ISSN 2544-6703 The Review of European Affairs Volume (1) Issue (2) 2017
Polish European Community Studies Association (PECSA) Warsaw 2017 The publication of “The Review of European Affairs” was prepared within the project “Connecting the European Union of Shared Aims, Freedoms, Values and Responsibilities” (EUSHARE), the Grant Agreement/Decision No. 2016-1675/001-001, co-financed by the Erasmus+ Programme (Jean Monnet Support to Associations) of the European Union in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Poland. The publication reflects only the views of the Authors and cannot be understood as the official position of the European Union or the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Poland. Editorial Board Editor in Chief: Ewa Latoszek Deputy Editors in Chief: Artur Adamczyk, Małgorzata Dziembała, Marta Pachocka Thematic Editors of the Issue: Małgorzata Dziembała, Marta Pachocka Assistant Editor: Michał Budziński Statistical Editor: Aleksandra Borowicz Political Sciences Editor: Kamil Zajączkowski Economics & Management Editor: Anna Masłoń-Oracz Finance Editor: Agnieszka Kłos Law Editor: Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada Editorial cooperation and proofreading: Kinga Garnette-Skorupska, Jan Misiuna Editorial supervisor: Czesława Kliszko Cover design: Elżbieta Giżyńska Cover foto: fotostar
© Copyright by the Polish European Community Studies Association (PECSA), Warsaw 2017 This is a peer-reviewed scholarly publication. All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by the copyright notice may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission of the Authors and the Publisher. The electronic copy is a reference (primary) copy. ISSN 2544-6703 Publisher Polskie Stowarzyszenie Badań Wspólnoty Europejskiej ul. Armii Krajowej 119/121, 81-824 Sopot, http://pecsa.edu.pl/ Editorial Office Katedra Unii Europejskiej im. Jeana Monneta Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społeczne, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie ul. Wiśniowa 41, bud. W, pok. 65, 66, 02-520 Warszawa, e-mail: [email protected] Typeset, printing and distribution ELIPSA Dom Wydawniczy ul. Inflancka 15/198, 00-189 Warszawa,http://elipsa.pl/ Spis treści/Contents
Vasile Cucerescu Th e Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? ...... 5
Ludmila Golovataia Th e Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. Th e Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic of Moldova ...... 25
Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead ...... 45
Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada Th e European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination to the General Principle of Equality ...... 61
Gaga Gabrichidze Th e Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality in European Union–Georgia Relations ...... 85
Patrycja Bytner Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ...... 101 Magdalen Proczek, Rudolf Michałkiewicz Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej ...... 113
Adam Gąsiorek Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej ...... 127 The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA
VASILE CUCERESCU*
The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness?
Abstract The Eastern Partnership of the European Union, launched in 2008 on the initiative of Poland and Sweden, has the characteristics of a very complex policy addressed to three Eastern European countries – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and to three South-Eastern European countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The complexity of relations rises from the geographical, historical and geopolitical backgrounds. At the same time, these relations are imbued with various complications of internal and external nature. Considering these unusual, but present, complications, the article makes a retrospective of adopted acts that refer to the Eastern Partnership: The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” and the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Eastern Partnership”. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” brings a new impetus in the framework of cooperation relations between the European Union and Eastern Partnership states. The relations are scrutinised through the prism of the neighbourhood policy and the Eastern Partnership policy. Positive and less positive results are revealed, accompanied by inherent challenges; all these serving as a kind of food for positive thinking in building resilience in the Eastern Europe. Relevant matter-of-fact examples are given from all Eastern Partnership countries and the way to discuss them. Open conclusions provide issues to be re-visited (revised) and several recommendations.
Key words: European Union; neighbourhood policy; Eastern Partnership; cooperation; resilience.
* European Community Studies Association Moldova, [email protected] 6 Vasile Cucerescu
Introduction
At fi rst sight, the Eastern Partnership initiative is a European policy similar to all others. In fact, it seems to be a more appealing one due to on the one hand the complexity of the relations that characterise the cooperation between the European Union and all six Eastern Partnership countries, and on the other hand bilateral cooperation of the European Union with each state. In the framework of the EU’s external relations, the Eastern Partnership occupies a very important place. Th is unique approach is determined by promoting good neighbourhoodliness. Eastern neighbours represent a zone of newly established countries that strive for building their statehood and develop cooperation with well-intended partners in which the European Union plays a signifi cant role. Th e Eastern Partnership initiative is a policy in continuous development, being aff ected by multiple qualitative and quantitative changes in the light of partners’ changing behaviour. Because of this the concept of resilience, applied to the EU’s policies ought to be visited and re-visited. In doing it, the provisions of EU Neighbourhood Policy and of EU Eastern Partnership will be analysed from this perspective to see to what extent they provide necessary and self-suffi cient instruments of cooperation for all involved parties and, if they do, to detect barriers that seem to be inherent and govern intra-partnership cooperation relations.
1. Re-Visiting European Union Neighbourhood Policy
From its inception in 2003, the policy entitled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” has become an important external instrument of the European Union’s cooperation with its neighbours. Th e document has fi ve parts and one annex with tables and charts. Th e provisions focus on (1) wider Europe: accepting the challenge; (2) neighbourhood – diff erent countries, common interests; (3) a new vision and a new off er; (4) a diff erentiated, progressive, benchmarked approach; and (5) next steps (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 2003). Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was conceived to avoid development discrepancies between the European Union and its neighbours in order to strengthen prosperity, stability and security of all involved parties. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is governed by the values of democracy, the rule of The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 7 law and respect of human rights. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) works through bilateral, regional, neighbourhood and cross-border cooperation tools. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed for 16 neighbouring countries: to the East (6) – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; to the South (10) – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. For certain the neighbourhood policy is one of the most ambitious initiatives of the European Union towards its neighbours, irrespective of their geographical position and their level of development. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is fully in harmony with the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. It is “an attractive European neighbourhood policy” (Kempe 2007, 188) for Eastern partners of the European Union. Additionally, Member States “have real diffi culty in agreeing on the substance of an attractive ENP and in striking a sound balance between off ers and demands. Th is weakens the credibility and impact of the EU’s policy towards its neighbours” (Lippert 2007, 187). Scholars identify diverging visions between Member States and European institutions as such and, consequently, a converging approach is necessary to conciliate national and supranational visions.
2. Re-Visiting European Union Eastern Partnership Initiative
Th e Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a specifi c initiative, detailing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as it addresses only six neighbours: in the East – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine; in the South-East – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Th is project was started on initiative of Poland and Sweden, and adopted in 2008. Th e Eastern Partnership (EaP) is based on the principles of international law and fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2008). Th e Eastern Partnership (EaP) works on four cooperation platforms: Platform 1: Democracy, good governance and stability – administrative reform; integrated border management; justice; fi ght against corruption; migration and asylum; common security and defence. 8 Vasile Cucerescu
Platform 2: Economic integration and convergence with EU policies – transport; small and medium-sized enterprises (SME); environment and climate change; trade and related regulatory cooperation; agriculture and rural development; statistics; harmonisation of digital markets. Platform 3: Energy security – electricity, gas and oil interconnections; diverse energy supply sources and transit routes; competitiveness; secure energy supply; integration of variable renewable energy sources. Platform 4: People-to-people contacts – participation in EU international cooperation programmes; capacity to reform; development of cooperation; sharing of good practices in education and research, youth and arts. Th e large spectrum of issues covers all fi elds of social activity. In other words, it assembles a totality of policies, which is characteristic to any Member State and the European Union as a whole. Probably it is the most that the European Union has off ered to any partner in the world in terms of designed policy, i.e. a replica of general development based on the same values shared by the European Union and Member States. In fact, it could be compared to a kind of recipe that is off ered. Moreover, it is supported by EU fi nancial instruments. At the level of policy, programmes and instruments, everything is arranged. However, let us see what happens, what are the results and the impact in the Eastern Partnership.
3. Eastern Partnership: Challenging Issues
Th e Eastern Partnership initiative is a very composite policy as it was conceived within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Th e policy itself is elaborated a-la carte to suit the needs of broader cooperation between the European Union and its six Eastern neighbours. Th e incentives included bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the parties. Action plans were introduced as concrete measures to attain the objectives stipulated in the agreements concluded by the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries. Th e deadlines have not always been realistic for the parties that undertook these commitments. Th is has also aff ected the perceived credibility of the partners. Among recent instruments of cooperation there are the Association Agreements concluded with three Eastern Partnership members: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 9
Th ese countries, “Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are considered the locomotives of the Eastern Partnership in concluding and implementing the Association Agreements” (Cucerescu 2016, 109), irrespective of the degree of implementation of the Agreements, taking into consideration internal and external contexts. Other members, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus have not concluded the Association Agreements. Consequently, there are two types of members, according to this category: “insiders of Association Agreements (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), and outsiders of Association Agreements (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus)” (Cucerescu 2016, 115). Moreover, the concluded Association Agreements display a contested membership perspective, i.e. they neither stipulate expressly the possibility to join the European Union, nor deny it. Incertitude hovers above the signing parties. Th is is crucial for going ahead for all contracting parties to avoid unnecessary speculations and scenarios. Additionally, it could fuel certain threats and create a perfect manoeuvring space for demolitionists of security and peace in Europe. Adam Hug claims that “the EaP was transformed by events from a broadly technocratic exercise into a geopolitical fault line between Europe (and the wider West) and Russia” (Hug 2015, 5). Th e Eastern Partnership should not be treated in this narrow meaning; it represents more, and it should not stop in front of this ephemeral and inconsistent impediment. Th e Eastern Partnership needs a broader vision and a global perspective to be completely eff ective and effi cient. “Rethinking the past EaP strategies is unavoidable, but positive eff ects of EaP cannot be underestimated. New initiatives must become more pragmatic and goal oriented from both sides” (Kerikmäe 2016, 4). In other words, there are progress indicators: positiveness, pragmatism, purposefulness, bothsideness and innovation. And everybody should keep to them. A straightforward approach comes from Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Dovilė Šukytė in their joint study Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership – challenges and opportunities for Lithuania’s foreign policy. Th e authors elaborate on such issues as dilemmas of the EU Eastern Partnership, EU external relations: lack of consistency, Eurasian Economic Union – an alternative to the EU association policy, Ukraine – the key to the success of the EU Eastern Partnership, as well as alternatives to the association agreements. Th e authors suggest revision of “the principle... providing for development of democratic and constitutional reforms in partner countries as a prerequisite for cooperation with the EU” (Kasčiūnas, Šukytė 2013, 7). Following the same line of ideas, in the fi ndings of the study Civil Participation in Decision Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries by Jeff Lovitt, there are highlighted key areas of effi cient and inclusive policy making that are valid for Eastern 10 Vasile Cucerescu
Partnership countries. Among them are: free access to information; detailed annual budgets and expenditure statements; government websites that are easily navigable, civil participation in political decision-making that will be informed and inclusive if advance notice of public consultation processes is provided; citizens’ initiatives; within the framework of the open government partnership, opportunities for public participation and access to information, in particular open data portals, have been further strengthened; adoption of green papers; public consultations at central, regional and local level which should become standard practice; public consultations should as standard practice include online consultations, expert working groups, and public hearings; eff ective, high-quality policies and laws that require clear procedures, professional draft ing skills, and a thorough consultative draft ing process; monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of policies and decisions at central and local government level should be mandatory; civil society organisations in the six Eastern Partnership countries should equip themselves with expertise in the draft ing of legislation; guidelines aimed at promoting civil participation in political decision-making; the governments of the six Eastern Partnership countries have an opportunity to build on existing standards and good practice (Lovitt 2016, 10-103). Th ese fi ndings are presented in a soft way, being called challenges, but, in fact, they may be called systemic chronic problems identifi ed before the Eastern Partnership was launched. Th is is a long discussion initiated in the 1990s, but still on current agenda. Th e explanation is very simple: post-independence established systems oppose resistance to everything coming from the outside as it could be an existential threat to the systems themselves. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” represents a recent initiative evolved from vision to action in promoting citizens’ interests. Th e title of the policy speaks for itself. It states that the principles guiding the external actions are: unity, engagement, responsibility, partnership. Th e principled pragmatism is to guide the EU’s external actions. It sets the priorities: security of the Union, state and societal resilience for the East and South, an integrated approach to confl icts and crises, cooperative regional orders, global governance for the 21st century. Th e EU’s priority for the neighbourhood, including the Eastern one, relies on investing in state and societal resilience, because “a resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy” (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” 2016, 23). Cooperation relations are to fully benefi t from the potential of all involved partners, because all of them have something to give for their mutual benefi t. It is The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 11 a win-win approach that should be considered when speaking about the Eastern Partnership. Th e dialogue needs a multi-faceted approach. For this reason, in the following chapter several slices of a sociological survey will be discussed. Th e survey was performed in one Eastern Partnership country and it focuses on diff erent aspects of the relations between the European Union and Moldova; even though the survey was conducted a couple of years ago, it is still of great signifi cance today.
4. A Sociological Example: Moldova
A concrete case in the Eastern Partnership is Moldova. Th e sociological survey “Widening the European Dialogue in Moldova” presents Moldovan citizens’ interesting perceptions concerning cooperation relations in Eastern Europe and the aspirations shared by respondents. Out of multiple questions 31 (Qi–Qxxxi) the most relevant ones for the purpose of this study were selected.
Qi) Have you ever heard of the following organisations? (%) Yes No 1. European Union (EU) 98,2 1,8 2. NATO 86,6 13,4 3. Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) 85,1 14,9 4. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 87,1 12,9 5. Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 32,4 67,6
Qii) To what extent are you interested in … % Very Rather Rather not Not at all Do not much interested interested interested know 1. What is happening in the EU 30,2 37,1 19,4 11,3 2,0 2. Relations between Moldova 37,4 35,1 15,4 10,0 2,1 & the EU 3. Relations between Moldova 35,3 32,1 21,5 6,3 4,8 & the ECU 4. Relations between 47,4 32,7 12,6 5,1 2,2 Moldova & Russia 12 Vasile Cucerescu
Qiii) How would you describe in general the relations between … ? (%) Very Rather Rather Very Do not good good bad bad know 1. The EU & its Eastern Neighbours 16,1 42,6 13,3 3,3 24,7 2. The EU & Moldova 17,5 51,0 15,9 3,7 11,9 3. The EU and Russia 8,9 30,4 34,1 12,3 14,3
Qiv) What is the perception of Moldova in the EU? (%) 23,0 Positive 24,5 Rather positive 22,3 Neutral 14,6 Rather negative 10,3 Negative 5,3 Do not know
Qv) What is the perception of the EU in Moldova? (%) 40,1 Positive 24,5 Rather positive 17,0 Neutral 7,6 Rather negative 7,5 Negative 3,3 Do not know
Qvi) How would you describe relations between the EU and Moldova? (%) 31,4 They are equal and mutual beneficial relations 34,7 They are mainly in the interests of the EU 24,5 They are mainly in the interests of our country 9,4 Do not know
Qvii) Do you think that relations between EU and Moldova are improving, worsening or not changing? (%) 39,0 Improving 43,5 Not changing 8,4 Worsening 9,1 Do not know The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 13
Qviii) Do you think the EU is interested in developing closer links with Moldova? (%) 50,4 Yes 31,0 No 18,6 Do not know Qix) Have you heard about the Association Agreement that the EU and Moldova are planning to initial in the near future? (%) 50,0 Yes 43,5 No 6,5 Do not know Qx) If the Association Agreement is initialled, what implications this would have for Moldova? (%) Do not know 26,7 Lower prices on goods & energy 62,3 Living costs would increase 11,0 62,0 Trade with the EU would increase 26,4 Limited access to the EU market 11,6 30,9 Higher level of security & 56,4 More problems and pressure 12,7 protection from Russia 44,4 Greater mobility/freedom of 43,1 More control of/limited mobility 12,5 movement 49,0 Better education/access to EU HEIs 38,2 Expensive & lengthy reforms 12,8 of education 44,8 More economic prosperity 41,6 Costly reforms, 13,6 and economic decline 49,4 Political stability 37,4 Political uncertainty 13,2 46,2 Eradication of corruption 40,6 Hidden corruption 13,2 43,2 Rule of law and independent 42,7 Rule of law on paper only 14,1 judiciary 43,3 More freedoms and rights 43,4 Life will remain the same 13,3 31,0 Resolution of Transnistrian conflict 54,3 Worsening of Transnistrian conflict 14,7
Qxi) What types of cooperation are currently developing between the EU and Moldova? (%). Multiple choice question 43,0 Economic cooperation 25,8 Visa partnership & mobility 40,9 Trade cooperation 18,3 Moldova’s participation in EU institutions 31,1 Student exchange 16,0 Public administration reform 30,8 Fight against corruption 12,0 Scientific and technical cooperation 29,4 Cross-border cooperation 8,0 Civil society forum 28,5 Business forum and cooperation 0 ,5 Other 27,2 Cooperation between local and the 18,7 Do not know EU’s authorities 14 Vasile Cucerescu
Qxii) Which of the above are most successful? (%) 15,5 Economic cooperation 4,4 Business forum and cooperation 8,1 Cross-border cooperation 3,1 Moldova’s participation in EU institutions 7,9 Student exchange 1,8 Public administration reform 7,9 Trade cooperation 1,7 Scientific and technical cooperation 6,4 Cooperation between local 0,6 Civil society forum and the EU’s authorities 5,9 Visa partnership & mobility 32,1 Do not know 4,6 Fight against corruption
Qxiii) Which of the above are least successful? (%) 14,8 Fight against corruption 3,8 Public administration reform 6,6 Economic cooperation 3,6 Moldova’s participation in EU institutions 6,5 Business forum and cooperation 2,8 Scientific and technical cooperation 5,7 Trade cooperation 2,2 Cross-border cooperation 5,0 Visa partnership & mobility 2,1 Civil society forum 4,8 Student exchange 0,2 Other 4,4 Cooperation between local and the 37,5 Do not know EU’s authorities
Qxiv) Have you ever heard about DCTFA for Moldova? (%) 35,0 Yes 65,0 No
Qxv) What specifi cally does it involve? (%). Multiple answers question. 35,7 Liberalization of trade of goods and services 10,6 Free movement of citizens (without visa) 5,4 Reduction of customs duties 3,4 Development of economic, social and political bilateral cooperation 2,9 Free movement of labour force 1,1 Cancellation of export duties 1,1 Investment growth in Moldova 1,4 Other 46,3 Do not know The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 15
Qxvi) Th e EU believes that Moldova is …? (%) Yes No Do not know 1. Strategic partner of the EU 35,9 45,7 18,4 2. Friendly country 80,6 11,8 7,6 3. Security threat 11,8 75,0 13,2 4. Second-class country 42,6 39,1 18,3 5. Foe 5,0 80,3 14,7
Qxvii) Th e EU sees Moldova? (%) Do not know 86,8 Peaceful 10,2 Militant 3,0 20,7 Developed 75,7 Laggard 3,6 72,0 Spiritual 24,5 Non spiritual 3,5 51,5 Independent 45,7 Dependent 2,8 73,7 Open 23,6 Closed 2,7 81,1 Partner 14,4 Rivalry 4,5 63,7 Democratic 33,5 Undemocratic 2,8 44,5 Legal-based 52,2 Illegal 3,3 15,2 Strong 82,1 Weak 2,7 90,1 Friendly 6,0 Hostile 3,9 55,3 Important 41,2 Insignificant 3,5
Qxviii) How would you describe relations between the EU and Moldova? (%) 9,2 Active cooperation in many spheres 32,7 Gradual cooperation 41,7 More talking than concrete actions 6,0 Lack of any cooperation 10,4 Do not know
Qxix) Would you agree that Moldova could learn a lot from the EU in relation to …? (%) Fully Rather Rather Absolutely Do not agree agree disagree disagree know 1. Democracy & effective governance 43,7 32,8 10,0 4,2 9,3 2. Market economy 47,6 32,0 9,6 3,4 7,4 3. State security 39,4 29,9 14,3 4,5 11,9 4. Multiculturalism 31,6 27,8 17,7 9,8 13,1 5. Religious toleration 23,8 24,7 22,7 13,5 15,3 16 Vasile Cucerescu
Fully Rather Rather Absolutely Do not agree agree disagree disagree know 6. Social security 38,9 30,8 11,1 7,0 12,2 7. Transparent and easy accessible judiciary 37,5 30,8 11,2 6,1 14,4 8. Effective labour market 45,2 28,8 12,8 5,0 8,2 9. Reforming education system 41,2 28,7 11,8 7,6 10,7 10. Fight against corruption 44,9 24,5 12,9 7,3 10,4 11. Reforming agriculture 43,0 30,2 10,5 5,5 10,8 12. SME development 41,6 31,4 9,9 4,3 12,8 13. Protection of environment 43,0 30,2 10,9 4,3 11,6
Qxx) Is the Transnistrian confl ict an obstacle for Moldova’s closer integration in the EU? (%) 70,2 Yes 17,6 No 12,2 Do not know
Qxxi) Could the EU and Russia work together to resolve the Transnistrian confl ict? (%) 31,1 Yes, it is important they work together 21,4 To a degree: they have different approaches, which may be difficult to reconcile 37,0 No, they are rivals in this region 10,5 Do not know
Qxxii) Is Moldova’s foreign policy more orientated towards …? (%) 19,4 Russia including the ECU 46,1 The West/ EU 11,6 Neutral 15,0 Multi-vector 7,9 Do not know Qxxiii) If a referendum about Moldova’s future were held today, how would you vote in it? (%) 35,9 For more cooperation with Russia and Eurasian Union 31,8 For more cooperation with the EU 25,0 For more cooperation with both 2,0 Against cooperation with both 5,3 Do not know The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 17
Qxxiv) If you had to choose between admission to the ECU or the EU, which option would you vote for? (%) 40,4 ECU 44,3 EU 4,9 None of the aforementioned 10,4 Do not know Qxxv) Which sentiments do you have when thinking about the EU? (%). Multiple choice question 46,8 Hope 21,5 Faith 20,3 Distrust 18,7 Concern 13,8 Enthusiasm 12,8 Indifference 9,2 Pride 6,2 Alienation 4,6 Do not know
Qxxvi) Which EU countries do you like the most? (%). Multiple choice question 38,2 Germany 1,6 Finland 27,6 Italy 1,5 Greece 20,8 France 1,0 Ireland 10,7 Great Britain 0,8 Hungary 10,3 Romania 0,7 Estonia 3,9 Spain 0,7 Denmark 2,5 Austria 0,6 Luxembourg 2,1 Portugal 0,5 Lithuania 1,8 Bulgaria 0,5 Slovak Republic 1,7 Sweden 0,5 Belgium 1,7 Netherland 0,1 Latvia 1,7 Czech Republic 30,5 None/Do not know 1,6 Poland
Qxxvii) How many times have you visited the EU? (%) 11,0 Once 1,4 10 times 5,3 Twice 0,2 11 times 4,1 3 times 0,2 12 times 1,8 4 times 0,1 13 times 2,2 5 times 0,5 15 times 18 Vasile Cucerescu
1,1 6 times 0,1 18 times 0,6 7 times 0,6 20 times 0,4 8 times 0,1 30 times 0,3 9 times 70,0 Never
Qxxviii) Have you ever had any problems when opening a Schengen visa? (%) 5,1 Yes 15,1 No 79,1 Never applied 0,7 Do not know
Qxxix) What other countries have you visited? (%) 48,4 Russia 0,2 Cyprus 35,5 Ukraine 0,1 Armenia 6,2 Belarus 0,1 Azerbaijan 1,6 Kazakhstan 0,1 United Arab Emirates 1,5 Israel 0,1 Estonia 1,3 Turkey 0,1 Uzbekistan 0,6 Georgia 0,1 China 0,4 United States of America 37,7 None/Do not know
Qxxx) Will Moldova become a member of the EU? (%) 46,8 Yes 33,6 No 19,6 Do not know
Qxxxi) If yes, when do you think this is likely to happen? (%) 0,4 2013 0,6 2027 8,5 2014 0,6 2028 17,7 2015 4,3 2030 8,5 2016 0,2 2032 6,2 2017 1,1 2033 8,8 2018 0,2 2034 1,1 2019 1,5 2035 17,3 2020 1,5 2040 The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 19
0,2 2021 0,4 2045 1,3 2022 1,3 2050 5,8 2023 0,2 2070 0,9 2024 0,4 2100 5,3 2025 5,5 Do not know 0,2 2026
Th e answer for Qi is that the EU receives 98,2%. For Qii relations between Moldova and Russia obtained the highest score of 47,4%. Th e perception of the EU in Moldova (Qv) is positive with 40,1% as of Moldova in the EU is 23% (Qiv). Altogether positive and rather positive attitudes constitute 2/3 (Qiv and Qv). Th e relations between the EU and Moldova are equal and mutual benefi cial with a score of 31,4% (Qvi). 39,0% of respondents answered that the relations between EU and Moldova are improving (Qvii). 50,4% believe that the EU is interested in developing closer links with Moldova (Qviii). As for the types of cooperation that are currently developing between the EU and Moldova (Qxi), economic cooperation represents 43,0%, trade cooperation – 40,9%. As for the success of the types of cooperation, they are below the expectations (Qxii). Moldova is believed to be with 80,6% (Qxvi) and seen with 90,1% (Qxvii) as friendly country by the EU; these are the highest scores. When asked about to describe the relations between the EU and Moldova, the respondents think that it is more talking than concrete actions with 41,7% (Qxviii). When thinking about the EU, Moldovan citizens display such sentiments as hope, faith, etc. (Qxxv). An alarming answer is off ered to Qxxvii: 70,0% did not visit the EU at all (Nota Bene: these are the answers of those who live in Moldova, excepting diaspora and mobility of the working force). Moldovan citizens are optimistic, they think the country will become a member of the EU with 46,8% (Qxxx). But when, the answers cover a period of up to 2100 (Qxxxi). All in all, the answers are positive or highly positive and seem to be imbued with optimism. Is it an exaggerated optimism? At fi rst sight, it could seem for an unarmed eye. But it is not for sure. It speaks about the heritage of Moldova: geographically, the country is situated in the Eastern Europe, the extremity of Latin people; linguistically, the Romanian language (mother tongue of 82% of Moldovans) belongs to the Romance family of languages; historically and culturally, Moldova is linked to Europe. 20 Vasile Cucerescu
5. EaP Multilateral Events
Just for scientifi c curiosity, the calendar of multilateral events was checked. Th e fi rst half of 2017 includes about 40 events organised both in the EU and in EaP countries (European External Action Service 2017a); in the second half it is planned to organise 65 events (European External Action Service 2017b). Th eir topics are quite diverse: CSDP High Level Conference for alumni from EaP countries; CSDP Orientation Course for EaP Countries; eHealth Workshop; EaPeReg Benchmarking Expert Working Group – Workshop (Tbilisi); 12th Transport Panel; 1st Panel on Rule of Law – focus on cybercrime; Panel on CSDP; 5th Panel on Environment and Climate Change; 12th EaP Public Administration Reform Panel; 2nd International Women’s Entrepreneurship Laboratory in the Eastern Partner region; Regional transport investment conference; investment opportunities for the transport sector (including a dedicated session for EaP); Panel on Migration and Asylum – expert meeting on border and migration management in emergency situations; Workshop/seminar on “Development and management of databases in civil service”; 3rd Master Class for Commercial Attachés; Training on “Organizational Structure and Professional Competency of Leadership in the Civil Service”; Seminar on integrity in higher education; 5th Panel on Statistics on innovation and R&D; Workshop/seminar on “Certifi cation of civil servants: Challenges and prospects”; 17th Platform 2 on Economic Integration and Convergence with EU Policies; 16th Panel on Integrated Border Management; 17th Platform 1 on Democracy, Good Governance and Stability; Senior Offi cials Meeting; Annual workshop of EaP energy regulatory bodies; Panel on Migration and Asylum – return, readmission and reintegration; Seminar on “Main Approaches to Reforming the Institute of Self-Government in the Eastern Partnership Countries”; 17th Platform 4 on People to People contacts; Skills Matching conference; 3rd Eastern Partnership Youth Forum; Research and Innovation regional event on funding for innovative companies; 17th Platform 3 on Energy Security; 16th Trade Panel (re-launch); Trust & Security Workshop; eTrade Workshop; eSkills Workshop; ICT Innovation Workshop; Refl ection Seminar on CSDP; Conference with academia and civil society from EaP countries on CSDP developments and partnerships; Moldova National Forum on creative industries; Workshop for media and communication experts on CSDP; 6th Meeting of Marie Skłodowska-Curie The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 21 actions National Contact Points: provision of support to facilitate the participation of EaP representatives. Th ere are a lot of EaP multilateral events, in total 105 only for 2017, but a pertinent question is to what extent they are productive. As the sociological survey mentions that the perception is that it is more talking than concrete actions. Obviously, the focus is on the benefi ts for the recipients of these events as they are the main targets for sharing experience and good practices. Another important issue in this context is related to cost-impact dichotomy, which seems to be ignored or consciously assumed by decision-makers. In case it is consciously assumed then a strategy for continuous improvement is highly needed in this rapidly changing world.
Conclusions
Th e above-mentioned facts are conducive to certain emergent conclusions on the EU’s policy towards the Eastern Partnership. Th ese open conclusions urge one to re- visit (revise) the cooperation between the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries as many times as needed to assess its eff ect on building bridges that serve the interests of the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries. A lot of events with participation of public offi cials are organized, however they seem to be ineffi cient. Th e proposal is to change the format of these meetings by inviting non-state actors (in a large sense of the concept) to obtain a balance between the offi cials and civil society representatives – at the same time it would be better to have more civil society members than offi cials. Th is would increase the effi ciency of the EU’s policy and agreements in all Eastern Partnership countries. Finally, a couple of ideas should be considered for Eastern Partnership initiative in order to strengthen what has been started: • To develop a better EU communication strategy at all societal levels in Eastern Partnership countries; • To open all EU programmes to Eastern Partnership countries; • To increase the mobility of people from the Eastern Partnership; • To continue and develop the diff erentiated approach; • To maintain the more-for-more principle in political and institutional relations with Eastern Partnership countries; 22 Vasile Cucerescu
• To think about a common security strategy both for the European Union and the Eastern Partnership.
