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Notes Introduction 1. Resolution 242, passed by the United Nations Security Council on 22 Novem- ber 1967, was in point of fact a British initiative. Chapter 1 1. Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987) (in Hebrew), pp. 258–9; Reuven Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment: Israel and the Territories after the Six Day War (Tel Aviv: Bitan, 1996) (in Hebrew), p. 28. 2. Israel State Archives, Jerusalem (henceforth ISA)/A–10/6304, Prime Minis- ter’s Files, 9 June 1967; Abba Eban, Memoirs (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ma’ariv, 1978) (in Hebrew), p. 430; Yitzhak Rabin, Service Notebook, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ma’ariv, 1979) (in Hebrew), p. 226. 3. Gidon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1981) (in Hebrew), p. 163. 4. Moshe Gilbo’a, Six Years, Six Days: The Origins and History of the Six Day War (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969) (in Hebrew), p. 259; Shlomo Slonim, Jerusalem in America’s Foreign Policy, 1947–1977 (The Hague, London and Boston, MA: Kluwe Law International, 1988), p. 192. 5. Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth FRUS), 1964–1968, Arab– Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, vol. 19, Harriet D. Schwar (ed.) (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 509; The National Archives, Kew (henceforth TNA)/Prime Minister’s Office (hence- forth PREM)/13/1621, Foreign Office (henceforth FO) to Tel Aviv, 16 June 1967; TNA/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (henceforth FCO)/17/541, Record of Meeting, 20 August 1967; Frank Brenchley, Britain, the Six Day War and its Aftermath (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), p. 83. 6. Eban, Memoirs, p. 419. 7. Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, p. 29. 8. FRUS, 1964–1968, Arab–Israel Crisis and War, 1967, vol. 19, p. 457. 9. Anwar el Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 179–80; Frank Aker, October, 1973: The Arab–Israeli War (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985), p. 5. 10. Dan Bavly, Dreams and Missed Opportunities, 1967–1973 (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2002) (in Hebrew), pp. 39–40; Yoram Meital, ‘The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian policy after the 1967 war: re-examination’, Middle East Journal, 54:1 (Winter, 2000), pp. 66–72 11. Shimon Shamir, Egypt under Sadat: The Search for a New Orientation (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1978) (in Hebrew), pp. 89–91; Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977 (Gainsville, FL: University of Florida, 234 Notes 235 1997), pp. 29–30; Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Book, 1981), p. 43. 12. Meital, Egypt’s Struggle, pp. 34–5; Nigel J. Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 132–3. 13. TNA/FCO17/522, Wilson to Johnson, 15 June 1967; TNA/PREM13/1620, Record of a Telephone Conversation, 7 June 1967, and FO to Certain Missions, 16 June 1967; Eugene V. Rostow, Peace in the Balance: The Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 250–5. 14. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspective of the Presidency, 1963– 1967 (New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1971), p. 303; Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt’s Post-War Political Strategy, 1967–1970 (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1989) (in Hebrew), p. 54; Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 54. 15. Rafael, Destination Peace, p. 159; Vaughn P. Shannon, Balancing Act: US For- eign Policy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), p. 64. 16. Antoly F. Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1952–1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 166; Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), pp. 133–5. 17. Mohrez Mahmoud El Hussini, Soviet–Egyptian Relations, 1945–1985 (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 183; Meital, ‘Khartoum Conference’, p. 74; Yezid Sayigh, ‘Turning defeat into opportu- nity: the Palestinian guerrillas after the June 1967 War’, Middle East Journal, 46:2 (Spring, 1992), p. 253. 18. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 166; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 53. 19. FRUS, 1964–1968, The Soviet Union 1964–1968, vol. 14, David C. Humphrey and Charles S. Sampson (eds) (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 2001), pp. 514–20, 523–32, 545–52; FRUS, 1964–1968, Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, vol. 19, pp. 556–63; Judith A. Klinghoffer, Vietnam, Jews and the Middle East: Unintended Consequences (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 182–5. 20. George W. Breslauer, ‘Soviet policy in the Middle East, 1967–1972: unal- terable antagonism or collaborative competition’, in George W. Breuslauer (ed.), Soviet Strategy in the Middle East (Boston, MA: Unwin and Hyman, 1990), pp. 27, 33–4; Jerome Slater, ‘The superpowers and an Arab–Israeli political settlement: the Cold War years’, Political Science Quarterly, 105:4 (1990–91), pp. 567–8. 21. Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East and the great powers’, in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds), The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 15–19; Mark J. Brandriss, ‘Internal politics and foreign policy in Israel: the search for peace, 1967–1973’ (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1983), p. 13; Dean Rusk, As I Saw It: A Secretary of State’s Memoirs (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 324–5. 22. Mohamed Heikal, Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab–Israeli Peace Nego- tiations (London: Harper and Collins, 1996), p. 148; Galia Golan, Soviet 236 Notes Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 68–9. 