The Doctrine of Revelation, the Word of God, and the Biblical-Theological Doctrine of Justification in the Theology of Eduard Bohl and His Critique of Albrecht Ritschl
By Meine Veldman
B.A. Hons. University of Waterloo, 1997 M.T.S. Conrad Grebel University College, 2000
A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Theology of Emmanuel College and the Department of Theology of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology Awarded by the University of St. Michael's College
Toronto, Ontario 2009
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Title: The Doctrine of Revelation, the Word of God, and the Biblical-Theological Doctrine of Justification in the Theology of Eduard Bohl and His Critique of Albrecht Ritschl
This thesis, written by Meine Veldman, is a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy in theological studies at the Toronto School of Theology, St. Michael's College, Toronto,
Ontario, for convocation in the year 2009.
This dissertation exposes and traces the structure of the nineteenth century Reformed theological writings of Eduard Bohl in light of his critique of Albert Ritschl. The thesis that Bohl's apologetic of the
Reformed doctrine of justification is principally rooted in Bohl's doctrine and hermeneutic of the Word of
God is demonstrated by Bohl's consistent refusal to place biblical and dogmatic questions in the domain of human rationality and subject them to human subjectivity. In turn, this informs his basic critique of Ritschl.
The argument of this dissertation first considers how Bohl and Ritschl expressed themselves texrually and contextually as further Reformers. Subsequently, the research concentrates biblically, historically and dogmatically on Bohl's critique of Albert Ritschl's theology of justification and reconciliation from the point of view of his doctrine of revelation. In the final section, this research points to the ramifications of this comparative study for our contemporary context and for the debate on the doctrine of justification.
The concluding section of the dissertation notes that B6hl expressed his understanding of history in terms of concentric circles. Of particular importance in Bohl's critical works is his emphasis that the
Word of God, as law and fulfillment, is from heaven, and that by it the living Triune God independently determines historical human reality from its eternal centre. In addition, my research stresses the significance of Bohl's thesis that justification is regeneration, thereby contributing to the debate on justification. Tracing Bohl's consistent application of this thesis, as rooted in his own exegesis and theological point of view, reveals the character and purpose of the theology of Bohl as it seeks to overcome substantial tenets of the theological influence of Augustine on Roman Catholic and Reformed theologians alike for the purpose of further Reformation.
ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Having come to the end of my academic studies I wish first to express my gratitude to my God and Father who has given me the ability, strength and perseverance to finish this dissertation. With much gratefulness and feeling of indebtedness I am also bound to many people who have surrounded me with their love and care during my research. To my dear wife Esther I express my heartfelt thanks first of all. She has been a drive and support for me to persevere, a help in accomplishing it, and full of love and encouragement when the end seemed not to be in sight. I also thank my father, Rev. K. Veldman for having been a constant source of inspiration, motivation, insight and research material. His interest, deep conviction and proclamation of the biblical truths and their spiritual comfort, directed me to embark upon a deeper exploration of the theology of Eduard Bohl. Among my academic advisors, I especially want to acknowledge and express my deep gratitude towards Professor James Reimer who has been my mentor and academic guide for a long time. His willingness and patience to see me through to the end of this dissertation, in spite of his own personal challenges, have been heart warming and inspiring. I thank the Lord for him. As well I wish to thank the professors Calvin Pater, Charles Fensham, Ephraim Radner, Nik Ansell, and Henk VandenBelt, who were willing to supervise me, especially through the last stages of my research and the writing of this dissertation. Besides the personal, spiritual and academic support I have received, I also express my thankfulness to Mr. A. Riezebos without whose continual and unwavering financial care and personal trust, Esther, I and my family of now six children, could not have overcome the practical difficulties that have faced us during these years of study, involvement in ministry and teaching theology. Finally, I am grateful for the forbearance shown by those who have continued to surround us with their support and presence in the context of the ministry of the Word. I pray that the Lord may reward this work for the furtherance of His Kingdom, the glory of Christ and the presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the midst of the Church.
111 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1. State of Research, Methodology and Thesis Statement
A. State of Research and Contribution
State of Research 1
Contribution 4
B. Approach and Methodology
Trajectory of Research and Writing 9
Methodology 10
Putting the Approach and Methodology of this Dissertation in Context 12
Some More Specific Observations Concerning the Structure of Bohl's Reformed Theology of Justification 13
Some Preliminary Remarks on the Structure of Bohl's Theology 15
Basic Intent of Research and Thesis Statement 22
Chapter 2. Bohl and Ritschl in Context: Two Contemporary 'Further' Reformers
A. Introduction: Eduard Bohl's Life, Work and Legacy
His Life 23
His Work 28
His Legacy 29
His Influence 30
iv B. Bohl as Further Reformer. 32
Some Introductory Comments 32
The Claim for a Further Reformation 34
Bohl's Doctrine of the Incarnation as the Context for Understanding His Desire for Further Reformation 35
Bohl and Kuyper on the Incarnation, the Image of God and the
Covenant of Works 43
The Imputation of Sin 44
Justification and Sanctification 49
Bohl as Further Reformer and Calvin 52
Bohl and Calvin on the Incarnation: Compared and Contrasted 55
Bohl and Calvin on Justification in Light of their Doctrine of the Incarnation 57
Summary Conclusions on Bohl as Further Reformer and Calvin the Reformer 60 A Final Significant Point for Comparison: Union with Christ, Justification and Sanctification 61
Some Broader Textual-Contextual Observations: Calvin, Luther and Bohl as Further Reformer 62
Bohl as 'Advancer of the Reformation' on the Doctrine of Sanctification 67
The Source of Bohl's Understanding of Sanctification Seeking to 'Further the Reformation' 70
Conclusion 71
C. Ritschl as Further Reformer
Introductory Comments 74
Leading Motifs in the Theology of Ritschl as Further Reformer 75
Not Metaphysics but the Church and the Kingdom of God 79
v Not Doctrine or Confession but God as Love as Theological First Principle 81
Restating the Teachings on Christ as Founder of Church and Kingdom 84
The Self as Properly Estimated in Light of Revelation, Church, God's Love, Christ 87
Evaluation of Ritschl as Further Reformer 90
Conclusion 92
Chapter 3. The Doctrine of the Word of God and Justification in the Thought of Bohl and Ritschl
A. Bohl's Doctrine of the Word of God: The Biblical Context of His Doctrine of Justification as a Critique of Ritschl
The Judgment of Ho-Duck-Kwon 94
Bohl's Doctrine of the Word of God: Introductory Comments 95
Bohl's Prolegomena 96
Bohl's Defense and Hermeneutic of the Scriptures 107
Abraham Keunen's Critique of Bohl's Christology and Hermeneutic of the Old Testament 110
Bohl's Defense 112
The Word and Anthropology 117
Conclusion 120
Bohl's Critique of Ritschl: The Living God and the Metaphysics of Revelation 123
The Doctrine of Inspiration and Bohl's Critique of Ritschl 127
The Historico-Theological Defense of Bohl's Hermeneutic 131
The Dogmatic-Biblical Postulates of the Doctrine of Justification 136
On the Law and the Prophets 137
Intermezzo: Bohl's Conception of History 141
vi Returning to Bohl's Biblical-Dogmatic Articulation of Justification 143
On the Historical Books 149
On the New Testament: the Gospels and the Letter of Paul to the Romans 153
The New Testament: The Gospels 153
The Letter of Paul to the Romans 154
B. The Doctrine of the Word of God in the Thought of Ritschl
Some Introductory Comments 158
Ritschl's Doctrine of Revelation: His Prolegomena 161
The Biblical Postulates of Ritschl's Doctrine of Justification: Sacrifice, the Christian Community and Christ 170
The Centrality of the Doctrine of God 175
Holiness 176
Righteousness 178
The Idea of Righteousness as Connected to the Idea of Law as Found in the Theology of Paul 182
Ritschl's Understanding of Justification by Faith 184
C. Summary and Comparative Conclusions 187
Final Concluding Observations 195
vn Chapter 4. Bohl's Treatment of the History of the Doctrine of Justification as a Critique of Ritschl's Treatment of the Same
Introductory Comments 200
Bohl's Approach to the History of the Doctrine of Justification 201
Bohl's Treatment of the History of the Doctrine of Justification and His Critique of Ritschl 205
The History of the Doctrine of Justification up to the Time of Melanchton 207
Conclusion 218
Bohl's Treatment of The History of the Doctrine of Justification after the Death of Melanchton and His Critique of Ritschl 219
Conclusion 226
Chapter 5. The Positive Articulation of the Doctrine of Justification in its Relation to other Doctrines as a Critique of Ritschl's Treatment of the Same
A. Considering the Christological Basis and the Biblical Exposition of the Doctrine of Justification as Found in His Dogmatik 229
Bohl's Claim: Ritschl As a Socinian: No More, No Less 237
Summary and Conclusion Concerning the Context of Bohl's Positive Exposition of the Doctrine of Justification as Exhibited in His Dogmatik and His Critique of Ritschl 243
Justification as Explained in the Context of Romans 8: 29-30 244
B. Bohl's Defense of the Protestant Doctrine Justification as Found in Von der Rechtfertigung Durch Den Glauben and His Critique of Ritschl
Introductory Comments of Analysis and Intent 247
Justification and the Original State 248
Justification and Original Sin 250
The Anthropological Consequences of Ritschl's Doctrine of Justification 254
vm Justification and the Holy Spirit 262
Justification, the Incarnation and a Proper Understanding of Revelation 267
Justification by Faith 271
Revelation, Justification and Regeneration 275
Baptism, Predestination and the Doctrine of Justification as True Scriptural Method....283
Justification and Sanctification and the Cause for Further Reformation Revisited 287
Justification and the Doctrine of the 'Old' and 'New' Man: Coming Full Circle 294
"Back to Metaphysics!" and the Concept of the Unio Mystica 299
Last Existential Observation: God, the Law, and the Human Being 303
Chapter 6. Critical Synopsis, Analytical Remarks About Bohl's Critique of Ritschl and Possible Ramifications of this Research for Our Contemporary Context and the Debate on the Doctrine of Justification
A. Critical Synopsis of Research
Introductory Comments 305
Bohl the Further Reformer 306
The Doctrine of the Word of God, Justification and the Critique of Ritschl 308
The History of Justification and Ritschl 310
The Positive Doctrine of Justification and Ritschl 311
B. Analytical Critical Observations About Bohl's Critique of Ritschl 315
C. Ramifications for the Doctrine of Justification
For the Contemporary Context 320
For the Specific Debate on Justification 326
Bibliography 329
IX CHAPTER 1
STATE OF RESEARCH AND THESIS STATEMENT
Thesis Statement
Bohl's defense of the Reformed doctrine of justification, written to minimize the influence of his contemporary Albert Ritschl, is principally rooted in Bohl's doctrine and hermeneutic of the Word of God. In particular, Bohl's exegesis of the image of God and its inherent theological anthropology provide us with an insight into the structure of Bohl's Reformed theology and the biblical, historical, and theological basis from which to understand, compare, and evaluate Bohl's critique of Ritschl's doctrine of justification.
A. STATE OF RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTION
State of Research
Even though Ritschl is the more known and influential theologian of the two, Bohl's
Reformed theology did not go unnoticed; Bohl was even an important theological voice during the nineteenth century. Not only was Bohl the subject of many important and significant references in the writings of Karl Barth,1 but Otto Weber, in his Foundations of Dogmatics, makes an important observation with respect to the intention and purpose of Bohl's last major dogmatic work, which was written in relation to Ritschl: "Bohl systematized Kohlbrugge's conception (of Sola Gratia) and relieved it of some of its
1 See Karl Barth, Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte (Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag, 1947), 581; Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes Die Kirchliche Dogmatik 1. Band, 1 Teil 1 (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1955), 234; Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes. Die Kirchliche Dogmatik 1. Band, 1 Teil 2 (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1948), 169, 210, 220; Die Lehre Von Gott. Die Kirchliche Dogmatik 2. Band, 1 Teil J (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1958), 317, 383; Die Lehre Von der Versohnung. Die Kirchliche Dogmatik 4. Band, 1. Teil (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1960), 585. 2 tension, especially in his monograph against A. Ritschl, Von der Rechtfertigung durch denGlauben."2
To be noted as important research done on the theology of Bohl is the fairly recent dissertation of Ho-Duck Kwon.3 In it the author highlights Bohl's historical relevance. He claims that Bohl as a Reformation-Renaissance figure offers a fruitful understanding of the human being in and for the context of even our contemporary existential concentration on the human-being-in-relation. Focusing on the axioms of
Bohl's theology, Kwon claims that Bohl's historical significance lies in his nonspeculative theology, which can be of real meaning for our contemporary context in terms of the question concerning the existence of the human being in face of the question of God and nihilism.4 Kwon himself does not explore the latter suggestion as his main focus, since the primary concentration of his research is Bohl's reception of Calvin. However, his dissertation is replete with fascinating references to more contemporary theologians such as Karl Barth and Paul Tillich, as well as recent theologians like Wolfhart Pannenberg, with whom he carries on an interesting dialogue in light of Bohl's proposal of a reemergence of Reformation thought for his own time.
We must also refer to the recent significant research done in the area of the theology of Bohl by Thomas R. V. Forster,5 who presents the theology of Bohl also as a
2 Otto Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, trans. Darrel L. Gruder, vols. 1 and 2. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1981), 147 (my emphasis). 3 Ho-Duck Kwon, E. Bohls Aufnahme der Reformatorische Theologie, besonders der Calvins: Die Bedeuting dieser Reformatoren-Renaissance fur die Losung theologischer Probleme der Gegenwart, diss., Ruprecht Karls Universitat, 1991). 4 Ibid., 225-234. Thomas Forster, 'Festwerden Im Glauben an Christum': EduardBohl's (1836- 1903) Proposal for a Re-emergence of Reformation Thought, diss., University of Aberdeen, 2006. 3
reemergence of Reformation thought, approaching the subject matter from a more
historical-theological perspective by placing Bohl in the context of influences on the
development of his theology and the controversies that shaped his mature thought as a
Reformation theologian.
In terms of Kwon's and Forster's comments on Bohl's critique of Ritschl,
important for this dissertation, both portray Ritschl in the same fashion, namely, as Bohl's
dualistic opponent.6 Whereas Kwon treats Bohl's critique of Ritschl more from a
systematic theological perspective, Foster seeks to let this forgotten Reformed voice of
the nineteenth century speak from a more historical-theological perspective.7
Most important, perhaps—besides these secondary historical-theological
resources for research on Bohl and his relation to Ritschl—Bohl's own writings are
replete with positive and negative references to Ritschl. These will form the primary platform and starting point for our own comparative and evaluative analysis. In
particular, referring to his book on justification, we will concentrate on Bohl's intention to
"save" the doctrine of justification from the hands and influence of Ritschl and his school
as one of his primary biblical and theological antagonists. How my own approach and
evaluation of Bohl's critique of Ritschl differs from the two above-mentioned
6 See Kwon, 104-112, and Forster, 186-202. 7 "Hopefully, with this historico-theological account on the life and the work of Bohl, we will be able to shed some rare shafts of light on a theologian who has wrongfully fallen into oblivion. Thus we hope to introduce a theologian whose life and theology still speak from the grave and of whom the present author believes has deserved a hearing that is long overdue!" Ibid., 8. 8 "Inzwischen ist auch Dr. A. Ritschl gestorben; ich meine aber, dass seine Schuler sich ihres Lehrers annehmen werden, dem ich ins Gehege gegangen bin, um hier seiner Autoritat Abbruch zu thun." Bohl, E., Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben: Ein Beitrag zur Rettung des protestantischen CardinalDogmas (Amsterdam: Leipzig & Scheffer, 1890), "Vorwort" n. pag. 4 dissertations will emerge from my own close consideration of the actual texts and contexts of Bohl and Ritschl, respectively. However, as a matter of introduction, let me mention some important points as I seek to contribute to the scholarship on Bohl, in particular with regards to his theology of justification in relation to Ritschl and its ramifications.
Contribution
As mentioned, to date two other dissertations on Bohl and his theology and influence have already been written. Writing in German, Ho-Duck Kwon concentrates in particular on Bohl's reception of the theology of the Reformer John Calvin. Thomas Forster, in his dissertation, introduces Bohl to the English-speaking world as a forgotten voice of the nineteenth century, one who advocated a reemergence of Reformation thought. In both dissertations Ritschl is treated as Bohl's dualistic or Pelagian opponent in terms of his doctrine of justification.
However, in contrast to both Kwon's and Foster's research on Bohl, it has become clear to me that for Bohl Ritschl was more than a peripheral dualistic opponent. In my opinion their treatment of Bohl's critique of Ritschl seriously neglects to explore the fundamental point of difference between the two, namely—what even Bohl himself signals as being the root difference between himself and Ritschl9—the answer to the question of what constitutes revelation. Both their dissertations expose primarily the theological, and to a certain extent the methodological, differences between Ritschl and
9 Bohl notes, "Right here we are at the essential difference between Ritschl and orthodoxy. But the difference is evident at the very outset, namely at the definition of what constitutes revelation." Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine of Justification, trans. C. H. Riedesel (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1946) 211 (my emphasis). 5
Bohl, neglecting, however, that the difference between the two is rooted in the biblical underpinnings of their doctrines of justification, that is, in their respective doctrines of the
Word of God. In light of this observation, I will seek to nuance some of these approaches and presuppositions and so seek to come to terms with what is most foundational and critical in terms of Bohl's critique of Ritschl and other nineteenth-century theologians,10 from the point of view of the structure of his own theology as rooted in his doctrine of the
Word of God.