References
Acts A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”. 2016. Accessed September 02, 2017. http://www. eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 2003. “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.” Accessed September 02, 2017. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/ EN/181231 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 2008. “Eastern Partnership.” Accessed September 02, 2017. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823&from=EN European External Action Service. 2017a. “Eastern Partnership Multilateral Events – 1st half of 2017.” Accessed September 02, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/2017_eap_ multilateral_events_with_deliverables_update.pdf European External Action Service. 2017b. “Eastern Partnership Multilateral Events – 2nd half of 2017.” Accessed September 02, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/2017_2nd_ semester_eap_multilateral_events.pdf Books Lovitt, Jeff . 2016. Civil Participation in Decision Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Book chapters Cucerescu, Vasile. 2016. “EU-EaP Association Agreements: Legal, Political, Economic, Societal and Historic Implications.” In EU Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: Th rough Cooperation Towards Integration, edited by Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, Vasile Cucerescu, Gaga Gabrichidze, Ioan Horga, Anatoliy Kruglashov, Latoszek, Ewa, Pachocka, Marta 101–117, Chisinau-Tbilisi-Chernivtsi: Print Caro Hug, Adam. 2015. “Trouble in the neighbourhood? Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership: Introduction.” In Trouble in the neighbourhood? Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, edited by Adam Hug, 4–7, London: the Foreign Policy Centre The Eastern Partnership: A Policy Striving at Building Good Neighbourhoodliness? 23
Kerikmäe, Tanel. 2016. “Dimensions and Implications of Eastern Partnership Policy: Introduction.” In Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, edited by Tanel Kerikmäe, Archil Chochia, 1–5, Cham: Springer International Publishing Scholarly articles Kasčiūnas Laurynas, Šukytė Dovilė. 2013. “Th e future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership – challenges and opportunities for Lithuania’s foreign policy.” Eastern Pulse, No 3 (48): 1–7 Kempe, Iris. 2007. “Identifying an Agenda for a New Eastern Policy – Evaluating the European Neighbourhood Policy beyond the ENP Approach”. Intereconomics, Vol. 42, No 4: 187–190 Lippert, Barbara. 2007. “Th e EU Neighbourhood Policy – Profile, Potential, Perspective.” Intereconomics, Vol. 42, No 4: 180–187 Sociological surveys GLOBSEC Policy Institute. 2013. “Widening the European Dialogue in Moldova.” Accessed September 02, 2017. http://www.cepolicy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/fi les/attachments/survey_ results.pdf
The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA
LUDMILA GOLOVATAIA*
The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic of Moldova
Abstract The intellect exodus remains a phenomenon of the XX–XXI century, its study being especially valid now because the effects it can generate are unpredictable, contradictory and sometimes quite difficult to perceive. The migration of highly educated people across international borders, most often from relatively poor countries of origin to relatively rich recipient countries requires particular attention and close monitoring. The article examines patterns of recent emigration of the highly-educated from developing countries, and particularly from Moldova – the “brain drain”. The purpose of this paper is to assess the issue that is caused by highly educated and skilled migration, and to try to analyze the impact of this phenomenon on the economic development of the countries of destinations and on the origin countries. Also, in article is shown the global action and solutions undertaken by the authorities in the Republic of Moldova to stem the brain drain. The paper predominantly uses the analysis method to expose and explain the phenomenon of intellectual migration from an economic perspective. Synthesis is used as a research method to highlight and present the links between brain drain and the economic development of a state.
Key words: brain drain, labor migration, the effects of brain drain, qualified human capital. Introduction
Th e modern period is characterized by the fact that the world economies are becoming increasingly globalized, and in such ways that create both opportunities and worries.
* Institute of International Relations of Moldova, [email protected] 26 Ludmila Golovataia
Many sectors of the economy are deeply touched by globalization, including an increase in trade with products, services and ideas, the movement of factors of production, such as capital and labor, and the movement of productive activity across international borders. Th e migration of highly educated people across international borders, most oft en from relatively poor countries of origin to relatively rich recipient countries requires attention and close monitoring. Th is article examines the patterns of recent emigration of the highly-educated from developing countries – the “brain drain”. Even though brain drain or skilled labor migration is a long-standing phenomenon, in recent years is has become a matter of great concern. “Brain drain” or “skilled labour migration” can be defi ned as a one-way movement of highly skilled people from developing countries to the developed countries that only benefi ts the industrialized countries. To what degree are qualifi ed migrants interchangeable with indigenous specialists is a question worthy of answering. Th erefore, the important point is to determine the eff ectiveness of migration and its impact on the income and wealth of the countries of destination. Major migration waves in Europe that have occurred in recent decades, especially aft er the crisis in Syria, raised the issue of the eff ect that migrants have on the national economy of the state. Until now, international assessments have been reduced to the fact that migrants will help to resolve the problem of labor shortage and achieve an increase in economic growth. But is it really so? As for the problem of brain exodus from Moldova, the situation is quite threatening. Moldovan society is considerably aff ected by the brain drain, which has a direct negative impact on the development of the economy, science and technology. Exodus of brains and skilled workers strongly aff ect the public and private sectors of the economy, leaving behind distortions on social equality and income per capita. With the amplifi cation of the phenomenon of brain drain and exodus of skilled labor, the outlook for innovation is diminishing, which is in fact the most important catalyst for the economy and the development of a state. Moldova lacks innovation and technology transfer, much needed for an economy in transition, which can be assimilated and put into practice only by a highly qualifi ed staff . Th e state needs public policies that encourage the studying youth to practice their professions in the country in exchange for real social and economic benefi ts. Moldovan population decreases rapidly and will continue to decline due to aging and low birth rates, which are detrimental. Th e purpose of this paper is to assess the issue that is caused by highly educated and skilled migration, and to try to analyze the impact of this phenomenon on the The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 27 economic development of the countries of destinations and on the donor countries. Additionally, the global and national action and solutions to stem the brain drain are explored. Th e paper predominantly uses the analysis method to expose and explain the phenomenon of intellectual migration from an economic perspective. Th e article describes the situation of brain drain in Moldova and shows the steps used in the Republic to improve the current situation. Synthesis is used as a research method to highlight and present the links between brain drain and the economic development of a state.
1. The Drain of Minds – a Kind of Modern Scientific Migration
For developed countries, this problem is more urgent than for developing economies. Over the past three decades, the world’s population aged 60 and over has doubled; by 2050 its share will double again. For example, in Germany, without taking into account the refugee factor, the able-bodied population would have decreased by 8.7 million by 2050 (TASS). The number of elderly people in developed countries has already exceeded the number of minors. It is expected that by 2050 there will be twice as many retirees in the United States, Western Europe and Japan as young citizens. According to a recently published report of Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), today, there are nearly 200 million migrants internationally and around 60% of them are in developed countries, while the other 40% in developing countries. Th e report also acknowledges that almost one in every 10 persons living in developed countries is a migrant. Each year the more developed regions receive about 2.3 million migrants coming from the less developed regions, accounting for two thirds of their population growth. Th e policy of covering the labor shortage by migrants has led to the situation that in the main countries of immigration, newcomers constitute 5–10% of the population and 10–25% of its economically active part (United Nations, 2016). Th e recent migration policy of Germany is based on the hypothesis of the favorable impact of migrants on the host economy if the basis of immigrants is unskilled labor. Th e main idea is the fi lling of low-skilled specialties by migrants and the preservation of an average and highly qualifi ed labor market for the indigenous population. Th is 28 Ludmila Golovataia position explains the approach to Ukraine, in which the share of potential highly qualifi ed emigrants in the EU exceeds the share of low-skilled workers. According to Europeans, this poses a threat to indigenous specialists in the EU countries. Th at is why the European Union opens the doors for low-skilled workers from the countries of the Middle East and Africa arriving through the humanitarian migration channel and closes them to workers from Ukraine (Strielkowski, Šperková 2016) But how do refugees aff ect the situation in the economy of Germany, for example? Th e authorities of this country cite the data of the International Monetary Fund report, according to which Germany’s GDP increased by 0.3% in 2016. Such growth is due to social welfare spending, which increased signifi cantly in 2016–2017, mainly due to payments and social benefi ts to refugees (Deutsche Bundesbank. International Monetary Fund. Accessed July 22th 2016). Migration, nevertheless, aff ects the economy ambiguously. Th e improvement and acceleration of the economy at the expense of migrants depends on how successfully new labor resources are integrated into society and their ability to give up on state funding in the future. In places where immigrants are concentrated, social services and payments are heavily pressured by the need for schooling, health care and social services for poor immigrant families that are not compensated for (Ottaviano, Peri, 2012). Th e 2013 study “Th e Economic Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries” showed that in developed European countries, as well as in Australia, Canada and the US, its positive impact is close to zero, or at best 0.5% of GDP. Th e study analyzed the migration of the last 50 years. Its infl uence is most noticeable in Switzerland and Luxembourg, where immigrants provide a net profi t of 2% of GDP. Th e study said that although migrants do not make a tangible contribution to the country’s budget, they are not a burden to it. Th e document noted that in most countries, migrants pay in the form of taxes and social contributions more than they receive in the form of benefi ts (facilities). However, since the salaries of migrants are lower than the salaries of local workers, the level of deductions to the budget, respectively, is also smaller. Th e wide involvement of low-skilled migrants in those or other industries can reduce labor productivity. Although low-paid immigrants can save fi nancial resources of employers, in some cases this slows down the modernization of production (OECD– UNDESA, 2013). Nevertheless, the use of cheap labor by foreigners underlies the functioning of a number of industries in developed countries. For example, in Belgium, immigrants make up half of all workers in the mining sector, in Switzerland – 40% of construction workers, in the USA – 70% of those employed in the agrarian sector. Th e newest branches of the economy in developed countries, on the other hand, are now being The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 29 upheld in large part by attracting a qualifi ed foreign labor force. Th us, in the sphere of information technology in the US, 18.3% of the employed are migrants. 60% of the authors of the most cited works on physics are of foreign origin and 30% – in other natural sciences in the United States. About a quarter of the founders or presidents of US biotechnology companies were also natives of other countries. Migration has an ambiguous eff ect on the ratio of the working and non-working population. Everything depends on the number of dependents per unit of labor force entering the country (children, spouses, non-working parents) (Colombo, 1998). A vivid example is Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1972, which was the peak of labor migration, the share of employed foreigners was 65%. However, in 1981, against the background of the cessation of migration infl ow, this indicator fell to 17%, while for Germans it was 44%. Risks coming from migrants mainly concern unskilled local workers, the already present migrants, who are entrenched in the labor market and strive to increase the cost of their payment, as well as women. Th us, the results of French studies indicate the negative impact of the Maghreb countries natives on the employment of local women workers and their earnings (Borjas 2006). Th ose who lose their jobs due to immigrants, turn to the state for benefi ts (Th e Economist e-Journal, 2016). As a result, pressure on the state budget of the host country remains. Immigration, the key part of which consists of low-skilled workers, helps to reduce the level of payment for their labor as compared with the payment of skilled workers. However, this factor has the opposite eff ect: increasing the number of specialists at any level leads to a decrease in the cost of services, which favors society as a whole, but threatens the local labor force (Th e Economist e-Journal, 2016) In the worst conditions for low-skilled categories of workers, migration contributes to the improvement of the situation of more qualifi ed groups of workers (Card, 2005). Migration also has an ambiguous impact on the national budget. According to a number of American studies, the average immigrant receives less in social benefi ts and pays more in taxes and contributions than the average native (Blau, Donehower, 2017). However, the impact on the budget depends on the length of stay of the foreigner in the host country and the dynamics of immigration. Newly arrived foreigners have a short-term negative impact on the country’s budget, as they need employment or strengthened government support. As the length of stay in the country and the income of migrants increase, their payments to the budget grow, and the benefi ts they receive are reduced. Accordingly, the state of the budget is benefi cially aff ected by the increase in the proportion of highly educated migrants. Th is applies to a lesser extent to workers of medium qualifi cation (Richwine, 2016). 30 Ludmila Golovataia
However, coming to developed countries (part from internal migration in the EU) are mainly low-skilled labor, and therefore impact on the state budget is more negative. With the help of migration it is impossible to solve future budget problems related to population aging. Migrants, regardless of age, are defi nitely not able to compensate for the corresponding losses in the treasury. In this regard, selective immigration policy can be used here only as an additional economic tool. Despite attempts to regulate migration by host countries, as well as to their attempts to fi lter these fl ows qualitatively, a signifi cant proportion of migrants continue to be accepted for humanitarian reasons, to arrive illegally without being screened and controlled, or to enter family reunifi cation programs. 70–80% of migrants in the United States, Sweden and Denmark account for people arriving under the programs of family reunifi cation, which deprives the state of the opportunity to regulate the quality of labor resources, and hence their impact on the economy. Due to the low proportion of workers, for whom the work is the main motivation to move (only 10–15%), the volume and immigration structure does not always correspond to the economic needs of the host society. Hence, the economic eff ect of migration has a dual character and poorly predicted long-term consequences.
2. Labor Market in the Republic of Moldova
Analysis of the labor market in Moldova in recent years refl ects a continued reduction of the workforce, including the highly skilled, which negatively aff ects the national economy of the country. In 2016 the economically active population of the R. Moldova constituted 1272.8 thousand people, without any change in terms of 2015. Th e rate of the population activity for 15 years old and over stood at 42.6%, being practically at the level of 2015 (42.4%). Th is indicator reached higher values among the male population – 45.4%, compared to the female – 40.1%. In the age group 15–29 this indicator had the value of 30.9%, and in the age group 15–64 – 47.2%. Th e rate of activity of the elderly working population according to national legislation (16–56 years among females and 16–61 years old among men) was 50.0%. Th e employed population constituted 1219.5 thousand persons, with no signifi cant changes compared to 2015 (+ 1.3%). As in the case of the economically active population, there were no disparities between the sexes (50.3% females and 49.7% males), while the percentage of men in rural areas was higher compared to the number of people in the urban sphere (relatively 54.1% of the rural population and 45.9% of the urban sprawl). The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 31
Th e rate of occupation of the population at the age of 15 years and older (the proportion of employed persons aged 15 and the total population of each age group) was 40.8% (+0.5 pp). Th e male occupancy rate (43.0%) was higher compared to that of females (39.0%). Th e rate of employment of the working age population (16–56 for women/61 for men) was 47.7%, the age group 15–64 years – 45.2%, and in the age group 15–29 years this indicator has a value of 28.4% (National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017).
Figure 1: Evolution of the number of workers and occupations (%)
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ZĂƚĂĚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚĂƚĞ ZĂƚĂĚĞŽĐƵƉĂƌĞ Source: National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017.
Unusually, the very modest success of the economy is hampering the growth of jobs. An inalienable role is also attributed to the incompatibility of demand in the labor market with the academic training of highly qualifi ed specialists. Th e employment rate for people graduating from higher education institution and specialized secondary schools is higher, because with the skills the possibility of placement on the labor market also increases. Unemployed people are oft en off ered jobs beyond their level of training, so the existing workforce is under-prepared and less compatible with labor market requirements. Th e inadequacy of the quality and competitiveness of the human potential with the high needs and demands of training and qualifi cation in the jobs declared by the economic agents leads to the poor alignment of the nature of demand to the off er on the labor market (National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017). 32 Ludmila Golovataia
Figure 2: Employment rate of labor force by educational level (%) ϳϬ
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ϭϬ ϮϬϭϯ ϮϬϭϰ ϮϬϭϱ ϮϬϭϲ ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝnjĞĚ ^ĞĐŽŶĚĂƌLJ͕ŐĞŶĞƌĂů Source: National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017.
Highly skilled labor remains disappointed by the monotonous nature of the relationship between labor supply and demand. As a result, unskilled labor fi nds its place in the labor market rather than the highly qualifi ed one, the latter becoming more vulnerable to migration. Unemployment increases virginly in relation to employment, and factors such as low salaries or lack of experience determine the vulnerability of the highly skilled labor force in the Moldovan labor market.
Figure 3: Unemployment rate by age category ϭϳ͕ϴ ϭϴ ϭϲ ϭϰ͕ϵ ϭϯ͕ϭ ϭϰ ϭϮ͕Ϯ ϭϮ ϭϬ ϴ͕ϴ ϵ͕ϭ ϳ͕Ϭ ϴ ϲ͕ϭ ϲ͕ϲ ϱ͕ϱ ϰ͕ϵ ϲ ϰ͕ϵ ϰ͕ϱ ϰ͕Ϯ ϯ͕ϳ ϯ͕ϰ ϯ͕ϯ ϯ͕ϵ ϰ Ϯ͕ϲ Ϯ͕ϲ Ϯ Ϭ ϮϬϭϯ ϮϬϭϰ ϮϬϭϱ ϮϬϭϲ ϭϱͲϮϰLJĞĂƌƐ ϮϱͲϯϰLJĞĂƌƐ ϯϱͲϰϰLJĞĂƌƐ ϰϱͲϱϰLJĞĂƌƐ ϱϱͲϲϰLJĞĂƌƐ Source: National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017. The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 33
Upon analyzing Figure 3 (National Birou of Statistic, Moldova, 2017) it is observed that among the young people (15–24 years old) the unemployment rate is the highest, which is determined by the fact that young people in the Republic of Moldova face diffi culties in fi nding their employment aft er completing their studies. On the one hand, lack of experience and seniority in work and, on the other hand, the lack of activities aimed at encouraging young people’s participation creates a precarious situation. Employment is paramount for social integration. With a quality job, young people are stimulated to increase their economic potential, learn continually and contribute to the socio-economic development of the countries. In Moldova the path of young people from the studies to the workplace is aggravated by the fact that the young population is decreasing and so many young people choose to emigrate abroad to work. In the same way, but to some extent the same reasons, there is also highly skilled labor migration (National Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Moldova, 2017). Starting with the fi rst years of independence, in the 1990s, the Republic of Moldova faced the generic phenomenon called “brain drain”. Its essence lies in highly qualifi ed people leaving the country to live abroad, in a very signifi cant number and indefi nitely. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these are people with higher education (graduate or undergoing training) and possibly with professional experience in the fi eld of specialization. Th e extremely low salary levels, the degradation and the lack of a modern material base adapted to the developments in the fi eld, the budget cuts for the respective institutions – all these factors led to the gradual devaluation of academic and scientifi c activity. Under these circumstances, some intellectuals in post-Soviet space in general and in Moldova in particular emigrated in search of an acceptable standard of living and well-deserved social recognition. Th e extremely unfortunate migration phenomenon in the case of Moldova is accentuated by the depressed situation, characterized by the unstable pace of macroeconomic indicators development in recent years. Th e main dysfunction of the labor market is the discrepancy between demand and supply of labor. At the same time, there is a shortage of skilled labor, which is refl ected in two aspects: the lack of qualifi ed staff and the high fl uctuation in certain occupational segments. On the other hand, there is a saturation of the labor force, especially in the wholesale and retail trade and the public administration. Labor productivity fl uctuations are generated by low wages that do not even meet the primary needs of employees, as a result, employees are either looking for a better paid job or choosing to work abroad, where wages are well above those off ered in Moldova (Moraru, 2011). 34 Ludmila Golovataia
At the same time, Moldovan economic agents face a shortage of staff , due to emigration, as well as because of the low qualifi cation of the labor force. 85% of companies report that they are facing the problem of lack of skilled labor, businesses require a higher level of professionalism or specifi c skills from workers. Most oft en, the economic agents mention that they are confronted with the signifi cant gap between their needs and the professional knowledge of the graduates of the educational institutions. Experts argue that although some mechanisms to mitigate labor market problems have made an impact, they are not noticeable, largely since human capital is not suffi ciently capitalized. Human capital is a constraint for the development of the national economy and the problems in this fi eld are determined by developments in education and health (Moraru, 2011). In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the situation of young people on the labor market diff ers from that of the EU, this being a dilemma on the labor market over the last decade. On the one hand, the academic training of young specialists reduces their compatibility with the demand in the labor market, thus creating serious disparities in the process of employing them. On the other hand, their professional training is in many cases questioned by employers in the absence of practical specialized knowledge (Monitor social, 2016). Also, what makes young people vulnerable to the labor market in terms of a highly skilled workforce is the attitude shown by young people due to lack of interest in studies, which in turn is infl uenced by the unattractive jobs in the job market in Moldova. In the Republic of Moldova the creation of the labor supply is conditioned especially by the demographic processes, the economic and political situation. Unemployment among young people is largely due to low wages in the employment provided by employment agencies. Th is leads to the real loss of human capital and the emergence of a shortage of highly qualifi ed cadres capable of applying their intellectual potential. Assessing the knowledge potential and trying to work at the workplace would increase productivity, but in fact many young specialists are sceptical about their employment opportunities and then working conditions.
3. Global and National Action and Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain
Th e source countries of the brain drain phenomenon, because they are negatively infl uenced, are looking for measures to limit it, while welcoming countries are The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 35 interested in encouraging this, bringing them all kinds of benefi ts, primarily economic. One of the main causes of brain drain amplifi cation process is the lack of jobs and poor-quality jobs. Th e European Union has approved a 75% employment target for men and women for the 20–64 age group by 2020: an ambitious commitment to the sustainability of the European social model, social welfare systems, economic growth and public fi nances. It will not be easy to achieve the goal. Th e crisis has reduced employment to 69% and increased unemployment to 10%; assuming that the labor market is stabilizing. Th us, achieving a 75% employment by 2020 will require an average increase in employment slightly above 1% per year. (Jeff , Chu, 2004) Decreased fertility caused the EU working age population (15–64) to decline already in 2012, even if immigration fl ows continue. Labor force is an essential value for development of a competitive, sustainable and innovative economy under the Europe 2020 objectives. In times of budgetary constraints and global competitive pressures, EU policies on employment and skills that help shape the transition to a green, smart and innovative economy, must be a priority. Th e EU can solve all these problems and can substantially increase the employment of women, young people and older workers, but only through decisive action, focused on four key priorities (Jeff , Chu, 2004): • First, better functioning of labor markets. Chronic high unemployment is an unacceptable loss of human capital: it discourages workers and leads to a premature withdrawal from the labor market and social exclusion. Flexicurity policies are the best tool for modernizing labor markets: they accelerate the pace of reform, reduce labor market segmentation, promote gender equality, as well as take advantage of transitions. • Secondly, a more competent workforce capable of contributing and adapting to technological change through new patterns of work organization. Investing in education and training systems, anticipating the skills needed, dissonance and guidance services are fundamental factors in increasing productivity and competitiveness, accelerating economic growth and, fi nally, increasing employment.; • Th ird, better job quality and working conditions. Th ere is no compromise between quality and quantity of employment: high levels of job quality in the EU are associated with equally high labor productivity and participation in employment. Working conditions and the physical and mental health of workers must be taken into account to meet the demands of the professional careers of the present, characterized by more transitions between more intense and demanding jobs and new forms of work organization; 36 Ludmila Golovataia
• Fourthly, stronger policies to promote job creation and labor demand. Economic recovery must be based on job-generating growth. Suitable conditions for creating more jobs, including high-performance companies and business models based on intensive research and development must be achieved. Policies that enable the capitalization of key sources of job creation and the promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment are also essential to the growth of employment (Communication from the Commission, 2010). Support for job creation and (re)allocation of employment should be targeted at sustainable and growing businesses, especially among SMEs. Policy initiatives must continue to seek both to improve productivity and employment by helping to allocate human resources to the economic and social needs identifi ed by the Europe 2020 strategy and to achieve the optimal balance between trade and non-commercial sectors. It should also improve the labor market situation of more vulnerable groups such as young people, women, low-skilled workers, elderly workers and minority groups. In order to respond to the main structural economic challenges facing Europe, transversal measures need to be complemented by specifi c actions in sectors with a particularly high potential for job-creating growth. Employment policies to help to create favorable conditions for job creation (Jauer, Liebig, Martin and Puhani, 2014). For this, they can mobilize the EU budget (in particular the European Social Fund). In addition to the measures on off er, such as investment in skills and labor activation, and services for linking supply and demand, there are a number of tools that have a positive eff ect on the demand for labor: • Targeting employment subsidies to new jobs. Creating adequate incentives and employment subsidies should motivate employers to make new net recruitment, creating jobs that would not otherwise be created; • Reduce the fi scal burden on labor cost in a budget-neutral way by moving to environmental taxes, consumer or property taxes, with adequate redistribution eff ects. However, preparation and implementation need to be carefully planned so that they do not have a negative eff ect on the employment prospects of the groups (immediately) below the eligibility threshold; • Promoting and supporting independent activities, social enterprises and new businesses. Encouraging entrepreneurship, greater availability of new business support services and microfi nance, and mechanisms for transforming unemployment benefi ts into grants for start-ups play an important role in stimulating self-employment and creating new jobs. Social economy and social enterprise actors are important factors in creating inclusive and socially inclusive The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 37
jobs and require specifi c support, for example through public procurement and access to fi nance; • Transforming informal or undeclared work into a regulated employment. Undeclared work is illegal. It also has serious budgetary implications, by reducing tax revenues and social security contributions. It has a negative impact on productivity and working standards, skills development and lifelong learning. It also does not provide a solid basis for pension rights and access to healthcare. Preventing and combating undeclared work, full application of Directive 2009/52 /EC on sanctions and illegal workers and measures to help workers who are not declared to be integrated into the labor market contribute to the fi scal consolidation process, creating a level playing fi eld for businesses and improving the quality of jobs. Stimulating net wages. A higher net salary is an incentive for hiring lower-skilled workers, as reducing wage pressure will allow employers to off er vacant jobs more easily. However, income replenishment should be designed in such a way as to avoid the “low wage trap”. Th ese benefi ts have positive eff ects when there is a signifi cant pay gap in the bottom of the income scale; Modernize wage setting systems to align salary levels with productivity developments and encourage job creation. Th e existence of wage setting systems to ensure that real wage growth refl ects the evolution of labor productivity and labor market conditions is a prerequisite for ensuring that increased production leads to a corresponding increase in demand for labor and job creation. Th e evolution of wages must take into account, according to national collective bargaining practices, the competitive position of the Member States. While salary moderation or adjustment may be necessary in some sectors or Member States, where wages have remained signifi cant as a result of productivity developments, targeted wage increases could be expected to contribute to aggregate demand (Collett, 2015). Measures adopted internationally to attract and retain human capital in general and scientists in particular are very diverse. One of the main strategies used to attract and retain high-skilled labor at national and international level is to increase investment in research, i.e. to allocate additional resources for technical-material endowment and the salaries of researchers. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the return of the highly qualifi ed labor force would entail enormous costs related to the modernization of the research and innovation infrastructure to create conditions like those in the West, to reduce the wage gap, to insure the privileged conditions in the institutional hierarchy, etc. (Borodak, Piracha, 2010). An alternative to this long-lasting process would be the 38 Ludmila Golovataia creation of scientifi c diasporas abroad, which could be an intermediate stage of the return process in the country of origin. Th e Academy of Sciences of Moldova launched in 2008 the initiative “Development of cooperation within the scientifi c Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova”. Th e initiative aims primarily at creating a platform for interaction between the scientifi c Diaspora and the Moldovan scientifi c community through the phased creation of the Scientifi c Diaspora Network of the Republic of Moldova. A practical example in this respect is the offi cial launch on 30 April 2010 of the Joint Research Project on “Connecting the Scientifi c Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova to the Scientifi c and Economic Development of the Country of Origin” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Development Agency. Th e overall objective of this research project is to promote knowledge-based data on the Moldovan Diaspora in the main destination countries and to provide a set of recommendations of the Government of Moldova, the scientifi c community and the scientifi c Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova, recommendations which can boost the development of the potential of the scientifi c community. Th e Expert Return Program, implemented by the International Center for Migration and Development (CMD) by the German Federal Ministry of Economics, Cooperation and Development, supports the professional reintegration of university graduates and experienced experts from the developing countries and who have completed their professional training in Germany and are interested in returning to their home country. Priority for the Program is the placement of those experts who have skills in areas relevant to development policies in their native country. Besides support in the process of identifying and providing job placement services a free consultation program fi nancially supports interested experts to return home (Returning Experts Program) (Bratu, 2015). In October 2010, the International Organization for Migration, Mission to Moldova (IOM), in partnership with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education and the Employment Agency, announced the launch of a pilot program to promote and support temporary or permanent return in Moldova, 30 young Moldovan graduates from abroad to engage in private/public institutions in Moldova to exchange experience and implement abilities. Th is program is implemented within the framework of the project “Support to the implementation of the migration and development component of the EU- Moldova Mobility Partnership”, funded by the EU and implemented by the IOM in cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Moldova. Th ere is a wide range of possible Diaspora activities that potentially can contribute to Moldova’s development and may merit public support in the future. The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 39
Th eir development impact should be evaluated rigorously because either government or donor funding would be involved. All of the above is promoted by the Pilot Program PARE 1 + 1, operating in Moldova, to attract money transfers of migrants in businesses. Th e main goal is to mobilize the human and fi nancial resources of Moldovan migrants for the sustainable economic development of the Republic of Moldova by stimulating the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Th e program operates according to the rule of “1 + 1”, that is, each invested Moldovan leu earned abroad will be supplemented by 1 leu (MDL) in the form of a grant from the Program budget. (Bratu, 2015) Within this program, the entrepreneurs have started and developed new business ideas, which had not been implemented in Moldova. Th e PARE 1 +1 enterprises were among the fi rst to develop businesses in the biomass fi eld (pellets and briquettes, green energy), exotic animal farming (chinchilla, ostriches, vipers), grow milk thistle, paulownias, rising added value to agricultural products by creating greenhouses, refrigerators, mills, snail farm, agricultural tourism, etc. From the economic point of view, this program proved to be eff ective both by a large number of open enterprises and by the fact that each leu invested by the state attracted private investments of 3–4 lei. Th e fi gures confi rm this eff ectiveness. During the last 7 years, under the PARE 1 + 1 program, 927 businessmen received grants. Th ey created about 3000 new jobs and 8 million euros were reinvested in the business. Th e PARE 1 + 1 program aims to mobilize the human and fi nancial resources of Moldovan labor migrants in Moldova’s sustainable economic development by encouraging the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises by migrant workers and remittance recipients. Recipients of assistance are labor migrants, recipients of their remittances, relatives of the fi rst degree of kinship. At the same time, the experience of Moldova is studied by other countries, in which there are many migrant citizens. An example is Serbia, which is intensively studying the Moldovan experience of implementing such a project in its country. Th e aforementioned projects aimed to address the phenomenon of brain drain by promoting the transfer of new ideas and skills in migration of young and highly qualifi ed labor force mobility. 40 Ludmila Golovataia
Conclusions
Th e source countries of the brain drain phenomenon, because they are negatively infl uenced, are looking for measures to limit it, while welcoming countries are interested in encouraging this trend, bringing them all kinds of benefi ts, primarily economic. One of the main causes of brain drain amplifi cation process is the lack and poor-quality jobs. In times of budgetary constraints and global competitive pressures, EU policies on employment and skills that help shape the transition to a green, smart and innovative economy, must be a priority. Th e EU can solve all the problems and can substantially increase the employment of women, young people and older workers, but only through decisive action, focused on four key priorities: better functioning of labor markets; more competent workforce capable of contributing and adapting to technological change through new patterns of work organization; better job quality and working conditions; stronger policies to promote job creation and labor demand. Measures adopted internationally to attract and retain human capital in general and scientists in particular are very diverse. One of the main strategies used to attract and retain high-skilled labor at national and international level is to increase investment in research, i.e. to allocate additional resources for technical-material endowment and salary of researchers. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, the return of the highly qualifi ed labor force would entail enormous costs related to the modernization of the research and innovation infrastructure to create conditions similar to those in the West, to reduce the wage gap, to insure the privileged conditions in the institutional hierarchy, etc. In the opinion of certain Moldovan experts, an alternative to this long-lasting process would be the creation of scientifi c diasporas abroad, which could be an intermediate stage of the return process in the country of origin. Taking into consideration these circumstances and recognizing the necessity of involvement of the scientifi c Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova, the Academy of Sciences of Moldova launched in 2008 the initiative “Development of cooperation within the scientifi c Diaspora of the Republic of Moldova”. Th e initiative aims primarily at creating a platform for interaction between the scientifi c Diaspora and the Moldovan scientifi c community through the phased creation of the Scientifi c Diaspora Network of the Republic of Moldova. The Problems Caused by Intellectual Exodus. The Solutions to Stem the Brain Drain in Republic ... 41
Th e Pilot Program PARE 1 + 1, operating in Moldova, aimed to attract money transfers of migrants in businesses. Th is program is one of the most successful national programs supported by the government and the best platform for cooperation between government and business. Along with the fact that it has a very strong component on training entrepreneurs for business development, the program promotes the development of small and medium businesses in rural areas, the development of villages in various regions of the country. Th e main goal is to mobilize the human and fi nancial resources of Moldovan migrants for the sustainable economic development of the Republic of Moldova by stimulating the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Within this program, the entrepreneurs have started and developed new business ideas, which had not been implemented in Moldova. Th is is the best practice of Moldova and therefore is studied by other countries where there are many migrant citizens. For example, Serbia is intensively studying the Moldovan experience of implementing such a project in its country.
