Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 23, Issue 2, November 2019 Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Volume 23, Issue 2, November 2019 (102-119) ISSN 1410-4946 (Print), 2502-7883 (Online) doi: 10.22146/jsp.37855

Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community

Amali Kartika Karawita London School of Public Relations Jakarta (LSPR) (email: [email protected])

Abstract Piracy in Somalia is a phenomenon that has presented several challenges for the international community since the beginning of the 21st century. Effectively formulating a plan of action against piracy requires the willingness of the international community to work together by implementing strong multilateral operations between countries and understanding the social and economic difficulties faced by Somalia, which has given rise to the endemic and its expansion throughout the region. Eradicating piracy means tackling the issue on land by confronting Somalia’s extreme poverty and lack of economic opportunity as well as creating a comprehensive legal framework that will serve as a model to fight piracy. The objective of the present paper is to discuss the roots of piracy in Somalia and the cycle it created, as well as provide an analysis on the legal framework in place in order to judge its effectiveness on an international level. The method applied to lead this research is based on the analysis of reports from international bodies such as the UN and the ICC, as well as academic articles. The results have shown that piracy is the fruit of social, economic, and political issues that have enabled the phenomenon to spread and establish itself in the country.

Keywords: maritime; piracy; international relations

Introduction days before being released after a ransom of $ Maritime piracy has become a worrying 4.5 million was paid (Ismunadi, 2011). issue, particularly in the pirate-infested region Somalia has attracted the attention of of the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia, the international community after continuous which poses great security threats to the pirate attacks in the region, triggering the main thousands of ships sailing this route every question on how to effectively deal with this day. The region holds strategic and economic issue. Somalia has a long history of conflict and importance due to the high maritime traffic. unrest, which contributed to the ongoing chaos Every day, ships are exposing themselves to in the country and led to the development of the increased risk of pirate attacks, endangering piracy on its shores. The difficulty of finding an both the crews and the merchandise onboard. adequate long-term solution to fighting piracy Several attacks were led off Somalia’s coast, has been the main problem the international triggering international concern over safety. community currently faces. A well-known attack in March 2011 targeted This paper aims to answer the following the MV Sinar Kudus, which was the first questions: what are the root causes of piracy in Indonesian ship hijacked by Somali pirates. Somalia, and what are the solutions provided The ship and the crew were held captive for 46 both onshore and off? Piracy is a crime

102 Amali Kartika Karawita: Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community taking its roots on land. It requires long-term The policies rather support global interests solutions focusing on the creation of an honest, and state/corporate self-interests (Rothe & effective, and determined justice system and the Collins, 2011). The general consensus among commitment of the international community to academics is the international community’s eradicate this issue entirely (Murphy, 2008). lack of interest and the inadequate policies in place to respond to the threat. The international Literature Review community still remains wary of carrying According to Murphy, piracy can be out activities, especially onshore, to eradicate defined as a land-based crime. The solution to piracy successfully, preferring offshore military effectively fight piracy is to create honest and action instead. This weariness is due to the lack determined criminal justice system (Murphy, of a credible national government with whom 2008). Treves (2009) also supports the idea to partner up (Affi, Elmi, & Mohammed, 2015). that piracy has become a lucrative business in By preferring to take actions offshore to secure Somalia due to the political instability caused international trade routes, the international by the absence of an effective government as community highlights its priority to protect well as fighting between different factions for foremost international trade before dealing with power. Furthermore, the author points out the the root causes of piracy onshore (Martinez- inadequacy of the present legal framework Zarzoso & Bensassi, 2012). The UN, the EU, the on piracy to fight violent activities off Somali US, as well as other developed countries whose coasts. This inadequacy lies in the narrow economy is supported on maritime commerce definition of piracy according to international have suggested that the best approach to law and the willingness of seizing states maritime piracy is through military means to exercise their jurisdiction and prosecute by the deployment of multinational naval pirates. International law allows actions to be warships that would restore security at sea. taken against pirates, but it does not ensure The weight of these international actors on that those actions are adequately taken. In the approach to piracy have overshadowed “Securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia,” other anti-piracy approaches. For instance, the author Bilyana Tsvetkova argues that Somali African Union has suggested re-establishing piracy has become a regional and security functioning governments (Tsabora, 2011). issue due to its impact on international trade and human security. For this reason, the Background: Somalian Civil War international community was enticed to The nature of the Somali conflict and the become more proactive in the repression of international context in which it has occurred piracy and to formulate solutions against this since the 1980s has been constantly evolving. problem (Tsvetkova, 2009). Tsvetkova agrees In its first phase, the conflict that started first with Murphy’s claim that eradicating Somali as a civil war in the late 80s slowly turned into piracy requires measures to interrupt the conflicts between war lords in the 1990s before system supporting it inland (Tsevtkova, 2009). becoming a conflict of ideology with the rise of In his research on the political discourse and the radical Islam in the 21st century (Bradbury & policy response of the international community, Healy, 2010). The consequence of this conflict’s Rothe and Collins (2011) concluded that the evolution led to the disintegration of the Somali policies currently in place to deter piracy were state and its inability to unite its government largely inefficient. They ignored the root causes into a centralized authority later on. The state of piracy, such as the disorganized Somali of lawlessness that befell Somalia in 1991 and society and the lack of a central authority. the failure of the international community to

