Fish As Food in an Age of Globalization

Home , Fish as food, John Dory, Rock salmon, Shifting baseline

FISH AS FOOD IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

JENNIFER L. JACQUET

B.A., Western Washington University, 2002 M.S., Cornell University, 2004

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Resource Management and Environmental Studies)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Vancouver)

August 2009

ABSTRACT

The human appetite for seafood has intensified and so has overfishing and damage to marine ecosystems. However, the true demand for seafood is often not captured in the national or United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) statistics. The underreporting of catches is prevalent worldwide, which inevitably leads to mismanagement, and justifies data improvements via catch reconstructions.

For instance, marine fisheries catch reconstructions for 1950 to present for Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania show that the small-scale fisheries sectors in both countries are underreported. Overall, reconstructed marine fisheries catches for

Mozambique and Tanzania were respectively 6.2 and 1.7 times greater than those reported by FAO. Similarly, shark catches have been underreported globally, and reconstruction of Ecuador’s mainland shark landings for 1979 to 2004 shows that shark landings were an estimated 7,000 tonnes per year, or nearly half a million sharks, and

3.6 times greater than those reported by FAO from 1991 to 2004.

Over the past decades, as we realize fish catches are larger than officially reported and

demand for seafood is outstripping the availability of wild resources, conservation groups have been attempting to change patterns of household consumption, particularly in

North America and Europe. These groups aim to reduce overfishing and encourage

sustainable fishing practices using tools like consumer awareness campaigns and

seafood certification schemes. But many factors impede these efforts, such as the

renaming and mislabeling of seafood, the absence of a significant price premium for

certified seafood, and, most importantly, a lack of demonstrably improved conservation status for the species that are meant to be protected.

This dissertation presents market-based initiatives that may strengthen current

initiatives, e.g. global adoption of chain of custody standards, working higher in the

demand chain, connecting seafood to climate change, and diverting small fish away from the fishmeal industry into human food markets. Also, conservation groups should

consider investing as much effort into the elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies, the

primary perverse incentive encouraging excess fishing capacity, as they put into altering

consumer behavior. Finally, conservationists can learn from the latest research on the

psychology of savings and investment. If these market efforts complement more marine protected areas and regulations, it may be possible to ensure fish as food and wildlife for both current and future generations.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………….…ii Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………………..iv List of Tables …………………………………………………………………………………….vii List of Figures …………………………………………………………………………………..viii Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...………ix Statement of Co-authorship…………………………………………………………….………xi

1. Introduction ..…………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1 references …………………………………………………………………………….6

2. Silent Water: A Brief Examination of the Marine Fisheries Crisis ……….…………7 And you may ask yourself, how did I get here? …………………………………………..9 And you may tell yourself, what have I done? ……………………………………….…….11 Into the blue again after the money is gone ……………………………………….……….13 You may ask yourself: am I right? Am I wrong? ……………………………………………15 Same as it ever was ……………………………………………………………………………17 Chapter 2 references …………………………………………………………………………..20

3. Few data but many fish: marine small-scale fisheries catches for Mozambique and Tanzania …………………………………………………………………………………..25 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………26 Material and methods…………………………………………………………………………..28 Mozambique………………………………………………………………………………...28 Tanzania …………………………………………………………………………………….31 Results …………………………………………………………………………………………..34 Mozambique ………………………………………………………………………………34 Tanzania ……………………………………………………………………………………35 Discussion ………………………………………………………………………………………36 Chapter 3 references …………………………………………………………………………..48

4. In hot soup: sharks captured in Ecuador’s water …………………………………..53 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………..54 On the equator ………………………………………………………..…………55 In the islands ………………………………………………………………………………..56 Fin flop: export legal or illegal? ……………………..……………………………………58 Methods ………………………………………………………………………………………….58 Results ………………………………………………………………………………………….60 Discussion ………………………………………………………………………………………60 Chapter 4 references …………………………………………………………………………..68

5. Counting fish: a typology for fisheries catch data ………………………………….72 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………….…73 A typology of fisheries data ……………………………………………………………………74 Catch known and reported ………………………………………………………………..75 Catch known and underreported………………………………………………………….76 Catch unknown and overreported …………………………………………….…….77 Catch unknown and underreported ………………………………………………………78 Discussion ………………………………………………………………………………………79 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………81

iv Chapter 5 references ……………………………………………………………………..84

6. The rise of seafood awareness campaigns in an era of collapsing fisheries ...87 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………88 Background of seafood –related social marketing …………………………………….89 Limitations of seafood awareness campaigns ………………………………………….91 The market ……………………………………………………………………………..91 Lack of traceability …………………………………………………………………….92 Mislabeling and renaming ………………………………………………………………94 Few efforts to measure campaign effectiveness …………………………………….94 Single species focus …………………………………………………………………….95 Successes of seafood awareness campaigns ……………………………………………96 Rethinking seafood and fisheries management ………………………………………….98 Chapter 6 references ………………………………………………………………….101

7. Trade secrets: renaming and mislabeling of seafood ………………...... ……105 Introduction …………………………………………………………………….………….106 Fish phonies …………………………………………………………………………………110 Consequences of mislabeling ……………………………………………………………..112 Consumer and government economic losses ………………………………………112 Resource losses ……………………………………………………………………….114 Undermining of eco-campaigns ………………………………………………………115 Health concerns ………………………………………………………………………..116 Discussion …………………………………………………………………………………..118 Chapter 7 references ……………………………………………………………………….126

8. Funding priorities: big barriers to small-scale fisheries ……………………….132 Chapter 8 references ……………………………………………………………………….140

9. Conserving wild fish in a sea of market-based efforts ………………………..142 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………….143 Overview of market-based sustainable seafood initiatives for marine fisheries ……..144 Common difficulties……………………………………………………………….…….. ……145 What is ‘sustainable’? …………………………………………………………………145 Small-scale and developing world fisheries left out ………………………………..146 Traceability concerns ………………………………………………………………….147 Regional focus ………………………………………………………………………….147 Species-oriented programs do not reward individual fishers ………………………148 Confusion in and between initiatives …………………………………………………148 Absence of price premium …………………………………………………………149 Lack of evidence of effectiveness …………………………………………………….150 More effective market-based efforts to conserve wild fish? …………………………...152 Labeling standards ……………………………………………………………….…….153 Directing efforts higher than households …………………………………….………153 Balancing positive and negative messaging in the marketplace ………….………154 Connecting seafood to climate change …………………………………….………..156 Eliminating the wasteful fishmeal industry …..…………………………..…………..157 Elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies …………………………….….…………159 Setting seafood targets ………………………………………………………………..159 Discussion ……………………………………………………………………….………….160 Chapter 9 references …………………………………………………………….…………169

10. What can conservationists learn from investor behavior? ……………………173 Chapter 10 references …………..……………….…………………………………..….…..177

11. Beyond food: fish in the 21st century ……………………………………………..178 Chapter 11 references …………………………………………………………………….185

vi LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Number of fishers by province and the proportion of fishers represented in Mozambique’s national fisheries statistics data ………………………………………….41

Table 3.2 Fisher, collector and human population data for Mozambique, and ratio of fishers & collectors to total population with sources and estimates …………………….41

Table 3.3 Industrial sector reported catches/sources for Mozambique, 1955-2003 ..….42

Table 3.4 Decadal industrial shrimp catch and estimated discards for Mozambique, 1950-2000 …………………………………………………………………………………….42

Table 3.5 Number of fishers/collectors on the Tanzanian mainland, 1970-2005 ...... 43

Table 3.6 Number of fishers and collectors for the islands of Ungaja and Pemba (comprising Zanzibar, Tanzania) for 1980-1989 …………………………………………44

Table 4.1 Reconstructed data and sources used to estimate total shark landings, FAO data, and fin exports (t) ...... 66

Table 5.1 Typology of reporting systems for fisheries data …………………………….83

Table 7.1 Some cases of renaming seafood to improve marketing …………………..123

Table 7.2 Some better documented cases of fraudulent mislabeling of seafood for purposes of deceiving customers …………………………………………………………124

Table 8.1 Fishing subsidy type, amount, main beneficiaries and effect on capacity ....139

Table 9.1 Timeline and overview of market-based sustainable seafood initiatives .…164

vii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1 Small-scale catch rates (catch per fisher) estimated and reported (•) for Mozambique, 1950-2004 ...... 45

Figure 3.2 Number of fishers, number of fishers and collectors, and human population for Mozambique, 1950-2004 ………………………………………………………………..45

Figure 3.3 Mozambique’s marine fisheries catches for 1950-2005, showing (a) total reconstructed catch (small-scale, industrial, plus discards) compared with FAO reported catch; and (b) catch reconstructions by sector ……………………………………………46

Figure 3.4 Tanzania’s marine fisheries catches for 1950-2005, showing (a) total reconstructed catches (Tanzanian mainland plus Zanzibar) compared to FAO reported catch; and (b) reconstructed catches separated by Zanzibar and mainland …………..47

Figure 4.1 Sharks caught in Ecuador, 1979-2005 ...... 67

Figure 8.1 Schematic illustration of the duality of large and small-scale fisheries prevailing in most countries of the world ...... 140

Figure 9.1 The rise in sustainable seafood initiatives, 1989-2009 ...... 169

viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was conducted as part of the Sea Around Us Project, an activity funded and

initiated by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Financial support for sections of this work was also provided by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Conservation International (CI),

FishSource and my ever generous and supportive parents.

I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues and co-authors on various papers included here: Helen Fox, Helena Motta, Amani Ngusaru, Juan Jose Alava,

Ganapathiraju Pramod, Scott Henderson, John Hocevar, Sherman Lai, Patricia Majluf,

Nathan Pelletier, Tony Pitcher, and Enric Sala.

In Africa, I was graciously assisted by Paula Afonso, Nathalie Faucher, Domingos Gove,

Martin Guard, Narriman Jiddawi, Haji Machano, Modesta Meddard, Simon. Milledge,

Godlove Mwamsojo, Jason Rubens, Fatima Sobo, Jose Tenreiro de Almeida, and Rudy van der Elst. I would also like to acknowledge the kindness of my Ecuadorian associates, Jimmy Martinez, Luis Morales, William Revelo, and Pilar Solís and recognize the support and enthusiasm Richard Wollocombe gave me during my time on the equator and in Africa.

Aspects of several manuscripts presented received kind insights from the ever opinionated Randy Olson, the wise George Dyson, and the resourceful M. Hirshfield.

Elizabeth Allen, Margaret Bowman, Jason Boyce, Andrew Cooper, Katie Cramer, Rainer

Froese, Didier Gascuel, Toby Gardner, Timothy Hansen, Rupert Howes, David Laibson,

Mark Powell, Mark Stevens, and Bill Sutherland also contributed at some point or another to a manuscript.

I would also like to thank Megan Bailey, Chad Wilkinson, and the darling Sarika Cullis-

Suzuki for their intellectual companionship at UBC as well as comments on draft manuscripts, blogposts, and new ideas.

I am also fortunate to have two committee members who are open-minded, dedicated to research, and unwaveringly supportive. My thanks to both Rashid Sumaila and Dirk

Zeller for their open doors and upbeat company.

Finally, this work would not have been possible without the perspective one can only attain by standing on the shoulders of giants. I came to understand both the etymology and semantics of this phrase upon the shoulders of the wisest and most benevolent giant of all: Daniel Pauly. I express sincere gratitude for his mentorship, editorial oversight, co-authorship, and generosity of intellect, gossip, and spirit. Yes we can.

x STATEMENT OF CO-AUTHORSHIP

Apart from Chapters 1 and 11, all chapters have been prepared as stand-alone manuscripts for submission to a peer-reviewed journal. They are currently all either

published, accepted, or at some state of review. I am the senior author on all papers and I assumed primary responsibility for the design, implementation, analysis, and

writing of co-authored papers. I am the sole author on Chapters 2 and 10. The

contributions of co-authors to Chapters 3-9 are summarized below.

Chapter 3 is co-authored with Helen Fox, Helena Motta, Amani Ngusaru, and Dirk Zeller.

Helen Fox, Helena Motta, and Amani Ngusaru provided insights into local conservation

concerns in Mozambique and Tanzania. Dirk Zeller provided guidance on all stages of

the work.

Chapter 4 is co-authored with Juan Jose Alava, Pramod Ganapathiraju, Scott

Henderson and Dirk Zeller. Juan Jose Alava provided the list and status of commonly

caught shark species in Ecuadorian waters and Pramod Ganapathiraju provided the

shark related apprehensions in Ecuador for 1991 to 2007, which I have not included here. Scott Henderson provided insights into local conservation concerns and policy recommendations related to shark finning in Ecuador. Dirk Zeller provided guidance on all stages of the work.

Chapter 5 is co-authored with Dirk Zeller and Daniel Pauly, both of whom provided guidance on all stages of the work.

xi Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are co-authored with Daniel Pauly who provided guidance and edits on all stages of the work.

Chapter 9 is co-authored with John Hocevar, Sherman Lai, Patricia Majluf, Nathan

Pelletier, Tony Pitcher, Enric Sala, Rashid Sumaila, and Daniel Pauly. John Hocevar

provided information related to recent Greenpeace sustainable seafood campaigns.

Sherman Lai assisted with the design and execution of Figure 1. Patricia Majluf provided

edits and information related to fishmeal and the Peruvian anchoveta campaign. Nathan

Pelletier assisted with the life history assessment section of the paper. Enric Sala

provided edits and ideas related to setting seafood targets. Tony Pitcher contributed

editorial oversight. Rashid Sumaila contributed to ideas and edits related to fisheries

subsidies. Daniel Pauly provided guidance on all stages of the work.

xii 1 INTRODUCTION

1 The earliest interactions between human beings and the marine environment are through the human appetite. Modern humans, i.e. Homo sapiens began consuming seafood at least

164,000 years ago on the shores of what is now South Africa, as evidenced by shell middens containing the remains of brown mussels, giant periwinkles, and whelks (Marean et al., 2007).

Similar remains are known from 125,000-year-old middens along the Red Sea coast of East

Africa, in what is now Eritrea, where humans enjoyed meals of oysters, crustaceans, and other shellfish (Walter et al., 2000). They also briefly consumed the flesh of the giant clam Tridacna costata, which they collected from the reefs. But their giant clambakes did not last. Shortly after human arrival, T. costata nearly disappears from the fossil record showing what may be the first documented case of eradication through overfishing (Richter et al., 2008).

The collective human appetite for seafood is the key reason for the overfishing crisis. Thus, the questions addressed in this dissertation center on a small but greedy organ: the human stomach. The details surrounding this basic statement are complicated, particularly as seafood has become increasingly profitable, markets have become increasingly globalized, and technology has facilitated fishing in every dimension of the sea. How we come to find ourselves in the midst of a fisheries crisis requires a historical perspective and brief synthesis of the results of the demand for seafood (Chapter 2).

Between 1996 and 2006, world exports of fish and fishery products for human consumption grew 57 percent (FAO, 2009). The increasingly global and profitable market for seafood is not without consequence on fish stocks or local communities that rely heavily on fish for food security (some people still rely on seafood for survival while others do not). Those who rely on fish for food have been marginalized, in part due to the fact that they are 1) often located in the developing world; and 2) catch seafood predominantly to feed their families rather than the market. This is the case in Mozambique, for instance, where women and children glean reefs

2 and intertidal areas for mollusks, crustaceans, and other small fish primarily for home

consumption but have not been considered in official fisheries catch statistics (Chapter 3). Part

of understanding the role fish plays in food security is thus in the improvement of fisheries catch

data.

Fisheries landings data are compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations (FAO) and are fed by national statistics. These data have served as the primary tool for

many global and regional fisheries studies, and are used to determine fish consumption, the

value of fisheries to national economies, and the amount of surplus fisheries production.

However, it is now recognized that these reported data are incomplete and often underestimate

actual catches, particularly those caught by the small-scale and/or subsistence fishing sectors

(see contributions in Zeller & Pauly, 2007).

To understand the true reliance on fish by developing world countries, Pauly (1998) outlines the

rationale and method for reconstructing catches, which includes the incorporation of grey

literature and anecdotes. I reconstructed catches for small-scale fisheries and re-examined this

sector’s role in food security for Mozambique and Tanzania (Chapter 3).

Understanding the fisheries of the developing world and the role of fish for food security is also

important in light of increasing demand and importation of seafood by the developed world. In

2006, the top five seafood importing nations were Japan, the U.S., Spain, France, and Italy

while China, Thailand, Chile, and Vietnam were among the top ten exporters (FAO, 2009).

Many developed nations have become net importers of seafood as their fisheries fail to meet

national demand due to the historical overexploitation of their fishing grounds. The demand

(and often fishing boats) from developed countries reaches distant waters, such as the high

seas and waters off tropical developing countries, where fish stocks are less exploited.

For instance, Asian demand for shark fin soup combined with overfishing in Asian waters has

led to an increase in shark finning in distant waters, including those off the coast of South

America. However, the national and international fisheries landings statistics do not adequately

reflect the level of shark fishing. For Ecuador, I examined how foreign demand is affecting the

local catches of sharks, and reconstructed shark captures by small-scale fishers on the

mainland (Chapter 4). Also, after considering the various inadequacies in the catch data for

Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ecuador as well as other regions of the world, I developed a

typology for fisheries catch data that provides a framework for thinking about fisheries data

reporting (Chapter 5).

Then this dissertation turns its helm toward conservation measures to solve overfishing and the insatiable demand for seafood. Because it is the appetite that lies at the root of the fisheries crisis, it is unsurprising that many conservation organizations believe it is through addressing this appetite that overfishing will be solved. A substantial effort has developed over the last two

decades that attempts to affect consumer demand in the Western world through various

awareness campaigns. In accordance with the call for evidence based conservation

(Sutherland et al., 2004), I reviewed the range of these campaigns along with their strengths

and weaknesses of these initiatives and compiled evidence for and against their success

(Chapters 6 and 9). There are major impediments that undermine consumer campaigns, such

as the renaming and mislabeling of seafood (Chapter 7) -- a type of cheating that is likely to

become more prevalent as seafood demand and trade continues to grow.

If conservation groups support a market-based approach to allay overfishing (as opposed to

more conventional conservation efforts such as catch/effort regulations and marine protected

areas), then one would imagine that a primary concern would be the elimination of subsidies,

4 which encourage excess fishing capacity (Sumaila and Pauly, 2006). At the same time

scientists and economists have called for the elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies (Sumaila

and Pauly, 2007), policy makers are also advised that fishing access and property rights should

favor smaller-scale, place-based fisheries that use passive gears (Pauly and Maclean, 2003).

At its 2003 session, the FAO Committee on Fisheries strongly advocated that “more efforts be

made to support the small-scale fisheries sector” (FAO, 2005). But given the attention on

consumers rather than the elimination of subsidies, which favor large-scale fisheries, I ask

whether small-scale fisheries are being lost in the market-based push toward fisheries

sustainability (Chapter 8).

After close examination of small-scale fisheries and market attempts at conservation, I propose

a series of market approaches I believe will be more effective to conserve wild fish (Chapter 9).

I also explore several ways in which the realm of conservation can learn from recent studies in

behavioral economics (Chapter 10). This dissertation examines: issues of seafood security;

how foreign demand for luxury products (i.e. shark fin soup) exacerbates fishing in the

developing world; systems of reporting catches; measures to assuage demand in the developed

world; and possible future directions for fisheries conservation. It is my hope that this interface

between statistics, market demand, and conservation will provide insights into fish as food in an

era of globalization.

5 Chapter 1 references

Ababouch, L., Gandini, G. & Ryder, J. (2005) Causes of detentions and rejections in international fish trade. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 473. Rome, Italy.

FAO (2005) Supporting small-scale fisheries through an enabling environment. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy.

FAO (2009) The state of the world fisheries and aquaculture. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy.

Hites, R.A., Foran, J.A., Carpenter, D.O., Hamilton M.C., Knuth B.A., & Schwager, S.J. (2004) Global assessment of organic contaminants in farmed salmon. Science, 303, 226-229.

Marean, C.W., Bar-Matthews, M. Bernatchez, J., Risher, E., Goldberg, P., Herries, A.I.R., Jacobs, Z., Jerardino, A., Karkanas, P., Minichillo, T., Nilssen, P. J., Thompson, E., Wattes, I. & Williams., H.M. (2007) Early human use of marine resources and pigment in South Africa during the Pleistocene. Nature, 449, 905-908.

Pauly, D. (1998) Rationale for reconstructing catch time series. EC Fish Cooperative Bulletin 11, 4-10.

Pauly, D. (2006) Major trends in small-scale marine fisheries, with emphasis on developing countries, and some implications for the social sciences. Maritime Studies 4, 7-22.

Pauly, D. & Maclean, J. (2003) In a Perfect Ocean. Island Press, Washington, USA.

Richter, C., Roa-Quiaoit, H., Jantzen, C., Al-Zibdah, M., & Kochzius, M. (2008) Collapse of a new living species of giant clam in the Red Sea. Current Biology 18,1349-1354.

Sumaila, U.R. & Pauly, D., editors (2006) Catching more bait: a bottom-up re- estimation of global fisheries subsidies. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 14(6) University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

Sumaila, U.R. & Pauly, D. (2007) All nations must unite to cut subsidies. Nature (correspondence) 450, 945.

Sutherland, W.J., Pullin, A.S., Dolman, P.M. & Knight, T.M. (2004) The need for evidence-based conservation. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 19, 305-308.

Walter, R.C., Buffler, R.T., Bruggemann, J.H., Guillaume, M. M., Berhe, S., Negassi, B., Libseki, Y., Cheng, H., Edwards, R. L., von Cosel, R., Neraudeau, D. & Gagnon, M. (2000) Early human occupation of the Red Sea coast of Eritrea during the last interglacial. Nature 405, 65-69.

Zeller, D. & Pauly, D. (2007) Reconstruction of marine fisheries catches by countries and regions (1950-2005). Fisheries Centre Research Reports 15(2). Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

6 2 SILENT WATER: A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE MARINE FISHERIES CRISIS1

1 A version of this chapter has been published. Jacquet, J. (2009) Silent Water: A Brief Examination of the Marine Fisheries Crisis. Environment, Development, and Sustainability 11: 255-263. All titles with gratitude to The Talking Heads.

7 In what is now the Republic of the Congo, a hungry man crouches at the edge of an ancient, overflowing river. He holds a spear carved from deer antlers and watches for the gentle

movements of the giant river catfish, greater than two meters in length, that have come to

spawn in this floodplain. This may be the world’s first fisher; the time is the rainy season,

90,000 years ago (Yellen et al., 1995).

This fisher is a hunter-gatherer, the dominant lifestyle until roughly 10,000 years ago, which

Sahlins (1972) describes as the “Original Affluent Society.” Sahlins (1972, p. 25) excerpts John

Eyre’s description of a hunter-gatherer village in remote Australia in 1845:

At Moorunde, when the Murray annually inundates the flats, freshwater crayfish make their way to the surface of the ground…in such vast numbers that I have seen four hundred natives live upon them for weeks together, whilst the number spoiled or thrown away would have sustained four hundred more. An unlimited supply of fish is also procurable at the Murray about the beginning of December…The number [of fish] procured…in a few hours is incredible….

The hunting-gathering, fishing tradition still exists, especially in the developing world and in

native communities, where small-scale fishers and their families rely heavily on fish for

subsistence (e.g. Johannes, 1978; Johannes et al., 2000). Fish is the last major group of wild

animals exploited for food. But marine fisheries and the livelihoods that depend on them are

threatened (Myers and Worm, 2003; Pauly et al., 1998; Worm et al., 2006). Accounts of former

abundance, by Eyre and others (e.g., Jackson et al., 2001, Roman and Palumbi, 2003,

McClenachan et al., 2006) now seem astounding. What happened to Eyre’s fish? Focusing on

the marine sector, from a Western cultural perspective, this paper briefly explores of the origins, present state, and future of the fisheries crisis.

8 And you may ask yourself—well, how did I get here?

About 1700 years ago, Christianity replaced pagan animism as the predominant axiom in

Europe. The Judeo-Christian God preemptively responds to the fisheries crisis in the Bible’s

Genesis 1:28: humans “have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.” The Christian-based belief in domination over nature arguably had great implications for resource use and technological innovation throughout Europe and, later, North America (White, 1967), where the fishing industry would further expand. (The Judeo-Christian belief system accounts for early resource use philosophy but does less well explaining the foundations of resource domination in later years.)

Religion also influenced marine fisheries when, near the beginning of the 11th century, the

Catholic Church made meatless Fridays compulsory for its members (Bell, 1968). Curiously,

‘meat’ did not include fish, for which demand then increased. Freshwater fish became scarce and coastal fishes such as herring and cod were sent inland (Barrett et al., 2004). In Europe, religion essentially changed marine fishes from “catch to commodity” (Fagan, 2006).

But the open ocean remained an avoided frontier (especially as most Europeans considered the

Earth to be flat) and fishing was limited to inshore stocks. Then, a shift occurred as the Middle

Ages ended, and the to the Age of Discovery began. “The image of boats hugging the coast, almost a perfect metaphor for the tight mental horizon of the Middle Ages, was crumbling”

(Berman, 1984, p. 41).

Europe looked to expand the geographical base of its economic operations, including the quest

for new fishing grounds (Berman, 1984). During the 14th century, cod fishing expanded through

the Northwest Atlantic (Barrett et al., 2004). The first circumnavigation of the Earth, initiated by

9 Magellan in 1519 and completed in 1522, re-established the ancient knowledge that the Earth

was round. With this discovery, the number of overseas voyages increased, and so did fishing.

After Magellan’s voyage, a scientific revolution took place between the 16th and 18th centuries and science was defined around Bacon’s reductionism rather than the holism of the Ancients.

This approach would revolutionize science and mathematics and would later have profound implications for the whole of the environmental sciences. The culmination of the era was

Newton’s Principia. Incidentally, Newton’s Principia was nearly not published because of a book about fish. The Royal Society backed out of their agreement with Newton due to financial

disaster after the publication of On the History of Fish (Willughby, 1686). This pricey failure nearly cost timely mathematical explanations of the orbits of heavenly bodies, three laws of motion, and his universal law of gravitation (Bryson, 2003).

The scientific revolution began a transition from religion-dominated thought to cognitive reasoning. “Ever since their invention, the highest expression of objectivity in science has been

quantification” (Roszak, 1973, p. 270). Mathematics would eventually provide the foundation for

the fisheries models (e.g. maximum sustainable yield) used by quota-setting managers in the

20th century (Smith, 1994).

Another element fundamental to modern science emerged at that time: the concept of nature in

which the dominant analogy was a machine that generated regularity, permanence and predictability of the universe (Kearney, 1971). When not predictable, nature became at least intelligible, as documented by Charles Darwin’s (1859) The Origin of Species. In 1883, a year after Darwin’s death, T.H. Huxley, appointed to three British fishing commissions, gave a speech at the International Fisheries Exhibition in London. He explained why overfishing or

“permanent exhaustion” was scientifically impossible and proclaimed that, “probably all the great

10 sea fisheries are inexhaustible... nothing we do seriously affects the number of fish.” Over the next century, humankind would test Huxley’s hypothesis.

And you may tell yourself: my God, what have I done?

From the engine, to the steel hull, to the trawl, to ice, modern technology is conspicuously occidental (White, 1967) and technological advances in fisheries also originated in the Western world (though they would eventually spread to and be outdone by the East). The Industrial

Revolution had immediate impacts on fishing. In the North Sea, steam ships equipped with otter trawls reported catches more than six times greater than those of sailing ships (Kurlansky,

1997).

By the 1850s, after fewer than 20 years of fishing for them, inshore stocks of halibut in the

Western Atlantic had disappeared (Pauly and Maclean, 2003). It is now understood that industrial fisheries require only 10 to 15 years to reduce fish populations to one-tenth of their pre-fishing size (Myers and Worm, 2003). But in the 1890s, North Atlantic fishers experiencing lower catch rates asked naturalists to determine the cause. The field of fisheries science was born and so began the search for culpability in the fisheries dilemma (Pauly, 1994).

The open-access nature of ocean resources was one of the first characteristics faulted. “You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and that the earth itself belongs to no one,” writes Rousseau (1754, p. 109). But others argued the notion of the earth

(and the seas) belonging to no one was the trouble. Hardin (1968), in his essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” recognizes the fate of fisheries:

11 Likewise, the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the ‘freedom of the seas.’ Professing to believe in the ‘inexhaustible resources of the oceans,’ they bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction.”