References
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The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA
INDRIKIS MUIZNIEKS* TATJANA MURAVSKA**
Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead
Abstract Multi- and inter-disciplinary approach in studies is an important trend towards strengthening research in Europe and in the world. The article examines a concept of doctoral schools contributing a trans- and inter-disciplinary dimension to postgraduate education. It discusses how educational institutions have to respond to the challenges of providing a high-quality research training environment. The authors show, by using the example of the University of Latvia, that the establishment of doctoral schools at university level is a worthy strategy for higher education institutions as it will give doctoral and master students an opportunity to acquire solid knowledge about subject maters and it will contribute to the creation of a stimulating research environment. The development of analytical skills and specialist knowledge promoted by doctoral schools is a valuable asset in areas where in-depth knowledge of the trans- and inter-disciplinary approach is at the centre of research.
Key words: doctoral schools, trans- and inter-disciplinarily research, universities.
* University of Latvia, [email protected] ** University of Latvia, [email protected] 46 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
Introduction
In the contemporary world human societies exhibiting diverse and complex cultural identities and diff erent beliefs interact very closely. To describe the transformation of the 21st century’s societies with words such as complexity, interdependence and interaction of various processes is to indicate clearly that the problems of these societies are increasingly complex and interdependent. Moreover, the same problems are not limited to single sectors or disciplines, and they are not easily predictable. Reality is a nexus of interrelated phenomena that cannot be reduced to a single dimension (e.g. Muravska 2011, 8). Currently important challenges are ahead of the European economy and politics as well as European integration. Th e EU is facing both a major wave of “brain drain”, seriously impacting its economy, as well as a serious “refugee crisis”. Shortage of labour and highly skilled professionals is recognized as an important constraint standing in the way of dynamic economic development in the EU and it is one of the main concerns for politicians and intellectuals. Th us, the institutions dealing with higher education and research are facing new challenges and must respond to the new processes that strengthen the mutual ties between international communities. Interrelation and interaction of political, economic, social and other dimensions leads to the interdependence of studies and the demand for integrated comparative educational settings that off er an inter-disciplinary approach to the development of generic and specifi c knowledge, skills and competences. Th e main objective of the article is to examine a concept of doctoral schools as a trans- and inter-disciplinary dimension of post -graduate education while, at the same time, discussing how educational institutions must respond to the challenge of providing a high-quality research training environment. Th e methodology of this contribution is based on the trans- and interdisciplinary approach as a tool in the assessment of analytical skills and specialist knowledge development promoted by doctoral schools. It is a strong asset in areas, where in-depth knowledge of trans- and inter-disciplinary approach is the focus of research. Th e authors show, by using the example of the University of Latvia, that the establishment of doctoral schools at university level is a valuable strategy for higher education institutions. Th ey argue that it will give doctoral and master students and opportunity to acquire solid knowledge about subject matters by applying an inter-disciplinary approach and that it will contribute to the creation of a stimulating research environment. Diff erent factors have impact on the educational and research environment, i.e. the changes in the international division of “intellectual” labour (Singh, Han 2017, 57) and the corresponding fi nancial resources as well as a number of economic growth factors, Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead 47 such as the period of the recent economic and social turmoil started in 2008 and its ramifi cations for education and research. Th ese changes are reshaping global markets and, at the same time, impacting education systems, research, innovation and knowledge development. Such transformation processes lead to intriguing research questions such as: how are universities adjusting to these new market demands and, specifi cally, how are universities creating a brand? What are the implications of the “university brand” and the introduction of a “brand society’ in the fi eld of higher education? Universities worldwide are in the midst of a dramatic transformation of their administrative and scholarly goals. Such reforms are driven by a sense of global competition among higher education institutions, now forcing universities to set strategic plans for growth and excellence. Th ese strategies join the already established practices of outlining fi nancial solvency, global ranking, and curricula. Universities also approach their identity in a strategic manner and increasingly concentrate their eff orts on branding. While still being “Republics of Scholars”, in today’s economic and political environment universities oft en perform as “Organisations” (e.g. Muravska, 2011). Th is is a new trend in the transformation of our societies which is also true in Latvia.
1. Situation in Latvia: Maturity in Relations to Postdoctoral Studies
Th e modifi cations in the Latvian higher-education system that followed the national implementation of the Bologna process had a domain-specifi c impact within the whole Latvian academic community. While the legislative changes equally aff ected all disciplines, for example, the transition to the three-cycle structure Bachelor- Master-PhD, the effi ciency of the quality assurance policies and mechanisms depended strongly on the maturity of each academic community in charge of their implementation, internationalization and the ability to publish research results at the doctoral level and beyond. As it is shown in Figure 1, there is a large imbalance in a number of research papers published in various fi elds. For example, in social sciences the share of publications is only 4% while in engineering as well as in physics and astronomy it is 13%. It is clear, that in many subject areas the number of research publications should be increased (e.g. Muižnieks 2016). 48 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
Figure 1: Research papers published by subject areas in Latvia 2005–2015 in percentage
/ŵŵƵŶŽůŽŐLJĂŶĚ WŚĂƌŵĂĐŽůŽŐLJ͘ ĂƌƚŚĂŶĚWůĂŶĞƚĂƌLJ DŝĐƌŽďŝŽůŽŐLJ dŽdžŝĐŽůŽŐLJĂŶĚ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ KƚŚĞƌƐ Ϯй WŚĂƌŵĂĐĞƵƚŝĐƐ Ϯй ϳй WŚLJƐŝĐƐĂŶĚƐƚƌŽŶŽŵLJ Ϯй DƵůƚŝĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌLJ ϭϯй ŚĞŵŝĐĂů Ϯй ŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ Ϯй ŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ϭϯй ϰй
DĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐ ϰй ŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ DĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ϰй ^ŽĐŝĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ϵй ϰй ŝŽĐŚĞŵŝƐƚƌLJ͘'ĞŶĞƚŝĐƐ ĂŶĚDŽůĞĐƵůĂƌŝŽůŽŐLJ ϲй ŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚ DĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ Chemistry ŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ϵй 7% ϴй Data source: Latvian Academy of Sciences; N=6743.
Figure 2 shows that the most cited research papers are in biochemistry, genetics and molecular biology as well as, by far, in medicine. Th e least cited are research papers are in mathematics, computer and social silences and multidisciplinary (e.g. Muižnieks 2016).
Figure 2: Research papers published in Latvia 2005–2015. Median citation number per 50 top papers
Earth and Planetary Sciences 18 Pharmacology. Toxicology and Pharmaceutics 22 Immunology and Microbiology 38 Multidisciplinary 3 Chemical Engineering 15 Environmental Science 26 Mathematics 12 Computer Science 15 Social Sciences 11 Biochemistry. Genetics and Molecular Biology 58 Chemistry 30 Agricultural and Biological Sciences 35 Materials Science 35 Medicine 136 Engineering 28 Physics and Astronomy 41
0 50 100 150 Source: Scopus, N=6743. Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead 49
Th e above information demonstrates that serious consideration should be given to further development of research in, for example, social sciences. However, attention should be devoted also to humanities and cultural sciences. To improve the situation there is a need to further develop diff erent forms and methods of education at the third level of studies − doctoral studies. One of the instruments in implementation of this task is the establishment of doctoral schools, methodological seminars with participation of professors and experts from partner universities and research institutions, who advise students and supervise doctoral study processes in one or more study areas. Th e harmonious approach in maintaining the development of diff erent fi elds should not be forgotten. Th e number of doctoral graduates should increase proportionally in humanities, social sciences and natural sciences (e.g. Muiznieks 2011). To ensure the maintenance of the Latvian “academic society” Latvia needs 100–120 new doctoral degree holders every year. During 2008–2010 there were on average around 130 graduates per year. In 2008 a doctoral degree was obtained by 139 graduates, in 2009 by 174 graduates and in 2010 by 132 graduates. However, to reach a qualitative change in the state of research and development in Latvia there is a need for 300 new doctoral degree holders every year. Such an increase is not an easy task, especially while keeping high standards for degree recipients. Th us, what follows is that doctoral degree funding should be increased by three to four folds (e.g. Muižnieks 2011). In 2009 a European Social Fund (ESF) was implemented in Latvia with an aim to support doctoral studies. To a large extent the €15.5-million programme helped in modernizing doctoral studies in all subject areas. It was very important due the severe public debt crisis in 2008 and the resulting reductions of funds available for doctoral studies and research (e.g. Delloite 2013). Th e academic community at the University of Latvia is among the most internationalized ones in the country, with long-standing scientifi c collaborations both at European level and worldwide, and research output of the highest quality. Th is, in turn, ensures the quality of the doctoral studies in the University’s education system, which, for the past few years has been competitive worldwide. To promote further academic development and interdisciplinary research, the University of Latvia implemented a concept of interdisciplinary, topic-oriented doctoral and master studies, in which a special role is assigned to Doctoral Schools (DS). 50 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
2. The Concept of Doctoral Schools and Their Role in Strengthening Interdisciplinary Research
Interest in the interdisciplinary approach has a long history and it sparked a lot of debates in the recent years. While academics tend to conclude that a deep understanding of contemporary society requires an interdisciplinary approach, the application of this approach in higher education and sciences is still complex. Th e present-day complexity, volatility and diversity of the globalised world demand changes and a response to new challenges in higher education and research. In this context, V.B. Mansilla (2005) concludes that a deep understanding of contemporary life requires an interdisciplinary approach. Th ere is a growing need for the involvement of experts in diff erent disciplines to handle the complex issues of the contemporary society and to carry out interdisciplinary research related to various topical problems. Meanwhile, higher education needs a new approach that can give students generic knowledge, wide outlook, professional skills and competences which in these circumstances can be a challenge. Educators and researchers agree that the debates about disciplinarily and interdisciplinarity are complex as they “directly challenge nothing less than the way the understanding, production and dissemination of knowledge are structured within the academy” (e.g. Shailer 2005). Also, interdisciplinary approach raises questions about how and to what extent university researchers and educators should collaborate with other parties involved in the new knowledge development (private research centers, industrial laboratories, business and commercial organizations, etc.). Doctoral School at the University of Latvia were launched in 2009 as projects with an aim to promote trans- and interdisciplinary research of young scholars and to increase the quality and effi ciency of research done by young researchers. Most of these young scholars are Doctoral and Master’s students who will continue their doctoral studies. Currently the 19 DS at the University are as follows: Research, Modelling and Mathematical Methodology Improvement for Atomic and Continuous Media Physical Processes; Study for Sustainable Use of Plant and Soil, Biological Resources European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies; Th e Baltic Doctoral School named aft er Wladimir Admoni; Doctoral School of Biomedical Research and Novel Technologies; Human Capacity and Learning for Life Wide Learning in Inclusive Context of Diversity; Computer Science and its Interdisciplinary Applications in Natural and Social Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead 51
Science; Doctoral School in Translational Medicine, Animal Diversity and Quality of Environment; Physics and Chemistry of Interaction between Electromagnetic Radiation and Materials, Functional Materials and Nanotechnology; Th e Development of Individuals, Groups and Organizations under the Infl uence of Interactions of Psychological, Educational and Social Factors; Lettonica and Intercultural Studies; Th e Analysis of Social and Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Area; Doctoral School in the Vision Research; Current Issues of Th eology and Religious Studies; Insuring International Competitiveness of the National Economy; Environmentally Friendly Organic Synthesis; Earth Resources and their Sustainable Use. Th e tasks of the doctoral schools are diverse. Th e schools should refl ect on and defi ne their research topics based on what is relevant for the needs of society. Th ey should focus on problems from multiple points of view of diff erent disciplines, off ering the views of academia, practitioners from a variety of disciplines, expert areas and countries. Th e main tasks of DS are to combine various fi elds of science, academic and research work to solve scientifi cally and socially important issues; to promote the exchange of ideas and information, including the creation of innovative projects by encouraging the use of doctoral studies’ results in the process of fostering innovation, to attract foreign partners and experts, to promote publication of research results in international scientifi c journals. Th e DS have to implement research on the basis of cooperation with diff erent departments, research centres and institutes at their own University, as well as in cooperation with research organisations, universities and think tanks outside of their University, to promote new innovative methods of conducting doctoral studies in the design and implementation of research projects. A number of doctoral programmes can be involved in each doctoral school. Doctoral School are also eligible to perform activities up to four years with the right to extend the deadline. A four-year period could be extended two times on the basis of repeated application followed by a positive decision from the Academic Advisory Council of the University and the University leadership support. Th e process of establishing a DS and reviewing its application consist of diff erent stages. 1. Th e Advisory Councils of the University have to consider the following criteria: scientifi c and practical signifi cance of the DS subject, novelty and inter- disciplinary, cooperation potential, the possible value added that might result from collaboration, as well as suggestions by the DS Executive Board. 2. Aft er the DS application is reviewed, Advisory Councils makes recommendations to the University leadership. 52 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
3. Th e University leadership establishes the Commission that evaluates the DS conformity with the development strategy of the University as well as with the interests of social partners and the University image. To establish a DS an applicant needs to fulfi l the following criteria and administrative requirements: – to cooperate with at least three diff erent doctoral programmes from three diff erent fi elds of science; – to submit three letters of support from institutions involved in DS; – to establish an Executive Board, consisting of at least 10 scientists (50% of which must be from the University staff , a least 3 board members must be scholars attracted from abroad and at least two members must be scholars from Latvia, but not the University staff ). It is also stated that there must have been at least one dissertation supervised (with doctoral degree obtained as a result) on average per one Executive Board member of the University over the past three years. Th e necessary documents for establishing the DS include an application, an action plan, the applicant’s evaluation form, letters of support, a list of declared members with attached CVs and proofs of participation in diff erent doctoral programmes, as well as the list of doctoral theses defi ned under the supervision of University academic staff included in the Exacutive Board of the DS. Th e participants of the DS are masters and doctoral students, their academic supervisors, the Exacutive Board, including its chairment and technicalsecreatary. The DS work is organised as followes: scientific colloquia, seminars, methodological training and other related activities. DS activities aim to improve the sceintifi c performance of their parcitipants, analyses research theories research methods learning, identifi cation of innovation and knwoledge transfer opportunities, publishing oportunities of research results, etc. Th e Executive Board makes decisions on cooperation with diff erent study programmes, research subject areas, involvement of new participants and partner institutions, ets. During 2009–2015 doctoral students had the opportunity to apply for grants to carry out research projects, defend their PhDs, get additional skills, acquire cross-disciplinary experience and boost their career. Th e number of publications in recognized journals has signifi cantly increased. All this was possible due to the implementation of EU ESF project “Support for doctoral studies in University of Latvia”. It was initiated in 2009 and by the end of 2015 had a budget of €22.2 million (European Commission 2011). From the start of the project, 541 doctoral theses have been submitted to the Doctoral Council, 527 of them have been successfully defended Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead 53
(University of Latvia 2015). Five competitions for scholarships were announced for about 600 doctoral students and doctoral degree candidates. Th is was a vital incentive for young researchers to undertake doctoral studies. Th e implementation of the ESF helped increase the number of specialists with doctoral degrees, and improve the knowledge potential of the country with high added value in promoting economic development on the basis of innovation and development of high-technology sectors. Apart from funding students, the ESF provided support for guest lecturers and seminars to encourage the adoption of new research methods. Most of these activities have been implemented through the activities of the doctoral schools. Currently there are 19 Doctoral schools operating as interdisciplinary, based on interdisciplinary approach to research in social, natural sciences and humanities.
3. Methodology of Interdisciplinary Research Implementation: The Example of the Doctoral School on European and Baltic Sea Region Studies
Interdisciplinarity and an integrated scientifi c approach is viewed by scholars as research to serve society. Much of the global literature on interdisciplinarity argues that it has a key role to play in addressing the grand challenges that society faces. Moreover, it has a catalytic role in encouraging interdisciplinary research by defi ning and describing the ‘grand challenges’ that require interdisciplinary solutions. Th e increased complexity associated with interdisciplinary research means that appropriate timescales for funding are an important consideration (Global Research Council 2016). However, a recently published book, “Rethinking Interdisciplinarity Across Th e Social Sciences And Neurosciences (2015)”, suggests “less focus on structures and funding for interdisciplinarity, and more on the everyday highs and lows of collaboration”. An eclectic approach has been selected by the University of Latvia when a Doctoral School for European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies (EIBSRS) was launched at the University in 2009 by decision of the Rector of the University of Latvia on November 2009 to support young scholars during their research training (University of Latvia 2009). It is also important to understand that doctoral schools are complimentary to the doctoral programmes and doctoral programmes remain responsible for academic admission of a PhD proposal, regular doctoral studies and the preparation of the PhD theses for their defence. 54 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
Th e doctoral school carries out activities related to the international dimension of the doctoral degree and helps to increase the value of the graduate on the job market, in the society and in their personal careers as researchers. Most of doctoral students at the School gathered “real” research experience by contributing to research projects implemented at the Centre for European and Transition Studies funded through the European Commission (Box 1). Box 1 The EBSRS School covers the following research dimensions: Northern dimension – Baltic Sea Region development strategy – Baltic Sea Region: Integration and cooperation, competitiveness, business development, marketing and clusters – Macroeconomic and financial stability – Common foreign and energy security policy – Social and demographic Dimensions in the EU policies – Migration and asylum problems in the EU – Good governance and public communication in the EU – Interdisciplinary research and education in European Integration Studies – Creative economy and innovation development in the Baltic Sea Region – Political and social dimension in the process of democratization in the newer EU member states and candidate countries – EU legal regulation in the areas of cooperation – Recognition of national interests within the EU – Baltic sea region in the EU: cultural and historical dimension in the EU – Territorial cohesion in the Baltic Sea Region countries and EU – Comparative law issues in the EU Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the University of Latvia Senate Decision No 169; European Commission, DG Education and Culture Grant Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, No.199871-LLP-1-LV-AJM-PO; Regulations on Promotion Councils and Promotion at the University of Latvia, No. 1/995 dated 12.04.2006, amended No. 1/335, dated 15.11.2011.
Research training at the school is associated with deepening and widening knowledge about the process of integration in Europe. Special attention is given to integration of the Baltic States in the EU, regional cooperation and socio-economic development in the Baltic Sea area. Participation in the School activities helps to improve skills in trans- and interdisciplinary research. Th e School cooperates with diff erent research structures at the University of Latvia and other educational and research establishments in the country, as well as partners from the EU and non-EU countries. Th is cooperation provides a solid platform for advanced studies that off ers added value within and outside the discipline of young researchers. Doctoral as well as Master students from diff erent subject areas and study programmes such as economics, law, politics, communication, management, culture, geography, European Studies and Baltic Sea Region Studies are welcome there. Th e doctoral school organizes guest lectures, seminars, regular discussions and Jean Monnet doctoral colloquia, as a part of the European Commission Jean Doctoral Schools at the University of Latvia: Sharing Experience and Looking Ahead 55
Monnet Programme. In addition, working groups are arranged to facilitate research- related activities. Th e DS also arranges information sessions, promotional events and interaction with industry, keeping up with the needs of external stakeholders. To facilitate the operation of the School an Executive Board of the DS was set up, which consists of 8 professors from the University of Latvia and two members from partner institutions from abroad. Th e Executive Board is responsible for admission of doctoral students. Applicants from the University of Latvia, higher educational institutions in Latvia and other countries are welcome to apply. Furthermore, the Executive Board suggests research themes and approves activities. All the Conferences and roundtable discussions were directed at facilitating further trans-disciplinary research on topics related to the assessment of complex and interrelated processes of legal, cultural and socio-economic integration in Europe and the Baltic Sea Region. Th e fi rst conference organised by the School in cooperation with a number of Latvian and international partners was held in 2011 (Box 2).
Box 2 International Conference “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives”, September 26–27, 2011 Doctoral School “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies (EIBSRS)” University of Latvia, Centre for European and Transition Studies, Wismar Business School – University of Applied Sciences Technology, Business and Design Canadian Embassy to Estonia, Latvian and Lithuania The conference is supported by the European Commission, the Latvian Embassy of Finland, the Nordic Council of Latvian office of the Canadian Embassy to Estonia, Latvian and Lithuania, the Baltic-German University Liason Office with Funds the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Themes of the Conference: Globalisation and the Future of the State Legal and Historical Aspects of European Integration University – Business Cooperation: Infrastructure and Environment EU Internal Market and Social Dimension Macro Regions, Territorial and special Development EU Internal Market Development and Trends Culture, Arts and Education Research, Innovation and Competitiveness University – Business Cooperation: Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Innovation ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION: European Union External Relations with Focus on the Eastern Partnership and Russia THE LATVIA–CANADA PANEL DISCUSSION: Latvia & Canada: Socio-Economic Dimensions within the European Context ROUNDTABLE DEBATE: University – Business partnership through the *triple helix* approach Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the University of Latvia Senate Decision No 169; Regulations on Promotion Councils and Promotion at the University of Latvia, No.1/995 dated 12.04.2006, amended No. 1/335 dated 15.11.2011; European Commission DG Education and Culture Grant Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence No.199871- LLP-1-LV-AJM-PO; Conference Programme
Since 2011 many regions and countries in the World are aff ected by the changing of the geo-political agenda which has an impact on the society, education and research. In the 2014 the Executive Board of the School suggested the organisation of a conference in cooperation with other DS that was held in 2015 (Box 3).
Box 3 International Conference “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2015” (Devoted to the Latvian Presidency of the European Union Council) June 11–13, 2015 Doctoral School “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region Studies (EIBSRS)” Doctoral School “Political, Social and Economic Process Analysis in Post-Soviet Area” Doctoral School “Current Issues of Theology and Religious Studies” Doctoral School “Insuring International Competitiveness of National Economy” Doctoral School “Lettonica and Intercultural Studies” Baltic Rea Region University Network http://www.lu.lv/eibsrs2015/ Themes of the conference: – Challenges of Population Development and Migration – Cognitive Sciences and Communication – Education and Language Policy – Management and Organisations – Knowledge Triangle and Competitiveness – The Baltic Sea Region and the Impact of International and European Law – Political Development and Governances – Territorial Cohesion and Regional Innovation – Security and Religion – Through the centuries: European Dimension of Latvian History
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the University of Latvia Senate Decision No 169; Regulations on Promotion Councils and Promotion at the University of Latvia, No.1/995 dated 12.04.2006, amended No. 1/335 dated 15.11.2011. European Commission Grant No. LLP-No. 2014–2634. European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2015, Riga, Latvia, University of Latvia organized by Doctoral Schools of the University of Latvia. Conference Programme
Box 4 Publications All publications comprise of research results, opinions and information that can be of value to practitioners, academics, and students. 2011, the fi rst volume of the book collecting research papers. Th is publication presents research papers in conjunction with the international conference “European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives”, University of Latvia Press, Riga – 640 p. Research papers have been presented at the conference hosted by the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Centre for European and Transition Studies (CETS) and the publication is supported by Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Latvia in the framework of the European Commission, Jean Monnet Programme. 2013, the second volume of the book European Integration and Baltic Sea Studies: University-Business Partnership through the Triple Helix Approach, Berliner Wissenschaft sverlag, Berlin – 336 p. 2014, the third volume EU Eastern Partnership: From Capacities to Excellence Strengthening Research, Regional and Innovation Policies in the Context of Horizon 2020, University of Latvia Press, Riga, Latvia – 180 p. Research papers have been presented at the conference hosted by the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Centre for European and Transition Studies (CETS) and the publication is supported by Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Latvia in the framework of the European Commission, Jean Monnet Programme. 2015, EU Social Dimension. An Innovative and Refl ective Society, eds. Muravska, T., Sloka, B. Riga: LU Publishing House. Research papers have been submitted by post-doc researcher and doctoral students. 2016, the contribution to the publication “Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU”, Piattoni, S., Polverari, L. (ed.) Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, by Muravska, T., Aprāns, J. & Dahs, A. Source: Publications. LU Centre for European and Transition Studies, https://www.lu.lv/cets/publications/
Th ese publications enhance the synergy between young and senior scholars, at the same time improving the research potential of the country.
Conclusions
Th e DS platform, which emerged in early 2010, played a paramount role in consolidating doctoral research at the University of Latvia. Th is concept should be evaluated in depth and, if found appropriate, developed further. On the basis of the current limited experience it seems to be eff ective. Interdependence of studies, for example in areas such as international relations, governance, corporate and social responsibility is an obvious trend in the modern university education and research. Th e experience of conducting research in DS confi rmed that integrated and interdisciplinary research is not a substitute for mono- disciplinary research, nor is it a competitor – this approach is supplementary. 58 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
In many cases, strong mono-disciplinary knowledge is the precondition for new cross-cutting knowledge. Meanwhile, interdisciplinary knowledge can contribute to creating the necessary dynamics of transferable skills within the individual fi elds through R&D activities. Th e experience of DS also confi rmed that internationalisation, including international and inter-sectorial mobility of the staff and doctoral students, has positive impact on building a stimulating research environment. Looking ahead, it is necessary to reassess the support needed for doctoral studies and research in the country. Th e experience of the support of the ESF was very benefi cial for the country in general, and for the University of Latvia in particular. It helped to signifi cantly increase the number of doctoral graduates. Th ere is a need to ensure that the momentum gained by the extension of doctoral studies through ESF can be maintained through the use of government funds and innovative approaches, for example such as independent sponsored research. All of the above-mentioned aspects are currently a subject of intensive studies, which have to answer a number of questions: How inter- and trans-disciplinarily in doctoral studies and science contribute to challenges of the 21th century and consequences of the currently evolving social and economic situation in Europe and in the World? How the curriculum of the doctoral schools should be adopted and developed and what are the results of the doctoral schools’ function in relation to their supplementary role to the doctoral programmes? What are the major priorities for the universities, doctoral and master’s programmes, doctoral schools in their delivery of methods of training that are most eff ective, effi cient and fair?