103 Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 23, Issue 2, November 2019 rebuild and stabilize the country will enable January 1991, the insufficient resources and piracy to develop and grow as a consequence. the discontentment toward the government caused Barre’s removal from power. Somalia Somalia as a Failed State was the theater of violent clashes for power Menkhaus suggests that the categorization and control between clans. Warlords began of Somalia as a failed state can be dated back taking control of Somalia’s fractured territory from the 1970s following the Ogaden war with and competed against each other to extend their Ethiopia in 1977. The first signs of state failure domination (Bradbury & Healy, 2010, p.10). were the collapse of Somalia’s education system Somalia formally reached its collapse by May and state farm production in the 1970s. It was 1991 (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). then followed by the weakening and dysfunction of most government institutions, rising tensions International response to Somalia’s collapse between clans, low salaries, and high levels of In response to Somalia’s collapse, the corruption, all of which consequently led to the United States, with the support of the United expropriation of resources, especially foreign aid, Nations, launched a multinational force for personal gains (Menkhaus, 2010). in December 1992 called “United Nations The collapse of Somalia is linked to Operation in Somalia” (UNOSOM) in the hopes external and internal factors. Externally, of restoring order and responding to security Somalia’s disintegration is the legacies of challenges posed by the collapsed Somali European colonization and the Cold War. state through military and humanitarian Consequently, Somali society became intervention (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). From increasingly militarized and divided (Loubser 1992 to 1995, UNOSOM aimed to revive & Solomon, 2014). The wars that followed important governmental functions and restart with neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, the economy to increase security. Humanitarian greatly weakened the country (Bradbury & operations, which consisted of food and water Healy, 2010). Internally, the conception of a distribution, were also actively conducted. centralized government holding authority However, UNOSOM was highly criticized for created tensions within Somali culture based its failure to end conflicts and disarm factions on a kinship system in which power is shared that hindered the peace process. UNOSOM (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2008). instead contributed to conflicts in Somalia by From 1969 to 1991, Somalia was under reinforcing the warlord power structures and the harsh regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. allowing the proliferation of armed groups. As Barre’s dictatorship led to growing resentment a result , UNSOM was forced to withdraw its amongst the population and cultivated rivalries forces. This event marked the disengagement of between clans. The repercussions of Barre’s Western powers (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). On a politics have contributed to the inability of regional level, after the retreat of UNOSOM, the Somali clans to form a unified government Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Menkhaus, 2007). (IGAD) became involved as the main actor The fall of Barre’s regime was accelerated to resolve the Somali conflict by promoting by the end of Cold War and the decline of political dialogue and restoring stability. Somalia’s strategic importance, which then However, IGAD faced many obstacles in the lead to the diminution of foreign aid. For pursuit of its mandate such as the lack of over 15 years, foreign aid had sustained the political will from Somali clan elders who were extensive patronage system and civil service reluctant to share power, financial constraints, to stabilize the regime (Menkhaus, 2007). By weak armies, and the lack of logistical support

104 Amali Kartika Karawita: Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community to continue its operations (Hearn et al., 2014). Civil society organizations (CSO) have Shortly after, IGAD was replaced by the African also played the important role of filling Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 in the gaps left by the collapse of Barre’s and is currently operating in the country. regime. These non-state actors participated AMISOM focuses on state-building and peace- in efforts of peace-building by promoting building operations. Its main objective is to dialogue, reconciliation, and rebuilding trust establish security by increasing the territorial in a polarized society. CSOs were facing many control of the Federal Government of Somalia difficulties in implementing themselves as (FGS). Its serves as a force to impose the a unifying force due to institutional issues, legitimacy of the FGS and thus solve the issue lack of resources, organizational weaknesses, of state failure plaguing the country since 1991 and internal disputes (Osman, 2018). Another (Williams et al., 2018). The mission has also major issue is the lack of non-partisan CSOs. been actively engaged in military operations Associations and NGOs often followed aimed at dismantling terrorist groups (Williams clan lines, which is not surprising given et al., 2018). Although the terrorist threat is the context of Somalia’s society based on still present, AMISOM was able to increase kinship (Tiilikainen & Mohamed, 2012). Many security, which has allowed Somalia to engage criticisms were formulated against the local in the political process for reconciliation and and international NGOs that have been using transfer some security responsibilities to Somali war for their own benefits. The success of these forces, thus reviving important components of different initiatives, although not negligible, a well-functioning nation. However, just like are limited due to financial issues to conduct IGAD, AMISOM still faces many obstacles and maintain operations, identity politics that in conducting its operations, such as the lack hinder the unification of the Somali people and of resources and capabilities to successfully the establishment of government legitimacy, as accomplish its mandate (Williams et al., 2018). well as the issue of extremism relating to the Its planned withdrawal in 2021 threatens influence of terrorist groups. stability and territorial gains (Faleg, 2019). During the years following the collapse of The Rise of Islamist Movements Barre’s regime, the US became heavily involved The failure of the international community in Somalia through UNITAF and Operation to find a suitable solution to the Somali Restore Hope, which was set to help the problem provided a fertile ground for the humanitarian catastrophe faced by the Somali emergence of Islamist extremists seeking people with the help of military force. The result to create an Islamic State. Since 1991, local was remarkably successful. UNITAF secured terrorist organizations, such as Al-Itihaad, have ports and airfields, helped humanitarian actively tried to establish an Islamic State in organizations safely reach their destination, Somalia by developing indirect political control and they opened up communication lines. through the infiltration of local administrations Unfortunately, the support provided by (International Crisis Group, 2002). Al Qaeda UNITAF was subjected to conflicts between has also developed its network in Somalia the military and the humanitarian community by supporting local Islamic groups with (Kennedy, 1996). This issue appears again training and logistics. The unguarded coasts of with the establishment of UNSOM in 2017 Somalia have sparked concern among Western and the opposition of humanitarian groups, countries, which believed that Al Qaeda was which feared the politicization of humanitarian using Somalia as one of the group’s hidden activities (Action Against Hunger, 2015). bases for its land and maritime operations.

