MAY 2016 The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia WALTER LOTZE AND PAUL D. WILLIAMS Cover Photo: AMISOM and the Somali ABOUT THE AUTHORS National Army recapture Buur-Hakba from al-Shabaab, February 23, 2013. UN WALTER LOTZE is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Photo/Stuart Price. International Peace Operations and an Associate Researcher with Stellenbosch University. He was previously Disclaimer: The views expressed in this a Special Adviser with the African Union Mission in paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Somalia. None of the information used for this report is International Peace Institute. IPI drawn from classified materials that the author may have welcomes consideration of a wide had access to in conducting his duties while in AMISOM. range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical E-mail: [email protected] policies and issues in international affairs. PAUL D. WILLIAMS is Associate Professor and Associate IPI Publications Director of the Security Policy Studies program of the Adam Lupel, Vice President Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor University, and a Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute. Suggested Citation: Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams, “The E-mail: [email protected] Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia” New York: International Peace Institute, May 2016. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS © by International Peace Institute, 2016 The authors would like to acknowledge financial support All Rights Reserved from a SOAR award provided by the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, www.ipinst.org as well as comments received at the IPI seminar on “UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments” on February 11, 2016. IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the French Ministry of Defence for making this publication possible. CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 2 From War-Fighting to Stabilization: The AMISOM Approach . 2 PREPARING FOR STABILIZATION OPERATIONS AN EXPANDED MANDATE AND A NEW FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AL-SHABAAB’S SHIFTING STRATEGY A SURGE TO BREAK THE STALEMATE AMISOM’s Expansion Operations: Ten Challenges . 9 LACK OF A SHARED STABILIZATION STRATEGY LAG IN NON-MILITARY RESPONSES SEPARATION OF SECURITY AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS FRAGMENTED COMMAND AND CONTROL RESILIENCE OF AL-SHABAAB NON-ARRIVAL OF FORCE ENABLERS CONTINUED INSECURITY OF THE SOMALI POPULATION DIFFICULTY BRINGING PEACE DIVIDENDS RIFTS BETWEEN ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITY DIFFICULTY PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AMISOM’s Consolidation Operations From “Clear-Hold-Build” to “Hold-Protect-Stabilize” . 14 A NEW STRATEGY FOR AMISOM AL-SHABAAB STRIKES SHIFTING THE AMISOM STRATEGY AGAIN Lessons Learned from AMISOM’s Experience . 17 iii Abbreviations AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia AU African Union CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation IED Improvised Explosive Device PCC Police-Contributing Country TCC Troop-Contributing Country TFG Transitional Federal Government UN United Nations UNPOS UN Political Office for Somalia UNSOA UN Support Office for AMISOM UNSOM UN Assistance Mission in Somalia UNSOS UN Support Office in Somalia 1 Executive Summary ities because the militants melted into the population, drew back, or redeployed in Somalia. In recent years, a growing number of United • The force enablers and multipliers that AMISOM Nations peacekeepers have been mandated to desperately needed, including military helicop - carry out “stabilization” tasks. This report investi - ters, never arrived. gates what lessons can be identified for UN • The expansion operations did not always peacekeepers from the African Union’s (AU) contribute to a tangible increase in security or attempts to stabilize Somalia. We provide a critical perceptions of security for the Somali civilian analysis of how the AU Mission in Somalia population. (AMISOM) evolved from principally a war- fighting operation to an operation focused on • Neither AMISOM nor the Somali government implementing a stabilization agenda. was able to consistently deliver significant peace dividends to the growing civilian population Although AMISOM began to take on various coming under their control. stabilization tasks in late 2011, the mission did not develop a working definition of the term until 2013, • A key assumption underpinning the security at which point it defined stabilization as “any post- strategy developed for the AMISOM surge conflict/-combat activities undertaken in order to proved faulty—namely, that the Somali National facilitate and promote early recovery of the popula - Army would play a supporting and then leading tion and institutions in a locality that has been role in the fight against al-Shabaab. recovered from Al Shabaab.” 1 This report focuses • Providing logistical support to the expansion on the four major offensive and consolidation operations was very difficult. operations AMISOM conducted on the basis of On the basis of this analysis, we identify nine that definition from early 2014 until the present lessons that emerge from AMISOM’s ongoing day: Operations Eagle, Indian Ocean, Ocean Build, attempts to stabilize Somalia: and Juba Corridor. 1. Missions must be appropriately configured to Overall, we argue that AMISOM’s attempts to fulfill their mandate. implement an effective stabilization strategy across 2. The political and military elements of a south-central Somalia suffered from a number of stabilization strategy must be in sync. political and operational challenges: 3. Extending state authority is not synonymous • The Somali Transitional Federal Government with peacebuilding, at least in the short term. (TFG) and AU did not have a shared stabilization strategy in place when AMISOM and the Somali 4. Territorial expansion is less important than security forces launched their expansion degrading the capabilities of spoilers. operations. 5. Strategic coordination among relevant partners • The speed of AMISOM’s military operations far is a crucial, mainly political task. outpaced the speed of the other stabilization 6. Lack of coordination can have negative political responses. and military effects. • The security and political dimensions of the 7. Effective stabilization requires positive relation - surge in AMISOM troop levels in January 2014 ships between peacekeepers and the local and the resultant stabilization operations were population. separated from one another. 8. There can be no successful exit without building • AMISOM was badly hampered by a fragmented capable, legitimate, and inclusive national system of command and control combined with security forces. weak multidimensionality. 9. UN organizational frameworks and bureau - • The expansion operations were not able to signif - cratic culture are not suited to supporting war- icantly degrade al-Shabaab’s key fighting capabil - fighting operations. 1 AMISOM, Provisional Guidelines on Stabilisation Activities , AMISOM internal document, 2013, p. 1. 2 Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams Introduction operations foreseen in any of the roadmaps developed to guide the African Standby Force, This report examines what lessons the AU’s experi - which focused on more traditional conceptions of ence in Somalia might hold for the UN as more of multidimensional peacekeeping and humanitarian its peacekeepers are given mandates involving military intervention. The AU has now recognized “stabilization” tasks. Although the UN’s missions at a strategic level that it needs to address this in Haiti since 2004, the Democratic Republic of the deficit, but the deficit remains. Congo since 2010, Mali since 2013, and the Central Given the many challenges AMISOM faces, the African Republic since 2014 all have the word lessons it offers do not simply generate “best “stabilization” in their name, the UN still has no practice” that the UN might emulate. Rather, the explicit definition of or framework for this lessons of AMISOM highlight the real dangers and concept. 2 When US-led multinational coalitions challenges inherent in stabilization efforts that have undertaken stabilization operations in must be considered in planning, mandating, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, they have tended resourcing, implementing, and reviewing UN to fall back on definitions of stabilization found in peace operations. the national doctrines of some of the key partici - To address these issues, the report is organized pants. But in both Afghanistan and Iraq, these into four sections. The first section provides an operations occurred after an invasion by large overview of AMISOM’s evolution from a war- numbers of modern forces with enormous budgets fighting to a stabilization agenda. The second and dedicated stabilization programming. These section analyzes AMISOM’s expansion operations are quite different circumstances from UN in 2014 and 2015 and identifies ten challenges that peacekeeping operations. bedeviled these efforts. The third section In that sense, the AU Mission in Somalia examines why the consolidation operations that (AMISOM) arguably offers a more useful point of followed this expansion achieved, at best, a mixed comparison for several reasons. First, AMISOM record. Finally, we identify nine lessons from has always operated with the consent of a host AMISOM’s experience in Somalia