References
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European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2011, Riga, Latvia, University of Latvia organized by Doctoral Schools of the University of Latvia. Conference Programme. Accessed September 27th, 2017. http://www.lu.lv/fi leadmin/ user_upload/lu_portal/projekti/eibsrs/EIBSRS__Final_Programme_01.pdf European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives – 2015, Riga, Latvia, University of Latvia organized by Doctoral Schools of the University of Latvia. Conference Programme. Accessed September 27th, 2017, http://www.lu.lv/eibsrs2015/ programme/ European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and Perspectives, editor in chief Tatjana Muravska, editors Roman Petrov, Biruta Sloka, Jā nis Vaivads, 2011, Riga: University of Latvia Press. -640p. Accessed September 27th 2017. https://www.lu.lv/fi leadmin/user_ upload/lu_portal/apgads/PDF/Book_konference_EIBSRS_internetam.pdf Callard, F., Fitzgerald, D. 2015. Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences, Palgrave Macmillan, UK – 131p. Accessed September 27th 2017. https://www.google.lv/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=Callard,+F.,+Fitzgerald,+D. +2015.+Rethinking+Interdisciplinarity+across+the+Social+Sciences+and+Neurosc iences,+Palgrave+Macmillan,+UK&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&gws_rd=cr&dcr=0&ei= pfrLWaniMKeF6ASJpYXwDg Country Profi le: Latvia. Researchers’ Report 2013, Delloite. Accessed September 5th April 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_policies/country_fi les/Latvia_Country_ Profi le_RR2014_FINAL.pdf Doctoral Schools. 2016, University of Latvia. Accessed September 27th 2017. http://www.lu.lv/ studentiem/studijas/limeni/doktorantura/skolas/ Interdisciplinarity. Survey Report for the Global Research Council, 2016. Annual Meeting. Accessed September 27th 2017, http://www.globalresearchcouncil.org/sites/ default/fi les/pdfs/Interdisciplinarity%20Report%20for%20GRC_DJS%20Research.pdf> Mansilla, V.B. 2007. Targeted Assessment of Students’ Interdisciplinary Work: An Empirically Grounded Framework Proposed . Th e Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/ April 2007). Th e Ohio State University. Accessed September 27th 2017. http://www. interdisciplinarystudiespz.org/pdf/VBM-Dawes_Assessment_2007.pdf Muižnieks, Indrikis, et al. 2011. Scientifi c Research Today- Challenges and Solutions for Latvia. In Interdisciplinarity in Social Sciences: Does It Provide Answers to Current Challenges in Higher Education and Research? edited by Tatjana Muravska, Žanta Ozolina, Riga: University of Latvia Press, pp.- 112-130. Accessed September 27th 2017. https://www.lu.lv/ fi leadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/apgads/PDF/Book_Interdisciplinarity.pdf 60 Indrikis Muiznieks, Tatjana Muravska
Muravska, Tatjana. 2012. European Studies in the Baltic States in a book: Analyzing European Union Politics, edited by Federiga Bindi, Kiel A. Eliassen F., Mulino: Società editrice il. Pp.79-93. Muravska, Tatjana, Ozolina, Žaneta. 2011. Interdisciplinarity in Social Sciences: Does It Provide Answers to Current Challenges in Higher Education and Research? Riga: University of Latvia Press. -232p. Accessed September 27th 2017. https://www.lu.lv/ fi leadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/apgads/PDF/Book_Interdisciplinarity.pdf. University of Latvia Centre for European and Transition Studies, Publications. Accessed September 27th 2017. ALEKSANDRA SZCZERBA-ZAWADA* The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination to the General Principle of Equality** Abstract The article provides an illustration of the EU antidiscrimination law through analysis of the concept of equality in the EU legal system. The analysis concentrates on the notion of equality and non-discrimination with respect to six protected characteristics (sex/gender, age, disability, racial and ethnic origin, religion/belief and sexual orientation) in the EU primary and secondary law as well as in the doctrine. It pays specific attention to the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The equality principle has longstanding roots, plays different roles in the EU legal system and has undergone the evolutionary change from market-oriented rule to the general principle of EU law. The article seeks to draw out the fact that thanks to the excessive interpretation of the concept of equality by the CJEU the Union antidiscrimination law has evolved into an independent set of legal norms. The result is the extension of the protection against discrimination beyond the concept of the EU citizenship; though, it still requires further development to be fully effective. Key words: equality principle, prohibition of discrimination, gender discrimination, EU antidiscrimination law. * Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski, [email protected] ** Th is research was partially supported by the European Union’s Erasmus+ Program under grant Jean Monnet Module “Inclusive Society Building Th rough EU Studies: Human Rights Protection in the European Union” (EUIncSo), project number 574570-EPP-1-2016-1-PL-EPPJMO-MODULE. 62 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada Introduction Th e European Union has started as an economic organization. Th e aims of the three predecessors of the EU, i.e. the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were to contribute to economic development and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries1. Nevertheless, in the course of integration processes the EU human rights and social dimensions have been deepened, contributing to bringing Europe closer to its citizens. Notably, very important role in creating “Europe of people” has been played by the equality principle that has longstanding roots in the EU law (MacHugh 2006, 31). Th e right to equality and non-discrimination for all constitutes a human right widely recognized by national, European and international law. In the EU legal system non-discrimination is both a right itself (e.g. Art. 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union2) and a constitutive element of other human rights, as the enjoyment of rights granted by the Treaties must be guaranteed to EU citizens on a non-discriminatory basis (art. 18 TFEU3). Th e article provides an illustration of the EU antidiscrimination law through an analysis of the concept of equality in the EU legal system. Th e analysis concentrates on the notion of equality and non-discrimination with respect to six protected characteristics (sex/gender, age, disability, racial and ethnic origin, religion/belief and sexual orientation) in the EU primary and secondary law as well as in the doctrine. It pays specifi c attention to the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Th e article also seeks to draw out the fact that thanks to the excessive interpretation of the concept of equality by the CJEU the Union antidiscrimination law has evolved into an independent branch of EU law exceeding the protection against discrimination beyond the EU citizenship. Despite its great role in the achievement of the aims of the EU, equality (and non-discrimination) remains a complex concept of unequivocal meaning that inevitably implies defi ciencies in the EU antidiscrimination law. 1 See respectively art. 1 of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 1 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and art. 1 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 2 C 202, 7.6.2016, 389–405. 3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated versions), OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 47–200. The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 63 1. The Concept of Equality and Non-Discrimination in the European Union Law – Two Sides Of The One Coin? 1.1. Equality and Non-Discrimination – Conceptualization Equality and non-discrimination remain equivocal concepts. Despite wide and deep doctrinal analysis, the discussion on equality is characterized by considerable conceptual and methodological confusion (McCrudden, Prechal 2009, 1). Th us, although widely recognized by national, European and international law, both understanding of equality and non-discrimination and their relationship to each other diff er considerably across legal systems and among scholars (MacNaughton 2009, 47). Th ese diff erences have signifi cant implications since the legal framework of equality and non-discrimination depends upon their meaning. Th is is refl ected in the antidiscrimination law of the European Union, in which diff erent approaches to equality are visible; although it has adopted a rather traditional version of the equality paradigm (formal one), based on individual rights and identity-neutral justice (Caruso 2002, ii). With a large degree of simplifi cation three main concepts of equality can be identifi ed. On the one hand there is formal equality, on the other – substantive equality and somewhere in between them lies equality of opportunity, which combines elements of both of the above-mentioned concepts. Formal equality assumes that similar situations should be treated in a similar way in accordance with Aristotelian maxim that “justice demands that equals be treated equally and unequals be treated unequally” (MucHugh 2006, 31). Th is is a procedural approach to the principle of equality, implemented through the introduction of a prohibition of discrimination, under which any diff erentiation of treatment is morally prohibited and cannot be justifi ed on any grounds. In accordance with this symmetrical approach to equality the obligation of equal treatment applies only to entities considered to be equal; here two vital questions arise – fi rst of all, who is equal and second, what does the requirement of equal treatment mean? If the answers were to be sought in the concept itself, one would have to conclude that equal entities are those who should be treated equally and equal treatment is the treatment of those who are equal. In this respect formal equality theory needs clarifi cation (Arnardóttir 2003, 9–10). Equal entities will 64 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada be singled out for their similarity, i.e. possessed characteristic that is recognized as relevant in a given situation. Th e choice will be determined by prevailing cultural, political and social value climate (Makonnen 2007, 14). On the other hand, the substantive equality formula refers to the situation of the group to which the individual belongs and focuses on achieving a fair distribution of goods and benefi ts (so called equality of results, Makonnen 2007, 14). Th is asymmetrical approach to the principle of equality implies the possibility of treating individuals diff erently, respective of whether the group they belong to has been discriminated against in the past, to mitigate negative eff ects of this discrimination. Th erefore, achievement of equality of outcomes may require measures such as parity or quota system. Equal treatment is, however, a rule and diff erentiation is permitted only as an exception (Arnardóttir 2003, 24). Th e model of equality that seems to strike a balance between two above- mentioned concepts being to some point substantive equality and later - formal, is the so-called equality of opportunity. In accordance with this approach it is possible to treat individuals diff erently, but only at the level of competition. Th erefore equality of chance is guaranteed without aff ecting outcome of the competition. Th e purpose of this concept of equality is to provide all individuals with equal opportunities with respect to access to education, employment, health care, etc. by eliminating prejudices and other factors that can have discriminatory eff ects (Makonnen 2007, 14). Th e doctrine emphasizes the role of the CJEU in developing this concept of equality through eff ort to discover the material aspect of the formal equality in the EU antidiscrimination legislation (De Vos 2007, 10). All three above-mentioned concepts are refl ected in the EU antidiscrimination law. Th e evidence of the dominant role of the formal equality in EU law is seen in the comparative logic the concept of discrimination is based on, especially with respect to direct discrimination which requires identical treatment of identical situations. As long as the comparable situations are treated consistently (for example equally badly) the requirements of the EU equality law are satisfi ed. Th e question of whether two situations are comparable is crucial for the establishment of discrimination as in this case no distinction must be made on the basis of protected characteristic which indicates that certain other distinctions will be permitted. It gives rise to a situation in which the selection of a characteristic that is considered to be neutral or irrelevant (such as economic status or eye colour) allows to avoid accusation of direct discrimination (lack of comparability) despite the fact individuals are in a similar situation with respect to the other characteristic. Th is comes in for criticism from the doctrine (Pogodzińska 2009, Fredman 1992, 120 et seq.). On the other hand, the The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 65 concept of indirect discrimination is results-oriented in the sense that an apparently neutral practice or criterion are considered to have discriminatory nature if they have unjustifi able adverse impact upon the group to which the individual belongs. Th is follows the logic of substantive equality as well as the affi rmative actions that aim to mitigate the unfair situation of disadvantaged groups through ensuring their fair share in the distribution of benefi ts (Barnard, Hepple 2000, 564–565). Th e concept of equality of opportunity is refl ected in the obligation of reasonable accommodation. Th e concept of reasonable accommodation obliges the employers to adopt, where necessary in a particular case, appropriate measures enabling a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. Although the EU equality law does not explicitly defi ne the denial of reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimination nor it compels Member States to classify it in that way (Burri, Prechal 2010, 51) the CJEU interprets reasonable accommodation duty as part of a wider equality obligation (HK Danmark, C-335/11 & C-337/11, para. 54) applied in order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment of people with disability to create for them equal professional chances. Th is proves that the qualifi cation of the reasonable accommodation duty in the EU legal system as the exception (to the formal equality formula), widely spread among academics (e.g. Dudek 2010, Ellis, Watson, 2015), is disputable. Th e European Union antidiscrimination law is characterized not only by equivocal concept of equality but also by ambiguous relation between equality and non-discrimination. With respect to this it is worth noting that the notion that equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative forms of the same principle is widely accepted. Th e former confi rms the right to be treated in the same manner as the others, the latter – expresses the prohibition on diff erent treatment, unless the opposite is objectively justifi ed (in both cases) (Nowicki 2001, 215). Positive and negative concepts of the principle of equality are, however, not equivalent (MacNaughton 2009, 47). Th e EU legislature seems to share this view as it defi nes discrimination as a qualifi ed form of unequal treatment. Th is is exemplifi ed by the defi nition of discrimination contained in the EU’s equality directives: Council Directive 2000/43/EC4, Council Directive 2000/78/EC5, Council Directive 2004/113/ 4 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.07.2000, 22–26. 5 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 02.12.2000, 16–22. 66 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada EC6 and Directive 2006/54/EC7. Under these sources of EU law discrimination, as opposed to “normal” unequal treatment, occurs only if less favourable treatment is based on one of the protected characteristics: sex, disability, religion or belief, racial or ethnic origin, sexual orientation or age. Equality is defi ned in the directives as the absence of any form of prohibited discrimination on any of the grounds mentioned above, as the EU law recognizes diff erent types of discriminatory treatment. 1.2. Prohibited Forms of Unequal Treatment in the European Union Legal System Th e equality directives prohibit direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to discriminate. Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the protected grounds (e.g. art. 2 (a) of the directive 2004/113/EC). Th e concept of direct discrimination is based on comparable logic which embraces hypothetical comparisons as well as comparisons with the treatment of actual persons (Ellis, Watson 2015, 146). According to the settled case law of the CJEU the comparability of the situations must be examined, inter alia, in light of the object of the national legislation establishing the diff erence in treatment (Kuso C-614/11, para. 45). In addition, any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or maternity leave (within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC8) also constitute direct discrimination even though there is no male candidate – so that no comparator (Dekker C-77/88). Interestingly, direct discrimination can be established even in the absence of a victim. It was confi rmed by the CJEU in Feryn case (C-54/07), where the Court concluded that the existence of such discrimination is not dependent on 6 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, 37–43. 7 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, 23–36. 8 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, 1–7. The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 67 the identifi cation of a potentially wronged party who claims to be the victim. Th e objective of equality would be hard to achieve if the scope of the protection against discrimination was to be limited to only those cases in which an unsuccessful candidate for a post, considering himself to be the victim of direct discrimination, brought legal proceedings against the employer. In such circumstances the fact that an employer publicly declares that it will not recruit employees of a certain characteristic constitutes direct discrimination as it is likely to strongly dissuade certain candidates from submitting their candidature and, accordingly, to hinder their access to the labour market. Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a protected characteristic at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justifi ed by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary (art. 2 (2)(b) of the directive 2000/78/EC). Th e concept of indirect discrimination is also based on a comparison, although this time it takes place in a group perspective instead of individual one (a victim of the alleged discrimination has to identify a group of persons in order to make a comparison). Th is form of unequal treatment was more problematic to defi ne than direct discrimination. Doubts arose as to whether the adverse treatment must have actually happened or it might be only anticipated or how to assess the “group” impact of the unfavourable treatment as it may be diffi cult to adduce statistical evidence to such claim (Ellis, Watson 2015, 150). It is worth noting that as far as the direct discrimination can be justifi ed only in cases explicitly prescribed by law, the indirect discrimination can be justifi ed by legitimate aim if applied measures are appropriate and necessary (i.e. proportional) what makes it more “fl exible” to defend against discrimination claims. Moreover, discrimination includes harassment and sexual harassment, as well as any less favourable treatment based on a person’s rejection of, or submission to such conduct [art. 2 (2) (a) of the directive 2006/54/EC]. Harassment is a situation where an unwanted conduct related to the protected characteristic of a person occurs with the purpose or eff ect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or off ensive environment and sexual harassment – where any form of unwanted physical, verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or eff ect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or off ensive environment. 68 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada For the purpose of equality directives an instruction to discriminate against persons on the protected grounds also constitutes a forbidden form of discrimination [art. 2 (4) of the directive 2000/43/EC]. Th anks to the case law of the CJEU discrimination is understood to include discrimination due to association. Th is type of discrimination occurs when a person is treated less favourably because of his or her association (relations) with someone who possesses one of the protected characteristics, even though she or he does not have the characteristic herself/himself (Karagiorgi 2014, 25). In Court’s view presented in Coleman case C-303/06 the principle of equal treatment (in that particular case with respect to disability) applies not only to a particular category of persons but by reference to the protected ground. What is more, a person may face discrimination also because of an assumption about his or her characteristic (e.g. sexual orientation or racial origin) which may or may not be factually correct (Chopin, Germaine 2015, 37). 2. The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: Selected Protected Characteristics in Several Fields 2.1. The Genesis of the Protection Against Discrimination in the European Union Law Th e most fundamental aspect of equality in EU law, apart from prohibition of discrimination based on nationality, which lays outside the scope of this paper, was the principle of equal treatment of women and men with respect to remuneration. Article 119 TEEC (now art. 157 TFEU), that obliged Member States to ensure and maintain the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work between men and women workers, was introduced because of economic reasons – to prevent Member States from gaining a competitive advantage through cheap female work that could distort the functioning of the internal market (More 1999, 518). Th is bare Treaty provision was transformed into a complex set of rules on equal treatment of women and men in employment and social security and subsequently – into antidiscrimination law on other grounds also as a result of judicial activity of the CJEU. The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 69 Th e Court issued a series of milestone judgments in which it recognized the direct eff ect of art. 119 TEEC allowing individuals to enforce the right to equality before national courts (Defrenne C-80/70). Moreover, the CJEU started to apply the perspective of human rights protection to equality issues, broadening a narrow economic perspective, as it repeatedly stated that there can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of the fundamental rights, constituting general principles of EU law, the observance of which it has a duty to ensure (Defrenne C-149/77, para. 2). Furthermore, the CJEU instigated the process of development of the material scope of application of the equality principle as it confi rmed that the concept of same work contained in art. 119 (1) TEEC included cases of work of equal value (Worringham C-69/80, para. 2). Th e EU legislator followed this logic and adopted several directives that introduced the gender equality principle beyond the specifi c issue of equal pay, although still in the area of employment typifi ed by the Council directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women9, Council directive of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (76/207/EEC)10 or Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security11. Th e initial burst of legislative activity during the 1970s owed during the subsequent years and the CJEU became a key engine for development in the EU antidiscrimination law. Th e CJEU expanded the notion of discrimination to cover indirect discrimination, permitted a shift in the burden of proof from complainant to respondent and pushed the boundaries of the material scope of the law (Bell 2011, 615). Th e Court also broadened the personal scope of protection against discrimination holding that the prohibition of gender discrimination cannot be confi ned simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other sex and as such must extend to discrimination arising from gender reassignment, which is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned (P v. S, C-13/94, para.20). Th is conclusion increased the number of protected grounds in the EU antidiscrimination law including implicitly sexual identity, however the breakthrough was made by the 9 OJ L 45, 19.2.1975, 19–20. 10 OJ L 39, 14.2.1976, 40–42. 11 OJ L 6, 10.1.1979, 24–25. 70 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada introduction of Article 13 TEC (now Article 19 TFEU) on virtue of the Amsterdam Treaty. Th is treaty provision allowed to adopt directives prohibiting discrimination on diff erent than gender characteristics, namely Council directive 2000/43/EC and Council directive 2000/78/EC that banned discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. Th e directives changed signifi cantly the existing approaches to combating discrimination based on these grounds across Europe, aiming to ensure all individuals living in the EU, both EU citizens and third country nationals, benefi t from eff ective legal protection against such discrimination (Chopin, Germaine 2015, 8). Th ey emphasise the need to establish eff ective protective mechanism against discrimination available to all who claim being discriminated against. Th e instruments are designed to guarantee the eff ective access to justice in discriminatory cases and include shared burden of proof (art. 8 of the Directive 2000/78/EC), prohibition of victimization (art. 11 of the directive 2000/43/EC) and duty to ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the enforcement of obligations under directive are available to all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them (art. 9 of the directive 2000/78/EC). Similar provisions are enshrined in the subsequent equality directives, i.e. directive 2004/113/EC12, directive 2006/54/EC13, following the relevant case law of the CJEU and raising the level of protection against unequal treatment throughout the European Union. Th e process of constitutionalising the equality principle in the EU legal system has been concluded with the Lisbon Treaty. 2.2. Equality and Non-Discrimination in the Primary Sources of European Union Law Aft er the Lisbon reform the status of equality principle was strengthened. Th e EU’s and Member States’ obligations under equality and non-discrimination have been clarifi ed in the primary sources of EU law. 12 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, 37–43. 13 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, 23–36. The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 71 Equality is one of the EU values. In accordance with art. 2 TEU14 “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Th ese values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. Moreover, promotion of the equality, also in its relations with the wider world, and combating discrimination are EU objectives is listed in art. 3 TEU. In order to pursue these goals eff ectively, in defi ning and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (art. 10 TFEU). Th e idea of mainstreaming implemented in the EU law refers particularly to the gender equality what is highlighted by art. 8 TFEU (“In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women”). Article 157 TFEU confi rms the principle of equal pay for equal work for man and women – the fi rst explicitly mentioned protected characteristic in the EU law. It stipulates that each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value (what codifi es the case law of the CJEU) is applied. For the purpose of this article, the term “pay” is construed broadly and means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer. In accordance with the settle case-law of CJEU pay within the meaning of art. 157 TFEU covers all consideration which employees receive directly or indirectly from their employers in respect of their employment i.a. special travel facilities for former employees (Garland, C-12/81), benefi t paid by an employer to a woman on maternity leave (Gillespie, C-342/93), overtime pay (Herzog, C-399, 409 & 425/92, C-34, 50 & 78/93), special bonus payments made by employers (Krüger, C-281/97), termination payments (Gruber C-249/97) and occupational pension scheme (Bilka, C-170/84). Art. 157 (2) TFEU explains that equal pay without discrimination based on sex means either that for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement or that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job. Th e two subsequent paragraphs express legal authorization respectively to the EU institutions and Member States. Art. 157 (3) TFEU authorizes the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 14 Treaty on the European Union (consolidated versions). OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 13–46. 72 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada procedure, and aft er consulting the Economic and Social Committee to adopt measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, complementing and extending the competent norm enshrined in art. 19 TFUE. According to art. 19 (former art. 13 TEC) “without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and aft er obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”. Th e doctrine emphasises limited ambit of this article that does not allow to use it as a legal basis of measures to promote equality beyond prohibition of discrimination (Ellis, Watson 2015, 16). Under art. 157 (4) TFEU so called positive actions are permissible. Th e provision states that “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specifi c advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers”. Th is kind of legitimization was expressly introduced into EU antidiscrimination directives and gave rise to numerous judgment of the CJEU (i.a. Hofmann, C-184/83, Kalanke, C-450/93, Marschall, C-409/95, Abrahamsson, C-407/98) revealing the Court’s ambiguity towards these kinds of measures which although intended to promote substantive equality are treated as the exceptions to the principle of (formal) equality (Szczerba-Zawada 2016). Important support for the principle of equality in the EU has been provided by giving legal force to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty. Nowadays the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties (art. 6 TEU). Chapter III of the Charter titled “Equality” guarantees that everyone is equal before the law (art. 20) and introduces general antidiscrimination clause according to which “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited” (art. 21). Th is autonomous non-discrimination provision must be interpreted in the light of art. 52 (2) of the Charter that envisages that “rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defi ned by those Treaties”. Th is implies the limited scope of application The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 73 of art. 21 (1) to the fi elds and grounds mentioned in art. 19 TFEU and the 4 equality directives. Th e Charter pays special attention to gender equality stating that “Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay” (art. 23). It also legitimates the affi rmative action in favour of the under- represented sex. Th e category of primary sources of EU law consists of also so called general principles of law. Th eir status is similar to the Treaties and has been formulated by the CJEU pursuant to its obligation under Article 19 of the TEU to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.Th e general principles of law play a crucial – constitutional – role in the EU legal system as “they put fl esh on the bones of a legal system which, being set out in framework Treaties, would in their absence have remained a skeleton of rules falling short of a proper legal order” (Ellis, Watson 2015, 99). Th e catalogue of general principles of EU law includes the principle of equality. It is clear against settled case of law of CJEU in accordance to which the prohibition of discrimination is merely a specifi c enunciation of the general principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of EU law (Ruckdeschel, C-117/76 & C-1677, para. 7). Th is general principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental rights, precludes comparable situations from being treated in a diff erent manner unless the diff erence in treatment is objectively justifi ed (Portugal v Council, C-149/96, para. 91). Interestingly, the CJEU qualifi ed both principles: equality and non-discrimination as general principle of EU law using both terms synonymously which makes the relations between equality and non-discrimination diffi cult to outline precisely. It is also unclear if the status of a general principle refers to non-discrimination irrespective of grounds or only to gender and age as stated expressly by the CJEU. Regardless of these uncertainties, the general principle of equality and non-discrimination plays a very important role in the EU law as it is used as a standard of review of the legality of actions taken by the EU and the Member States. Th e CJEU has made it clear that the Member States are constrained by the general principles (including equality) when they implement Union measures even if the time for implementation of the (equality) directives has not passed. As Court noted in landmark Mangold case (C-144/04), para. 76, “observance of the general principle of equal treatment, in particular in respect of age, cannot, as such, be conditional upon the expiry of the period allowed the Member States for the transposition of a directive intended to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of age, in particular so far as the organisation of appropriate legal remedies, the burden of proof, protection against victimisation, 74 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada social dialogue, affi rmative action and other specifi c measures to implement such a directive are concerned”. 