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Another concern raised by the to foreign fleets (Tharoor, 2009). With their international community was the possibility own rudimentary equipment, local fishermen of collusion between terrorists and pirates could barely compete against the bigger and in the region (Nelson, 2012). This concern more modern foreign ships. In addition to is mainly motivated by the assumption that illegal fishing, Somali waters have become the terrorists could be inspired by the pirates to dumping ground for industrialized countries conduct maritime operations against ships of hazardous waste since the early 1980s. (Murphy, 2008) or use piracy as a means The 2005 UNEP environmental assessment to finance their land operations (Brookes, on Somalia reported that the waste dumped 2009). However, today, there is no conclusive along Somalia’s coasts comprises of highly evidence supporting this claim (Murphy, toxic waste dangerous to the environment 2008). and the health of local populations (Tharoor, Nevertheless, the lack of an effective 2009). Most of this waste was not disposed of government in Somalia provides ground for adequately according to international measures. criminal activities to take place. The historical The 2004 tsunami led to the contamination of roots of the Somali conflicts have given rise the drinkable water sources for the population to the phenomenon of piracy by creating an (UNEP, 2005). To this day, the dumping of adequate setting for such activity to develop hazardous waste has had devastating impacts over time. Piracy in Somalia has thrived on on the local populations, who have experienced two decades of extreme violence, which have health problems such as respiratory infections, had devastating economic, political, and social skin diseases, child disfigurement, and even effects on the population and nation at large. death (UNEP, 2005). It is estimated that the cost of dumping toxic or radioactive waste off Failed State and the Rise of Piracy the Horn of Africa for European companies is In this context, Somalia’s failure to form around $2.50 per ton instead of $250 per ton if a stable government since 1991 led to the these companies disposed of the waste properly development of piracy as a response to the and legally in Europe (Tharoor, 2009). absence of a central authority able to control As a response to the environmental and the territory and provide basic needs to the illegal fishing threats, Somali fishermen were population. One of the main consequences of a forced to defend their waters and insure their state’s disintegration is the inability to perform fishing expeditions (Tharoor, 2009). In the early security tasks. This meant that Somalia’s 90s, the fishermen took up arms against foreign 3,330km coastline, the longest in continental ships. At the beginning of maritime piracy, Africa, as well as its borders were not patrolled trawlers intercepted boats without licenses (Tharoor, 2009). Therefore, foreign fishing ships and paid a small amount to the interceptors to were able to take advantage of the political conceal the illegality of their activity. People situation. The absence of an effective authority saw in this practice the possibility to make over Somali territorial waters led foreign money. Soon, fishermen joined hands with fishing ships to plunder Somali’s fish stocks militias and unemployed youth to hijack (Husein, 2010). The UN has estimated that the ships (Raunek, 2016). Pirates were able to cost of illegal fishing in Somalia reached $300 create a business centered on ship hijacking million each year (Tharoor, 2009). The Somali and ransoming, which consequently led their fishing industry has always been a small-scale interest to bigger catches with higher value industry, which in terms of their fleet, lacked (Tharoor, 2009). Although the initial motive new technologies and modern boats compared of these fishermen was the protection of their

