Black Widows and Internet Videos: Employing Women in Islamist Insurgencies
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Revised 14 March 2012 Black Widows and Internet Videos: Employing Women in Islamist Insurgencies Christopher J. Sims Department of War Studies King’s College, London Conference Paper Gender and War Newcastle University 12 March 2011 ‘Though it previously seemed highly unlikely because of the existing notions of women as victims of war rather than as perpetrators, women are now taking a leading role in conflicts by becoming suicide bombers – using their bodies as human detonators for the explosive material strapped around their waists. To complicate the notions of femininity and motherhood, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is often disguised under the women’s clothing to make her appear as if she is pregnant and thus beyond suspicion or reproach. The advent of women suicide bombers has transformed the revolutionary womb into an exploding one’ -- Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism Abstract1 Tracing a historical trajectory through the Islamic world, this paper outlines the mutable role of women in the tradition of jihad from the time of the prophet to al Qaeda in the present day. Examining groups such as the North Caucasus Black Widows, it is argued that the development of the suicide bomber and Mumbai-style assault suicide as valuable asymmetric weapons in insurgencies and terrorism increased the ability of the female to contribute in an operational capacity by orders of magnitude. Arguments against the deployment of women – rape, transgender relations, perceived physical inferiority and normative taboos – become moot in martyrdom operations. This recruitment process requires a dynamic between ideology and grievance – combining religious narratives with personal motivations arising from disenfranchisement. Examining the role of the Internet as a novel medium that obfuscates gender and affords a fluid medium for propaganda and procurement, it is stressed that as a gender-neutral realm where women can join forums and interact with greater ease and safety than in strict societal settings, the Internet uniquely enables and enhances women’s roles within the jihad. This female revolution from supporter and nurturer to operator – from mujahidat to mujaribat – is less about ‘personnel shortfalls in combat operations’, rather more about an inexorable progression towards full mobilisation enabled by social media. Finally, this paper asserts that doctrinal contradictions on the employment of females in martyrdom operations affords the opportunity to marry secular Western norms with moderate Islamic scholarship in the generation of moral opprobrium, presenting a united front against radicalism which is itself struggling with a war of rhetoric to 1 I am grateful to Mia Bloom for her valuable comments and criticisms regarding revisions to this paper. I also thank Nina Musgrave for her insightful suggestions and additional information on Hamas and Jerome Devitt for his important contextual observations and historical notes. All remaining errors of fact or judgement are my own. 1 2 provide greater equality for women. Analysing the writings of prominent Islamists including Ayman al Zawahiri; Umayma al Zawahiri; Ibrahim al Banna; Abdallah Azzam; Yusuf al-Ayyiri and Zachary Chesser highlights the fungible nature of ideology when alloyed to the necessities of strategic development. Introduction ‘Artists are tricky fellows, sir, forever reshaping the world according to some design of their own.’ -- Jonathan Strange, Jonathan Strange and Mr Norrell One of the main drivers for the recent growth of studies involving suicide terrorism has been the actions of al-Qa‘ida and the focus on this entity by the ‘terrorism industry’2. Keen to paint suicide terrorism as Oriental cowardice and part of a larger clash of civilizations, John Keegan wrote emotively in the aftermath the terrorist atrocities of 11 September 2001, that ‘Orientals…shrink from pitched battle, which they often deride as a sort of game, preferring ambush, surprise, treachery and deceit as the best way to overcome an enemy’3. Basking in the shadow of this idea, a body of academic literature has attempted to paint suicide terrorism as being part of the wider clash of civilizations4. This belief in an immutable confrontation between two permanently opposed constructs – East fighting West – has informed policy for the past decade. Recent scholarship has, however, noted the fluid nature of culture, sacred history and religion when presented with strategic necessities5. Examining the dynamic between grievance, social structure and ideology that motivates female suicide bombers, the paper is split into four sections. Firstly, exploring the role of women in early Islamic military history, their participation