But while technology and the oceans’ accessibility can be partially blamed, the majority of the

world’s fishers uses low-tech gear and is coast-bound. Yet, this group, the small-scale fishers,

catches roughly the same amount as the industrial sector, which is possible because the small-

scale sector employs nearly 25 times more people (Pauly, 2006).

In his 1798 essay on population, the Reverend Malthus outlines the impending doom of

overpopulation outstripping food supply. This idea has since been adapted to developing world

fisheries. Large coastal populations using destructive fishing practices produce a phenomenon

Pauly (1997) describes as “Malthusian overfishing”, which threatens fish stocks as well as food

security. Though Schumacher (1973) contends that “Small is Beautiful”, the small-scale fishing

sector has also contributed to the marine fisheries crisis.

Around the time that Rachel Carson’s (1951) The Sea Around Us won the National Book Award,

the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) became prevalent in Europe and North

America. Soon after, in the late 1970s, Larkin (1977) wrote the epitaph for MSY, and managers

began to make conservative quota recommendations. But the effects of the mathematization of

fisheries management were still to come. “An institutional juggernaut had been set in motion”

(Walters and Maguire, 1996, p.129) and the failure of fisheries science climaxed with the

devastating collapse of northern cod in the early 1990s. Mathematics had a definitive role in the

marine fisheries crisis.

Then there is a debate that really happened in the ocean realm: in the early 20th century, John

Muir and Gifford Pinchot would come to embody the respective philosophies of preservation and

12 conservation (Nash, 1982). But in terms of fisheries and the oceans, the preservationist

approach was never fully considered. Globally, approximately 0.6 percent of the oceans are

dedicated as marine protected areas (MPAs) (Wood, 2007) as compared to the 12 percent of terrestrial area that has been designated as protected (Chape et al., 2005). Furthermore, only

0.01 percent of the oceans are actually closed to fishing (Pauly et al., 2002)

Five years after Muir’s death, the Smithsonian Institution ran an article in its annual report

entitled, “The Sea As a Conservator of Wastes and a Reservoir of Food” (Moore, 1919). By the middle of the century, this strategy was expanded to include the dumping of radioactive wastes as an ecosystem service (Bryson, 2003). In 2004, 65 percent of the U.S. coastline (excluding

Alaska), most of it on the eastern seaboard, was under fish advisories (EPA, 2004). Modern industrial pollutants have infiltrated the marine food web. Fisheries that had sustained people for thousands of years are, instead, now poisoning them (Booth and Zeller, 2005).

Into the blue again after the money is gone

Pitcher and Hart (1998, p. 218) write, “Alone among the social sciences (and often disavowed by them) only economics offers an internally consistent and rigorous mechanism for achieving cooperation.” Pitcher and Hart are not alone; many scientists and managers have turned to the field of economics to understand and perhaps help alleviate the fisheries crisis. From an economic standpoint, a significant flaw in fisheries management is thought to stem from the lack of tenure right (Hardin, 1968). In the early 1980s, 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) were established for coastal nations, but economists argue for further privatization using mechanisms such as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and the elimination of flags of convenience.

13 Yet, Clark (1973) demonstrates that the overexploitation of fisheries is possible even under

privatized fishing rights because private firms adopt high rates of discount. Sumaila and

Walters (2005) address high discount rates with “intergenerational discounting,” a method to better incorporate future generations in management decisions that will ultimately affect them.

Sumaila (2004) demonstrates that, when considering the benefits to future generations, marine ecosystem restoration becomes economically viable.

But the biggest improvement in fisheries management could come from the elimination of perverse subsidies, which is necessary for any constructive environmental change (Holling,

2001; Meyers and Kent, 2001). Governments began subsidizing the expansion of fishing into the Northwest Atlantic, for instance, hundreds of years prior to official pronouncement that subsidies were complicit in cod’s collapse (Walters and Maguire, 1996; Lear, 1998). Today’s fisheries are still, in part, kept afloat with public tax money. In total, governments subsidize the global fishing fleet with US$30-34 billion annually (Sumaila and Pauly, 2006), which accounts for 35-40 percent of the landed value of fish (Sumaila et al., 2007) or an average of about

US$0.33 per kg of marine fish. This over-investment in fisheries in the short-term encourages excess capacity and overfishing. To compensate and reduce excess capacity, some governments buy back boats from the fishing industry, which is also a subsidy (Clark et al.,

2005). In addition to subsidization, the industrial fishing sector operates under an economic system that encourages externalities and corporate policy that, by legal definition, cannot take

into account the public good (Bakan, 2004).

Perhaps because corporations have become so powerful, environmental non-governmental

organizations (ENGOs) have recently gained influence, in some cases enough to challenge

governments (Buttel, 1992). ENGOs now lobby governments for the expansion of MPAs, the

delineation of exclusive fishing zones for small-scale fishers, and the outlawing (and

14 enforcement) of destructive fishing practices, such as bottom trawling, discarding fish, and the

use of dynamite.

Other ENGOs have forsaken government for grass roots efforts and engagement in “exemplary

action,” which emphasizes the presumed power of an individual as an ecological consumer

(Eckersley, 1988). In terms of fisheries, this movement is best seen through the attempts to

change seafood consumption patterns (e.g. seafood wallet cards, the Marine Stewardship

Council eco-certification). However, consumer awareness attempts, though perhaps successful

in raising awareness of seafood products, have unfortunately made no demonstrable impacts

on the resource itself (Jacquet and Pauly, 2007).

You may ask yourself am I right? Am I wrong?

“Shallow ecologists think that reforming human relations toward nature can be done within the

existing structures of society” (Naess, 1988). The philosophical application of deep ecology has

occurred in the terrestrial realm but, so far, has not been substantially applied to the oceans.

Perhaps this is, in part, due to the physical property of the ocean itself: it is difficult to see what

we have done. But within the last decade or so, we have seen the 40,000 unemployed fishers

after the collapse of the northern cod (Harder, 2003). We have seen jellyfish blooms around the

world (Purcell et al., 2001). We have seen innumerable scientific articles that prophesize a

bleak future for marine fisheries--but not a future without hope (e.g. Pauly et al. 2003).

Rebuilding marine ecosystems is possible. But to do so, is a fundamental change in prevailing

basic assumptions required?

A new Sea Ethic, promoted by the Blue Ocean Institute, would help society create a relationship

with the oceans in the manner that A Sand County Almanac (Leopold, 1949) did with the land.

15 In her chapter, “Save the Whales, Screw the Shrimp,” Williams (2001) challenges that

preserving nature is a moral issue (and recognizes the pecking order in preservation with her title).

Other scientists see the capacity of more practical technical fixes, though they, too, require fundamental shifts in values. Dayton (1998), for instance, called for a reverse of the burden of proof; fishers should be required to demonstrate that their actions do not cause damage to marine ecosystems rather than requiring that resource managers prove that they do. Walters

(1998) argued that our conceptual view of the seas should change. Currently, more than 99 percent of the world’s oceans are open to fishing; this should be reversed, and the oceans should be considered closed to fishing with small exceptions, i.e. fishery openings, as is the case with salmon in the Pacific Northwest. Russ and Zeller (2003) and Zeller (2005) likewise argued that fishing should be considered a privilege, rather than a right, and call for more marine closures with the aid of international ocean zoning.

Pauly (1995, 2007) identifies the constraints of the human lifetime in terms of fisheries. Each generation thinks that the ecosystem they were exposed to when they were young was more or less pristine and this, in part, is why resources are misused. He describes this phenomenon as

“shifting baselines” and emphasizes the need to recognize and overcome our “collective amnesia”. To address the shifting baseline, many ecologists are incorporating history in their research to get a sense of former abundance (Schrope, 2006).

Lewis (1992) vehemently criticizes radical environmentalism as destructive to the environmental movement. Yet, whale populations are beginning to rebound largely because of early efforts by

Greenpeace, which simultaneously communicated whale folklore and gruesome whale hunts.

Their media efforts created a public outrage and an eventual moratorium on whaling. So far,

16 campaigns of this kind have been less successful in terms of fisheries, though they do exist

(e.g. WildAid’s shark campaign; see Watts and Wu, 2005).

News of the fisheries crisis has begun to permeate popular culture. For instance, the recently

published novel, The Swarm (Schätzing, 2006), describes in detail the changes happening in

the world’s oceans (the disappearance of whales and fish, for instance, and the subsequent takeover by toxic blooms and jellyfish). A terrific, science-fictional threat to humanity follows,

which Worm (2006) calls “Armageddon in the oceans.” Millions of Schätzing’s novels have sold

worldwide. In Germany, where it was initially published, Der Schwarm has led to an increase in marine science funding (Worm, 2006).

Roughly five hundred years after the dawn of science, religion might also, directly or indirectly, play a role in marine ecosystem restoration and the protection of fisheries (Dunham and

Coward, 2000). Although the Catholic Church and many other religious entities have yet to exhibit enlightenment in terms of birth control and contraception (Bayes and Tohidi, 2001), there has been progress in fisheries. In 1966, Pope Paul VI, along with U.S. bishops, terminated obligatory ‘meatless’ Fridays, except during Lent (Bell, 1968). Recently, one religious group initiated a “What Would Jesus Drive?” campaign because “transportation is a moral issue”. Will religious leaders likewise consider fisheries a moral issue and ask, “What Would Jesus Fish?”

Same as it ever was

But is a fundamental shift in values possible on a global scale? Moreover, would it substantially affect market demand? The U.S. now eats almost five times more fish than it did one hundred years ago (NMFS, 2006). Worldwide, per capita consumption of marine fishes has doubled

17 since the 1960s (WHO, 2006). So, too, has the global population. How can marine fisheries feed the global appetite? They cannot.

Humans began farming on a global scale roughly 10,000 years ago and this lifestyle became predominant over the hunter-gatherer one (Quinn, 1992). Now the agricultural model of production is being applied to seafood. After the Papal decree of meatless Fridays, some

European monasteries tried to establish artificial fishponds to meet fish demand. These ponds were unsuccessful as people found fish, instead, in the sea (Fagan, 2006). Now, one thousand years later, the oceans are nearly empty and the artificial ponds (many of which float at sea) are a reality. In the last decade, aquaculture production has doubled. In 2004, aquaculture produced nearly 40 percent of all fish consumed, or nearly 60 million tonnes (FAO, 2005).

Wilson (2002) writes about aquaculture, “What was free for the taking must now be manufactured.” Eventually, fish biotechnology might entirely compensate for the decline in wild fish supply. In the meantime, though, many fish species raised in fish farms require wild, ocean- born fish for feed (Naylor et al., 2000). In this way, aquaculture puts additional pressure on ocean fisheries.

Furthermore, aquaculture has many ethical dimensions, which include the loss of traditions and the ethical concern of domesticating wild fish. In the Sea of Sicily, tonnaras were complex

systems of nets to catch tuna as well as a right of passage for the local men, who learned how

to set the nets, sing songs about tuna, and speak an entire tonnara language (Maggio, 2000).

Italy’s last tonnara has closed and the songs are silent. Instead, juvenile tuna are captured at

sea, slowly towed toward shore, and fattened in net pens off the Mediterranean coastline until they are sold (Volpe, 2005).

18 White (1967 p. 1203) writes, “All forms of life modify their contexts.” After more than 90,000

years of fishing, will the modification of the oceans include the virtual elimination of wild marine

fisheries? The human appetite, from the first fisher to the six and a half billion potential seafood

consumers alive today, is ultimately the root of the marine fisheries crisis. The human mind,

equal in number and technically more impressive, is ultimately the decider of how we satiate the

collective appetite for seafood and whether we do so with only ourselves in mind.

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24 3 FEW DATA BUT MANY FISH: MARINE SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES CATCHES FOR

MOZAMBIQUE AND TANZANIA1

1A version of this chapter is in review. Jacquet, J., H. Fox, H. Motta, A. Ngusaru, and D. Zeller. Few data fut many fish: Marine Small-scale fisheries catches for Mozambique and Tanzania.

25 Introduction

To assess hunger and malnutrition by country, the United Nations Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO) requires the collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of

information relating to nutrition, food, and agriculture, including fisheries (Ward, 2004). The FAO

FishStat database, which offers time series data on marine fisheries landings from 1950 to the

present, is fed by national statistical data compiled by its member countries. Therefore, the quality of global FAO data depends on the capacity of statistical collection within these

countries. FAO data have served as the primary tool in many global fisheries studies (e.g.,

Grainger and Garcia 1996; Garcia and Newton 1997; Pauly et al., 1998; Garcia and de Leiva

Moreno, 2003) but they are recognized as deficient in many regions (e.g., Pauly 1998; Zeller and Pauly, 2007; Zeller et al., 2007), including Africa (van der Elst et al., 2005; Tesfamichael &

Pitcher, 2007).

Data reported by FAO are unfortunately not readily distinguishable by sector (e.g., commercial vs. subsistence). Domestic, small-scale fishing (both small-scale commercial as well as non-

commercial subsistence) often contributes significantly to food security and nutritional needs of coastal communities, particularly in developing countries. However, small-scale fisheries have

often been marginalized politically due to their socio-economic, physical, and political remoteness from urban centers (Pauly, 1997), resulting in under-representation in official statistics. Instead, government focus and support is often directed toward industrial fishing, which provides foreign exchange earnings. This dichotomy is thus also often reflected in reported data, and hence impacts interpretation of global analyses.

The role of small-scale fisheries in local economies and food security must be closely examined, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the only region of the world where child malnutrition is

26 predicted to increase rather than decline (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 1999). In Mozambique and

Tanzania, two of the poorest countries in the world, small-scale fisheries have long contributed

to rural livelihoods and food security. Although this is recognized in some instances, it is not

clear to what extent this is reflected in concrete policy level action. Clearly, these resources and

their habitat need to be protected for local food security and livelihood purposes.

In both Mozambique and Tanzania, small-scale fisheries greatly resemble those from centuries ago and provide an important source of protein. Small-scale fishing takes place both from shore, and from canoes and dhow-type planked boats, mostly propelled by sails (Mngulwi, 2006), and almost exclusively in the nearshore waters of 40 m depth or less (UNEP, 2001). In the 19060s, industrial fishing began in the waters off Mozambique and Tanzania. Fishing vessels were often financed or entirely operated by European countries and allowed to operate in Mozambique and

Tanzanian waters in exchange for foreign revenues. In the 1980s, for instance, shrimp became

Mozambique’s largest earner of foreign exchange after cashews (Anon., 1984). But not without a price.

Similar to the situation in West Africa (e.g., Marquette et al., 2002), Mozambican and Tanzanian industrial shrimp trawlers disobey legal requirements to stay offshore and fish in inshore areas as well. The trawlers damage the ocean bottom and destroy passive fishing gear set by small- scale fishers (Lopes and Gervásio, 1999). They also often discard large fractions of their catch as unwanted by-catch (e.g. Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002). But species caught and discarded by shrimp fisheries often overlap directly with those resources that small-scale fisheries rely on

(and almost never discard). In this sense, industrial fishing can threaten food security for the population.

27 In Mozambique, there are around 120,000 fishers and 658 small-scale landing sites, while in

Tanzania there are an estimated 55,000 fishers and more than 400 landing sites for the

mainland and Zanzibar combined (Jiddawi & Muhando, 1990; Shao et al., 2003; IDPPE, 2004).

Underestimation of and difficulty in data collection for small-scale marine catches have been

recognized repeatedly (e.g. Herrick et al., 1969; Anon., 1988; Mongi 1991; Charlier, 1994; Gillet,

1995; Guard et al., 2000). In both countries, general underreporting of small-scale catch is

thought to be potentially substantial. The present study reconstructed total marine fisheries

catches for both countries for the period 1950-2005 to derive a historic baseline and evaluate

the overall magnitude of underreporting.

Material and methods

Marine fisheries catches have been successfully reconstructed in other regions of the world

(Zeller et al., 2003; Pauly & Zeller 2007; Zeller et al., 2007). Here, we follow the basic conceptual framework and approach outlined by these studies to reconstruct historic marine fisheries catches for Mozambique and Tanzania. This required the collection of data and information from published and grey fisheries literature available for both countries (details can be found in Jacquet & Zeller 2007a, 2007b available at www.fisheries.ubc.ca/publications/reports/fcrr.php), combined with interpolations and clearly defined assumptions.

Mozambique

At the national level, Mozambique’s fisheries are considered in three sub-sectors: industrial,

semi-industrial, and artisanal or small-scale. For this paper, we combine the latter two sectors

thus consider Mozambique’s fisheries in two categories: small-scale and industrial, where the

28 small-scale sector includes boat-based fisheries as well as ‘collectors’ (consisting of shore-

based collectors and boat-based divers, most often for home consumption).

Small-scale sector

Time-series data on small-scale catches were not available, although unpublished reports

provided estimates for the small-scale fleet for certain years (e.g. Krantz et al., 1986; Charlier,

1994). However, these studies did not present details of their methods for estimation, nor did

they appear to include the ‘collector’ component in catch estimates. Thus, they were considered

as minimal estimates.

The data that were most comprehensive were the 2003 and 2004 national catch data as collected and reported by the Instituto Nacional de Investigação Pesqueira (IIP), which explicitly included estimated small-scale fisheries catches with a clearly described estimation method

(IIP, 2003, 2004). While the 2004 data were derived from sampling 115 of the larger fishing centers, expansions were never made to the other 543 (smaller) centers (N. Faucher, Instituto

Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Pesca de Pequena Escala, pers. comm.). The 2003 data included full coverage of three coastal provinces (Maputo, Sofala, and Zambezia), 70% coverage of two other coastal provinces (Nampula and Inhambane), and excluded the southern province of Gaza and the northern province of Cabo Delgado, which has the largest number of active boats and the second largest number of fishers (KPMG, 2006). This information was combined with the 2002 fisher census (IDPPE, 2004) to determine that, overall, approximately

62% of the total number of fishers were included in the national statistics (Table 3.1).

Therefore, it was assumed that the reported catch for 2003 and 2004, being 67,074 and 57,747 t respectively, was caught by 62% of all coastal fishers. Assuming proportionality, we increased the reported catches for 2003 and 2004 by 38% to derive ‘100% estimates’ for these years.

29 This resulted in a reconstructed small-scale catch of 108,184 and 93,140 t for 2003 and 2004,

respectively. Based on these adjusted total small-scale catches and the associated fisher

population, we derived estimated per fisher catch rates of 2.47 and 2.09 kg·fisher-1·day-1 for

2003 and 2004, respectively.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that, due to additional fishing pressure from refugees, catch rates

declined during the civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1992 (Dutton and Zolho 1990; Lopes

and Gervasio, 1999). A case study on the small-scale fishery of Inhaca Island (part of the province of Maputo) presented data from fisher interviews, and suggested that catch rates

declined by 38% over the last 30 years from 29 to 11 kg·fisher-1·day-1 (de Boer et al., 2001). We applied this 38% inversely to the lower 2003 national catch rate of 2.47 kg·fisher-1·day-1 (derived above) to derive an estimated catch rate of 6.44 kg·fisher-1·day-1 at the start of the civil war in

1975. Thus, the national small-scale catch rate was assumed to decline from the estimated 6.44

kg·fisher-1·day-1 in 1975 to 2.47 kg·fisher-1·day-1 in 2003. To remain conservative, the catch rate was assumed constant (6.44 kg·fisher-1·day-1) for the 1950-1974 pre-war period (Figure 3.1).

Estimates of fisher populations were available for seven different years spanning 1965-2002

(Table 3.2), however, estimates prior to 1995 excluded collectors. Therefore, we took the

average proportion of collectors to total fishers for 1995 and 2002 (45%), and applied this

average proportion to estimate ‘collector’ populations for the earlier years (Table 3.2). The ratio of fishers plus collectors to the entire Mozambique population (based on interpolated census

data available at www.populstat.info) was determined for these seven years, while ratios for the

remaining years were estimated proportional to the whole population trends. We used this

derived time-series of ratios to estimate numbers of fishers and collectors for 1950-2004 (Figure

3.2). Combining these derived fisher plus ‘collector’ estimates with the derived catch rates

provided total small-scale catch estimates from 1950-2004.

Industrial sector

Historically, more resources have been allocated to monitoring and reporting the fisheries catch

by the industrial sector. Thus, grey literature reports indicating industrial catch were accepted as

reported (Table 3.3). For years when data were unavailable, catch estimates were interpolated

linearly between adjacent periods, thus assuming that no direct correlation existed between

industrial catch development and human population trend (see also Zeller et al., 2006).

The increase in industrial shrimp fisheries in the 1970s (Anon. 1984) meant a corresponding

increase in by-catch (landed) and discards (not landed). By-catch is likely under-reported, while

discards are entirely absent from the reported data. Schultz (1997) reported an annual by-catch

of 21,000 to 29,000 t between 1993 and 1996, while in 1982, shrimp fisheries discards were

estimated at 15-20,000 t (Anon., 1982). However, it is thought this latter amount is conservative

and was likely at least 25,000 t (Tenreiro de Almeida, former Secretary of State for Fisheries in

the 1980s, pers. comm.) Thus, assuming 25,000 t of discards in 1982 and comparing this to

total FAO reported shrimp catch of 8,900 t for 1982 resulted in a 2.8:1 ratio of discards to shrimp

catch. This ratio was applied to the time series of reported shrimp catches to produce time

series of estimated discards (Table 3.4). Total reconstructed catch was thus derived from

estimates of small-scale catch plus industrial catch plus discards.

Tanzania

Examination of Tanzania’s FAO statistics revealed that data for Zanzibar, a region of Tanzania

comprised of two large offshore islands (with substantial fish catches), are missing from official

statistics. This may be an artifact of the complexity and history of Tanzanian bureaucracy:

mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar each have autonomous institutional and legal structures for

31 managing fisheries, and thus separate systems of reporting. We estimated total catches for the mainland and Zanzibar separately, and combined these estimates to derive country totals.

Mainland Tanzania

For the mainland, we retained the data as reported by FAO for the years 1950-1969, which

were the best estimates we could obtain. However, it is possible that catches from this period were under-estimated. A new data collection system implemented in Tanga (the northern most

province) suggested that catches since the 1970s were at least 35% greater than previously reported (Verheij et al., 2004). Thus, we increased the 1970-2005 time series of reported marine fisheries catches for the mainland by 35%. This adjustment is likely conservative (Martin Guard,

Eco2 Dive Centre, pers. comm.).

This adjusted time series of fisheries catches did not include any catches by collectors (shore- based collectors and boat-based divers). Mainland frame surveys estimated 576 and 796 collectors in 2001 and 2005, respectively. For 1970-2000, for which we had reliable number of fishers, we took the ratio of collectors to fishers from 2001 (3:100) and applied that to the 1970-

2000 number of fisher time-series (Table 3.5). The numbers of collectors for 2002-2004 were estimated using linear interpolation between 2001 and 2005 reported numbers of collectors. To obtain estimates of ‘collector’ catch, we used the reported ‘collector’ catch rate and effort data for Matemwe, Zanzibar (4.0 kg·collector-1·day-1 for 240 days per year, see below; Jiddawi &

Stanley, 1999). As there were no data on the number of fishers and number of collectors from

1950-1969, we took the estimated 1970 ‘collector’ catch as a ratio to fishers catch (0.8:100) and used this to conservatively estimate collected catches from 1950-1969. Total marine catch estimates for the mainland were thus obtained by combining the adjusted catch time series for fishers and the estimated catch time series for collectors.

32 Zanzibar

For Zanzibar (consisting of the two islands Unguja and Pemba), fisheries catches by boat-based fishers were available from 1980-2005 (missing data for 1989 were interpolated). For 1980 and

1981, however, the catch data were thought to represent only Unguja Island. Furthermore, for

1980, we had data for the number of fishers on Unguja and Pemba (5884 and 7058, respectively; Ngoile, 1982; Table 3.6). We thus calculated the 1980 catch per fisher of 0.67 t·fisher-1·year-1, and used this rate for the number of Pemba fishers to establish the Pemba catch for 1980. For 1981, we interpolated the number of fishers between frame surveys (1980 and

1985) and then repeated the steps used for 1980 to determine the 1981 catch data for Pemba.

However, these data did not include the catch by collectors except for the years 1980, 1985,

1989. We interpolated the number of collectors between these years to determine the number

of collectors from 1980-1989 (Table 3.6). Jiddawi & Stanley (1999) estimated catch rates for collectors in Matemwe, Zanzibar to be 4.0 kg·collector-1·day-1. At Matemwe, fishers go to sea

16-20 days per month, while in other parts of Zanzibar fishers go to sea as often as 25 days per month (N. Jiddawi, Institute of Marine Sciences, pers comm.). Here, we assumed the catch

rates from Matemwe to represent the average rate for collectors, which is likely conservative for

earlier years because catch rates appear to have declined (N. Jiddawi, Institute of Marine

Sciences, pers. comm.). Thus, we assumed a catch rate for collectors of 4.0 kg·collector-1·day-1 and an effort of 20 days per month (i.e., 0.96 t·collector-1·year-1). This rate and effort was multiplied by the time series of collectors (from 1980-1989) to obtain ‘collector’ catches from

1980-1989. Because 1989 was the last reliable data point for the number of collectors in

Zanzibar, we used the ratio of ‘collector’ catch to boat-based catch in 1989 (23:100) to estimate

a time series of collected fish from 1990-2005 based on assumed proportionality to reported fisheries catches.

33 For 1950-1980, we had only two data points for estimated catches: 1959 and 1975, which were presumed not to include collectors. We thus interpolated these boat-based catch data between

1960-1974 and 1976-1979. For 1950-1958, we extrapolated the catch backward based on the

linearly increasing catches interpolated annually from 1959-1975 (an increase of 250 t

annually). To estimate catches taken by collectors, we used the ratio of ‘collector’ catch to boat- based catch in 1980 (33:100) and carried this ratio back unaltered to 1950. We then aggregated

the boat-based and ‘collector’ catch for a time series of Zanzibar marine fisheries catches from

1950-2005. Finally, we aggregated the estimated total catches for Zanzibar and the mainland to

obtain an estimate of total catches for the United Republic of Tanzania from 1950-2005.

Results

For Mozambique and Tanzania combined, the overall reported catches potentially

underestimated total catches by a factor of 3.5 over the 1950-2005 time period. For each

country taken separately, reported catches were 6.2 and 1.7 times lower than reconstructed

catches for Mozambique and Tanzania, respectively.

Mozambique

Catch data as reported by FAO on behalf of Mozambique suggested a steady increase in catches from 7,800 t in 1950 to a peak of 37,130 t in 1981, before declining to around 25,000 t per year in the late 1990s-early 2000s. In contrast, the estimated total marine fisheries catches as reconstructed here suggested a rapid increase in catches starting in the late 1960s and continuing through the civil war, reaching a peak of 222,080 t in 1986 before beginning a decline that seems to continue to the present day (Figure 3.3a). Thus, using the reconstruction approach as outlined here, Mozambique’s annual catches were likely between 47,000 and

177,000 t higher than the reported data suggested. Since 2000, the FAO has reported annual

34 catches between 24,000 t and 32,000 t, while the present study suggested annual catches between 150,000 t and 173,000 t for the same time period.

The reconstructed time series data also illustrates the magnitude of small-scale catches. In terms of tonnage, the small-scale sector caught almost six times the amount of the industrial sector (Figure 3.3b). Excluding freshwater catches and ignoring imports and exports of industrial catch, and assuming that the entire small-scale catch was consumed within Mozambique, the average per capita marine seafood consumption over the 55-year period was 9.6 kg·person-

1·year-1 for Mozambique. From 2000-2004, marine seafood consumption was estimated

between 4.8 and 6.7 kg·person-1·year-1.

Tanzania

Catches as reported by FAO for Tanzania suggested an increase in fisheries catches from around 14,000 t through the 1950s to a peak of nearly 62,000 t on 1996 followed by a slow decline. In contrast, reconstructed catches show that fisheries catches increased from 25,000 t in the 1950s to around 97,000 t in the last decade (Figure 3.4a). Overall, for the 1950-2005 period, the reconstructed catch was 1.7 times larger than that reported by FAO.

The present study indicated that, for the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, total marine catches over the last few decades ranged between 10,000-25,000 t and 36,000-77,000 t, respectively.

Thus, mainland catches were about three times those of Zanzibar (Figure 3.4b). On the mainland, catch per fisher has been around 3.5 t·fisher-1·year-1 in recent years and total catches have declined, while catch rates have been much lower in Zanzibar, ranging between 0.5 and

1.5 t·fisher-1·year-1, while total catches have increased due to increased fishing pressure. Catch

per fisher peaked in the early 1980s. On the mainland, catch per fisher in the mid-1990s was roughly 5 t·fisher-1·year-1 while in recent years it has been around 3.5 t·fisher-1·year-1.

