Causes and Consequences of Kenya's Military Intervention In

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Causes and Consequences of Kenya's Military Intervention In Causes and Consequences of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia Yirgu Alemu Center for African Studies For Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in African Studies (Citizenship and State in Africa) Addis Ababa University Advisor: Dr, Yasin Mohammed (PhD) June, 2014 Addis Ababa 0 Acknowledgement I would like to express my special gratitude to my advisor Dr. Yasin Mohammed whose incredible contributions were essential not only for the successful accomplishment of this thesis but also for my academic life in general. My deepest thank also goes to my sweetheart Sr, Tadelech Desta for her prayer and moral support throughout the course of my educational career from high school to second degree. My final thank is to my lovely sons Bekalkidan, Beamlak and Bemenet. i Table of contents Pages Acknowledgment ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i Table of Contents --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii List of Tables -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v List of Maps --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v Acronyms ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------vi Glossary ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ viii Abstract --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ix Chapter One ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1. Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1.1 Background of the study ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1. 2 Statement of the problem --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 1.3 Objectives of the study ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 1.4 Significance of the study ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 1.5 Scope of the study ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 1.6 Limitations of the study ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 1.7 Organization of the Study --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 Chapter Two --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 2. Methodology and Study Area---------------------------------------------------------- ------------------ 9 2.1 Methodology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 2.1.1 Review of Documents ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 2.1.2 Media monitoring ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 2.1.3 Procedures of Data Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------------- 10 2.1.4 Ethical considerations ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 2.2 Study Area-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 2.2.1 Somalia------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- 10 2.2.2 Kenya--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- 12 Chapter Three ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15 3. Review of Related Literature ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 ii Chapter Four --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 4.Conceptual and theoretical framework of foreign military intervention ----------- 22 4.1 Foreign military intervention ----------------------------------------------------- 22 4.1.1 Conceptual Debates on Military Intervention ----------------------------- 23 4.1.2 The Concept of Military Intervention ----------------------------------------------------- 23 4.1.3 The New Interventionist Debate ----------------------------------------------------------- 25 4.1.4 African Cases of Military Intervention ---------------------------------------------------- 27 4.1.5 The Case of Somalia, 1992------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 28 4.1.6 British Intervention in Sierra leone, 2000 ------------------------------------------------- 29 4.2. Theoretical Approaches to Military Intervention ---------------------------------------------- 31 4.2.1. Constructivism ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 4.2.2. Pluralism -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 4.2.3. Idealism --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 4.2.4. Realism----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 35 Chapter Five--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- 36 5. Causes and Consequences of Kenya‟s Military Intervention in Somalia ------------------------- 36 5.1. Causes of Kenya‟s Military intervention in Somalia ------------------------------------------ 36 5.1.1. Political Causes ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 5.1.1.1 Security threat -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 5.1.1.2 Defending Territorial integrity ------------------------------------------------------- 38 5.1.1.3 Domestic military dynamics --------------------------------------------------------- 41 5.1.1.4. Internal Political dynamics ---------------------------------------------------------- 42 5.1.1.5. Strategic interest of creating a buffer zone ---------------------------------------- 45 5.1.2 Economic Causes ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47 5.1.2.1. The Question of oil ------------------------------------------------------------------- 47 5.1.2.2. Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor Project ---------------- 49 5.1.3 Social cause ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51 5.2. Consequences of Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia ---------------------------------- 55 5.2.1 Casualties -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55 5.2.2 Retaliatory attacks on Kenya --------------------------------------------------------------- 56 5.2.3 The repatriation of Refugee ----------------------------------------------------------------- 61 iii 5.2.4 The formation of Juba land ----------------------------------------------------------------- 63 5.2.5 Strengthening of African Union Mission in Somalia ----------------------------------- 67 5.2.6 Kenya‟s financial instability ---------------------------------------------------------------- 69 5.2.7 Further Militancy in Kenyan ---------------------------------------------------------------- 70 5.2.8 Al Shabaab‟s loss of strong holds ---------------------------------------------------------- 72 5.2.9 Alienating Kenyan Somalis ----------------------------------------------------------------- 73 Chapter Six --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 75 6. Recommendation and Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 75 6.1. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 75 6.2. Recommendation ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 76 References ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 79 Appendixes iv List of Tables Table 1: Value of Kenyan military spending, 2010–13 ---------------------------------------- 42 Table 2: Masters of Jubaland since the collapse of the central Somali state in 1991 ------ 63 List of Pictures Picture 1: Kenya‟s defense force in Somalia ---------------------------------------------------- 36 Picture 2: Westgate-Mall outside view before the attack -------------------------------------- 58 Picture 3: Westgate-Mall inside view before the attack --------------------------------------- 59 Picture 4 :West gate outside view during the attack ------------------------------------------- 59 Picture 5:West gate inside view during the attack --------------------------------------------- 60 v Acronyms AlAI: Al Ittihad Al Islamiyya AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia ASWJ: Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama AU: African Union DRA: Department of Refugee Affairs ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group EU: European Union HIPS: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies IDP: Internally displaced persons IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development KADU: Kenyan African Democratic Union KANU: Kenyan African National Union KDF: Kenyan Defense Forces LAPSSET: Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor MP: Members of Parliament MYC: Muslim Youth Center NARC: National Alliance Rainbow Coalition NFD: Northern Frontier District NFD: Northern
Recommended publications
  • Assessment Report 2011
    ASSESSMENT REPORT 2011 PHASE 1 - PEACE AND RECONCILIATION JOIN- TOGETHER ACTION For Galmudug, Himan and Heb, Galgaduud and Hiiraan Regions, Somalia Yme/NorSom/GSA By OMAR SALAD BSc (HONS.) DIPSOCPOL, DIPGOV&POL Consultant, in collaboration with HØLJE HAUGSJÅ (program Manager Yme) and MOHAMED ELMI SABRIE JAMALLE (Director NorSom). 1 Table of Contents Pages Summary of Findings, Analysis and Assessment 5-11 1. Introduction 5 2. Common Geography and History Background of the Central Regions 5 3. Political, Administrative Governing Structures and Roles of Central Regions 6 4. Urban Society and Clan Dynamics 6 5. Impact of Piracy on the Economic, Social and Security Issues 6 6. Identification of Possibility of Peace Seeking Stakeholders in Central Regions 7 7. Identification of Stakeholders and Best Practices of Peace-building 9 8. How Conflicts resolved and peace Built between People Living Together According 9 to Stakeholders 9. What Causes Conflicts Both locally and regional/Central? 9 10. Best Practices of Ensuring Women participation in the process 9 11. Best Practices of organising a Peace Conference 10 12. Relations Between Central Regions and Between them TFG 10 13. Table 1: Organisation, Ownership and Legal Structure of the 10 14. Peace Conference 10 15. Conclusion 11 16. Recap 11 16.1 Main Background Points 16.2 Recommendations 16.3 Expected Outcomes of a Peace Conference Main and Detailed Report Page 1. Common geography and History Background of Central Regions 13 1.1 Overview geographical and Environmental Situation 13 1.2 Common History and interdependence 14 1.3 Chronic Neglect of Central Regions 15 1.4 Correlation Between neglect and conflict 15 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 3 Demography, Data Processing and Cartography