106 Amali Kartika Karawita: Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community waters, the economic gains from intercepting Maritime piracy is able to grow on the foreign ships rapidly took over. gap left by the central state. It has revitalized local economies. Somali culture highlights the Piracy, An Economic Phenomenon importance of sharing. Those who are wealthy Somalia’s economic situation helped are expected to share their resources with other foster the development of piracy. As a result members of the clan as a moral obligation of the civil unrest, the Somali economy was (Shortland, 2012). The profits of piracy are completely destroyed. The absence of a central distributed among the community. Roughly government to regulate and articulate coherent 30% goes to the hijackers, 10% to the local economic policies aggravated the country’s community elders and officials, while 20% of economy. Poverty in Somalia is endemic. profits go to financiers and the last 10% to the Over 12 million people are living below the sponsors (Kellerman, 2011). international poverty line, at $0.19/day in On the other hand, piracy has brought 2017 (World Bank, 2017). The unemployment significant development and infrastructure to rate is one of the highest, accounting for 67% the county and its population. For example, of a young population in which 70% of the the inland city of Garowe has registered population is under the age of 30 (UNICEF, a wide growth from 2002 to 2009, with 2017). Inequality is high as economic growth satellite images showing light industrial and happens in the city, accentuating the gap commercial development (Shortland, 2012). between urban and rural areas (World Bank, A number of hotels have popped up, destined 2017). The absence of a stable government for a rich clientele most likely linked to pirates. providing services to the population means Therefore, money earned through piracy has that the private sector has become the main brought some contributions to the fast growth provider of these services. This privatization of Garowe, designating the city as the center has led to the development of an unregulated for the pirates’ operations (Shortland, 2012). economy in which piracy and other criminal Piracy money is mostly spent inside Somalia, activities are booming freely (Menkhaus, especially in the urbanized inland cities like 2010). Garowe. Piracy became a particularly lucrative business that generated $415 million in ransom Corruption of Somali Officials money between 2009 and 2010 (Bowden et al., The spread of piracy along the coast of 2010). So as long as Somalia’s economy does Somalia, as well as the creation of strong base not improve, piracy will continue to thrive. In a camps in urban cities, would not be possible country where poverty is rampant, piracy offers without the high levels of corruption usually an alternative way to make a living, which affecting failed states. Corruption is one of attracts young Somali men. Piracy is viewed as the elements undermining the formation of a an economic opportunity to improve people’s stable authority in Somalia (Anti-Corruption livelihoods. Pirates able to strike a good ransom Resource Centre U4, 2012). The country is deal can radically change their lives. This ranked as one of the world’s most corrupt practice offers young men the opportunity countries, obtaining in 2011 a score of 1 on a to integrate the economic elite of the country scale of 0 to 10, 10 being the highest level of (Osei-Tutu, 2011). Many build lavish houses, cleanliness (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre buy new cars, drugs, prostitutes, guns, and U4, 2012). marry the most beautiful girls, thus giving them Corruption prevents economic growth a taste of the high life (Hunter, 2008). and development (Ahmad, Ullah, & Arfeen,

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2012). In Somalia, corruption is even more pirate syndicates operating in Dubai have been exacerbated by the elite who compete for laundering money acquired through ransoms. power and access to resources (Ahmad, Ullah, People incriminated in these illicit operations & Arfeen, 2012). In a poverty-stricken system, include businessmen from Somalia and the corruption provides the perspective to increase Middle-East mainly. These syndicates play a the income, providing people with additional major role in the development of piracy off revenue which is not negligible in Somalia the Somali coast, especially by getting access (Leslie, 2014). to new technologies useful for hijacking and Corruption enables pirates to pursue their tracking ships (Sengupta & Howden, 2009). multimillion-dollar business with impunity. The absence of an effective government Piracy, A Response to Somalia’s Social with sufficient resources to pay security Context forces gave strong incentives for bribery and The economic degradation that followed extortion (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, the disintegration of the Somali state severely 2012). For example, armed militias imposed impacted the population, allowing piracy to fees and staff taxes to UN agencies and thrive in such an environment. The two decades non-governmental organizations (NGO) to of civil unrest led to severe social consequences, access, monitor, and manage these agencies’ such as widespread poverty, hunger, and the activities with the aim to divert humanitarian displacement of the population. The collapse assistance (Member of the Monitoring Group of the state gave rise to conflicts between clans on Somali and Eritrea, 2012). Immigration and factions for control over territories and services, airports, customs, and ports are also resources essential for survival (Bradbury affected. A large part of official corruption is & Healy, 2010). The scarcity of resources conducted at the Mogadishu port and other only fueled more violence. Consequently, it ports in the Puntland area, where local officials forced 1.5 million people to flee Somalia from are accepting bribes from pirates (Tharoor, December 1991 to March 1992 and it displaced 2009). The telecommunication sector has been over 2 million people (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). particularly affected by corruption due to its Furthermore, the Horn of Africa is importance for piracy. Telecommunication particularly vulnerable to food shortages. Food companies often pay undeclared fees to officials security is measured by the availability, access, to protect them (Anti-Corruption Resource stability, and the utilization of food (Stringer, Centre, 2012). In areas where piracy is virulent, 2016, pp.11-18). In Somalia, food shortages were like Haboyo, hijacked ships are kept several accentuated by the ongoing conflict, making it miles from the coast. Telecommunication difficult for humanitarian operations to take service is needed to ensure that the ships place. It also hindered agricultural production. are guarded, supplied, and that the hostages This led to a substantial increase in the price are alive. Pirates use the Internet to evaluate of food for people who could barely afford ransoms (Shortland, 2012). Furthermore, enough to sustain their existence (Terefe, 2012). pirates need to access information, especially The combination of these several social from government and port officials, in order to and economic issues has contributed to the conduct their operations (Gilpin, 2009). Bribing implementation of piracy. When taking into officials guarantee the continuous access of ship consideration that a single pirate hijack can lead information (Gilpin, 2009). to a ransom anywhere between $500,000 and Corruption is intrinsically linked to $3 million (with individual profit going up to money laundering (OECD, 2017). Organized $15,000 in a country where poverty is rampant