In seeking to contribute to our contemporary context in terms of the doctrine of justification and its ramifications, of particular interest is how Bohl articulated his conception of history as conditioned by his understanding of justification and Scripture.
As informed by his exegesis and understanding of the function and authority of biblical revelation, Bohl conceptualized his understanding of history in terms of concentric circles: "The history of man is not a tedious development from nil to infinity, but it proceeds in concentric circles."11 From this perspective Bohl sought to express his positive articulation of justification as a way of thinking that seeks to refract the rays of
God's revelation not in terms of being or substance (as quantifiable, or scientifically objective), but in terms of God's living Word as it comes to the whole human being, who is, as such, primarily and totally a creature dependent upon God in time. Exploring the
It should be noted that Bohl was first and foremost an Old Testament scholar and thus a biblical theologian, and that Ritschl was a New Testament scholar in the early part of his career, one who sought to ground his theology in a particular understanding of the authority and development of the Scriptures. Therefore, by exploring the similarities and the differences between Bohl and Ritschl, I will focus on these areas of concentration, and so I will seek to nuance expressed opinions in the recent dissertations on Bohl and contribute to the resurgence of interest in Bohl's voice also for our day. I will discuss this further in chapter 2. Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 80. 6 ramifications of this understanding of history for our contemporary context in light of
Bohl's doctrine of the Word of God and the structure of his theology will be one of the interests of this research.
As preliminary observation in this regard I note that Bohl lived in a time in which the theory of evolution was gaining wide acceptance—a theory that organizes data primarily in terms of horizontal and historical (historistic) development. It is in this context that Bohl expressed his understanding of history in terms of concentric circles as an apologetic biblical standpoint. In his polemics Bohl specifically directed his attention against these tendencies in his critique of the historical-critical method of the Old
Testament emergent during his time, which he saw as influenced by evolutionary and
Hegelian thought patterns.
What we will see as particularly important in Bohl's critical works is that Bohl emphasized that the law as spiritual Word of God-was to be emphasized as a gift from heaven, revealing the person and will of the eternal God Himself, and as such it was not first to be subjected to history or the evolution of the religious consciousness of human
• 17 beings or prophets, as Wellhausen et al. had expressed it. From the outset the eternal word of God was meant to determine reality and history and as such form the basis of later wisdom literature, prophecy, and the rest of Scripture, including a proper understanding of the human being and justification under God. This implied for Bohl
1 See Bohl, Tot de Wet en Tot de Getuigenis Een Verweerschrift tegen de Nieuw- critische studie van het Oude Testament (Amsterdam: Scheffer & Co., 1884). See in particular pp. 1-5, where he deals with the pertinent question, does the law come from heaven, or from human beings and from human history? He invites the critics to take their standpoint again on the fact that the law is from God. 7 also, specifically in the context of his critique of Ritschl, a call back to the metaphysics of the classical creeds of Christianity.
Without focusing too much on the historical-critical arguments Bohl presents, I intend primarily to point to the possible ramifications of Bohl's doctrine of the Word of
God and his conception of history. This I will seek to do in light of his appreciation and critique of Ritschl. In particular the following question will be important: What can
Bohl's reconfiguration of history as concentric circles and of revelation as primarily refracted through time—with God as its eternal center speaking and directly effecting it by His eternal Word—contribute to our scientific and technological postmodern age?
As specific contribution to the debate on justification today and related to Bohl's understanding of the Word of God and its method as expressed in his doctrine of justification, I will seek to point to some possible ramifications of Bohl's central thesis that justification is regeneration. As we will see, Bohl traces this thesis back to the
Reformation itself, after having expressed it in terms of his own exegesis. He claims that his expression of justification as conceptually and effectively falling together with regeneration must be understood in continuity with the catholicity of the church and therefore ought not to be abandoned. In terms of how justification and regeneration ought to be understood together, conceptually and effectively, we will see that Bohl differs greatly from the Roman Catholic tradition and from other Lutheran and Reformed and post-Reformation theologians.
Finally, as a contribution to the more specific theological debate on justification, I will point to the ramifications of Bohl's thesis that justification is regeneration, not only 8 in terms of the history of the doctrine of justification but also in terms of what his thesis might mean for the specific debate on justification today.
In all of this I will seek to allow Bohl dialogically to participate in our own contemporary context, both generally and specifically, after I have considered his own context and text and his critique of Ritschl and others. How I desire to go about doing so and with what specific thesis in mind is the subject matter of the next section. 9
B. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
Trajectory of Research and Writing
I will first consider Bohl and Ritschl as they individually expressed themselves as related
to the past and how they desired to have an impact on the future of Protestant and
Reformed theology as further reformers. Following this consideration the research will
focus on Bohl's interaction with Ritschl as his contemporary from the specific point of
view of his doctrine of revelation and his critique of Ritschl's theology of justification
historically and dogmatically. Finally, I will point out what the results of this
comparative study of these two significant Protestant theologians may imply for our own
contemporary context and the recent debate on the doctrine of justification.
The overall trajectory and structure of this research will be more specifically
divided into six chapters. Following this first chapter on the state of research and
methodology, I will consider Bohl and Ritschl in their historic context, paying special
attention to their desire that through their work they wished to complete or further the
Reformation. In the second chapter we will summarily note and describe some of the
foundational aspects and leitmotifs of Bohl and Ritschl's theologies of justification,
which will set the stage for the rest of this research.
In chapter 3 I will turn to the primary concentration of my research, namely, the
biblical and exegetical underpinnings of Bohl's critique of Ritschl's doctrine of justification as rooted in Bohl's doctrine of revelation and the specific structure of his
Reformed theology. 10
Having considered the basic context for the thesis of this dissertation in chapter 3, the research will then branch out in chapters 4 and 5 to consider Bohl's treatment of the history of the doctrine of justification and its positive theological articulation in comparison and contrast with Ritschl's articulation of the same areas of concentration.13
After having considered Bohl's specific critique of Ritschl's doctrine of justification and others from the standpoint of the structure of his own Reformed theology, in the final chapter of this dissertation, chapter six, I will point to some ramifications of my investigation for our contemporary context and the specific debate on the doctrine of justification.
Methodology
In terms of approach and methodology, it is my conviction that one cannot but take one's stand from within a particular theological context, from the vantage point of which one in turn judges the facts and the results of the investigation. In my case, that vantage point will primarily be Bohl's Reformed theology and its biblico-historical standpoint, while at the same time I will also seek to walk, at times, in Ritschl's shoes. In other words, the approach of this dissertation intends to focus, first, on the particular rather than on a
Bohl's book on justification, Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben, follows the same order as Ritschl's main three-volume work on justification and reconciliation: the history of the doctrine of justification, the biblical postulates of justification, and the doctrine of justification in relation to other doctrines of Christian theology. No doubt this order was chosen by Bohl as a way to minimize Ritschl's work and influence in all these areas of concentration. Therefore, just as Bohl expressed his critique of Ritschl and others by mirroring the order in which Ritschl treated the doctrines of justification, in this dissertation I will divide my investigation in accordance with these areas of concentration as well. 11
general or so-called scientific (objective) vantage point. This approach could be
categorized, historiographically speaking, as "nominalist."
This approach is purposely chosen following the comments of the great medieval
and Reformation scholar and historian Heiko Oberman, who termed himself a nominalist
historian.14 He writes, "While up to this time I had studied late medieval nominalism
primarily as a chapter in the history of thought,... I now became a nominalist historian
myself by discovering the relevancy of its most critical edge: its acute sense of singularity
of the events, persons, and constellations.... Accordingly, a well-advanced traditional
textual analysis of Luther's thought [for example] could only be transformed into a profile
of the historical contextual Luther after I had come to apply my nominalist lesson:
reaching out for the person of flesh and blood with sweat and aspirations, in his unique
time and place without any effort to force him into the preconceived universals of our
own making such as 'Middle Ages' or 'Modern Times.'"15
Heiko Oberman, The Impact of the Reformation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), viii-ix. Here one should not confuse nominalist philosophy, which denies the existence of the independent reality of what universal terms refer to, with the methodology of the nominalist-historian. The latter refers to a particular approach in the context of the study of historic texts and historic personalities. It takes as its point of departure the research of individual texts and of individual personalities, rather than seeking to prejudge the historical particular material by way of preconceived constructs or ideas. 15 Ibid., viii-ix. Oberman expresses this same approach in the context of writing on the forerunners of the Reformation in his book Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought (Cambridge: James & Clarke, 2002). Here Oberman expresses his own opinion on the task of a historian: "We do not feel that it should be the task of the historian of ideas to establish causal connections in the historical succession of these ideas.. .. Accordingly, the standard for a Forerunner cannot be that he 'caused' the Reformation in one aspect or another, for example by exercising direct or indirect influence on Luther; the study of the Forerunner is determined rather by the wish to give Reformation thought its proper historical context.... Thus the use of the category of Forerunners does not function to establish the nature of the cause, but to describe the structure of the change. The uniqueness of Luther's discovery is now generally admitted, 12
Taking this approach does not mean that one cannot and ought not to be critical, even of one's chosen 'place.' To the contrary, it is my conviction that this is the way for one to be able to understand one's place and at the same time to be conscientiously critical of it. Such a critique will occur precisely in the course of the investigation.
My questions thus will be these: How did Bohl, as a contemporary of Ritschl, react to his own context from his own unique Reformed perspective? How did he deal with and understand the text of Scripture, its exegesis, and the history of Christian theology with the expertise and means he had acquired? In what way did he desire to leave a mark on the history of Christian theology, while at times seemingly borrowing from Ritschl and at other times fundamentally rejecting Ritschl's own interpretations and readings of the Scriptures, his treatment of the history of Christian theology, and his positive articulation of the doctrine of justification? What, finally is the structure of
Bohl's Reformed theology, contextually and textually considered?
Putting the Approach and Methodology of this Dissertation in Context
The approach taken in this dissertation is to be contrasted with certain tendencies of attempting to see particular individuals and their theologies as part of the stream of history itself or as 'products' of their historic formation or of the history of ideas. In my view the vantage point of one's inquiry must be first the particular and if possible the present of the considered individual, in this case of Bohl and Ritschl. Thus for my own specific purposes, Bohl's own methodology and the structure of his theology, as he
but the degree of his uniqueness on this point can be measured only by a study of his context." Oberman, Forerunners, 38-39. 13
absorbed and reacted to his own scholarly and theological context, will be my first
particular concentration.
In light of these observations, my first general observation is that the main
difference between the structure of the theology of Bohl and that ofRitschl is grounded in
their respective doctrines of revelation as intimately related to their doctrines of justification.
Some More Specific Observations Concerning the Structure ofBohl's Reformed Theology
of Justification
First, for Bohl, starting from the revelation of the Word of God does not mean that he
rejects what one might call 'creational theology' or metaphysics. Comparing Bohl and
Ritschl on this score is fundamental to my thesis and its development.
According to Bohl, the particular existential, affective, and intellectual 'place' in
which one stands is and ought to be the revelation of God because it conditions and
determines our understanding of God, the self, and the world and how they are related.
This particular stance itself is determined and informed, as we will see, by the oneness
and eternality of the nature and authority of revelation and its Revealer. Such a stance as to how Bohl understands revelation implies metaphysics,16 as it presupposes and implies
1 For Bohl, metaphysics means not only that God is experienced and known by His effects—a stance which rejects metaphysics as an intrusion into the realm of the empirical and particular—but that God goes beyond His effects as a personal spiritual being who can and does establish direct relations between Himself and other personal beings face to face by way of His special revelation in the context of His own creation. The latter creational context assumes the ancient understanding of metaphysics as a reality, or principle, without which anything that is could neither be nor continue to exist. The former idea, that metaphysics is some reality or principle that speaks of what is beyond as the actual personal, spiritual, and sovereign ground of what we know and 14
a creational theology. While comparing Bohl and Ritschl on this score, we will see a
distinct difference between the two. For Ritschl revelation is first mediated through the
particular. In Ritschl's doctrine of the Word of God, the history, nature, and authority of
revelation are first subjected to a critique as mediated by the present community of justified/regenerate believers, and this to the express exclusion of metaphysics.17
Here I need to add a point and raise a more specific question: What then do I
believe is at work in the structure of Bohl's theology, from the vantage point of which I
will seek to approach, albeit critically, my own investigation of his critique of Ritschl?
A response to this question, to be worked out in the rest of this dissertation, is
this: I observe that what, structurally speaking, is fundamentally important in Bohl's
biblical, historical, and dogmatic methodology and theology is his spiritual and
relational understanding of God's Word and revelation. What also furnishes the context
and determines Bohl's understanding of revelation is his unwillingness to place the
biblical and dogmatic questions of revelation in the domain of human subjectivity,
history, and rationality first, even in terms of method. To do so would be to approach
1 S again the methodology of the scholastics of the Middle Ages and to succumb at the
experience, prevents the theologian from falling into the extreme of pantheism or mysticism. In other words, what Bohl understands by metaphysics embraces elements of the ancient academic metaphysics as well as more recent forms of metaphysics that focus on the beyond. Respectively, we can also say that Bohl's understanding of revelation led him to seek to walk between the immanentistic and transcendendal extremes of metaphysics in Christian theology. In the following chapters I will expand on these observations. In particular, we will return to these preliminary remarks on metaphysics in chapter 3. 17 This is most particularly true of what we have called and described above as ancient metaphysics. See footnote 16. 18 Johannes Wichelhause, Bohl's one-time teacher who brought him into the circle of the friends of H. F. Kohlbrugge and whose approach and theology he both defended and articulated more systematically, expresses this same conviction with respect to what 15 same time to the rationalistic and 'scientific' approaches to revelation prevalent in Europe after the Enligthenment, as demonstrated in the theology of Ritschl.
Some Preliminary Remarks on the Structure of Bohl's Theology
To gain a preliminary understanding of the structure of Bohl's Reformed theology, let me put the above thesis in a comparative perspective with other methodologies.
In general, Bohl's approach and understanding of the history of theology can be seen in contrast with the idea and impulse of some historical theologians who are intent on searching for causal or conceptual links of dogmatic or historical continuity or discontinuity.19 Such an approach essentially operates from the presuppositions, motivations, and impulses of a philosophy that seeks to see together what seems divided.
Such an approach rests on an apparent impulse to hypostasize revelation or history, and this impulse tends to absorb the particulars into streams, or movements, by placing the particular in an ordered whole as organized and grasped by way of categories borrowed mostly from the structure of Greek philosophical thinking rather than from a right
happened in the history of Reformed theology: "Partheigeist, Schulgezanke, Rechthaberei, dogmatische Spitzfindigkeiten regierten auf den Hochschulen von Wittenberg und Jena und die gesammte lutherische Kirche wurde durch die Concordienformel in eine abirrende Bahn gelenkt. Diese stellt zwar die Schrift als einzige norma fidei an ihre Spitze, aber in der Wirklichtkeit verlegt sie die Dogmatischen Fragen bereits in das Gebiet des menschenlichen Verstandes und nahert sich wiederum der mittelalterlichen Scholastik." Johannes Wichelhause, Academische Vorlesungen uber die biblische Dogmatik nebst Mittheilungen aus seinem Leben, ed. A. Zahn, 2nd ed. (Halle: Julius Fricke, 1884), 13 (my emphasis). 19 See W. J. van Asselt, et al., Inleiding in de Gereformeerde Scholastiek (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998). In this work Van Asselt and P. L. Rouwendal seek to present and defend their historical-theological approach in terms of a "positive continuity theory" in comparison and contrast with other theories which argue for a so- called "negative continuity theory," or a theory which sees more discontinuity between what happened after the Reformation and the Reformers themselves. See ibid., 25-29. 16
understanding of what it means to submit to Word-revelation itself. Furthermore, the
latter approach tends to turn the way of interpreting thoughts, things, and people into a
school—a school in which all those who are in this school are able to understand and
handle the same tools of learning or the same categories of thought and so are enabled to
place these thoughts, persons, or things in an orderly manner with sufficient dialectical
nuance (continuity/discontinuity) in more or less the same way (method). This is
essentially a scholastic approach to the history of theology and dogmatics.
In addition, such an approach applies a 'place-thinking' (locus) method to
revelation (or its history) with a certain dialectical mastery for the purpose of teaching,
learning (grasping), and ordering. In this way, history and revelation tend to be first
placed in the domain of human subjectivity; rationality, history or methodology, and the
dogmatic questions related to and springing from God's revelation are subjected to
categories that are alien to it.
In my view, the attempt of seeking to place persons and their theological thoughts
in a scheme of continuity or discontinuity must be avoided as it works from presuppositions of emphasizing space, place and rational thought over revelation and
time with the assumption of standing independently over against the facts of history to
order, organize, and appropriate them in accordance with certain preconceived ideas or
methodologies.
Instead, I will follow Kwon's lead in observing that Bohl's structure of thought
and thinking owes much to the biblical Hebraic way of thinking.20 Kwon explains this by noting that Hebraic thought moves in time, while Greek thought is structured in space or
20 "BOHL'SAufterung scheint an der hebrdischen Denkweise orientiert zu sein." Kwon, 37. 17 place, which provides the foundation for the ontological, or shall we say, the substantial tendency and characteristic of Greek thinking.21 This observation is fundamentally important in this discussion on methodology, as I seek to uncover and trace the structure of Bohl's theology or his Denkweise (way of thinking), as compared with the theology of
Ritschl and others.