35 Discussion

The Western Indian Ocean represents 8% of the world’s oceans but, according to FAO data, generates only 4% of reported global landings (van der Elst et al,. 2005). As we have shown here by examples of Mozambique and Tanzania, such an assessment is more an indicator of poor and substantially incomplete reported data than underutilized fisheries productivity.

According to our reconstructions, Mozambique and Tanzania’s marine fisheries catches from

1950-2005 were 6.2 times and 1.7 times greater, respectively, than those reported by FAO based on country reports. These findings support broader research in the Western Indian

Ocean that suggested that FAO data reflect less than half of the real catch in the region (van der Elst et al. 2005). Our findings also reinforce what Pauly and Zeller (2003) emphasized: there is a need to complement FAO data and incorporate estimates of previously ignored catches, even if these are based on approximations and assumptions.

Critics of this method will point first to the fact that uncertainty is unaccounted for. There is indeed significant uncertainty in catch reconstructions and some recent studies have incorporated this potential error using a Monte Carlo sampling technique (e.g. Tesfamichael and

Pitcher, 2007). But there is far less uncertainty in the reconstructed catch data than there is in the FAO data (which also do not report uncertainty but still have been widely and uncritically used; e.g. Pontecorvo et al. 2009). Reconstructed data account for fisheries by all known sectors, including illegal catches, bycatch, catches by marginalized people (such as women and children), whereas the FAO data are only as good as its member countries demand or allow it to be (and have been shown to be biased for various reasons; see Pauly and Zeller, 2003).

Thus, one is reminded that the insistence on precision can undermine a historical perspective and can lead to ‘shifting baselines’ (Pauly, 1995). As the economist John Maynard Keynes is attributed with having said: “It is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.”

36 In both countries, marine fisheries catches recorded by the national fisheries divisions were not extrapolated countrywide. Furthermore, the catch by collectors (fishers on foot and divers) was

often omitted from official fisheries data. The reconstruction for Mozambique, as undertaken here, now accounts for catches by all fishers and collectors, as well as discards by the shrimp fishery. For Tanzania, reconstructed catches now incorporate Zanzibar, as well as catches by collectors on both the mainland and Zanzibar. They also conservatively compensate for general underreporting on the Tanzania mainland. Thus, the reconstructed data better reflects total catches taken from marine ecosystems. Although there is a level of uncertainty associated with our estimates, we remained conservative in our assumptions throughout. The reconstructed data illustrate more likely historical trends and patterns for Mozambique and Tanzania over the last 50 plus years. Importantly, the catch estimates presented here are closer to the truth than the alternative of continuing to rely on reported catches, and therefore to assume that no data means no catch.

For national governments, the earning potential from tax revenues on commercial and export fisheries is often enticing. But the lack of data on total fisheries catches puts management authorities in serious risk of over-licensing. In negotiations of fisheries access agreements, reference tonnage is partly used to determine initial cost of the agreement. In the absence of better data, FAO data and other unreliable existing statistics that underestimate fisheries catches are often taken as benchmarks, which results in low tonnage values.

The present study is specific to Mozambique and Tanzania; however the situation presented is relevant for all the Western Indian Ocean countries, and Mozambique and Tanzania are likely representative. In sub-Saharan West Africa for example, foreign fishing nations’ payments for access agreements greatly under-represent the true value of the resource being extracted by foreign vessels from local Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). In Guinea-Bissau, the revenue

37 the country received by ‘selling’ the fishing rights to the EU is only 7.5% of the value of the fish

had it been processed in Guinea-Bissau (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002). More holistic estimates of total catches being taken by countries will assist in ensuring more appropriate compensation for foreign fleet access agreements. Declining trends in fisheries catches over time, such as those documented here for Mozambique, also reveal potential overfishing of local resources.

Given the common ontogenetic linkages between inshore (shallow) and offshore (deeper) shelf waters for many fish and invertebrate resources (e.g. Zeller and Pauly, 2001), the likely heavy or excessive fishing pressure by the small-scale fisheries in shallow, nearshore waters will likely be exacerbated by inappropriate or excessive catches granted by access agreements. This may substantially impact local food security.

In recent years, the Mozambique’s Fisheries Research Institute has made great improvements in data collection, which is reflected in recent government reports. The new system has resulted in higher estimates of catch--800% greater than estimates derived using previous approaches (e.g., Afonso, 2006). These recent improvements to data monitoring will likely be adopted by FAO after several years of reporting have taken place (D. Gove, IIP, pers. comm.).

But unless Mozambique, and hence FAO, retroactively use these data to hind cast back to 1950 to adjust the substantial historic underreporting, the future data will continue to misrepresent the

historic baseline, with potentially dire consequences for ecosystem-based interpretation of the

effects of fishing.

Small-scale fisheries catches, according to the reconstruction presented here, were substantial

and, on average, accounted for 75% of total marine catches. Inshore resources are important to coastal people, many of whom live a marginal existence. The reconstructed small scale

fisheries catch estimates suggest that fish is a more important part of food security than would

otherwise be perceived. Our reconstruction showed that previous per capita fish estimates

38 based on reported data (e.g., 3 kg for Mozambique but 8 kg for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole1) substantially under-estimated true consumption. Using the reconstructed data, average countrywide per capita marine fish consumption over the 55-year period was 9.6 kg·person-

1·year-1. In Mozambique and Zanzibar, collectors play an important role in food security as the

invertebrates they collect are often eaten at home while the fish caught by men at sea are sold

(Semesi & Ngoile, 1993; de Boer & Longamane, 1996; de Boer et al., 2000; Guard et al. 2000;

Silva, 2006). On the Tanzanian mainland, collecting appears to occur at a reduced rate,

compared to Mozambique and Zanzibar, possibly due to the availability of alternative sources of

animal protein.

There are several reasons for the concern over the status of fisheries in Mozambique and

Tanzania. The present catch reconstruction confirmed reports of declining catch rates on the

Tanzanian mainland (Silva 2006). Historically, fishers in Tanzania were considered better off

than farmers (Wenban-Smith 1965), but this has changed as more people have entered the

fishery (Shao et al., 2003). The decline in catch rates is coupled with other indications of

overexploitation, e.g., reduced mean size and decreased abundances (Kristiansen et al., 1995; de Boer et al. 2001) and the widespread use of unsustainable fishing practices (Lopes and

Gervasio, 1999; Verheij et al., 2004). Population pressure also exists. Overall, the number of small-scale fishers in both countries appears to have quadrupled over the last four decades.

Combined, fishing practices and population pressure strongly suggest that ‘Malthusian overfishing’ (Pauly, 1997) is occurring in Mozambique and Tanzania. Though there are attempts

at fisheries management in both countries, and the level of enforcement has increased

significantly in Mozambique (Afonso, 2006), enforcement of existing legislation should be a high

priority along with parallel efforts to develop, implement, and support additional community-

1 World Resources Institute (WRI). Costal and Marine Ecosystems-Mozambique. http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/wat_cou_508.pdf [Accessed December 18, 2007].

39 based management actions, such as community-based no-take fishing zones (MPAs).

However, focus on fisheries and related measures alone will not be sufficient, as overall poverty

needs to be addressed through vigorous and innovative moves to enhance and support alternative livelihood options.

Equally important, increasing global markets for seafood are also a point for scrutiny. In 2002,

there were 12 licensed industrial fishing vessels fishing in Tanzania’s EEZ (Jiddawi & Öhman,

2002). By 2004, this number had grown to 24 (Mngulwi, 2006). Currently, there is a government provision to lift the export ban on marine finfish in Tanzania that had been in place since the

colonial era, and allow ten different groups of fish to be exported (Mgawe, 2005). Anderson and

Ngatunga (2005) point out that an export fishery would raise local prices and reduce the supply to domestic markets. It may also exacerbate hunger and poverty (Mgawe, 2000), and likely

result in further non-sustainable increases in targeted fishing effort.

The present study illustrated that the marine fishing sector is a more important asset to national

food security for Mozambique and Tanzania, and the magnitude of resource extraction much greater than was previously recognized. In both countries, little data do not mean small catches.

Mozambique and Tanzania should be very cautious in allowing international markets to

stimulate additional fishing effort given the domestic reliance on fish for fundamental food

security purposes, especially in regards to access agreements.

40 Tables

Table 3.1 Number of fishers by province and the proportion of fishers represented in Mozambique’s national fisheries statistics data.

Coastal 2002 census of Percent Number of fishers Number of fishers not province fishersa representedb represented represented Cabo Delgado 26,609 0 0 26,609 Nampula 39,585 70 27,710 11,876 Zambezia 14,151 100 14,151 0 Sofala 11,838 100 11,838 0 Inhambane 17,784 70 12,449 5,335 Gaza 1,497 0 0 1,497 Maputo 6,783 100 6,783 0 TOTAL 118,247 62 72,930 45,317 aIDPPE (2004) bKPMG (2006)

Table 3.2 Fisher, collector and human population data for Mozambique, and ratio of fishers & collectors to total population with sources and estimates. Year Reported Reported Source Collector Fishers & Population Ratio fishers collectors estimatesa collectors (x 106) (fishers & collectors/ 1000 people) 1965 16,131 no data Herrick et al. 13,198 29,329 7,414 3.96 (1969) 1979 38,883 no data Konigson et 32,086 70,969 11,329 6.26 al. (1985) 1981 39,609 no data Debeauvais 32,407 72,016 11,885 6.06 et al. (1990) 1982 42,300 no data Konigson et 34,609 76,909 12,097 6.35 al. (1985) 1988 43,876 no data Debeauvais 35,899 79,775 13,369 5.97 et al. (1990) 1995 49,045 47,378 IDPPE (1998) - 96,423 14,854 6.49 2002 69,359 48,888 IDPPE (2004) - 118,247 18,676 6.33 aBased on a 45% proportion of collectors to total fishers, as derived from reported data for 1995 & 2002

Table 3.3 Industrial sector reported catches and sources for Mozambique, 1955-2003. Year Reported catch (t) Source 1955-1960 3,300-3,900 a Krantz et al. (1986) 1961-1975 3,285-15,655b DNP (1976) 1981 24,650 Konigson et al. (1985) 1982 20,000 SIDA (1982) 1985 49,100 Gerboval et al. (1994) 1986 51,610 Gerboval et al. (1994) 1987 48,050 Gerboval et al. (1994) 1990 33,436 Gerboval et al. (1994) 1994 23,229 Charlier (1994) 2003 22,037 Tembe (2004) a1955 catch was 3,300 t; 1960 catch was 3,900 t b1961 catch was 3,285 t; 1974 catch was 15,655 t

Table 3.4 Decadal industrial shrimp catch and estimated discards for Mozambique, 1950-2000. Year Reported Estimated shrimp catch (t)a discards (t)b 1950 0 0 1960 400 1,120 1970 800 2,240 1980 11,700 32,760 1990 10,539 29,509 2000 11,195 31,346 aFAO FishStat bBased on 25,000 t of discards for the early 1980s, a discard:shrimp ratio of 2.8:1 was estimated.

Table 3.5 Number of fishers and collectors on the Tanzanian mainland, 1970-2005. Year No. of fishers No. of collectors 1970 6,719a 202 1971 8,200b 246 1972 8,531b 256 1973 8,188b 246 1974 8,331c 250 1975 8,500b 255 1976 11,157d 335 1977 10,033d 301 1978 9,800b 294 1979 8,100b 243 1980 7,600b 228 1981 13,200b 396 1982 13,500b 405 1983 9,500b 285 1984 13,783e 413 1985 11,392f 342 1986 12,619 379 1987 12,739 382 1988 13,855 416 1989 13,887 417 1990 16,178 485 1991 16,361 491 1992 15,027 451 1993 15,027 451 1994 15,027 451 1995 13,822 415 1996 13,822 415 1997 13,822 415 1998 20,625 619 1999 20,625 619 2000 20,625 619 2001 19,071 576g 2002 19,071 631 2003 19,071 686 2004 19,071 741 2005 29,754 796h aFisheries Division (1970) bBagachwa et al. (1994) cFisheries Division (1975) dMikisi (1984) eBagachwa et al. (1994) f1985-2005 F. Sobo, Fisheries Division, pers. comm. gFisheries Division(2002) hFisheries Division (2005)

Table 3.6 Number of fishers and collectors for the islands of Ungaja and Pemba (comprising Zanzibar, Tanzania) for 1980-1989. Year No. of fishers No. of fishers Collectors (Zanzibar (Unguja) (Pemba) total) 1980 5884a 7058a 4555a 1981 5954 7194 3937 1982 6024 7330 3319 1983 6094 7467 2700 1984 6164 7603 2082 1985 6234b 7739b 1464b 1986 - - 1679 1987 - - 1894 1988 - - 2108 1989 - - 2323c a Ngoile (1982) b Carrara (1987) c Mongi (1991)

44 Figures

Figure 3.1 Small-scale catch rates (catch per fisher) estimated and reported (•) for Mozambique, 1950-2004; catch rate was assumed to decline with the start of the civil war in 1976.

Figure 3.2 Number of fishers, number of fishers and collectors, and human population for Mozambique, 1950-2004. Reported data indicated by anchor points (•).

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52 4 IN HOT SOUP: SHARKS CAPTURED IN ECUADOR’S WATERS1

1 A version of this chapter has been published. Jacquet, J., J.J. Alava, P. Ganapathiraju, S. Henderson, and D. Zeller. (2008) In Hot Soup: Sharks Captured in Ecuador’s Waters. Environmental Sciences 5(4): 269-283.

53 Introduction

Sharks have survived the dangers of the world’s seas for more than 400 million years. Today, over 250 species of sharks exist, ranging in size from tiny pygmy sharks (Euprotomicrus bispinatus) to 12 m plankton-feeding whale sharks (Rhincodon typus) (Compagno et al., 2005).

However, over the last couple of decades, the wasteful practice of shark finning (the removal of dorsal, pelvic, and pectoral fins) for shark fin soup has become a major threat to shark survival.

The consumption of shark fin soup is a Chinese tradition that dates back to second century B.C.

In the past, consumption of fins was confined to the privileged classes. But rapid economic growth in China has had impacts on shark populations. A relatively small class of people demanding shark fins has been replaced by hundreds of millions of mouths willing to commonly pay $400/kg for fins. Ecuador exports shark fins to Taiwan, Singapore, China and Hong Kong.

Roughly half of all shark fins traded globally are imported to Hong Kong. Between 1991 and

2000, Hong Kong shark fin imports alone grew 6% per year (Clarke, 2004). It is estimated that shark finning alone now claims between 26 million and 76 million sharks annually (Clarke et al.,

2006).

Due to naturally slow population growth rates, many sharks are particularly vulnerable to overfishing, prompting the American Fisheries Society to recommend that sharks become high management priorities for fishing nations (Musick et al., 2000). Since the late 1980s, populations of almost all recorded shark species caught in the Northwest Atlantic decreased by more than 50%, with some species (e.g. hammerheads and thresher sharks) showing even greater declines (Baum et al., 2003). The IUCN Red List, a catalogue of species that are at high risk of extinction worldwide, lists 39 species of elasmobranches (i.e., sharks and rays).

54 The management of shark fisheries is usually difficult, due to a lack of data on shark captures, which results in underestimations of fishing pressure. The biomass of sharks caught globally is estimated to be three to four times larger than the shark catch estimates presented by the

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on behalf of its member countries

(Clarke et al., 2006). In Ecuador, we suspected underreporting of shark captures was also a problem.

On the equator

More than 40 shark species are found in Ecuadorian waters, most of which (~90%) are listed on the IUCN Red List. Many of these species are frequently caught, some for meat and some for traditional use, such as angel shark eggs to treat asthma (Martinez et al., 1999). Most sharks, however, are caught and used only for their fins, which are sold primarily to Hong Kong traders but might also be exported to Taiwan, Singapore, and China. The shark fin trade has existed in

Ecuador since at least the early 1960s (INP, 1964).

Sharks are often caught incidentally in various fishing gears, including, pelagic and bottom longlines, drift and set gillnets, handlines, and shrimp trawls (Watts and Wu, 2005). According to

Ecuadorian law, fishers are not allowed to target sharks specifically, though the high price to be

gained from shark fins subverts this regulation. ‘Incidental catch’ can make up as much as 70%

of total landings (Aguilar, 2006). Sharks are finned and the carcasses are often discarded

overboard as higher value fish species are used to stock the ship’s hold (Bostock and Herdson,

1985).

In the 1980s, there was concern in Ecuador about the high quantities of dead sharks being

thrown back to sea without using the meat (~70 %) (Wood et al., 1988). The government-led

55 attempt in the mid-1980s to increase internal sales of shark failed due to high prices and poor quality (Helder, 1994). There seems to be an aversion to shark meat in Ecuador, particularly on the coast-- perhaps because shark meat spoils rapidly and the quality of meat is often poor

(Franciso-Fabian, 2001). Shark meat is sometimes used to make fishmeal and sometimes

mislabeled and sold as ‘marlin fillets’, ‘sea bass’, or ‘flounder’ (Revelo and Guzman, 1997).

Large quantities of ‘incidental’ sharks led the Ecuadorian government to limit the export of shark

fins in 1989. In 1993, another law was passed to prohibit the extraction of fins without using the

meat (i.e. all sharks had to be landed with fins intact) (Franciso-Fabian, 2001). This law was

prompted by growing concern that exported shark fins were actually originating from sharks

caught within the protected Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR), 1000 km from the Ecuadorian

mainland.

In the islands

Historical accounts of early voyages to the Eastern Pacific point to the profusion of sharks there

(Roberts, 2007). On his crowning visit to the Galapagos in 1835, Charles Darwin was impressed by the abundance of marine life and wrote in the Beagle records, “The Bay swarmed with animals; Fish, Shark & Turtles were popping their heads up in all parts.”

In the 1930s, at least one whale shark in the Galapagos Islands was, in the name of science, subjected to “repeated harpooning and a number of shots with a heavy rifle” (Gudger, 1933).

Not long afterward, in the 1950s, shark finning in Galapagos became a commercial enterprise

(INP, 1964). In the late 1980s, tens of thousands of sharks were caught for the Asian market

(Camhi, 1995).

56 In 1998, industrial fishing (and shark finning) was prohibited in the GMR, which today

encompasses a 40-mile radius around the archipelago. In 2000, the Inter-Institutional

Management Authority of the GMR prohibited shark fishing, landing and trading of any type in the Galapagos Archipelago (the Ministry of the Environment officially enacted this legal resolution as an Ecuadorian Law in 2003). The Galapagos Islands and Marine Reserve are now a World Heritage Site and internationally recognized for their rich marine biodiversity.

Galapagos waters are home to 30 species of sharks that come to the nutrient rich waters to visit symbiotic cleaning stations, where cleaner fish pick parasites from the sharks’ bodies (Zarate,

2002). The GMR also provides a unique opportunity to reliably scuba dive with sharks. In 2006, more than 145,000 tourists visited Galapagos—representing a total value of $418 million, an estimated $63 million of which remains in the local economy (Watkins and Cruz, 2007).

Though capturing sharks is prohibited, illegal shark finning by local Galapagos fishers has been

on the rise since the collapse of the sea cucumber fishery in the late 1990s (Watts and Wu,

2005). Mainland Ecuadorian and foreign (e.g. Colombian, Costa Rican, Japanese, Taiwanese,

and Korean) industrial fishing vessels also illegally fin sharks within the Galapagos Marine

Reserve. Over the last two decades, Ecuadorian authorities have apprehended a small fraction

of local, national, and international fishing vessels illegally shark finning within the Reserve’s

boundaries. In 2001, the author witnessed the incineration of its 1044 shark fins and the at-sea

disposal of 78 carcasses after the Galapagos National Park detained the Costa-Rican long-

lining vessel, Canella II, for fishing illegally in the GMR. Given roughly 5 fins per shark, the crew

of Canella II likely killed at least 200 sharks but retained only 78, which supports accounts of

high rates of discarding in shark fisheries.

57 Fin flop: export legal or illegal?

Partly over concern for the Galapagos, the President of Ecuador signed a decree in 2004 for the complete ban on the export of shark fins, even from the mainland (Watts and Wu 2005). But shark finning is very lucrative; fishers receive a minimum of $20/kg (Franciso-Fabian, 2001).

The only comparable activity in terms of profitability is drug trafficking. Thus, the export of mainland shark fins continued after the ban (the photos featured here were taken in May 2005) and, during this time, many shark fins were smuggled to Peru or simply labeled as ‘plastic

sheeting’ or unspecified marine products. (Watts and Wu, 2005). In July 2007, against the advice from conservation groups, the Ecuadorian President overturned the ban on shark fin exports.

Despite this long history of shark fishing and the problems of illegal shark finning, the FAO did not begin reporting shark data on behalf of Ecuador until the 2005 update of data (which

retroactively included statistics from 1991 to 2005). However, knowing that shark finning has

existed at least since the early 1960s, this study reconstructs historical shark catches for the

Ecuadorian mainland using sporadic data on shark landings. We examined the period 1979-

2004, from when the FAO database for trade in fisheries began until 2004, when shark fin

exports were officially banned.

Methods

For the purpose of this study, we considered shark captures by Ecuadorian mainland fishers in

the two categories used by government and grey literature reports: small-scale and industrial.

For the small-scale sector, shark catches were available for 1982 and 1987-2004, though the

58 1988 data point was discarded because it was anomalous (more than three times higher than the average annual catch). However, of Ecuador’s 138 small-scale fishing ports, these data were representative of only 8 monitored ports: Esmeraldas, Manta, San Mateo, Santa Rosa,

Anconcito, Engabao, Playas, Puerto Bolivar (Solís and Mendívez, 1999). According to a 1999 survey of fishers, this represents only 21,005 of the nation’s 56,068 fishers. Assuming fishers nationwide have comparable average per capita catch rates, this implies that reported catch reflects only 37.5% of Ecuador’s total shark catch.

National reported shark landings were thus increased by 2.7 times to give countrywide estimates and account for the number of ports and 62.5% of fishers that went unmonitored. For the years 1979-1981, when small-scale shark landings were unavailable, I assumed the sharks to be 5% of total small-scale marine fisheries landings (the average ratio of sharks to total catch for the years 1982 and 1987). For years between 1982 and 1987, I interpolated the ratio of sharks to total catch (ranging from 4-6%) and multiplied this by the small-scale catch reconstructions to obtain annual shark landing estimates.

Estimates of sharks landed by industrial fishing boats were available for 1979-1982 and 1990-

1995. Industrial landings between 1982 and 1990 were interpolated. For the years 1996-2004, I assumed an industrial catch equal to the average annual industrial catch from 1990-1995 (608 t). I then aggregated the small-scale shark catch estimates and the industrial shark catch estimates to obtain total estimates for mainland shark landings.

FAO recently made shark captures available for Ecuador for the period 1991-2005

(www.fishstat.org). Ecuador’s shark fin export data were obtained from several sources from

1979 to 2004, including the FAO commodities and trade fisheries database. Data were not available for the year 1996, which I interpolated. Dried shark fins conservatively represent 1-2%

59 of the live weight of sharks (Bostock and Herdson, 1985). Thus, I used an average of 1.5% to

obtain estimates of live shark weight from dried shark fin weights (Table 5.1).

Results

I compared reconstructed catches with import data and FAO data (Figure 4.1). From the period

of FAO reporting, 1991-2004, Ecuador’s estimated shark landings are 3.6 times greater than

FAO reports. Reconstructed shark landings for the Ecuadorian mainland averaged 6868 t per

year from 1979-2004, with small-scale fisheries accounting for 93% of total landings. On

average, shark fin exports from Ecuador were 109 tonnes per year over the 1979 to 2004 time

period, or an equivalent of 6950 t in live weight per year. From 1998-2004, Ecuadorian shark fin

exports exceed mainland catches by 44%, or an average of 3850 tonnes per year.

The FAO commodities and trade database only reports shark fin exports for the years 1981-

1994, though national data sources (Table 4.1) clearly show that shark finning has occurred for

at least ten additional years.

Discussion

This research shows that shark landings by Ecuadorian mainland fishers are three to four times

greater than those reported by FAO (1991-2004). These findings agree with broader research

indicating that global shark catches globally exceed the values presented by FAO by a factor of

three or four (Clarke et al., 2006). Our results further support the notion that the use of FAO

figures to characterize trends in shark fin trade may lead to false conclusions (Clarke, 2004).

60 Curiously, the fisheries data reported to the FAO by Ecuador did not include any shark catches until the 2005 update of data. Though reports indicate that 28 species of shark are commonly caught in Ecuador’s waters, only six categories of sharks are reported by FAO on behalf of

Ecuador: thresher sharks; shortfin makos; miscellaneous sharks; requiem sharks; hammerhead sharks; and houndsharks and smoothhounds. The absence of shark fin export data in the FAO database subsequent to 1994 is also problematic.

Great discrepancies not only exist between what FAO reports (and hence Ecuador) and what

Ecuador catches on the mainland, but between what Ecuadorian mainland fishers capture and the amount of shark fins Ecuador exports. In the late 1990s, after the collapse of the sea cucumber fishery, many newly immigrated Galapagos fishers turned to fishing for sharks. There are anecdotes to suggest an estimated 80% of Ecuador’s shark fin exports originated from

Galapagos (WildAid, 2007). Our results suggest that, since 1998, an average of 44% of

Ecuadorian shark exports are unaccounted for, and it is possible that sharks from the

Galapagos account for this gap.

We recognize the amount of uncertainty in these reconstructions, but believe they better represent reality. Furthermore, these estimates of shark landings are likely conservative minimums given reports of high rates of shark discards. Sharks caught as bycatch while fishing for pelagic species, particularly before the 1990s, were likely discarded at sea and this bycatch is large and unaccounted for. According to reports from the Inter-America Tropical Tuna

Commission (IATCC), Japanese long-liners also finned sharks through the 1990s (Merlen,

1995). Both of these sources of finning are not accounted for here.

Aside from reconstructing catches, anecdotes can be an important source of understanding for resource management (Pauly, 1995). Fishers report that that catches of shark per fisher have

61 declined (Watts and Wu, 2005). Catch compositions of sharks might have also changed. In

1985, makos, tiger, bulls and Galapagos sharks were the most commonly caught sharks

(Bostock and Herdson 1985). Today, in Manta, which some sources described as the epicenter

of Ecuador’s “shark mafia”, blue sharks (Prionace glauca) and pelagic thresher sharks (Alopias pelagicus) make up nearly 90% of all shark landings; the former is listed as ‘near threatened’ and the latter as ‘vulnerable’ and facing a high risk of extinction in the medium-term future on the IUCN Red List (Aguilar et al., 2007).

Worldwide, an estimated 1.7 million tonnes of sharks are killed annually for their fins alone

(Clarke et al., 2006). As top predators, sharks exert important controls on food webs and ecosystem function (Worm et al., 2002). The disappearance of sharks could have major impacts on marine ecology. The removal of sharks in the northwest Atlantic caused a trophic cascade and an increase in their food source, cownose rays, which led to a subsequent decline in commercially valuable scallops (Myers et al., 2007). A trophic model of Galapagos fisheries indicates that the removal of sharks would cause an increase in toothed whales, sea lions, and other reef predators, which would cause decreases in commercially valuable grouper (Okey et al., 2004). However, whether sharks are keystone predators is debatable, particularly in areas

where tunas and billfishes are central to ecosystem function, such as the Central Pacific

(Kitchell et al., 2002). But the goals of conserving biodiversity, the waste associated with finning,

tourism, and precautionary principle (particularly due to slow-growing shark populations) are

also sound reasons to preserve sharks.

Given the worldwide distribution of sharks and their susceptibility to overfishing, a call for

international collaboration in shark management was made two decades ago (Manire and

Gruber, 1990). In 1989, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),

which provides an international legal framework for preventing trade in endangered species,

62 imposed an international ban on ivory. Comparing shark finning to killing elephants only for their tusks, several conservation groups are calling for a similar global ban for shark fins.

Though a global ban on shark finning has not yet been adopted, some nations have banned

shark finning outright, including the U.S., Canada, Brazil, and, for a short while, Ecuador. The

Bahamas banned shark finning for the simple reason that revenues generated by live sharks

exceed the revenues generated by dead ones (Watts, 2001). In 2004, the International

Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) adopted an international ban on shark finning. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) followed in 2005. In June

2007, CITES adopted a proposal to ban international trade in sawfishes, shark relatives considered to be critically endangered around the world.