108 Amali Kartika Karawita: Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community and economic opportunities are low) it becomes at least two ships and taking place on the understandable why piracy has been such an high seas (Chalk, Smallman, & Burger, 2009). attractive business for young Somalis (Gilpin, This definition excludes many acts of piracy 2009). This practice guarantees their survival occurring on territorial seas. Furthermore, the in face of misery. definition stresses on an act committed for In order to defeat piracy, it is important private ends meaning that an act motivated by to address the issues Somalia faces as a failed political ends does not qualify as piracy under state. As Murphy said, piracy is foremost a UNCLOS (Kao, 2016). land-based crime as it arises from economic In the case of piracy in Somalia, the main and social problems. The root of these problems issue regards article 100 of UNCLOS which resides in the non-existence of a functional states: state that can perform its duties and provide “All States shall cooperate to opportunities and security for its inhabitants. the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the Addressing Piracy Offshore jurisdiction of any State.” The Holes in the Application of the Legal Framework on Piracy Piracy is a crime that falls under The United Nations Convention on the international jurisdiction. Every state has the law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the main basis responsibility to arrest any person participating upon which the legal framework FOR piracy is in piracy. UNCLOS provides a legal basis to set. UNCLOS reflects customary international prosecute these acts; however, this framework law which binds all states, parties, and non- depends on whether nations have sufficient parties (Marciniak, 2012). Piracy is defined in national laws and willingness to bring pirates article 101 of UNCLOS as: to trial (Chalk, Smallman, & Burger, 2009). The (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, problem in the Horn of Africa is that captured or any act of depredation, committed for pirates were often released without facing private ends by the crew or the passengers justice. Somali pirates are unlikely to be tried of a private ship or a private aircraft, in Somalia due to the absence of an effective and directed: (i) on the high seas, against government (Warner, 2013). The seizing states another ship or aircraft, or against persons are usually reluctant to use such extensive or property on board such ship or aircraft; powers by prosecuting and bringing arrested (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or pirates to their courts, as this represents a property in a place outside the jurisdiction considerable burden to the seizing state. If of any State; Somali pirates were to serve their sentence in (b) any act of voluntary participation in the another country, their return to Somalia would operation of a ship or of an aircraft with be impossible. Moreover, the length of the knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship detention before being charged or receiving or aircraft; legal assistance are possibly violating human (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally rights laws (Treves, 2009; Warner, 2013; BBC, facilitating an act described in subparagraph 2011). This demonstrates the clear hole on how (a) or (b). to deal with captured pirates (Treves, 2009). As a result, effective international actions were This definition presents certain limitations. slowed down off the coasts of Somalia, which The conditions for an act to qualify as piracy led pirates to be released without facing any are acts committed for private ends, involving criminal charges (Treves, 2009).

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International Cooperation as A Solution 2016, no persons nor ships were detained by Against Piracy pirates, showing that Operation Atalanta has Effectively defeating piracy in Somalia contributed to the prevention and deterrence of demanded extensive international cooperation acts of piracy in Somalia by notably providing and self-investment from different navies, protection to ships in the “High Risk Area”, which today represents a remarkable degree which is an area where there is a higher of collaboration between countries (Chalk, risk for piracy to happen and in which self- Smallmaen, & Burger, 2009). The international protective measures are most likely required community agreed to adopt a common and (International Maritime Organization). global approach regarding piracy in order to Furthermore, Operation Atalanta secure the region. Several joint actions were set has worked closely with several regional up. States use naval power to counter the threat. governments, such as Kenya, the Seychelles In 2008, the European Union (EU) and Mauritius, for the transfer of presumed launched a counter-piracy operation named pirates with the perspective of their persecution EU NAVFOR- Atalanta along the coasts of and conviction, thus illustrating the EU’s Somalia (European Union Naval Force Somalia, determination to defeat piracy by applying 2015). The different countries taking part in sanctions in collaboration with other this operation provide navy vessels, maritime governments thus strengthening the legal patrols, and reconnaissance aircraft, as well framework in place and patrolling the Gulf as military and civilian staff (European Union of Aden and the Indian Ocean as well as Naval Force Somalia, 2015). conducting reconnaissance and surveillance This operation enables EU NAVFOR to missions (European Union Naval Force arrest suspected pirates and seize all objects Somalia, 2015). onboard suspected ships. People apprehended The EU’s engagement against piracy has during the operation can be prosecuted by also led EU NAVFOR to conduct land raids in any EU members, and by neighboring nations Somalia after Operation Atalanta was expanded where the pirates are caught, or a third-party to include land targets. With the support of the State (European Union Naval Force Somalia, Somali transitional government, the first raid 2015). A transfer option is given for states who was led near the port of Haradhere, a well- seized pirates and who do not want to exercise known pirate base. The goal was to destroy their jurisdiction. Pirates can be transferred to onshore safe havens for pirates and deprive any member-state or third-party state willing them of logistics to pursue their operations to prosecute them (Treves, 2009). Moreover, the (BBC, 2012). operation does not only aim at tracking down Just like the EU NAVFOR and its Operation and bringing pirates to trial, but it also aims at Atalanta, other joint measures have been destroying the business of piracy especially its instituted like the CTF-151, a multinational task financing. The EU’s action works on sharing force established to coordinate international information with Interpol and EUROPOL maritime patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Several (European Union Naval Force Somalia, 2008). states like China, Russia, and South Korea have Since 2008, Operation Atalanta has been been sending navy ships into the region (Chalk, highly successful. It has effectively helped Smallman, & Burger, 2009). These measures drop the number of pirate attacks before they were given more weight thanks to Resolutions happen. To illustrate this last point, in January 1816, 1846, and 1851 passed by the Security 2011, 736 people were taken hostage and 32 Council which urge states to take necessary ships were captured by pirates. By October actions to stop pirate attacks coming from

