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Colombia's Borders

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Colombia's Borders MOVING BEYOND EASY WINS: COLOMBIA’S BORDERS Latin America Report N°40 – 31 October 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. VULNERABLE BORDERS ............................................................................................. 2 A. CENTRIFUGAL CONFLICT ............................................................................................................. 2 B. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ................................................................................................................ 4 C. DIPLOMATIC REPERCUSSIONS ...................................................................................................... 6 III. A FRESH START: THE SANTOS AGENDA ............................................................... 7 A. RECONSTRUCTING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ................................................................................ 7 B. SPURRING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................... 8 C. REVIEWING CONSOLIDATION POLICY .......................................................................................... 9 IV. THE ECUADORIAN BORDER .................................................................................... 10 A. CONFLICT DYNAMICS ................................................................................................................ 10 B. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ....................................................................................................... 12 C. SHIFTING REFUGEE POLICIES ..................................................................................................... 14 V. THE VENEZUELAN BORDER .................................................................................... 17 A. CONFLICT DYNAMICS ................................................................................................................ 17 B. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ....................................................................................................... 20 C. INVISIBLE REFUGEES ................................................................................................................. 22 VI. MOVING BEYOND EASY WINS ................................................................................ 23 A. STRENGTHENING STATE PRESENCE ............................................................................................ 23 B. IMPROVING THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ............................................................................. 26 C. BUILDING JOINT PROBLEM-SOLVING CAPACITY ........................................................................ 27 VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF COLOMBIA .......................................................................................................................... 30 B. MAP OF COLOMBIA-ECUADOR BORDER ........................................................................................... 31 C. MAP OF COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA BORDER ........................................................................................ 32 D. GLOSSARY OF TERMS ....................................................................................................................... 33 E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 35 F. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA SINCE 2008 ....................................... 36 G. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 37 Latin America Report N°40 31 October 2011 MOVING BEYOND EASY WINS: COLOMBIA’S BORDERS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Improved relations between Colombia and its neighbours illegal armed groups in both neighbouring countries. Se- have not alleviated the plight of border communities. For curity cooperation is improving. The Colombian Congress fifteen years, porous borders that offer strategic advantages has passed a constitutional reform to redistribute royalties to illegal armed groups and facilitate extensive illicit econ- from oil and mining concessions, a measure that should in- omies have exposed them to an intense armed conflict that crease funds for public investment in many peripheral re- is made worse by the widespread absence of public insti- gions that currently do not benefit from that bonanza. In an tutions. The warfare triggered a humanitarian emergency effort to produce tangible results fast, the foreign ministry and worsened relations especially with Ecuador and Vene- is leading implementation of projects aimed at boosting zuela, the most affected neighbours. Spurring development social and economic development in border municipalities. in the periphery and reconstructing diplomatic ties are pri- orities for President Juan Manuel Santos. A little over a year The Santos agenda represents a substantial policy shift, but into his term, his new policies have paid undoubted diplo- as the conflict continues unabated in the border regions and matic and some security dividends. But the hard part is still has increasing repercussions on Venezuelan and Ecuado- ahead. Efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and rian soil, problems remain. Three sets of issues need to be build civilian state capacity must be scaled up, tasks that, tackled. First, more must be done to increase the civilian amid what is again a partially worsening conflict, have been state presence in the destitute border areas. Militarisation neglected. Otherwise, pacifying the troubled border regions of the borders has failed to deliver durable security gains, will remain a chimera, and their dynamics will continue to and efforts by security forces to increase their standing fuel Colombia’s conflict. with local communities continue to stumble over human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian Border regions were drawn into the armed conflict by the law. With dynamics along their borders increasingly resem- mid-1990s, when they became main theatres of operations bling the situation in Colombia, similar problems are fast for illegal armed groups, often financed by drug trafficking. emerging in Ecuador and Venezuela. The security forces of A crackdown under Álvaro Uribe, Santos’s predecessor, all three countries must play by the book and focus more brought only elusive gains there. The illegal armed groups on citizen security, and their civilian authorities must take have been pushed deeper into the periphery but not defeat- the lead in providing services. ed. Coca cultivation and drug trafficking remain signifi- cant. Violence has come down in most regions, but remains Secondly, more effective responses to the severe humani- higher along the borders than in the nation as a whole, and tarian problems are needed. Colombia continues to strug- security has begun to deteriorate in some zones, as New gle to attend to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Illegal Armed Groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs) other victims of the conflict, a large number of whom extend their operations, and guerrillas gain new strength. cross the borders in search of protection. But protecting The Uribe approach also carried high diplomatic costs. Re- them has not been a priority in Venezuela, leaving an es- lations with the neighbours became toxic over a 2008 Co- timated 200,000 highly vulnerable. This contrasts with lombian airstrike on a camp of the main rebel group, FARC, the response in Ecuador, which has recognised and pro- located just inside Ecuador and over allegations that Ven- vided documentation to some 54,000 Colombian refu- ezuela was harbouring guerrillas. gees. But Ecuador has tightened its policy since January 2011, exposing such individuals to new risks. Govern- Fixing the border problems has been a priority for Santos. ments are hesitant to give more weight to a potentially di- He has moved quickly to restore diplomatic relations with visive issue in bilateral relations, but looking the other way Ecuador and Venezuela, and bilateral platforms are in an will only make matters worse over the long run. early stage of either being revived or created. There is a strong political commitment on all sides to preserve the Thirdly, efficient forums to solve problems jointly and pro- restored friendships, despite the continuing presence of mote border development are still lacking. This partly re- Moving Beyond Easy Wins: Colombia’s Borders Crisis Group Latin America Report N°40, 31 October 2011 Page ii flects the neighbours’ reluctance to acknowledge any re- digenous and Afro-Colombian groups and local grass- sponsibility for a conflict they consider a domestic matter roots organisations. of Colombia but that in fact is sustained by transnational 7. Mitigate risks associated with natural resource extrac- criminal networks and is increasingly creating victims on tion in border conflict zones, including by ensuring all sides of the borders. The high diplomatic volatility has deeper consultation at grassroots level, enforcing com- also been damaging efforts to institutionalise cooperation pliance with environmental standards and promoting that needs to be grounded in buy-in and participation of lo- transparency
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