In 2004, when Ecuador banned the export of shark fins, it had some of the most progressive shark legislation in the world, though its effect on the water was questionable. Today, a commercial export market for shark fins is again legal and in full effect. Researchers claim

“shark stocks can be harvested sustainably and, if carefully managed, can provide very stable fisheries” (Walker, 1998). The question in Ecuador is not whether a shark fishery can be sustainable but whether it can be carefully managed.

The reconstructed shark captures presented here, which should be taken as minimum

estimates, show that Ecuador’s shark fisheries are more exploited than previously believed.

These findings support urgent implementation of the measures Ecuadorian law mandates:

eliminating targeted shark captures, finning, and transshipments, as well as adoption of measures to minimize incidental capture. Furthermore, the discrepancies in data show that monitoring of sharks is sporadic at best. Thus, a serious shark landings monitoring system and effective chain of custody standards are needed.

Better labeling is also needed for all fisheries products, including sharks (Jacquet and Pauly,

2008). In Ecuador, shark meat and fins are often mislabeled. In Hong Kong, customs data

would be dramatically improved by establishing a Hong Kong-based customs inspection

program for shark fins and other shark products. Furthermore, trade quantities often cannot be

compared due to differences in commodities codes. Efforts should be made to more strictly

teach and enforce these codes (Clarke, 2004).

Other shark conservation efforts in Ecuador include the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) Marine

Corridor Initiative. In 2004, the United Nations Foundation and Global Conservation Fund

granted $3.315 million to strengthen five marine reserves in the eastern Pacific and to promote

regional cooperation on marine conservation issues in the eastern Pacific. This has allowed

initial implementation of the ETP corridor that will provide much-needed and long overdue

protection for migratory species, such as sharks, sea turtles, whales, and seabirds. This large

multiple-use area spans 521 million acres (211 million hectares) of ocean and constitutes the

largest marine area explicitly managed for conservation and sustainable use under a voluntary

cooperation agreement in the Western hemisphere. The tuna industry and some other fisheries

have opposed the corridor, but the countries involved are all supportive. Overcoming this

resistance and achieving active support of the industrial fishing sector is crucial to ensure that

migratory species protected within national marine protected areas (MPAs) are not decimated in

open waters. The recent placement of Galapagos on UNESCO’s list of endangered World

Heritage Sites further highlights the need for improved marine management even in relatively

well-financed MPAs.

These top-down approaches are also complemented by bottom-up projects. The group WildAid

is working to eliminate demand for shark fins soup and also initiated many country campaigns in

64 Ecuador. They are also helping in efforts to find substitute products for shark fin. The main

culinary attraction of shark fins is their gelatinous texture. In proportion to its size, there is more gelatin in a shark’s fin than any other living thing (Caldwell and Ellison, 1978). The texture of

shark fin is important in making the soup, but shark fins are essentially tasteless. The flavor of

shark fins soup relies entirely on the broth, usually made from chicken (Watts, 2001). Efforts to

make shark fin analogs out of pork and melon rinds are underway. However, there is nothing

that can substitute for sharks in the sea.

65 Tables

Table 4.1: Reconstructed data and sources used to estimate total shark landings, FAO data, and fin exports (t) Year Small- Industrial Mainland FAO1 Fin exports Estimated live scale total weight based on fin exports 1979 4290 3787 4668 -- 1288 8533 1980 4046 777 4123 -- 1218 8067 1981 4758 1697 4927 -- 1428 9467 1982 47412 6887 5429 -- 1428 9467 1983 3994 620 4614 -- 898 5933 1984 4889 553 5443 -- 959 6333 1985 4958 486 5445 -- 769 5067 1986 4494 419 4913 -- 639 4200 1987 92193 352 9571 -- 759 5000 1988 98273 285 10112 -- 839 5533 1989 104354 218 10653 -- 919 6067 1990 43474 1514 4498 -- 929 6133 1991 86964 2304 8926 2600 851 5667 1992 69574 1684 7125 2423 821 5467 1993 121733 6144 12788 4131 841 5600 1994 113044 9364 12240 4004 1011 6733 1995 86964 15484 10244 2803 1051 7000 1996 96213 608 10229 1805 -- 6167 1997 99894 608 10597 1874 8010 5333 1998 42475 608 4954 980 7710 5133 1999 16654 608 2272 625 12410 8267 2000 26086 608 3216 807 15410 10267 2001 74386 608 8046 2790 14510 9667 2002 56536 608 6261 2120 15810 10533 2003 37216 608 4329 1400 12710 8467 2004 23386 608 2946 1254 9910 6600 SOURCES: 1) FAO (2007) 2) Herdson et al. (1985) 3) INP (1999) 4) Arriaga & Martinez (2002) 5) Revelo (1999) 6) INP (2005) 7) Bostock & Herson (1985) 8) Willman (1984) 9) Scott & Torres (1991) 10) Watts & Wu (1995)

66 Figures

Figure 4.1 Sharks caught in Ecuador, 1979-2004

67 Chapter 4 references

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71 5 COUNTING FISH: A TYPOLOGY FOR FISHERIES CATCH DATA

72 Introduction

Some fisheries catch data serve only as eulogies for once thriving enterprises (e.g. the North

Atlantic cod fisheries). Conversely, some data-poor fisheries may be well managed (Johannes,

1998). The usefulness of catch data can be debated, but the general assumption is that

scientific evidence based on data is a prerequisite for policies to protect resources, including

fisheries resources, and to manage the people using them. In his description of sustainable

fisheries, Charles (2001) writes, “It is a truism that good decisions require good information.”

Global fisheries reports, data, and interpretation are part of the mandate of the Food and

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), whose constitution requires the collection,

analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of information related to nutrition, food, and

agriculture (Ward, 2004). The FAO (1997) definition of ‘Fisheries Management’ includes “the

integrated process of information gathering”. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 provided an international framework for highly migratory fish stocks and

is even more explicit about the data collecting principles countries should follow.

Since 1950, FAO has compiled, from every country, reported fisheries landings and related data

broken down into weight by taxa as well as spatially, by 18 large statistical areas. This

database, known as FishStat (see http://www.fishstat.org), provides the only comprehensive

global time series for national fisheries landings.

FAO catch data have served as the primary source for many global and regional studies

evaluating and interpreting global fisheries trends (Garcia and de Leiva Morena, 2003),

demonstrating ‘fishing down the marine food web’ (Pauly, 1998), estimating the fuel usage by

the global fishing fleet (Tyedmers et al., 2005), inferring the potential collapse of fisheries

73 worldwide (Worm et al., 2006), or assessing potential management options (Costello et al.,

2008). Policy-makers, and organizations that set out to inform them (e.g. the World Resources

Institute), often use FAO catch data to determine national earnings from fish exports, production trends, and per capita fish consumption.

FAO catch data are also used in conservation policies. An example is the Marine Trophic Index, partly based on global fisheries data and quantifying changes in marine food webs, which is one of eight measures of biodiversity to be used by countries party to the Convention on Biological

Diversity (Pauly and Watson, 2005).

At the same time, recent studies have called into question how closely FAO fisheries data correspond to reality (Clarke et al., 2006; Watson and Pauly, 2001; Zeller et al., 2007). In general, the deficiencies associated with FAO catch data are the responsibility of FAO’s member countries, where human resources and the political agenda affect data quality. Also, because FAO requires countries to report fisheries ‘landings’ rather than ‘catches’, many fish that are caught but not landed (e.g. discarded fish) are excluded from the datasets.

Here we present a simple typology for fisheries data with examples in each category. We hope this helps to illustrate and raise awareness about some issues of data quality so as to address and overcome them.

A Typology of fisheries data

The general classification framework for fisheries data presented here conceptually combines the possibilities of the ‘knowing’ and ‘reporting’ of fisheries catches. We recognize that both

‘knowledge’ and ‘reporting’ of a country’s catch can occur in degrees, so it is best to consider

74 each of these fields as a continuum. At the national and international level, we recognize countries can never report all of their catch. Given these caveats, fisheries catch data are best considered in four broad categories (Table 5.1), each of which applies at every link in the supply chain of data collection--from the original fisher to the collection agencies (e.g. local, national, regional, and global).

Catch known and reported

This is the ideal classification toward which fishers and collectors of fisheries data should strive.

In this scenario, reported catch reflects as accurately as possible the actual catch being taken.

At the national and international level, we suspect this is an empty data set; each time we investigate at those levels, assumed reporting accuracy evanesces. For example, the U.S.A. is

often thought to have good catch statistics. However, upon close inspection, the statistics of the

National Marine Fisheries Service do not include discarded bycatch (Harrington et al., 2005), recreational fish catches (Coleman et al., 2004), illegal catch (J. Sutinen, pers. comm.), nor fish caught within the three-mile coastal limit of state waters (e.g., Arctic Alaska; Booth and Zeller,

2008), which means that the reported national catches are lower than actual catch.

The best examples of knowing catch and reporting it are fisheries with high levels of observer

coverage. The groundfish trawl fishery in British Columbia, Canada, for instance, has had 100%

observer coverage since 1996 (Branch et al., 2006). Often, actual catch for such fisheries is

reported spatially in great detail at the regional level (i.e. for assessments of specific stocks and

management), but not publicly available because the spatial data are deemed commercially

sensitive. It is also uncertain whether non-target catch and non-retained catch ends up being

reported as fisheries ‘catches’ at the national, hence international level.

75 Catch known and underreported

This is likely the most common category for fisheries statistics. In this case, actual catch is greater than reported catch. The case of underreporting known catches (or not reporting them altogether) can be an intentional form of cheating and often takes place due to illegal activity at the enterprise (or fisher) level. In fisheries, data recording and hence reporting, are stymied by disincentives for fishers to report catch—i.e. the opportunity costs associated with taking time to complete forms, fear of punishment, political support, and material gain (Herrera and Kapur,

2007), though this has not always been the case (Rosenberg et al., 2005). The consequence of present-day underreporting catches is to subvert stock assessments and management, which leads to overoptimistic catch quotas, and undermine the sustainability of fisheries.

From shrimp and finfish trawl fisheries in the Eritrean EEZ (Tesfamichael and Pitcher, 2007) to sturgeon poachers in Oregon (Cohen, 1997), underreporting by fishers who know their catch is very common worldwide (Pitcher et al., 2002). Globally, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported

(IUU) catches were estimated as at least 11 million tonnes in 2007 (roughly 15% of total catch) valued between US$10 and $23 billion (Agnew et al. 2008).

The non-reporting of discards is particularly problematic. In some fisheries, good estimates of discards are available and could be expanded gear-wide or even country-wide, such as the study that estimated that nearly one-quarter of all fish caught by U.S. fisheries are discarded

(Harrington et al., 2005). In other cases, it is necessary to rely on expert knowledge to complement literature for estimates of discards. This was the case for total catch estimation in

Mozambique, which had to rely on grey literature and personal communication for an estimate of shrimp fisheries discards, which accounted for nearly two times the landed amount of

targeted shrimp (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007a).

Intentional underreporting of catches also transpires due to the activity known as ‘high grading’,

whereby fishers replace an initial catch of fish in the ship’s hold with more valuable ones caught

later and throw away the initial catch. High grading occurs because the replacement fish are

fresher, or larger, or are a more valuable species. High grading obviously subverts catch statistics, as the discarded fraction of the catch is not reported.

Misreporting, when fishers know what they catch but report it as some other species, is also common (Jacquet and Pauly, 2008). When English fishers exceed their cod quota, they simply mislabel their cod as ‘ling’ (Clover, 2006). Around 40% of randomly tested shark fillets labeled as ‘lemon sharks’ in New Zealand were discovered to be hammerhead and bronze whaler sharks, which are illegal to target (Smith and Benson, 2001).

Knowing the catch and not reporting it does not always occur at the fisher level nor is it necessarily associated with clandestine behavior. The island of Zanzibar, Tanzania, for instance, reports its fisheries catch through a fisheries institution independent from the mainland

Tanzanian fisheries institution. The catch is known (between 10,000-25,000 tonnes annually over the last few decades), but Zanzibar’s catch is not incorporated into the official Tanzania statistics and hence is not reported to FAO on behalf of Tanzania. This oversight is significant, as Zanzibar fishers account for one-quarter of the country’s catch (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007b).

Catch unknown and overreported

In this peculiar case, reported catch exceeds actual catch. This type of intentional misreporting

usually stems from a strong centralized government with a state directive for a planned growth in fisheries. Watson and Pauly (2001) described an instance of this statistical malpractice when

77 their predictive fisheries models could not explain reported catch trends of several countries, including China. China’s high reported catches (and the regular, annual increases in reported catches) were in accordance with the central government’s fisheries growth policies but not with what their large Exclusive Economic Zone was capable of biologically producing. Hence, China overreported fishery catches each year between the mid-1980s and 1998. As a consequence,

FAO now presents global fisheries with China separate from the rest of the world.

Catch unknown and underreported

Similar to the case of knowing the catch, but not reporting it, this scenario also results in actual

catches being larger than those reported. Often, not reporting is not intentional but instead an

oversight due to lack of resources, cultural biases, or perceived management and hence

reporting mandate. This scenario is the one most commonly applicable to the small-scale

sector, including subsistence fishing (Chuenpagdee et al., 2006; Pauly, 2006) and recreational

fishing (Zeller et al., 2008).

In general, data collection for the subsistence or small-scale fishing sector seems to suffer the

‘streetlight parable’: the search for lost keys focuses under the streetlight where one can see

best but not necessarily where the keys can be found. Although collecting data from industrial

fisheries and a few small-scale ports or markets may be easier, it may be unrepresentative of total catches.

In Ecuador, for example, national fisheries data is only gathered from 8 small-scale fishing ports, representing only 38% of the nation’s fishers (Jacquet et al., 2008). Similarly, in

Mozambique, only 115 of the 658 small-scale ports are monitored and reported. Thus, reported

catches for the Mozambican small-scale sector reflect the landings of only 62% of canoe fishers

78 (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007a). In both cases (and likely others), fisheries catches are not extrapolated to the country as a whole and we suspect this oversight occurs in many countries around the world.

Discussion

It is our hope that this typology of fisheries catch reporting can be used when considering issues of data quality and possible gaps in information. There are several indicators that suggest to which category data belong (Table 5.1). For instance, if a dataset describes a fishery with high levels of observer coverage or high resolution to the species level, it is likely the data reflect a fishery where the catch is known and reported. On the other hand, if only export commodities

(e.g. shrimp, tuna) are reported in a national dataset or per capita fish estimates based on

reported data are much lower than those collected from independent sources or those reported

in other countries regionally (e.g. in Mozambique), there is probably a good portion of the

nation’s catch that is unknown and underreported.

Several options exist for improving the problem of reporting and understanding historical fisheries catches. First, scientists and fisheries managers must accept that an estimation of catch (even a crude one) is preferable to the alternative (and less true) option of reporting zero fish caught. Essentially, a careful non-zero estimate, although not necessarily with high statistical precision, has clearly a higher statistical accuracy than a precise, but inaccurate reported catch of zero in catch statistics (no data being interpreted as zero catch). The need for improvement in this realm is particularly evident in the non-industrial, non-commercial fishing sector, where increased efforts should be made to establish comprehensive, even if from non- annual sampling and estimation, schemes (Zeller et al., 2007). At the national level, frame surveys, which count the number of fishers, per fisher catch rates, and are designed to

79 complement port sampling, should be used to obtain countrywide estimates of fisheries catches.

International and regional organizations (e.g. FAO, SPC) could facilitate, train, and coordinate

efforts to re-estimate total catch using sampling, expansion, and interpolation methods.

Researchers must also recognize the need to synthesize historical documents and incorporate

anecdotes into their work. Many existing documents tend to reiterate the commonly held

assumption, based on biased databases, that many fisheries catches are small. What often

needs to be done is a re-estimation of fisheries catches from the bottom up, even if that means

using anecdotes, which can be as “factual as a temperature record” (Pauly, 1995) and must be

considered to counter the shifting baselines syndrome. Studies affirm that the incorporation of

historical anecdotes and reconstruction of catches can provide better baselines and compelling

results (e.g. Jackson et al. 2001).

For commercial fleets, industry funded onboard monitoring systems should be developed and

promoted. Other measures and incentives have to be implemented to increase the reporting

rate and correctness in commercial fisheries, including adding fisheries observers to more fleets. Similarly, the international community should initiate efforts (via FAO) to get fishing fleets

as well as countries to begin collecting and reporting more reliable data on fisheries discards.

To further improve data, the international community must agree to and establish a better

system of monitoring on the high seas (Agnew et al., 2008).

When portions of annual catches are not included in stock assessments, the result may be incorrect estimates of sustainable catches. The issue of fisheries data reporting is not trivial and the concern is not only for the resource. Chronic underreporting of the small-scale fishing sector can, for instance, lead to inequitable policy decisions that favor industrial fisheries (that often compete for the same resources), to the underestimation of the contribution of small-scale

80 fishing to national GDP (Zeller et al., 2006), and to jeopardizing food security (Jacquet and

Zeller, 2007a). Furthermore, corrections to inflated Chinese catch data suggested that world fish catches were not increasing but, in fact, declining (Watson and Pauly, 2001).

Similarly, improvements in data collection and/or reporting over the last decades may distort data trends. The FAO catch data are not static and can change each year as FAO tries to improve reporting, or receives modified member country data. But one must be careful at how to interpret improvements. In Mozambique, new systems of reporting implemented in 2003

indicated catches in the small-scale fishing sector were more than double those previously

reported (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007a). But this does not mean that fishers are twice as well off or

that there was an increase in small-scale effort. This simply showed a change in data collection

methods. In fact, the balance of evidence suggests that Mozambique fisheries are over-

exploited and catch rates have declined (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007a).

Conclusion

Astronomers use high-powered telescopes to peer across the universe at light that has traveled through space for billions of years. Such ‘superb seeing’ enables astronomers to look directly at the past. Fisheries scientists and managers do not have this astronomical good fortune.

Instead, fisheries scientists perceive the past through their own personal experience, the anecdotes of others (written or oral), or, most often, through quantitative national or international catch data sets. Unfortunately, as we have illustrated, these historic data sets have various problems of incompleteness.

Many marine ecosystems were already impacted before 1950, when the FAO initiated its global fisheries catch data compilation. As suggested by Roman and Palumbi (2003), studies involving

81 genetics may give us a good ecological perspective of historical abundance in the oceans. Until

we have a better historical picture of ocean ecosystems with the help of genetic data and other data (e.g. Roberts, 2007), the public and its representatives will need to continue to try to make decisions based on societal values that, hopefully, are informed by science rooted in data.

Data are often unreliable, which is what led Hurwicz (1972) to develop his theory of ‘incentive

compatibility’ to show the lack of incentive for people to share their information with the

government truthfully. Although it is theoretically possible to get people to reveal their private

information (Myerson, 1979), perfect information (i.e. certainty) is frequently missing from

statistics, including fisheries data sets. But we should not allow uncertainty to cloud good

decision-making, and fisheries managers must focus on the trends of the available data rather

than focusing on the unknown (Rosenberg, 2007). When it comes to managing fish, as well as

compiling fisheries catch data, it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.

82 Tables

Table 5.1 Typology of reporting systems for fisheries data.

Catch is… Reported vs. Characteristics Indicators Examples Sources Actual catch

Known and Reported = actual strong fisheries Observer coverage Alaska Branch et al. Reported management common; high salmon, (2006) structures and resolution to Canadian adequate resources species level in West-coast (perfect accuracy) for monitoring; often dataset groundfish developed world fishery and sablefish fishery

Known and Reported catch < fisheries often Export data exceed discards, Coleman et al. underreported Actual catch operating illegally— catch data for shark finning, (2004), quota busting, certain high grading, Jacquet and defying EEZ groups/species renaming and Zeller boundaries or laws; mislabeling, (2007b), (intentional sectors perceived to recreational Jacquet et al. underreporting) be of minor fisheries (2008) influence and/or without management or reporting mandates

Unknown and Reported catch > centralized Increase in China Watson and overreported Actual catch government with a fisheries catches Pauly (2001) policy of economic suspiciously growth and lacking consistent; independent biological models (intentional statistical reporting do not support overreporting) agencies supposed amount of fisheries resources being captured

Unknown and Reported catch < poor resources for Only export small-scale, Jacquet and underreported Actual catch data collection, commodities (e.g., subsistence, Zeller often developing shrimp, tuna) are recreational (2007a); countries; or sectors reported; per capita fisheries Zeller et al. not mandated for fish estimates (2008) (unintentional reporting, often based on reported underreporting) developed world data are much lower than those collected from independent sources or those reported in other countries regionally

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86 6 THE RISE OF CONSUMER AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS IN AN ERA OF COLLAPSING FISHERIES1

1 A version of this chapter has been published. Jacquet, J. & D. Pauly (2007). The rise of consumer awareness campaigns in an era of collapsing fisheries. Marine Policy 31: 308-313.

87 Introduction

Atlantic halibut, now described as ‘America’s favorite whitefish,’ was considered unpalatable in the early 1800s. By the 1830s, tastes had changed and a market for halibut developed, which led to a vigorous fishery in New England and Nova Scotia (Cushing, 1988). In less than 20 years, inshore halibut stocks of the Western Atlantic collapsed and have not recovered since

(Pauly and Maclean, 2003).

Likewise, until the 1930s, Atlantic bluefin tuna were discarded as trash fish in the waters around

Denmark (Pauly, 1998). In 2001, a 200-kilogram Atlantic bluefin tuna sold for just under

US$175,000 at a Tokyo auction (AP, 2001). It is mainly to feed this market that the tuna fishery has depleted the Atlantic bluefin’s spawning biomass to 20% of 1970 levels (Magnusson et al.,

2001).

Fish fillets and fish sticks were originally made mostly from cod. After cod was depleted nearly everywhere it occurs, these fish products were replaced by haddock, then redfish, and then, lately, by Pacific pollock (Kurlansky, 1997). The market for seafood may be dynamic, but its consequences are uncomfortably static and predictable. The rising global market demand for seafood has led to an increase in industrial fishing coupled with fisheries mismanagement. The result has been overfishing, the collapse of innumerable fish populations (e.g. Myers and Worm,

2003) and the destruction of ocean habitat (e.g. Watling and Norse, 1998).

Fisheries have fully exploited more than half of the world’s fish stocks (FAO, 2004) and drastically altered ecosystems are left in their wake (Pauly et al., 1998). As human consumption of fish has doubled in the last 30 years (Delgado et al., 2003), the world is now eating down the marine food web. Invertebrates and low-trophic level fish are replacing piscivorous species

88 such as cod and swordfish. Rock and Jonah crab, at one time discarded as bycatch, are now marketed in spring rolls and crab congee. The change in public taste is essentially a reflection of the changes in marine ecosystems.

The expansion of bottom-trawl fishing during the 1980s devastated benthic communities and further altered ecosystems. After the removal of predators and competitors, jellyfish have flourished in the Bering, South China, and Black Seas (Pitcher and Pauly, 1998). The seafood

market has adapted to these changes and the world harvest of jellyfish is now well over 250,000 tonnes annually, with consumption occurring primarily in Japan (Edwards et al. 2000).

Jellyfish, however, do not appeal to the palate of consumers in the West nor do they indicate healthy marine ecosystems. Thus pressure has built to complement the traditional methods of

fisheries management (effort limitation, gear restriction, quotas) with non-traditional methods

(e.g., the establishment of marine protected areas). This is the context in which, in North

America and European Union, a number of awareness campaigns directed at seafood consumers have developed. This article examines the various limitations and successes of seafood awareness campaigns.

Background of seafood related social marketing

Kotler and Zaltman (1971) define social marketing as the application of marketing to the resolution of social problems. In the 1970s, the field of marketing underwent a major change and its use in changing social behavior was emphasized, though the results were not overwhelmingly successful. The most obvious proponents of social marketing for environmental change were the government (e.g. “Keep America Beautiful”) and NGOs (e.g. “Save the

Whales”). With the collapse of fish stocks and increase in concern for the oceans, NGOs have

89 launched a variety of seafood related social marketing campaigns, ranging from eco-labeling to the explicit boycott of certain products.

From a policy perspective, the eco-label aims to educate consumers about the environmental effects of the products’ production/consumption so as to catalyze a change in purchasing behavior and ultimately reduce negative environmental impacts. From a business perspective, companies are induced to use environmentally preferred production, distinguished by an eco- label, with the expectations of gaining a greater market share and higher profits.

The most famous and controversial seafood label, born in the 1990s with the first eco-labels, is perhaps the ‘dolphin safe’ logo on tuna cans. The best-established seafood label and most widely discussed (e.g. Constance and Bonanno, 1999; Phillips et al., 2003; Sumaila et al., 2005;

Kaiser and Edward-Jones, 2006) is that of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The MSC was created in 1997 by WWF and Unilever, after the latter, one of the world’s largest seafood

retailers, expressed its goal to source all fish from sustainable sources by 2005. The MSC

designed a set of environmental criteria for sustainable and well-managed fisheries along with a

label for fish products that receive MSC approval.

Aside from eco-labels, many NGOs and aquariums have launched campaigns to influence consumer behavior. Consumers can consult seafood wallet cards at the grocery or restaurant

to determine which fish are ecologically best and worst to eat. The Smithsonian Institution published a cookbook of sustainable seafood dishes. The Incofish Project, funded by the

European Commission, produced the ‘FisherMin,’ a ruler against which shoppers can measure

their fish to ensure they are not buying juveniles (for rationale, see Froese, 2004). The fundamental goals of these campaigns are to encourage the public to eschew seafood caught

unsustainably and, in so doing, help revive fish stocks on the brink of collapse.

The limitations of seafood awareness campaigns

The market

The main problems faced by seafood social marketing are the characteristics of the market

itself, in terms of both consumers and producers. Asia consumes more than two-thirds of the

world’s seafood (FAO, 1999). Yet, to date, very few Asian consumers discriminate between

products in the context of environmental issues and therefore are not targeted by groups like the

MSC (Phillips et al., 2003). Furthermore, future expansion in demand for fish and fishery

products is expected to arise not only in Asia, but in Latin America and Africa, where consumers

are also likely not to be responsive to eco-labeling of fish (Gardiner and Viswanathan, 2004).

Gardiner and Viswanathan (2004) also worry that, in the future, high demand from markets not

requiring eco-labels could marginalize approaches to eco-labeling, and make eco-labels

suitable only for niche markets.

This is perhaps because, unless the program is mandatory, only fisheries that stand to benefit

financially from adopting a product certification and label are likely to do so. Many developing

countries are concerned that the promotion of eco-friendly products is happening in markets

where food requirements have already been met and that small-scale fishers will be left to sell

the unsustainable fish by default (Constance and Bonanno, 1999). If eco-labeling cannot serve

the needs of the small-scale fishers, i.e. the vast majority of fishers worldwide, how can it be

considered in the global improvement of fisheries management? This argument is furthered by

skepticism over the support of labeling programs by industrial fishing companies directly

associated with the decline of fish population, such as Unilever (Constance and Bonanno,

1999).

Furthermore, in North America, the effect of eco-labels varies significantly between individuals

with different levels of education or environmental involvement (Teisl et al., 1999). In terms of

seafood eco-labels, Wessells et al. (1999) found few statistically significant variables that

affected consumption of eco-labeled seafood. However, their study did reveal that one of the

only variables that influenced the choice of a certified product was if the purchaser belonged to an environmental organization. They also found that consumers who generally purchase frozen

seafood are less likely to choose an eco-labeled product.

Lack of traceability

Social marketing may be further undermined by more insidious counter-marketing strategies by

seafood traders. Because of the absence of traceability, many exporters and even domestic

suppliers are able to sell their fish as eco-friendlier versions. For instance, seafood awareness

campaigns as well as health and safety organizations have stressed the benefits of tilapia, a vegetarian farm-raised freshwater fish. As a result, the demand for tilapia has increased. In

response, the Whitefish Association of Ecuador now sells South Pacific hake, a pelagic, ocean-

going fish caught with longlines, filleted and labeled as tilapia (Martinez-Ortiz, 2005).

Sharks, considered undesirable in Ecuadorian city markets, are filleted, relabeled and sold

instead as weakfishes or even tuna (Bostock and Herdson, 1985). Using DNA testing, Marko et

al. (2004) found that three-quarters of the fish sold in the U.S. as ‘Red snapper’ belong to a

species other than Lutjanus campechanus, ‘the’ Red snapper (in the U.S.). Re-labeling not only

deceives consumers but also provides them with the false sense that fish supply is keeping up

with demand.