For the purpose of greater clarity, let me further elucidate the observation of
Kwon with regard to Bohl's way of thinking in comparison and contrast with what I have observed with regard to the dialectical method of place-thinking above.
As noted by Kwon, Greek spatial thinking tends to subject the subject of its investigation to a dialectic that primarily is concerned with extension (Raum), of movement, of disposition; that is, in terms of the quantifiable, of the movable in space, and of physical and visual categories. However, with such an approach, speech and word tend to be absorbed by the visible and graspable, and in principle word-revelation is absorbed by a context of categories of thought and procedures alien to it.22 In the end the
21 "Das Denken der Hebraer bewegt sich in der Zeit, wahrend die Griechen ausgepragt den Raum als Denkform benutzen. Wir sehen darin den Grand dafur, da(3 die Griechen ontologisch denken." Ibid. Here Kwon refers to Thorlief Boman's book, Das hebraische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen, 7th ed. (Gottingen, 1983), 104. 22 Walter J. Ong describes this method in terms of what happened under the influence of Ramus in Ramus' Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983): "With Ramus, the voice goes out of this world. The loci- communes, Ramus says, repeating Agricola's injunction, are to be worked hard, but the reason, he adds, is that they provide, not richness or vocal abundance, but arguments which can be hooked or 'glued' onto questions. . . . Ramus'. .. order in dialectic is, as has been seen, radically visualist and diagrammatic in conceptualization, so the transfer of decorum from rhetoric to dialectic and its subsequent volatilization here ... is, in effect, an elimination of the vocal and personalist in favor of the diagrammatic within the concept of accommodation or adaptation itself. Out of this operation emerges Ramist plain style. This style is certainly not the high or grand style, nor is it the low or the middle style [styles in the decorum of rhetoric]. It is the phoenix which rises from the holocaust of all three styles, the verbal counterpart of the coming visualist universe of 18
biblical and dogmatic questions springing from the word of God will be first placed in the
domain of human rationality, experience, and history, with that domain's implicit
consequences. This Bohl is unwilling to do, both in terms of the history of the church and
in terms of his doctrine of the Word of God and his doctrine of justification.23 The
'objects,' voiceless and by that very fact depersonalized, 'a close, naked, natural way of speaking,' as near the 'mathematical' as possible" (212-13). To be sure, Ong's intent is not to posit this development against the Hebrew dialogical method; however, the thesis of his writing is that with Ramus as a scholastic-humanist—including those who followed him and were influenced by him, as for example, Alsted, William Ames, and Harvard itself (see page 197)—"The oral-auditory is liquidated in favor of the visual.... It was a movement away from a concept of knowledge as it had been enveloped in disputation and teaching [both forms of dialogue belonging to a personalist, existential world of sound] toward a concept of knowledge which associated it with a silent object world, conceived in visualist, diagrammatic terms." (112, 151). 23 See Bohl, Prolegomena voor eene Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Amsterdam: Scheffer, 1892). This was published in Dutch as a translation of earlier articles written by Bohl for Evangelische Sonntagsbote, Austria, 1867, and [Evcmgeliscfi] Reformierte Kirchenzeitung of Stahelin and Thelemann, [1874] 1875. In these articles, which form his Prolegomena, Bohl clearly rejects any attempt to dialectically reduce (mit dialectischer Kunst herzuleiten) the history of dogmatics and the church to a certain ground-principle. Such efforts will always be in vain (ein ganz vergebliches Bemiihen). Neither Alexander Schweizer (Zentraldogmeri) nor Matthias Schneckenburger nor Bauer have found the philosopher's stone. "Denn mit der Enstehung und Entwickelung einer Kirche verhalt es sich factisch anders als mit der Ausbildung eines philosophischen Systems. Die Kirche oder Gemeinde Christ ist, ..., 'aus dem Worte Gottes geboren,'... Je treuer die gemeinden sich an die heilige Schrift hielten ... um so reiner war auch ihre Gestalt. In der Apostelzeit war diese Reinheit relativ am gro|3ten." Eduard Bohl, "Streisziige durch das Gebiet der reformirten Dogmatik I. Entstehungsgrund der reformirten Kirche," Evangelisch-reformirte Kirchenzeitung 24, No. 19-20 (1874): 145-146. The history of the Church was soon distorted when the Church Fathers began to seek for weapons, or branches of service (methods) "die aus der Philosophic entlehnt waren." Ibid., 146. However, the church's "Mittel und Schwerpunkt, den sie in der heiligen Schrift besa|3, verkannte sie mehr und mehr; Kriicken und abermals Krucken wurden gesucht, um dem empfindlichen Auswahl der biblischen Wahrheiten zu ersetzen." Ibid., 147. Bohl also clearly rejects such distinctions as formal and material principles, which are borrowed from Aristotelian philosophy, to interpret the history of dogma and the church. "Man hart vielfach ein doppeltes Prinzip fur die Reformation nachwiesen wollen, ein Formal und ein Materialprinzip. Das ist aber eine durchaus abstracte, durch die Geschichte nicht zu belegende Trennung. Wo anders hat sich das Dogma von der Rechtigung entzundet, als an der Heilige Schrift?" Ibid., 149. What had happened soon after the Apostolic Church by borrowing 'branches of service' from philosophy, repeated itself in the seventeenth 19 structure of Bohl's theology stands, in actual fact, in stark contrast to the approach and methodology as outlined above.
Thus, Bohl's more Hebraic way of thinking, as it is rooted in the Word of a God who lives and who speaks, inherently opposes itself to the results of the application of the dialectical method of place-thinking to biblical and historical theology as such.24 A further reason for this is that rational or dialectical thought as applied in place-thinking inherently implies an illusionary independence of the human being over against God and the nature, character, and function of the Word of God as it borrows from Greek rational and ontological thought. And so as one applies the dialectical place-thinking method to
century. "In de zeventiende eeuw komt het orthodoxe leerbegrip tot vastere formuleering en wordt met meer scholastieke formules toegerust. De dogmatiek maakt zich allengs van de exegese los, daarin geheel afwijkende van Calvijn; het dogma werd niet altijd in de levendwekkende bron der Heilige Schrift gedompeld, om vernieuwd daaruit weer te voorschijn te komen. Zoo naderde ook in de Gereformeerde Kerk de tijd, waarin men aan de Schrift de haar toekomende plaats in het middelpunt niet meer toestond, en zoodoende terugkeerde tot de oude paden der Scholastiek." Bohl, Prolegomena, 102. For the Dutch translation of the German article above see pages 80-94, ibid. 24 Farrell, a source on Hebraic thought to which Kwon also refers in his analysis of Bohl's theology as more Hebraic than Greek, connects Ong's criticism of Ramus with a positive affirmation of Hebraic thought: "Ong's account of visualism in Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue emerged only after he had gathered a massive amount of material concerning Ramus' work and the antecedents of Ramus's thought in the ancient and medieval world. In connection with his theological studies, Ong had learned about the kind of distinction that Thorlief Boman calls attention to in Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek—that Hebrew thought favors sound ("Hear, O Israel!"), while Greek philosophic thought gravitates toward visual analogues, such as Plato's Ideas (or Forms). See Thorlief Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, trans. J. L. Moreau (London: SCMP, 1960). When Ong made the connection between the visualism of Greek philosophic thought and the tradition of dialectic and logic derived from it, he recognized that he was studying a tradition of visualism and that Ramus and his followers extended this visualist tradition spectacularly with their branching diagrams and with the aid of printed books. Indeed, as we will see below, Ong sees the late medieval tradition of logic and dialectic contributing to the emergence of a new state of mind in print culture, the state of mind that has given us modern science." Thomas J. Farrell, "Walter Ong's thought as framework and orientation for cultural studies in the humanities" (http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/ Renascence,-Summer 2003), 2. 20 revelation, history, and theological research, one's investigation will tend to result in an expression of a conceptual or causal historical development25—or of the history of salvation, or even of the order of salvation itself—in which one can no longer extract
This is essentially what happens in the methodology of Richard A. Muller, The Study of Theology: From Biblical Interpretation to Contemporary Formulation, Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991). For a critique of Muller's method in theology, see John Frame, "Muller on Theology," WTJ 56 (1994): 133-151. For Ramus, Prometheus was the first philosopher (see Ong, 215). The Promethean tendency of placing revelation in the domain of human rationality precisely shows itself in his method and philosophy as followed by many others, as Ramus subsumes the dialogical way of Scriptures into his "natural dialect" and expands upon it via imitation and practice, thereby effectively diminishing the dialogical dimension of Word-revelation. With Ramus' "corpuscular epistemology, supposing that knowledge consists of sets of mental items" (Ong, 203), the gaze turned to this world, to history, and towards the self. In his works he "organizes in an observational field not the external world but the 'contents' of consciousness" (Ibid., 195). Otto Weber comments, "After classical Reformed theology, led by Calvin, had ascribed to 'experience' (experientia) a significant role, it was the Englishman William Ames (1576-1633), working in Holland, who under the influence of the empirical philosophy of Petrus Ramus (1515-72) first outlined systematically a theology of experience. Ames has been described as a forerunner of Schleiermacher. This is true at least in regard to his method, which sees theology as the analysis and description of the spiritual life, of Christian experience." Otto Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, I- 545. See also Douglas Horton, foreword, The Marrow of Theology, by William Ames, trans. John D. Eusden (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997). He concludes his foreword by saying, "Yet, the main connection abides: Both Schleiermacher and Ames stressed the empirical and voluntaristic nature of the Christian faith" (66). Later semi-Ramists, in particular Jean Bodin, attempted with the same approach to "'methodize' man's understanding even of history" Ong, 297. The same can be said of the Calvinist Bartholomew Keckerman, "who systematized theology, the other sciences, and history as well." Ibid., 298. Muller and his methodology can best be understood as having come out of this tradition. Frame quotes Muller: "The reason that Scripture is authoritative—apart from our traditional doctrinal statements concerning its divine inspiration and its authority as a doctrinal norm—is that its contents are mirrored in the life of the church and that, in this historical process of reflection, the believing community has gradually identified as canon the books that rightly guide and reflect its faith while setting aside those books that fail to reflect its faith adequately." Frame, "Muller on Theology," 146. Even the Scriptures thus are approached from a so-called objective historical point of view of seeing things together in their development, historically, experientially, and systematically, besides what we believe concerning them. Hereby, revelation and the history of its interpretation are placed in the domain of human experience, rationality, with an assumption of neutrality correspondent to an assumption of a would-be autonomous individual. 21 oneself from visual and physical categories, however dialectically nuanced the presentation of that may be. It is precisely this tendency that stands in sharp contrast to the dialogical way of thought that I believe is expressed in the structure of Bohl's theology, which I desire to uncover and trace in this dissertation. It stands in stark contrast to the personal, spiritual, and relational dimension of word-revelation, or to dialogical thought as rooted in the nature and character of revelation itself expressed in
Bohl's theology of justification and the Word of God. Finally, I observe that such an approach is rooted in false presuppositions.26
In the work of W. J. van Asselt, et al, Inleiding in de Gereformeerde Scholastiek, a chapter is dedicated to Aristotle. In it the authors, T. T. Pleizier and P. M. Wisse, discuss the philosophy and terminology of Aristotle as important for understanding the scholastic tradition. They note that Aristotle considered circular reasoning (petitioprincipii) as faulty reasoning {drogredenatie). See Ibid., 33.1 will attempt to show that Bohl was not afraid to apply this mode of reasoning when speaking of God and his revelation. In fact, such presuppositional reasoning is precisely the way to prevent the biblical and dogmatic questions, as rooted in God's revelation, from falling into the domain of human subjectivity. Any other way presupposes a certain independence or neutrality of the human subject vis-a-vis God's revelation and thereby introduces human subjectivity into the process of understanding its meaning, effect and execution. Positively appropriating Aristotle, even if merely on the level of method, as many (Reformed) scholastics have done and historians like Muller and van Asselt approve of, thinking to be able to separate method from content (see ibid., 12-13) can perhaps be termed drogredenatie (faulty reasoning). The medium is never neutral. In light of this, Bohl's theology will prove to be specifically and expressly non- Aristotelian and non-Ramist. Above we have shown how Bohl rejected the introduction of Aristotelian categories in theology, such as the dialectic of formal and material distinctions. As far as Bohl's connection with the influence of Ramus on Reformed theology is concerned, we note his observation in regards to the semi-Ramist Keckermann and the Ramist Heinrich Alsted. According to Bohl, both these theologians belonged to the beginning of a period in which dogmatics gained more and more predominance over a lively interaction with the Word of God, because of which the exegesis of Scriptures " op de achtergrond raakte [was relegated to the background]." Bohl, Prolegomena, 103. Bohl furthermore observes that it was the Ramist Heinrich Alsted who for the first time applied scholastic terminology to Reformed dogmatics. He writes, Heinrich Alsted "paste het eerst de scholastieke benamingen op the dogmatiek toe [as first one applied the scholastic nomenclature to dogmatics]." Ibid., 103. 22
Basic Intent of Research and Thesis Statement
In this dissertation I will seek to unearth and trace the structure of Bohl's theology in the context of his critique of Ritschl. As we will see, Bohl's essential refusal to place biblical and dogmatic questions in the domain of human rationality, as being contrary to the character and content of revelation itself, furnishes his basic critique of Ritschl and of many others. How this is so will be the subject of the rest of this dissertation; I will thereby seek to defend the thesis that Bohl's defense of the Reformed doctrine of justification, written to minimize the influence of his contemporary Albert Ritschl, is principally rooted in Bohl's doctrine and hermeneutic of the Word of God. CHAPTER 2
BOHL AND RITSCHL IN CONTEXT: TWO CONTEMPORARY 'FURTHER' REFORMERS
A. INTRODUCTION: EDUARD BOHL'S LIFE, WORK AND LEGACY
His Life
Since this dissertation will focus primarily on Eduard Bohl and his Reformed theological
critique of the Lutheran Albrecht Ritschl, let me first provide a brief description of Bohl's
life and work.
Eduard Bohl was born in 1836. He passed away in 1903 in Vienna, where he was professor of Reformed dogmatics, biblical theology, apologetics, philosophy of religion,
and pedagogy.
Born in Hamburg, Bohl was raised in a family of a wealthy salesman. His father
Ludwig was Lutheran, and his mother Marie Antoinette, whose last name was De Liagre, came from an influential family of Antwerp and was brought up Roman Catholic. Bohl, however, was raised in the Lutheran religion of his father.1 His parents envisioned a future for him as a lawyer, but Bohl was drawn to the study of theology, which he began in 1856.
Before being seriously engaged in the study of theology, particularly of the
Scriptures and biblical theology, Bohl studied in a gymnasium in Berlin that was under the direction of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). From this famous historian Bohl
1 For more extensive details of Bohl's background see Forster, 9-14. See also Kwon's dissertation on Bohl and Calvin. In the Dutch language one can consult W. Balke, Eduard Bohl: Hoogleraar te Wenen Schoonzoon van H. F. Kohlbrugge (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 2001).
as 24 received a great love for history. Having entered the University of Berlin, he studied his first semester for a relatively short time under Ernst W. Hengstenberg (1802-1869), who was a strong spokesman for Lutheran orthodoxy.2 However, at the age of twenty, Bohl began to take studies in theology seriously.
Drawn by the fame of August Tholuck (1799-1877),3 he decided to study in
Halle, which was even then a stronghold of Lutheran Pietism and scholarship. Here he became a diligent student of the Old Testament and oriental languages.
During his studies in Halle, Bohl became acquainted with students who would later share many of the same theological convictions. Among them one in particular is worthy of mention, a German student by the name of Adolph Zahn.
Even though during Bohl's later life, there were some church and personal issues that seemed to separate him from Zahn,4 Bohl nevertheless continued to share and receive theological support from Zahn in the latter's published work, Ueber den Biblischen und
2 Ibid., 10. 3 Forster refers to the description of Tholuck's point of departure and theology, using the description of Tholuck's theology by Claude Welch in his Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume 1, 1799-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), which is enlightening for our purposes. "The distinguishing mark of the preaching and theology of Tholuck was his locating of the center of gravity for Christian thinking in the specific experience of sin and regeneration. The idealistic philosophy, in its pantheistic tendency, had to be rejected because it contradicted that consciousness, particularly the consciousness of sin and redemption.... For Tholuck, regeneration formed the precondition of all theological knowledge." Claude Welch, quoted in Forster, 11, n.10. What we will see in Bohl's apologetic theology is that he too saw Idealism and its pantheistic tendencies as one of the greatest dangers to Reformed theology. However, as we will also see, the center of gravity in Bohl's theology was not regeneration but imputation as inherent in the doctrine of justification. 4 See Bohl, Dr. Adolf Zahn's Aufenhalt in Elberfeld: Ein Wort der Aufkldrung (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1900). 25
Kirchlichen Begriffder Anrechnung: Ein Beitrag zur Rechtfertigungslehre, which in part
can be seen as a confirmation of Bohl's published work on the doctrine of justification
and its central concentration on the importance of imputation. Even in terms of Bohl's
appropriation or critique of Ritschl, who was their contemporary, Zahn comments, "Great
is everything he says about Osiander and also correct that already in the seventeenth
century Pietism and rationalism find their beginnings, and that for the discovery of this,
Ritschl and Heppe are to be credited."6
Important for Bohl's theology was that in Halle he became acquaintaned with
Johannes Wichelhause,7 who lectured to him on exegesis and Reformed biblical
dogmatics. While intensely studying Reformed sermons, Reformed exegetes, and
Reformed dogmaticians under the tutelage of Wichelhause, who was a friend of Dr. H. F.
