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Specific Instance Complaint OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Specific Instance Complaint OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Against: Italtel Group SpA Via Reiss Romoli - loc. Castelletto 20019 Settimo Milanese (Milano) Italy Tel: +39 02 43881 WeBsite: http://www.italtel.com/ CEO: Mr. Stefano Pileri Email: [email protected] Subject: Italtel’s Breaches of human rights provisions of the OECD Guidelines in relation to an agreement Between Italtel and the Telecommunication Company of Iran for provision of telecom services and technologies in the Islamic RepuBlic of Iran Complainants: International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) 17 Passage de la Main d'Or 75011 Paris, France Tel: +33 1 43 55 25 18 WeBsite: www.fidh.org REDRESS 87 Vauxhall Walk London SE11 5HJ, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)20 7793 1777 WeBsite: www.redress.org c Justice for Iran Suite 8, 1 AbBey Street, Eynsham, OX29 4TB, United Kingdom Tel: +44 1865 880000 WeBsite: www.justiceforiran.org c Contact person for Complainants: Ms. Shadi Sadr Executive Director of Justice for Iran Email: [email protected] Presented to: Italy National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Ministry of Economic Development Directorate General for Industrial Policy, Competitiveness and SMEs Division VI - International policies, promotion of corporate social responsiBility and the cooperative movement Via Molise, 2 00187 Rome, Italy Tel: (+ 39-6) 4705 3052 Fax: (+ 39-6) 4705 2013 Email: [email protected] 2 Table of Contents I. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... 4 II. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 6 III. PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES .................................................... 8 IV. WHAT IS AT STAKE ...................................................................................................... 8 V. KEY bACKGROUND INFORMATION ............................................................................ 15 1. Freedom of Expression and Internet in Iran ........................................................... 15 2. Relevant PuBlicly Available Information and Reports ............................................ 19 3. IRGC and Cyber Army ............................................................................................. 24 4. IRGC’s Takeover of the TCI ..................................................................................... 26 VI. bREACHES OF THE OECD GUIDELINES ...................................................................... 28 1. Failure to Conduct Risk-based Human Rights Due Diligence ................................. 29 2. Failure to Identify the Full Scope and Severity of Potential Adverse Human Rights Impacts .......................................................................................................................... 31 3. Failure to Disclose Information Including Social Reporting .................................... 32 4. Failure to Promote Internet Freedom through Respect of Freedom of Expression Online ............................................................................................................................ 33 5. Other Potential breaches ....................................................................................... 34 VII. OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS .................................................... 35 VIII. REQUESTS TO THE NCP .......................................................................................... 37 Annex 1: Italtels’s Press Release ............................................................................... 39 Annex 2: TCI’s Press Release ..................................................................................... 40 Annex 3: Complainants’ letters to Italtel ................................................................... 42 Annex 4: Small Media Report: Filterwatch, March 2017 .......................................... 45 3 I. SUMMARY The present Complaint is suBmitted to the Italian NCP by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), REDRESS, and Justice for Iran (JFI) (collectively referred to as the “Complainants”). The Complainants allege that Italtel Group SpA (“Italtel”) has Breached the OECD Guide- lines for Multinational Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”) in relation to a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) entered into by Italtel and the Telecommunications Company of Iran (“TCI”) on 13 April 2016, whereby the parties agreed to purportedly “cooperate on the development of the Iranian telecommunications sector.”1 The services offered by Italtel to TCI include “IP-NOC, IP-bb projects as well as provision of equipment for the implementation of the Iranian telecom network … on the Basis of the plans designated by TCI within 18 months.”2 However, it is unclear whether this agreement has been for- mally executed and implemented and whether any services and/or equipment have so far been delivered to TCI. As will be explained in section VI below, TCI is currently controlled by a consortium led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), which took over the company in 2009. Commanded by Iran’s Supreme Leader, the IRGC has been Iran’s most powerful military and security entity since its inception in 1979 in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. IRGC has played a crucial role in crushing political dissent and civil liBerties throughout the country and more recently in cyBerspace. As such, the Italtel-TCI agreement, which aims to advance the infrastructure for TCI’s tel- ecommunications and Internet services, risks to contriBute to Internet censorship and suppression of a wide range of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Iran. The agreement would also empower and equip the IRGC with the tools to suppress opposi- tion voices and commit serious human rights violations online and offline as detailed fur- ther in this complaint. By entering into the agreement with TCI, Italtel has partnered with one of the main violators of Internet freedom and freedom of expression in Iran, namely the IRGC, an entity which has been sanctioned by the US and the EU including for its record of human rights violations in Iran. Therefore, it is respectfully suBmitted that, by entering into the MoU, Italtel has Breached multiple principles of the OECD Guidelines by: i. failing to comply with its duty of due diligence as contemplated under the OECD Guidelines; it also failed to take reasonable steps and make good faith efforts to conduct human rights due diligence, including identifying the relevant factual cir- cumstances and consulting with and preventing harm to affected communities, as part of its business decision-making and risk management systems; 1 Press Release by Italtel entitled “Italtel and TCI Agree to Cooperate on Telecommunication De- velopment Projects in Iran”, Tehran, 13 April 2016, available at: <http://www.italtel.com/content/uploads/2016/04/PR-Italtel-Iran.pdf>, accessed 5 SeptemBer 2017. For a copy of the Press Release by Italtel please see Annex 1. 2 Press Release by TCI entitled “TCI and Italtel Signed an MoU to Cooperate on Telecommunication Development Projects in Iran”, 17 April 2016, at: <https://www.tci.ir/en/News/ctl/ArticleView/mid/1669/articleId/2511/TCI-and-ItalTel-signed-an-MoU-to- cooperate-on-telecommunication-development-projects-in-Iran>, (no longer available) last accessed 2 FeBruary 2017. For a saved copy of the Press Release by TCI please see Annex 2. 4 ii. failing to identify and conduct any ex ante assessment of potential, and in the cir- cumstances foreseeable and arguably inevitable, adverse social and human rights-related impacts and risks associated with its planned business activities with TCI. Alternatively, it was willfully blind to frequent and well-documented oc- currences of serious human rights violations committed by IRGC in cyberspace and within the telecommunications system. Italtel knew or should have known about the violations of the rights of the Iranian people to freedom of expression and information, as well as long-lasting and extensive violations of human rights, including the right to privacy, in which the IRGC, as the main shareholder of TCI, has been involved; iii. failing to disclose information about whether and which steps it is taking to iden- tify and mitigate risks and potential adverse impacts in designing the services, technologies and potentially products it intends to provide to the TCI as per the MoU; and, iv. failing to promote internet freedom through respect of the rights to freedom of expression, assemBly and association online. Moreover, in the event and to the extent that the MoU shall be operable and enforcea- ble and/or shall materialize into a definitive agreement Between Italtel and TCI and/or shall be otherwise implemented, without Italtel having adequately met the above obliga- tions, Italtel will have: i. engaged in close business cooperation with major violators of human rights in Iran relating to telecommunications and cyBerspace, equipping them with more sophisticated and efficient means for perpetrating serious violations of the hu- man rights against Iranian citizens and others subject to Iran’s jurisdiction; ii. placed itself in a situation that would risk to cause Italtel to contriBute or other- wise become complicit in the commission of serious violations of human rights committed or sanctioned by the Government of Iran through the IRGC, such as mass interception and surveillance of
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