92 Lack of traceability and re-labeling of fish also undermines environmental regulations. The

National Environmental Trust (2004) published a report on Patagonian toothfish revealing that a considerable amount of illegal toothfish enters the U.S. intermingled with other seafood or under

the nondescript title ‘frozen fish fillet’. The same report cited the 2001 South African indictment

of Hout Bay Fishing Industries, a company that attempted to smuggle two tonnes of toothfish

beneath a thin layer of crayfish.

Shrimp suppliers operate similarly. There has been a widespread campaign in Europe to raise

awareness of the negative effects of farm-raised shrimp. As a result, Thai shrimp, which

account for nearly 30% of global production, are often exported as wild-caught rather than farm-

raised. In addition, due to EU tariffs on Thai shrimp, small producers simply smuggle Thai

shrimp to Malaysia for processing (Miller, 1999).

Just as the inability to trace fish impedes the aims of consumer awareness campaigns, so does

the inability to trace the industrial boats illegally catching those same fish. More than 1200

large-scale fishing vessels fly flags of convenience and more than 1400 fishing vessels operate

under unknown flags, a drastic increase from the early 1990s (Gianni and Simpson, 2005).

These flags provide cover to globally roaming fishing fleets seeking to evade conservation and

management policies.

Greenberg (2005) writes of the pirate fishing boat caught illegally fishing for Patagonian

toothfish in the South Georgia Strait. The boat was dynamited, but the owners were never

found and the $400,000 fine remains unpaid. Similar accounts of owner evasion are a common

occurrence worldwide. These boats land their illegal catches in ports with relaxed import

regulations (Greenberg, 2005).

93 Mislabeling and renaming

Financial incentives associated with eco-friendliness have the unforeseen effect of inspiring fishers and seafood companies to misrepresent their seafood product. Although the Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has no official label, Nile perch fillets from

Lake Victoria are sold with a self-attributed eco-label claiming the fish were caught under the

FAO’s code of conduct for responsible fisheries (Pitcher, 2003). This type of misrepresentation is widespread. A study conducted by Kangun et al. (1991) found that more than 50% of environmental advertising is deceptive or misleading.

Financial incentives may also spur undesirable species to be renamed with more appetizing titles. Rock crab, once discarded as bycatch, is now marketed and sold as ‘peekytoe crab’.

The Patagonian toothfish, an endangered species, is marketed as Chilean sea bass (Knecht,

2006). Slimeheads were opportunely renamed Orange roughy as the market developed (Pauly et al., 2003). Flesh of low value fish is used to make imitation ‘krab’. Dual names and name

changes confuse consumers and complicate education efforts by seafood advocacy groups.

Few efforts to measure campaign effectiveness

In part due to the amount of manipulation in the seafood market, seafood wallet cards and other related tools have seemingly proved to be ineffective in fulfilling their aims. After distributing over one million seafood wallet cards, the Monterey Bay Aquarium conducted a self-study that revealed no overall change in the market and that fishing pressures have not decreased for targeted species (Seafood Watch Evaluation, 2004). This is an unfortunate contradiction to

Sproul’s (1998, p. 146) assertion that “an informed consumer is a reformed abuser.”

94 Still, the Monterey Bay assessment documents a genuine concern for results. After more than

eight years of effort, the MSC annual reports (MSC, 2004; 2005) declare the number, value, and location of certified products but altogether ignore the certifications’ effectiveness (quantifiable

or otherwise).

The MSC’s first certification was of the Australian rock-lobster industry, a process that cost more than $260,000 (Rogers et al., 2003). Despite the detailed process and indicators of responsible management, there is contention that this certification was done in error and that the rock- lobster industry may not be ecologically sustainable (Sutton, 2003). Similarly, the New Zealand

hoki fishery, also certified by the MSC, reported significant stock declines in 2004 (Greenberg,

2005). The MSC may create an incentive for industry to foster effective stock management but has so far failed to demonstrably arrest the decline of fish stocks.

Single species focus

Many of the problems associated with fisheries do not only involve a negative impact on the species themselves, but also on the species that are caught incidentally and discarded as waste

(Kelleher, 2005), as well as the destruction of habitat for a taxonomic range of species (e.g.

Watling and Norse, 1998). Another foreseeable problem is that encouraging the consumption of

‘sustainably caught’ fish puts excessive pressure on presently healthy fish stocks.

In an era where understanding that fishery management must be ecosystem based is growing

(Pikitch et al. 2004), the rhetoric of seafood campaigns based on a species-specific approach may represent a step backward. As Pauly and Maclean (2003) point out, low-trophic level, farmed fish such as tilapia may be substitutable for high-trophic level, wild fish at dinnertime, but they cannot replace the function of wild fish in the ecosystems from which they were extracted.

95 Successes of seafood awareness campaigns

Unilever’s goal to source all fish for their company from sustainable sources by 2005 was an

admirable one, though it was unattained. By 2005, Unilever managed 46% of its European fish

products from MSC certified fisheries, but the overwhelming bulk of this was Alaska pollock

(Unilever, 2005).

Meanwhile, the MSC has established itself as an independent organization and is gaining

momentum (Howes, 2005). It has now certified 40 fisheries (the equivalent of 3 million tonnes of seafood, just under 4% of global production) and labeled more than 300 seafood products.

Indeed, the mammoth retailer Wal-Mart announced its ambition to source all of its wild caught fish from MSC certified fisheries within the next five years (Wal-Mart, 2006).

The absence of uniform standards, a former inadequacy of seafood labeling, was recently resolved with a set of standardized guidelines published by the FAO. The guidelines outline general (and voluntary) principles that should govern eco-labeling schemes and minimum requirements a fishery should meet to be awarded an eco-label (FAO, 2006). The development made in the realm of seafood labeling over such a short time span may indeed confirm notable progress toward sustainable fishing practices (as Robinson (2004) proposes labeling, standards and certification has done for sustainable development as a whole) though the question arises of whether the this progress occurs swiftly enough.

Successes are also evident in some other seafood awareness campaigns. Tilapia (or fish labeled as such) is one of the most promoted eco-friendly fish and has moved up from to 9th most consumed fish in America in 2003 to 6th in 2004 (Cox, 2005). However, it is possible the change in preference was price or health driven (due to tilapia’s low mercury content).

96 Some localized campaigns, such as SeaWeb’s ‘Give Swordfish a Break’ campaign, which encouraged restaurant owners to omit swordfish from their menus beginning in 1998, have seen a rebounding of the population. But the success might be attributable to the second goal of the campaign to close nursery areas in the U.S. to fishing, which was achieved in 2000. There is also speculation that consumer concern over mercury levels reduced demand for swordfish.

Also, some NGOs focusing on seafood problems are, in their efforts, discovering the loopholes that prevent the efficacy of their programs and are then lobbying governments for legislative change. For instance, the National Environmental Trust (2004) launched the ‘Take a Pass on

Chilean Sea Bass’ campaign and, while conducting research, found that illegally caught

Patagonian toothfish (their real name) would arrive at ports and, before the paperwork could be cleared by officials, the toothfish would make it to market. Therefore, consumers would not know whether their fish is legally or illegally caught. NET successfully lobbied the U.S. government to require that toothfish imports be pre-approved by the National Marine Fisheries

Service before being landed (NOAA, 2006).

In addition, consumer awareness campaigns have distributed a large amount of information and, presumably, this is raising awareness and the profile of fish in society. The Monterey Bay

Aquarium’s study finds that seafood wallet cards do increase awareness (Seafood Watch

Evaluation, 2004) and a new ethical concern for the oceans is undeniably important. Many fishing nations are democracies, run by elected governments. Thus, citizens should be capable of reversing the trend of overfishing and consumer awareness campaigns may play a role in their decision-making.

97 Rethinking seafood and fisheries management

Despite the recent publicity of consumer awareness campaigns and the danger of mercury levels in seafood, U.S. citizens consumed a pound more seafood per capita in 2004 than they did in 2002 (an increase from 7.1 kg to 7.5 kg; Cox, 2005). If the goal is to reduce pressure on wild stocks of fish, then perhaps consumer-oriented conservation strategies need to be reconsidered.

NGO donors may legitimately require measures and reports of campaign effectiveness. In their paper on fisheries eco-labeling, Gardiner and Viswanathan (2004) cite criteria against which to judge different certification schemes. However, they do not mention criteria against which to judge the effectiveness of those certifications on the health of fish stocks. The majority of

studies on seafood awareness campaign efficacy are of the ex ante variety about indications of

willingness to pay or to use a label. Yet, ex post studies of seafood awareness campaigns’

impacts on the seafood market are virtually nonexistent (except for some aspects in Seafood

Watch Evaluation, 2004). Without evidence of seafood awareness campaigns’ efficacy, former

recommendations to intensify eco-labeling and other market-based efforts to move the fishing

industry toward sustainability should be reconsidered.

The proliferation of labels does not necessarily ensure that conservation goals will be met.

Organic food labeling is widespread in grocery stores across North America and is considered the most successful eco-labeling program. The California Certified Organic Farmers’ eco-label, the predecessor to the 2002 USDA organic food label, has existed since 1973. Yet, from 1991-

1998, California increased pesticide use by 40% (Kegley et al., 2006).

98 Considering the limitations of social marketing of seafood and the limited funding available,

NGOs should reflect on the impacts of their programs. In the case of consumer awareness

campaigns, they may consider shifting their conservation focus to other avenues. In analogy to

the ‘slow food’ movement (Petrini, 2003), Chuenpagdee and Pauly (2005) suggest that NGOs

try initiating a ‘slow fish’ movement, that would emphasize the need to slow the rate of fishing,

reduce fishing capacity, and support small-scale over industrial fishers. NGOs could encourage

fisheries to join such campaigns on the premise that quality can be a more important and

profitable attribute than quantity (Martinez-Garmendia and Anderson, 2005). Perhaps NGOs

should even consider a ‘no fish’ campaign that encourages boycotting fish altogether and

distribute bumper stickers reading, ‘Save the Oceans! Eat a Chicken.’

Today there exists a tendency for environmental policy initiatives to be set outside the

government sector, likely because the multinational companies affected by regulation are

prominent and influential. Buttel (1992) notes a trend in ‘NGOization,’ whereby NGOs have

gained influence previously achievable only by governments; this phenomenon is partly

explained by the loss of legitimacy by nation states and international institutions.

But the current faith in the magic of free-market mechanisms must be questioned; we will have

to manage fisheries with our heads, not our stomachs. Consumers should not be misled that a

system of management or conservation based on purchasing power alone will adequately

address the present dilemma facing fisheries globally.

Fisheries are the last major world industry exploiting wild natural resources for food, yet we do

not think of the industry in such terms. Consider the U.S. National Fish and Wildlife Service, a name that implies fish are perceived and managed as something other than wildlife. NGOs can help people realize that fish are wildlife, and not only food. NGOs can also launch

99 environmental education campaigns to alter the view of seas open to fishing will small

exceptions (i.e., marine protected areas) to the reverse view, that the seas should be closed to

fishing, with small exceptions (Walters, 1998). Through these or other means, NGOs can

encourage the public to rally behind the point of serious fisheries management.

Though fisheries regulations may need overhauling (Pitcher et al., 1998), they are needed,

nonetheless. A citizen’s strongest influence is ultimately his/her engagement in the democratic

process and the election of governments committed to fisheries management through curtailing

overcapacity, abolishing flags of convenience, strengthening regulations, and ensuring

traceability.

When whales were on the brink of extinction, the primary avenue of protection was not a

campaign in opposition to using whale oil or against eating whales. Whaling ceased after the emergence and wide public acceptance of a ‘whale mythology’, which de-commodified them

(Pauly, 1994). The moratorium on whaling, ratified by the International Whaling Commission

(IWC), was a direct result of the revulsion toward whaling felt through most of the Western world. It is only when a similar revulsion is felt by the public about the wholesale destruction of fish populations and marine ecosystems that we can hope to save them from our management

and our appetite.

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104 7 TRADE SECRETS: RENAMING AND MISLABELING OF SEAFOOD1

1 A version of this chapter has been published. Jacquet, J. & D. Pauly (2008). Trade secrets: Renaming and mislabeling seafood. Marine Policy 32: 309-318.

105 Introduction

In the 1980s, wild-caught fisheries peaked (Watson and Pauly, 2001). This same decade, trade

liberalized and the traceability of all products, including seafood, became a concern. The

Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-1994) further enhanced trade in seafood (Timothy

Hansen, Director, U.S. Seafood Inspection Program, pers. comm.). In the years that followed, more fish stocks collapsed around the world (Worm et al., 2006), and the issue of traceability, particularly illegal, unregulated, and unrecorded (IUU) fisheries, was identified as a factor contributing to overfishing (FAO, 2007).

The highest priority, in terms of traceability, is combating the global IUU fisheries that are kept afloat by nations that provide flags of convenience and relaxed import and export regulations.

Worldwide, thousands of fishing boats scour the seas and employ fishing practices that would be illegal in their home nations (Gianni and Simpson, 2005).

The renaming and mislabeling of seafood is also significant in terms of global seafood

traceability concerns. There are several factors to consider when labeling seafood, such as: a) species’ identity; b) country of origin; c) production method; d) potential eco-labels. Primarily

because consumers, especially in the U.S., are generally unfamiliar with seafood products, each of these factors can potentially be mislabeled. In contrast, wholesalers are often very familiar

with their products. Though fishers mislabel seafood, especially if they caught it illegally, the

literature reviewed here suggest that mislabeling is most often done by distributors and the final

seafood retailer (e.g. fishmongers and restaurants) for the sake of increased profits. A further

complicating factor is that many labeling regulations only apply to wholesalers, not restaurants.

The widespread mislabeling of seafood negatively affects consumers in terms of price, their

ability to make eco-friendly purchases, and potentially their health. Mislabeling also contributes

106 to the further erosion of fisheries, not only because consumers cannot make informed decisions on behalf of conservation, but also because mislabeling undermines import/export seafood regulations.

Globally, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Codex Alimentarius require the country of origin of all food products to be identified with the exception that “when a

food undergoes processing in a second country which changes its nature, the country in which the processing is performed shall be considered to be the country of origin” (FAO, 1985). A

recent study indicates that only one-quarter of cans of tuna were labeled with a country of origin, often Thailand, even when the tuna was not caught, but only canned there (Burger and

Gochfeld, 2004). Similarly, U.S. supermarkets sell cans of ‘Wild Alaska salmon’ with a ‘product of Thailand’ label (authors’ pers. obs.).

Many FAO member nations, opposed to any barriers to trade, resist labeling requirements and debate which fish species can share a common commercial name. For example, there is disagreement between Peru and the EU as to what constitutes a ‘sardine’ (FAO, 2007). For these reasons and other producer concerns over label costs, the FAO Codex may owe its continued viability more to its utility for tax purposes than consumer awareness or protection.

Given the lax FAO requirements, some member nations have adopted their own seafood labeling policies. In 2002, the European Union (EU) implemented regulations to identify the official commercial and scientific name, the origin, and the production method (farmed or caught from the wild) for all fishery and aquaculture products (Moretti et al., 2003), though evidence calls into question how closely these standards are being followed (Evans, 2007). In the U.S., the government recognizes that seafood is often mislabeled, but the enforcement of federal labeling requirements does not reflect a great deal of concern.

107

As early as the 1930s, canned mackerel was being labeled and sold as ‘salmon’ (Kallet and

Schlink, 1933). But it was not until 1991, after the expansion of seafood trade globally, that the

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) established the Office of Seafood and a 60 percent

increase in funding for seafood inspection (Foulke, 1993). After testing seafood for ten years

(1988-1997), the National Seafood Inspection Laboratory issued a press release indicating that

37 percent of fish and 13 percent of other seafood (shellfish are more difficult to disguise) were

labeled incorrectly (Tennyson et al., 1997).

The FDA now maintains a list of seafood names for industry to use in uniformly labeling its

product. The agency provides an online ‘regulatory encyclopedia’ with the official names for fish

and photos of their fillets for use by federal, state, and local officials as well as seafood

purchasers (see http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~frf/rfe0.html). But legislation that would require adequate seafood labeling requirements has been continually weakened, as was the case with the Country of Origin Label (COOL) Legislation in the U.S., which revised the country-of-origin labeling requirements and made them voluntary rather than mandatory, in part owed to a nearly

US$30 million lobbying campaign (Lovera et al., 2005). Furthermore, COOL legislation exempts fish markets, restaurants, and fishing vessels (Golan et al., 2004) as well as processed imports

(Food & Water Watch, 2007) from registering in the program.

Those existing U.S. seafood labeling regulations are by and large the result of protectionism.

However, after September 11, 2001, the U.S. food supply was analyzed and found to be a security liability; subsequently, the U.S. Bioterrorism Act of 2005 required all links in the food and feed supply chain to be traceable (Hernandez, 2006). But, in 2006, the FDA had only enough resources to check 1 percent of the 8.9 million food shipments imported (Barrionuevo,

108 2007). The Agency tested only 0.59 percent of seafood imports in 2006—two-thirds the amount

of imported seafood tested in 2003 (Food & Water Watch, 2007).

Rather, the traceability of seafood in the U.S. becomes a political priority when the protection of

seafood producers is at stake. In Maine, lobster fishers, who started an ‘Imposter Lobster’

campaign, are working to restrict the use of the ‘Maine lobster’ label by processors in New

Hampshire and Nova Scotia (Anon., 2006). But, of all fish, it is catfish that wields the greatest

clout in U.S. Congress.

In 2000, fish farmers in the southern U.S. felt that catfish from Vietnam (which was not permitted

to call itself catfish, and is therefore known as ‘basa’) should be labeled and sold as

‘Vietnamese’--the “Product of Vietnam” label on the box apparently not capturing the depth of its

foreignness. At the time, Vietnamese catfish accounted for nearly 20 percent of the U.S. market

for catfish (Laws, 2001). So southern U.S. Congressmen introduced a bill that required

wholesalers and restaurants to correctly label fish—but not all fish, just Vietnamese catfish. A

few restaurants questioned why labeling catfish from Vietnam was necessary while labeling

their crawfish, imported from China, was not (Walsh, 2001).

To the chagrin of U.S. fish farmers, Vietnamese catfish were also marketed as “Delta fresh

catfish” and “Cajun Delight catfish”. In 2001, the U.S. Farm Bill was amended so that the term

“catfish” could only be used for species of fish raised in the southern U.S., and not for their close

cousins from Southeast Asia (Laws, 2001). The farming of catfish, sponsored by the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of a post-war reparation project, and

again after the 2004 tsunami (USAID, 2005), had been, apparently, too successful.

109 Fish phonies

Financial incentives are the strongest motivation to rename fish with more appetizing titles or mislabel seafood as a high-priced species. Many fish are given an entirely new name (often similar to that of an already popular fish) to boost sales (Table 7.1). Concerned with the public image of the hogsucker (Hypentelium spp.) and stumpknocker (Lepomis punctatus), the U.S.

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), from 1973-1981, spent US$8.5 million on which

“underutilized” fish species should be renamed (Miller, 1981). Even without this expenditure, fish with ugly names would have likely been rechristened.

Cheap hake from South Africa and an Indonesian fish called ‘Malabar blood snapper’ are now both marketed as ‘Scarlet snapper’ (Walsh, 2001). In California, rockfish can be sold as Pacific red snapper (Foulke, 1993). Slimeheads were sensibly renamed ‘Orange roughy’ (Pauly et al.,

2003). Aside from being marketed as ‘Cajun delight’, catfish from Vietnam has also been sold as ‘Pacific dory’, ‘White roughy’, and ‘Grouper teammate’ (Walsh, 2001; Nolgren and Tomalin,

2006). The U.K. grocer Marks & Spencer got permission from trade authorities to sell Witch as

‘Torbay sole’ (Marks & Spencer, 2007). In the early 1990s, tilapia importers tried to rename their commodity ‘St. Peter’s fish’, since it can be found on the Sea of Galilee in Israel and the name would resonate in the Bible Belt; however, the U.S. FDA did not allow the evangelical makeover (Foulke, 1993). Renaming, though not of fish, can also occur for the sake of political advantages. In 2002, Austin Mitchell, a Labour MP in Britain, temporarily changed his name to

Austin Haddock during Seafood Week, to encourage fish consumption and garner support from his fishing constituency (Anon., 2007).

110 The problem of renaming fish is eclipsed, however, by the magnitude of mislabeling fish as a different species (Table 7.2). Many different fish species masquerade as Lutjanus

campechanus, ‘the’ Red snapper in the U.S., found in the southern Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico and a best-selling restaurant fish. In 1992, the FDA intercepted around 550 kg of fresh rockfish

from Canada mislabeled as Red snapper (Foulke, 1993), but this indictment was minuscule

compared to the amount of Red snapper fraud that has occurred over the last two decades.

Several studies indicate that 70 to 80 percent ‘Red snapper’ sold in the U.S. is some other fish

(Tennyson, 1993; Hsieh et al., 1995; Marko et al., 2004). In one recent case involving Chicago

sushi restaurants, all 14 ‘Red snappers’ sampled were actually some other fish species (Fuller,

2007). South of the equator, a similar problem occurs with the antipodean analog of Red snapper: around 40 percent of Red emperors (Lutjanus sebae) in Australia are incorrectly labeled (Anon., 2003).

The mislabeling of grouper is nearly as problematic. Grouper are now overfished in the Gulf of

Mexico and now, particularly at restaurants, many inexpensive fish are sold in its place. A string

of grouper scandals was uncovered in Florida, where as much as 70 percent of fish labeled

‘grouper’ was actually another species. The catfish, hake and tilapia that appeared during one

of the samples not only fell outside any grouper genus, they fell outside the broader family of sea basses to which all grouper belong (Nohlgren and Tomalin, 2006).

Seafood species may also be labeled as the correct species, but hide the fact that they have

been farmed. A report that analyzed salmon from several different states showed that, when

wild salmon are abundant (during the summer and fall), they are correctly labeled. Outside of

the season for wild salmon, more than half of the sampled ‘wild’ salmon were actually farmed

(Anon., 2006). Similarly, three-quarters (6 of 8) of ‘wild’ salmon fillets sampled by the New York

Times in its namesake city’s Fulton Market were actually farm-raised (Burros, 2005). The

111 mislabeling of farmed fish as ‘wild’ is not confined to the U.S.--a look at more than 100 samples from retailers in the United Kingdom found that 15 percent of ‘wild’ salmon, 11 percent of ‘wild’

sea bream, and 10 percent of ‘wild’ sea bass were actually farmed (Evans, 2007). It is rare, but occasionally this type of mislabeling occurs by accident. In one study, a farmed salmon escaped to the wild--in spite of salmon farm claims of zero escapement--and was then caught and sold as wild (Burros, 2005), its ghost posing deep ontological questions.

For seafood awareness programs to obtain their desired outcomes (including improving the ecological health of fisheries), it is essential that seafood consumers have accurate information and that eco-labels acquire and/or maintain their integrity. But to increase profits, reputation, and/or because of the inconsistent availability associated with eco-friendliness, fishers and seafood companies also mislabel seafood products as environmentally friendly. In 2003, the

Puget Customer’s Co-op (PCC) Natural Markets in Seattle, Washington was caught mislabeling between 4 and 5 percent of its fish with the label “EcoFish”, a certification sticker that denotes the seafood has been harvested in an environmentally responsible manner (Denn, 2003). After this discovery, EcoFish suspended its program at all PCC markets (Nyhan and Frey, 2003).

Two salmon purchased during the Consumer Reports study (Anon, 2007) were labeled as

‘organic’ (both turned out to be farmed), though no federal rule exists for using the term ‘organic’

on fish. The giant retailer Wal-Mart was accused in January 2007 of mislabeling foods with

‘organic’ labels at dozens of stores in five states—this from a company that pledged to source

all fish from sustainable sources by 2010 (Wong, 2007).

Consequences of mislabeling

Consumer and government economic losses

112 For free market economics to function properly, consumers require perfect information (Smith,

1904). Not only is some of the information about seafood imperfect, it is often deceptive. The mislabeling of fisheries products most often occurs after they are purchased from the fishers, who are most often ‘price-takers’. The price for certain fish can be high, even in terms of ex- vessel prices, due to resource scarcity. Rather than pay high prices, distributors, retailers, and restaurants often buy fish of lesser value, illegally sell these fish as their higher value relatives, and accrue the windfall profits. The consumer, meanwhile, loses.

When rockfish was renamed Pacific red snapper, restaurants profited from the substitution, not consumers (Walsh, 2001). When white sturgeon caviar is marked as ‘beluga caviar’, consumers pay five times too much (Cohen, 1997). In 1989, the U.S. FDA detained a 20,400- kg shipment of Oreo dory (Pseudocyttus maculatus) imported from New Zealand and bound for

Ohio markets as Orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus). Ohioans might not have detected the difference in taste, but they would have surely been upset to pay three times more for the

fish (Foulke, 1993). Diners at one Florida restaurant would have also been angry had they

known they paid US$23.95 in 2006 for ‘champagne-braised black grouper’ that was actually

tilapia. The value of frozen catfish, when sold as grouper, quadruples, as does the loss to

consumers (Tomalin, 2006). In New York City, wild salmon can sell for as much as US$64 per

kg while farmed salmon goes for US$11-26 per kg (Burros, 2005). But farmed salmon sold as

wild salmon can exceed the price genuine wild salmon when it is sold outside the wild salmon

season (Anon., 2007).

In addition to consumers, governments can lose financially due to mislabeling. In January 2007,

Mr. Danny Nguyen and his two seafood companies were charged with a 42-count criminal

indictment for mislabeling over a hundred tonnes of Vietnamese catfish as grouper and other fish so as to avoid U.S. anti-dumping duties that were put in place for catfish in 2003 (NOAA,

113 2007). Nguyen’s company and nine others were charged with selling nearly five million kg of

Vietnamese catfish falsely labeled as sole, grouper, conger pike, and flounder (Intrafish, 2007).

Resource losses

Renamed and mislabeled fish can have dire consequences for species that are under protection and/or are illegal to sell. In a document on the promotion of shark products for export, one finds that, “In the USA, shark meat sale has a better chance of growth under anonymity” (Helder,

1994). This is true in other parts of the world, too (see Table 7.2). In Ecuador, sharks are filleted, relabeled and sold in city markets as flounders or even tuna (Bostock and Herdson,

1985). Approximately 40 percent of the nearly 200 shark fillets tested in a New Zealand study were not lemon sharks, as the label indicated, but were instead hammerhead, bronze whaler, and school sharks, which are illegal to harvest (Smith and Benson, 2001).

Overfishing in the Caspian Sea, where most of the world’s caviar originates, has driven many of the 25 species of sturgeon there close to extinction. Meanwhile, U.S. imports of caviar have doubled since 1991 (Anon., 1998). How to feed the U.S. appetite for caviar? In a 1996 case,

2000 adult sturgeon in the Columbia River, Oregon, were killed to illegally harvest 1500 kg of caviar, which was relabeled and sold as imported beluga and Russian oestra caviar [61]. In the late 1990s, examination of 95 different samples of caviar being sold in New York City found that

23 percent were mislabeled with respect to species (Birstein et al., 1998).

Lack of traceability and re-labeling of fish also undermines environmental regulations. Over a five-year period, Neptune Fisheries imported at least 85,500 kg of mislabeled undersized lobsters to the U.S. from Nicaragua, where the export of such small tails (i.e. juvenile lobsters) is illegal (NOAA, 2003).

114 Undermining of eco-campaigns

Renaming and mislabeling of seafood also prevents ‘eco-aware’ consumers from making effective purchasing decisions on behalf of conservation (Jacquet and Pauly, 2007). Many exporters and even domestic suppliers are able to sell their fish as eco-friendlier versions due to the lack of traceability. With the extensive mislabeling of farmed salmon as wild, how meaningful is a boycott of farmed salmon, such as the Living Oceans Society’s ‘Farmed and

Dangerous’ campaign, if farmed salmon pose in the market as wild?

Similarly, there has been a widespread campaign in Europe to raise awareness of the negative effects of farm-raised shrimp, the production of which can destroy mangrove habitat and reduce water quality (Naylor et al., 2000). As a result, Thai shrimp, which account for nearly 30 percent of global production, are often exported labeled as ‘wild-caught’ rather than ‘farm-raised’ (Miller,

1999). For its eco-friendly and mercury-free reputation along with its price, tilapia has moved up from the 9th to the 5th most consumed fish in the U.S. In Ecuador, the Whitefish Association of

Ecuador now sells South Pacific hake filleted and labeled as tilapia (Martinez-Ortiz, 2005).