2.3. European Union Secondary Law on Equality and Non-Discrimination Th e EU secondary equality legislation is typifi ed mainly by directives. Th is specifi c source of EU law is binding upon Member States as to the result to be achieved, giving national authorities some discretion with respect to forms and methods. National legislators must adopt implementing measures to transpose directives, but the implementation shall in no circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of protection against discrimination already aff orded by Member States in the fi elds covered by the directives (i.a. art. 7 of the directive 2004/113/EC). Th e implementation of the directives means achievement of their objectives. In case of equality directives this is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination in order to put into eff ect the principle of equal treatment on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Council Directive 2000/78/EC), racial or ethnic origin (Council Directive 2000/43/EC) and sex/gender (Directive 2006/54/EC and Council directive 2004/113/EC). As the CJEU reiterates, the Member States’ obligation to achieve the results envisaged by the equality directives is binding to all the authorities of the member states: legislative, executives and judicial bodies. “It follows that, in applying national law, and in particular the provisions of national legislation specifi cally introduced in order to implement a directive, national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result referred to” (Johnston C-222/84, para. 6). Th e anti-discriminatory directives prohibit direct and indirect discrimination, as well harassment and instruction to discriminate. It is worth highlighting that the protection against diff erent forms of discrimination is limited to concrete areas as the material scope of application of the directives covers: employment and occupation (Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Council Directive 2000/43/EC, directive 2006/54/EC), social protection and social advantages (Council Directive 2000/43/EC, directive 2006/54/EC and directive 79/7/EEC), education (Council Directive 2000/43/ The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 75 EC) and access to and supply of goods and services (Council Directive 2000/43/ EC and Council directive 2004/113/EC). Th erefore the EU equality law provides protection against discrimination diversifi ed upon both the protected characteristics and fi elds of protection. As a result there is a hierarchy of protected characteristics – the characteristic that is protected against discrimination to the widest extent (in four areas) is racial or ethnic origin, gender is protected in three areas, while the characteristics protected only in one area are as follows: religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. Table 1: Personal and material scope of application of EU prohibition against discrimination Protected characteristics Area of protection Racial or Religion/ Sexual Gender Age Disability ethnic origin belief orientation Employment X X X X X X Social XX protection Access to goods XX and services Education X Source: Own elaboration based on equality directives It is important to notice that all the directives set the minimum requirements of protection against discrimination. It means that the Member States may introduce or maintain provisions which are more favourable than those laid down in the directives, and, at the same time are not allowed to lower the standard of protection already established in their national legal systems. As the aim of the directives is to put into eff ect the principle of equality they envisage solutions to encourage victims of discrimination to refer to the protection mechanism. Th is includes the shared burden of proof according to which when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment had not been applied to them they can, before a court or other competent authority establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, then it shall be for the respondent to prove that there had been no breach of the principle of equal treatment (art. 19 of the directive 2006/54/EC). Th e shared burden of proof plays a signifi cant role in ensuring that the principle of equal 76 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada treatment can be eff ectively enforced which has been confi rmed in the established case law of the CJEU. Th e same refers to the so called prohibition of victimization, i.e. protection of individuals who claim discrimination from any adverse treatment or adverse consequence as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment (art. 9 of the directive 2000/43/EC). Despite its fundamental role in the EU law and constantly broadened scope of application through the judicial activity of the CJEU the equality principle does not have absolute character as all the antidiscrimination directives allow some exceptions to equality principles, including genuine occupational requirements, protection of women regarding pregnancy and maternity, reasonable accommodation for disabled persons, positive actions, justifi cation of diff erences of treatment on grounds of age. Th e table below indicates the exceptions to equality principle envisaged in four directives constituting the core of EU antidiscrimination secondary legislation. Table 2: Exceptions to equality principle in the EU law Exception to Directive the equality principle 2000/43 2000/78 2004/113 2006/54 Occupational requirements Art. 4 Art. 4 - Art .14 (2) Protection of women regarding - - Art. 28 pregnancy and maternity Justification of differences of treatment - Art. 6 - - on grounds of age Positive actions Art. 5 Art. 7 Art. 6 Art. 3 Reasonable accommodation for - Art. 5 - - disabled persons Source: Dudek 2015, 271. Under the exceptions concerning occupational requirements Member States are allowed to accept that a diff erentiation of treatment based on a one of the protected characteristics does not constitute discrimination but only if, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. Similar exceptions have been extended to churches and other public or private organizations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, but exclusively with respect to the religion or belief if by reason of the nature of these activities or The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 77 of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justifi ed occupational requirement, having regard to the organization’s ethos. Th is diff erence of treatment in such a case cannot, however, justify discrimination on any other ground (e.g. sexual orientation). Although allowed, the CJEU consequently interprets this provision as the derogation of the individual right which must be interpreted strictly and applied in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Moreover, the Member States should assess periodically the introduced limitations with respect to genuine occupational requirements in order to decide whether it is justifi ed to maintain this kind of derogation in the light of social developments (Johnston C-222/84, paras. 4, 37). Th e aim of the exception allowing to guarantee specifi c rights to women on account of pregnancy and maternity (such as maternity leave) is, as explained by the CJEU, fi rstly, to ensure the protection of a woman’s biological condition during pregnancy and thereaft er until such time as her physiological and mental functions have returned to normal aft er childbirth and secondly, to protect the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment (Hofmann C-184/83, para. 25). Lack of one of the above-mentioned reasons will result in the similarity of situation of men and women that requires their similar treatment in the light of which the exception at stake cannot be accepted. Th e aims of protecting female workers are valid only if, there is a justifi ed need for a diff erence of treatment as between men and women. Th is is not the case of prohibition of women’s nightwork, as whatever the disadvantages of nightwork may be, it does not seem that, except in the case of pregnancy or maternity, the risks to which women are exposed when working at night are, in general, inherently diff erent from those to which men are exposed (Stoeckel C-345/89, para. 15). It must be noted that the above-mentioned derogations constitute the so called ‘closed system of exceptions’ as regards direct discrimination (Burri, Prechal 2010, 10). It means that in the situation that amounts to direct discrimination the diff erent treatment is accepted as far as one of these exceptions applies. In the case of indirect discrimination, however, the justifi cations may be based on other grounds under the condition that the diff erentiation pursues legitimate aim and the measures to attain that aim are appropriate and necessary (as envisaged by a defi nition of indirect discrimination). 78 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada Th e obligation to make a reasonable accommodation constitutes of two elements: it envisages that the employer must take appropriate measures unless this would result in a disproportionate burden on his or her account. As opposed to the above- mentioned justifi cations to diff erent treatment, the CJEU does not require a narrow interpretation of the concept of the reasonable accommodation. It rather postulates a broad defi nition of the reasonable accommodation duty covering elimination of the various barriers, not only material but also organisational, that hinder the full and eff ective participation of persons with disabilities in professional life on an equal basis with other workers (HK Danmark C-335/11 & C-337/11), what confi rms the thesis that this concept should not be classifi ed as an exception to the formal equality but rather as an example of equality of opportunity. Th e other accepted exception to the equality principle allows for diff erentiation of treatment on ground of age if, within the context of national law, it is objectively and reasonably justifi ed by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary (art. 6 (1) of the Directive 2000/78/EC). Th is rather broad formula of justifi cation of diff erent treatment based on age is criticized in the doctrine as weakening the protection of discrimination with respect to this characteristic (Zawidzka-Łojek 2013, 220). Th e attempt to reach out beyond the strict consistency of treatment, which can lead to unequal treatment in practice, is made with the acceptance of the so called positive actions in the EU law. Th ese measures, referred to in chapter 3.2, are intended to promote substantive equality through quotas and other actions taken in favour of underrepresented groups. As such, although discriminatory prima facie, they are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual inequalities which may exist in the reality of social life. Nevertheless constituting derogation from an individual right to equal treatment, such measures must remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view (Briheche C-319/03). Conclusions Antidiscrimination law, including EU law, is controversial. It is the result, to some extent at least, of the fact that what is qualifi ed as discrimination in law is both wider and narrower than its social understanding (Khaitan 2015, 2). Th e problem with The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 79 the EU non-discriminatory law is its limited and equivocal material and personal scope of application which implies that it refuses to prohibit conduct that many would consider discriminatory (e.g. earlier retirement age for women) while in other instances it qualifi es as discrimination treatment that is hardly considered to be as such by laymen such as company’s dress code banning all head coverings. Th erefore, despite the qualifi cation of concepts such as direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, affi rmative actions or reasonable accommodation as part of equality mechanism, also as a result of the creative judicial interpretation of the Court of Justice of the EU, there is a need for further development. New forms of prohibited unequal treatment (e.g. multiple discrimination), new grounds of protection (e.g. gender identity) and new fi elds of protection (e.g. corporate boards) are waiting for introduction. Th eir explicit legal recognition would, undoubtedly, contribute to put equality into practice and to further satisfy the aim of the EU antidiscrimination law. Th is requires shift from formal equality, predominant in the EU antidiscrimination law, to substantive equality that would change the character and scope of duties under the principle of equality. It would enable to transcend the norm of equality set usually by the majority group, which in fact deepens the existing inequalities. At this stage of development, the EU antidiscrimination law, although it has some redistributive eff ect (e.g. under the concept of indirect discrimination), it does not demand a resolution of the underlying structural problems which disadvantage diff erent minority groups (Fredman 1992, 125). Although the status of equality as a general principle of EU law mitigates identifi ed weaknesses, at least partially, allowing to broaden the scope of obligations of the Member States under equality principle (as proved by the Mangold judgment), and adoption of equality legislation would enhance eff ectiveness of the protection against discrimination. Th e latter faces, unfortunately, legal obstacles – the principle of subsidiarity that governs the shared competences, under which the matter of equality and non-discrimination falls, makes, in fact, EU legislative activity in this area dependent on the acceptance of the Member States which have so far opposed the proposals of new equality directives [e.g. Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 2008/0140 (CNS)]. To sum up, despite its market-related origins, the principle of equal treatment has evolved into a constitutional right of equality that is one of the general principles of EU law. It is also the judicial activity of the Court of Justice of the European Union that shaped the principle of non-discrimination in a way that was not explicitly 80 Aleksandra Szczerba-Zawada envisaged in the founding Treaties that allowed to expand its personal and material scopes of application. However, much still needs to be done to improve the level of protection and to strike a balance between equality and diversity, as the equality of treatment must not be based on the assumption of identical treatment that results in eradication of all diff erences. Th e equality principle should guarantee the same scope of freedom to develop one’s identity and not force somebody to resign from their individualism in the name of similarity. In this perspective the principle of equality is used to protect diff erences to assure that they do not adversely aff ect the minority groups through perpetuation of stereotypes, as the problem to be addressed is not unequal treatment per se, but the disadvantage which oft en is attached to such treatment (Fredman 1992, 128). References Publications Arnardóttir Oddny Mjöll. 2003. Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights, the Hague, London, New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publ. Barnard Catherine, Hepple Bob. 2000. “Substantive Equality”, Th e Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3: 562–585. Bell Mark. 2011, “Th e Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening”. In: Th e Evolution of EU Law, edited by Paul Craig, Gráinne de Burc, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 611–640. Burri Susanne, Prechal Sacha. 2010. EU Gender Equality Law Update 2010, Luxmebourg: Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender- equality/fi les/dgjustice_ eugenderequalitylaw_update_2010_fi nal24february2011_en.pdf Caruso Daniel. 2002. “Limits of the classic method: positive action in the European Union aft er the new equality directives”, Jean Monnet Working Paper, Vol. 10, Iss. 2. http://www. jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/02/021001.pdf: 1–61. Chopin Isabelle, Germaine Catharina. 2015. Developing Anti-discrimination Law in Europe. Th e 28 EU Member States, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Turkey compared, Luxmebourg: Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/ fi les/comparative_analysis_2014.pdf The European Union Antidiscrimination Law: from Prohibition of Wage Discrimination ... 81 De Vos Marc. 2007. Beyond Formal Equality. 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The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA GAGA GABRICHIDZE* The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality in European Union–Georgia Relations Abstract Political conditionality became an integral part of the external policy of the European Union (EU) in the early nineties. EU–Georgia relations are no exception to this. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief investigation of the place, significance and function of human rights’ clauses as a part of political conditionality in the legal framework of the EU–Georgia relations. To this end, the paper briefly reviews human rights clauses in international agreements of the EU and analyses the relevant articles in EU–Georgia bilateral documents and autonomous instruments of the EU. Further, some considerations in respect of effectiveness and consistency of human rights are also provided. It is argued that the human rights clause plays a less important role in practice than it would be expected as an “essential element” of agreements concluded by the EU. Key words: Human rights clause; Conditionality; Georgia. A number of instruments have been used by the EU to facilitate the export of its values and norms. In the fi rst place, bilateral documents should be mentioned (trade and association agreements, action plans). However, unilateral acts of the EU, such as decisions of the Council, progress reports prepared by the Commission, etc., are also of very high signifi cance (Cremona 2011, 275). Whereas, conditionality is the key tool to ensure that partner countries comply with human rights and democracy standards and it can be applied in diff erent ways. While ex ante conditionality – whether in the framework of an association agreement or cooperation agreement – is to be fulfi lled * New Vision University (Tbilisi), [email protected] 86 Gaga Gabrichidze in advance, ex post conditionality is a part of a relevant agreement and constitutes a precondition for its application/implementation (Fiero 2003, 131). Th e latter is more widespread in the external policy of the EU and an example thereof is the practice of including human clauses in agreements concluded by the EU with third countries. Conditionality can also be divided into positive and negative conditionality. Positive conditionality involves promising benefi ts to a partner country if it fulfi ls certain conditions. Negative conditionality involves reducing or terminating benefi ts in case the partner country does not comply with the conditions (Fiero 2003, 100). Oft en, the policy of the EU towards the partner is a combined version of both forms of conditionality. Th is is also the case with Georgia. Th e paper aims to provide an overview and an analysis of human rights as a part of political conditionality in EU–Georgia relations. Th e starting point is a brief overview of human rights clauses provided for in international agreements concluded by the EU. Th is will lead us to an overview and analysis of the place and meaning of human rights as envisaged in EU–Georgia bilateral documents as well as in autonomous instruments of the EU. Finally, the issue of eff ectiveness and consistency of human rights as a part of political conditionality will be addressed. It is argued that human rights clauses lack strict and concrete mechanisms which would ensure their eff ectiveness in practice and go beyond the scope of consultations and political dialogue within the bodies established under the existed cooperation framework. 1. Human rights in international agreements of the European Union Th e EU has concluded numerous agreements with third countries or regional groups of third countries, such as, for example, ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Th e Cotonou Agreement), which is the legal framework for EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c. Although the main object of regulation of most of them is trade, many agreements exceed the scope of trade regulation and cover broader aspects of cooperation. Just as diverse are the titles of these agreements: trade agreement; political dialogue and cooperation agreement; framework agreement; economic partnership agreement; trade and cooperation agreement; partnership and cooperation agreement; stabilisation and association agreement; Europe agreement; association agreement. Human rights clauses as The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 87 a part of political conditionality have been an integral part of all these agreements concluded by the EU since the early nineties. In 1995, the Council approved a suspension mechanism to be included in Community agreements with non-member states which enabled the European Community, in cases of serious and persistent violations of human rights, to react with immediate eff ect. Whereas, human right should be defi ned as an essential element of the agreement. Th is mechanism provided for taking “appropriate measures” in the event of violation of human rights. Th at does not necessarily mean that the appropriate measure should be suspension or termination of the agreement. As a rule, the EU uses dialogue with the government of the partner country as a primary tool for solving the problems. Furthermore, suspension of cooperation in certain areas, imposition of a trade embargo, postponement of planning or starting new projects, etc., can also be considered as an appropriate measure (Communication from the Commission 1995). 2. Human Rights in European Union–Georgia Bilateral Documents 2.1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Th e fi rst legal basis for the relationship between the EU and Georgia was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Communities and their Member States, on the one part, and Georgia, on the other part, which was signed on 22 April 1996 and entered into force on 1 July 1999 for a period of ten years. Aft er the expiry of this period in 2009 the PCA was being automatically renewed year by year1. Already in the preamble of the agreement it is stated that the parties are “convinced of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human 1 Article 97 of the EU–Georgia PCA provided that it should be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither party gives the other party written notice of denunciation of this Agreement six months before it expires. 88 Gaga Gabrichidze rights, particularly those of persons belonging to minorities, the establishment of a multiparty system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market economy, and recognizing the eff orts of Georgia to create political and economic systems based on these principles”. Furthermore, Article 2 of the PCA defi nes the essential elements of the agreement. Whereas, it should be noted that in the Georgian version of the PCA the term the term “basic elements” is being used. It cannot be considered as a correct translation of the term “essential elements” which can be found in the English version of the PCA. Based on the practice of the EU, the term “essential elements” does have a certain meaning and defi nes those conditions whose violation puts the application or even existence of an agreement into question. In particular, these are the following: Respect for democracy, principles of international law and human rights as defi ned in particular in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy, including those enunciated in the documents of the CSCE Bonn Conference. Special importance is conferred on the provision of Article 2 of the PCA by Article 98 of the PCA. Namely, according to the latter, if either Party would consider that the other Party has failed to fulfi l an obligation under the agreement, it can take appropriate measures. Before so doing, it shall supply the Cooperation Council2 with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with an aim to seek a solution acceptable to the parties. However, in cases of special urgency, the parties had no obligation to address the Cooperation Council and could react immediately in cases of violation of the agreement, which could be in form of partial or full suspension of the application of the PCA. Th e joint declaration to Article 98 annexed to the PCA defi nes the term “cases of special urgency” as cases of material breach of the agreement by one of the parties. Whereas, violation of the essential elements of the agreement set out in Article 2 is considered such a breach. Th is form of human rights conditionality is the classic version of the so-called „Bulgarian“ clause (It was fi rst used in the Europe Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania in 1993), which replaced the „Baltic“ clause (fi rst used in the Europe Agreements with Baltic states in 1992) in the practice of the EU. Th ey diff er considerably from one another as, on the one hand, according to the „Baltic“ clause, only in case of a serious infringement of the essential provisions either party is enabled to immediately suspend the agreement either in whole or in part, while under the „Bulgarian“ clause either party is able to suspend the agreement another party fails to 2 Th e Cooperation Council was established under Article 80 of the PCA. The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 89 fulfi l any obligation under the agreement. On the other hand, the „Bulgarian“ clause, in contrast to the „Baltic“ clause, provides for consultation procedure and envisages immediate suspension only in cases of special urgency (Gabrichidze 2011, 47). Here should be noted, that the PCA did not limit itself to only laying down human rights conditionality. It also provided for legal grounds for cooperation in the fi eld of human rights. In particular, Title VII of the PCA was devoted to this issue. Article 71 of the PCA envisaged that the parties should cooperate on all questions relevant to the establishment or reinforcement of democratic institutions, including those required in order to strengthen the rule of law, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to international law and OSCE principles. Th is cooperation should take the form of technical assistance programmes. 2.2. European Union–Georgia Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy On 14 June 2004, Georgia was off ered to participate in the initiative of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Communication from the Commission 2003). Although the ENP did not substitute the PCA – the main legal basis of Georgia-EU relationships at that time – it expanded the scope of perspectives off ered by the EU. Specifi cally, the ENP provided for the possibility to participate in the internal market and to further deepen the economic integration. In the ENP Strategy Paper the Commission expressly refers to the central role and importance of values in external policy of the EU. In particular, it is stated that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Th ese values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non- discrimination. Th e Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting these values“ (Communication from the Commission 2004, 10). Furthermore, in the same document the Commission defi nes political conditionality with respect to those countries which would be covered by the ENP. Specifi cally, with regard to Southern Caucasus countries it is stated that „the EU should consider the possibility of developing Action Plans with these countries in the future on the basis of their individual merits. With this in view, the Commission will report to the Council on progress made by each country with respect to the strengthening of democracy, the 90 Gaga Gabrichidze rule of law and respect for human rights” (Communication from the Commission 2004, 8). In addition, the EU–Georgia bilateral Action Plan, which was the basic tool for the implementation of the ENP, laid down priority areas, which should be accorded particular attention within the framework of the cooperation. It is worth mentioning that the list starts with strengthening the rule of law, especially through reform of the judicial system, including the penitentiary system, and through rebuilding state institutions and strengthening democratic institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with international commitments of Georgia (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 3). In addition to the priorities, the Action Plan provided for general objectives and actions which had to complement the priorities (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 4). One of these objectives is political dialogue and reform (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 4.1) including the component “Democracy and the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms” (EU–Georgia Action Plan, 4.1.1). 2.3. Association Agreement Along with other Eastern neighbours of the EU Georgia is also included the EU Eastern Partnership initiative. Eastern Partnership, initiated by Polish and Swedish Governments, was decided to be adopted by the European Council on March 2009. Formally it was founded on 7 May 2009 (Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit 2009). Together with the other objectives intended to deepen cooperation, the Eastern Partnership provides for the possibility of concluding a new enhanced agreement with partner states which also includes the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area. Negotiations with Georgia in this respect began on 15 July 2010. Th e text of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement was initialled by the parties on 29 November 2013, at the third Eastern Partnership Summit and signed on 27 June 2014. On the basis of Article 431 of the Association Agreement, the provisional application of substantial parts of the Association Agreement started on 1 September 2014. It fully entered into force on 1 July 2016, the fi rst day of the second month following the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratifi cation or approval (Article 431.2 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Th us, the EU–Georgia Association Agreement is the current legal framework of relations between Georgia and the European Union. The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 91 As for the place and importance of human rights under the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, fi rst of all, in the preamble there are several references to human rights. In particular, it is stated that the EU is built on the following common values: democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Whereas, it is also underlined that these values also lie at the heart of political association and economic integration as envisaged in the Association Agreement (Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Further, the parties declare that they are committed to further strengthen the respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, democratic principles, the rule of law, and good governance (Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Besides, the parties, one more time, confi rm that they are committed to all the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the concluding documents of the Madrid, Istanbul and Vienna Conferences of 1991 and 1992 respectively, and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, as well as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). In the fi rst provisions of the Association Agreement it is stated that one of the aims of the association relationship established between the EU and Georgia is enhancing cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice „with the aim of reinforcing the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms“ (Article 1.2 f) of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). In addition, also here, just as in the PCA, respect for the democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms are considered in the rank of essential elements of the agreement. Concerning their meaning there is a reference to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990 (Article 2.1 of the EU– Georgia Association Agreement). As in the case of the PCA, the status of an essential element lends special signifi cance to the democratic principle and protection of human rights compared to other obligations under the Association Agreement. In case of a dispute, a party may take appropriate measures if the matter is not resolved within three months of 92 Gaga Gabrichidze the date of notifi cation of a formal request for dispute settlement (Article 421 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement) and if the complaining Party continues to consider that the other Party has failed to fulfi l an obligation under this Agreement. Th e fact of violation by one of the parties of democratic principle or human rights is one of the exceptions when the other party is not under obligation to follow the procedure of a three month consultation period before reacting and taking appropriate measures (Article 422 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement.). In the Title II of the Association Agreement, which is devoted to political dialogue, reform and cooperation in the fi eld of foreign and security policy, strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is declared as one of the aims of political dialogue (Article 3.2 h) of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Furthermore, in the context of domestic reform it is mentioned that the parties will, among others, cooperate on developing, consolidating and increasing the stability and eff ectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law and on ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 4 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). And fi nally, in Title III of the Association Agreement dealing with the issues of freedom, security and justice, the issue of the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is separately addressed. Specifi cally, it is noted that in their cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice the parties shall attach particular importance to further promote the rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary, access to justice, and the right to a fair trial (Article 13.1 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Moreover, it is underlined that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on freedom, security and justice (Article 13.3 of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement). Logically, provisions of the Association Agenda which was formally adopted by the EU and Georgia on 26 June 2014 and establishes priorities for the period 2014-2016 with a view to prepare for the implementation of the Association Agreement are more concrete. One of the priorities of the Association Agenda is, in accordance with the Association Agreement, political dialogue and reform, whereby one of the aims of the cooperation is to strengthen the respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities as enshrined in the core UN and Council of Europe Conventions and related protocols (Paragraph 2.1 iii) of the EU–Georgia Association Agenda). In the context of cooperation, on the one hand, a reference is made to the EU Special Adviser on Constitutional and Legal reform and Human Rights Th omas Hammarberg‘s report from September 2013 „Georgia in Transition“ (Hammarberg The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 93 2013) and, on the other hand, a list of issues is provided for, which should be covered by cooperation (Paragraph 2.1 iii) of the EU–Georgia Association Agenda).3 3. Human Rights in Autonomous Instruments of the European Union In the preamble of Regulation No 2053/03 concerning the provision of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia which was adopted on 19 July 1993, the Council made a reference to the fact that technical assistance will be fully eff ective only in the context of progress towards free and open democratic systems that respect human rights. Regulation no 1279/96 of 25 June 1996, which replaced Regulation No 2053/03, is more explicit. In particular, according to Article 3.11 of Regulation no 1279/96, when an 3 Specifi cally, the list includes the following issues: Adoption of a comprehensive National Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan; actively pursue in this strategy and action plan the specifi c recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE/ODIHR, the Council of Europe/European Commission against Racism and Intolerance and international human rights organisations notably in implementing anti-discrimination policies, protecting minorities and private life and ensuring the freedom of religion; Adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, as recommended by UN and Council of Europe monitoring bodies, to ensure eff ective protection against discrimination; Taking steps towards signature, ratifi cation and transposition into national legislation of relevant UN and Council of Europe instruments in the fi ght against discrimination, including taking into account the UN Convention on Statelessness and the standing recommendations of the Council of Europe on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; Responding appropriately to the conclusions and recommendations of relevant Council of Europe bodies on compliance by Georgia with the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities; Ensuring eff ective implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Ensuring eff ective execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights; Maintaining eff ective pre- and non-judicial mechanisms for both dispute settlement and the protection of human rights; promoting and raising awareness on human rights and anti-discrimination in the judiciary, law enforcement, administration; Continuing to strengthen media pluralism, transparency and independence in line with Council of Europe recommendations; Taking the recommendations of the Public Defender’s Offi ce into account in policy-making and provide adequate resources and strengthen the PDO offi ce; Supporting the eff ective functioning of the institutional mechanism foreseen in the anti- discrimination law; Build monitoring capacities of the Parliamentary Committees on Human Rights and Legal issues linked to the implementation of the Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan; Supporting Civil Society Organisations and notably the representative social partners (trade-unions and employers’ organisations) as service providers and watchdogs in areas prioritised by the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, including labour rights, privacy, rights of minorities and other vulnerable groups and media freedom. 