23. David Pollock, The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy since the Six Day War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 20–1; Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 138; Rafael, Destination Peace, pp. 164–5. 24. Eban, Memoirs, pp. 437–8. 25. Riad, Struggle for Peace, p. 47; Pollock, Politics of Pressure, p. 22; Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 166. 26. See, for example, Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964– 1967: The Coming of the Six Day War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 8–12, 203–28. 27. ISA/Hez4/1391, Remez to Lourie, 18 October 1967; Harold Wilson, The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), p. 339; Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 264. 28. TNA/PREM13/1623, FO to Tel Aviv, 17 August 1967; TNA/PREM13/1627, Record of Meeting, 6 November 1967; United States National Archives, Washington, DC (College Park, MD) (henceforth USNA)/RG59/18, Hughes to Acting Secretary, 22 September 1967; FRUS, 1964–1968, Arab–Israeli Dis- pute, 1967–1968, vol. 20, Louis J. Smith (ed.) (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 63–4. 29. TNA/FCO17/541, Meeting with Eban, 15 September 1967; and TNA/FCO17/ 508, Brief by the FO, 15 November 1967. 30. Yossi Melman, Hostile Partnership: The Secret Relations between Israel and Jordan (Tel Aviv: Meitam, 1987) (in Hebrew), p. 70; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, pp. 35–7. 31. Bavly, Dreams and Missed Opportunities, p. 41; Yossi Beilin, The Price of Unity: The Labour Party up to the Yom Kippur War (Ramat Gan: Revivim, 1985) (in Hebrew), pp. 21–2; Chaim Nadal, Between the Two Wars (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2006) (in Hebrew), p. 27. 32. Moshe Dayan, New Map, Different Relations (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Ma’ariv, 1969) (in Hebrew), pp. 55; Ha’aretz, 10 August 1967; Ma’ariv, 10 August 1967. 33. TNA/PREM13/1624, Record of a Meeting, 6 November 1967. 34. Knesset Debates, vol. 50, 30 October 1967 (in Hebrew). 35. Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, p. 110; Ma’ariv, 15 August and 8 Octo- ber 1967. 36. Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspec- tive (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), p. 87; Ha’aretz, 26 September 1967. 37. FRUS, 1964–1968, The Arab–Israeli Crisis, 1967, vol. 19, pp. 940–3. 38. Meital, Egypt’s Struggle, p. 42; Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998), pp. 166, 170. 39. ISA/Hez4/1391, Remez to Jerusalem, 2 October 1967; TNA/Cabinet Min- utes (henceforth CAB)128/42/3, 55th Conclusions, 14 September 1967, and 63rd Conclusions, 2 November 1967. Notes 237 40. Riad, Struggle for Peace, p. 54; Avraham Sela, Unity within Conflict in the Inter- Arab System: The Arab Summit Conferences, 1964–1982 (Jerusalem: Magnus, 1983) (in Hebrew), pp. 75–8. 41. Mohamed Heikal, Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1996), pp. 53–4. 42. FRUS, 1964–1968, Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, vol. 19, pp. 973–6. 43. ISA/Hez4/1391, Record of Conversation, 15 October 1967; FRUS, 1964– 1968, Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, vol. 19, pp. 930, 940; George Brown, In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George Brown (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 233. 44. ISA/A8/8161, Meeting of Foreign and Defence Committee, 5 September 1967; Yohanan Katz, The Dove that Failed (Tel Aviv: Yaron Golan, 2006) (in Hebrew), pp. 35–6; Ha’aretz, 4 September 1967. 45. ISA/A9/8161, Meeting of Foreign and Defence Committee, 14 Novem- ber 1967. 46. ISA/A8/8161, Meeting of Foreign and Defence Committee, 5 September 1967; Eban, Memoirs, p. 439; Amnon Sella and Yael Yishai, Israel the Peaceful Belligerent, 1967–1979 (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 11. 47. Knesset Debates, vol. 50, 30 October 1967.
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  • Chapter 1 the Meaning of Detente

    Chapter 1 the Meaning of Detente

    Notes CHAPTER 1 THE MEANING OF DETENTE I. Arthur M. Schlesinger,Jr., 'Detente: an American Perspective', in Detente in Historical Perspective, edited by G. Schwab and H. Friedlander (NY: Ciro Press, 1975) p. 125. From Hamlet, Act III, Scene 2. 2. Gustav Pollak Lecture at Harvard, 14 April 1976; reprinted in James Schlesinger, 'The Evolution of American Policy Towards the Soviet Union', International Security; Summer 1976, vol. I, no. I, pp. 46-7 . 3. Theodore Draper, 'Appeasement and Detente', Commentary, Feb . 1976, vol. 61, no. 8, p. 32. 4. Coral Bell, in her book, TheDiplomacy ofDitente (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), has written an extensive analysis of the triangular relationship but points out that, as of yet, no third side to the triangle - the detente between China and the USSR - exists, p. 5. 5. Seyom Brown, 'A Cooling-Off Period for U.S.-Soviet Relations', Foreign Policy , Fall 1977, no. 28, p. 12. See also 1. Aleksandrov, 'Peking: a Course Aimed at Disrupting International Detente Under Cover of Anti­ Sovietism', Pravda , 14 May 1977- translated in Current DigestofSovietPress . Hereafter, only the Soviet publication will be named. 6. Vladimir Petrov , U.S.-Soviet Detente: Past and Future (Wash ington D.C .: American Enterprise Institute for Publi c Policy Research, 1975) p. 2. 7. N. Kapcheko, 'Socialist Foreign Policy and the Reconstruction of Inter­ national Relations', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 4, Apr . 1975, p. 8. 8. L. Brezhnev, Report ofthe Tioenty-Fiftn Congress ofthe Communist Parry ofthe Soviet Union, 24 Feb. 1976. 9. Marshall Shulman, 'Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence',Foreign Affairs, vol.