is observed to be either as ‘enablers’, affording males the opportunity to join the struggle or in less common instances as ‘prosecutors’ – joining the battle. The majority of participation in battle occurs during the nascent years of Islam, when it faced an existential threat that necessitated the mobilisation of all followers. Secondly, the paper investigates current jihadi ideology concerning the role of women’s participation in the struggle: it observes a stark division between those who see women solely as enablers and those who would bring them to the frontline. Thirdly, the paper examines the nature of suicide bombing, then specifically female martyrdom operations, analysing the ongoing ‘feminist Orientalism’ debate that has 2 See Herman, E. and O’Sullivan (1990) The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terror (New York: Random House). Since 9.11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, this industry has burgeoned. 3 Keegan, John (2001) ‘In this War of Civilisations, the West will Prevail’, Daily Telegraph, October 8 4 Kim, T. (2002) ‘Islamic Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations’, Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 14(1) pp.97-117. Raphael Israeli focuses specifically on Islamic culture, calling the phenomenon, ‘Islamikaze’ – in Israeli, R. (1997) ‘Islamikaze and their Significance’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(3), pp.96-121. For a nuanced handling of this debate see Atran, S. (2004) ‘Mishandling Suicide Terrorism’, Washington Quarterly, 27(3), p.75. In an indication of how widely the phenomenon has shaped scholarship, biological theories have also been posited for the Islamic suicide terrorism, see for example a critique in Bloom, Mia (2010/11) ‘Life Sciences and Islamic Suicide Terrorism’, Correspondence, International Organization, 35(3), pp.185-192 5 For example, Porter, P. (2009) Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (London: Hurst) 2 3 come to characterise the discipline. Lastly, the paper examines the role of the Internet in disintegrating traditional patriarchal social structures, thus affording women the opportunity to become respected ‘partners in jihad’ in the new, flattened structure which has come to characterise the struggle. Two notes on definition are required here: firstly, a growing body of recent scholarship has focused on the departure of Jihadism from Islamism6, the latter being defined as ‘the modern religo-political current that seeks to integrate Islamic teaching to various aspects of the socio-political sphere’7. Whilst at a base level Islamism and Jihadism share a common premise, that Islam and politics are one and the same, the Islamists work on social programmes and communal organisation: a tripartite relationship between the community, the state and God. Jihadists, by contrast, see a bipartite relationship between the individual and God that necessarily bypasses state structures8. Though jihadis present themselves as responding to an unjust political situation, they have internalised the problem as a purely religious individual struggle, attempting to solve perceived political injustice through purely religious, militant means. Secondly, the development of jihad in Islamic revelation and history has proceeded differently in Shi’a and Sunni thought. For an offensive jihad Shi’a scholars see the necessity for a divinely appointed leader – an Imam – before such an engagement could begin. Sunni jurists by contrast argue that any de facto Muslim leader carries the necessary authority to lead this action. Since in Shi’a tradition, the Imam and any specifically designated deputy has been absent since the tenth century, the obligation to engage in offensive jihad lapses. On questions of defensive jihad however, a moral requirement explicit in Qu’ranic passages (2:190-91), there is no requirement for an Imam and the Shi’a position echoes the Sunni position of fard’ayn – an individual duty between that person and God, dissolving any previous personal or social obligations9. Women in Islamic military history In Islamic history women are either enablers allowing men to prosecute jihad or in rarer instances they actively participate in conflict, be it jihad or qital10. Such 6 A large body of scholarship on this departure has evolved at the Center for Countering Terrorism, West Point: see inter alia Brown, V. (2007) Cracks in the Foundation: Leaderships schisms in al- Qa’ida from 1989-2006 (West Point, NY: CTC); Fishman, B. and Moghadam, A. eds. (2010) Self- Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qaeda and its Periphery (West Point, NY: CTC). For how this schism may corrupt the group see Brahimi, Alia (2010) ‘Crushed in the Shadows: Why al- Qaeda will Lose the War of Ideas’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(2), pp.93-110 7 Lahoud, N. (2010)