94 Gaga Gabrichidze essential element for the continuation of cooperation through assistance is missing, in particular in cases of violation of democratic principles and human rights, the Council may decide upon appropriate measures concerning assistance to a partner state. Th e next succeeding regulation combined approaches of the both predecessor regulations. Namely, in the preamble of Regulation no 99/2000 of 29 December 1999 it is stated that assistance from the EU will be fully eff ective only in the context of progress towards free and open democratic societies that respect human rights, minority rights and the rights of the indigenous people. Besides, Article 16 of Regulation no 99/2000 envisages that in cases of violation of democratic principles and human rights, the Council may decide upon appropriate measures concerning assistance to a partner country. In 2006 a new fi nancial mechanism – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – was established with the purpose to support the European Neighbourhood Policy (Regulation no 1638/2006). It replaced and enhanced the fi nancial assistance programmes TACIS (for Eastern European countries) and MEDA (for Mediterranean countries). Programmes and projects fi nanced within the framework of ENPI should be consistent with European Union policies and respect commitments under multilateral agreements and international conventions to which the EU and its partners are parties, including commitments on human rights, democracy and good governance (Article 5 of Regulation no 1638/2006). Accordingly, cases of threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms would provide a basis to conduct an ad hoc review of strategy papers (Article 7 of Regulation no 1638/2006). Moreover, together with the values of liberty, democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are the principles that may trigger „appropriate steps“ in respect of any assistance granted to the partner country within the framework of the ENPI when they are failed to be observed (Article 28 of Regulation no 1638/2006 in conj. with Article 1.3 of the same regulation). In 2014 the ENPI was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (Regulation No 232/2014) which also declared promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms as one of its objectives and priorities (Article 2.2 a) of Regulation No 232/2014; Paragraph 1 of Annex II of Regulation No 232/2014). Th e progress of partner countries shall be regularly assessed and support may be reconsidered by the EU in the event of serious or persistent regression (Article 4.2 of Regulation No 232/2014). In general, analogous to the ENPI, according to the rules of the ENI, in the event of threats to democracy, the rule of law or human rights and fundamental freedoms an ad hoc review of the programming documents The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 95 may be conducted (Article 7.10 of Regulation No 232/2014). However, in the ENI the provision on „appropriate steps“ in respect of any assistance granted to the partner country is missing. Exactly this fact is referred to in the Statement of the European Parliament annexed to the Regulation establishing the ENI. In particular, the European Parliament underlines that the regulation does not contain any explicit reference to the possibility of suspending assistance in cases where a benefi ciary country fails to observe the basic principles such as the principles of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Th e European Parliament considers any suspension of assistance under the ENI to modify the overall fi nancial scheme agreed under the ordinary legislative procedure. As a co-legislator and co-branch of the budgetary authority, the European Parliament is therefore entitled to fully exercise its prerogatives in that regard, if such a decision is to be taken. With this statement the European Parliament underlines its readiness to support possible decisions on suspending fi nancial assistance (European Parliament 2014). 4. Effectiveness and Consistency of Human Rights as a Part of Policy of Political Conditionality The main problem of human rights clause can be either non-existence of an eff ective mechanism of its implementation or non-use of the existing one. As for the human rights clauses used in EU–Georgia relations, no questions remain open concerning the content of these clauses. In particular, it is clear what is the meaning of human rights as there are given references to concrete international contractual frameworks and mechanisms existing in the fi eld of human rights protection. Furthermore, the fact, that protection of human rights is one of the essential elements of agreements, leaves no room for interpretation. Th e core question remaining open concerns eff ectiveness and consistency of application of human rights clauses. Th ese clauses are, by their nature, part of ex post conditionality. Respect for human rights by partner countries is not a condition to be fulfi lled in advance but a condition for application/implementation of the relevant agreement. Accordingly, in the event of failure to comply with this obligation the partner country has to expect negative consequences. Obviously, it is diffi cult to evaluate the impact of the EU on human rights protection in Georgia on the basis of objective criteria. However, it should be possible to identify the attitude of the EU towards the level of compliance with conditions regarding human rights protection as provided for in agreements concluded with 96 Gaga Gabrichidze Georgia. With this in mind, a look at the relation of a progress or a backward step in respect of human rights with the instruments off ered by the EU to Georgia with the aim of deepening bilateral relations can be taken. For the purpose of getting a general picture of the situation regarding human rights protection in Georgia, annual reports of the international non-profi t organisation “Freedom House” can be used. Whereas, the ratings of “Freedom House” are based on scores assigned to 25 indicators. Each country is assigned two numerical ratings – from 1 to 7 – for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. Th e average of ratings determines whether it is Free, Partly Free or Not Free. Since the 1992 reporting year Georgia is being rated as a “Partly Free” country4. Specifi cally, starting from 1996, the ratings of Georgia concerning state of political rights and civil liberties are as follows: Table 1: State of political rights and civil liberties in Georgia Report Political rights Civil liberties Result 1996/1997 4 4 Partly Free 1997/1998 3 4 Partly Free 1998/1999 3 4 Partly Free 1999/2000 3 4 Partly Free 2000/2001 4 4 Partly Free 2001/2002 4 4 Partly Free 2003 4 4 Partly Free 2004 4 4 Partly Free 2005 3 4 Partly Free 2006 3 3 Partly Free 2007 3 3 Partly Free 2008 4 4 Partly Free 2009 4 4 Partly Free 2010 4 4 Partly Free 2011 4 3 Partly Free 2012 4 3 Partly Free 2013 3 3 Partly Free 2014 3 3 Partly Free 2015 3 3 Partly Free Source: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VcB_psDtmko (accessed on 15 August 2017). 4 In 1991–1992 report covered the 1991 reporting year, Georgia was rated as Not Free. The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 97 If political conditionality would be eff ectively and consistently used from the side of the EU in relations with such countries as Georgia, in parallel with deepening and developing bilateral relations there should a progress in these countries regarding human rights protection. In the table, the year 1996 is taken as the starting year as in 1996 the EU–Georgia PCA was signed. Other important dates in this context are: the year 1999, when the PCA came into force; the year 2004, when the ENP started; the year 2009, when the Eastern Partnership Initiative started; the year 2010 – beginning of negotiations on conclusion of an association agreement between Georgia and the EU; the years 2013–2015 – initialling, signing and entering into force of the EU– Georgia Association Agreement. As the table shows, Georgia’s rating remained more or less stable during the period under consideration at a level of the average or below the average. Only in 2005-2006 (provided in the 2006 and 2007 annual reports) and 2012–2014 (provided in the 2013, 2014 and 2015 annual reports, respectively) state of both, political rights as well as civil liberties, was rated at the level of the average. If we compare the dynamics of deepening the EU–Georgia relations with the situation in Georgia regarding protection for human rights, we can see that the latter lags behind. Th is indicates that human rights clause plays a less important role in practice than it would be expected by an “essential element” of the agreements concluded by the EU. Of course, the “Freedom House” reports cannot be considered a determining factor of the EU external policy. However, annual progress reports concerning the implementation of the ENP in Georgia prepared by the Commission also refer to problems with human rights5. Nevertheless, the EU uses political dialogue as the primary mechanism to address these diffi culties. Th erefore, in general, eff ectiveness and consistency of human rights conditionality can be called into question. Th ere are several reasons for this. First, it was not conducive to fulfi lment of this condition that the EU was off ering to deepen relations with the Eastern Partnership countries without a diff erentiated approach. For example, it was off ering conclusion of association agreements to countries with diff erent state of human rights protection. As of now it seems that the EU, with the revised ENP, takes a more diff erentiated approach (Joint Communication 2015). However, it is not to be ignored that sometimes economic and political interests and not human rights are in the foreground while developing relations with a partner 5 ENP Country Progress Reports for Georgia can be found on the following website (accessed on 13 August 2017): http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/political_relations/ political_framework/enp_georgia_news/index_en.htm 98 Gaga Gabrichidze country (Ghazaryan 2014, 172). It is obvious that this aff ects the eff ectiveness of the instrument of political conditionality. Second, the absence of a clear EU membership perspective in the Association Agreement can also aff ect motivation of the partner country. Nevertheless, it should be also noted here that the absence of a rigid approach to human rights conditionality can be reasonable to some extent. Deepening of cooperation with a partner country through dynamic integration will more likely make this country more obliging in respect of human rights protection in the future. It cannot be denied that strict application of human rights clause can interfere with bilateral cooperation in other important areas. Besides, it is questionable how eff ective consistent and strict political conditionality would be in respect of human rights protection. Conclusions Considered as the main instrument for supporting human rights protection in partner countries, human rights clause is an integral part of legal frameworks of cooperation between the EU and third countries, including Georgia. Moreover, it is an essential element of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement and thus, a formal condition for its application/implementation. But in fact, human rights clause as a part of political conditionality does not have strict and concrete mechanisms which would ensure its eff ectiveness and go beyond the scope of consultations and political dialogue within the Association Council. In practice, the use of the suspension mechanism by the EU can be expected only in dramatic cases of human rights violations. If we take a perspective of political sciences, in the end, impact of the EU policies on the domestic policy of partner countries can be explained with external incentives model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 7), according to which the level of compliance with requirements set by the EU is directly connected to the cost- benefi t calculations by the partner country: the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, the level of adoption costs, etc (Schimmelfennig 2005, 3). Considering the practice of the EU related to the use of human rights clause there are also reasons to assume that on the side of the EU the cost-benefi t calculation also can play important role in handling human rights clause. The Instrument of Human Rights Clause as a Part of Conditionality European Union... 99 References Books and Articles Cremona, Marise. 2011. “Values in EU Foreign Policy”, in: Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.), Beyond the Established Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing: 275–315. Fiero, Elena. 2003. European Union‘s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff . Gabrichidze, Gaga. 2011. „Human Rights Clause in EU Trade Agreements“. In International Standards of the Protection of Human Rights and Georgia, Tbilisi: 47–57. Ghazaryan, Nariné. 2014. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU, Oxford: Hart publishing. Hammarberg, Th omas. 2013. Georgia in Transition – Report on the human rights dimension: background, steps taken and remaining challenges. Assessment and recommendations. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005. Th e International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis, CES Working Paper, Harvard University: Center for European Studies. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2005. Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, in: Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich (eds.): Th e Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1–28. European Union Law Council Regulation (EURATOM, EEC) No 2053/93 of 19 July 1993 concerning the provision of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia, 29. 7. 93, Offi cial Journal of the European Communities No L 187/1. Annex 2, Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries. COM (95) 216 fi nal, 23 May 1995. 100 Gaga Gabrichidze Council Regulation (EURATOM, EC) No 1279/96 of 25 June 1996 concerning the provision of assistance to economic reform and recovery in the New Independent States and Mongolia, 4.7. 96, Offi cial Journal of the European Communities No L 165/ 1. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Communities and their Member States, on the one part, and Georgia, on the other part. Offi cial Journal of the European Communities 1999, L 205. Council Regulation (EURATOM, EC) No 99/2000 of 29 December 1999 concerning the provision of assistance to the partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 18. 1. 2000, Offi cial Journal of the European Communities L 12/1. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours“. COM (2003) 104 fi nal. Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the Commission. European neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 fi nal, Brussels, 12 May 2004. EU–Georgia Action Plan, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/georgia_enp_ap_fi nal_en.pdf (Accessed on 15 August 2017). Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 9.11.2006, Offi cial Journal of the European Union L 310/1. Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit“, Prague, 7 May 2009, Brussels, 7 May 2009 8435/09 (Presse 78). Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, Offi cial Journal of the European Union 2014, L 261 EU–Georgia Association Agenda, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/associationagenda_2014_ en.pdf (Accessed on 15 August 2017). Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument .15.3.2014 EN Offi cial Journal of the European Union L 77/27. Statement by the European Parliament on the suspension of assistance granted under the fi nancial instruments. 15.3.2014, Offi cial Journal of the European Union L 77/27. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN(2015) 50 fi nal. The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA PATRYCJA BYTNER* Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 Abstract The debt crisis in the European Union has shown that the mistakes made during the creation of Economic and Monetary Union have contributed to the emergence of a crisis and have made it more difficult to help the states that are affected by it. The article compares the shape of the Economic and Monetary Union with the concept of monetary integration presented in 1970 by Pierre Werner, which assumed coordination at the level of the European Union fiscal and monetary policy. The text attempts to answer the question whether the application of solutions adopted by Pierre Werner would help avoid a debt crisis in the European Union.Key words: Economic Partnership Agreement, ECOWAS, European Union, primary commodities, product diversification. Key words: debt crisis; Pierre Werner; Eurozone; economic connections; monetary policy Introduction Th e problem of excessive government debt is one of the biggest problems in the world economy. Although it is now largely related to the 2007+ fi nancial crisis, this phenomenon is not new, because the fi rst time that it has severely disrupted the global fi nancial system was in 1980’s. Th en, aft er a series of oil crises, the debt crisis hit Latin * Warsaw School of Economics, [email protected] 102 Patrycja Bytner American countries had a negative infl uence on the economic development of the region. Th en, the eff ects of the crisis were felt not only in the countries which were hit by the crisis. At present, the euro area debt crisis is one of the most pressing problems that the European Union is facing. Th e strong economic connections between countries in the zone have caused the problems of several countries to shift the functioning of the whole community, not only at the economic but also at the political level. Th e essence of the crisis is that the excessive indebtedness of some European Union states (especially Greece) has undermined the stability of the remaining and functioning economies of the Member States. Th e global crisis of 2007–2009, which had negative eff ects on the functioning of the global capital markets, was one of the most important causes of escalation of the crisis in the European Union (see more: Narodowy Bank Polski 2009). At that time, although the value of the euro was not weakening, the level of excessive indebtedness of individual states infl uenced their creditworthiness. Th is situation has started to become a threat to the rest of the community. Infl ation increased and poorer Eurozone economies had problems with their competitiveness (see more: Narodowy Bank Polski 2010). Th e debt crisis of the European Union has shown the weaknesses of the Economic and Monetary Union. Attempting to step out of the crisis and helping the Member States was at the same time an attempt to reform the Eurozone. When European Union was looking for solutions to the problems of the community, steps were made to deepen the integration and unifi cation of those sectors which were not included in the Treaty From Maastricht1. One of the ways to solve problems, was the resumption to the Werner Plan which was presented in the 1970s. Th is report suggested that the implementation of the common monetary policy could be eff ective only in the pursuit of sound fi scal policy (Werner 1970, 17). By analyzing the causes of the current crisis in the Eurozone, the statement proposed by Pierre Werner has again become more relevant. Th e article attempts to answer the question of the optimal shape of the Economic and Monetary Union, which would help avoid debt crises. Th e currently functioning model of the EMU was compiled with the EMU proposal designed by Pierre Werner 1970. Next, the main theses of the Werner Plan and EMU design fl aws aft er the Treaty of Maastricht will be presented. Th en, both solutions will be analyzed in the context of their effi ciency and sovereignty of fi scal policy in the Member States. Finally, the issue of the eff ectiveness of EU crisis management and the fi ght against the eff ects 1 Th e Treaty on European Union (TEU), Dz.U. C 191 z 29.7.1992 Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ... 103 of the debt crisis will be discussed, with particular emphasis on the analysis of the mechanisms in EMU. Th e starting point for this article was the critical analysis of publications on the debt crisis in the European Union (both domestic and foreign authors). In addition, an analysis was made of the most important legal acts that directly or indirectly aff ected the evolution of the crisis and the functioning of the EMU, as well as the reports of transnational institutions examining the macroeconomic situation in Europe. Th en the results of the analysis of previous legal acts and the current ones were synthesized in order to obtain a holistic view of EMU management and to attempt to evaluate what would be the optimal structure of EMU. 1. The Main Thesis of Pierre Werner’s Plan Pierre Werner was the Prime Minister of Luxembourg in 1959–1974 and 1979–1984. During his political career he was actively involved in establishing the foundations for the functioning of the European Economic Communities. One of his most important contributions was the preparation of a plan for the creation of the European Monetary Union in 1970, which was called Werner’s Plan. Th e plan assumed the creation of an economic and monetary union in three stages realized in ten years. Th e implementation of Werner’s assumptions was interrupted by the oil crisis, which caused a collapse of “the snake in the tunnel mechanism” (similar to the current Exchange Rate Mechanism – ERM2). Th e integration planned by Werner was stopped at the fi rst stage of his plan. Twenty years later, the Euro currency introduction plan written by Deloros (in the “Report on economic and monetary union on the European Community”) largely benefi ted from Werner’s accomplishments. Despite this, it was diff erent in several key aspects. Th ese diff erences have proven to have signifi cant implications for the further functioning of the European Union. Th e main assumption proposed by Pierre Werner was that the coordination of monetary policy at European Union level would be eff ective only if the rational budgetary policy was pursued. Th e strategy on how to closely coordinate these two policies was to hand over country competences in this area to the EU institutions. 2 Th e Exchange Rate Mechanism was introduced in 1979 under the European Monetary System (EMS). Member States agreed to keep the rates of individual currencies within a specifi ed range expressed in ECUs within +/- 2.25% of the agreed parity rate. 104 Patrycja Bytner According to the assumptions, the proposed system of the central banking was modeled on the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Th is institution was responsible for the monetary policy. It was also the second most important institution designated as the “center of economic policy decisions”. In the Werner’s Plan it was responsible for the development of a broad budgetary policy and making macroeconomic decisions. Th is institution was accountable to the European Parliament (Nowak-Far 2001, 21) and was supposed to be able to infl uence the budgets of the Member States, particularly with regard to the defi cit problem, sources of funding and the use of possible budget surpluses. Th e assumptions adopted by the Werner commission also assumed the harmonization of tax systems and the transfer of monetary policy to the level of the Community. Th is proposal required greater integration than the integration within the single market. It was associated with a signifi cant limitation of the sovereignty of states in economic decisions, which, in the face of the oil crisis and related problems in the foreign exchange markets, were met with social resistance in the countries of the European Communities. 2. Disadvantages of the Economic and Monetary Union after the Treaty of Maastricht Foundations of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the plan to introduce a common currency with the criteria of convergence have been included in the Maastricht Treaty. When the foundations of the EMU were being created, for the above-mentioned political reasons, they departed from Pierre Werner’s assumptions on shaping the budgetary policy shaping. Th e European Central Bank (EBC) was created in diff erent institutional and functional shape from Werner’s Plan (see more: Fedorowicz 2010, 139−156). EBC was the institution responsible for monetary policy of the EU. Due to political disputes the plan to construct an independent fi scal policy coordination institution was completely ignored. Th is was the issue that undermined the functioning of the EU, contributing not only to the current Eurozone debt crisis, but also to the negative implications for Member States’ fi scal policies. Th e primacy of politics over previously adopted economic assumptions was observed not only in establishing the legal basis for the EMU, but also in shaping the foundations of the Eurozone. While observing the process of selection of countries able to participate in economic integration, it is impossible to resist the impression that they are largely driven by political arguments rather than economic ones. It was Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ... 105 already visible in 1997 when the shape of the euro area was decided upon. Although only two from eleven candidates fulfi lled the criterion of budgetary convergence (and six out of nine debt-to-GDP ratios showed an upward trend), it was decided in May 1998 that all the candidate countries would begin to integrate at the same time (Szołucha 2012, 96). Th e problem has also been the enforcement of the convergence criteria, specifi cally the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, already in the near future, since the euro zone began to operate. Th e imposition of sanctions was strongly correlated with decisions of a strictly political nature, as refl ected in the decision of the ECOFIN Council taken in 2003 to refrain from taking additional measures against Germany and France under the excessive defi cit procedure (Panfi l 2011, 162-164). Th is provision was repealed by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Th is situation clearly demonstrated the dependence of the sanctioning process on politics (Jędrzejowicz, Kitala, Wronka 2013). According to estimates, the convergence criteria were broken 60 times by the euro area countries between 2002 and 2011 and the European Commission’s activities were limited to the so-called formal early warnings “blue letters” to governments (Cziomer 2012, 11). In addition, it is important to mention the real problems of EU institutions in the control of countries, not only in terms of the convergence criteria, but also in the quality of the data they report on budgetary expenditures and the real economic situation in these countries. A good example is the situation in Greece, which at the time of the Eurozone entry was painted incorrectly due to falsifi ed data sent to Eurostat, and untrusted information passed on to the EU institutions until the onset of the crisis in that country (see more: Wyżnikiewicz2015, 105-113). It should also be noted that EU Member States have strengthened the process of economic integration while political integration was avoided. Th ere was integration only in some random areas (Cziomer 2012, 11). Th is rhetoric was confi rmed during the preparation and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty3 and was yet another cause of the escalation of the eff ects of excessive debt. 3 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Dz.U. C 306 z 17.12.2007. 106 Patrycja Bytner 3. Dilemma of Sovereignty and the Shape of Fiscal Policy Comparing the observed way of coordinating the fi scal policies of member states and taking into account the indispensable impact of policy on economic decision- making, Werner’s message to create a self-contained institution that could infl uence the budgets of the Member States and at the same time control and coordinate budget policies to avoid fi nancial crises seems well thought through. Th e discipline of fi scal and budgetary policy determines the eff ectiveness of monetary policy, which is particularly important at the time that emerging economies attempt to get out from the crisis (Gasz 2013, 64). Th e increase in debt causes increasing government bond yields, increasing debt servicing costs and calls for new sources of defi cit fi nancing. Th e fi scal and budgetary policy of the euro area until the onset of the crisis was shaped ad hoc, in a chaotic and inconsistent manner. Th e crisis has shown that the targeting of fi scal monitoring on the nominal and structural balance of the public fi nance sector has proven insuffi cient to ensure macroeconomic security of the euro area (Gasz 2013, 67). Th ere was a lack of institutions equipped with the tools to allow for fair scrutiny of the members of the Union, but also a lack in the tools and incentives to mobilize member states to save in times of prosperity. At the same time, the convergence criteria began to be questioned, particularly in peripheral countries, where they are viewed by some researchers as one of the causes of the crisis. Establishing the solutions described above would require States to completely renounce sovereign public fi nance policy. While observing a package of anti-crisis measures taken within the Community, it is impossible to resist the impression that members are seeking deeper economic integration, but the renunciation of such an important instrument by the states can be a long-term process or even impossible in the current political situation (see more: Kubin 2007, 149−198). Werner, in his assumption of the Economic and Monetary Union, called for a higher level of Community budget, transnational development of medium-term objectives and short-term economic policy. He was also keen on tax harmonization, because in his way of thinking diff erences in this fi eld aff ect the movement of goods, services and capital in the Community. It is currently limited to turnover taxes, excise duties and other indirect taxes, and can only be implemented to the extent that is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, for example by setting minimum Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ... 107 limits on VAT rates (TEU art 93). Due to the subsidiarity principle, the process of tax harmonization was therefore limited to the necessary minimum, creating a situation in which decisions made by individual states could aff ect other members of the Economic and Monetary Union4. Despite the criticism of such a solution, which is one of the obstacles to complete integration and even mutual competition among euro area members, the state still does not want to waive the privilege of shaping its own tax policy (especially in the case of direct taxes). However, it is not a surprise that individual countries are apprehensive of one of the most important tools for shaping their economic policy, especially given the diversity of economies of the euro area member countries (see more: Szeląg 2003). However, that the problem of Community fi scal policy undoubtedly was connected to the lack of real convergence of economies in the euro area. In combination with the renunciation of autonomous monetary policy and diff erent challenges facing individual countries, this phenomenon would hinder the eff ective management of the euro area. Th ese issues have not been noticed, either in the Werner Report or in the Maastricht Treaty, where the infl ation target has allowed peripheral countries to relatively quickly pass nominal criteria and develop economic growth (TEU Art. 141 par. 1). Th e illusion of real convergence has been broken by a crisis that has shown some that countries’ appearance of economic growth, in fact hid mismatched business cycles and non-synchronized economies. As a result, the problem of the so-called one size fi ts all came into light, that is, the mismatch of euroland interest rates to the economic situation of individual states or the general macroeconomic dispersion (Gotz 2012, 73). Consequently, the future shake-up only in one of the countries of EMU may also be a problem for countries in good economic conditions. On the other hand, with the current method of fi scal policy coordination, it is impossible to fi nd another solution and a reliable control measure; one that would make it possible, for example, to create, at the time of integration, an aforementioned institution responsible for fi scal policy, which would operate in parallel to the ECB. In the case of pursuing a common fi scal policy throughout the euro area, the issue identifi ed by Philipp Bagus as a “Tragedy of the commons” should also be mentioned. It could be observed by analyzing Greece’s behavior. Th rough its excessive credit expansion and populist government policies, it has contributed signifi cantly to the 4 Tax harmonization issues were also addressed in the context of the signing of the Euro Plus Pact in 2011. For the Europa Plus Pact see: More: Conclusions of the European Council 24-25 March 2011, online, access: 10.11.2016 (http:/www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/presdata/PL/ ec/120311.pdf.) 108 Patrycja Bytner problems not only in the euro area(see more: Bagus 2011, 80–94). Th e temptation “to stow away” by some members of the Economic and Monetary Union was also not taken into account by the Werner Report, and now, paradoxically, it has been strengthened by crisis-led instruments such as a fi xed rate loan, TARGET2 settlement system, Emergency Liquidity Assistance, which can promote over-exploitation of the common goods (Gotz 2012, 73). In addition, the temptation to abuse is enhanced by the way the EU operates. Th e situation of misuse of rules and fractures of the basic assumptions of budgetary policy was noted at a time when it was no longer possible to punish the state, but it required support as was the case with the Greek debt crisis. Th is phenomenon is the voice of diff erent political cultures in EU member states and diff erent decision-making mechanisms. A striking example is the extreme approach to budget spending in Greece and Germany, where populist politics contrasts with budget pragmatism. 4. The Struggle with the Consequences of Excessive Debt and Crisis Management During the fi ght against the eff ects of the fi nancial crisis, the eyes of the observers were turned towards the European Central Bank, which also did not deal with criticism. As previously mentioned, Werner’s plan advised to create a central banking system based on the American model. However, the solution was selected without giving ECB the central feature of the central bank functions, this of the last-instance lender. It was also forbidden to buy Member State bonds on primary markets (TEU art. 104). Such decisions made the ECB have limited capacity at the time of the crisis, and in the initial phase, engaging in repo operations (which were pledged), contributed further to deepening defi cits in countries struggling fi nancially. In addition, it is questionable to set infl ation targeting as the main area of ECB activity, as it could lead to overheating of economies and the creation of artifi cial booms – such as in Ireland and Iceland (see more: Czernicki 2012). Introduction of the Werner Report’s assumptions at the time of the ECB’s establishment would create greater opportunities and better ways to deal with the crisis. Th e independence of this institution, whose weakness has been brutally exposed in the fi nancial crisis, is also of great importance. Th e ECB had to reduce the credibility of repo securities under political pressure as a result of the fi rst rescue eff orts for Greek public fi nances. In 2012, the European Central Bank launched the Outright Monetary Transaction Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ... 