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Somali territorial waters (Chalk, Smallman, & operations. As such, a global and comprehensive Burger, 2009). approach by nations needs to be adopted and Resolution 1851, adopted in December the legal framework against piracy needs to 2008, encouraged nations and regional be strengthened to reaffirm the international organizations fighting against piracy to put community’s will to end piracy. in place: “[…] an international cooperation mechanism to as a common point of contact The Djibouti Code of Conduct between and among states, regional and As emphasized by the CGPCS, the key international organizations on all aspects of to defeating piracy lies on the development combating piracy […] off Somalia’s coast,” of a regional approach regarding the issue. (United Nations Security Council, Resolution The Djibouti Code of Conduct focuses on 185, 2008, p.3). localized actions to counter piracy in the region The following year, the Contact Group on as opposed to actions led on water by naval Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was forces (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). This initiative, established. The CGPCS serves as the coordinator which is a legally non-binding instrument, between the different navies involved in counter- reflects the international community’s will piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Internationally and determination to erase piracy. The next Recognized Transit Corridor and the Somali important step lies in capacity-building which basin. Through concrete steps, the group works includes the reinforcement and the consolidation actively on mitigating piracy threats by giving of national institutions. The parties to the counter-piracy trainings, promoting the Best Djibouti Code are committed to sharing and Management Practices (BMP) (which are counter- reporting information to information centers as piracy measures for ships), and also promoting well as national focal points and prohibit ships ways to strengthen self-protection capabilities suspected of piracy (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.) Moreover, nations also engage in arresting and Compared to the EU NAVFOR, the prosecuting pirates. The objective is to empower CGPCS holds the role of spreading public and a state’s law enforcement forces as well as diplomatic information on several aspects of to enhance national legislations on piracy to piracy, thus raising awareness on the threat meet the need of the state’s law enforcement posed by this issue (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). and judiciary system (Oceans Beyond Piracy, Furthermore, in 2009, the CGPCS launched a n.d.). The present Code of Conduct takes into mission in East Africa and in the Gulf of Aden consideration international cooperation in the which aimed to assess the regional capabilities scope of maritime security operations as well as of counter-piracy. The final report highlighted the coordination of security operations through the need to bring support to solutions against the three maritime information-sharing centers piracy, which include strengthened penal and (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). By reinforcing regional judicial legislations and involving the media capacities by notably developing the Somali and the communities in the fight against and other East African countries coastguards piracy (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). More and providing a regional training program with importantly, the report highly recommends the other international organizations, such as NATO further implementation of the Djibouti Code of and the EU, the Code aims at creating a first wall Conduct upon which counter-piracy measures against piracy (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). depend (Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d.). The Djibouti Code of Conduct is an Naval actions alone will not solve the important instrument supplementing the issue of piracy in Somalia; it can only deter its existing legal framework regarding piracy.

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The objective is to make this framework more or not the Code can reach its objectives is effective in combating piracy. For this reason, debatable. It is primarily a non-binding the Code of Conduct stresses parties, such agreement, which is apolitical and operating as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to help provide mostly on a technical level, showing that, in resources for East African countries in order reality, the level of political support is quite to develop the capabilities of the region. The weak (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Moreover, there main issue faced by many of these countries is no guarantee that countries in the region is the lack of resources (Muli, 2011). It has will successfully cooperate with each other, become apparent that a big disparity from a especially knowing the history of national technological standpoint exists between East rivalries and disputes in the region. Bueger & African countries that clearly lack maritime Saran (2012) The second flaw of the Djibouti security capacity and big naval forces like Code lies in its over-ambitious agenda, which the United States (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). It aims at creating a trans-regional solution by becomes difficult to work when such differences bringing together African and Gulf nations but remain between the countries, because piracy excluding countries like India and Pakistan, is an international issue and the only way to which are two important maritime powers defeat it is through multilateral cooperation active in the domain of counter-piracy, due the and the development of countries like Somalia operational field of piracy groups in the Indian in terms of maritime capacity. The Jeddah Ocean (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Amendment adopted in 2017 revised the However, the implementation of the Djibouti Code by broadening its scope to Djibouti Code is a big step forward in the fight include a range of illicit maritime activities such against piracy. It is an important step in the as human trafficking and illegal, unreported, development of regional capacities (Geiss & and unregulated fishing (IUU) (IMO, 2019). Petrig, 2011). It is through the development In particular, the amendment shifted the of a regional infrastructure that piracy can be traditional state security perspective to human addressed in the long term. The workshops security by recognizing the importance of the and training offered, as well as the culture of “blue economy” in promoting sustainable information-sharing and communication, are economic growth, employment, and stability the main keys the Djibouti Code highlights in (Brits & Nel, 2018). Local economies would order to advance a functional counter-piracy benefit from sustainable fishery management policy (Bueger & Saran, 2012). and prevention of maritime crimes. The Jeddah Amendment is the first agreement to paint a International Measures and its Impact on bigger picture on maritime issues in the region Piracy (Menzel, 2018). Its success only depends on The different measures taken since 2008 the willingness of countries to implement the have had a positive impact on the number new measures. The amendment is a small step of pirate attacks near the coasts of Somalia, towards progress. It offers a newly perspective showing a sharp decline. According to the on the issue; however, it is still very restrictive, International Maritime Bureau, they registered focusing on national security rather than only 15 attacks off the coasts of Somalia in human security as a solution to maritime issues 2013 compared to the 75 incidents in 2012 and in the region (Brits & Nel, 2018) 237 incidents in 2011, which was the peak of Although the Djibouti Code offers a great Somali piracy (ICC, 2013). In 2016, no successful advancement in the domain of counter-piracy attacks off Somalia were registered (Patinkin, and cooperation, the question of whether 2017). More recently, a new report published

