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Elections in Russia: What Prospects Does the New Political Cycle Offer?

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Elections in Russia: What Prospects Does the New Political Cycle Offer? 2011 No. 5 (39) Elections in Russia: what prospects does the new political cycle offer? Justinas Pimp÷ An overview of the process and results of the State Duma elections On December 4, the State Duma elections were held in Russia. Prior to the elections, the attention to processes inside the country was as low as never before. The Kremlin made sure that the electorate did not have any real alternatives to the current ruling party, which is why the political campaign proceeded in a particularly idle way. Perhaps the only intrigue at the elections was the question of how many seats the ruling United Russia party would lose (on the eve of the elections, its approval rating dropped from 62 % to 51 %). The results have demonstrated that the losses are greater than was expected. 49.32 % of the electorate voted in favour of the ruling party; therefore, United Russia will have 238 mandates in the sixth State Duma. Four years ago the respective results were 64.3 % of the electoral votes and 315 mandates in the State Duma. Considering the reported violations and instances of falsification, United Russia‘s share of the vote could actually be a few per cent less than the official count showed. Analysts regard the performance of the ruling party as a loss and a grave signal to Vladimir Putin before the upcoming Russian presidential elections due in March 2012. The message sent is as follows: the current political elite as well as Putin and the “power vertical“ he has built are all losing legitimacy and societal support. In the absence of a real alternative, a large part of Russian society still supports the current authorities; however, keeping up with the policy of “stability” will only fuel public dissatisfaction. As united Russia loses its positions, the opposition will get stronger in the State Duma. The Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and A Just Russia will share about half of the mandates. On the other hand, these parties do not constitute an opposition as it is perceived in the West: they are in one or another way associated with the Kremlin and are all dependent on its financial support. Independent and explicitly opposing political forces (such as Yabloko or PARNAS) were left behind the systemic opposition and outside the State Duma. Therefore, despite certain pluralistic tendencies, the State Duma will remain www.eesc.lt under the Kremlin‘s rigid control. The results of the 2011 and the 2007 State Duma elections are given below 1. Parties Votes received Votes received (%) in 2011 (in %) in 2007 United Russia 49.32 64.3 The Communist Party 19.19 11.57 A Just Russia 13.24 7.74 The Liberal Democratic Party 11.67 8.14 Yabloko 3.43 1.59 Patriots of Russia 0.97 0.89 Right Cause 0.6 Did not participate The Agrarian Party of Russia Did not participate 2.3 Civilian Power Did not participate 1.05 The Union of Right Forces Did not participate 0.96 The Party of Social Justice Did not participate 0.22 As compared to the previous elections, the just completed State Duma elections may be characterised by several positive aspects. First of all, for the first time since 2004, the observers of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe were allowed to come to the country and assess the transparency and democratic course of the elections. Besides, all seven registered parties were allowed to take part in the elections. To facilitate political competition between smaller parties, certain minor amendments to Russian electoral law have been made. On the other hand, these aspects were dimmed by gross violations and systematic measures hampering political competition and oppositional activities. PARNAS, a union of liberal parties headed by former Deputy Prime- Minister Boris Nemtsov, was denied registration. The political party was thus prevented from participating in the elections. Western mass media provided extensive coverage of the Kremlin‘s actions against the independent election monitoring group Golos , which fights for free elections in Russia. On election day, a number of independent online media portals and websites of other civic organisations did not operate as they were targeted by Kremlin-affiliated cyber attacks. Protests – the herald of civil society in Russia? On the weekend following the elections, tens of thousands of Russians flooded Moscow streets. They protested against the falsified election results and demanded new elections. There were instances of falsification of the results 1 Rusijos Vyriausiosios rinkimų komisijos duomenys. Available at: <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=1001000 28713304&vrn=100100028713299&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=n ull&vibid=100100028713304&type=233 >. www.eesc.lt 2 indeed although apparently they were not decisive. According to exit poll data of the Public Opinion Foundation, which conducts sociological surveys, United Russia was to score 46 % of votes (the official result is 49.32 %). Nevertheless, the protest actions which took place after the elections are to be primarily perceived not as a protest against the violations during the elections, but rather as the disillusionment of Russian citizens with Putin‘s system. After it had become clear that Putin was to regain his position as president while Dmitry Medvedev would most likely become prime-minister, the reaction shared by many Russians was “not for another 12 years”. As a result, the support for the tandem and the ruling party dropped sharply. Part of the society expressed their position in street protests, spoilt the ballots or voted for anyone, but the current authorities. According to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, the election results and the subsequent rallies mark certain irreversible changes taking place in Russia‘s society. The social contract which followed the principle “the state does not interfere with our lives, we do not interfere with the authorities” is cracking. Russian citizens, especially the middle class, demand respect for civil rights, independent courts, the police which would protect its citizens, combating corruption which is deep-rooted in the bureaucracy system, etc 2. In the future, the citizens‘ involvement in the political life of the country will be stipulated by the fact that, given relative decrease in revenues from resource exports, the state budget will increasingly rely on the taxes paid by the country‘s residents. As a matter of fact, the authorities do realize that the current “power vertical” and the petro-state model (a state heavily dependent on gas and oil exports) are not stable in the long term. Sooner or later the objective economic, social and demographic challenges will bring about the necessity of a political modernisation, which will also open gates for reforms in other spheres. The point in Russia’s evolution when political advancement and social modernisation gain momentum (traces of the latter are already observable) will constitute the essential prerequisite for further modernisation of the entire country, says Trenin 3. It is clear that these processes should be viewed in a long term perspective as they will only take shape during the next political cycle. Scenarios of Russia‘s political and economic development In a short term perspective, protests that have already taken place on the political arena will not bring about any remarkable changes. Most Russian citizens, residents of urban areas in particular, still support Putin‘s principle of “governed democracy”. The opposition remains weak and divided, currently 2 Dmitry Trenin, “Duma elections: Expert Analysis”. Available at: <http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=46205 >. 3 Dmitry Trenin, “Post Imperium: A Eurasian Story”. Available at: <http://carnegie.ru/events/?fa=3376 >. www.eesc.lt 3 unable to produce a strong leader who could challenge Russia’s governing elite and initiate changes. The Kremlin‘s consent to allow rallies is most likely just part of a peculiar strategy. The authorities, Putin primarily, perceive it is an opportunity to demonstrate that the public opinion is taken into consideration. During the annual “telemarathon” on December 15, Putin acknowledged that Russia must overhaul its political elite. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin may become one of such “renewals”. Putin’s long-standing associate, Kudrin resigned from his post as Finance Minister in September 2011, the official reason being his disapproval of Medvedev’s expenditure policy, primarily due to an increase in military spending. After his resignation from the government, Kudrin has expressed rather harsh criticism of the authorities and has advocated reforms and liberalisation. It is not impossible that it is Kudrin who will become the new Russian prime-minister rather than Medvedev, who has exhausted himself and whose popularity has been waning. An assessment of Russia‘s trajectories of political and economic development on a broader scale brings to light three possible scenarios: 1. Status quo – political stagnation. This would almost invariably result in certain strengthening of authoritarian tendencies. This scenario is feasible bearing in mind the level of entrenchment of Russia‘s current elites, the merge of large business and politics as well as a fragile system of “checks and balances” developed by the Kremlin. Attempts at reforming or changing part of the system (for instance, reforming management of energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft, combating systemic corruption in the system, etc.) might no longer serve as lubricants for the system’s mechanisms. The success of maintaining the status quo will depend on whether the Kremlin will manage to at least temporarily offset challenges faced by the economy and the society. This will largely depend on energy prices. The latter will be hard to forecast, while, given further stagnation in the global economics, it is likely that the dynamics of energy prices will not be sufficient to ensure the Kremlin‘s “stability“.
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