109 (OMT) program, which was a contradiction of the ECB’s assumptions, which could not directly fi nance defi cits in the Member States (Gasz 2012, 67). Th e establishment in 2011 of the so-called European semester5, an annual cycle of economic policy coordination, seems important for fi scal harmonization. It is a solution aimed at ensuring sound public fi nances and preventing excessive disruption of macroeconomic imbalances which was introduced when a spillover problem was identifi ed at Community level. In the same year, a package of directives called a six-pack6, and a year later, a very controversial Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Management in the Economic and Monetary Union (Compact) were signed. In addition to strengthening the mechanism of penalizing the member states for failing to comply with budgetary discipline (Fiscal Pakt art 7 and 8), the provisions of the agreement oblige the state to inform about the plans for issuing public debt (Fiscal Compact art 6). Th is was done too late, as perhaps owing to such co-ordination and control if it were to be introduced from the very beginning of the existence of the euro area, problems with the real threat of Member States’ default and the repercussions that the whole community had could be avoided. Th e issue of controlling and closer coordination of economic policies was also touched upon by Werner, who called for a periodic review of each of the countries in the community, in order to avoid diff erentiation of economic policies and, consequently, their lack of coherence over a longer period of time. Th e crisis has also highlighted the lack of crisis management framework and the lack of anticipation of negative consequences of economic shocks in the European Union. It was only as a result of the existing problems that aid mechanisms were established for the Member States (eg the European Stability Mechanism) or the lack of supervisory bodies such as the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, European Systemic Risk Board was addressed. Th e European Stability Mechanism was established in September 2012. Its role is to mobilize funding 5 Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. 6 In the six-pack are: Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the eff ective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances and Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive defi cit procedure. 110 Patrycja Bytner and provide fi nancial assistance to the euro area Member States with serious fi nancial problems that may undermine the fi nancial stability of the euro group as a whole. Th e ESM assumes two types of state aid. Th e fi rst is a preventive credit line, which has no implications on the benefi ciary’s economic policy. Th e second source of aid is loans, which are subject to macroeconomic adjustments. In addition to state aid, ESM also received the option to purchase bonds in the primary or secondary market and to provide fi nancing to fi nancial institutions (Luc 2011, 145–167). Th e actions described above may help avoid future problems or at least help identify them earlier. Th e negligence in integration process relating to such an important part, for example, to the banking union and the no-bail-out clause prohibiting the possibility of providing assistance to a country in fi nancial trouble7 is undoubtedly one of the causes of the crisis in the European Union. Th ese problems were not foreseen by the legal basis of the Economic and Monetary Union but were also not addressed in the Werner report. Th e assumption of the self-suffi ciency of states in the event of a crisis was undoubtedly a mistake and was contrary to the goal of economic integration. By creating a single market, with the single currency and monetary policy, only a optimistic vision of the future was pursued, without exploring any problems that could arise in the future. Conclusions Looking at the solutions chosen by the Economic and Monetary Union and the Werner report, it can be said that the concept created by the Luxembourg Prime Minister, in spite of a few shortcomings, was closer to realizing the basic conditions of an optimal currency area than the rules under which the current euro area functions. Looking at the causes of the crisis and its course, it could be argued that the Economic and Monetary Union, resembling that proposed in 1970, though much more diffi cult and taking longer to create, and requiring many political concessions, could be more resilient to internal abuse by individual members of the community. One of the causes of the debt crisis (even taking into account the failure to consider the elements of crisis management and the divergence of economies) is the artifi cial separation of monetary policy from fi scal and de facto management at diff erent levels, 7 Art. 125 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Debt Crisis in the Eurozone Against Legal Systems Proposed by Pierre Werner in 1970 ... 111 which caused the accumulation of many of the aforementioned problems. With the announcement by Greece of troubled debt repayments, they joined the domino eff ect, causing the fi rst and at the same time, an extremely severe crisis in the euro area. Observing the EU’s eff orts to fi nd ways out of trouble, it is impossible to resist the impression that it is slowly beginning to move towards Werner’s suggestions. In order to eff ectively coordinate the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union, however, there is a need for a simultaneous political agreement, which is extremely diffi cult to accomplish, especially in the current political situation. References Th e Treaty on European Union (TEU), Dz.U. C 191 z 29.7.1992. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Dz.U. C 306 z 17.12.2007. Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union 1989, Report on economic and monatary union on the European Community, Presented April, 17, 1989, Brussel Bagus, Philip. 2011. Tragedia euro, Warszawa, Instytut Ludwiga von Misesa. Branna, Justyna, Wąsowicz, Regina. 2013. Semestr europejski. Przewodnik po kluczowych dokumentach, Warszawa: Ośrodek Informacji i Dokumentacji Europejskiej. Czernicki, Łukasz. 2012, „Euro(pa) w kryzysie. Scenariusze rozwoju sytuacji, propozycje zmian w funkcjonowaniu Unii Gospodarczo-Walutowej, alternatywa dla członkostwa w strefi e euro”. In Europejski ład gospodarczy w 2020 roku, ed. J. Staniłko, Warszawa: Instytut Sobieskiego. Cziomier, Edward. 2012. „Polityczno-prawne aspekty kryzysu zadłużenia strefy euro Unii Europejskiej”, Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Vol. XIX, 1: 7–26. Fedorowicz, Magdalena. 2010. „Kompetencja prawotwórcza Europejskiego Banku Centralnego”, Studia Europejskie, No 4: 139–156. Gasz, Małgorzata. 2013. „Mechanizmy przeciwdziałania kryzysowi zadłużenia w strefi e euro”, Nierówności społeczne a wzrost gospodarczy, No 30: 62–70. Gotz, Marta, 2012, Kryzys i przyszłość strefy euro, Warszawa, Difi n. Hnatyszyn-Dzikowska Anna. 2009. Realizacja stabilizacyjnej funkcji państwa w warunkach europejskiej integracji gospodarczej, Piła, Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Pile Jędrzejowicz, Tomasz, Kitala, Marcin, Wronka, Anna., Polityka fi skalna w kraju należącym do strefy euro. Wnioski dla Polski, on-line, 20.05.2017, http://www.nbp.pl/badania/ seminaria_bise/jedrzejowiczO.pdf. 112 Patrycja Bytner Kamiński, Tomasz. 2013. „Wpływ kryzysu gospodarczego w Europie na politykę zewnętrzną Unii Europejskiej”, Zeszyty Natolińskie, nr 52, Warszawa. Kubin, Tomasz. 2007. Polityczne implikacje wprowadzenia unii walutowej w Europie, Katowice: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. Luc, Sylwia. 2011. „Koordynacja polityki w Unii Europejskiej w obliczu kryzysu ekonomicznego”, Prace i Materiały Instytutu Rozwoju Gospodarczego SGH, nr 85: 145–167, Instytut Rozwoju Gospodarczego Szkoły Głownej Handlowej Narodowy Bank Polski 2009. Polska wobec światowego kryzysu gospodarczego, Warszawa, Narodowy Bank Polski Narodowy Bank Polski 2010. Przegląd strefy euro IV, Warszawa: Narodowy Bank Polski Machelski, Tomasz. 2013. „Rola Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w ramach instytucjonalnych uwarunkowań stabilności fi nansowej Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej”, Studia BAS, nr 3(31). Mucha-Leszko, Bogumiła. 2007. Strefa euro. Wprowadzenie, funkcjonowanie, międzynarodowa rola euro, Lublin: Wyd. UMCS. Nowak-Far, Artur. 2001. Unia Gospodarczo-Walutowa, Warszawa: Centrum Europejskie Natolin Panfi l, Przemysław. 2011. Prawne i fi nansowe uwarunkowania długu skarbu państwa, Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer. Report to the Council and the Commission on the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community – “Werner Report” (defi nitive text). “Supplement to Bulletin 1970, No 11 of the European Communities”. Szeląg, Konrad. 2003. „Jednolita polityka budżetowa w strefi e euro – realna wizja, czy utopia?”, Bank i Kredyt, nr 11–12. Szołucha Marian. 2012. Finanse publiczne w strefi e euro w latach 1999–2009. Wnioski dla Polski, Warszawa: Europejskie Centrum Analiz Gospodarczych. The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA RUDOLF MICHAŁKIEWICZ* MAGDALENA PROCZEK** Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej Abstrakt Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przedstawienie najważniejszych założeń polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, a także ukazanie związku tej polityki z postanowieniami dotyczącymi nadużywania pozycji dominującej z perspektywy ekonomicznej oraz prawnej. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w oparciu o literaturę przedmiotu, publikacje instytucji Unii Europejskiej, a także bezpośrednią analizę postanowień Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej. W opracowaniu omówiono istotę polityki konkurencji wraz z jej traktatowymi założeniami oraz wskazaniem ekonomicznych celów postanowień Unii Europejskiej w zakresie polityki konkurencji, a także scharakteryzowano stosowane praktyki antykonkurencyjne w postaci nadużywania pozycji dominującej przez przedsiębiorców i ich potencjalny wpływ na handel między państwami członkowskimi. Opracowanie wieńczy próba oceny polityki konkurencji UE, w której zostały wskazane obszary, które wymagają dalszej nowelizacji. Opracowanie ma charakter opisowo-problemowy. Słowa kluczowe: polityka konkurencji; ochrona antymonopolowa; Unia Europejska; pozycja dominująca. * Ernst & Young, [email protected] ** Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, [email protected] 114 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek Wprowadzenie Niniejsze opracowanie ma na celu przedstawienie najważniejszych założeń polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, a także ukazanie związku tej polityki z postanowieniami dotyczącymi nadużywania pozycji dominującej przez przedsiębiorców. Zestawie- nie tych dwóch zagadnień zostało dokonane na podstawie bezpośredniej analizy postanowień Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej (TFUE) oraz pozostałych aktów prawnych związanych z tą problematyką. Pozycje zwarte, wykorzystane w tym badaniu, to w przeważającej większości prace polskich autorów, stanowiące ciągle relatywnie niewielki dorobek w tych obszarach, które postanowiono w ni- niejszym opracowaniu wyeksponować. Odwołano się również do badań instytucji publicznych – zarówno krajowych, jak i Unii Europejskiej. Praca ma charakter opisowo-problemowy. W postępowaniu badawczym wykorzystano metodę badań niereaktywnych, analizę krytyczną treści i syntezę. 1. Istota polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej Polityka konkurencji stanowi bardzo istotną część działalności Unii Europejskiej. Początków tej polityki należy upatrywać w okresie przyjęcia traktatów rzymskich w 1957 r., będących podstawą systemu, którego celem była ochrona przed destabilizacją konkurencji na wspólnotowym rynku. W swym założeniu „miał on umożliwić stworzenie dopracowanych, skutecznych przepisów, które zapewnią właściwe funkcjonowanie europejskiego rynku, a konsumentom pozwolą czerpać korzyści z systemu wolnorynkowego” (Komisja Europejska, 3). Podstawą prawną dla polityki konkurencji UE są artykuły zawarte w Tytule VII Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej zatytułowanym – „Wspólne reguły w dziedzinie konkurencji, podatków i zbliżenia ustawodawstw”, w szczególności art. 101 do 109 TFUE. Chcąc zobrazować czym jest polityka konkurencji, można by ograniczyć się do stwierdzenia, że polityka konkurencji to działania polegające na stosowaniu norm prawnych, które stanowią gwarancję tego, że poszczególni przedsiębiorcy będą uczciwie ze sobą rywalizować (na zasadach konkurencyjnych). Taki stan rzeczy w założeniu doprowadzić ma do poprawy wielu parametrów ekonomicznych, Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej 115 ostatecznie mających bezpośredni wpływ na całą gospodarkę, jak potencjał przedsiębiorstw oraz przedsiębiorczości, wachlarz produktów oferowanych konsumentom, jakość nabywanych dóbr i usług. Odwrotny efekt, w związku ze stosowaniem polityki konkurencji, można zaobserwować natomiast względem cen nabywanych dóbr i usług, które maleją w ramach poprawnie działającej konkurencji. Mając powyższe na uwadze, Unia Europejska obrała sobie za cel przeciwstawienie się antykonkurencyjnym praktykom przedsiębiorców. W ramach tych działań, Komisja Europejska wykrywa praktyki ograniczające konkurencję i nakazuje ich zaniechania, a także zajmuje się kontrolą koncentracji przedsiębiorstw w poszczególnych branżach, kwestią pomocy publicznej udzielanej przez państwa członkowskie oraz zajmuje się rozwojem koncepcji liberalizacji rynków Komisja Europejska wraz z organami antymonopolowymi państw członkowskich, ma obowiązek zapobiegać antykonkurencyjnym działaniom podejmowanym przez przedsiębiorstwa, a także zwalczać te praktyki. Zadania te, Komisja Europejska wraz z organami antymonopolowymi państw członkowskich wykonuje w ramach polityki konkurencji UE (Komisja Europejska, op. cit.). Polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej stanowi zatem podstawowy element rynku wewnętrznego, którego głównym zadaniem jest dostarczenie konsumentom na terytorium UE lepszej jakości dóbr i usług przy zachowaniu niskich cen. Główne działania, na których oparta jest unijna polityka konkurencji, to: • zwalczanie porozumień naruszających konkurencję; • zapobieganie praktykom polegającym na nadużywaniu przez przedsiębiorstwa pozycji dominującej na wskazanym rynku (na rynku wewnętrznym lub znacznej jego części); • nadzorowanie proponowanych połączeń przedsiębiorstw; • nadzorowanie pomocy państwa dla przedsiębiorstw, gdyż może ona prowadzić do zachwiania konkurencji. Określone w art. 101 TFUE antykonkurencyjne porozumienia przedsiębiorstw (kartele) polegają w szczególności na: • ustalaniu w sposób bezpośredni lub pośredni cen zakupu lub sprzedaży albo innych warunków transakcji; • ograniczaniu lub kontrolowaniu produkcji, rynków, rozwoju technicznego lub inwestycji; • podziale rynków lub źródeł zaopatrzenia; • stosowaniu wobec partnerów handlowych nierównych warunków do świadczeń równoważnych i stwarzaniu im przez to niekorzystnych warunków konkurencji; lub 116 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek • uzależnianiu zawarcia kontraktów od przyjęcia przez partnerów zobowiązań dodatkowych, które ze względu na swój charakter lub zwyczaje handlowe nie mają związku z przedmiotem tych kontraktów. Jednakże nie należy zapominać, że powyższe działania nie muszą stanowić antykonkurencyjnych praktyk, ponieważ porozumienia te mogą przyczyniać się „do polepszenia produkcji lub dystrybucji produktów bądź do popierania postępu technicznego lub gospodarczego, przy zastrzeżeniu dla użytkowników słusznej części zysku, który z tego wynika” (art. 101 ust. 3 TFUE). Artykuł 102 TFUE określa praktyki, które ustawodawstwo unijne uznaje za nadużywanie pozycji dominującej. Według powyższego artykułu, „niezgodne z rynkiem wewnętrznym i zakazane jest nadużywanie przez jedno lub większą liczbę przedsiębiorstw pozycji dominującej na rynku wewnętrznym lub na znacznej jego części, w zakresie, w jakim może wpływać na handel między państwami członkowskimi”. Wskazany powyżej artykuł zawiera również katalog przykładowych zachowań, które mogą świadczyć o tym, że przedsiębiorca nadużywa pozycji dominującej. Zachowania te polegają w szczególności na: • „narzucaniu w sposób bezpośredni lub pośredni niesłusznych cen zakupu lub sprzedaży albo innych niesłusznych warunków transakcji; • ograniczaniu produkcji rynków lub rozwoju technicznego ze szkodą dla konsumentów; • stosowaniu wobec partnerów handlowych nierównych warunków do świadczeń równoważnych i stwarzaniu im przez to niekorzystnych warunków konkurencji; • uzależnianiu zawarcia kontraktów od przyjęcia przez partnerów zobowiązań dodatkowych, które ze względu na swój charakter lub zwyczaje handlowe nie mają związku z przedmiotem tych kontraktów”. Jak zauważa doktryna oraz orzecznictwo, wskazana powyżej defi nicja nie jest wystarczająca, by jasno określić, które przedsiębiorstwa dopuszczają się zachowań antykonkurencyjnych, związanych z nadużywaniem pozycji dominującej. Zgodnie z wypracowanym poglądem nauki prawa konkurencji UE, pozycja dominująca przedsiębiorstwa jest to „pozycja ekonomicznej (rynkowej) siły przedsiębiorstwa, która umożliwia mu zapobieganie skutecznej konkurencji na rynku właściwym, przez możliwość przejawiania zachowań w znacznym stopniu niezależnych od innych konkurentów, klientów, a w końcu także od konsumentów” (Szydło 2010, 82–83). Co warte podkreślenia, regulacje UE w zakresie ochrony konkurencji, nie zakazują przedsiębiorcom posiadania na wskazanych rynkach pozycji dominującej. Zgodnie z wypracowanym stanowiskiem Komisji Europejskiej (Komunikat Komisji Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej 117 z dnia 24 lutego 2009 r. w sprawie priorytetów, którymi Komisja będzie się kierować przy stosowaniu art. 82 Traktatu WE w odniesieniu do szkodliwych działań o charakterze praktyk wyłączających, podejmowanych przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące, Dz. Urz. UE z 2009 r., C 45/7), prawo Unii Europejskiej nie zabrania żadnemu przedsiębiorstwu posiadania pozycji dominującej, o ile pozycja ta nie jest utrzymywana za sprawą działania niezgodnego z prawem konkurencji. Podkreślenia wymaga jednak fakt, że szczególną rolą przedsiębiorstwa zajmującego pozycję dominującą, jest stanie na straży, aby żadne inny przedsiębiorstwo lub uczestnik rynku, ze względu na zawinione działania dominującego przedsiębiorstwa – nie mógł ponieść szkody w związku z ograniczeniem konkurencji na danym rynku. Na mocy rozporządzenia Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 z dnia 21 grudnia 1989 r. w sprawie kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorstw Komisja Europejska jest uprawniona do wydania zakazu połączenia przedsiębiorstw lub zakupu przedsiębiorstwa, w przypadku w którym transakcja ta mogłaby się wiązać z ryzykiem powstania ograniczenia konkurencji na danym rynku. Istnieją trzy rodzaje decyzji wydawanych przez Komisję Europejską w zakresie połączeń przedsiębiorstw i są to odpowiednio: • bezwarunkowa zgoda – taka zgoda jest wydawana w ok. 90% przypadków już na etapie wstępnego badania wniosku; • warunkowa zgoda – w takim przypadku Komisja Europejska narzuca przejmującemu/nabywającemu przedsiębiorstwu dodatkowe warunki, od spełnienia których warunkuje wydanie zgody na przeprowadzenie transakcji; • brak zgody. Rodzajem praktyk, które również mogą zostać potencjalnie uznane za ograniczające konkurencję jest „wszelka pomoc przyznawana przez państwo członkowskie lub przy użyciu zasobów państwowych w jakiejkolwiek formie, która zakłóca lub grozi zakłóceniem konkurencji przez sprzyjanie niektórym przedsiębiorstwom lub produkcji niektórych towarów, jest niezgodna z rynkiem wewnętrznym w zakresie, w jakim wpływa na wymianę handlową między państwami członkowskimi” (art. 107 TFUE). Przykładami takiej pomocy są m.in. pożyczki, subwencje, ulgi podatkowe, gwarancje rządowe. Istnieje oczywiście szereg wyłączeń w przypadkach, w których udzielenie takiej pomocy nie stanowi de facto pomocy. Chodzi o sytuacje szczególne, takie jak np. działalność podejmowana na obszarach objętych klęskami żywiołowymi, ochrona miejsc pracy w przypadku ryzyka upadku przedsiębiorstw, czy też wsparcie udzielane na terytoriach, na których występuje wysoki poziom bezrobocia. Wszelkie działania podejmowane przez Unię Europejską w ramach polityki konkurencji są skrupulatnie analizowane i przewidują liczne wyjątki, które mają 118 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek zapewnić ochronę nie tylko konkurencji, ale również służyć wolności gospodarczej i rozwojowi gospodarczemu (np. wyjątki wyłączające możliwość uznania zawieranych porozumień między przedsiębiorcami za antykonkurencyjne). 2. Cele postanowień Unii Europejskiej dotyczące prawa konkurencji Cele, jakim przyświecało wprowadzenie przepisów Unii Europejskiej w zakresie konkurencji są wielorakie. W okresie poprzedzającym wprowadzenie Traktatu Lizbońskiego przez długi okres celem Unii Europejskiej było zagwarantowanie niezakłóconej konkurencji na rynku UE. Traktat Lizboński dokonał zmiany w tym zakresie. W obecnym brzmieniu Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej (TUE), nie ma już odniesienia do niezakłóconej konkurencji, lecz pojawia się pojęcie rynku wewnętrznego. Zgodnie z brzmieniem art. 3 TUE „Unia Europejska ustanawia rynek wewnętrzny. Działa na rzecz trwałego rozwoju Europy, którego podstawą jest zrównoważony wzrost gospodarczy oraz stabilność cen, społeczna gospodarka rynkowa o wysokiej konkurencyjności zmierzająca do pełnego zatrudnienia i postępu społecznego oraz wysoki poziom ochrony i poprawy jakości środowiska. Wspiera postęp naukowo-techniczny”. W okresie po wprowadzeniu Traktatu Lizbońskiego, konkurencja została potraktowana przez państwa członkowskie jako środek, a nie cel sam w sobie. Służy ona ustanowieniu rynku wewnętrznego, o czym świadczy dołączony do wersji skonsolidowanej TUE protokół (nr 27) w sprawie rynku wewnętrznego i konkurencji, w którym „państwa członkowskie uznały, że rynek wewnętrzny obejmuje system zapewniający niezakłóconą konkurencję” (Kurcz 2010, 32). Co więcej, dążąc do realizacji tego celu, państwa członkowskie przyznały kompetencje Unii Europejskiej do podjęcia kroków zmierzających do przyznania nowych uprawnień organom europejskim, co znajduje swoją podstawę w art. 352 TFUE. Zgodnie z art. 3 ust. 3 TUE Unia Europejska jako cel obrała sobie nie tylko zrównoważony rozwój gospodarczy i stabilność cen, ale również zobowiązana jest przy tym zapewnić brak wykluczenia społecznego (Kurcz 2010, 33). W tym miejscu pojawia się wątpliwość, w jaki sposób Unia Europejska chce zapewnić równowagę między polityką konkurencji, która w swoim założeniu ma ograniczać interwencjonizm państwowy (chodzi o kwestię pomocy państw członkowskich Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej 119 dla przedsiębiorstw), a z drugiej strony ma zapewniać pełne zatrudnienie i brak wykluczenia społecznego, co (zwłaszcza to drugie) jest co do zasady niemożliwe do wykonania bez interwencji ze strony państwa. W literaturze przedmiotu można często odnaleźć tezę, że „pomoc publiczna zasadniczo oddziałuje na rynek negatywnie, uprzywilejowując wybranych uczestników gry rynkowej i pogarszając sytuację konkurencyjną pozostałych przedsiębiorców” (Materna 2009, 25; Marquardt 2007, 51). Istnieje również kilka podstawowych celów, niewymienionych w traktatach, a które bez większego wysiłku jest w stanie wyodrębnić doktryna. Jednym z nich jest zapewnienie dobrobytu konsumentom „przez zachowanie konkurencyjnej struktury rynku jako mechanizmu zapewniającego optymalny społecznie rozdział środków produkcji i równocześnie kształtujący należycie cenę i podaż oferowanych towarów i usług” (Kępiński 2013, 7). Jednak pojęcie dobrobytu konsumenta, często stosowane w literaturze i orze- cznictwie przedmiotu jest na tyle nieprecyzyjne, że nie wiadomo czy chodzi o dobro- byt wszystkich konsumentów, czy tylko kupujących wskazane dobra. Nie jest także sprecyzowane, czy pod tym pojęciem należy rozumieć również kupujących z sektora B2B (ang. business-to-business) takich, jak inni producenci, sprzedający, pośrednicy czy detaliści, czy tylko tych z sektora B2C (ang. business-to-consumer), gdzie występuje bezpośrednia relacja przedsiębiorcy z końcowym odbiorcą – konsumentem. Innymi celami wyodrębnionymi w doktrynie, których ochronie służą regulacje UE dotyczące konkurencji są np. (Materna 2009, 28): • „ochrona małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw, • redystrybucja dochodów, • zachowanie miejscowej kontroli biznesu, • przeciwdziałanie nadmiernej koncentracji władzy politycznej”. Należy też zaznaczyć, że celem przepisów dotyczących konkurencji jest nie tylko zapewnienie dobrobytu konsumentów, ale również ochrona ich interesów, bowiem każdy przepis dotyczący szeroko pojętej ochrony konkurencji służy pośrednio również ochronie konsumentów. Przepisy dotyczące konkurencji, to de facto także ochrona pozostałych przedsiębiorstw przed zagrożeniami, które mogą potencjalnie wyniknąć ze strony mocniejszych uczestników wspólnego rynku (realizacja celu ochrony małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw). Stawiając czoło nieuczciwym praktykom przedsiębiorstw, nie należy zapominać, że przepisy dotyczące ochrony konkurencji mają w głównej mierze zapewnić swobodę konkurencji, umożliwiając jednocześnie działanie przede 120 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek wszystkim pozostałym małym i średnim przedsiębiorstwom, a także chroniąc ich interesy. Jest to istotne o tyle, że to właśnie pozostałe przedsiębiorstwa operujące na określonym rynku właściwym są głównymi „adresatami”, w których wymierzone są praktyki ograniczające konkurencję. To przedsiębiorstwa jako pierwsze odczuwają następstwa antykonkurencyjnych zachowań na rynku, takich jak nadużywanie pozycji dominującej przez silniejszych uczestników rynku. Następstwa te, w ślad za mniejszymi przedsiębiorstwami, odczuwają następnie odpowiednio konsumenci oraz cały rynek UE, co nie pozostaje bez wpływu na handel między państwami członkowskimi. 3. Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej a handel między państwami członkowskimi Zgodnie z art. 102 TFUE niezgodne z rynkiem wewnętrznym i zakazane jest nadużywanie przez jedno lub większą liczbę przedsiębiorstw pozycji dominującej na rynku wewnętrznym lub na znacznej jego części, w zakresie, w jakim może wpływać na handel między państwami członkowskimi. Jak zostało zauważone w doktrynie oraz orzecznictwie UE, przesłanka traktująca o możliwości wpływu określonej praktyki przedsiębiorstwa na handel między państwami członkowskimi powinna być rozumiana w sposób szeroki. „ Przesłanka ta powinna zostać uznana za spełnioną w przypadku, w którym na postawie obiektywnych czynników prawnych lub faktycznych można z dostatecznym stopniem prawdopodobieństwa uznać, że określone zachowanie przedsiębiorcy może w sposób bezpośredni lub pośredni, faktycznie lub potencjalnie wpływać na warunki handlu między państwami członkowskimi, co w efekcie może stanowić zagrożenie dla realizacji integracyjnego celu Unii” (Kohutek, Sieradzka 2008, 60–61). Organom antymonopolowym państw członkowskich na podstawie art. 35 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu został nadany obowiązek każdorazowego badania podczas wszczynania postępowania antymonopolowego w przypadku naruszenia ustawy antymonopolowej danego państwa członkowskiego czy określona praktyka nie narusza jednocześnie norm prawnych określonych w art. 101 lub art. 102 TFUE. Jeżeli takie naruszenie zostanie stwierdzone, to wtedy organ antymonopolowy danego państwa członkowskiego jest Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej 121 zobowiązany uznać, że wskazane naruszenie występuje, zaś postępowanie uzyskuje status transgranicznego, gdyż spełniona zostaje przesłanka „wpływu na handel między państwami członkowskim”. Zarazem organ monopolowy danego państwa członkowskiego jest zobowiązany do wszczęcia równoległego postępowania w spra- wie naruszenia określonych regulacji UE (Krasnodębska-Tomkiel 2015, 20–27). Obowiązek zastosowania prawa antymonopolowego UE nie jest ograniczony je- dynie do sytuacji, w których nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w sposób rzeczywisty ma wpływ na handel między państwami członkowskimi, gdyż norma prawna za- warta w art. 102 TFUE została ukształtowana za pomocą wyrażenia „może wpłynąć” a nie „wpływa”. Zgodnie z wytycznymi Komisji Europejskiej z 2004 r. (Guidelines on the eff ect on trade conceptcontained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty), w celu udowodnienia, że określona praktyka wpływa na handel między państwami członkowskimi niezbędne jest wykazanie, że: • określona praktyka wpływa na handel między państwami członkowskimi, • wpływ jest możliwy, • wpływ jest dostrzegalny. Omawiane wytyczne uznają, że wpływ nie jest odczuwalny w odniesieniu do porozumień między przedsiębiorcami, gdy łącznie zostają spełnione następujące warunki: • wspólny udział przedsiębiorców w określonym rynku właściwym w ramach Unii Europejskiej, na którym praktyki wywarły wpływ, nie przekracza 5%; • wspólne roczne obroty, osiągnięte przez określonych przedsiębiorców na właściwym rynku UE, na których sprzedawano określone dobra, nie przekraczają 40 mln EUR. Doktryna wskazuje, że dla stwierdzenia występowania przesłanki wpływu na handel między państwami członkowskimi wystarczające jest ustalenie, że określona praktyka stosowana przez przedsiębiorcę, wywiera pośredni lub bezpośredni, rzeczywisty lub hipotetyczny wpływ na całokształt handlu między państwami członkowskimi. W tym miejscu warty jest podkreślenia fakt, że z wytycznych Komisji Europejskiej z 2004 r. wynika, że zniekształcenie struktury rynku UE, które może zostać dokonane w szczególności przez ograniczenie możliwości wejścia na ten rynek nowemu przedsiębiorcy, może zostać uznane za naruszenie regulacji antykonkurencyjnych UE. Z wytycznych Komisji Europejskiej wynika także, że przepisy antymonopolowe UE znajdują zastosowanie również we wszelkich rodzajach transgranicznej (ang. cross-border) aktywności gospodarczej przedsiębiorstw (Kolasiński 2016, 5–10). 122 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek Praktyki, stanowiące część ogólnej strategii działania przyjętej przez przedsiębiorcę zajmującego pozycję dominującą na rynku, powinny być badane pod kątem tego, jaki skutek wywołuje sama strategia przedsiębiorstwa. Jeżeli przedsiębiorstwo dominujące podejmuje różne działania, lecz wszystkie są ukierunkowane na realizację tego samego celu (np. na ograniczeniu sprzedaży przez konkurentów), dla możliwości zastosowania art. 102 TFUE wystarczy, aby chociaż jedno z działań podjętych przez przedsiębiorcę dominującego mogło wpływać na handel między państwami członkowskimi (Kowalik-Bańczyk 2010, 34–42). W wytycznych Komisji Europejskiej z 2014 r. w odniesieniu do rodzaju określonego działania przedsiębiorstwa wyodrębnione są takie praktyki bądź porozumienia, które w swej istocie są zdolne wywierać wpływ na handel, np. porozumienia dotyczące podziału poszczególnych rynków, których uczestnicy mają siedziby na terytoriach różnych państw członkowskich. W tym celu jest możliwe wyodrębnienie dwóch podstawowych aspektów. Mowa o zasięgu terytorialnym, czyli obszarze, na którym określona praktyka dominującego przedsiębiorstwa jest stosowana (nadużycie pozycji dominującej), a także miejscu, w którym określone przedsiębiorstwa mają swoje siedziby oraz istocie praktyki, to znaczy czego dotyczy dane porozumienie (Minkiewicz 2014, 8–20). Regulacje UE w zakresie ochrony konkurencji ze względu na wpływ na handel między państwami członkowskimi znajdą najprawdopodobniej zastosowanie, w odniesieniu do charakteru oferowanych dóbr (przez co należy rozumieć nie tylko towary, ale również usługi), które mogły zostać objęte określonym porozumieniem lub praktyką stosowaną przez dominujące przedsiębiorstwo, jeżeli dobra te ze swej natury mogą zostać w łatwy sposób sprzedane w handlu między państwami członkowskimi lub są one potrzebne przedsiębiorstwom, które chcą dokonać ekspansji na rynek UE lub też tym przedsiębiorstwom, którzy dokonują rozszerzenia swojej działalności na inne państwa członkowskie. Jednak w przypadku, w którym ze względu na charakter oferowanego dobra zainteresowanie ze strony przedsiębiorstwa z innego państwa członkowskiego jest ograniczone lub brak jest popytu na oferowane dobro ze strony przedsiębiorców chcących dokonać rozszerzenia swojej działalności, zdecydowanie trudniejsze będzie stwierdzenie, że dany przypadek podlega regulacjom UE (Minkiewicz 2014, 8–20). Dzięki dołączeniu organów antymonopolowych do współpracy z Komisją Europejską w ramach programu egzekwowania prawa antymonopolowego UE, znacznemu zwiększeniu uległa skuteczność oddziaływania organów publicznych UE w tym zakresie. W najlepszy sposób jest to odzwierciedlone w publikowanej na bieżąco ewidencji postępowań prowadzonych wspólnie przez wszystkich członków Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej 123 Europejskiej Sieci Konkurencji. W okresie przeszło 10 lat funkcjonowania Euro- pejskiej Sieci Konkurencji, w okresie od wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej, zostało zaewidencjonowane wszczęcie blisko 2000 postępowań w sprawach naruszeń zarów- no art. 101, jak i art. 102 TFUE. W blisko połowie wszczętych postępowań, zostały wy- dane merytoryczne decyzje kończące postępowanie. Warty podkreślenia jest jednak fakt, że z blisko 2000 wszczętych postępowań, tylko niewielką część stanowiły sprawy prowadzone przez Komisję Europejską (Krasnodębska-Tomkiel 2015). Przyczyniło się do tego zakończone sukcesem zaangażowanie organów antymonopolowych państw członkowskich w Europejską Sieć Konkurencji, które w trakcie prowadzenia postępowań antymonopolowych zostały uprawnione i jednocześnie zobowiązane, gdy to konieczne, do stosowania przepisów dotyczących konkurencji zarówno w wymiarze krajowym, jak i Unii Europejskiej. Wnioski Niewątpliwie stworzone przez politykę konkurencji UE instrumenty stanowią silny oręż w rękach jej organów. Przeprowadzona w niniejszym opracowaniu analiza korelacji regulacji dotyczących praktyk nadużywania pozycji dominującej jako form ograniczania konkurencji i przepisów polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej pozwala jednoznacznie stwierdzić, że prawo jest w tym zakresie ukształtowane w sposób bardzo szeroki. Już na podstawie samej konstrukcji obowiązujących postanowień TFUE, można dowieść, że niektóre regulacje stoją w sprzeczności z zasadą swobody przedsiębiorczości. W konsekwencji wciąż można odszukać kwestie, które mogłyby ulec zmianom. Za przykład mogą posłużyć regulacje w zakresie indywidualnych wyłączeń porozumień spod zakazu ich zawierania. W takich przypadkach organy antymonopolowe Unii Europejskiej lub państw członkowskich wymagają od przedsiębiorstw udowodnienia, że ich współpraca (zawarte porozumienie) przynosi osobom trzecim (zwłaszcza konsumentom) określone korzyści. Taki stan rzeczy prowadzi do sytuacji, w których zakazowi zawierania porozumień mogą podlegać także neutralne w skutkach dla konsumentów i podmiotów trzecich porozumienia, które spełniają ustawowe przesłanki do uznania ich za zakazane, jednak brak jest do tego ekonomicznych podstaw. Bezpośrednia analiza przepisów TFUE dotyczących polityki konkurencji prowadzi również do krytycznych wniosków. Niewątpliwie negatywnie należy ocenić zakaz zawierania porozumień przez przedsiębiorstwa, których jedynym skutkiem jest 124 Rudolf Michałkiewicz, Magdalena Proczek doprowadzenie do osiągnięcia przez nie pozycji dominującej. Nie można się zgodzić, że takie działania są same w sobie szkodliwe, gdyż zakazane są jedynie ewentualne negatywne skutki, które może nieść za sobą nadużywanie tak uzyskanej pozycji. W tym zakresie zastosowanie znajdują odrębne przepisy, zatem takie stosowanie owych regulacji stanowi ponownie naruszenie zasady swobody przedsiębiorczości. Mimo powyższych przykładów ukazujących niedoskonałość niektórych postanowień dotyczących ochrony konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, należy jednak stwierdzić, że co do zasady polityka konkurencji UE oraz związane z nią przepisy spełniają swoją rolę. Potwierdzeniem tego jest fakt, że na poszczególnych rynkach właściwych Unii Europejskiej przedsiębiorstwa mają coraz większą świadomość prawną w zakresie ochrony konkurencji, a zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do stosowania praktyk nadużywania pozycji dominującej. Świadczy to o tym, że przepisy dotyczące ochrony konkurencji oraz polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, mimo ograniczonej legislacji (w porównaniu z innymi dziedzinami prawa UE), spełniają swoją rolę i są wystarczającym narzędziem w rękach organów antymonopolowych zarówno Unii Europejskiej, jak i państw członkowskich. W dobie postępującej globalizacji i coraz częściej spotykanej dominacji ogromnych, międzynarodowych koncernów, nie można sobie wyobrazić funkcjonowania rynku Unii Europejskiej bez regulacji dotyczących polityki konkurencji. Z drugiej strony obowiązująca zasada swobody przedsiębiorczości skłania ku trwałemu poszukiwaniu „złotego środka”, celem umożliwienia jej stosowania, ale także zintegrowania jej z polityką konkurencji, co w efekcie powinno przełożyć się na poprawę konkurencji, a następnie dobrobytu konsumentów. Bibliografia Guidelines on the eff ect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Dz. Urz. UE z 2004 r., C 101. Kępiński, Marian. 