Renaming and mislabeling also generates confusion among those consumers who support

boycotts and stronger regulations. The ‘Take a Pass on Chilean Sea Bass’ campaign had to

navigate through the fact that Chilean sea bass is actually Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) and that, in recent years, Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni) has been substituted for its sparse relative. Furthermore, illegal shipments of toothfish enter the country labeled as crayfish or under the generic label of ‘frozen fish fillet’ (NET, 2005; Knecht, 2006).

Mislabeling also gives consumers the sense that supply is keeping up with demand. When there was a moratorium on U.S. grouper fishing between 2004 and 2005, mislabeled fish served

115 to sustain demand for an overfished stock. When English fishers exceed their cod quota, they label their cod as ling to pass it through customs (Clover, 2006), but the reverse is also true.

Consumers are sold sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria) as ‘black cod’, groupers as ‘rock cod’, and the poisonous Oilfish as ‘blue’ or ‘Atlantic cod’ (see Table 7.2). The collapse of the Northern cod stocks off Newfoundland, Canada, might have gotten a lot of media attention, but to the consumer, cod stocks seem just fine.

Health concerns

Properly labeling seafood is not only required for economic and ecological reasons but also for

health reasons. In the U.S., it is estimated that seafood products cause 18 to 20 percent of the

food borne illnesses contracted by 76 million Americans each year Food and Water Watch,

2007). Mislabeling contributes to illness in the U.S. and beyond. For instance, two Chicago

consumers of recently fell ill after ingesting the tetrodotoxin found in pufferfish, which was mislabeled as ‘monkfish’ (Anon., 2007).

Oilfishes (common names include: oilfish, escolar, rudderfish, butterfish, ruddercod, and snake mackerel) are indigestible by about half of all people and its waxy reputation has made its sale illegal in Italy and Japan. For many years, oilfishes have caused outbreaks of diarrhea among consumers in Australia, where food and agricultural officers determined the problem to be one related to incorrect marketing (Shadbolt et al., 2002). Consumers in Hong Kong recently got a potent dose of incorrect marketing when a large shipment of oilfish (Ruvettus pretiosus) from

Indonesia was labeled as ‘Atlantic cod’ and more than 600 consumers fell ill (Lam, 2007).

The correct labeling of species is also important in terms of contaminants. The risk of poisoning due to the consumption of neurotoxins (e.g. mercury) through predatory fish, particularly tuna,

116 has been debated for the last forty years. In the U.S., consumers have been warned about

canned tuna and told that albacore tuna, labeled often as ‘white tuna’, is highest in mercury, while cans of ‘chunk light’ or ‘light tuna’ are composed of tuna species with lower mercury content. But about 90 million cans of ‘light tuna’ sold in the U.S. each year contain yellowfin

tuna, which has mercury levels equivalent to that of albacore (Commission on Life Sciences,

2000; Roe et al., 2005). But rather than properly labeling their products, producers have chosen

to reduce risk by decreasing the amount of tuna in a can by roughly 15 percent to exactly 170 g

(6 oz.) and thus stay below the ‘allowable’ limit for mercury (Burger and Gochfeld, 2004).

Mercury is also a concern for individuals still consuming whale meat. In Japan, about 40

percent of what is supposed to be baleen whale meat is mislabeled as dolphin or other toothed

whale meat, which has an average mercury level of 370 parts per million (ppm)—925 times

higher than the Japanese legal limit for mercury, which is, with 0.4 ppm, lower than the U.S. limit

of 1.0 ppm (Endo et al., 2003; Tibbetts, 2003).

Aside from species labeling, labeling the country of origin and the production method is also

important for human health. High pesticide residuals have been found in Chinese shellfish that

pose a risk to human health (Guo et al., 2007). A study of more than 700 salmon samples from

around the world confirmed the need for labeling. Hites et al. (2004) found farmed salmon

contain higher concentrations of contaminants than wild salmon. Moreover, salmon farmed in

European countries have significantly higher levels of contamination than those raised in North

and South America.

117 Discussion

In 2006, assuming a conservative 15 percent of farmed salmon were mislabeled (some investigations have found as much as 75 percent), 212,250 tonnes of farmed salmon were sold

worldwide as wild. The consumer losses for these mislabeled salmon alone were at least US$2 million in illicit gains for the distributors and/or retailers as reward for their deception.

Meanwhile, farmed salmon production (and its associated negative ecological impacts) expanded. The consumer’s ability to impact the market, by avoiding farmed salmon, for instance, was made less effective. Furthermore, consumers of the fraudulent salmon ingested

more contaminants than they would have had their salmon really been wild-caught.

The importance of properly labeling food (centered mainly on quality and health concerns) has

been debated for at least a century. In the early 1900s, the public, stirred by Upton Sinclair’s investigation into the horrifying realities of meatpacking plants in The Jungle (Sinclair, 1906),

clamored for food safety standards. In the case of seafood, the government regularly seized

canned fish in the 1920s, which it described in one case as “filthy, putrid, and decomposed”.

The canneries refused to clean up their practice, claiming the government could not prove the

putrid fish was actually harmful to consumers [10, 82] (Chase and Schlink, 1927; Kallet and

Schlink, 1933). Early proponents of the U.S. consumer movement, who founded the group that

now issues Consumer Reports, independently tested products and to lobbied the government

for better grading and labeling of products. The work by the Consumer Reports team in the

1920s and 1930s prompted governments to outlaw blatantly false claims in advertising, to

establish quality standards for consumer goods, and become actively involved in labeling them

(Klein, 2000). But, then and now, labeling requirements are slow to take effect. In 1973, nearly

100 percent of over 2000 people interviewed in the U.S. were in favor of a nutrition label on food

products (Lenehan et al., 1973). Yet, the U.S. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act did not pass

118 until 1990 and was not implemented until 1994. In Canada, nutrition label requirements were

not made mandatory until 2005.

In terms of seafood, the mislabeling issue and the fishing industry’s resistance toward (and

power to contest) labeling standards is more than a century old. In 1906, after The Jungle

(Sinclair, 1906) triggered public outrage, there was overwhelming Congressional support for a

new Food and Drug Act. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture’s first response to the new act was

to weaken it: the Maine fish packers wanted to allow all small pelagic fish to be labeled as

‘sardines’, which the Secretary granted (Kallet and Schlink, 1933). Industry’s ability to weaken

labeling legislation that is backed by popular support continues today. In April 2005, Country of

Origin Legislation (COOL) went into effect for seafood, but after legislators struck “the onerous

mandatory system” and established instead “a rigorous voluntary program”. Agribusiness (e.g.,

Wal-Mart Stores, Tyson Foods, the American Meat Institute) participated in the political process

with a US$29.2 million lobbying campaign against COOL legislation (Lovera et al., 2005). This

in spite of the fact that several studies have indicated one-third of all seafood sold in the U.S. is

mislabeled (Anon., 1992; Tennyson et al., 1997).

The fishing industry’s standard argument is often that proposed labeling legislation is too costly.

But the costs associated with mislabeling are also high: consumer and resource losses, eco-

label ineffectiveness, and health concerns. Today the market climate is one that encourages

consumers to responsible for their health and the health of the environment. While it is true that

consumers should have a better understanding of their seafood (appearance, flavor, and origin),

awareness alone will not protect consumers from deceit in the seafood market.

There are straightforward approaches that have proven effective at testing seafood for validity to

the species level, including biochemical techniques, DNA fingerprinting, and assays (Birstein et

119 al., 1998; Smith and Benson, 2001; Moretti et al., 2003). A database is also under construction

that catalogues the molecular genetics of different seafood species (Maldini et al., 2006). While

these techniques are relatively inexpensive, they require complex technologies, human resources, and political will, and are thus likely unrealistic in the developing world, where the

majority of seafood consumed in developed countries originates. Until such methods become

economically and politically viable, labeling is likely to remain an important, though

cumbersome, component of international trade.

A global mandate for species, country-of-origin, and production method labeling as well as

verifiability of eco-labels is necessary for all seafood. At the international level, the FAO Codex

Alimentarius should require actual geographic site of origin, not just the place of processing.

The U.S., which imports more than 80 percent of its seafood, could move from protecting catfish

producers in the southern U.S. from competitive imports to becoming a leader for seafood labeling in the global arena. Though recent years have affirmed the Marine Stewardship

Council (MSC) as the leader of eco-labeling, any attempts in this vein by the International

Standards Organization (ISO), which has its own evaluation and certification scheme to assess sustainable fisheries, should collaborate with the MSC so that consumers are not further inundated with information to the extent that efforts become counter-productive (Sproul, 1998).

Perhaps the best method is to ensure labeling standards is with a third-party validation from

‘cradle to plate’. To improve traceability and retain public confidence in labeling claims, the

MSC recently implemented a Chain of Custody certification that guarantees fish buyers that their seafood can be traced back through the supply chain from the point of sale to the fishery of origin (MSC, 2007). The MSC chain of custody standards could be adopted nationally and/or globally.

120 Additionally, the penalties for mislabeling and illegally harvesting fish must be raised. The fines

for mislabeling foods as organic are high--up to US$10,000 in some cases (Wong, 2007). But

fines for illegally harvesting fish—never mind mislabeling them--are minimal. In the case of the

two poachers who were indicted on grounds of illegally harvesting American sturgeon caviar

(and selling it as imported Russian caviar), their fines totaled US$17,375—less than 1 percent

of the estimated US$2 million the pair made on the sale (Cohen, 1997).

Marine conservation non-profits should also continue efforts to win legislation for seafood

traceability, including labeling standards. The National Environmental Trust (NET, 2005)

published a report on Patagonian toothfish revealing that a considerable amount of illegal

toothfish enters the U.S. intermingled with other seafood or under the nondescript title ‘frozen

fish fillet’. They have worked to prevent of fish from entering the U.S. under such a vague

description but, so far, have not had success.

In 1992, Consumer Reports (Anon., 1992) published an article titled, “The label said Snapper,

the lab said baloney”. Fifteen years later, the mislabeling of Red snapper is, if anything, more

widespread (e.g. Marko et al., 2004). Red snapper began disappearing a half century ago, but

one would never know by reading a menu. Using old menus from the 1850s onward,

researchers are presently gaining insights to historical marine abundance (Holm, 2003; Hopkin,

2005). In the future, due to the rampant mislabeling of seafood today, this sort of study would

be futile.

Of greater concern is that species are mislabeled because there is a shortage of the desired

species or because the species itself was illegally caught (illegal, because there is a shortage).

Species are renamed because an ever-growing demand for seafood creates new markets for

fish that were once considered unmarketable (e.g. slimeheads, toothfish). Today’s renaming

121 and mislabeling is not only an indication of cheating, but is, fundamentally, an indication that global fisheries are in distress.

122 Tables

Table 7.1 Some Cases of Renaming Seafood to Improve Marketinga Scientific Original Renamed Remarks (Source) name name Hoplostethus Slimehead Orange roughy Originally named ‘slimehead’ in 1957, it was renamed in 1979 as atlanticus the seafood market changed (Pauly et al., 2003).

Dissostichus Patagonian Chilean sea Renamed in late 1970s by a fish merchant from California. In elegenoides toothfish bass 1994, fish merchants appealed to the FDA to change the name officially, which the FDA refused on grounds that Patagonian toothfish falls outside of the sea bass family (Knecht, 2006). Glyptocephal Witch Torbay sole Renamed by Marks & Spencer, the U.K. grocer, after an English us bay where the fish is often found (Marks & Spencer, 2007). cynoglossus Squalus Spiny Rock salmon, From 1973-1981, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) acanthias dogfish Hass spent US$8.5 million investigating which “underutilized species” with a bad image should be renamed (Miller, 1981). Ruvettus Oilfish Blue cod A Toronto consumer fell ill after eating oilfish that was labeled as pretiosus ‘Blue cod’ steaks at a Chinese supermarket (Anon, 2007). Sebastes Rockfish Pacific red In California, Rockfish can be sold as Pacific red snapper but, spp. snapper, Rock outside of California, the U.S. FDA only allows Sebastes spp. to be cod sold as ‘Rockfish’ (Foulke, 1993). Merluccius South Scarlet “Anything that is red is going to be sold as red snapper, no matter capensis and African snapper what it is,” said one restaurant supplier (quoted by Walsh, 2001). M. hake paradoxus Lutjanus Malabar Scarlet malabaricus blood snapper snapper Anoplopoma Sablefish Black cod (Anon, 2007) fimbria Oncorhyncus Chum Silver brite This mislabel is common in Chicago and probably elsewhere keta salmon salmon (Anon, 1992). Ictalurus Channel Southern trout, One of the names used to rid catfish of their original image (think punctatus catfish Ocean catfish Porgy and Bess in “Catfish Row”) [Authors’ personal observation]. Pangasius ‘Basa’ Cajun delight (USAID, 2005) bocourti catfish, Delta fresh catfish, White roughy, Pacific dory, Grouper teammate Cancer Rock crab Peekytoe crab Once discarded as trash crab, rock crabs underwent a marketing irroratus makeover in the mid-1990s and, renamed as ‘Peekytoe crab’, have now become the “culinary darlings” of many chefs (Redmayne, 2002). a) The scientific names of fish and invertebrates were verified using FishBase (www.fishbase.org) and SeaLifebase (www.sealifebase.org), respectively.

123

Table 7.2 Some Better Documented Cases of Fraudulent Mislabeling of Seafood for Purposes of Deceiving Customersa You are You Which is But you get: Also Remarks/Source in: purchase: supposed to called: be: Common Scientific Scientific name Common name name name U.S. Red Lutjanus campechSaenbuasstes spp. Rockfish Studies indicate that 70 to 80 percent snapper Oreochromis Tilapia ‘Red snapper’ sold in the U.S. is spp. some other fish (Tennyson, 1993; Coryphaena Mahi Mahi Hsieh, 1995; Marko et al., 2004). hippurus Ictalurus Channel punctatus catfish U.S. Grouper Epinephelus Ictalurus Channel Grouper from the Gulf of Mexico was spp., punctatus catfish once abundant. Now, as much as 70 Mycteroperca Merluccius spp. Hake percent of tested ‘groupers’ (mostly spp. Oreochromis Tilapia in Florida) have been mislabeled spp. (Nohlgren and Tomalin, 2006). Theragra Alaska chalcogramma pollock U.S. ‘Wild’ Oncorhynchus Salmo salar Farmed Many ‘wild’ salmon are actually salmon spp. salmon farmed, particularly outside of the salmon season (Burros, 2005; Evans, 2007). U.S. Mahi Mahi Coryphaena ??? Yellowtail (Burros, 1992) hippurus U.S. Halibut Hippoglossus ??? Sea bass (Burros, 1992) spp. U.S. Orange Hoplostethus Pseudocyttus Oreo dory (US FDA, 2006) roughy atlanticus maculatus Zeus faber John dory (Burros, 1992; US FDA, 2006) U.S. Swordfish Xiphias Isurus Mako shark (Burros, 1992; US FDA, 2006) gladius oxyrinchus U.S. Cod Gadus morhua Theragra Alaska (Burros, 1992) chalcogramma pollock U.S. ‘Dover Microstomus Atheresthes Arrowtooth The irony is that Solea solea occurs sole’ pacificus stomias flounder in Dover (US FDA, 2006). U.S. Red drum Sciaenops Pogonias cromis Black drum (US FDA, 2006) ocellatus U.S. Rock cod Scorpaenidae Squalus Spiny (Gorton’s Fresh Seafood, 2007) acanthias dogfish U.S. Monkfish Lophius spp. Tetrodon spp. Pufferfish Two Chicago customers recently fell ill after ingesting tetrodotoxin found in their ‘monkfish’, which was actually pufferfish (Anon, 2007). U.S. Shrimp, Crustaceans, Protein fibers Surimi One New Yorker complained bitterly crabs, Decapods extracted from about surimi substitution—tired of scallops, offal receiving “additive laden, colored, lobsters and extruded cheap fish sausage” in lieu of the shellfish he ordered (quoted in Burros, 1987). U.S. Beluga Eggs of Huso Eggs of Lumpfish (Pauly, 2004) caviar huso Cyclopterus roe lumpus Eggs of Paddlefish (US FDA, 2006) Polyodon roe spatula U.S. Scallops Pectinidae Various Skate wings (US FDA, 2006) U.S. Patagonian Dissostichus Dissostichus Antarctic (Knecht, 2006)

124 toothfish eleginoides mawsoni toothfish U.S. Lobster Homarus spp., Nephrops Langoustine (Hernandez, 2006) Panilurus spp., norvegicus or scampi Panulirus spp. U.S. White Morone Perca Yellow (US FDA, 2006) perch americana flavescens perch U.S. Zander Sander Perca Yellow (US FDA, 2006) lucioperca flavescens perch U.S. Sauger Sander Sander vitreus Walleye (US FDA, 2006) canadensis U.S. Pink Oncorhynchus Oncorhynchus Chum (US FDA, 2006) salmon gorbuscha keta salmon Hong Atlantic cod Gadus morhua Ruvettus Oilfish (Lam, 2007) Kong pretiosus France ‘Thon Thunninae Lamna nasus Porbeagle French common name: ‘Requin blanc’ taupe commun’ (Anon., 2006). Alopias vulpinus Thintail French common name: ‘Renard de thresher mer’ (Anon., 2006). shark Ecuador Tilapia Oreochromis Merluccius gayi South (Martinez-Ortiz, 2005) spp. Pacific hake Weakfish Scioenidae Flounder Pleuronectidae Ecuador Tuna Thunninae Selachians Shark (Bostock and Herdson, 1985) Flounder Pleuronectidae Colombia ‘Pargo rojo’ Lutjanus spp. Oreochromis Tilapia (Jeffrey Wielgus, University of British spp. Columbia Fisheries Centre, pers. Comm.) Australia Barramundi Lates Lates niloticus Nile perch 13 percent of barramundi tested in calcarifer Polydactylus King an Australian study were mislabeled macrochir threadfin (Anon., 2003). Australia King Sillaginodes Micromesistius Southern (Hughes, 2003) George punctatus australis blue whiting whiting Merlangius North sea merlangus whiting Sillago spp. Silver whiting Merluccius spp. Hake Australia Red Lutjanus Lethrinus Spangled 41 percent of Red emperors tested in emperor sebae choerorhynchus emperor an Australian study were mislabeled Lethrinus Redthroat (Anon., 2003). miniatus emperor Australia Dhufish Glaucosoma Glaucosoma Northern 46 percent of Dhufish tested in an hebraicum buergeri pearl perch Australian study were mislabeled Glaucosoma Pearl perch (Anon., 2003). scapulare a) The scientific names of fish and invertebrates were verified with FishBase (www.fishbase.org) and SeaLifeBase (www.sealifebase.org), respectively.

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131 8 FUNDING PRIORITIES: BIG BARRIERS TO SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES1

1 A version of this chapter has been published. Jacquet, J. & D. Pauly (2008). Funding priorities: Big barriers to small-scale fisheries. Conservation Biology 22(4): 832-835.

132 Since the mid-1990s, there has been a concerted effort to encourage fisheries sustainability by

targeting large-scale, high-catch fisheries and by raising consumer awareness. Because of the

often slow pace of regulatory approaches, this voluntary, market-oriented effort has been

structured so as to avoid government involvement. But have small-scale fisheries, our best

option for sustainable use of fisheries resources, been lost in the market-based push toward

sustainability?

In financial terms, the largest sustainable fisheries initiative has been the U.S.-based Seafood

Choices campaign, largely funded by the Packard Foundation. From 1999-2004, Seafood

Choices invested $37 million in more than 30 nonprofit organizations to promote market-based

sustainable seafood initiatives, such as ecolabeling certification and seafood wallet cards, which

signal to consumers sustainably caught fish (Bridgespan Group, 2005). In contrast, over the last

decade, only 2 U.S.-based nonprofit organizations have invested <$1.5 million in research and

policy reform related to global fisheries subsidies (M. Hirshfield, personal communication).

Since the late 1990s, the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) has had one full-time staff

working on fisheries subsidies and lobbying countries to reduce subsidies (~ cost:

<$100,000/year). In 2005 the nonprofit organization Oceana began a campaign against

fisheries subsidies with some staff working part-time on the issue of subsidies (~ cost:

<$75,000). In 2006 Oceana ramped up their efforts against subsidies (~ cost: $125,000-

150,000) and in 2007 spent ~$400,000 on subsidy-related efforts, including a paid advertising

campaign, media, staff, and travel (M. Hirshfield, personal communication).

Although they are often described as very variable between countries, small-scale fisheries are

characterized as fishers operating on in boats of 15 m or less or without boats (Chuenpagdee et al., 2006). They generally use less energy-intensive fishing gear and cannot operate far offshore. While industrial trawlers use destructive fishing gear that destroys the bottom habitat

133 upon which exploited species depend (Chuenpagdee et al., 2003) and, jointly with other industrial fisheries, discard 8-20 million tonnes of unwanted dead fish each year (Zeller & Pauly,

2005), the small-scale fisheries discard little to no fish and (with the exception of few gears, including dynamite) do not destroy benthic communities. Unlike specialized industrial fisheries, small-scale fishers are capable of targeting different fish species depending on their availability

(Munro, 1979). Furthermore, small-scale fisheries produce little to no fishmeal while the

industrial sector reduces 20-30 millions of fish annually into fishmeal to feed pigs, chickens, and

farmed fish (Alder & Pauly, 2006). Small-scale fisheries employ 25 times more people and use

one-quarter the fuel to catch roughly the same amount of edible fish (roughly 30 million tonnes)

as the large-scale, industrial fishing sector (Chuenpagdee et al., 2006; Pauly 2006; Figure 8.1).

Although small-scale fisheries are potentially, and in many cases actually, more sustainable

than large-scale fisheries, they are disadvantaged due to their typical remoteness, lack of

infrastructure, and marginal political power. Furthermore, small-scale fisheries are at a

disadvantage when competing for fisheries resources and market access with heavily

subsidized industrial fleets (Ponte et al., 2007). More recently, small-scale fisheries have begun

to face an additional barrier to trade from well-intentioned sustainable fisheries initiatives, such

as ecolabeling.

The best fisheries ecolabel is that of the London-based Marine Stewardship Council (MSC),

whose 2006 budget was $4.6 million (MSC, 2006). Since 1999, the MSC has certified about 4%

of the global market for fish from capture fisheries (as opposed to farmed fish). Of the 23 MSC-

certified fisheries, 2 are located in the developing world and only 1, the Mexican Red rock

lobster, is a small-scale fishery. The MSC bias against small-scale fisheries is neither intentional

nor unacknowledged, and it stems from real technical difficulties in defining sustainability criteria

for fisheries that are data-poor.

134

Thus, critics of ecolabeling point out that product promotion is occurring in markets in which food requirements have already been met and that small-scale fishers, by default, are left to sell the “unsustainable” fish (Constance & Bonanno, 1999). Ecolabeling may provide good incentives for the improvement of industrial, high-volume fisheries, but ecolabeling cannot contribute much to the global improvement of fisheries management if it cannot serve the needs of small-scale fishers (i.e., the majority of fishers worldwide).

A market-based approach to improving fisheries sustainability globally is the elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies (Sumaila & Pauly, 2007). Worldwide, fisheries subsidies are estimated at $30-34 billion annually, the overwhelming majority of which goes to industrial fisheries (Table 8.1). Politicians keep excess fishing capacity afloat using subsidies. Large-scale vessels are built by heavy industry with big subsidies, whereas small-scale boat construction generally favors local craftsmanship and receives little government financing. On the water, large-scale fisheries are further granted the competitive edge over small-scale fisheries, often under the false premise that the large-scale sector delivers more fish to markets. The result: subsidies further marginalize small-scale fishers and marine biodiversity suffers more than if the market was truly competitive.

Fuel subsidies, which total $6.3 billion annually, illustrate the situation (Sumaila et al., 2006).

The industrial fishing fleet uses 89% of total fuel for catching fish, whereas the small-scale fleet uses only 11%. The average industrial fisher receives an estimated 187 times more fuel subsidies each year than the average small-scale fisher (Tyedmers et al., 2005; Pauly, 2006).

Yet, small-scale fishers catch four times more fish per liter of fuel (Pauly, 2006). The elimination of fuel subsidies to industrial trawlers alone would render the 200-strong fleet of high-seas bottom trawlers unprofitable, sparing the reef habitat and bycatch these industrial boats

135 generate in their pursuit of overfished deep sea species (Sumaila, 2007). The retirement of the

high-seas bottom trawlers would relieve pressure on at least 3 poster species for the sustainable seafood movement: Orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus), rockfish (Sebastes

spp.), and Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus elegenoides), all of which are listed in the avoid

category on seafood wallet cards and are eschewed by eco-friendly chefs. Moreover, the dearth

in supply could make creating market infrastructure for alternative species from the small-scale

sector economically viable.

Market-based sustainable seafood initiatives and the elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies

are not incompatible goals, but conservation funding for fisheries is scarce. Since 1999, a

minimum of $6.2 million/year has funded market-based sustainable seafood initiatives, whereas

projects to abolish harmful fisheries subsidies are likely to have received <$150,000 annually

over this same period. Given the role of the state in subsidizing large-scale, destructive

fisheries, funding toward political reforms would trump consumer-oriented efforts to change the

marketplace. The limited money for fisheries conservation should go toward efforts that yield the

highest sustainability returns on conservation investments.

Nonprofit marine conservation groups could use this money to launch large-scale public relations campaigns, fund advocacy to lobby subsidies for industrial fisheries (including funds for advocacy groups of small-scale fishers, recreational anglers, and fiscal conservatives opposed to industrial fishing subsidies), and research to expose the flows of subsidy money.

Groups opposed to farm subsidies, for instance, have tracked government dollars to individual farms and disclose the farm’s name, location, and amount received in a given year via an online database (http://farm.ewg.org/farm). A global database could reveal the extent of fisheries subsidies, (e.g. the $300 million in subsidies that went to European drift-netters to convert to

136 less-damaging fishing gear) and describe what happened with the money (e.g. most Italian drift-

net operators pocketed the money and continue to fish illegally; Oceana 2005).

Ecolabeling, consumer seafood guides, and even boycotts have not resulted in accelerated

progress in fisheries policies (Bridgespan Group, 2005; Jacquet and Pauly, 2007), partially

because these initiatives are not appropriate for data-deficient, small-scale fisheries. More than

$37 million has been invested in sustainable seafood initiatives to date, from which more than

12 million small-scale fishers worldwide will never benefit. It is time to consider funding of this

magnitude for a more equitable and fundamental market-based approach that will yield results

on the water: the elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies.

137 Tables

Table 8.1 Subsidy type, amount, main beneficiaries, and effect on capacitya Subsidy type Amount Main Effect on ($ billion) beneficiaryb capacityc Fishing port construction and renovation programs 8.0 Large Bad Fuel 6.3 Large Bad Fisheries management programs and services 5.8 Large Good Fishery development projects and support services 2.5 Small Bad Boat construction, renewal and modernization programs 1.9 Large Bad Fisher assistance programs 1.7 Small Ugly Marketing support/processing/storage/infrastructure programs 1.6 Small/Large Bad Fishing access agreements 1.0 Large Bad Fishery research and development 0.9 Large Good Rural fishers community development program 0.9 Small Ugly Vessel buyback programs 0.9 Large Ugly Tax exemption programs 0.7 Large Bad aAdapted from Sumaila & Pauly 2007 bLarge or small-scale fishing sector cThe categories (good, bad, ugly) refer to their effect on fleet growth and hence overfishing: good subsidies do not increase the size of the fleet, bad do, and ugly subsidies depend on the context (see Sumaila & Pauly 2007).

138 Figures

Figure 8.1 Schematic illustration of the duality of fisheries prevailing in most countries of the world, using numbers raised to global level. This duality of fisheries largely reflects the misplaced priorities of fisheries ‘development’, but also offers opportunity for reducing fishing mortality on depleted resources while maintaining most social benefits. The solution here is to phase out the large-scale fisheries. Adapted from graph in Pauly (2006).

139 Chapter 8 references

Alder, J., and D. Pauly. (2006) On the multiple uses of forage fish. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 14(3). Fisheries Centre, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Bridgespan Group. (2005) Seafood choices evaluation. David & Lucile Packard Foundation, Los Altos, California.

Constance, D.H. & Bonanno, A. (1999) Regulating the global fisheries: The World Wildlife Fund, Unilever, and the Marine Stewardship Council. Agriculture and Human Values 17, 125-139.

Chuenpagdee, R., Morgan, L.E. Maxwell, S. Norse, E.A. & Pauly, D. (2003) Shifting gears: Assessing collateral impacts of fishing methods in the U.S. waters. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 1, 517-524.