    VOLUME 3 DEMOGRAPHY, DATA PROCESSING AND CARTOGRAPHY M. Rahmi, E. Rabant, L. Cambrézy, M. Mohamed Abdi Institut de Recherche pour le Développement UNHCR – IRD October 1999 97/TF/KEN/LS/450(a$ Index MAJOR FINDINGS ...…………………………………………….……….…………….3 I-1 : Demography ...…………………………………………….……….…………….3 I-2 : Exploitation of the aerial mosaics …………………………………………..5 1 - Cartography of the refugee camps. …………………………………...……...5 2 - Estimation of the populations ………………………………………………..…6 I-3 – Conclusion : results of the integration of maps and data in a GIS … 10 II – Demography data processing ………………………………………………....13 Table 1. Number of households and family size …….....………………..….…....13 Graph 1 . Family size ..…………………………………….………………….14 Graph 2. Family size (percentage) …………………….…….……………. 15 Table 2 : Number of refugees by sex and by block …….……………...…... 15 Table 3 : number of households and family size by blocks ………………… 20 Table 4 : population by age and by sex. ……………………………...… 26 Graph 3. Pyramid of ages …………………………………………………29 Table 5 : Relationship by sex …………………………………………………38 Graph 4 : relationship …………………………………………………………39 Table 6 : Number of refugees by sex and nationality ………………….40 Table 7 : Number of refugees by sex and province of origin ………….41 Table 8 : UNHCR codes for districts and nationality ………………….43 Table 9 : Number of refugees by nationality, sex, and district of origin. ………………… 50 Table 10 : Principal districts of origin of somalian refugees (population by block and by sex). ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 69 Table 11 : Principal
    [Show full text]
  • Clan – Based Federalism in Somalia and Relationship Between The
    T.C. ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES CLAN – BASED FEDERALISM IN SOMALIA AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL MEMBER STATES MASTER THESIS HAMDİ ALİ MUSSE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ANKARA 2020 T.C. ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES CLAN – BASED FEDERALISM IN SOMALIA AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL MEMBER STATES MASTER THESIS HAMDİ ALİ MUSSE DEPARMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Supervisor Assistant Professor Selcen ÖZKAN ANKARA 2020 ACCEPTATION AND CONFIRMATION PAGE The thesis, prepared by HAMDI ALI MUSSE and titled “CLAN–BASED FEDERALISM IN SOMALIA AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL MEMBER STATES”, is accepted as a master thesis at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration by unanimous vote/majority vote. Tittle Name Surname Institution Signature Ankara Yıldırım Assist. Prof. Dr. Selcen ÖZKAN Beyazıt University Ankara Yıldırım Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Çolpan YALDIZ Beyazıt University Assist. Prof. Dr. Feriha YILDIRIM Gazi University Thesis Defense Date: 11.11.2020 I approve that the thesis fulfills the necessities to be deemed a master thesis at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. Director of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Title Name Surname DECLARATION I hereby declare that this Master thesis titled Clan–based federalism in Somalia and relationship between the Federal government and Federal member states has been prepared in accordance with the thesis writing of manual of the graduate school of Social science.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia's Judeao-Christian Heritage 3
    Aram Somalia's Judeao-Christian Heritage 3 SOMALIA'S JUDEAO-CHRISTIAN HERITAGE: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY Ben I. Aram* INTRODUCTION The history of Christianity in Somalia is considered to be very brief and as such receives only cursory mention in many of the books surveying this subject for Africa. Furthermore, the story is often assumed to have begun just over a century ago, with the advent of modem Western mission activity. However, evidence from three directions sheds light on the pre­ Islamic Judeao-Christian influence: written records, archaeological data and vestiges of Judeao-Christian symbolism still extant within both traditional 1 Somali culture and closely related ethnic groups • Together such data indicates that both Judaism and Christianity preceded Islam to the lowland Horn of Africa In the introduction to his article on Nubian Christianity, Bowers (1985:3-4) bemoans the frequently held misconception that Christianity only came recently to Africa, exported from the West. He notes that this mistake is even made by some Christian scholars. He concludes: "The subtle impact of such an assumption within African Christianity must not be underestimated. Indeed it is vital to African Christian self-understanding to recognize that the Christian presence in Africa is almost as old as Christianity itself, that Christianity has been an integral feature of the continent's life for nearly two thousand years." *Ben I. Aram is the author's pen name. The author has been in ministry among Somalis since 1982, in somalia itself, and in Kenya and Ethiopia. 1 These are part of both the Lowland and Highland Eastern Cushitic language clusters such as Oromo, Afar, Hadiya, Sidamo, Kambata, Konso and Rendille.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia Question(S) Security Situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019)