Kohlbriigge (1803-1901), Bohl became convinced that he had found the heartbeat of the
5 Adolph Zahn, Ueber den Biblischen und Kirchlichen Begriff der Anrechnung: Ein Beitrag zur Rechtfertigungslehre (Amsterdam: Scheffer & Co, 1899). See in particular pages 18, 39, and 42. Yet he also remained critical: "Fur die weitere Entwicklung der Rechtfertigungslehre verweise ich auf Bohl. Manche Aeusserungen desselben uber die Alten sind sorgfaltig zu priifen. Im allgemeinen scheint er mir die Alten etwas zu scharf zu beurtheilen. Seine Kritik an Calvin kann ich nicht billigen." Ibid., 42. In spite of Zahn's overall positive appraisal of Bohl's work on justification, it is significant that he disapproves of Bohl's critique of the Reformer Calvin. In the next chapter we will delve deeper into Bohl's critique of Calvin in light of our observation that Bohl sought to complete what the Reformers began in a pure way but did not always finish. See E. Bohl. Ter Verwering Bedenkingen tegen de Inleiding van het Werk van Prof. Dr. A. Kuyper, "De Vleeswording des Woords" (Amsterdam: Scheffer & Co., 1888) 13. The Dutch reads as follows, "Mijn wensch is, zuiver voort te zetten wat onze hervormers zuiver begonnen, ofschoon niet altijd voltooid hebben." 6 "Vortrefflich ist alles, was er uber Osiander sagt, auch ist richtig, dass schon im 17 Jahrhundert die anfange des Pietismus und Rationalismus finden, und dass in der Aufdeckung derselben das Verdienst von Heppe und Ritschl liegt." Ibid., 42 (my translation). 7 See in Dutch, W. Balke, Johannes Wichelhause: Hoogleraar te Halle en vriend van Dr. H. F. Kohlbrugge (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 2000). 26
Reformation and joined himself to this professor as an eager student.8 This was to have a lasting impact on his theology, all the more because through Wichelhause Bohl entered into the circle of friends of Kohlbriigge, who was to have an even greater influence on his exegesis and theology.9
Bohl, however, was not to profit long from his studies under Wichelhause.
Wichelhause died young and unexpectedly, and Bohl moved to Erlangen, which was a bastion of Lutheran orthodoxy at the time. Here Bohl followed studies under Johann Ch.
K. Von Hofmann, Gottfried Thomasius, and the pedagogue Karl Georg von Raumer.
During this time he also studied the work of Alexander Schweizer, in particular
Schweizer's Zentraldogmen, and many works of Reformers such as Calvin, Zanchius, and Ursinus.10 The latter studies, in combination with his contacts with the circle of friends around Kohlbriigge, inspired Bohl to become Reformed. And so it occurred that in this bastion of Lutheran orthodoxy, Bohl became part of a group of Reformed students and joined himself officially to the Reformed Church in 1860, all the while continuing his studies and pursuing his deep interest in the Old Testament, oriental languages, and pedagogy.
Eduard Bohl, Dogmatik: Darstellung der christlichen Glaubenslehre auf reformirt-kirchlicher Grundlage (Basel: Leipzig & Felix Schneider, 1887), 18. 9 In his dissertation on Bohl, Forster has sufficiently researched and documented this influential connection in Bohl's life. He concludes, "Having then established the inseparable link between Kohlbriigge and Bohl, one can safely say that Bohl is correctly termed a Kohlbriiggian, a follower of Kohlbriigge's theology. Thus, the term 'Neo- Kohlbriiggian' is not appropriate in describing Bohl's convictions, as it suggests a deviation from Kohlbriigge." Forster, 67. This will also become clear in our analysis of Bohl as a 'completer' of the Reformation below. For this 'pure' completion of the Reformation, Kohlbriigge was one of Bohl's most significant sources of inspiration. 10 Forster, 13. 27
While studying in Erlangen under the famous Franz Delitzsch, to whom he felt
most drawn, Bohl also became well acquainted with Talmudic and Rabbinic writings. His
dissertation would become a defense of Solomon as the writer of Ecclesiastes and an
investigation into the Iranistic mirror of the Aramaic expressions in this book of the
Scriptures. Bohl finished his academic credentials with a second dissertation on Isaiah
24-27 at the University of Basel (1861).n In Basel he married the daughter of
Kohlbrugge, Anna, which cemented his relationship with Kohlbrugge also in a personal
way.
Finally, even though Bohl and Ritschl were contemporaries, there is no indication
that they ever met each other. Bohl, of course, could not ignore the influential presence of
Ritschl and his writings on the theological scene. Particularly in the latter part of his life
he began to see Ritschl as an important theologian to be reckoned with and therefore
incorporated a critique of Ritschl in the introduction of his Dogmatik. In addition, there is
no doubt that, in writing his book Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben, Bohl
effectively sought to diminish the influence of Ritschl and his school.12
Ritschl, for his part, probably had no idea of Bohl's theology and he considered
the work of Kohlbrugge, who was the unmistakable "fatherly" theological influence on
Bohl's two dissertations were Aramaismis Libri Koheleth: Dissertatio historia et philosophica, qua librum Salomoni vindicare conatur (Erlangen: Blaesing, 1860) and Vaticinium Jesaiae Cap. 24-Cap. 27: commentario illustration (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1861). 12 "Inzwischen ist auch Dr. A. Ritschl gestorben; ich meine aber, das seine Schiiler sich ihres Lehrers annehmen werden, dem ich ins Gehege gegangen bin, um hier seiner Autoritat Abbruch zu thun." Bohl, Von der Rechtfertigung, foreword. For further comments on Bohl and Ritschl see also W. Balke, Eduard Bohl, 118. On this page he refers to a circular letter written by Bohl, in which he states that with his book on justification he desired to give Ritschl a "slap on the head." 28 almost all aspects of Bohl's theology,13 "not worth pursuing."14 Ritschl saw this direction of theological thought and/or Pietism as not worthy of much serious consideration, let alone appreciation.
His Work
During his stay in Basel, Bohl published his first writing in German, Zwolf Messianische
Psalmen (1862).15 This work caused him two years later to enter into a dispute with the famous Dutch Old Testament scholar, Abraham Keunen (1821-1898), who attempted to refute Bohl's hermeneutic and christological interpretation of the messianic Psalms he had chosen to exegete. This would leave a mark on Bohl's further theological work and career as defender of a conservative orthodox hermeneutic of Scripture and christology.lf
Bohl was looking for work, but the prospects of becoming a professor in Basel of
Reformed dogmatics were not favorable. However, in Vienna, Austria, after Kaiser Franz
II had decreed in 1819 the establishment of a Protestant faculty for learning, posts were
13 Ho-Duck Kwon goes even so far as to call Wichelhause's intimate collaboration with Kohlbrugge (who was Bohl's professor in Halle) and Bohl, a nineteenth-century "'Reformatoren-Renaissance' fur die Losung theologischer Probleme der Gegenwart." Kwon, 1. See also, Ulrich Gabler, "Eduard Bohls Auseinandersetzung mit dem Hollander Abraham Kuenen iiber die rechte Auslegung des Alten Testaments 1864," Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft fiir die Geschichte des Protestantismus in Osterreich 96 (1980): pp. 1-3, 113-114. 14 Ritschl states that it is not worth "die verschrobenen theologischen Gedankengange dieses Mannes weiter zu verfolgen." Ritschl. A. Geschichte des Pietismus in der Reformirten Kirehe, vol.1 (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1880-86), 595. 15 Eduard Bohl, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen erklart: Nebst einer grundlegenden christologischen Einleitung (Basel: Bahnmaier's Verlag, 1862). 1 Below I will deal extensively with this scholarly exchange of opinions, as it touches the core of Bohl's understanding of the nature and the authority of Scriptures and his hermeneutic of Scripture in general and will provide, as such, an important context for Bohl's critique of Ritschl's doctrine of the Word of God. 29
still open for the young theologian. The Reformed chair remained open until 1864, at
which time Bohl was elected to fill this post, and he labored there for the rest of his life.
In it he was called upon to teach Reformed dogmatics, biblical apologetics, pedagogy,
and philosophy of religion.17
After thirty-five years of lecturing and writing, Bohl was forced to retire from his position in Vienna for health reasons. His labor had been fruitful, and his career was honored by his being conferred the rank of kaiser-koniglicher Hofrat (a honorary title
conferred on senior civil servants) in 1899. Four years later Bohl passed away.
His Legacy
Bohl's legacy consists of his retranslation and advocacy of the Second Helvetic
Confession19 for the Reformed body of churches in Moravia, Bohemia, and Hungary and his significant influence among the pastors there through his teaching in Vienna.
Furthermore, during his lifetime and thereafter the work of Bohl continued to influence the Dutch theological scene and the Reformed Church in the Netherlands. In particular he had significant influence upon many Dutch pastors and theologians by way of his theological works and circular correspondence. Not only did the controversy with
Keunen make Bohl known in the Netherlands as a theologian, but specifically through his connection with Kohlbriigge, Bohl continued throughout his life to have friends in the
Netherlands who translated and disseminated many of his works. Also, his exchange with the prominent and influential Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper added to Bohl's
17 For a list of Bohl's works, see the bibliography. 18 Forster, 20-21. 19 See Bohl, Die Zweite Helvetische Confession: Eine Antrittsrede (Vienna: Wilhelm Braurmiller, 1864). 30 theological influence and legacy. In fact, this exchange would develop into a major controversy when Kuyper critiqued Bohl's theology—in particular, his understanding of
9ft the image of God and the incarnation of the Word —and would leave its marks on the
Dutch theological scene.
Finally, I mention the connection Bohl had with North America. This connection appeared in the form of a favorable endorsement he received from the well-known
Princeton theologian B. B. Warfield, who also allowed him to write an article in the
Reformed and Presbyterian Review about the situation in the Austrian-Hungarian church.21
His Influence
The influence of Bohl's works and the significance of his legacy in the areas and regions alluded to have been duly researched and documented in the dissertations of Kwon and
Forster.22 However, more research could be done on Bohl's influence in Eastern Europe, where many of his students became pastors and where he himself and Kohlbriigge worked to promote Reformed orthodox and confessional theology. As well, the influence of Kohlbriigge and Bohl in North America remains a largely unexplored field. We observe, therefore, that we only stand at the beginning of documenting Bohl's influence.
The work to recover this theologian from the lost pages of Reformed theological history has just begun: Kwon's dissertation on Bohl's theology, the first since Bohl passed away,
20 See Forster, 59-69, for an extensive account of this controversy and its consequences. Below I will deal with this controversy under the heading of Bohl and Ritschl as "further" Reformers. 21 See Eduard Bohl, "Recent Dogmatic Thought in Austria-Hungary," The Presbyterian and Reformed Review 2, no. 5 (1891): 1-29. 22 See previous chapter. 31 was only written recently. Forster's dissertation is the second to help in this regard. These two dissertations nonetheless show a resurgence of interest in Bohl that can also be seen in the recent re-publication of his Dogmatik in Germany by Thomas Schirrmacher.23 This resurgence of appreciation and interest are finally also manifest by the publication of books on Bohl and his theology and influence published in the Netherlands by Dr.
Balke.24
23 Bohl, Dogmatik, ed. Thomas Schirrmacher (Bonn: Verlag fur Kultur und Wissenschaft, 2004). This edition includes an extensive introduction by Schirrmacher about Bohl's life and work, as well as an extensive bibliography of his work and the works in which he is quoted or referred to. 24 See especially W. Balke, EduardBohl. 32
B. BOHL AS FURTHER REFORMER
Some Introductory Comments
It is clear that in writing his book Von Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben, Bohl sought to
diminish the influence of his contemporary Albrecht Ritschl and the latter's school.25
Ritschl (1822-1889) had become one of the most influential Protestant theologians in
Germany even during Bohl's lifetime and theological career. He had become renowned
by claiming to be able to steer away from what he called deformations of the
Reformation, which had occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, desiring at
the same time to propose what he thought of as an "unfinished Reformation."26 Ritschl
sought to do this as a conscious historical and biblical theologian on the basis of exegesis
and a turning back to a correct understanding particularly of the doctrine of justification.
This he finally expressed, after having written many studies in both the realm of
Scriptures and the history of doctrine, in his magnum opus, The Christian Doctrine of
Justification and Reconciliation?1 It is with this work, the culmination of much writing
and teaching, that Ritschl desired to propose a further Reformation.
See page 27, n. 38. For further comments on Bohl and Ritschl see also Balke, Eduard Bohl, 118. As noted, Otto Weber in his Foundations of Dogmatics makes an important observation with respect to the character and purpose of Bohl's last major dogmatic work: "Bohl systematized Kohlbrugge's conception [of grace]... and relieved it of some of its tension, especially in his monograph against A. Ritschl, Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben." Otto Weber, 1:147, n. 67. 26 See James C. Livingston, The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century, vol 1 of Modern Christian Thought, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1988), 271- 272.1 will return to this observation, with respect to Bohl, when I analyze and describe the controversy between Kuyper and Bohl as primary context for this expression of Bohl below. 27 Albrecht Ritschl, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, vol. 1, trans. John S. Black (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872); Der biblische Stojf der Lehre, vol. 2. of Die christliche Lehre von der 33
Because I intend to focus on Bohl and his theology, I will first expand on the desire and claim of Bohl to further or complete the Reformation. Then I will consider
Ritschl's desire to have the same effect upon the history of theology with his articulation of the doctrine of justification as founded on the Scriptures and reflected upon within the context of the history of this doctrine. To do so I will consider the following questions in this chapter: What did Bohl and Ritschl share in common besides their specific idea of and for a further Reformation? What are the fundamental differences between the two?
With these questions in mind we will turn to both the texts and the contexts of Bohl and
Ritschl. At the same time we will touch upon and highlight major issues to be expanded upon and elucidated in the rest of this research.
Rechtfertigung und Versohnung (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1889); The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive Development of the Doctrine, vol. 3 (1902; Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2004; German edition, 1874). These are the volumes and editions used for this dissertation. 34
The Claim for a Further Reformation
Bohl makes the claim that the intention and content of his own theological work is to
further the Reformation in a defense of his book on the incarnation of the Word of God.28
Writing against remarks of Abraham Kuyper about Bohl's doctrine, in which Kuyper
accused Bohl of crossing the boundary and breaking with sound church traditions,
specifically those of the Reformed church, with his expressions about the sinlessness of
Christ,29 Bohl notes that the issue between him and Kuyper is deep and strikes the core of
his writings on the interpretation of the image of God (anthropology), the covenant of
works and of grace, the imputation of sin, the incarnation of Christ (christology), and justification and sanctification; most of all, it strikes at Bohl's claim and wish to
"correctly further [or complete] what our Reformers correctly began but did not always
finish."30 Therefore, his defense seemed all the more necessary.
2 E. Bohl, Von der Incarnation des Gottlichen Wortes (Vienna: Georg Paul Fasey, 1884). Bohl's defense of his doctrine of the incarnation appears in Zur Abwehr: Etliche Bemerkungen gegen Dr. A. Kuyper's Einleitung zu Seiner Schrift "Die Incarnation des Wortes" (Amsterdam: Scheffer & Co., 1888).); Dutch translation, Ter Verwering. Bedenkingen tegen de Inleiding van het Werk van Prof. Dr. A. Kuyper, "De Vleeswording des Woords" (Amsterdam: Scheffer & Co., 1888). All translations of the German or Dutch versions of Bohl's works on the incarnation are mine. 29 See A. Kuyper. De Vleeswording des Woords (Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser, 1887), vi-Lvi, esp. xxxviii. For a more in-depth analysis of this conflict between Kuyper and Bohl, see Forster, 153-169.1 will highlight what is necessary of this debate to demonstrate Bohl's claim to further the Reformation and so set the stage for comparing this claim, in terms of its fundamentals, with that of Ritschl. 30 See page 25, n.31. For the Dutch translation see E. Bohl, Ter Verwering, 13. 35
Bohl's Doctrine of the Incarnation as the Context for Understanding His Desire for
Further Reformation
To provide a clearer context of this controversy between Kuyper and Bohl, first some remarks on his book on the incarnation are in order; it will also put Bohl's statement about the necessity of a further Reformation immediately in the context of his critique of
Ritschl.
In the introduction to his actual work on the incarnation of the Word of God, Bohl states that he was not simply interested in reproducing the old christological doctrines with regard to Christ's incarnation but in stating the same fundamental truths in a 'new manner'31 to gain a deeper insight into the soteriological truths and comfort of the doctrines of reconciliation, satisfaction, and justification. In doing so Bohl was keenly aware of the context in which he lived, particularly of the mediating theologians of his time.