112 Amali Kartika Karawita: Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community by the ICC International Maritime Bureau As one of the main components reveals a further decline of piracy attacks. of the Somali Compact, stability calls for From January to June 2017, 87 attacks have initiatives such as the Transition Initiatives been reported compared with 97 incidents for Stabilization+ (TIS +) to increase stability worldwide, showing a decline when compared and further the participatory process in order to the same previous period, where 97 incidents to promote good governance and community were reported. Piracy off Somalia’s coasts made cohesion at district and communal levels. up only 5 of these incidents (ICC, July 2017). These initiatives advocate for the restoration This successful decrease in attacks have of dialogue between communities through been attributed to the efforts of the international art, culture, and sports activities to enable community, especially through naval operations, the population to heal from the trauma of the mitigation measures, and the determination of war and prevent vulnerable classes to fall into the international community to defeat the threat extremism (USAID, 2019). posed by piracy in Somalia. Although the number Stability also goes along with economic of incidents has been low since 2012, the region initiatives to assure the long-term re- is not completely free of pirates, and continued establishment of the Somali Government. The efforts will need to be made to assure that the lack of economic recovery and employment Gulf of Aden remains safe. opportunities reinforce the cycle of violence and conflicts that have driven many Somalis Addressing Piracy Onshore to engage in piracy as an alternative for living The main key to addressing the issue of (Menkhaus, 2004). State failure results in the piracy in Somalia is to create a peaceful and collapse of the economy and economic collapse stable environment to enable the process of creates state failure. The goal is to break this peace-building and state-building. The Somali vicious cycle (Menkhaus, 2004). Creating Compact is the result of a process determining economic opportunities will ultimately Somalia’s priorities for three years (2014-2016). improve the livelihood of the population by This compact has included a comprehensive creating jobs and increasing production and approach to the main peace and state-building income. Economic programs like the Growth, goals, which include rebuilding trust and Enterprise, Employment and Livelihood dialogue among Somalis. However, progress program (GEEL) aim to integrate Somalia into is still to be made regarding engagement and the global economy, thus reviving the local dialogue with Somalis as well as the coherence economies (USAID, 2019). Change is caused between humanitarian and development efforts by the evolution of political and economic in order to produce long-term results (Manuel interests of key actors in Somalia. For example, et al., 2017). Along with state-building efforts, UNOSOM has had an important economic there is a clear need to establish the legitimacy presence in Somalia, which has produced of the government in order to restore stability economic opportunities such as procurement in the country (Hearn et al., 2014). Thus, there is and construction contracts, property rentals, the need to involve and actively engage Somali and currency exchange. Economic actors were people. The challenge is to create a unified voice motivated by the potential economic gains that and promote cooperation in order to create led to a shift to more legitimate commerce and democratic political institutions and engage services (Menkhaus, 2004). in peace mediation and capacity-building in The revitalization of the economy will health and education sectors (Tiilikainen & demand human capital. Education will be Muhamed, 2012). essential to support economic growth. The