    COI QUERY Country of Origin/Topic Somalia Question(s) Security situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019): 1. Short description of the region 1.1 Somaliland 1.2 Puntland 2. Control of territory and presence/activities of non-state armed groups 2.1 Somaliland 2.2 Puntland 3. Recent security trends, impact on the civilian population and overview of documented incidents with civilians casualties 3.1 Sanaag and Sool 3.2 Somaliland 3.3 Puntland Date of completion 12 December 2019 Query Code Q39 Contributing EU+ COI --- units (if applicable) Disclaimer This response to a COI query has been elaborated according to the Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI and EASO COI Report Methodology. The information provided in this response has been researched, evaluated and processed with utmost care within a limited time frame. All sources used are referenced. A quality review has been performed in line with the above mentioned methodology. This document does not claim to be exhaustive neither conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to international protection. If a certain event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. The information in the response does not necessarily reflect the opinion of EASO and makes no political statement whatsoever. The target audience is caseworkers, COI researchers, policy makers, and decision making authorities. The answer was finalised on the 12 December 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Shabaab Is a Movement That Merged Four Somali Groups and Has Been Supported from Its Early Days by Foreign Islamists, Including Those Linked to Al-Qâ’Idah
    THE RISE OF A JIHADI MOVEMENT IN A COUNTRY AT WAR HARAKAT AL -SHABAAB AL MUJAHEDDIN IN SOMALIA Roland Marchal Senior Research Fellow at CNRS SciencesPo Paris March 2011 This report is independent and does not represent the views of Her Majesty’s Government CONTENT Content Executive Summary Chapter I: Historical Background to the Development of al-Shabaab 1. A political history 1.1. Learning from failures? The radicalisation of the Somali Islamist movement 1.2. The experiments of the Islamic Courts 1.3. The emergence of al-Shabaab 2. Getting organized 2.1. The Supreme Council 2.2. The ministries or Maktabs 3. Conclusion Chapter II: The confrontation with other Islamic Trends 1. The Salafi divide 2. Al-I’tisaam, Muqawama and the Salafi Trend 3. The merging with Hisbul Islaam 4. The collusion with Takfiir wa Hijra 5. An apolitical Jihad? 6. Conclusion Chapter III: Citizens of Jihad. Al-Shabaab Recruitment 1. Joining al-Shabaab 1.1. Coerced recruitments 1.2. Economic incentives 1.3. Born again Jihadists 2 1.4. Recruitment of diaspora and East African radicalized Muslims 1.5. Challenging generational privileges 2. Short notes on the media policy 3. Recruitment among political “minorities” 4. Conclusion Chapter IV: Al-Shabaab Military Tactics 1. The modernisation of war and the globalisation of suicide bombers 2. Organizing the coexistence of foreign and local fighters 3. Military misadventures 4. Conclusion Chapter V: Funding an apparatus and ruling a population 1. Getting money for al-Shabaab 1.1. Collecting money outside the country 1.2. Getting funding from Somalia: maximisation of the protection economy 2.
    [Show full text]
  • THE PUNTLAND STATE of SOMALIA 2 May 2010
    THE PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA A TENTATIVE SOCIAL ANALYSIS May 2010 Any undertaking like this one is fraught with at least two types of difficulties. The author may simply get some things wrong; misinterpret or misrepresent complex situations. Secondly, the author may fail in providing a sense of the generality of events he describes, thus failing to position single events within the tendencies, they belong to. Roland Marchal Senior Research Fellow at the CNRS/ Sciences Po Paris 1 CONTENT Map 1: Somalia p. 03 Map 02: the Puntland State p. 04 Map 03: the political situation in Somalia p. 04 Map 04: Clan division p. 05 Terms of reference p. 07 Executive summary p. 10 Recommendations p. 13 Societal/Clan dynamics: 1. A short clan history p. 14 2. Puntland as a State building trajectory p. 15 3. The ambivalence of the business class p. 18 Islamism in Puntland 1. A rich Islamic tradition p. 21 2. The civil war p. 22 3. After 9/11 p. 23 Relations with Somaliland and Central Somalia 1. The straddling strategy between Somaliland and Puntland p. 26 2. The Maakhir / Puntland controversy p. 27 3. The Galmudug neighbourhood p. 28 4. The Mogadishu anchored TFG and the case for federalism p. 29 Security issues 1. Piracy p. 31 2. Bombings and targeted killings p. 33 3. Who is responsible? p. 34 4. Remarks about the Puntland Security apparatus p. 35 Annexes Annex 1 p. 37 Annex 2 p. 38 Nota Bene: as far as possible, the Somali spelling has been respected except for “x” replaced here by a simple “h”.