Bohl, in contrast to the mediating theologians, expressly did not seek to find his point of departure in a mediating principle like, for example, those found in the philosophy of Kant, or neo-Kantianism, Romanticism, or even culture or history. With the structure and content of his writings he sought simply to penetrate deeper into the mystery of the person and work of Christ the Mediator Himself as informed by the
Scriptures. In this way, Bohl was not simply retreating into a confessional camp but seeking to answer the spirit and theological currents of his time by way of the structure and content of his own theology as rooted in his doctrine of the Word of God.
31 Bohl, Von der Incarnation, vi: "An dem Beispiel der Fleischwerdung des Wortes wollen wir zu zeigen, inwiefern die Theologie in die Alten Spuren wieder einzulenken hat, ohne doch zu repristiniren, sondern wirklich so, das die alte Wahrheit in neuer Weise der nach Brot des Lebens hungrigen Gemeinde mittheilt!" 36
When Bohl's work is seen from this perspective, and in the context of my comparison of his thought with Ritschl's, it is interesting to note that Bohl starts his work on the incarnation with a significant reference to Ritschl. Ritschl had stated that in the development of theology in his own time there was to be observed a return to a naturalistic expression of Christianity or to natural theological tendencies, and this all in the context of a return to the traditional churchly doctrines concerning Christ and God.
Bohl observes that Ritschl found this senseless and unfruitful for his age.32
Bohl notes that in reaction to these tendencies Ritschl chose a way influenced by
Kant's thought. Ritschl sought to start from below, that is, from the effects of things-in- themselves that in turn are supposed to teach us the function and attributes of these things-themselves. In addition, Bohl notes that Ritschl chose to work using an analytic approach to the fundamental questions in theology, starting from the subject and so constructing the formal matters of theology,33 including the response to the concrete questions about the person and work of Christ.
Bohl in this book refrains from commenting on whether Ritschl's own path and approach is fruitful. He states, however, that he himself doubts that Ritschl is indeed successful in returning to the Reformers in this particular way.34
For our purposes of an initial comparison between Bohl and Ritschl, I note that
Bohl agrees with Ritschl that the post-Reformers, particularly those during the time of the confessional age and later those during seventeenth-century orthodoxy, with their definitions and strife about christology, were rather unfruitful; Bohl went so far as to state
Ibid., 1. Ibid. Ibid., 2. 37 that it brought about a lamentable period of dead orthodoxy.35 In addition, according to
Bohl, Pietism, as for example that of Zinzendorf, also failed to blow new life into this period with its proposals.36
With these comments Bohl positions his own theological return to the
Reformation neither strictly with the confessionalists nor with the Pietists. He found both confessionalism, which emphasizes the objective and dogmatic-rational side of the
Christian faith, and Pietism, which emphasizes the subjective side of the Christian faith, unfruitful as answers for their times. Rational or Pietistic subjective ontological concerns had begun to take center stage,37 and, according to Bohl, they had not done much better in answering the challenges of the time than had the mediating theologians.
Among the mediating theologians of his time, Bohl saw in the theology of
Schleiermacher in particular a failed attempt to answer the spirit of his times.
Schleiermacher explained Christ as newly born out of and for pious feelings: God had
TO become merely a purpose for the sentiments of the pious believer. Furthermore,
Schleiermacher's christology virtually denied the preexistence of Christ. He and those who followed him started purely from below and so attached Christ's divinity to his humanity when He was elevated.39
35 Ibid., 3. "Das Herz ging leer aus." Ibid. 36 Ibid., 4. 37 As we will see, Ritschl did not see himself in either of those two camps with his new approach, writing against the confessionalists of his time and being very critical of the pietists at the same time. See in particular "Theology and Metaphysics" and "'Prolegomena' to the History of Pietism," in Albrecht Ritschl, Three Essays: Theology and Metaphysics, "Prolegomena" to The History of Pietism, Instruction in the Christian Religion, trans, with introduction Philip Hefner (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2005). 38 Bohl, Von der Incarnation, 5. 39 Ibid., 7. 38
What is important with regard to Bohl's critique of Schleiermacher, in particular, is that thereby Bohl implicitly distanced himself from Ritschl as well, even though he shared Ritschl's critique of dead orthodoxy and certain strands of Pietism.
Schleiermacher's methodology, in fact, had been inspirational for Ritschl's own theology, together with the work of Schneckenburger.40 Yet, in spite of this implicit link, it is interesting that Bohl did not see Ritschl entirely in the same line of reasoning, approach, and tradition that either Schleiermacher or Schneckenburger had proposed.Ritschl, according to Bohl, had seen things correctly in his critique of the failed attempts of dead orthodoxy or subjective Pietism to answer the challenges of his age. Mediating theologians as well, and in particular Schleiermacher, had done little to find a return to a clear Reformed voice for their times. However, they had endeavored to stay within certain boundaries of orthodoxy, even though they had hopelessly misconstrued them.
This was in contradistinction to Ritschl, who was to be recommended for his criticism of dead orthodoxy or Pietism yet had arguably made things worse in terms of his own proposals.
See Ritschl, "Theology and Metaphysics," in Three Essays, 199. He writes, "Now the fact of the matter is that Schleiermacher did indeed use these expressions which were current for him out of his Herrnhut background, but he reinterpreted them to refer to the effects, which extend from the redeemer to the believers within the church. In addition, he analyzes all the circumstances that are here suggested within the framework of the subjective life. With respect to method, therefore, he is my forerunner; I have learned my method partly from him, and partly from Schneckenburger!" About the latter Bohl notes that he too indeed stood in the line of Schleiermacher, as Schneckenburger interpreted Schleiermacher as saying nothing essentially new but simply seeking to express the old doctrines of the church in accordance with his time. See Bohl, Von der Incarnation, 7. 39
In Bohl's view, Ritschl had returned to the old heresies of the Socinians. Just
like the Socinians, Ritschl was also not able to come to terms with the divinity of Christ
and His preexistence as the eternal Son of God. He also simply followed the Socinians,
who deduced Christ's divinity from the eternal council of God as confirmed by His
faithfulness to His calling here upon earth. For Ritschl, Christ becomes the manifestation
of the will and self-end of God, and as such known, willed, and loved by God beforehand
in His council.42 And so, with Ritschl, Socinianism had returned to the theological
playing field, albeit perhaps in a refined sense, and this for Bohl was ostensibly worse.43
Concluding his remarks about Ritschl in this first systematic work on the
incarnation, Bohl notes that it is best for Christians not to entertain the wrong doctrines
{Irrlehre) of Ritschl too long. He observes with pleasure that recently the consistorial
council of Miinchmeyer had acknowledged in Luthardt's "Zeitschrift vom Juni 1883" a
valid and energetic protest against Ritschl's doctrines of justification and sanctification.44
Already in this first theological work Bohl places Ritschl in the camp of the Socinians, calling him a refined Socinian. As to Ritschl's attitude, approach, and intention, referring to Ritschl's main work on the doctrine of justification and reconciliation, Bohl writes: "Vor Allem muss auffalten, mit welcher Selbstgewissheit Ritschl, von alien Vorgangern—wollte Gott! auch von nachfolgern—verlassen, die Lehre des Heils auftheilt, als hatte er allein das Recht, hier zu bestimmen und als ob man sich von ihm erst seinen Antheil an der Heilslehre mtisse geben lassen." Bohl, Von der Incarnation, 8. 42 Ibid., 9. Bohl notes that in later editions Ritschl sought to refine his thoughts on the preexistence of Christ, but in the end Bohl concludes, "Bei aller Praciserung des in der ersten Auflage Gesagten bleibt es bei der socinianischen Praexistenz im gottlichen Rathschluss: denn die zweite Person unseres apostolischen Glaubensbekenntnisses nach der nicenischen Auslegung besteht fur Dr. Ritschl nicht." Ibid. 43 It is to be noted that Bohl did not necessarily see Ritschl as either a mediating theologian or as a pure rationalist or pietist. Ritschl, with his refined Socinianism, in actual fact, falls outside the camp of the Reformed tradition. This is what Bohl seemingly means by regarding Ritschl as worse than the mediating theologians. 44 Bohl, Von der Incarnation, 9-10. Christoph Ernst Luthardt (1823-1902), as Bohl's and Ritschl's contemporary, was an Orthodox confessionalist of the Lutheran 40
We observe then that in terms of these interactions of Bohl, which he sought to have with his immediate historical context, he was a theologian conscious of his time and historical context. He was both appreciative and critical of what was presented as both new and old. In this context Ritschl was for him a serious theologian for analysis, comment, and critique, and in spite of what Bohl advised other Christians of his time not to do, namely, to entertain the thoughts of Ritschl too long, he himself would continue to do so. Bohl would not shy away from reading, analyzing, and critiquing Ritschl, and at times, as we will see, borrowing from him positively for his own end as he was also seeking to 'further' the Reformation. As we will point out, he even armed himself with
Ritschl's critique of the mystic and pantheistic tendencies of Pietism, as expressed in his program for a further Reformation.
This having been said, however, the charge of calling Ritschl a 'refined Socinian' is a serious charge. In fact, as I will point out, this is the reason why Bohl does not simply classify Ritschl as a rationalist, a Deist, a dualist, a Pietist, or a mediating theologian but sees the main problem of Ritschl's theology of justification as being his doctrine of
Church. He was professor of New Testament and systematic theology at the University of Leipzig. Ritschl himself also saw in Luthardt one of his main opponents, and in part he wrote the defense of his methodology and theology against him, Theology and Metaphysics, in 1881 (now included in Three Essays). Philip Hefner states, "He was convinced that his opponents were blinded by adherence to an outmoded metaphysics which they confused with their Christian faith, and when in April a journal appeared with three articles that intensified his opinions, he interrupted his work on the History of Pietism to write a rejoinder. He wrote this essay between April 15, and June 6, 1881, aiming it specifically against Luthardt of Leipzig, Frank of Erlangen, and Hermann Weiss of Tubingen. The first two were confessionalists, the third a pietist." Hefner, "Introduction," in Ritschl, Three Essays, 150. Hefner gives own opinion about this writing of Ritschl: "It is acknowledged that Ritschl tends to obscure the fact that he is relying on Kant as much as on Lotze in his attack on metaphysics, just as he is vague on some of his own problems of methodology. Nevertheless, the piece gives a clear insight into what Ritschl thought was at stake in his rejection of metaphysics and what he considered to be the foundations of dogmatic theology." Ibid., 150. 41 revelation. Let me expand on this latter observation, as I believe it touches upon the central thesis of our investigation of Bohl's critique of Ritschl.
What is significant about Bohl characterizing Ritschl as a Socinian so early on in his writing is that this in principle points in the direction of my thesis that the foundational difference between Bohl's and Ritschl's doctrine of justification is grounded in their respective understandings of revelation. Socinians mainly characterized themselves by their approach to revelation, or the Word of God, and consequently with those doctrines which were, according to them, inextricably intertwined with their approach and interpretation of Scripture, such as their tendency to deny the doctrine of the Trinity, their underestimation of the preexistence and the divinity of Christ, their denial of the necessity of substitutionary atonement, their avowal of freedom of the will, and their concentration on practice and ethics.45 In addition, historico-theologically speaking, this demonstrates why Bohl did not place Ritschl in the camp of the mediating theologians or simply categorize him as a Deist. Certainly, Socinians were by and large
Unitarians as well, but the their Unitarian doctrines were inextricably intertwined with their approach to Scripture and their principles of hermeneutics,46 which ultimately set
The Socinians' point of departure was revelation, not in any way natural theology. "Socinians totally rejected natural theology and inferred all knowledge of God from revelation." Herman Bavinck, Prolegomena, vol 1 of Reformed Dogmatics, trans. John Vriend, ed. John Bolt (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003) 305. In his extensive treatment of Socinianism, William Cunningham writes, "In the rationalistic perversion of the true principles of the Reformation, as to the investigation of the divine truth and the interpretation of Scripture, we have the foundation on which Socinianism is based." William Cunningham, Historical Theology: A Review of the Principal Doctrinal Discussions in the Christian Church since the Apostolic Age, vol. 2 (London: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1969), 155. 46 See William Baird, From Jonathan Edwards to Rudolf Bultmann, vol. 2 of History of New Testament Research (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 11. Baird notes that American Unitarianism, as first expressed in a clear way by Willaim Ellery Charming 42 them apart. During the time of the Reformation, their way was, as Otto Weber points out, a "completely different way of going about 'overcoming the Middle Ages.'"47 In this
Ritschl followed them.
Before I turn to a more comprehensive demonstration that Bohl's critique of
Ritschl's thought and his evaluation of it are grounded in the two men's respective doctrines of revelation, I must return to my exposition of Bohl's particular claim for a further Reformation in the context of his debate with his other contemporary, Abraham
Kuyper, with the particular purpose of exposing Bohl's own idea of'advancing' the
Reformation. I will select the central biblical and theological issues that led to Bohl having to defend himself and having to lay bare the principles of his theology as to a further Reformation. Subsequently, to give Bohl's desire and claim for a further
Reformation yet a broader historical context, I will compare some of these fundamental in 1819, is first and foremost rooted in principles of biblical interpretation and the doctrines derived from proper interpretation. To be sure, there is an ambiguity in their approach to revelation and how this is related to their doctrines. Cunningham notes, "If men had adopted rationalistic principles as their rule or standard in the investigation of divine truth and the interpretation of Scripture, they would certainly bring out, in the application of them, the Socinian system of theology; and, on the other hand, if, from any cause or influence, they had already imbibed the leading elements of the Socinian system of theology and yet did not think it altogether safe or expedient to deny the divine origin of the Christian revelation, they must, as a matter of course, be forced to adopt, as their only means of defense, the rationalistic principle of interpretation." Cunningham, 155. Yet, he continues, "These two things must, from the very nature of the case, have always gone hand in hand. They could scarcely, in any case be separated in the order of time." Ibid., 155-156. These two observations, namely, that the Socinians rejected natural theology and sought a theology principally grounded in special revelation, coupled with the observation that ambiguity exists between interpretation and doctrine, will be important for the main subject matter of my thesis. Ritschl, too, denied natural theology a place in his theological system and found in revelation and the history thereof his starting point. Furthermore, the question also will loom large in the course of this investigation as to what precedes or what is first in Ritschl's theology. Was his rejection of traditional doctrines similar to that espoused by the Socinians, or did his critical/rational principles inevitably lead him from his presuppositions about revelation to his system of theology? 47 Otto Weber, 2:218. 43 tenets of his thought with Calvin and Luther. This will provide the proper textual and
contextual stage for investigating and comparing Bohl's claim for the need of a further
Reformation in comparison with and contrast with Ritschl's own claim to finish the unfinished Reformation.
Bohl andKuyper on the Incarnation, the Image of God and the Covenants of Works
In his work on the incarnation and his defense of it, in which Bohl makes the claim for a further Reformation, he notes that his contemporary, Dr. Abraham Kuyper, is much intrigued by the concept of the covenant of works and of grace and uses it as the architectonic principle for his theology.48 Bohl, however, asks whether, historically
speaking, the very idea of the covenant of works is Reformed. He himself denies this and states that one cannot find it either in Calvin, in Olevianus, nor in Zanchius. In fact, one must see this development in covenant theology as a deformation.*9 It is a development that occurred in the seventeenth century, a century that, according to Bohl, can better be called the Reformed Middle Ages.50
Bohl notes that if this is the era from which Kuyper received the inspiration and criteria for his Reformed theology, he himself certainly did not.51 For Bohl this construction of covenant theology is entirely theoretical and abstract, as is manifested in its accumulative and determinative expression in the theology of the seventeenth century covenant theologian Johannes Coccejus. Furthermore, Bohl claims that such abstraction
48 Bohl, ZurAbwehr, 9. 49 Ibid., 10. 50 Ibid. 10. This is a theme to which Bohl will return in his treatment of the doctrine of justification. See Bohl, Von der Rechtfertigung, 55-56. 51 Bohl, ZurAbwehr, 10. 44
and theorization has frequently gone together with a systematization of the ordo salutis,
which finally caused a deathblow to the doctrine of justification by robbing it of its
central place and replacing it with an emphasis on sanctification.
According to Bohl, the covenant of works idea was a useful prefiguration, or
'stepping stool'for what later was accentuated in the doctrine of sanctification and a feverish preoccupation with regeneration (as coming before justification), the works of
the law, and the marks of grace after justification.53 In other words, this was a return to a
substantial, mystic, or legalistic ontology of the present. This is precisely Kuyper's
preoccupation: he proposed to read the Reformation through the lens of the post-
Reformation theologians—or, in Bohl's words, from out of the context of the "Reformed
Middle Ages."
Coming to the point in question, which is the interpretation of the image of God,
Bohl argues against this seventeenth century theological development, as according to
him it principally works with and from a wrong biblical interpretation of the status
originalis—in other words, from a wrong interpretation of the image of God in which
God created the human being. What should be maintained, instead of the abstract idea of
the covenant of works, is that the original state (in connection with the image of God in
which God created the human being) ought not to be conceived of as a conditional state for righteousness but as a sphere of righteousness in which the original human beings
were to live the life they received from God.