Jacquet, J. & Pauly, D. (2007) The rise of seafood awareness campaigns in an era of collapsing fisheries. Marine Policy 31, 308-313.

MSC (Marine Stewardship Council) (2004) Annual report, Marine Stewardship Council, http://www.msc.org/html/content_460.htm [accessed 21st October, 2005]

Munro, J.L. (1979) Stock assessment models: Applicability and utility in tropical small-scale fisheries. Pages 35-47 in S.B. Saila and P.M. Roedel, editors. Stock assessment for tropical small-scale fisheries. International Center for Marine Resource Development, University of Rhode Island.

Oceana (2005) The Use of Driftnets: A Scandal for Europe, a Mockery for the United Nations. Oceana, Washington, D.C. http://www.oceana.org/europe/publications/reports/the-use-of- drifnets-abr-scandal-for-europe-abr-mockery-of-the-unitedbr-nations/#c3929 [accessed 22nd January, 2008].

Pauly, D. (2006) Towards consilience in small-scale fisheries research. Maritime Studies 4, 7- 22.

Ponte, S., Raakjaer, J. & Campling, L. (2007) Swimming upstream: Market access for African fish exports in the context of WTO and EU negotiations and regulation. Development Policy Review 25, 113-138.

Sumaila, U.R. & Pauly, D. (2007) All nations must unite to cut subsidies. Nature (correspondence) 450, 945.

140 Sumaila, R. Teh, L., Watson, R. Tyedmers, P. &. Pauly, D. (2006). Fuel subsidies to fisheries globally: Magnitude and impacts on resource sustainability. In Sumaila, U.R. & Pauly, D. (eds.), Catching more bait: a bottom-up re-estimation of global fisheries subsidies. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 14(6), 2. University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

Sumaila, U.R. (2007) Running on empty: Eliminate fuel subsidies to reduce destructive bottom trawling on the high seas. Conservation Magazine 8, 6-7.

Tyedmers, P., Watson, R., & Pauly, D. (2005) Fueling global fishing fleets. Ambio 34, 635-638.

Zeller, D. & Pauly, D. (2005) Good news, bad news: Global fisheries discards are declining but so are total catches. Fish and Fisheries 6, 156-159.

141 9 CONSERVING WILD FISH IN A SEA OF MARKET-BASED EFFORTS2

2 A version of this chapter is in review. Jacquet, J., J. Hocevar, S. Lai, P. Majluf, N. Pelletier, T. Pitcher, E. Sala, R. Sumaila, and D. Pauly. Conserving wild fish in a sea of market-based efforts.

142 Introduction

Fish consumption is on the rise globally. The U.S.A. now consumes almost five times more fish than it did 100 years ago (~2.2 million t in 2004; ~500,000 t in 1910; NMFS, 2006), and

Chinese consumers are now consuming almost five times more seafood per capita than they did in 1961 (25.4 kg/person in 2005; 4.8 kg/person in 1961; Halweil, 2006). Worldwide, per capita consumption of marine fishes has nearly doubled since the 1960s (9 kg in 1960s; 16 kg in 1997; WHO, 2006), while the human population also doubled over this same time period.

Future projections show that seafood supply from capture fisheries is decreasing and that, overall, today’s marine fisheries are unsustainable (Pauly et al., 2002; Worm et al., 2006).

To meet predicted demands for seafood by 2020, aquaculture production will be required to double. Alternatively, how and for what we fish (e.g., low trophic level species) will require

considerable reform (Pitcher, 2008). Since the growing demand for seafood has been

implicated in the marine fisheries crisis, it is perhaps appropriate that some effort be directed at

reforming the human appetite (e.g., Grescoe, 2008). So far, this reform has largely manifested

itself in a host of market efforts to encourage what is popularly referred to as ‘sustainable

seafood’, whose meaning is generally a broad one covering ecologically responsible fishing that

minimises the bycatch of non-target species, and brings acceptable levels of ecosystem and

environmental impacts. This paper aims to provide an overview of these initiatives, review their

common difficulties, and present several possible avenues for improving market-based

approaches to conserve wild fish.

143 Overview of market-based sustainable seafood initiatives for capture marine fisheries

Marine capture fisheries peaked in the late 1980s (Watson & Pauly, 2001), though the problem was not realized until the early 1990s, when the first consumer-oriented initiative for sustainable seafood began. The first major seafood campaign was the boycott of canned tuna in the late

1980s, which led to the first seafood eco-label, the ‘dolphin safe’ label, in 1990.

In 1997, the first certification scheme created specifically for sustainable fisheries was

established in the form of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) (Kaiser & Edward-Jones,

2006). The MSC designed a set of ecological criteria for sustainable and well-managed

fisheries along with a label for fish products that receive MSC approval; two of the authors (TP

and DP) actively participated in this process. Today, the MSC label is the best-established and most widely discussed fisheries certification (Constance & Bonanno, 1999; Phillips, 2003;

Sumaila et al. 2005) and, as of the end of 2007, about 7% (~5.25 million tonnes) of the annual

global landings of marine fisheries are currently MSC-certified (Agnew et al. 2006).

One year after the MSC’s inception, the National Audubon Society and Carl Safina developed

the first consumer seafood guide and, in 2000, the Monterey Bay Aquarium published a seafood

wallet card. The first trade association, the Seafood Choices Alliance, founded in 2001,

provided infrastructure for the initiatives that would follow (Table 9.1).

Globally, market-based sustainable seafood initiatives are on the rise (Figure 9.1; Table 9.1).

The fundamental goals of these initiatives are to raise awareness and ultimately reduce

overexploitation of sensitive species by reducing demand (by shifting purchasing decisions

toward products from more sustainable fisheries). They can be considered in the following

categories (as in Roheim & Sutinen, 2006):

144

i) Evaluation system, i.e., criteria to determine sustainability, and to generate items in (ii) to (v);

ii) Boycotts;

iii) Eco-labels;

iv) Consumer seafood guides (including cookbooks);

v) Distributor seafood guides (often used jointly with pressure on/engagement with retailers to

not carry particular species or to improve practices);

vi) Trade associations.

Common difficulties

There are broad limitations of seafood awareness campaigns, including the global nature of the

seafood market and lack of traceability of both the original fish and the various stages of

processed products (Jacquet & Pauly, 2007). Here we highlight some specific trends and

difficulties among programs and comment on how they are being addressed.

What is ‘sustainable’?

Unfortunately, each different initiative has a different definition of sustainability and a different methodology to assess it. A recent assessment used 18 criteria to assess nine systems for evaluating fisheries sustainability and found that there were several areas that none of them addressed adequately: 1) socio-economic attributes, 2) food security, 3) capacity of the assessment to adapt to local issues and unique aspects of the fishery, and 4) peer review of assessment decision (Leadbitter & Ward, 2007).

145 Lacking in most sustainable seafood initiative is consideration of environmental implications of bringing both fisheries and aquaculture products to market (Pelletier & Tyedmers, 2008). These

include use efficiencies and emissions intensities of compounds such as greenhouse gases,

acid precipitants, ozone-depleting and eutrophying agents, and a wide variety of chemicals with

ecotoxicological effects (Pelletier et al., 2006). A growing body of life cycle and energy analyses

of fisheries and aquaculture identify the key stages of seafood supply chains and facilitate

comparisons of eco-efficiency between competing production technologies (e.g., Pelletier &

Tyedmers, 2008). Such information could easily be incorporated in existing sustainable seafood initiatives.

In the case of the MSC, there have been controversies over aspects of the certification of

Alaska pollock, New Zealand hoki and Western Australian rock lobster. Some feel there has been a lack of consideration of stock declines, key life history characteristics, food chain, bycatch, and habitat effects and/or a failure to identify all stakeholders (Ward, 2008). Moreover, another round of controversy could begin if the MSC certifies fisheries that target fish for reduction (i.e., fish caught for the fishmeal market) due to the wastefulness of converting wild fish into smaller (but more valuable) amounts of farmed fish.

Small-scale and developing world fisheries left out

Small-scale fisheries are probably the best hope for sustainable fisheries as they are typically low-tech and coast-bound, although there are exceptions to this. On a global scale, small-scale fisheries employ 25 times more people and use one-quarter the fuel to catch roughly the same amount of fish for human consumption as the large-scale, industrial fishing sector

(Chuenpagdee et al., 2006). But in the marketplace, small-scale fisheries are at a disadvantage when competing for market access with large-scale industrial fleets, which are often heavily

146 subsidized (Sumaila & Pauly, 2006). More recently, small-scale fisheries face an additional cost barrier to trade from well-intentioned sustainable fisheries initiatives, such as eco-labeling

(Jacquet & Pauly, 2008a; Gulbrandsen, in press).

3.3 Traceability concerns

For seafood awareness programs to obtain their desired outcomes, it is essential that seafood

consumers have accurate information and that eco-labels acquire and/or maintain their integrity.

But, in the U.S.A. more than one-third of all fish appears to be mislabeled (Tennyson et al.,

1997) and many fish are also renamed. Mislabeling and renaming subverts all sustainable

seafood initiatives, including those aimed at consumers (Jacquet & Pauly, 2008b). For

example, the Canadian Living Ocean Society’s ‘Farmed and Dangerous’ campaign encourages

consumers not to eat farmed salmon due to its adverse ecological and human health effects,

but several recent investigations indicate that retailers frequently mislabel farmed salmon as

‘wild caught’ (Burros, 2005; Consumer Reports, 2006; Evans, 2007).

Regional focus

Many seafood guides have a regional focus, despite the global nature of the seafood market. In

the U.S.A., consumer seafood guides focus mainly on fish caught by national fisheries (Roheim

& Sutinen, 2006), which is inappropriate given that more than 80% of seafood consumed in this

country is imported.

147 Species-oriented programs do not reward individual fishers

Consumer boycotts and consumer guides have been criticized for being indiscriminate toward responsible and irresponsible fishing operators, imposing an economic cost on responsible operators (Kaiser & Edward-Jones, 2006; Roheim & Sutinen, 2006). It has been argued that eco-labeling, on the other hand, is capable of rewarding individual operators because it engages consumers in rewarding certain members or sub-sectors of the fishing community who conduct responsible fishing practices (Roheim & Sutinen, 2006). Unfortunately, rewarding individual operators may be at odds with creating simple messages. The MSC certification of the fishery for Patagonian toothfish in British-controlled waters off South Georgia, for instance, rewarded responsible fishing operators in that one region but sent a mixed message to consumers, who were advised by the U.S. -based National Environmental Trust to boycott the fish (Jacquet,

2007).

Confusion in and between initiatives

The many sustainable seafood initiatives generate too many seafood labels, too much information, and too much confusion. For instance, the 2007 ‘Seafood Watch’ wallet card from

Monterey Bay Aquarium lists tuna 12 ways (i.e., species, method of fishing, country) between the three columns of ‘best choices’, ‘good alternatives’, and ‘avoid’. The World Wildlife Fund’s seafood choice card in Spain lists bluefin tuna as a species to avoid, but as a ‘best choice’ if the tuna come from coastal fishing traps. Although these complexities reflect the reality of the global seafood market, they also confuse consumers (Jacquet, 2007, Stromsta, 2007a). This is intensified by government agencies recommending the consumption of seafood because of its nutritional values (e.g., omega-3 acids; Brunner et al. 2009), at the same time as other agencies

148 recommend eating less of certain species (e.g., farmed salmon) due to their high concentrations

of mercury and other toxic compounds.

Furthermore, different consumer guides provide different recommendations depending on their criteria for ranking seafood, so that there is not only confusion generated by each card but also between among? cards. Each sustainable seafood initiative must have some way of assessing sustainability, which invariably leads to inconsistencies. The confusion this generates is evident

at www.seafoodguide.org, which was intended to enable querying seafood guides by web- enabled phones (R. Froese, IFM-GEOMAR, Kiel, Germany, pers. comm.), but has inadvertently exposed inconsistencies between the guides it covers. The website presents seafood guides for

19 countries and displays interesting results for countries with more than one guide (e.g., the website presents 3 for Germany and 9 for the U.S.). While different organizations might generate a unanimous recommendation (i.e., ‘avoid’) for some species (e.g., Atlantic cod,

Atlantic bluefin tuna), the recommendations can be grossly inconsistent for other species. For example, six organizations (including the Blue Ocean Institute), for instance, rank Atlantic halibut as a fish to avoid while Environmental Defense recommends consuming it with caution and Friends of the Sea and Monterey Bay recommend it as a sustainable choice. Similarly inconsistent recommendations are generated for albacore, bigeye tuna, lingcod, Atlantic haddock and many other species.

Absence of price premium

From a policy perspective, an eco-label aims to educate consumers about the environmental effects of the products’ production or consumption so as to catalyze a change in purchasing

behavior and ultimately reduce negative environmental impacts. From a business perspective,

149 companies are induced to use environmentally benign production methods, distinguished by an

eco-label, with the expectations of gaining a greater market share and higher profits.

Price premiums for certified forest products are estimated between 5 to 10 percent (Gardiner &

Viwanathan, 2004). Dolphin-safe tuna does receive a price premium measured at $400 per

tonne (Vogel, 1995) and wild salmon can sometimes generate a price premium over farmed

salmon, though the market is variable (Knapp, 2007). But, so far, there is no evidence that

seafood certified as sustainable benefits from a price premium (Stromsta, 2007b). Instead, operators seem to be engaging in certification because it brings them access to new markets.

Lack of evidence of effectiveness

After distributing over one million seafood wallet cards, the Monterey Bay Aquarium conducted a study that revealed no overall change in the market and that fishing pressures had not

decreased for targeted species (Quadra Planning Consultants Ltd., 2004). A review of 30

different non-profit organizations with market-based sustainable seafood campaigns from 1999-

2004 found that consumer-oriented campaigns increased awareness and visibility for the

sustainable seafood issue, but that there is “no clear evidence that this increased salience is

leading to big changes in buying practices, nor accelerated fisheries policies” (Bridgespan

Group, 2005). In other words, there is no evidence that consumer campaigns are effective at

reducing demand or fishing pressure.

The dolphin-safe tuna label is often perceived as the most effective seafood-related label (due

to its visibility and its price premium). The label combined with several national and

international regulatory schemes (e.g., the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, the U.S.

embargo on non dolphin-safe tuna and the International Dolphin Conservation Act) has helped

150 to reduce dolphin mortality because of a reduction in the number of boats setting on dolphins.

This is why NOAA fisheries scientists suggested the definition of the label not be watered down to allow tuna caught with the chasing-and-encircling techniques to be certified as ‘dolphin safe’

there was international political pressure to do so in 2003.

However, several dolphin populations have not recovered as quickly as expected. For instance,

time series data of population estimates for the northeastern pantropical spotted dolphin

(Stenella attenuata attenuata) and eastern spinner dolphin populations (Stenella longirostris) in

the eastern tropical Pacific from 1978 to 2000 show essentially no change in abundance over

that time (Gerrodette & Forcada, 2005). There does appear to be a slight increase in the

abundance of the two species in recent years (Gerrodette et al., 2008) but spotted dolphins and

spinner dolphins are estimated respectively at 19% and 29% of their abundance levels prior to

1959, the year when a yellowfin tuna purse seine fishery began in their region (Wade et al.,

2007). The tuna purse seine fishery continues to have negative effects on dolphin populations

due to unreported bycatch, the separation of mothers and calves, and/or other factors

(Gerrodette & Forcada, 2005; Cramer et al., 2008). This data along with Ward (2007) show that

dolphin populations are still in trouble, despite the label, 100% observer coverage and strict regulations, because ‘dolphin-safe’ methods of catching tuna did not lead to a sufficient reduction in overall fishing pressure and hence bycatch.

Furthermore, MSC certification is unlikely to arrest the decline of fish stocks (Ward, 2008;

Gulbrandsen, in press). For example, 2008 data for the U.S.A. pollock fishery, which is MSC- certified and has been regarded as a poster fishery for sustainable seafood, are cause for concern. Acoustic surveys indicate the 2008 biomass is almost 50% below the biomass from

the previous year, prompting NOAA officials to recommend to the North Pacific Fishery

Management Council a sustainable catch of 815,000 metric tons for 2009, an 18.5 percent

151 reduction from 2008 (NOAA, 2008). In some cases, such as in Western Australia, MSC certification might even be giving fishing interests leverage against establishing fishing sanctuaries on the grounds that sanctuaries are unnecessary if the affected fisheries are already certified (Sutton, 2003). Overall, eco-labels on behalf of dolphins and fisheries appear to be weak instruments for conservation (Ward, 2007).

Per capita U.S. demand for seafood has increased in recent years and is up from 6.9 kg per person in 2000 to 7.4 kg in 2007 (NOAA, 2008). Many of the species considered least sustainable by conservation groups (e.g., shrimp, tuna, and salmon) remain the most desirable.

There may be psychological reasons for this. A recent and rather disconcerting study found that

French customers who tasted two identical caviar samples preferred the one they thought came from a ‘rare species’ of sturgeon (Gault et al., 2008). Rarity was valued more than intrinsic quality. Why would we expect most consumers of shark fin soup, bluefin tuna, or even cod to behave any differently?

More effective market-based efforts to conserve wild fish?

Given the limitations of consumer-based efforts to promote sustainable seafood, perhaps the large investment into household consumers sector was premature. Based on our collective experience and evidence, we present several additional avenues for market-based conservation measures that may strengthen or complement current initiatives,. We also argue that these

proposed ideas should be tested in accordance with the scientific method and evidence-based

conservation (Sutherland, 2004).

152 Labeling standards

Oftentimes, consumers cannot be sure that the seafood they purchase is the fish that the label

or menu claims it to be (Jacquet & Pauly, 2008a). Without access to information on country of origin (where the fish is caught, not processed), fishing method, let alone the correct species,

consumers cannot make effective decisions on behalf of sustainable seafood. Therefore, all

market-based initiatives must consider putting additional effort into improving labeling standards, particularly in the U.S.A., where less than 2% of all imports and 0.6% of seafood imports are tested for contaminants in a laboratory. In contrast, in 2005, Japan physically inspected 12% of seafood products and 21% of processed seafood products (Food & Water

Watch, 2007).

Of all the sustainable seafood initiatives, the MSC offers the best model of traceability in the

form of chain of custody standards, which traces fish from the fishery of origin to the point of sale. There is evidence that traceability standards in fisheries (e.g., South Georgia toothfish) have improved as a result of MSC certification (Roheim and Sutinen, 2006). Without proper labeling, all consumer-oriented campaigns will continue to be undermined by cheating.

Directing efforts higher than households

In recognition of the limitations and pace of affecting household consumers, efforts to promote sustainable seafood should aim higher in the demand chain and focus on affecting large buyers

(and indeed, many initiatives are shifting their efforts in this direction). Among food retailers, the ten largest companies account for nearly 50% of the U.S.A. seafood market (Bridgespan Group,

2005). In the U.K., nearly 90% of seafood is nowadays sold through supermarkets, which have gained immense buying power, particularly when compared to the past when fish was primarily

153 sold through local fishmongers (Greenpeace, 2005). This focus on targeting large retailers, which consolidate seafood purchases, is likely to have a bigger and faster market impact than consumer guides. Furthermore, large retailers appear concerned about wild fish stocks on the

grounds that sustainability is good business and have shown much interest, perhaps also for the sake of reputation gains.

Focusing on large retailers does seem to be the new goal of Seafood Choices (Bridgespan

Group, 2005) and several other groups (Table 9.1). In May 2008, for instance, fourteen

American and Canadian organizations formed the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions and released their “Common Vision for Environmentally Sustainable Seafood.” While industry response to the Common Vision was mixed, companies voicing support for the initiative

included retailers Ahold, Whole Foods Market, and Wal-Mart, as well as food service giant

Compass Group.

Balancing positive and negative messaging in the marketplace

While it is true that environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) can use retailers as allies to force change, another strategy that is underutilized, particularly in North America, is the use of negative messaging to affect retailer reputation. According to research related to cooperation, a good reputation is valuable currency and is gained by playing by the rules of a social community. It may be beneficial to act uncooperatively in a social dilemma, however, unless the news of defection is made available to those in the community (Semmann et al.,

2004). Thus whenever individual or institutional behavior is relevant to the public good, it should be made public (Pfeiffer & Nowak, 2006). Under this premise, one way to motivate large seafood retailers is to generate bad press that highlights unsustainable practices. This negative messaging uses the base of consumer awareness that has been raised by wallet cards and

154 eco-labels to push companies already engaged in sustainability efforts to step up their efforts.

Greenpeace is one group utilizing reputation in market-based seafood efforts.

First in Europe (in the U.K., followed by the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France, Spain,

Austria, and Norway) and most recently in the U.S.A., Greenpeace has used a ranking system to assess supermarket chains in terms of the sustainability of their seafood (e.g., Greenpeace

2005; 2006). While this approach does provide information for consumers, the strategic focus is on the retailers, which are evaluated on the basis of the amount and number of unsustainable seafood products they sell, as well as the presence and quality of their procurement policies, labeling efforts, and training programs. The ranking has created competition at all levels, with some retailers taking steps to try to get to the top of the ranking and others seeking to get off the bottom. In the lead-up to the publication of Greenpeace’s ranking of U.S. retailers, top-scoring

Whole Foods Market agreed to stop selling red-listed orange roughy, Target committed to dropping red snapper, and Wegman’s dropped bluefin tuna. Retailers adopting sustainable seafood procurement policies and dropping several red-listed items have marked all countries where Greenpeace has employed this approach. Within just two months of the release of the

Swedish report, all but one major Swedish retailer had dropped all 14 products on Greenpeace

Nordic’s red list.

Greenpeace also uses public displays to affect reputation and catalyze change in seafood markets. In November 2008, Greenpeace erected ‘crime scenes’ at 8 Loblaw grocery stores in

Toronto with the message “caught red-handed selling redlist fish.” The following day, Loblaw officials were reportedly “disappointed” but said they would work to offer more MSC-certified fish

(Fiorillo, 2008). The more conventional methods of positive messaging and alliance with retailers are complemented (and could be even more so) by using negative messaging and reputation to motivate large seafood retailers to act.

155

Connecting seafood to climate change

According to a United Nations report (Steinfeld et al., 2006), 18% of human-caused greenhouse gases stem from farm animals and the livestock industry. People for the Ethical Treatment of

Animals (PETA) used the report as an opportunity to advertise in The New York Times how meat eating contributed to global warming and how a person switching to a plant-based diet does more for carbon footprint than switching from a sport utility vehicle to a sedan. Paul

Watson succinctly described this phenomenon in a recent presentation at UBC’s Fisheries

Centre, “a meat eater on a bicycle is worse than a vegan in a Hummer”.

The global concern for global warming also presents opportunities to connect seafood to climate

change. In the same way that the UK has called attention to food miles, seafood miles could be

used to inform and frame a discussion on sustainable seafood. Global fuel use by fisheries, just

to catch and land fish (not process and ship it further) has been estimated as 1.2% of global oil

consumption (Tyedmers et al., 2005). No discussion about seafood sustainability should be

complete without considering the relationships between its resource dependencies and

emissions and the stability of the broader, biogeochemical cycles that cumulatively provide the

implicate order for healthy marine ecosystems.

Fish sticks could be made of heavily-managed, MSC-certified Alaska pollock, but the fish might

have traveled 4,300 miles before reaching the processing plant. Salmon farmed in Chile, filleted in China, processed and packaged in Canada, and eaten by a customer in San Diego could travel as far as 22,300 miles (Grescoe, 2008). In the growing Mediterranean bluefin tuna ranching industry, highly endangered fish are taken from the wild and towed back to large caves where they are fattened on herring and other wild-caught forage fish (Greenpeace, 2008). A

156 full-grown bluefin tuna may include energy costs of finding, catching, and towing the tuna, as well as of catching, transporting, and freezing the feed fish. The inclusion of life-cycle thinking would, at a minimum, underscore the importance of promoting energy efficient fisheries and aquaculture production, as well as low-trophic level culture systems (Pelletier & Tyedmers,

2008) and industrial fisheries would likely be considered far less sustainable than small-scale fisheries.

Eliminating the wasteful fishmeal industry

In North America and Europe, there has been a call to eat lower on the food web (Pimentel &

Pimentel, 2003; Pollan, 2008) and this has been echoed for marine food webs (Hall, 2007;

Grescoe, 2008). However, humans currently must compete with factory-farmed animals for this

meal of small pelagic fish. Currently, about 30 million tonnes of fish--36 percent of world

fisheries catch—are ground up each year into fishmeal and oil, mostly to feed farmed fish,

chicken, and pigs (Alder et al., 2008). As Grescoe (2008) points out, “turning fish as delicious as

sardines into fertilizers, mascara, or chicken feed may be one of our epoch’s more subtle and

grievous crimes against nature.”

We argue that decreasing the amount of fish used for reduction should be a top priority of the

sustainable seafood movement, particularly because pigs and chickens alone consume six

times the amount of seafood as U.S.A. consumers and twice as much seafood as consumers in

Japan. One premise of sustainable seafood should be that no fishery that catches fish for

reduction into fishmeal and fish oil should be eco-certified. Instead, groups interested in

promoting sustainable seafood should encourage direct human consumption of forage fish.

157 In Peru, for instance, the anchovy fishery, which began in the early 1950s, now amounts to as

much as half of the world’s fishmeal. Much of this fishmeal is used to feed farmed fish in China

as well as livestock and farmed salmon. But as Peru exports fishmeal and other products

derived from its catch of 5 to 10 million tonnes of anchovy each year, half of its population (15

million people) lives under conditions of critical poverty and 25% of infants are malnourished

(NEI, 2006). This discrepancy led to a major campaign in 2006 involving scientists, chefs, and

politicians to remake the image of the anchovy as fish fit for Kings and Queens too. The goal

was to increase the real and perceived value of these fish, to develop local and export markets,

to make investing in freezing and canning facilities attractive, so that Peru could afford to shift

away from turning perfectly edible fish into fishmeal. During week to promote the humble

anchovy, 18,000 Peruvians tasted the small fish at more than 30 restaurants in Lima, the

nation’s capital. Anchovies are much more valuable to the Peruvian economy as canned fillets

rather than as fishmeal. One tonne of fillets is sold for five times the price of one tonne of meal

and requires half the fish (3 tonnes for 1 tonne fillets versus 6 tonnes for 1 tonne meal). The

government decided to dedicate 30% of its annual food security budget, or about US$80 million,

for programs that will go to supplying anchovies. As a result, by late 2007, one year after the

campaign began, demand for fresh anchovies has grown 46% and demand for canned

anchovies is up 85%. It is hoped that higher prices for anchovies will limit their use in fishmeal

industry, thereby causing an overall reduction in demand for anchovies.

Without fishmeal, protein alternatives for animal feed are needed. There is a new interest in

mass-producing insects (Ratliff, 2008) as a sustainable protein source to replace fishmeal in fish

and livestock feeds and experimental trials show that a fishmeal alternative, at least partially,

might be possible. More important, agriculture and aquaculture need to revert back to less

intensive systems, requiring only plant-based inputs.

158 Elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies

Arguably, a powerful market force driving overfishing is fisheries subsidies. Globally, fisheries

subsidies are an estimated $30-34 billion annually, $20 billion of which contribute directly to

encouraging excess fishing capacity (e.g., fuel subsidies, boat construction; Sumaila & Pauly,

2006; Sumaila et al., 2008) and favor industrial fisheries over small-scale, more sustainable ones. Yet the U.S. conservation community’s investment in eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies has been less than 4% of the investment into consumer-oriented market based campaigns over the last decade (Jacquet & Pauly, 2008b). The market-oriented goal of eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies must become a global conservation priority. Therefore efforts by the World Trade Organization to discipline fisheries subsidies is important and needs to be pursued with even more rigor than before (Sumaila & Pauly, 2007 Sumaila et al., 2007).

Setting seafood targets

Finally, to warrant continued investment each market-based conservation program should be

designed so as to produce outcomes and testable results (Sutherland et al., 2004). The number

of consumers reached by a seafood choice campaign is not alone a measure of success, unless it is accompanied by a measureable improvement in wild fish populations. Simply creating demand for an eco-certified product is not enough unless there is a concurrent decrease in demand for other, overfished species.

Sustainable seafood initiatives must be integrated and coordinated with others and have a

common goal. In the same way that coordinated efforts by the scientific community and

governments have determined targets for greenhouse gas emissions, national and international targets are needed for seafood catch and consumption (and at what trophic level) to shift global

159 fisheries to sustainable enterprises. Such an analysis must be regional, to take into account

national differences in fishing capacity (industrial v. artisanal fleets) and complexity of the markets (local v. global). This analysis could yield an ‘optimal sustainable consumption rate’ of wild fish, and in turn determine the rate of increase of aquaculture production and other alternatives to seafood, to meet demand.