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Somali population is particularly young, to reinforce and strengthen the authority of the around 40% of Somalis are between the present institutions to reestablish the rule of age of 6-18; this demographic will become law. Somalia’s transitional government needs important contributors to the economy in the to actively fight corruption, which enabled years to come. Education will enable younger piracy to spread with impunity throughout generations to learn skills and knowledge. the country as well as work actively to break The challenge is to overcome low school down the underground economy created by enrollment and the lack of educational facilities this business with the help of the international and qualified teachers in the country that have community, since piracy is a transnational suffered due to civil wars (World Bank Group, threat. 2019). The case presented the importance of an effective and strengthened justice system Conclusion willing to eradicate this problem. Even though The case of piracy in Somalia has illustrated piracy is a crime that falls under universal the importance of defeating piracy by resolving jurisdiction, the reality shows that states are Somalia’s internal problems and strengthening often unwilling to assume such extended rights its criminal justice system. Piracy developed or are unable to prosecute suspected pirates as a consequence of the disintegration of the due to inadequate national legislation or the Somali state. The population was severely lack of law enforcement, as was the case with affected by the two decades of conflict that Somalia. From the beginning, the international followed the collapse of the Barre regime in regime against piracy lacked efficiency in 1991. Violence became an integral part of life dealing with captured pirates, which led to for the Somali people. With no functioning the unwillingness of nations to bring charges government able to perform state duties, such against pirates. This lack of efficiency hindered as assuring security on land and sea, Somalia effective international actions to take place. became the victim of plundering from foreign The trigger, which led to the change of ships and the dumping ground of toxic waste, the international community’s attitude, was which ultimately triggered fisherman to take the surge of Somali pirate attacks in the Gulf of up arms and engage in acts of piracy as a way Aden from 2008 to 2012. The global approaches of survival due to the gross lack of economic adopted by the international community opportunities and the vicious circle of poverty showed its determination to eradicate piracy and hunger that kept creeping up. This setting in Somali waters. This approach pushed for enabled piracy to flourish and impose its roots multilateral cooperation between nations. deeply within Somali society. Operations led by EU NAVFOR, CT-151, and Understanding the background history the establishment of the CGPCS are signs that of Somalia is the main key to addressing the the international community will no longer issue of piracy. Piracy takes its roots on land, tolerate acts of piracy. Naval operations, like which means that in order to defeat piracy it Atalanta, send a clear message to pirates that is important to work on a solution on land by the stance on piracy has changed. It is a clear confronting the economic and social issues example of a determined policing effort. The present in Somalia and articulating long-term international community is taking a hard line in action plans to revitalize Somalia’s economy the repression of this crime. Since cooperation as well as assuring humanitarian aid to the means that information-sharing is necessary in country to fight poverty and famine and order to dismantle the business model of piracy continue the process of state-building in order and track down the people behind it, honest

114 Amali Kartika Karawita: Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community communication between the different parties to solutions to piracy ? Global Affairs, (3),1 305- the fight are required. Finally, as demonstrated 314. doi: 10.1080/23340460.2015.1078576 by the Djibouti Code of Conduct, naval Ahmad, E., Ullah, M. A., & Arfeen, M. I. (2012). operations are not enough to stop pirates; it is Does Corruption Affect Economic Growth. important to develop the maritime capacities Latin American Journal of Economics, 49(2), of countries like Somalia, in collaboration with 277-305. doi: 10.2307/41959246 other international organizations that should be Anti-Corruption Resource Center U4 expert on the front line in the fight against piracy. This answer. (2012, July 13). Overview of case also illustrated the importance of social and corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia. economic initiatives in order to restore stability Retrieved from https://www.google. in the Somali society for the peace-building com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&sou and state-building process to begin. These rce=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwjmno onshore initiatives are aimed at increasing the SN2PXYAhXGe7wKHR37CU8QFgg well-being of the society by providing durable oMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww. and viable living alternatives for young Somali u4.no%2Fpublications%2Foverview-of- citizens. The approach of the international corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-somal community has begun to shift to an approach ia%2Fdownloadasset%2F2894&usg=AOv based on human development instead of only Vaw1wL4nRiFU0L85ugGO3G4Xf focusing on military measures. BBC. (2012, May 15). Somali piracy: EU forces in The effectiveness of these different first mainland raid.BBC News. Retrieved measures and initiatives has led to the decrease from http://www.bbc.com/news/world- of pirate attacks in Somali waters between africa-18069685 the 2011 peak of piracy and 2017. The efforts BBC. (2011, January 25). Q & A: What do you made to address the issue of piracy should be do with a captured pirate?. BBC News. maintained and strengthened. The position Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/ of Somalia has revealed the importance of news/world-africa-11813168 bringing the fight both on land and at sea. Piracy Bowden, A., Hurlburt, K., Aloyo, E., Marts, is more than just attacks against ships; it is the C., & Lee, A. (2010). The economic cost of consequence of economic and social problems maritime piracy. Retrieved from http:// and the lack of an efficient government. The oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/ threat of piracy, although greatly reduced, is files/attachments/The%20Economic%20 still present; the main task is to control it. Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Full%20Report. pdf References Bradbury, M. & Healy, S. (2010). Endless war, a Action Against Hunger. (2015, August). brief history of the Somali conflict.Accord , Consequence of the structurally integrated 21, 10-14. Retrieved from https://rc- UN Mission in Somalia on principled services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws. humantiarian action and access to population com/s3fs-public/Whose_peace_is_it_ in need. Retrieved from https://www. anyway_connecting_Somali_and_ actionagainsthunger.org/blog/somalia- international_peacemaking_Accord_ eighteen-months-after-establishment- Issue_21.pdf unsom-action-against-hunger-deeply- Brits, P. & Nel, M. (2018). African Maritime concerned-about security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or Affi, L.A., Elmi, A., & Mohamed, S. (2015). dream?. African Security Review, 1-20. doi: Avoidinf Somalia: What prevents onshore 10.1080/10246029.2018.1546599

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