Perhaps uniquely, Bohl interprets the preposition 'in' in the phrase 'created in the
image of God' as indicative of a state in the presence of and under the total influence of
52 Ibid., 10-11. 53 Ibid.,11- 45
God's righteousness, holiness, and Spirit.54 Therefore, it was not work, as implied in a
covenant of works conception, but trust, or faith in God's Word that preserved Adam and
Eve in the state of perfect righteousness with, under, and in the image of God.55
Therefore, the original state of righteousness in the image of God is never to be thought
of as conditional, or substantial, in the sense of having to do with infusion (as in the
thought of Andreas Osiander) or as conditioned by a test-commandment, as implied in
the idea of the covenant of works, but as a state that was a result and effect of the creative
power of God, that is, of His wisdom, righteousness, holiness, and love.
If these fundamental thoughts are drawn into the sphere of the doctrine of
salvation and re-creation, being again newly re-created in Christ, therefore, should also
not imply substantial or ontological renewal. Many post-Reformers had nevertheless
theologized in this fashion, thinking of salvation in terms of a restoration of the
qualitative or substantive constitution of the human being in their doctrines of either justification (Osiander), or regeneration and sanctification. Thus, furthering the
"Der Mensch ist von Gott gemacht mit der Zweckbestimmung: dap er sei im Bilde Gottes: 1 Mos 1:26.... hei(3t es;... bezeichnet die Sphare, worin, bzw. fur welche der Mensch geschaffen ward.... oder konkreter ausgedriickt: das Erschaffen des Menschen fand start in Gottes Bilde als der ma|3gebenden Sphare und dem rechten Elemente des Menschen Bild." Bohl, Dogmatik, 186-187. 55 "Solange als nun der Mensch dieses Gebot Gottes fest im Auge behalt und alien Verfuhrungen zum Trotz sich an das Wort seines gutigen Vaters anklammert, ohne zweifeln und zu rasonieren, so lange bleibt und verharrt er in dem volkommenen Urstande." Ibid., 201. 56 In summary, Forster states in his dissertation that "Bohl's anthropology is un- speculative in orientation in as far as it attempts to steer away from answering issues of the quality of human nature, such as substances and inherent qualities in man. To Bohl's mind, the simplest explanation of what a human being is like, is best answered by raising the question of man's goal and purpose in life, and that can only be answered by pointing to his origin. Bohl advocates a strictly theo-teleotic understanding of man, he can be termed a human being in the strict sense of the word as long as he lives for and unto his 46
Reformation for Bohl means not returning to what he calls the Reformed Middle Ages but returning to the Reformers themselves, albeit in a 'new manner' based on deeper exegetical insights and their consequences, expressing the same basic truths in the context of one's own time.
The Imputation of Sin
Thinking consistently from his exegetical conviction about the image of God, Bohl continued to draw the same line with respect to sin and the loss of God's image in the fall.
Original sin, as original righteousness, must not be thought of as substantial, or in short, biological. It too must be understood juridicially, that is, in accordance and congruence with the judgment of the Word of God and their real effects upon humankind. In particular, Bohl saw Rom 5:12-21 as the lens through which original sin should be understood, in this way.
According to Bohl, the inheriting of the sin and guilt of Adam—and their effects, namely, death—happened by way of imputation.57 It was and is simply the result of
God's imputation of the sin of Adam, as the representative of human kind, that all of humankind ever since entered into a state of death, that is, a state estranged from the life of God, a life which presupposed a life in perfect righteousness and holiness, a life in the image of God (Eph 4:24). With the fall out of this state, the substance of human nature did not change, but his/her situation and direction changed. The human situation had become a fleshly situation, contra the Spirit and Word of God, that is, without original righteousness. It had become a situation expressed in enmity against God under the
Creator. Consequently, by the fall, there is no way for man to fulfill his calling in life anymore." Forster, 239. 57 Bohl, ZurAbwehr, 21. 47 dominion of darkness, sin, death, and Satan. In short, original sin, for Bohl, was to be thought of as resulting in the loss of the state of original righteousness with as consequence an aversion against God as a birth into a culpable state of spiritual death, the root of all sin.58
Now, returning to the debate between Bohl and Kuyper, according to Kuyper
Bohl had crossed the line by claiming that the sins and guilt of Adam were also imputed to Christ, as He came to share in our fleshly situation.59 Bohl fell short of what the Bible said about Christ being, "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners" (Heb 7:26)60.
In his defense, appealing to Heb 2:14, 17, Bohl simply noted that the phrase "but without sin" is not part of the description of Christ's partaking of human flesh, as was inserted even by Calvin, nor is it necessary.61 Christ's entering into the realm of death, estranged from the life of God, placed him under the judgment of God, as God imputed the sins, the original guilt of His people, to Him. The nature of Christ as truly man and
God, however, was not affected thereby. Again, here too, the imputation of sin should not be thought of in a substantial manner and the imputation of righteousness, as its counterpart also is not meant understood as changing the constitution of the one to whom it is imputed. Again the thought of imputation as reckoning should be central here in both cases.
The deeper issue here is that Bohl saw the first stage of Christ's humiliation not in terms of him becoming a human being, as was often thought, but in him having descended into our fleshly situation, into our situation estranged from God, into our
58 See Bohl, Dogmatik, 224-225. Kuyper, De Vleeswording, vi. 60 Ibid. Bohl, Von der Incarnation, 16-17. 48
situation of death and in the realm of the prince of darkness, as the consequence of the
imputation of sin upon Adam and his race.62 That is what it meant to speak about the
Word becoming flesh: Christ coming into our situation. To that Heb 2:14,17 points, and
that is what Rom 8:3 means, according to Bohl,63 where it states that God sent "His own
Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." In that place
he obeyed His Father in all things. In that place, in contrast with the first Adam, He
remained faithful to the Word of God, to its very jot and tittle, and so indeed remained
sinless. He fulfilled the law in the place of his people, under law and sin and in the realm
of death. Tempted in all things, yes, but without sinning (Heb 4:15), being fully endowed
with the Holy Spirit.
Summing up, the incarnation of Christ must be understood from within the
framework, according to Bohl, of a correct biblical interpretation of the image of God as
inherently 'desubstantial,' and from within the biblical concept of the word of imputation
and its consequences; not from within the covenant of works, to which is often added, in
the realm of soteriology, the mystical union with Christ as its subjective and personal-
spiritual and substantial counterpart.64 To Christ, the sins of Adam were imputed (2 Cor
For Bohl, Rom 8:3, not Phil 2, is the classic text for the proper understanding of the humiliation, the incarnation of Christ. 64 See Bohl, Ter Verwering, 25. Here Bohl observes that Kuyper adds this idea of mystical union with Christ, in the area of soteriology, to his idea of the covenant of works and his covenant theology, which he inherited from the seventeenth century. This is supposed to safeguard the subjective element of Christianity within Christian theology. However, this latter idea is also taken from the same era, with all the consequent substantializing in the doctrines of regeneration, justification, and sanctification. The human being again regains central stage, displacing the pure work of the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. Bohl furthermore notes that the idea of the mystical union with Christ must not be interpreted as a mystical union with Christ in terms of a believing 49
5:21) as result of which the wrath of God was poured out upon Him, and death ensued.
His grave was an antitype of his crib and His incarnation a prefiguration of His cross.
Yet, He remained without sin, fulfilling the will of His Father and the law of God, obedient throughout His entire life in our flesh, our situation, as having the full measure of the Holy Spirit.
Justification and Sanctification
One can observe that with this work on the incarnation Bohl, in fact, 'set the stage' for his later dogmatic works, in particular for his final and possibly most significant theological work, his book on justification, Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben: Ein Beitrag zur Rettung des protestantischen Cardinals Dogmas. In this first work and its defense against Kuyper, all the ground themes are laid out as important context and background for his doctrine of justification. In particular, his interpretation of the image of God and the thought of imputation are central and will remain centrally important.
Drawing on the conclusions of his interpretation of the image of God for the rest of his treatment of the incarnation of the Word and its soteriological implications, Bohl finally applied all this with full force to the central doctrine of the Reformation, the doctrine of justification, thereby seeking to 'correctly further (complete) the Reformation.'
Seeing all this together with what we have said about Bohl's exegetical convictions concerning the image of God, and his thoughts on the imputation of the righteousness of
Christ to the sinner—a righteousness fulfilled and earned by Christ in our situation—
Bohl writes: individual soul; it is rather Christ's marriage with the church, the congregation as a whole, in light of Eph. 5: 25ff., Song of Songs, and 2 Cor. 11:2. Ibid., 22. 50
God no longer sees any evil or unrighteousness in His people. In place of judgment, which had death as its result, stands here the righteousness unto life, that is to say, the declaration of righteousness, which brings life (cf. Rom. 5:15 ff). We can also express it this way, in Christ we are reinstated in the image of God. The justification of sinners that comes from God, in fact, lets the same declaration come over us as every first sentence pronounced at creation. (Gen. 1:26).... God now sees the sinner in connection with Christ, as He saw him before in closest connection with Adam (Rom. 5:15-21).65
To put it somewhat bluntly and succinctly: the word of declaration of judgment upon sin, and its real effects, stands over against the word of declaration of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and its real effects. To quote once more,
Paul states definitely (Rom. 5:21), that just as sin hath reigned in death, that is that it exercised its dominion through death as medium, so now grace reigns through righteousness, (righteousness characterizes the nature and manner of His reigning), unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.66
Here too, no transferral of new qualities or substances, even on the basis of the sinners' union with Christ, takes place at any time; nor does it happen when we speak of regeneration and sanctification. In fact, and here we come to the central point, precisely with his consistent emphasis on the centrality of the word of judgment and imputation and its centrality, Bohl sees himself 'correctly furthering' the Reformation against the backslidings of the seventeenth century and beyond as he posits the word of declaration of judgment of sin upon Adam and his posterity, and their real effects, over against the declaration of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and its real effects upon those who believe in Jesus. Personal faith only counts here too.61 Sanctification ensues with the gift of the person of the Holy Spirit, who is "the abiding personal author of all those
Bohl, Dogmatik, 420 (passages translated from this work are all my translation). 66 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 234. 67 Ibid., 235. 51
effects, which are customarily comprehended under the term 'sanctification,' that is, faith in God's word of declaration, based on the merits of Christ (justification), and
personal faith in the gift that accompanies it, namely, the Holy Spirit. No new law of
marks in the human being, or of works to be done by the human being, is to be erected
here, for the Spirit as the Comforter of those who can find nothing in themselves but sin
(Rom 7:14) brings the believer to the feet of Christ the Word, who is made for them,
"wisdom, and also righteousness, sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor 1:30).69 This
Word is God's word of declaration and new life in Him, which ought not to be placed in
the realm of human rationality.
Having examined the context in which Bohl expressed himself as having the wish
to 'correctly advance' what the Reformers not always clearly finished, it remains
necessary to further explore and evaluate this claim in a wider context before I turn to
Ritschl's articulation of finishing the unfinished Reformation. In order to do so, one might
begin by asking how Bohl related his doctrine of the incarnation, justification,
regeneration, and sanctification to the Reformation doctrines themselves, in particular to
Calvin,70 and not only to those expressed in the post-Reformation era?71 This will
08 Ibid., 236. 69 This is finally the song of Bohl's Dogmatik. See Balke, EduardBohl, 131. 70 To do so I will make use of Kwon's dissertation. In this dissertation, Kwon seeks to compare Bohl and Calvin specifically in the areas of their respective christologies, doctrines of justification, and hermeneutic of Scripture. I will primarily look at what Kwon writes about the first two of these, namely, their christology and doctrine of justification, within the context of my comparison of Bohl and Ritschl. 71 In the process I will also come to a certain evaluation of the legitimacy of some of Kuyper's critique of Bohl, in spite of Bohl's categorization of him as a post- Reformation theologian. See for further investigation in this matter A. Kuyper, The Work of the Holy Spirit, trans. Rev. Henry de Vries (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1956), 232-237, 259-262; and A. Kuyper, De Vleeswording, v-lvi. 52 elucidate the question: In what sense, then, was Bohl a 'further' Reformer also in the context of the Reformation itself, in particular in relation to Calvin?
Bohl as Further Reformer and Calvin
Beginning with the doctrine of the incarnation, Bohl himself notes that Calvin, like A.
Kuyper, also anxiously emphasized the fact that Christ truly took upon himself a human nature, with all its peculiarities and limitations but without sin.72 To support that Jesus was indeed without sin, many of those who with Calvin emphasized these same assertions use Heb 2:14, 17, to which they add, "but without sin," even though the text does not warrant this.73 He notes further that with Calvin they are absolutely right in terms of their intentions, that is, to safeguard the holiness of Christ. However, these
Reformers went simply too far, too secure the holiness of Christ in such a naturalistic way74 when they emphasized and asserted that in some way Christ came forth out of the womb of Mary with a pure and unspotted holy nature, with unspotted and holy flesh.
Bohl notes that this is, in fact, unnecessary and even questionable. Furthermore, it has the effect of taking away the ground that enables one to truly and seriously speak of Christ's humiliation.75 How and why? Because when one in this way speaks of the incarnation of the Logos and of the first phase of His way for the redemption of His people, there is really nothing humiliating about it. The fact that Jesus became a human being—who, in effect like the first Adam, appeared in perfect holiness and righteousness according to His
Bohl, Von der Incarnation, 16. 73 Ibid., 16-17. He writes, "Wenn sie also angstlich dem Text Hebr. II, 14,17 die Worte: 'Doch ohne Siinde' octroyiren, die hier gar nicht stehen," 74 "Sich ... diese Heiligkeit Christi auf naturalistische Weise sicher zu stellen," Ibid., 17 (my emphasis). 75 Ibid. 53
human nature—cannot be considered his first step of humiliation, as if it were wrong to
become a perfect human being. This is particularly true when one considers this as the
first step of His way for the redemption of His people, in whose place He came to deliver
them from flesh and their fleshly situation. Considered from this perspective, the
incarnation loses its deep soteriological significance and necessary meaning.76
Considered closely, with this critique of many Reformers including Calvin, Bohl
cuts deeply into some fundamental themes of the Calvinist Reformed tradition and its
christology and soteriology. This difference is the more serious because here we are
dealing at the same time with the ground structure and foundational context of Bohl's
entire theological enterprise.77 Let me expand on this for the purpose of exposing Bohl's
own way of thinking and his desire to correctly advance the Reformation.
Bohl explains it this way, "Das, was die Incarnation zur Exinanition macht, fallt weg, so wie wir die Fleischwurding leugnen und mit den Neueren von einer blossen Menschwerdung reden. Die Natur Adam's vor dem Fall ist kein der Gottheit unadaquater Tempel, wohl aber die Natur nach dem Fall. Erst der Eintritt des Logos in das Lebensgebiet der gefallen Menschheit ist als eine Erniedrigung (actus exinanitionis) zu bezeichnen. Es war zwar wohlgemeint, aber doch irreleitend, wenn man die menschlichen Natur unseres Herrn auf den standpunkt der Natur Adam's, den sie vor dem Fall einnahm, zuruckzubringen trachten. Kam dann noch die gottliche Natur hinzu, und dann noch obendrien die prophetischen Stellen von des Geistes Ruhen auf Christo (Jes. 11: Iff, 61:1, cf. Luc. 4:21), so war man wieder ohne den so nothigen Beruhrungspunkt dieser Natur mit der unsrigen." Ibid. 77 Kwon notes that Bohl's understanding of Christ's humiliation as context for his understanding of Christ's exaltation—that is, his coming into the flesh—expresses an independence or uniqueness (Eigenari) that, in fact, informs the basic structure, content and impulse of his theology: "Es ist eine Eigenartbei Bohl's Zweistandenlehre, dap die Bedeutung der Erniedrigung Jesu Christi bei ihm nicht in der Menschenwerdung liegt, sondern in der Fleischwurding. Die meisten Von-oben-her-Theologen trennen sich ebensowenig wie die Von-unten-her-Theologen von der Auffassung der Inkarnation Jesu Christi als der Menschwerdung. Wir konnen hier sofort erkennen, da(3 Bohls Auffassung von der Erniedrigung sich im Rahmen seiner theologische Struktur bewegt, namlich zwischen der seiner Auffassung von der Gottebenbildlichkeit und der vom Fleischwurding. [To which Kwon adds in a footnote:] Bohls ganze Theologie hangt an dieser Begriffes." Kwon, 36. 54
Kwon, in his dissertation on Bohl, which compares him with Calvin, after he has examined the axioms that inform both their theologies, sees in these two theologians complementary figures of and for the purpose of Reformation.78 Looking at both, as it were beside each other, Kwon constantly observes similarities and differences in their theologies; he does so, however, without making a choice or a further evaluation in terms of the correctness of the content of their theologies in light of Scripture or in light of the history of theology. In a sense, one can say that Kwon remains neutral in his final judgments as to the ultimate truth of the expressions of both theologians under investigation, other than to suggest where the one could, or perhaps should, be seen to complement the other.
In the context of my own comparing of Bohl and Calvin —which stems from my interest in Bohl in terms of his own desire to correctly advance the Reformation, and that in comparison and contrast with Ritschl—I find that Bohl's own desire and claim is not so much about whether he can be viewed as being in the tradition of Calvin (as member of the Reformed church and being a professor of Reformed dogmatics; Bohl himself claimed as much) or whether or not he complements Calvin, but what was the quest of
Bohl to understand or correct Calvin in order to 'further advance' the Reformation.