2013. Prawo konkurencji. System prawa prywatnego. Tom 15. Warszawa: C.H. Beck. Kohutek, Karol, Sieradzka, Małgorzata. 2008. Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska. Kolasiński, Marek Krzysztof. 2016. ‘Odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza za uszczerbek powstały w Unii Europejskiej w wyniku zawarcia sprzecznych z prawem antymonopolowym ugód patentowych o odwróconej płatności’. Wolters Kluwer Polska: Ochrona antymonopolowa w ramach polityki konkurencji Unii Europejskiej 125 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego, nr 6, https://sip.lex.pl/#/publikacja/151287920. Dostęp: 08.10.2017. Komunikat Komisji z dnia 24 lutego 2009 r. w sprawie priorytetów, którymi Komisja będzie się kierować przy stosowaniu art. 82 Traktatu WE w odniesieniu do szkodliwych działań o charakterze praktyk wyłączających, podejmowanych przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące (Dz. Urz. UE z 2009 r., C 45/7). Komisja Europejska. 2014. Konkurencyjność. Luksemburg: Komisja Europejska. https:// publications.europa.eu/pl/publication-detail/-/publication/8200c251-aa42-11e6-aab7- 01aa75ed71a1. Dostęp: 08.10.2017. Kowalik-Bańczyk, Krystyna. 2010. ‘Pojęcie wpływu na handel w decyzjach Prezesa UOKiK’, Wolters Kluwer Polska: Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, nr 5, https://sip.lex.pl/#/ publikacja/151109595. Dostęp: 08.10.2017. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, Małgorzata. 2015. ‘Konwergencja systemów ochrony konkurencji w Unii Europejskiej w zakresie przeciwdziałania praktykom ograniczającym konkurencję’. Wolters Kluwer Polska: Europejski Przegląd Sądowy nr 7, https://sip.lex.pl/#/publikac- ja/151258508. Dostęp: 08.10.2017. Kurcz, Bartłomiej. 2010. Prawo i ekonomia konkurencji. Wybrane zagadnienia. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska. Marquardt, Piotr. 2007. Pomoc publiczna dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorców. Warszawa: LexisNexis. Materna, Grzegorz. 2009. Pojęcie przedsiębiorcy w polskim i europejskim prawie ochrony konkurencji. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska. Minkiewicz, Mariusz. 2014. ‘Pojęcie wpływu na handel i reguła konwergencji w praktyce stosowania prawa UE przez polskie sądy i Prezesa UOKiK’. UOKiK: Internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny, nr 3, https://sip.lex.pl/#/publikacja/151297064. Dostęp: 08.10.2017. Rozporządzenie Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 z dnia 21 grudnia 1989 r. w sprawie kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorstw, Dz. Urz. UE z 1989 r., L 395. Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 81 i 82 Traktatu, Dz. Urz. UE z 2003 r., L 1. Szydło, Marek. 2010. Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w prawie konkurencji. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska. Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, Dz. Urz. UE z 2012 r., C 326. Traktat o Unii Europejskiej (wersja skonsolidowana), Dz. Urz. UE z 2016 r., C 202. Traktat z Lizbony zmieniający Traktat o Unii Europejskiej i Traktat ustanawiający Wspólnotę Europejską podpisany w Lizbonie dnia 13 grudnia 2007 r., Dz. Urz. UE z 2007 r., C 306. The Review of European Affairs Volume 1:2(2) 2017 The Polish European Community Studies Association PECSA ADAM GĄSIOREK* Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa infromacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej Abstrakt Społeczeństwo informacyjne, z uwagi na istotność zagadnienia dla rozwoju poszczególnych państw czy regionów w XXI wieku, stanowi obszar zainteresowania wielu badaczy. Jego ele- menty składowe, a szczególnie zastosowanie nowoczesnych technologii (ICT), przyczyniają się do bardziej efektywnego gospodarowania dostępnymi zasobami, lepszego wykorzystania po- tencjału obywateli, a w konsekwencji, uzyskania wyższego wzrostu gospodarczego i poziomu życia mieszkańców. Unia Europejska także sprzyja rozwojowi społeczeństwa informacyjnego na obszarze państw członkowskich – działania, mające temu służyć, zostały zapisane m.in. w Strategii „Europa 2020”. Jednakże, jak wskazuje wiele analiz, najbardziej zaawansowane ugru- powanie integracyjne na świecie nie jest, pod wieloma względami, terytorium jednolitym. Dla- tego też cel artykułu sformułowano jako przedstawienie zróżnicowania, które występuje w Unii Europejskiej, pod względem zaawansowania procesu rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Dla osiągnięcia założonego celu posłużyła analiza literatury przedmiotu oraz analiza danych statystycznych, pochodzących z bazy Międzynarodowej Unii Telekomunikacyjnej (ITU) oraz Europejskiego Urzędu Statystycznego (Eurostat) dla lat 2010-2016. W rezultacie przeprowa- dzonych badań można stwierdzić, że społeczeństwo informacyjne w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich UE znajduje się w różnych stadiach rozwoju, jednakże postęp, dokonujący się na tym obszarze, jest stale widoczny. Co więcej, obserwuje się zmniejszenie występujących dyspro- porcji pod względem dostępności do nowoczesnych technologii. Dalszym działaniem powinna być edukacja społeczeństw tak, aby świadomie i w większym stopniu wykorzystywały możliwo- ści, które oferują ICT. Słowa kluczowe: społeczeństwo informacyjne; Unia Europejska; ICT. * Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach, [email protected] 128 Adam Gąsiorek Wprowadzenie Społeczeństwo informacyjne, w literaturze określane jako społeczeństwo „nowego typu”, wykształciło się w XX w. na skutek rozpowszechnienia technologii informacyjno-komunikacyjnych (ICT), ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sieci Internet. Nie ulega więc wątpliwości, że wraz z rozwojem technologicznym, który jest procesem ciągłym, także społeczeństwo informacyjne ewoluuje, przystosowując się do nowych osiągnięć, wśród których na początku XXI w. można wskazać m.in. komunikację mobilną – zagadnienie to przedstawione zostanie w pierwszej części artykułu. Wskazuje się, że rozwój tego rodzaju społeczeństwa nie następuje jednorodnie, ale jest dość zróżnicowany pod względem geografi cznym. Istotną materią jest więc próba określenia pozycji Europy na tle pozostałych regionów świata i jej zmiana na przestrzeni ostatnich lat, będąca przedmiotem części drugiej artykułu. Wartym zainteresowania wydaje się również zagadnienie różnorodności, występującej w Unii Europejskiej – przybliżone na wybranych przykładach w części trzeciej – w kontekście postępu we wprowadzaniu kolejnych elementów, charakteryzujących społeczeństwo informacyjne, w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich UE, a także określenie, czy na skutek działań strategicznych, podejmowanych przez Unię, pojawia się konwergencja, oznaczająca wyrównywanie szans rozwojowych wszystkich unijnych obywateli. Celem artykułu będzie zatem przedstawienie zróżnicowania, które występuje w Unii Europejskiej, pod względem zaawansowania procesu rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Dla osiągnięcia założonego celu posłuży analiza literatury przedmiotu oraz analiza danych statystycznych, pochodzących z bazy Międzynarodowej Unii Telekomunikacyjnej (ITU) oraz Europejskiego Urzędu Statystycznego (Eurostat) dla lat 2010–2016. 1. Społeczeństwo informacyjne – ewolucja pojęcia Zagadnienie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego stanowi istotny element badań naukowych w XXI w. Jednakże należy wskazać, że pojęcie „społeczeństwo infor- macyjne” powstało już w II połowie XX w., a za jego twórcę uznaje się japońskiego antropologa T. Umesao. Zgodnie z opracowaną defi nicją, „johoka shakai” oznaczało wówczas społeczeństwo, którego rozwój jest przede wszystkim zdeterminowany przez technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne – ICT (Olszak 2014, 15). Na przestrzeni Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 129 kolejnych lat wielu twórców, reprezentujących różne dziedziny nauki, podejmowało analizy, mające na celu dokonanie charakterystyki „nowego typu społeczeństwa” – oprócz szeregu defi nicji (Tabela 1) sformułowali oni także wiele określeń, zastępujących pierwotną wersję, pochodzącą z 1963 r. W literaturze można zatem znaleźć – między innymi – pojęcia: społeczeństwo informatyczne, społeczeństwo medialne, społe- czeństwo globalnej informacji, społeczeństwo wiedzy, społeczeństwo oparte na in- formacji i wiedzy, społeczeństwo postindustrialne czy nawet społeczeństwo usług (Haber, Garwol 2011, 53; Chmielarz 2007, 261; Nycz 2011, 15; Nowak 2013). Pomimo dość dużej różnorodności w zakresie pojęciowo-defi nicyjnym, która spowodowała niejednoznaczność opisywanej kategorii, przyjmuje się, że wciąż najczęściej używanym i rozpowszechnionym terminem jest „społeczeństwo informacyjne”. Tabela 1: Wybrane defi nicje pojęcia „społeczeństwo informacyjne” Lp. Autor Definicja 1 D. Bell Społeczeństwo, w którym zatrudnienie w usługach związanych z informa- cją zaczyna przeważać nad pracą i zatrudnieniem w rolnictwie i przemyśle. Wykształca się ono na skutek postępu technologicznego i rosnącego zna- czenia informacji, a nie siły (pracy) czy energii (maszyn). 2 K. Doktorowicz Istotny element strategii politycznej, określającej kierunki rozwoju cywi- lizacyjnego, ekonomicznego i społecznego państw oraz ich organizacji ponadnarodowych o największym potencjale gospodarczym i informa- tycznym na świecie. 3 T. Goban-Klas Społeczeństwo, które nie tylko posiada rozwinięte środki przetwarzania informacji i komunikowania, lecz przetwarzanie informacji jest podstawą tworzenia dochodu narodowego i dostarcza źródła utrzymania większo- ści społeczeństwa. 4 S. Juszczyk Społeczeństwo staje się społeczeństwem informacyjnym, kiedy osiąga stopień rozwoju oraz skalę i skomplikowanie procesów społecznych i gospodarczych, wymagające zastosowania nowych technologii gromadzenia, selekcji, przetwarzania i wykorzystania olbrzymiej liczby informacji powstałych w ramach owych procesów. 5 J. Kisielnicki Społeczeństwo, które posiada dostęp i umie wykorzystać: informatyczną infrastrukturę, zasoby informacji i wiedzy dla realizacji zbiorowych i indywidualnych celów w sposób skuteczny i ekonomiczny. 6 K. Krzysztofek, Społeczeństwo, w którym informacja jest intensywnie wykorzystywana M.S. Szczepański w życiu ekonomicznym, społecznym i politycznym oraz społeczeństwo, które posiada bogate środki komunikacji i przetwarzania informacji, będące podstawą tworzenia większości dochodu narodowego oraz zapewniające źródło utrzymania większości ludzi. 130 Adam Gąsiorek Lp. Autor Definicja 7 C.M. Olszak Społeczeństwo, które posiada nieograniczone (lub prawie nieograniczone) możliwości dostępu do ICT, informacji i wiedzy, które umożliwiają osiąga- nie różnych celów społecznych, ekonomicznych, edukacyjnych, ekologicz- nych i kulturowych, będących podstawą tworzenia większości dochodu narodowego orz zapewniających źródło utrzymania większości ludzi. 8 A. Toffler Społeczeństwo informacyjne jako trzecia fala rozwoju społecznego, w którym podstawowym surowcem jest informacja. 9 E. Ziemba, Społeczeństwo, w którym ludzie, firmy i administracja publiczna R. Żelazny posiadają oraz wykorzystują infrastrukturę ICT w procesach eksploracji i eksploatacji informacji dla realizacji zbiorowych i indywidualnych celów w sposób skuteczny i efektywny. Źródło: Sarama 2011, 38; Haber, Garwol 2011, 53–54; Olszak, Ziemba, Żelazny 2010, 18; Olszak 2014, 15; Ziemba, Żelazny 2013, 556; Tracz-Krupa 2013, 439. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że zamieszczone w tabeli 1 defi nicje stanowią tylko niewielką część spośród dostępnych w bogatej literaturze. Podkreślenia wymaga również fakt, że rozważania, wyjaśniające istotę społeczeństwa informacyjnego, akcentują różnorodne aspekty tego pojęcia, np. ekonomiczne, socjologiczne, politologiczne czy technologiczne (F. Webster, w ramach prowadzonej analizy, wyróżnił pięć różnorodnych defi nicji, z których każda zwraca uwagę na inne kryteria identyfi kacji zagadnienia – technologiczne, gospodarcze, zawodowe, przestrzenne i kulturowe) (Webster 2006, 8–31). Można także zauważyć, że coraz częściej formułowane są defi nicje wieloaspektowe, które starają się łączyć kilka (przynajmniej dwa) obszary nauki. Najważniejszym dobrem w społeczeństwie informacyjnym – jak wynika z dotychczasowych analiz – stała się informacja, z której wprost wynika posiadanie wiedzy. Co więcej, dwa przywołane zasoby rozpatruje się w kategorii substytutu wobec ziemi, surowców naturalnych czy pracy w gospodarce (Nycz 2011, 15), a ich posiadanie, odpowiednie przetwarzanie i wykorzystanie warunkuje uzyskanie przewagi konkurencyjnej na współczesnym rynku (Olszak 2014, 15–18). Można zatem przyjąć, że informacja i wiedza są zasobem strategicznym, wykorzystywanym przez coraz więcej podmiotów, a więc niejako równorzędnym wobec klasycznych czynników produkcji. W literaturze znaczne grono autorów skłania się również ku stwierdzeniu, że informacja stała się towarem, gromadzonym i dystrybuowanym w skali międzynarodowej, którego wykorzystanie w sposób racjonalny przynosi wymierne korzyści dla określonych podmiotów (Chmielarz 2007, 261–264). Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 131 Społeczeństwo informacyjne jest kategorią niejednoznaczną nie tylko z uwagi na różnorodność spojrzeń względem jego istoty, ale również z powodu płaszczyzn, które obejmuje, jak i ogniw, z których składają się poszczególne płaszczyzny (schemat 1). Schemat 1: Płaszczyzny i ogniwa społeczeństwa informacyjnego ^ƉŽųĞĐnjĞŷƐƚǁŽŝŶĨŽƌŵĂĐLJũŶĞ WųĂƐnjĐnjLJnjŶĂƐƉŽųĞĐnjŶĂ WųĂƐnjĐnjLJnjŶĂƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐnjŶĂ ;ƑǁŝĂĚŽŵŽƑđ͕ĞĚƵŬĂĐũĂ͕ ;ƐƚŽƉŝĞŷƌŽnjǁŽũƵƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝŝŝŶĨŽƌŵĂĐLJũŶŽͲŬŽŵƵŶŝŬĂĐLJũŶLJĐŚͿ ƉŽnjŝŽŵŝŶƚĞůĞŬƚƵĂůŶLJ ƐƉŽųĞĐnjĞŷƐƚǁĂͿ /ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵŬƚƵƌĂ/d ŬƚŽƌnjLJƐƉŽųĞĐnjĞŷƐƚǁĂ ;ƐŝĞđ͕/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ͕ƐĞƌǁĞƌLJ͕ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂĐũĂ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂĐLJũŶĞŐŽ ŬŽŵƉƵƚĞƌLJ͕ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂůĞƐƚĂĐũŽŶĂƌŶĞ ;ƵƐųƵŐŝŝƚƌĞƑĐŝĐLJĨƌŽǁĞͿ ;ůƵĚnjŝĞ͕ƉƌnjĞĚƐŝħďŝŽƌƐƚǁĂ͕ ŝŵŽďŝůŶĞͿ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂĐũĂƉƵďůŝĐnjŶĂͿ Źródło: Ziemba, Żelazny 2013, 556; Chmielarz 2007, 262. Rezultatem teoretycznych rozważań nad zagadnieniem społeczeństwa informacyjnego, było wyróżnienie jego charakterystycznych cech, do których zaliczono (Nycz 2011, 15): • dominację sektora usług w gospodarce (szczególnie nauki, służby zdrowia oraz fi nansów i ubezpieczeń); • dominację specjalistów i naukowców w strukturze zawodowej kraju; • wzrost znaczenia wiedzy teoretycznej, będącej źródłem innowacji; • dążenie do uzyskania przez społeczeństwo kontroli nad rozwojem technologicznym gospodarki; • rozwój koncepcji uczenia się obywateli przez całe życie; • tworzenie „technologii intelektualnych”, będących podstawą w procesie podej- mowania decyzji zarówno w aspekcie politycznym, jak i społecznym. Należy jednak zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że nie w każdym społeczeństwie informacyjnym obie płaszczyzny – technologiczna i społeczna – są w jednakowo wysokim stopniu rozwinięte. Konsekwencją takiego stanu jest możliwość opisu 132 Adam Gąsiorek wybranej społeczności jedynie przez niektóre z przytoczonych cech. Dowodzi to, że społeczeństwo informacyjne nie jest stanem, ale raczej procesem (schemat 2), w którym rozwój poszczególnych ogniw ma miejsce dzięki inicjowaniu odpowiednich działań. Schemat 2: Stadia rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego •zapewnienie odpowiedniej jakości infrastruktury informatycznej, jak i oprogramowania Stadium wczesne •zapewnienie dostępu do Internetu, najlepiej szerokopasmowego (infrastrukturalneͿ •zapewnienie powszechnego poziomu umiejętności korzystania z technologii informatycznych Stadium pośrednie (edukacyjne) •bardzo dobra dostępność do odpowiedniej infrastruktury •powszechna umiejętność korzystania z technologii Stadium •świadomość społeczeństwa odnośnie możliwości, korzyści stabilności i zagrożeń, wynikających ze stosowania technologii (dojrzałości) Źródło: Łukasik-Makowska, Sala 2011, 375. 2. Europa na tle świata – wybrane wskaźniki rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego Ujęcie procesowe społeczeństwa informacyjnego, jak przytoczono w pierwszej części artykułu, zakłada, że następuje stały rozwój jego poszczególnych elementów składowych, którego dynamika może być jednak zróżnicowana terytorialnie. Należy zatem podjąć próbę analizy, mającej za zadanie wykazać różnorodność regionów świata pod względem intensyfi kacji rozwoju wybranych ogniw – komponentów Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 133 społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że ponadregionalne lub kontynentalne grupowanie państw przyczyniło się do uzyskania wyników na dużym poziomie ogólności, które mogą służyć wyłącznie do wyciągania wniosków o charakterze ramowym, jednak powodem takiej konstrukcji zestawienia był sposób gromadzenia danych przez Międzynarodową Unię Telekomunikacyjną. Wykres 1: Gospodarstwa domowe z dostępem do Internetu w domu (w %) w latach 2010–2016 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Afryka Państwa arabskie Kraje Azji i Pacyfiku Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw Europa Ameryka Północna i Południowa Źródło: International Telecommunication Union, 2017. Pierwszym wybranym wskaźnikiem jest odsetek gospodarstw domowych, posiadających dostęp do Internetu w domu. Jak można zauważyć na wykresie 1, w Europie przybiera on corocznie w latach 2010–2016 najwyższe wartości (osiągając poziom 84%), na drugim miejscu od 2013 r. znajduje się Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw (w 2016 r. 67,8%), a zaraz za nią Ameryka Północna i Południowa (64,4%). Natomiast dostęp do Internetu w domu w państwach arabskich, Azji i Pacyfi ku oraz w Afryce posiada wciąż mniej niż połowa gospodarstw domowych. Szczegółowe ujęcie wskaźnika, dotyczącego odsetka gospodarstw domowych, które posiadają dostęp do Internetu w domu (tabela 2) pozwala na sprawdzenie, czy regiony, których wyniki są niższe od najlepszego (Europy) zmniejszają odległość do niego, czyli rozwijają sieć dostępu do Internetu w gospodarstwach domowych szybciej od niego, czy ma miejsce stagnacja bądź sytuacja przeciwna. Można przyjąć, 134 Adam Gąsiorek że wszystkie regiony świata, poza Afryką, zmniejszyły swoją odległość do Europy (posiadającej każdego roku najwyższą wartość wskaźnika) w latach 2010–2016. Najwyraźniej uczyniła to Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw (o 17,7 p. proc.) oraz kraje Azji i Pacyfi ku (o 10 p. proc.), a najmniej obszar obu Ameryk – tylko o 3,1 p. proc. Negatywnie na tle pozostałych wyróżniła się Afryka, która zwiększyła odległość do lidera – Europy – o 4,7 p. proc. w okresie badanych sześciu lat. Tabela 2: Gospodarstwa domowe z dostępem do Internetu w domu w latach 2010–2016 (w %) Wspólnota Ameryka Państwa Kraje Azji Rok Afryka Niepodległych Europa Północna arabskie i Pacyfiku Państw i Południowa wynik 3,8 22,7 20,2 33,8 67,7 45,1 2010 odległość 63,9 45,1 47,6 33,9 22,7 wynik 5,6 27,8 23,9 39,1 70,6 48,3 2011 odległość 65,0 42,8 46,8 31,5 22,3 wynik 7,5 31,0 29,1 49,2 73,6 51,9 2012 odległość 66,1 42,5 44,5 24,4 21,7 wynik 9,0 34,3 33,8 56,2 76,0 55,5 2013 odległość 67,0 41,7 42,3 19,8 20,6 wynik 11,1 38,5 37,6 60,9 79,0 58,3 2014 odległość 67,9 40,5 41,3 18,1 20,7 wynik 13,6 43,1 42,7 63,5 81,3 61,4 2015 odległość 67,7 38,2 38,6 17,8 19,9 wynik 15,4 45,7 46,4 67,8 84,0 64,4 2016 odległość 68,6 38,3 37,6 16,2 19,6 Odległość – odległość od największego odsetka w danych roku (w punktach procentowych). Źródło: International Telecommunication Union, 2017. Biorąc pod uwagę nominalną zmianę miernika dostępu gospodarstw domowych do Internetu, największy wzrost nastąpił – analogicznie jak w przypadku zmniejszenia odległości – we Wspólnocie Niepodległych Państw (34 p. proc.), następnie w krajach Azji i Pacyfi ku (26,3 p. proc.) oraz w państwach arabskich (23,1 p. proc.). Warto podkreślić, że nawet Afryka odnotowała wzrost na poziomie 11,6 p. proc. jednak był on niższy od przyrostu w Europie, który wyniósł 16,3 p. proc. – wolniejsze tempo wzrostu wpłynęło na zwiększenie odległości kontynentu afrykańskiego od europejskiego pod względem dostępności gospodarstw domowych do Internetu w domu. Należy zauważyć, że Europa wciąż utrzymała pierwszą pozycję w rankingu, Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 135 a Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw – druga w zestawieniu – osiągnęła w 2016 r. europejski poziom sprzed sześciu lat. Drugim wybranym wskaźnikiem jest odsetek korzystających z zasobów Internetu w poszczególnych regionach świata. Wykres 2 ilustruje jego odczyty w latach 2010– 2016, na podstawie których można stwierdzić, że również – jak wskaźnik pierwszy – przybiera on najwyższe wartości w Europie (osiągając na koniec okresu poddanego analizie poziom 79,1%), następnie (w 2016 r.) we Wspólnocie Niepodległych Państw (66,6%) oraz w Ameryce Północnej i Południowej (65%). W pozostałych regionach świata z zasobów Internetu korzysta mniej niż połowa ich mieszkańców, a w Afryce jest to jedynie ¼ populacji. Wykres 2: Osoby korzystające z zasobów Internetu w latach 2010–2016 – odsetek populacji poszczególnych regionów świata 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Afryka Państwa arabskie Kraje Azji i Pacyfiku Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw Europa Ameryka Północna i Południowa Źródło: International Telecommunication Union, 2017. Szczegółowe ujęcie wskaźnika, dotyczącego odsetka osób, które korzystają z zasobów Internetu (tabela 3) pozwala na sprawdzenie czy regiony, których wyniki są niższe od najlepszego (znów Europa) zmniejszają odległość do niego, co oznacza, że liczba mieszkańców, korzystających z Internetu zwiększa się w szybszym tempie niż w regionie liderującym, czy ma miejsce stagnacja bądź sytuacja przeciwna. Można przyjąć, że wszystkie regiony świata w latach 2010–2016 zmniejszyły swoją odległość 136 Adam Gąsiorek do Europy. Największy przyrost miał miejsce w przypadku Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw (o 20,5 p. proc.), w pozostałych regionach nie przekroczył 10 p. proc. Tabela 3: Osoby korzystające z zasobów Internetu w latach 2010–2016 – odsetek populacji poszczególnych regionów świata Wspólnota Ameryka Państwa Kraje Azji Rok Afryka Niepodległych Europa Północna arabskie i Pacyfiku Państw i Południowa wynik 9,6 23,7 22,5 33,5 66,6 48,6 2010 odległość 57,0 42,8 44,1 33,1 0,0 17,9 wynik 11,9 26,4 25,2 39,5 67,8 51,0 2011 odległość 55,9 41,4 42,6 28,3 0,0 16,8 wynik 14,0 29,3 28,0 49,4 70,0 55,0 2012 odległość 56,0 40,7 41,9 20,6 0,0 15,0 wynik 16,7 32,2 30,7 54,4 71,7 55,9 2013 odległość 55,0 39,6 41,0 17,3 0,0 15,8 wynik 19,6 35,8 34,6 58,2 74,6 58,1 2014 odległość 55,0 38,8 40,0 16,4 0,0 16,5 wynik 22,5 39,0 38,2 61,7 76,3 62,2 2015 odległość 53,8 37,3 38,1 14,6 0,0 14,1 wynik 25,1 41,6 41,9 66,6 79,1 65,0 2016 odległość 54,0 37,5 37,2 12,5 0,0 14,1 Źródło: International Telecommunication Union, 2017. W ujęciu nominalnym, miernik wskazujący odsetek korzystających z zasobów Internetu, odnotował największy wzrost – analogicznie jak w przypadku analizy odległości – we Wspólnocie Niepodległych Państw (33,1 p. proc.), następnie w państwach Azji i Pacyfi ku (19,4 p. proc.) oraz w państwach arabskich (17,9 p. proc.). Warto podkreślić, że w Europie przyrost wartości wskaźnika wyniósł jedynie 12,5 p. proc. i był najniższy spośród regionów poddanych analizie. Należy jednak zauważyć, że kontynent europejski utrzymał pierwszą pozycję w rankingu, a druga w zestawieniu Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw osiągnęła w 2016r. poziom, jaki Europa odnotowała sześć lat wcześniej. Biorąc po uwagę przytoczone wybrane wskaźniki rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego, zwrócenia uwagi wymaga fakt, że Europa, zarówno pod względem dostępu gospodarstw domowych do Internetu, jak i odsetka osób, korzystających z jego zasobów, zajmuje pierwsze miejsce na świecie (wyniki na poziomie ok. 80%), jednocześnie cechując się jedną z niższych dynamik ich wzrostu. Na Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 137 szczególną uwagę zasługuje Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw, która pod względem analizowanych mierników w 2016r. zajęła drugie miejsce na świecie, wyprzedzając Ameryki: Północną i Południową – przyrost odczytów wyniósł ponad 30 p. proc. na przestrzeni opisywanych sześciu lat. Kontynent afrykański wciąż pozostaje regionem z najsłabiej rozwiniętym społeczeństwem informacyjnym: jedynie 22,5% jego mieszkańców korzysta z zasobów Internetu, a 15,4% posiada do niego dostęp we własnym gospodarstwie domowym. 3. Społeczeństwo informacyjne w Unii Europejskiej – zaawansowanie rozwoju w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich Ostatnim etapem prowadzonej w artykule analizy jest spojrzenie na proces rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej oraz potencjalne zjawisko konwergencji, zachodzące pomiędzy nimi, biorąc pod uwagę wybrane wskaźniki, opracowywane przez Eurostat. Porównaniu będą podlegać dane dla lat 2010 i 2016 – pierwszy z nich wyznacza moment rozpoczęcia działań, związanych z realizacją strategii na rzecz inteligentnego i zrównoważonego wzrostu, sprzyjającego włączeniu społecznemu „Europa 2020”, a drugi jest ostatnim rokiem, za który są dostępne dane statystyczne. Tabela 4: Odsetek osób korzystających z Internetu co najmniej raz w tygodniu Odległość Odsetek Odległość Odsetek Kraj 2010 2016 od średniej średniej od średniej średniej UE-28 (średnia) - - - 79 - - UE-27 (średnia) 65 - - - - - Belgia 75 10 115,38 84 5 106,33 Bułgaria 42 -23 64,62 58 -21 73,42 Czechy 58 -7 89,23 79 0 100,00 Dania 86 21 132,31 94 15 118,99 Niemcy 75 10 115,38 87 8 110,13 Estonia 71 6 109,23 85 6 107,59 Irlandia 63 -2 96,92 79 0 100,00 Grecja 41 -24 63,08 66 -13 83,54 138 Adam Gąsiorek Odległość Odsetek Odległość Odsetek Kraj 2010 2016 od średniej średniej od średniej średniej Hiszpania 58 -7 89,23 76 -3 96,20 Francja 72 7 110,77 82 3 103,80 Chorwacja - - - 71 -8 89,87 Włochy 48 -17 73,85 67 -12 84,81 Cypr 50 -15 76,92 74 -5 93,67 Łotwa 62 -3 95,38 77 -2 97,47 Litwa 58 -7 89,23 72 -7 91,14 Luksemburg 86 21 132,31 97 18 122,78 Węgry 60 -5 92,31 78 -1 98,73 Malta 60 -5 92,31 76 -3 96,20 Holandia 88 23 135,38 92 13 116,46 Austria 70 5 107,69 82 3 103,80 Polska 55 -10 84,62 70 -9 88,61 Portugalia 47 -18 72,31 68 -11 86,08 Rumunia 34 -31 52,31 56 -23 70,89 Słowenia 65 0 100,00 73 -6 92,41 Słowacja 73 8 112,31 78 -1 98,73 Finlandia 83 18 127,69 91 12 115,19 Szwecja 88 23 135,38 91 12 115,19 Wielka Brytania 80 15 123,08 93 14 117,72 Źródło: Eurostat, 2017. Wskaźnik, odnoszący się do częstotliwości korzystania z Internetu wskazuje (tabela 4), że w 2016 r. 79% obywateli Unii Europejskiej przeglądało jego zawartość co najmniej raz w tygodniu i było to o 14 p. proc. więcej, aniżeli sześć lat wcześniej. Wartości powyżej średniej (lub jej równe) odnotowano w trzynastu państwach, jednakże Słowacja i Słowenia w 2016 r. znalazły się poniżej odczytu przeciętnego, zaś Czechy i Irlandia zrównały się z nim. Należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że zróżnicowanie w ramach UE, biorąc pod uwagę okres poddany analizie, istotnie się zmniejszyło: w 2010 r. Rumunia z odczytem na poziomie 34% stanowiła jedynie 52,31% przeciętnej, a Holandia i Szwecja odnotowały poziom 88%, czyli 135,38% średniej, natomiast w 2016 r. także Rumunia z odczytem na poziomie 56% wyróżniła się negatywnie (70,89% średniej), a najlepszy okazał się Luksemburg – 97%, czyli 122,78% wartości przeciętnej. Różnica między państwem o najgorszym i najlepszym odczycie zmalała z 54 p. proc. do 41 p. proc., jednak wciąż jest to poziom dość wysoki. Nadto, w 2016 r. w żadnym unijnym państwie członkowskim odsetek osób, które korzystają Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 139 z Internetu przynajmniej raz w tygodniu, nie znajdował się poniżej 50%, co jeszcze sześć lat wcześniej miało miejsce w Bułgarii, Grecji, Włoszech, Portugalii i Rumunii. Co więcej, już w sześciu państwach wyniósł on powyżej 90% – Danii, Luksemburgu, Holandii, Finlandii, Szwecji i Wielkiej Brytanii. Tabela 5: Odsetek gospodarstw domowych posiadających szerokopasmowy dostęp do Internetu Odległość Odsetek Odległość Odsetek Kraj 2010 2016 od średniej średniej od średniej średniej UE-28 (średnia) - - - 83 - - UE-27 (średnia) 61 - - - - - Belgia 70 9 114,75 82 -1 98,80 Bułgaria 26 -35 42,62 63 -20 75,90 Czechy 54 -7 88,52 80 -3 96,39 Dania 80 19 131,15 92 9 110,84 Niemcy 75 14 122,95 90 7 108,43 Estonia 64 3 104,92 85 2 102,41 Irlandia 58 -3 95,08 86 3 103,61 Grecja 41 -20 67,21 68 -15 81,93 Hiszpania 56 -5 91,80 81 -2 97,59 Francja 66 5 108,20 79 -4 95,18 Chorwacja - - - 77 -6 92,77 Włochy 49 -12 80,33 77 -6 92,77 Cypr 51 -10 83,61 74 -9 89,16 Łotwa 53 -8 86,89 75 -8 90,36 Litwa 54 -7 88,52 71 -12 85,54 Luksemburg 70 9 114,75 97 14 116,87 Węgry 51 -10 83,61 78 -5 93,98 Malta 69 8 113,11 82 -1 98,80 Holandia 80 19 131,15 95 12 114,46 Austria 64 3 104,92 85 2 102,41 Polska 57 -4 93,44 76 -7 91,57 Portugalia 50 -11 81,97 73 -10 87,95 Rumunia 23 -38 37,70 70 -13 84,34 Słowenia 62 1 101,64 78 -5 93,98 Słowacja 49 -12 80,33 78 -5 93,98 Finlandia 76 15 124,59 91 8 109,64 Szwecja 83 22 136,07 89 6 107,23 Wielka Brytania - - - 92 9 110,84 Źródło: Eurostat, 2017. 140 Adam Gąsiorek Miernik, opisujący posiadanie szerokopasmowego dostępu do Internetu przez unijne gospodarstwa domowe pokazuje (tabela 5), że w 2016 r. już 83% z nich posiadało tego rodzaju możliwość połączenia z siecią – było to o 22 p. proc. więcej, aniżeli w 2010 r. Wartości powyżej średniej odnotowano w dwunastu krajach w 2010 r. i dziesięciu krajach sześć lat później. Koniecznym wydaje się podkreślenie, że po dokonaniu zestawienia lat 2010 i 2016, Belgia, Francja, Malta i Słowenia, mimo podwyższenia wartości wskaźnika, znalazły się w 2016 r. poniżej przeciętnej. Natomiast w przypadku Irlandii wystąpiła sytuacja odwrotna – na skutek wzrostu odsetka o 28 p. proc. mogła zostać zaliczona do grupy, posiadającej wartość wskaźnika powyżej średniej. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że znacząco zmniejszyło się zróżnicowanie, występujące w Unii Europejskiej: jeszcze w 2010 r. Rumunia, z odczytem na poziomie 23%, stanowiła jedynie 37,7% średniej, a Szwecja, która odnotowała poziom 83%, aż 136,07% wartości przeciętnej. Z kolei w 2016 r. Bułgaria z odczytem na poziomie 63% wyróżniła się negatywnie (75,9% średniej), natomiast najlepszy okazał się Luksemburg – 97%, czyli 116,87% przeciętnej. Różnica między państwem o najgorszym i najlepszym odczycie zmalała więc z 63 p. proc. do 34 p. proc., co, średnio ujmując, oznaczało zmniejszanie rozwarstwienia o 4,8 p. proc. rocznie. Analogicznie jak w przypadku wskaźnika poprzedniego, w 2016 r. w żadnym unijnym państwie członkowskim odsetek gospodarstw domowych, posiadających szerokopasmowy dostęp do Internetu, nie znajdował się poniżej 50%, co jeszcze sześć lat wcześniej miało miejsce w Bułgarii, Grecji, Włoszech, Rumunii i Słowacji. Co więcej, już w sześciu krajach wyniósł on 90% i więcej – Danii, Niemczech, Luksemburgu, Holandii, Finlandii i Wielkiej Brytanii. Tabela 6: Odsetek osób, które dokonały zakupów w Internecie w ciągu ostatnich 12 miesięcy Odległość Odsetek Odległość Odsetek Kraj 2010 2016 od średniej średniej od średniej średniej UE-28 (średnia) - - - 55 - - UE-27 (średnia) 40 - - - - - Belgia 38 -2 95,00 57 2 103,64 Bułgaria 5 -35 12,50 17 -38 30,91 Czechy 27 -13 67,50 47 -8 85,45 Dania 68 28 170,00 82 27 149,09 Niemcy 60 20 150,00 74 19 134,55 Estonia 17 -23 42,50 56 1 101,82 Irlandia 36 -4 90,00 59 4 107,27 Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 141 Odległość Odsetek Odległość Odsetek Kraj 2010 2016 od średniej średniej od średniej średniej Grecja 12 -28 30,00 31 -24 56,36 Hiszpania 24 -16 60,00 44 -11 80,00 Francja 54 14 135,00 66 11 120,00 Chorwacja 14 - - 33 -22 60,00 Włochy 15 -25 37,50 29 -26 52,73 Cypr 18 -22 45,00 29 -26 52,73 Łotwa 17 -23 42,50 44 -11 80,00 Litwa 11 -29 27,50 33 -22 60,00 Luksemburg 60 20 150,00 78 23 141,82 Węgry 18 -22 45,00 39 -16 70,91 Malta 38 -2 95,00 48 -7 87,27 Holandia 67 27 167,50 74 19 134,55 Austria 42 2 105,00 58 3 105,45 Polska 29 -11 72,50 42 -13 76,36 Portugalia 15 -25 37,50 31 -24 56,36 Rumunia 4 -36 10,00 12 -43 21,82 Słowenia 27 -13 67,50 40 -15 72,73 Słowacja 33 -7 82,50 56 1 101,82 Finlandia 59 19 147,50 67 12 121,82 Szwecja 66 26 165,00 76 21 138,18 Wielka Brytania 67 27 167,50 83 28 150,91 Źródło: Eurostat, 2017. Pomimo tego, że ok. 80% gospodarstw domowych w Unii Europejskiej ma szerokopasmowy dostęp do Internetu i wielu jej mieszkańców często korzysta z zasobów w nim zamieszczonych, to dokonywanie zakupów w Internecie, jak wynika z tabeli 6, jest stosunkowo mało intensywne. W 2016 r. jedynie niewiele ponad połowa unijnych obywateli (55%) zadeklarowała, że w ciągu ostatnich dwunastu miesięcy nabyła towar lub usługę za pomocą Internetu. Co prawda, w porównaniu do 2010 r. nastąpił istotny wzrost odczytu, o 15 p. proc., jednak można przypuszczać, że poziom 40% był dalece niewystarczający. Wartości powyżej średniej odnotowano w dziewięciu państwach w 2010 r., a sześć lat później w trzynastu – do Danii, Niemiec, Francji, Luksemburga, Holandii, Austrii, Finlandii, Szwecji i Wielkiej Brytanii, mających odczyty ponad przeciętną, na koniec badanego okresu dołączyły Belgia, Estonia, Irlandia i Słowacja. W przypadku tego wskaźnika podkreślić należy, 142 Adam Gąsiorek że zróżnicowanie, które występowało w Unii Europejskiej w 2010 r. – Rumunia, z odczytem na poziomie 4% (10% średniej) vis-a-vis Danii, która odnotowała poziom 68% (170% średniej) – zostało w 2016 r. zwiększone. Wówczas najniższy odsetek deklarujących zakupy przez Internet odnotowano także w Rumunii [wyniósł on 12% (21,82% średniej)], natomiast najwięcej deklarujących (83%) zaobserwowano w Wielkiej Brytanii (150,91% przeciętnej). Różnica między państwem o najgorszym i najlepszym odczycie wzrosła więc z 64 p. proc. do 71 p. proc. Wartym podkreślenia jest również negatywny fakt, że wyłącznie w przypadku ośmiu państw w 2010 r. i trzynastu w 2016 r. ponad połowa ich mieszkańców dokonała zakupu towaru lub usługi drogą internetową. Wnioski Społeczeństwo informacyjne w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej znajduje się w różnych stadiach zaawansowania, czego dowiodła przedstawiona analiza. Pomimo wiodącej pozycji, jaką Europa – w ujęciu łącznym – zajmuje na świecie pod względem dostępu gospodarstw domowych do Internetu i korzystania z jego zasobów przez Europejczyków, ujawnione różnice wydają się być znaczące. Różnorodność w zakresie wdrażania nowoczesnych technologii ICT oraz ich wykorzystania w codziennym życiu bezpośrednio wpływa na możliwości, jakie posiadają obywatele państw członkowskich UE. W regionach, w których społeczeństwo informacyjne znajduje się w pierwszej fazie rozwoju są one zdecydowanie mniejsze, aniżeli tam, gdzie mieszkańcy świadomie i z łatwością wykorzystują dostępną na rynku technologię. Dane statystyczne, dotyczące przekształceń w zakresie społeczeństwa „nowego typu”, które zbierają instytucje i organizacje międzynarodowe, powinny być przyczynkiem dla działań, podejmowanych w celu przechodzenia do kolejnych faz jego zaawansowania tak, aby w całej Unii Europejskiej społeczeństwo informacyjne osiągnęło stadium stabilności (dojrzałości) i dzięki temu nastąpiło wyrównanie szans wszystkich mieszkańców obszaru ugrupowania. Inicjatywy te z pewnością wpłynęłyby na poprawę realizacji założeń Strategii „Europa 2020” oraz przyczyniłyby się do zmniejszenia zjawiska wykluczenia cyfrowego, dotąd w niektórych krajach UE będącego na stosunkowo wysokim poziomie. Zróżnicowanie rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Unii Europejskiej 143 Bibliografia Chmielarz, Witold. 2007. Systemy biznesu elektronicznego. Warszawa: Difi n. Haber Lesław H., Garwol Katarzyna. 2011. „Technologie teleinformatyczne jako źródło patologii w społeczeństwie informacyjnym” w: Społeczeństwo informacyjne. 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