    [Show full text]
  • SOMALIA BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION in SOUTHERN and CENTRAL SOMALIA Country of Origin Information Service
    SOMALIA BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA Country of Origin Information Service Date: 17 August 2012 SOMALIA – BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA 17 AUGUST 2012 Contents Preface Paragraph 1. SECURITY SITUATION - OVERVIEW .............................................................................. 1.01 Events of 2011 ...................................................................................................... 1.07 Numbers of casualties in 2011 ........................................................................... 1.11 Events of 2012 ...................................................................................................... 1.22 Numbers of casualties in 2012 ........................................................................... 1.18 Type and nature of violence ................................................................................ 1.26 2. KEY ACTORS ........................................................................................................... 2.01 Government and pro-government forces ........................................................... 2.01 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ..................................................... 2.01 Ethiopian troops to withdraw from Belet Weyne and Baidoa .............................. 2.08 Transitional Federal Government forces ............................................................ 2.09 Insurgent groups .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Scramble for the Horn of Africa – Al-Shabaab Vs. Islamic State
    DOI: 10.32576/nb.2019.4.3 Nation and Security 2019. Issue 4. | 14–29. Viktor Marsai Scramble for the Horn of Africa – Al-Shabaab vs. Islamic State Over the past three years, the so-called Islamic State (IS) has made significant pro- gress in building an international network of Jihadist groups that pledged allegiance to the organisation. The affiliates of IS are both new-born movements like the Islamic State in Libya, and older groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria. The latter are much more valuable for the ‘Caliphate’ because they have broad experience and capacities that allow them to operate independently of IS. In its global Jihad, therefore, the Islamic State tried to gain the support of the members of former al-Qaeda franchises, shifting their alliances from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi. The paper offers an overview of such IS efforts in the Horn of Africa and an evaluation of how successful this quest had been until 2017. Keywords: Somalia, Libya, terrorism, extremism, Africa, Islamic State, al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab in Somalia (full name: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, or ‘Movement of Striving Youth’) is distinct from other Jihadist organisations. Al-Shabaab established and extended territorial control in Somalia over at least 250,000 square kilometres in 2008–2009 – five years prior to IS.1 It created effective administrative and judiciary systems and launched military, political and ideological attacks against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and its foreign supporters. In 2011–2012, offensives of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) inflicted serious setbacks on the movement, and it had to vacate the capital, Mogadishu.
    [Show full text]
  • PDF Download Seventeen Trips Through Somaliland and a Visit To
    SEVENTEEN TRIPS THROUGH SOMALILAND AND A VISIT TO ABYSSINIA PDF, EPUB, EBOOK George Carlos Swayne Harald | 450 pages | none | Nobel Press | 9785519047555 | English | none Seventeen trips through Somaliland and a visit to Abyssinia PDF Book British authorities took note of the disturbance and turmoil and he was thus expelled from the city. We purpose information in a diversion of appearing and media. The Isaq are portrayed as particularly callous and shameful in the way they parade looted Ogaden camels in front of their previous owners. War Office. Namespaces Article Talk. Seventeen trips through Somaliland and a visit to Abyssinia : a record of exploration and big game shooting, with descriptive notes on the fauna of the country by H. Views Read Edit View history. The land of Zinj Stigand, C. Swayne " against Abyssinia First meeting with Abyssinians Disturbed. Check out pictures, bibliography, biography and community. All the tombs are provided with narrow but very massive wooden doors, swinging about vertical extensions from top and baseof one side. Low, Marston and Co. Fine to be doubled in failure to comply with latter conditions and aeroplanes to be used to bomb stock on grazing grounds. In the s Sultan Awad was killed in a battle which resulted in Sultan Nur facing no opposition and was the sole ruler of the Habr Yunis Sultanate up until he started the Dervish uprising, which resulted in his uncle Madar Hersi being crowned. The Kingdom's territory encompassed the lands settled by the Habr Yunis tribe of the Garhajis clan. Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa : being a journal of an expedition undertaken under the auspices of H.
    [Show full text]
  • PROTECTION of CIVILIANS REPORT Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia
    UNSOM UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SOMALIA PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS REPORT Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia 1 JANUARY 2017 – 31 DECEMBER 2019 Table of Contents Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................7 Civilian Casualties Attributed to non-State Actors ....................................................................9 A. Al Shabaab .............................................................................................................................9 B. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama ..........................................................................................................16 C. Clan Militia ..........................................................................................................................17 D. The Islamic State Affiliated Group ......................................................................................17 Civilian Casualties Attributed to State Actors and other Actors ............................................18 A. Somali National Army ...................................................................................................18 B. Somali Police Force .......................................................................................................21 C. The National Intelligence Security Agency
    [Show full text]
  • How Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,And the Islamic State
    How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and the Islamic State THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT THREAT Aaron Y. Zelin, Editor “Al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations never stopped being a primary terrorism concern for me, for the U.S. intelligence community, and for the broader counterter- rorism community. Not a day has gone by in my entire tenure at NCTC where our emphasis on al-Qaeda has been anything less than a top priority. That’s the beauty of working on terrorism issues. You get the privilege of having multiple top priorities.” —Nicholas Rasmussen Director, National Counterterrorism Center, comments at The Washington Institute March 1, 2017 How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and the Islamic State THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT THREAT Aaron Y. Zelin EDITOR THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 153 First publication June 2017 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2017 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | v ABOUT THE WORKSHOP | vi CONTRIBUTORS | viii KEY AL-QAEDA-RELATED EVENTS, 2009–17 | xii ■ OVERALL THREAT Introduction AARON Y.
    [Show full text]