As I have pointed out above, Bohl sought not simply to represent or reproduce orthodoxy but to express orthodoxy for his own time, as grounded in and conditioned by
78 Seeing inherent in Bohl's doctrine of the incarnation the fundamental premises or axioms of his entire theological endeavors, with his specific interpretation of the image of God—or in other words, his specific theological anthropology—Kwon sees in Bohl's theology a complementary attempt to deal with the theologies of Bohl's own time. Looking at his comparison of Bohl's and Calvin's understanding of the doctrine of Christ (which includes the incarnation of the Word of God) and their doctrine of justification, Kwon constantly seeks to complement either Calvin with Bohl or Bohl with Calvin. See Kwon, 164-201. 55 his own exegesis and the theological conclusions he himself drew from his insights into the Word of God in a deeper and 'new' manner. Inherent in this desire and quest is the search for truth and falsehood. In this light, I believe that when Bohl criticized others, including Calvin, he did not do so with the objective in mind simply to complement
Calvin, but in a serious manner to express orthodoxy better or more correctly. To think otherwise is not to take Bohl seriously in terms of his own desires and endeavors.
In light of these observations I will take the research of Kwon, in particular his comparison of Bohl and Calvin on the points of doctrine, of christology, and of justification and evaluate his results, together with others', in the context of my own question of research and thesis.
Bohl and Calvin on the Incarnation: Compared and Contrasted
Beginning with the doctrine of the incarnation, as I noted in conjunction with Kwon's observations, with this first systematic theological work Bohl expressed and worked out the axioms for the further structure of his theology. In this context of comparison Kwon observes that Calvin's focus was on Christ's office as Mediator.79 Christ had to become a human being to fulfill God's demands as counterpart to the disobedience of the first
Adam. The purpose of the incarnation, in conjunction with this focus, is for Calvin restoration}0 Furthermore, Calvin's interest, in terms of the incarnation of Christ, focuses on the how of the union of the two natures of Christ, in order to emphasize the divinity of
Kwon, 169. "Die Menschwerdung Christi und ihre Notwendigheit ist bei Calvin durch das officium mediator is zu begrunden." on "Mit einem Satz: Das Wort wurde Fleisch, damit er uns von einem niedrigen Niveau zu einem hoheren hinzieht. So liegt der Zweck der Inkarnation Christi in der Wiederherstellung." Ibid., 170. 56
Christ as that which served Christ in his office to struggle against sin and death to
overcome them for fallen humanity.
With this in mind, what is apparent is that Calvin's interest and focus was on the
ontological-ethical aspects of the incarnation.82 The incarnation of Christ meant his
becoming a human being. Furthermore, as we have already noted with respect to Bohl's
critique of Calvin in this regard, for Calvin, Christ became a human being as Adam had
been a human being before the fall. In contrast, for Bohl, Christ became a human being
in the place and under the same circumstances as fallen human being (flesh). The point of
difference being, among other things, that Calvin's interest and focus were clearly
ontologico-ethically oriented as he sought to underscore the fact that the nature of Christ
as human being was holy and unspotted. Flesh for Calvin is mortal and distorted in
nature. And so, he interprets the incarnation also from an ontological perspective,84with
an eye towards the restoration of the distorted and mortal, and in this sense, fleshly
human being.
In contrast, as I have noted, for Bohl, the incarnation of the Word is not to be understood and concentrated upon first and foremost in a particular ontological fashion.
Consequently, since he draws and interprets the incarnation entirely from within a
81 Ibid., 171. 82 "Calvins Aussage von der Art und Weise der Fleischwerdung zeigt, dap er sich noch an der scholastischen Theologie orientiert." Ibid., 173. 83 "Calvin sagt, da|3 Christus die Menschliche Natur, wie sie war, vor dem Fall Adams annahm." Ibid., 171. See Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 2.13.4. On the same page Kwon notes specifically that Calvin avoids saying that Christ became flesh in his commentary on John 1:14.1 have noted Bohl's critique of this standpoint above. Kwon states succinctly, "Nach Bohl konnte Christus unser Erloser sein, weil das Wort nicht mensch, sondern Fleisch wurde." Ibid. 84 "Betrachtet er die Fleischwurding in ontologischer Hinsicht." Ibid., 172. 57 soteriological framework of reference and purpose, neither is his interest and focus directed towards ontological-ethical restoration.85
Insofar as I have already noted, because Bohl's understanding of the incarnation is conditioned by his interpretation of the original state of righteousness (image of God),
Bohl in his theology sought to 'desubstantialize' soteriology. In light of my observations with respect to Calvin it is clear that the point of departure, structure, interest, and focus of Bohl's theology are decidedly different from Calvin on these central points.86
Bohl and Calvin on Justification in Light of their Doctrine of the Incarnation
The interest in the ontology of the human being as created in the image and likeness of
God continued to play an important role in Calvin's doctrine of justification, that is, in
Calvin's soteriology.87 For him, the body is the organ through which the image of God reflects itself. Both body and soul are dependent on the image of God.88 In light of this,
Kwon differentiates between a category of destiny (Bestimmung) and a category of relation (Beziehung), which are both part of Calvin's understanding of the definition and purpose of the image of God. In comparison to Bohl, he notes that Bohl concentrated
For Bohl, "Die Werke des Erlosers hangen nach Calvins Verstandniss von der Fleischwerdung mit der Zerstorung des Fleisches garnicht zusammen." Ibid., 172. 86 To put this back into the context of the controversy Bohl had with Kuyper, Bohl's attempt to categorize Kuyper squarely as a post-Reformation theologian was only partly warranted. It may even be argued that Kuyper indeed was more faithful to Calvin in this regard; not only did he have similar interest in and focus on the ontological aspect of the doctrine of the human being and the incarnation of the Word, but he also had interest in and focus upon the theme of restoration, even restoration of the "flesh," which is also a prominent theme throughout Calvin's theology. 87 Ibid., 178.
Ibid., 178-179. On this see also, 58 only on the relational category, to which he adds that the category of destiny in Calvin's understanding of the image of God is intertwined with Calvin's substance-thinking, or ontological concentration.
Now it must be observed that in Calvin the category of destiny is dependent on the category of relation. Without a true relation to God as Maker and Restorer, and an acknowledged total dependency upon God with respect to both, the human being will not find his ontological destiny fulfilled. Yet the image of God as created and restored is to be reflected in body and soul. In his commentary on Genesis, Calvin states, "But since they bear the image of God engraved in them ... there yet exists some remnant of it,"90 and this is the point of contact for restoration.
What is also important to note is that Calvin finds his concentration point in the description of Christ as prototype for the restoration of the human being. Bohl, on the other hand, saw Adam before the fall as the norm for the renewal of the human being in
Christ. This implies that Calvin left the door open for an ontological restoration in conjunction with a historical development of the same after the fall with respect to the human being.
sy Ibid., 180. 90 Calvin, as quoted in ibid., 180. Calvin understands the image of God as finding its proper seat in the soul and perceives it as endowments integrally connected to man's body. In light of Col. 3:10, which reads that we are "renewed in knowledge," he thus favors a priority of the intellect: "To begin with, God's image was visible in the light of the mind, in the uprightness of the heart, and in the soundness of all the parts." Institutes, 1.15.4. Calvin saw three steps in the creation of the human being: the dead body was raised from the dust, the body was given a soul for vital motion, and God engraved his image on the soul, to which immortality was attached. Understanding and will he thought of as the faculties of the soul. Through them God sees fit, as means, to restore also the image of God in believers. 59
In contrast, Bohl's point of departure is almost strictly vertically oriented, to the virtual exclusion of the necessity of historical development, even from the beginning.
Therefore, in the structure of Bohl's theology one encounters a consistent and consequential lack of an ontological-historical focus, particularly in his soteriology.
Kwon notes that in this respect Calvin exceeds Bohl in that he incorporates the mandate of the human being to have dominion over the other creatures, which corresponds to the human being having been created in the image and likeness of God.91 In light of my own research, I observe that here we touch upon a fundamental structural difference between the conclusion of Bohl and that of Calvin which, in principle, are difficult to understand as complementary.92
91 Kwon, 181. Kwon frequently uses the expression "geht iiber hinaus" in his comparison of Bohl and Calvin to indicate a significant and important difference between them on a specific point of doctrine or issue. He uses this expression without directly attaching an evaluative judgment to it. 92 Without extensive comment on the doctrine of original sin in Calvin's theology, one thing that needs to be observed is that also with respect to sin Calvin's doctrine is two-dimensional; that is, there is a relational side and an ontological dimension to the idea of original sin. Although the relational dimension is determinative in this regard in that original sin has come about because of distrust and disobedience towards God and his wisdom, righteousness, and holiness, the effect of sin is also ontological. Human nature has become unclean from the womb. Ibid, 182. "Wegen dieser zweiten Definition ist Calvin's Auffassung von der Erbsunde auch als ontologisch zu betrachten." As I have pointed out above, Bohl also denies the necessity of such an ontological dimension in terms of the doctrine of sin. Original sin for Bohl results, first, in the loss of the original righteousness of God (image of God) and, second, aversion to God and turning from God towards sin, the devil, and death. This is the human being's spiritual and relational situation after the fall, which henceforth determines all the facets of his or her life. For Bohl, original sin is also the absence of being led or driven by the Holy Spirit, as one finds oneself outside of the righteousness and holiness of God, and this all as the effect of the imputation of Adam's sin upon the human race. 60
Summary Conclusions on Bohl as Further Reformer and Calvin the Reformer
Having explored Calvin's understanding of the incarnation and some points of his thoughts about original sin, I have pointed out, following Kwon, that Calvin's approach and understanding is essentially two dimensional. There is the spiritual-relational dimension, which in Calvin's thought also ought to be understood as preeminent.
However, this first dimension ought never to be understood without taking into account the importance of the ontological dimension. In fact, Calvin's theology must be understood from within the fundamentally important framework of and impulse for restoration.97. The ontological category (Bestimmung) must be seen as a central thrust and focus within the theology of Calvin. Although rooted in and dependent upon the spiritual- relational category, the purpose or destiny of the relational-spiritual dimension is ontological restoration. As I have pointed out, this left the door open in Calvin's theology for a 'developmental' historical dimension for the purpose of restoration.
Now, in contrast with Bohl, it has become clear that Bohl did not emphasize the ontological dimension as understood by Calvin. In fact, saying it stronger yet by summing up what I have said so far, neither Calvin's orientation toward the two natures of Christ as necessary preconsideration for the work of Christ in his office as Mediator nor Calvin's concentration upon the human being as such in the area of sin and
93 See I. John Hesselink. Calvin's Concept of the Law (Pennsylvania: Pickwick Publications, 1992). In particular pages 283-284 are important in this regard. He writes, "Another way is to think of the goal of the life-long process of regeneration as the restoration of the image of God in the life of the believer." Ibid. 61 redemption, are present in Bohl's approach; or at least they are not present in the same way. For Bohl the 'ontological-historical dimension' is, in actual fact, consumed within the spiritual-relation dimension, as we will see.
A Final Significant Point for Comparison: Union with Christ, Justification and
Sanctification
For Calvin, what is centrally important for the doctrine of justification is the believer's union with Christ.94 Again the two dimensions, the spiritual-relational and the ontological, are part of Calvin's understanding of the believer's union with Christ, which is the foundation of his understanding of justification. Otherwise stated, the outer as well as the inner effect and dimension of the fruits of the believer's union with Christ are emphasized by Calvin; that is, both justification and sanctification (or regeneration), are fruits of the union with Christ.
Certainly the spiritual-relational dimension ought to be understood as the initial cause and context, as Calvin also underlines the fact that the way this union is effected takes place and is maintained by the Holy Spirit, whose primary work is faith. But again, the purpose for this should not be underemphasized: the ontological-restoration dimension is the basic thrust of Calvin's theology. In correspondence with his christology, which emphasized that Christ's humanity was unspotted, among other things, so also in his soteriology, the personhood or the ontology of the saved sinner is emphasized in and for holiness and restoration. In Calvin's words, the union with Christ by the Holy Spirit and faith makes possible that the Christ outside us also becomes Christ
94 "Auf welche Art und Weise vollzieht sich die Rechtfertigung? Calvins antwort lautet: 'durch die Gemeinschaft mit Christus.'" Kwon, 185. 62 in us.95 Here the spiritual-relational dimension and the ontological dimension unite, the purpose being forgiveness of sins, the imputation of the righteousness of Christ
(justification), and restoration (regeneration and sanctification). For Bohl this second dimension is vertically and effectively consumed under the first dimension, namely, the spiritual-relational one.
Some Broader Textual-Contextual Observations: Calvin, Luther and Bohl as Further
Reformer
As a textual and historical observation, we must note that from the beginning Calvin's doctrine of justification had always been inherently more than juridical, forensic, and extrinsic. From the start, the doctrine of justification in Calvin was immediately connected with the gifts of the Holy Spirit on the basis of the union with Christ, which in turn formed the basis for its intrinsic connection with sanctification, the law, and restoration. Calvin writes in the first edition of his Institutes,
For our merciful Lord first indeed kindly received us into his grace according to his own goodness and freely given will, forgiving and condemning our sin, which deserved wrath and eternal death [Rom 5:11; 6:22]. Then through the gifts of his Holy Spirit he dwells and reigns in us and through him the lusts of the flesh are each day mortified more and more. We are indeed sanctified, that is consecrated to the Lord in complete purity of life, our hearts formed to obedience to the law.96
95 Ibid. 96' John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion Embracing almost the whole sum of piety, & whatever is necessary to know of the doctrine of salvation: A work most worthy to be read by all persons zealous for piety, and recently published, 1536 ed. Trans, and Annotated by Ford Lewis Battles (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), 34-35. 63
In this first articulation of his doctrine of justification we already see the emphasis on the seeds for necessary ontological change, intrinsically connecting justification with the doing of the law. For Calvin justification involves the beginning of intrinsic ontological and historical change. There is a direct line with internal human subjectivity; a direct line to sanctification and the ontological category of restoration.
Already, in the first edition of his Institutes, Calvin broke his discussion on justification up by a discussion on the uses of the law. After the discussion of the uses of the law he gave this, his more-than-only extrinsic, forensic, or juridical perspective on justification, a more solid foundation. He points here to the foundation, "which is Jesus
Christ."97 In him true believers are elected before the foundation of the world. By his death they are redeemed "from condemnation of death, and freed from ruin... adopted unto him as sons and heirs by the Father.. .reconciled through his blood... [and] engrafted in Him [they] are already in a manner partakers of eternal life."98 All these benefits get summed up thus: "This is too little: we experience such participation in him that, .. .in brief all his things are ours and we have all things in him, in us there is nothing."99
The foundation of justification is thus indeed Christ and his benefits objectively speaking, which believers participate in, subjectively speaking, so becoming partakers of
Christ in his benefits. This then is, in principle, the content of Calvin's doctrine of justification as being more than only extrinsic, forensic, or judicial and oriented towards restoration. It is rooted in faith-union with Christ, which is the basis for the connection of
97 Ibid., 37. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 64 justification with sanctification.100 Thus from the beginning the ontological dimension was part and parcel of the overall thrust of Calvin's theology.
In contrast, we can say that Luther held to a juridical, forensic, extrinsic understanding of justification, even if one spoke of it anthropologically. Judgment as applied to the believer is by its very character 'forensic' In this way Luther interprets
Rom 4:7, "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered"
(KJV).
Luther comments, "Believers inwardly are always sinners; therefore they are always justified from without."101 And it is remarkable that Luther here defines 'inwardly' not essentially, qualitatively, or inherently, but judicially, forensically, and extrinsically:
"By 'inwardly' I mean, as we appear in our own judgment and opinion [i.e., as sinners]; by 'from without1 as we appear before God and His judgment. We are righteous "outside of ourselves" when our righteousness does not flow from our works; but is ours alone by divine imputation."102 For Calvin what is described in this verse is more than referring to a judgment, forensic and extrinsic, i.e., pertaining to that which is and comes from the outside. It incorporates an internal given, a subjective concomitant, even a life of holiness.
In the later editions this is more developed, especially with the help of more quotations from Augustine on this issue. In Inst. 3.14.4, Calvin most clearly links justification to sanctification through communion with Christ. He uses the analogy of trees and states, "Finalement, il est certain que ce sont mauvais arbes, vu qu'il n'y a de sanctification qu'en la communion du Christ." Jean Calvin. Institution de la Religion Chretienne (Geneva: La Societe Calviniste de France, 1957), 236. 101 Martin Luther. Commentary on Romans, trans. J. Theodore Mueller (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1976), 83. 65
Calvin interpreted Rom 4:7 forensically, as a declaration of God, however also in terms of a subjective disposition: faith. "It is certain that David is not speaking concerning the ungodly, but of believers, such as he himself was."103 In this same context
Calvin states,
The Lord declares that for Abraham he reckoned faith as righteousness [Rom 4:3], not at the time when Abraham was as yet serving idols, but after he had for many years excelled in holiness of life. Therefore, Abraham had long worshiped God with a pure heart and kept such obedience to the law as can be kept by mortal man. Yet he still had a righteousness set in faith.104
Thus, for Calvin, the concomitant 'inward' to justification and righteousness is not a judgment of unrighteousness upon the self, as by Luther, but a dispositio of heart, faith; not a placement under judgment (forensic), but inner 'attitude'; something to grasp Christ and His benefits and a holiness of life. This is already distinctly present in the first edition of Calvin's Institutes: "Consequently, when all our confidence is utterly cast down, yet we still rely on His goodness, we grasp and obtain God's grace, and (as Augustine says) forgetting our merits, we embrace Christ's gifts. This is what it means to have true faith."105
This distinction between Luther and Calvin is thus already present from the beginning. It is this interpretation of justification by Calvin, seeing it as more than only judicial, forensic and, extrinsic—namely, incorporating a 'fitting' internal attitude in connection with union with Christ and His benefits—which ushers in the believer the ontological dimension of sanctification.
