results in this area the political system has to be reformed. It is not surprising that to date, Putin has not demonstrated determination to launch these reforms.
Demography. The demographic state of the country is yet another threat facing both Russia‘s economy and statehood. Shrinking population of the country and aging society are outcomes of a decline in birth rate. It is estimated that, given the current tendencies, Russia‘s population will drop from the current 142 million to 116 million by 2050. According to the forecasts of the Russian State Statistics Service Rosstat , the number of retired people will increase by 9 million by 2030, while the number of working age people will decline by 11 million, which may lead to a demographic trap and a slowing economy. Meanwhile attempts to import labour force from the neighbouring countries bring about ethnic problems.
Health indicators of Russian society are among the lowest across the globe. Average life expectancy for men and women is 60 and 72 years respectively. Protracted transformations produce pressure, expansion of alcoholism, chronic and infectious diseases in the society. To date, the authorities have not responded to the demographic issues properly; however, further lingering on problem resolution may have catastrophic consequences.
Summing up, it should be pointed out that the 4 December 2011 State Duma election and the presidential elections due March the current year undoubtedly mark the beginning of a new political period in Russia. After a decade of stability, the country witnesses changes that are primarily apparent in the social structures of the society. As the middle class is strengthening, other groups are beginning to perceive themselves as part of the civil society, which is no longer separated from the state by a “social contract”, apathy and individualism. The Russians start to demand that the authorities ensure a fair and equal allocation of the country’s product, responsible courts and police, efficient health care and education systems.
When Putin regains the presidency, he will encounter a situation opposite to what he witnessed in 2000, when the economy was growing and the society expressed unprecedented support. By now Russia‘s economy has lost its dynamics, while the country is confronted with immense challenges and there is little time left to solve them. Nevertheless, the greatest factor is shrinking support of the society for both Putin and his “power vertical” model. To remain in power, Putin will have to change and become a new kind of leader in the eyes of the society.
How well he succeeds in accomplishing these objectives will become clear in the nearest future. One of the most telling indicators of Putin‘s assumed course will be appointment of officials to significant governmental posts after the Presidential elections in March 2012.
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