The sustainable seafood movement must also place more emphasis on data sharing and publishing results. The only way forward is to develop webs of interaction of initiatives and stakeholder groups that have been isolated in the past – because of lack of communication between stakeholder groups or because competing interests within and between groups.

Discussion

Seafood is one of the only wild foods (aside from mushrooms) that Westerners eat with any regularity. After more than a decade of market-based sustainable seafood initiatives, the demand for this last wild food source is higher than ever, which has resulted in further declining fish populations (Pauly et al., 2002, Worm et al., 2006) and a complementary rapid domestication of marine species (Duarte et al., 2007).

Individuals and groups working to curb overfishing in the 1980s and 1990s first attempted to work within regulatory frameworks, but became frustrated with the pace of regulatory approaches and the tactics of powerful interest groups. Many abandoned the political process in favor of the market. In 1992, Carl Safina unsuccessfully lobbied for a CITES listing of bluefin tuna, which would have banned the trade of tuna (Grescoe, 2008). Safina later assisted in designing the first seafood wallet card and then formed the Blue Ocean Institute, dedicated to creating a new ethic but also to developing seafood guides and working closely with consumers.

160 These efforts snowballed into the concerted international effort aimed at household consumers

today.

We do not argue against the principle that consumers should make a point of choosing products

that reflect their ideals, a premise that is especially prevalent in food choices (Pollan, 2007;

Pollan, 2008; Clover, 2006: Grescoe, 2008). But in terms of monetary outlays and human

energy, we argue that putting too much emphasis on end consumers is not an effective market-

based strategy. There is simply too much cheating in the marketplace (e.g., mislabeling), too

much misleading information, too many inconsistencies, and, so far, too few results.

Just as consumers experienced fatigue in the 1990s after corporate eco-advertising amounted

to little action or outcome, so might this decade witness the same fatigue in terms of sustainable

seafood campaigns. For instance, in 2002, Sainsbury’s in the UK committed to sourcing all of

its wild fish from sustainable sources by 2010. But after working closely with the MSC and

shelving 12 MSC-labeled products, MSC-certified fish only amount to 1 percent of total fish

sales (Roheim & Sutinen, 2006). In 2006, Wal-Mart pledged to source all of its capture fish from

the MSC by 2010 (Gunther, 2006), a goal Wal-Mart is not likely to meet. The ‘greenwashing’

corporations were accused of in the 1990s could turn to a ‘bluewashing’ today.

However, it is important to note that these corporations are motivated to make these promises

because they believe that their consumers want them to act. In this way, it is clear that

consumers can help drive changes in the market. However, to avoid the ‘bluewashing’

phenomenon, sustainable seafood campaigns must be goal-oriented and communicate whether

or not goals were met. National and international seafood consumption targets could help

determine these goals. To achieve reduction in seafood demand more quickly, sustainable

seafood initiatives might work higher in the demand chain, begin connecting seafood to climate

161 change, campaign to divert small fish away from the fishmeal industry and into consumer markets and work to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies.

The conservation movement’s emphasis on consumers and market-based initiatives is perhaps

a result of the Reagan-Thatcher-Bush years, during which government was perceived as the problem and markets as panaceas. Today, this perception is changing. Working with

household consumers alone cannot save fish. Although government regulations are far from

perfect, the successes of government efforts to improve fisheries have been more obvious and measureable (e.g., marine protected areas; Roberts et al. 2001). Even within a market-based approach, there is a need to ensure that information is correct and that conservation efforts are not obstructed by harmful subsidies. In other words, working with consumers and retailers also brings an imperative of working with governments.

162

Tables

Table 9.1: Timeline and Overview of Market-based Sustainable Seafood Initiatives Year Country Sponsor Category Name Remarks/HTML Late U.S. Earth Island Boycott/Eco-label Dolphin safe Boycott of canned tuna resulted in the first seafood eco-label, the ‘dolphin safe’ logo. 1980s Institute logo http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/ 1995 Global United Evaluation Code of Voluntary agreement that sets out principles and international standards for fisheries Nations Food system Conduct for management. and Responsible http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm Agriculture Fisheries Organization 1997 Global World Wildlife Eco- Marine Became independent in 1999. To date, 22 certified fisheries; 4% of global market. Fund & label/evaluation Stewardship http://www.msc.org Unilever system Council 1997 U.S. Monterey Bay Consumer Seafood Watch Began as a list of sustainable seafood for an aquarium exhibit and in 2000 became a Aquarium seafood Program wallet card. Other aquaria use the same information with a different interface. guide/Evaluation http://www.mbayaq.org/cr/seafoodwatch.asp system 1998 U.S. Audubon Consumer Seafood Lover’s First consumer seafood guide, produced by Carl Safina who, at the time, was working for seafood Guide Audubon. Today it is also co-sponsored by the Wildlife Conservation Society. guide/Evaluation http://seafood.audubon.org/ system 1998- U.S. SeaWeb & Boycott Give Swordfish 700 chefs boycott swordfish until the international fishery commission cut quotas 2000 Natural a Break http://www.seaweb.org/programs/swordfish/ Resources Defense Council 1999 Global Evaluation Rapfish RapFish considers 5 areas: ecological, economic, ethical, social, technological (Pitcher system and Preikshot, 2001), and the FAO Code of Conduct (Pitcher, 1999). Microsoft Excel Software for Rapfish is available (Kavanagh and Pitcher, 2004). http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/X4175E/X4175E00.HTM 1999 U.S. Eco- EcoFish New England-based company selling sustainably caught fish. In 2001, EcoFish was label/Evaluation certified as sustainable by the MSC (the first seafood distributor to earn such system certification). Also have a new seafood safe logo based on contaminant testing. http://www.ecofish.com/ 1999 Australia Evaluation Environment Legislation that requires fisheries that fall into certain categories to undergo sustainability system Protection and assessments that are then submitted to the Dept. of Environment and Heritage (has Biodiversity been done for nearly every export species). Conservation http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/ Act 1999 Australia Consumer Victoria National Evaluates the status of important commercial fishery species from southern Australia 1 6 3

seafood guide/ Parks Assoc. Evaluation system 2000 U.S. Consumer Fish for seafood guide Thought: An Eco-Cookbook 2001 U.S. Trade Seafood http://www.seafoodchoices.com/home.php association Choices Alliance 2001 U.S. Environmenta Consumer Oceans Alive Program was formerly known as Seafood Selector Website and Pocket Guide and was l Defense seafood guide renamed the Ocean Alive program in 2005. http://www.oceansalive.org/home.cfm 2001 U.S. EarthEasy Consumer Sustainable http://www.eartheasy.com/eat_sustainable_seafoods.htm seafood guide Seafood Guide 2001 U.S. Seafood Distributor Sourcing http://www.seafoodchoices.com/resources/sourcingseafood.php Choices seafood guide Seafood Alliance 2001 U.S. Distributor Choice Catch Sponsored by New England Aquarium and Ahold. Formerly known as EcoSounds, seafood guide Choice Catch audits domestic and international sources of seafood for environmental impact and sustainability based on scientific information available to ensure sustainability and traceability of Ahold’s seafood product (Ahold is the fifth largest U.S. grocery chain). http://www.neaq.org/choicecatch/ 2001 Global Eco- Marine Marine Aquarium Council is a third-party certifier. label/evaluation Aquarium http://www.aquariumcouncil.org/ system Council certification and eco-label 2002 Global Evaluation Traffic Lights Unilever’s internal fishery assessment system based on FAO guidelines. system http://www.seafoodchoices.com/membership/champions_unilever.php 2002- U.S. National Boycott Take a Pass on Program ended when NET merged with Pew Charitable Trusts. 2007 Environmenta Chilean sea l Trust (NET) bass campaign 2002 U.S. Environmenta Distributor Business Guide 101-page document available online l Defense seafood guide to Sustainable http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2532_BusinessGuideSustainableSeaf Seafood ood.pdf 2002 U.S. Sustainable Eco-label FishWise Began in California and is now implemented in 34 stores. As of 2005, also provides Fishery retailers/consumers with information regarding contaminants. Advocates http://www.sustainablefishery.org/ 2002 U.S. South Distributor Sustainable Restaurant partners agree to remove Chilean sea bass, orange roughy, and shark from Carolina seafood guide Seafood their menus. Aquarium Initiative Collaboration between southern business and NGOs. http://www.scaquarium.org/SSI/default.html 1 6 4

2002 UK Marine Distributor Good Fish Has been used by some UK supermarkets looking at sustainability. Conservation seafood guide Guide http://www.fishonline.org/ Society 2002- Canada Endangered Distributor Endangered Ask that members not serve swordfish, Chilean sea bass, orange roughy, and certain 2005 Fish Alliance seafood guide Fish Alliance types of caviar. 161 pioneer members. In 2005 merged with Environmental Defense. http://www.endangeredfishalliance.org/ 2003 U.S. Blue Ocean Consumer Fully transparent. Based on the methodology developed by C. Safina in the Audubon Institute seafood guide/ Society’s Seafood Lover’s Almanac. Other aquariums use the same information with a Evaluation different interface (e.g., Shedd aquarium re-labels it as “Right Bite”). system 2004 U.S. Star Chefs Consumer Sustainable http://www.starchefs.com/features/food_debates/html/sustainable_seafood.shtml seafood guide Seafood Guide 2004 Canada Eco-label? Organic Ocean Group of independent B.C. fishermen who sell sustainable seafood. http://www.organicocean.com/ 2004 N.Z. New Zealand Consumer Best Fish Guide Have full evaluation online; first independent ecological ranking for N.Z. commercial Forest and seafood fisheries. Bird guide/Evaluation http://www.forestandbird.org.nz/bestfishguide/index.asp system 2004 U.S. The Consumer One Fish, Two Sustainable Seafood cookbook. Smithsonian seafood guide Fish, Crawfish, Bluefish 2004 Australia AZ Marine Consumer Sustainable http://www.amcs.org.au/default2.asp?active_page_id=137 Conservation seafood guide Seafood Guide Society 2004 South Africa World Wildlife Consumer Seafood pocket Text messaging available. Fund seafood guide guide http://www.panda.org.za/sassi/ 2005 U.S. Consumer Co-op American Article that combined information from the FDA, FDA, Monterey Bay Aquarium, and Blue seafood guide Safe Seafood Ocean Institute; reprinted by other magazines Wallet List 2005 EU Trade Seafood European branch. association Choices Alliance 2005 UK Greenpeace Distributor Recipe for Reviews sustainability of common fish in UK supermarkets by combining seafood guide Disaster recommendations from Australian, New Zealand, USA and UK NGOs. 2005 Italy, Friend of the Eco- Uses FAO guidelines and third-party certification (includes aquaculture) and is used by Switzerland Sea label/evaluation Italy-based retailer Co-op and, in October 2007, the Swiss retailer MANOR; also allows system text messaging. 2005 Canada Vancouver Distributor Ocean Wise Vancouver-based restaurants. Aquarium seafood guide/Evaluation system/ Eco- 1 6 5

label 2005 Spain Greenpeace Consumer Guia para el Report and consumer guide seafood guide consumo responsable de pescado 2006 U.S. PCC Natural Consumer Seafood Partnership with Monterey Bay Aquarium Markets seafood guide choices for a healthier ocean 2006 U.S. Environmenta Distributor first corporate http://www.environmentaldefense.org/page.cfm?tagID=1464 l Defense seafood guide purchasing Wegman’s partnership and Bon Appetit 2006 Canada Various Consumer SeaChoice NGOs seafood guide/ Evaluation system/more 2006 E.U. IncoFish Miscellaneous FisherMin, A ruler against which shoppers can measure their fish to ensure they are not buying Project juveniles (Froese, 2004). http://www.incofish.org/Results/tools/FishNorth.php 2007 E.U./North WWF, the Evaluation A Common Tool http://www.seafoodchoices.org/newsroom/CommonMethods.php America North Sea system for Assessing Foundation Seafood (Dutch), Sustainability Greenpeace, Seafood Choices Alliance 2007 E.U./North Distributor Sustainable America seafood guide Fisheries Partnership/Fish Source 2007 E.U. Trade Responsible Sustainable Food LabWill work with business-to-business seafood trade focusing on Association Fishing Alliance small-scale capture fishers and aquaculture. 2007 USA Blue Ocean Consumer Fish Phone Institute seafood guide 2007 Belgium World Wildlife Consumer Fund (WWF) seafood guide 2007 Denmark WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Finland WWF Consumer 1 6 6

seafood guide 2007 France WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Germany WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Hong Kong WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Indonesia WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Netherlands WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Norway WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Poland WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Spain WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Sweden WWF Consumer seafood guide 2007 Switzerland WWF Consumer seafood guide ? Netherlands North Sea Consumer North Sea http://www.goedevis.nl/ Foundation seafood guide Foundation De Goede Visgids 2002 Germany Greenpeace Consumer Magazin http://www.greenpeace.de/themen/meere/fischerei/ seafood guide 2008 Netherlands Greenpeace Consumer Maak Schoon http://www.maakschoonschap.nl/ seafood guide Schap 2008 US New England Consumer Celebrate http://neaq.org/documents/CelebrateSeafoodGuide.pdf Aquarium seafood guide Seafood

1 6 7

Figures

Figure 9.1 The rise in sustainable seafood initiatives, 1989-2009 1 6 8 Chapter 9 references

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10 WHAT CAN CONSERVATIONISTS LEARN FROM INVESTOR BEHAVIOR?1

1 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication. Jacquet, J. (in press) What can conservationists learn from investor behavior? Conservation Biology. 1 73

How do we encourage personal savings and investment? Answers to this question, revealed through new analyses in experimental economics, provide insight into how to encourage collective savings and investment in our future through ecological conservation.

Lesson 1: Awareness alone is a weak instrument for change

The 2001 bankruptcy of major corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing resulted in devastating losses for the companies’ employees, many of whom held their retirement assets in employer stock. The media repeatedly highlighted these financial losses;

The New York Times alone ran 1,364 stories over the 6-month period following Enron’s bankruptcy, 112 of which ran on the front page. The amount of awareness raised about the riskiness of investing in employer stock far surpassed media attention given to ecological concerns.

Yet, even after the media barrage about an issue directly affecting them, employees overwhelming retained their employer stocks--the fraction of assets held in employer stock fell by no more than 2 percentage points. Workers in Texas (home to Enron), who were subject to even greater media exposure, responded to the loss with no overall reduction in employer stock investments (Choi et al., 2005).

If the collapse of major corporations resulting in loss of personal savings did not change household behavior, how can we expect consumers to change in response to information on environmental degradation? Information alone is insufficient. Conservation initiatives must include solutions, beyond raising awareness of an ecological concern.

Lesson 2: The default institutional setting determines the destiny

In the same way that relatively few people donate their organs unless organ donation is the default, relatively few employees save money via their firm’s 401(k) plan unless saving money is 1 74 the default. A U.S. study examining employee behavior found that when enrollment in a 401(k) plan was optional but not the default, 30% of employees participated. If, however, the default

was reversed and the firm automatically enrolled its employees in the 401(k), 80% of employees

kept the 401(k) plan (without losing their freedom to choose; employees could opt out with a 5-

minute process) (Choi et al., 2004).

Moreover, the psychology of personal savings could influence how conservationists work to

save our ecological heritage. Changing default settings for patterns of consumption (allowing

the less desirable outcome but only upon request) can be preferable to regulations because it

allows for greater consumer freedom. In the same way firms should make a savings program

the default for their employees, conservation groups could lobby institutions (e.g. governments,

utilities, universities, businesses, architecture firms) to make socially optimal choices the default

for their citizens.

For instance, when households have the option to pay premiums for renewable energy sources

or recycling programs, these green options should be the default. Thermostats in corporate

buildings should be set lower but allow for employees to increase the temperature each

morning. Architects should make appealing stairwells central to building design, rather than the

current elevator default (elevators would be available but not central). Stores could continue to

provide plastic bags for their customers but only upon request.

Lesson 3: Sometimes, setting extreme defaults is optimal.

Defaults should be set to maximize the average well-being, which is not the same as setting the default to the average preference of all citizens. Often, default rates of savings should be bolder than the average person would want (Choi et al., 2003) and this relates to our conservation

goals. Conservation groups might aim to set extreme defaults to start and then ratchet them

1 75 down as demanded by society rather than lobbying for constant incremental increases from a

very weak base.

In the oceans, for example, our collective debt (e.g. overfishing, pollution, climate change) far outweighs our savings (e.g. marine protected areas). More than 99% of the world’s oceans are

open to fishing (Spalding et al., 2008). Perhaps conservation groups should initiate policies to reverse our conceptual default—the view of the oceans as being open to fishing with small exceptions—to see the oceans as closed to fishing with small exceptions (Walters et al., 1998).

The recent financial crises around the world point to the role that institutions play in both creating and assuaging economic hardship. Free markets may be compatible with long-term stability, both economically and ecologically, but only with an institutional component that encourages precautionary, risk-averse behavior. This behavior will not develop from education alone. Just as the Enron debacle did not lead to changes in investments in employer stocks, awareness of environmental problems alone is not likely to yield the desired ecological results.

Conservation efforts must enlist existing institutions to reset default patterns of consumption, support regulatory efforts, and shift conceptual views of nature. Just as we need an institutional nudge to cultivate our personal savings account, we also need this to save the planet.

1 76

Chapter 10 References

Choi, J., Laibson, D. Madrian, B. &Metrick, A. (2003) Optimal defaults. American Economic Review 93:180-185.

Choi, J. Laibson, D. Madrian, B. & Metrick, A. (2004) Plan design and 401(k) savings outcomes. National Tax Journal 57:275-98.

Choi, J. Laibson, D. & Madrian, B. (2005) Are empowerment and education enough? Undiversification in 401(k) plans. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:151-198.

Spalding, M., Fish, L. & Wood, L. (2008) Toward representative protection of the world’s coasts and oceans—progress, gaps, and opportunities. Conservation Letters 1, 217- 226.

Walters, C.J. (1998) Management without accurate stock assessment. In Pitcher, T.J., Hart, P. & Pauly, D. (eds.), Reinventing Fisheries Management. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordecht, Netherlands.

1 77

11 BEYOND FOOD: FISH IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1 78

Aside from mushrooms, seafood is the last wild food regularly eaten in Western society.

Overfishing imperils this last globalized hunter-gatherer food system and those humans who still largely rely on fish for survival. Overfishing can be considered in two primary categories: a

Malthusian form, a combination of overpopulation and destructive fishing practices (Pauly,

1997), and an industrial form, which is the coupling of over-efficient fishing techniques with lax

and unsustainable policies.

Globalization further exacerbates overfishing and the tension between luxury and subsistence

markets. The increasing demand for seafood has led to fishing in the furthest reaches of the ocean, while the demand for luxury seafood from the developed world competes with the food-

security demand from the developing world for the same marine resources.

Sometimes, the competition between the developed and developing worlds is obvious. In

African waters, for instance, shrimp trawlers from distant lands compete with local fishers for the same fishing grounds. Most often, however, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market shrouds the redirection of fish from those who need it to survive to those who do not. This redirection is facilitated by non-transparent access agreements (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002) and subtly and not so subtly unequal trade patterns.

Industrial development through the 1960s and 1970s led to a pattern in the small-scale sector where the desire for cash gradually shifted the principally subsistence fisheries to subsistence- plus-market fisheries. In the most extreme cases, the effects of the globalized market are more severe, as developing countries eager for foreign exchange sell off what they perceive to be

‘surplus’ fisheries production (often driven by reliance on incomplete statistics) and fishing rights to the developed world. This can result in an inversion of the Robin Hood parable: the stealing

of fish from the poor to feed the rich.

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It is possible that many developing world countries never had a ‘surplus’ of fish in the first place,

but that the catches of their small-scale, subsistence fishers have simply gone unrecorded. In

Mozambique, for instance, access agreements have allowed distant water fleets to access

Mozambican waters—often under the premise that local, small-scale fishers produce little to no fish. Since the 1950s, Mozambique has reported primarily industrial catches and has vastly under-reported the nation’s small-scale fishing sector due to lack of resources and civil war.

However, based on reconstructed data for the small-scale sector, since 2000, the Mozambique fishing sector as a whole caught between 150,000 and 172,000 t per year. Overall,

reconstructed marine fisheries catches from 1950-2005 for Mozambique were 6.2 times greater

than data reported to and by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

(Chapter 3).

Similarly, in Tanzania, Zanzibar’s recorded fisheries statistics are missing from Tanzania’s

marine fisheries catches reported by FAO. Taking into account reconstructed small-scale

fisheries catches, total mainland catches are also at least one-third larger than reported by

official data, which means that Tanzanian marine fish catches are at least 95,000 t in recent

years and that, for 1950-2005, catches were 1.7 times greater than those reported. The small-

scale fishing sector’s catches in both countries, which make up approximately 75% of total

catch, are not small, even if they appear to be so in international statistics (Chapter 3).

In Ecuador, globalization’s effects on the small-scale sector have led fishers to target previously undesired species (i.e. sharks). The Asian demand for shark fin soup has led to heavy shark

fishing pressure in the Eastern Pacific and yet, perhaps due to the highly contentious nature of

shark finning, shark catches in the region are also underreported. Until the 2005 update of

fisheries data, the FAO did not report elasmobranches for Ecuador (after 2005, Ecuador

backdated shark captures for 1991 to 2004). Yet, the reconstruction of Ecuador’s mainland

shark landings for 1979 to 2004 shows that shark landings were an estimated 7,000 tonnes per 1 80 year, or nearly half a million sharks, and 3.6 times greater than those retrospectively reported by

FAO for 1991 to 2004 (Chapter 4).

These cases of data misrepresentation are cited as case studies in a typology to classify fisheries catch data (Chapter 5). At each stage in the reporting chain, from fisher to

national/international agencies, fisheries catch can be: known and reported; known and

underreported; unknown and overreported; or unknown and underreported. Of these four

categories, underreporting seems to be the likeliest outcome.

To obtain a better understanding of fisheries catches around the world, catches can be reconstructed based on biological models (e.g. Watson & Pauly, 2001) or by using historical gray literature to establish proxies, as I have done here (Chapters 3 and 4) and has been done elsewhere (Zeller et al., 2006; 2007). In the meanwhile, countries must recognize that they are often operating with limited and insufficient data and that political will must be garnered to make precautionary fisheries management decisions in the face of data uncertainty (Chapter 5) and perhaps even prior to scientific consensus (Ludwig et al., 1993).

In the specific case of Ecuador, the discrepancies in data require immediate implementation of the measures existing Ecuadorian law mandates: eliminating targeted shark captures, finning, and transshipments, as well as adoption of measures to minimize incidental capture. Most of all, a serious shark landings monitoring system and effective chain of custody standards are needed. This recommendation, in fact, is true for the seafood sector as a whole.

As the global trade and market for seafood has grown, the market has simultaneously masked and revealed unconventional signs of overfishing through the twin problems of renaming and mislabeling (Chapter 7). Resource scarcity, the potential for greater profits, and weak

1 81 legislation have all encouraged incorrect labeling, the results of which include consumer losses, the further degradation of fisheries resources, and even adverse effects on human health.

To protect consumers, governments should support a global mandate to label species, country- of-origin, and catching or production method on all seafood with high penalties for infractions.

To garner support for such legislative actions, consumers must become better acquainted and concerned with their seafood and its origin. This is especially important in the U.S., where 80 percent of the seafood is imported, more than one-third of all fish is mislabeled, and less than one percent of seafood is inspected (Chapter 7).

The problem of renaming and mislabeling also subverts consumer awareness campaigns, which have become very popular conservation investments in recent years and in part aim to decrease consumption of overfished species by encouraging demand for sustainably-caught

ones (Chapter 6 and 9). But even the most sophisticated of consumers would have difficulty

navigating the confusing messages and cheating that occur in Western seafood markets.

Just as Charles Darwin (1859) convinced us of the significance of small changes over large

amounts of time (i.e. natural selection), so too have we learned the ecological consequences of

early fishing epochs that Jackson et al. (2001) describe as the ‘aboriginal’ and ‘colonial’ periods.

Using anecdotes as data (as per Pauly, 1995), historical ecologists show that early fisheries,

despite being low-tech in nature, had significant impacts (e.g. Jackson et al., 2001). The

incorporation of anecdotes into scientific studies also allows us to comprehend the true

magnitude and impact of small-scale fisheries in the developing world (e.g. Chapters 3 and 4),

recreational fisheries (Zeller et al., 2008; McClenachan, 2009), and the aquarium trade.

It requires less convincing to comprehend the considerable impacts of the recent ‘global’ fishing

industry. One trawler today can remove 60 tonnes of fish from the ocean in a single haul. 1 82

Indeed, industrial fisheries are capable of reducing fish biomass by 90% in just 15 years (Myers and Worm, 2003). Put simply, this modern industrial era hailed a type of fishing that led to big changes over small amounts of time.

This is why consumer efforts, which aim to reform consumer preferences in luxury markets, are largely futile. So far, the consumer campaigns that address “sustainable seafood” have not proved themselves capable of much more than catering to niche desires to ‘do the right thing’

(Chapter 6 and 9). These small changes at the household level would require widespread adoption and, therefore, a lot of time – time we do not have -- to yield positive effects.

Furthermore, localized successes in reducing demand for certain species are easily masked by a globalized and increasing demand for seafood.

This certainly does not mean efforts should not be undertaken. Indeed, one could argue the benefits of marine protected areas are also eclipsed in an ocean where more than 99% of the ocean is open to fishing (Spalding et al., 2008; Wood et al., 2008). However, it does provide an argument that the conservation community must be more strategic in its efforts and its funding strategy (Chapter 8).

Today’s conservation movement, like the fishing industry it seeks to revolutionize, must make big changes over small time. It can do this best by working higher in the demand chain, in what can be described as vertical (consumer to mega-consumer or government), rather than horizontal (consumer to consumer), agitation. In a market-based approach, efforts should be directed at eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies (Chapter 8), working with large seafood buyers, and eliminating the use of fishmeal in agricultural feed (Chapter 9).

Finally, the biggest change the conservation community could hope to achieve would be to

create an ethical shift that seeks to create mythologies for fish and invertebrates, i.e., to de- 1 83 commodify them. We were able to achieve this with whales because they are mammals that

nurse their young, communicate with one another, and apparently exhibit high levels of

intelligence. However, fish are, for the most part, cold-blooded, expressionless creatures. But,

in some ways, fish are not that different from birds and, as anyone who has ever been to

England knows, there is no shortage of sentiment for avian species. Like the albatross, tunas

cover remarkable migratory distances. Like an eagle, an octopus can also build an impressive

home. And, like many macaws, the Moorish idol chooses a mate for life. Fish are not simply

food. When discussing their future, we should engage as citizens concerned about Earth’s

fellow inhabitants as much as consumers worried only about our appetite.

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Chapter 11 references

Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species. London: John Murray.

Kaczynski, V.M. & Fluharty, D. (2002) European policies in West Africa: who benefits from fisheries agreements? Marine Policy 26(2), 75-93.

Ludwig, D, Hilborn, R. & Walters, C. (1993) Uncertainty, resource exploitation, and conservation: lessons from history. Science 260, 17-18.

McClenachan, L. (2009) Documenting loss of large trophy fish from the Florida Keys with historical photographs. Conservation Biology 23, 636-643.

Myers, R.A. & Worm, B. (2003) Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory fish communities. Nature 423, 6937.

Pauly, D. (1995). Anecdotes and the shifting baselines syndrome of fisheries. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 10, 430.

Pauly, D. (1997). Small-scale fisheries in the tropics: marginality, marginalization, and some implications for fisheries management. In E. Pikitch, D. Huppert, and M. Sissenwine (Eds.). Global Trends: Fisheries Management. Bethesda, Maryland: American Fisheries Society Symposium 20.

Spalding, M., Fish, L. & Wood, L. (2008) Toward representative protection of the world’s coasts and oceans—progress, gaps, and opportunities. Conservation Letters 1, 217- 226.

Watson, R. & Pauly, D. (2001) Systematic distortions in world fisheries catch trends. Nature 424, 534-536.

Wood, L., Fish, L., Laughren, J. & Pauly, D. (2008) Assessing progress towards global marine protection targets: shortfalls in information and action. Oryx 42, 340-351.

Zeller, D., Booth, S. & Pauly, D. (2006) Fisheries contributions to GDP: Underestimating small-scale fisheries in the Pacific. Marine Resource Economics 21, 355-374.

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