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Iran Sanctions Iran Sanctions (name redacted) Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs April 18, 2018 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RS20871 Iran Sanctions Summary The multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) provides Iran broad relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran’s civilian economic sectors, including U.S. secondary sanctions (sanctions on foreign firms that do business with Iran). On January 16, 2016, upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments, U.S. Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws took effect, relevant executive orders (E.O.s) were revoked, and corresponding U.N. and EU sanctions were lifted. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, nonbinding U.N. restrictions on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and a binding ban on its importation or exportation of arms remain in place for several years. Iran was able to develop its nuclear and missile programs and to assist pro-Iranian regional groups and governments even when strict sanctions were in place. Remaining in place are relatively less effective sanctions, not targeting Iran’s core economic sectors, including a general ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran; U.S. sanctions imposed because of Iran’s support for terrorism, its human rights abuses, its interference in specified countries in the region, and its missile and advanced conventional weapons programs; and sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliates. Some additional sanctions on these entities and activities were made mandatory by the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), which also increases sanctions on Russia and North Korea. As part of an asserted shift to broadly counter Iran, the Trump Administration has threatened to cease implementing the JCPOA unless Congress and U.S. allies successfully address the agreement’s weaknesses. The Administration has, to date, continued to implement the agreement by exercising waivers of sanctions laws suspended in accordance with the JCPOA, while continuing to impose sanctions on missile- and IRGC-related entities and on Iranian human rights violators. However, the President said on January 12, 2018, that he would not renew any more waivers, the next one being due on May 12, 2018, unless his conditions for “fixing” the JCPOA are met. Because the President has also not certified Iranian compliance with the JCPOA under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), Congress might separately act to reimpose Iran sanctions. The reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions could harm Iran’s economy depending on the degree to which foreign governments and companies cooperate with the sanctions reimposition. During 2012-2015, Iran’s economy shrank by 9% per year, crude oil exports fell from about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd) to about 1.1 mbd, and more than $120 billion in Iranian reserves held in banks abroad were inaccessible. JCPOA sanctions relief has enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly presanctions levels, regain access to funds held abroad and reintegrate into the international financial system, achieve about 7% overall economic growth in each of 2016 and 2017, attract new foreign investments in the energy sector, and buy new passenger aircraft. The relief from sanctions on Iran’s most vital sectors contributed to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s reelection in the May 19, 2017, vote. Yet, perceived economic inequities and grievances constituted a key component of the widespread unrest in December 2017-January 2018. And, there are some indications that Iran’s economy is being adversely affected by uncertainty about whether all U.S. sanctions will be reimposed by the Trump Administration. See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by (name redacted) and (name redacted); and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by (name redacted) . Congressional Research Service Iran Sanctions Contents Overview and Objectives ................................................................................................................ 1 Blocked Iranian Property and Assets ............................................................................................... 1 Executive Order 13599 Impounding Iran-Owned Assets .......................................................... 3 Sanctions for Iran’s Support for Terrorism and Destabilizing Regional Activities ......................... 4 Sanctions Triggered by Terrorism List Designation .................................................................. 4 Exception for U.S. Humanitarian Aid ................................................................................. 5 Sanctions on States Designated as “Not Cooperating” Against Terrorism ............................... 5 Executive Order 13224 Sanctioning Terrorism-Supporting Entities ......................................... 5 Application to the Revolutionary Guard by the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) .............................................................. 6 Implementation ................................................................................................................... 6 Executive Orders Sanctioning Iran’s Involvement in Iraq and Syria ........................................ 6 Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment with Iran .................................................................................. 6 What U.S.-Iran Trade Is Allowed or Prohibited? ...................................................................... 7 Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms ................................................................. 10 Sanctions on Iran’s Energy Sector ................................................................................................. 10 The Iran Sanctions Act (Including Triggers and Applications Added by CISADA, ITRSHRA, IFCA, and Other Laws) ...................................................................................... 11 Key Sanctions “Triggers” Under ISA ................................................................................ 11 Mandate and Time Frame to Investigate ISA Violations .................................................. 15 Interpretations and Implementation of ISA and Related Laws ......................................... 17 Oil Export Sanctions: Section 1245 of the FY2012 NDAA Sanctioning Transactions with Iran’s Central Bank ...................................................................................................... 20 Implementation: Exemptions Issued ................................................................................. 20 Foreign Exchange Reserves “Lock Up” Provision of ITRSHRA ..................................... 21 Sanctions on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles, and Conventional Arms Transfers ........... 23 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and Iraq Sanctions Act ................................................. 23 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ....................................................... 24 Proliferation-Related Provision of the Iran Sanctions Act ...................................................... 24 Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act ......................................................................... 24 Executive Order 13382 on Proliferation-Supporting Entities ................................................. 25 Arms Transfer and Missile Sanctions in the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44). .................................................................. 25 Foreign Aid Restrictions for Named Suppliers of Iran............................................................ 27 Sanctions on “Countries of Diversion Concern” ..................................................................... 28 Financial/Banking Sanctions ......................................................................................................... 28 Targeted Financial Measures ................................................................................................... 28 Ban on Iranian Access to the U.S. Financial System .............................................................. 29 CISADA: Sanctioning Foreign Banks That Conduct Transactions with Sanctioned Iranian Entities ..................................................................................................................... 30 Implementation of Section 104: Sanctions Imposed ......................................................... 31 Iran Designated a Money-Laundering Jurisdiction/FATF ....................................................... 31 Cross-Cutting Secondary Sanctions: The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) ........................................................................................................................................ 32 Post-JCPOA Status: Sections Listed Below Waived ............................................................... 32 Congressional Research Service Iran Sanctions Implementation ................................................................................................................. 33 Sanctions on Iran’s Cyber and Transnational Criminal Activities ................................................. 33 Executive Order 13694 (April 1, 2015) .................................................................................
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