103Joh n Calvin, Institutes (1559), 3.14.11. 104Ibid. 105John Calvin, Institutes (1536), 34. 66
Putting these observations in the context of our comparison of Calvin and Bohl, it
is precisely this ontological dimension, already present with Calvin from the beginning
that Bohl seeks to eliminate or reconfigure as part and parcel of the doctrine of justification. In fact, one can make the observation that Bohl here stands much closer to
Luther than to Calvin. More specifically, Bohl, in his work on the doctrine of justification, builds more on the works of Melanchton than on Calvin.106 It is therefore
not surprising that throughout this work he only mentions Calvin sparingly as positive
reinforcement of his doctrine.107
Finally, the difference between Bohl and Calvin lies in the fact that Bohl
concentrates on the forensic aspect of justification by emphasizing the imputative
character of the act of the justification of the ungodly. As we saw above, Calvin's
interpretation of the justification of the ungodly (Rom 4:5) is transformed into justification of the believer and its fruits. For Bohl, advancing the Reformation meant,
also with respect to Calvin, the elimination or reconfiguration of this ontological
dimension and tendency as expressed by Calvin. This becomes even clearer when we turn
to Bohl's understanding of sanctification and its sources.
1U0Kwon, 163. 107 Ibid., 187. "Interresanterweise beruft Bohl sich in seinem, 'Von der Rechtfertigung' nur selten auf Calvin." 108 In light of these observations it is interesting to ask whether Calvin can escape the judgment that his doctrine of justification is more akin to an analytic understanding of it rather than a synthetic understanding of the judgment of God in justification. His emphasis on the ontological dimension of the doctrine, even though conditioned and determined by the spiritual-relational dimension, is certainly to be regarded as an important context in this regard. 67
Bohl, as 'Advancer of the Reformation' on the Doctrine of Sanctification
Finally, it is in the area of the doctrine of sanctification that Bohl can most clearly be seen as seeking to advance the Reformation. With his reconfiguration of the ontological dimension as understood by Calvin, which in effect is linked with and rooted in the basic thrust of Calvin's theology, Bohl's primary concentration on the spiritual-relational dimension is also reflected in his doctrine of sanctification and further worked out. Also in this area, perhaps precisely in the area, for Bohl, the Word and the Spirit ought not to be placed in the domain and control of flesh, of works, of rationality.
As already noted, it is precisely in this area, as connected with the doctrine of regeneration, that Bohl felt much had gone awry in the post-Reformation era. A resubstantialization and concentration on the subject had returned with the concentration on what happens in and with the believer after and before justification. What is to be noted, however, is that Bohl did not reject the Reformed idea of the third use of the law, or in other words, the function of the law in the lives of the regenerate. In this sense Bohl clearly remained in the sphere of the great Reformer Calvin. However, in contradistinction to what happened in many theologians of the post-Reformation era, and in many ways, as anticipated by Calvin himself,109 Bohl here too seeks to solely understand and express sanctification in spiritual-relational terms, thus advancing the
Reformation.
Calvin's concept of the law, as noted by John Hesselink in Calvin's Concept of the Law, is intractably intertwined with the idea of ontological restoration. See in particular pages 283-284. 68
Bohl begins his treatment on the third use of the law and sanctification with the
observation that in the new creation, by way of the Word of justification of the ungodly,
that is, the new creation of grace, the human being remains who he or she was, namely,
flesh. No substantial mystical union with God in Christ takes place. The human being
does not become divine, neither are new qualities infused into the human being. The
human was and remains a beggar.11 The ungodly remains the ungodly or else the subject
and comfort of the judgment of justification would be eliminated, and the doctrine of justification would lose its strength and central place in the life of the Christian and in
Christian theology. It is this consistent trajectory of thought in his theology whereby, I
believe, Bohl desired to achieve further reformation by combating what he called the
deformations of the seventeenth century (the Reformed Middle Ages), positing his
theology between the poles of confessional dead orthodoxy, or rationalism (including the
mediating theologies), and the false Pietism of his own day. In the area of sanctification
this means that it is not the human subject who again becomes the focus in any way, but
again, solely and alone the grace and work of God; that is, His faithfulness to His own
Word by God the Spirit must receive the full honour. Bohl's understanding of the third
use of the law is precisely focused upon that.
Thus, far from denying the importance of God's law, Bohl maintained and tried to
establish it also in his doctrine of sanctification. As God could not and would not justify
the human being without denying his own will, law, and justice, and as He sent His Son
to satisfy it, so also God sanctifies the righteous in Christ with His law as rule and norm.
Bohl, Dogmatik, 431. 69
To clarify this, Bohl refers to Rom 8:2, which says that the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set the believer free from the law of sin and death. This law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus is and becomes the new norm for the ordering of the
Christian's life.lu As God by His Word has delivered the sinner freely, so God also will freely guide the sinner by His Spirit and Word to walk in a new way of life. In Christ, the sinner is transferred into the realm and power of the Holy Spirit. Here the believing sinner experiences that God Himself 'will take the law into His hands to fulfill it in his or her life.112 The law and will of God will be honored by God himself as it was honored by the person and work of Christ when he fulfilled it. In Christ, the believer is in accordance with the law, and so God will also accomplish that under the reign of free and absolute grace, in the realm of the person of the Spirit, the believer will be in conformity to the law. The Christian is not without the law, lawless, but in the fulfilled law, in Christ, he or she lives by the Spirit. In this way the believer is kept by the Holy Spirit in God's way of righteousness, and this righteousness is none other than what the law of God had revealed. The Spirit takes this, and no new law, and leads the believer in its way as rule and norm, lest the redeemed fall into enthusiasm, antinomianism,113 or even self- righteousness. This, it must be noted, is also and alone worked by and in the human being who believes—believes, that is, not only in the person and work of Christ but also in the person and work of the Holy Spirit, never looking to what is seen but what is unseen, never looking to the self but to Him, as faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen (Heb 11:1).
111 Ibid., 438. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid., 439. 70
In this way Bohl maintained a purely spiritual-relational understanding of salvation and anthropology, indeed of the Word and Spirit of God, never to be placed in the realm of flesh. As the believer is in Christ, Christ is his or her righteousness and life.
And as the Holy Spirit is in the believer, by the Spirit, Christ is also his or her substance and sanctification, as the believer stands under the grace and guidance of God by the
Spirit, and that all in accordance with the law. The gaze is always and only directed in faith to God and glories in His work, never to the human subject, who is and remains ungodly, even when regenerate.
The Source ofBohl's Understanding of Sanctification Seeking to 'Further the Reformation'
In speaking of the third use of the law, Bohl refers to Kohlbriigge's article I Believe in the
Holy Spirit.114 With this understanding of the third use of the law in the life of sanctification Bohl stood entirely in the line of Kohlbriigge, in particular that the law humbles the regenerate but at the same time becomes, for those who are in Christ Jesus by faith, a promise that the Spirit of God fulfills in them.115 In this short work,
Kohlbriigge sought to express and enumerate the same concerns that occupied Bohl, namely, the reontologization of soteriology in the area of sanctification, as expressed above. Bohl in his theological work takes up the substance of this work of Kohlbriigge
Ibid., 440. The reference is to H. F. Kohlbriigge, Schriftmafiige Erlduterung des alien, algemeinen, ungezweifelten, christlichen Bekenntnisses: "Ich glaube in den Heiligen Geist," 1855; the translation is Scriptural Elucidation of the Article of the Christian Faith, "IBelieve in the Holy Spirit," trans. Emil Buehrer (Green Bay, Wis.: Reliance Publishing Co., n. d.). See also Edward Martin Huenemann, Hermann Friedrich Kohlbrugge: Servant of the Word by the Spirit and Grace of God, PhD diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1961. 115 Bohl, Dogmatik, 440. 71
and integrates it into his dogmatics.116
Conclusion
The undercurrent in Bohl's theology, which at the same time reinforces the idea of
advancing the Reformation, is the indirect or direct elimination of the ontological
dimension, particularly in the area of soteriology. In other words, it is the elimination of
the tendencies of sinful 'flesh' or, as said above, the hypostasizing of grace, or yet
otherwise stated, the 'scientific' aptitude of the human mind and heart to possess, control,
and divide what can only be considered as the gift and work of God in terms of His Word
and Spirit. The Christian faith and walk is only to be understood and experienced in a
relational-spiritual way, in which Godwho gives and acts freely by grace alone, in Christ
alone, and by the person and power of His Holy Spirit and Wordis Sovereign. From this
point of view and point of departure Bohl wrote his Dogmatics and his doctrine of justification, thereby, in effect, removing all the Augustinian vestiges of substantialization
116 Ibid., 82. Huenemann notes as historical observation that Kohlbrugge (and I believe, so also Bohl under his influence and guidance) deliberately sought to break with Augustinianism, which always saw grace as infused, as an endowment. This is historically significant in that we can observe an attempt to break with those traces of Augustine in the West that were not sufficiently acknowledged, even in the Reformation, as in need of Reform. Augustine's doctrine of justification was one of gratia infusa, all within the context of the analogia entis. Precisely through this tendency, even in Reformed theology, Kohlbrugge and Bohl sought to break through and establish a pure analogia fidei (see ibid., 180-181), thereby also removing the last vestiges of Augustinianism from Reformed theology. The elimination of the ontological, or its reconfiguration, particularly in the area of soteriology and the sole and pure focus on the spiritual-relational dimension, is, I believe, part and parcel of this same intent. I Believe in the Holy Spirit, which was worked out along these lines with this intent in mind, is therefore to be understood as the consistent expression of the spiritual-relational dimension, especially in the area of sanctification, which for Bohl became the inspiration for his own doctrine of sanctification. 72 of the present time,117 whether conceived in terms of the individual or history itself, human works, or even culture. However, insofar as Bohl maintained the importance of the third use of the law in the life of the justified for sanctification, he remained clearly within the sphere of Calvin.
Finally, we have noted that Bohl was a theologian conscious of the time in which he lived, and that he exhibited his intent to further the Reformation not simply by reproducing what the Reformers said but by saying the same confessional truth in a new manner based on new exegetical insights. His theology was a theology not only of the past but of and for the present in which he lived, a time that was on the one side inundated by rationalism and certain kinds of dualisms or Pelagianisms and on the other side plagued by mysticism and pantheism. It is between these two poles, finally, that
Bohl sought to express his theology as a theology that sought to further, or advance, the
Reformation. For him, as we have seen, Ritschl falls into a different historical-theological category, that of a 'refined Socinianism.' This makes the dynamic between these two theologians as 'further Reformers' vital and at times ambivalent; both, to a great extent, are to be understood as standing in places uniquely their own, yet seeking to advance the
Reformation.
Having considered Bohl's immediate context (Ritschl, Kuyper) and his relation to the Reformation itself (Calvin and Luther), I have attempted to lay bare the principal structure of his theology and so to set the stage for a further comparison with Ritschl.
However, before I turn to Bohl's specific critique of Ritschl, I must first consider Ritschl
117 See previous footnote. 73 as 'further Reformer' and so first contextually seek to expose the place in which Ritschl stood historically with the intent for further Reformation and lay bare the axiomata of his theology for the sake of comparison, as I have done with regard to Bohl. 74
C. RITSCHL AS FURTHER REFORMER
Introductory Comments
Having pointed out some primary thoughts, patterns and motives in the theology of
Bohl—the reconfiguration or elimination of the 'ontological dimension,' specifically in the area of soteriology, and writing of a theology that avoids the extremes of both pantheism and mysticism, all in the context of his concern for maintaining a historical, spiritual relation between God and the sinner as informed by the Word of God and the
Holy Spirit—we ask, what are the primary motifs in Albrecht RitschPs theology of justification? What are his dogmatic and biblical presuppositions, and what ideas did he articulate in order to further the Reformation?
In answering these questions I will need to turn primarily to Ritschl himself and his context, as I have already done with Bohl, in order to give the reader an insight into
Ritschl's own motives and dogmatic and biblical presuppositions. In the following chapters I will come to more critical observations and seek to unearth the primary differences between Bohl and Ritschl in answer to these questions. 75
Leading Motifs in the Theology ofRitschl as Further Reformer
In the first volume of his magnum opus, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and
Reconciliation, Ritschl points out that fundamentally theology is about "estimating the self."118 From the outset, for Ritschl, the focus is on the self in light of historical revelation; the leading idea is "a religious self-estimate in the light of God's grace alone."119 Otherwise stated, the focus is not the answer to the question of what happens to
God in relation to Himself and what God does in relation to the believer, as we saw was the case in B6hl, but the focus is the answer to the question of what happens to and is important for the human being in terms of his or her religious self-estimation in light of the grace of God and His revelation.
To put this observation in a wider context of understanding, for Ritschl, the doctrines of the Christian church, specifically her doctrines concerning soteriology, must first somehow be understood not metaphysically but historically; that is, from the standpoint of the church and revelation. God's purpose of grace is realized in history through the church, with "the result, namely [that]... the church founded by Christ has freedom of religious intercourse with God, notwithstanding the fact of sin, and at the same time, in the exercise of that freedom, directs the workings of its own will in conformity with God's expressed design."120 What this ought to bring about is that "to the
A. Ritschl, A Critical Study of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872), 108. 119 Ibid., 119-120. 76 religious discernment this implies in itself moral restoration of man and all religious blessedness."121
For Ritschl, the estimation and blessedness of the self have first and foremost to do with the will: "The bearing of Christ's saving work on the mutual relations between the Divine and the human will must be expressed."122 Metaphysical speculation leads to mystical absorption of some kind or another, and thereby it leads to a loss of personality, history, and the possibility of the practical will; in short, it leads to a false and impractical estimate of the self. The self must be understood and maintained in a religious and moral manner so as to retain the possibility of personhood and practical transformation for the coming of the kingdom of God.
Historically, for Ritschl, Abelard and his theory of the atonement had suggested the better way, because Abelard in his commentary is more directly (than Anselm) attentive to "the subject of justification and reconciliation of men and so he confines himself entirely to ethical ideas."123 Of Anselm Ritschl is very critical: "The part of
Christ's work that relates to God is ranked by Anselm above that which relates to men.
But in Abelard's view, God's love towards men as displayed in Christ—in His incarnation, in His teaching, in His passion—is the leading thought upon which depends the effect of the intercession directed to God by the incarnate God."124
Clearly, what is central for Ritschl is not God but the effects of God in Christ upon the human being. This is the context and way to come to a proper estimation of the self, that is, as freed from metaphysical speculation or even philosophical speculation on
121 Ibid. 122 Ibid., 8. 123 Ibid., 35. 124 Ibid., 39. 77 the nature of being. Christian revelation is about the effects of revelation and grace, upon the self as primarily will, for practical purposes. The ever-present temptation to absorb the individual, either in science or in terms of a "meta-science,"—nature or metaphysics, respectively—as happens in pantheism or mysticism, must be avoided.
For Ritschl, philosophical knowledge must not be confused with the religious dimension of the Christian religion, which is based upon the historic revelation as handed down through the church. This is also at the same time the best way to avoid the critique of Strauss that all theology is ultimately anthropology, or a projection of the needy human.125 History is objective, and the church is there before the individual and his or her will for a practical life. Therefore, for the motive of obtaining a proper religious estimate of the self in light of the grace of God, one must remove metaphysics from the theological playing field, inside or outside the church, whether Catholic or Protestant.
Hereby I have touched upon Ritschl's leitmotif whereby he sought to further what the
Reformation, in particular Luther, had begun.
To pursue this leitmotif a bit further historically, applying it to Ritschl's relation to the Reformation and his desire to complete the unfinished Reformation, Ritschl appealed to the personal character of the doctrine of justification as found in Luther. To break through the metaphysical strangle-hold philosophy had had on Christian theology for decades for the sake of a proper religious estimation of the self in light of God's grace,
Luther, according to Ritschl, had meant by justification "an experience of the believer complete in itself and continuous."126 In other words, this experience was not first to be conditioned by the church's machinery or system of substantial grace (i.e., justifying
125 Ibid., 45-46. 126 Ibid., 122. 78 grace, sacramental grace, or what I have called with reference to Bohl the hypostatization of grace), but it was a. personal experience between God and the human soul. This was so because Luther saw justification not as making a righteous person out of an otherwise sinful person, but rather, "on account of the abiding imperfection of... good works, [the person] does not find his standing before God, [that is] his righteousness and the ground of his abiding assurance of salvation .... [except] in the mediatorial and perfectly righteous work of Christ appropriated by faith."127 Ritschl saw Luther's view of justification as therefore never to be understood as an analytic judgment but always primarily as a synthetic judgment of God.128 That is to say, a sinner is not justified because of anything in him or her (analytically) but on account of another, namely, the work performed by Jesus Christ (synthetically).
Precisely on the power of these thoughts, that is, on the power of the personal character, the strictly religious character of justification, Luther broke through the metaphysical strangle-hold Christian theology had been held in for a long time. By denying that justification was an analytic judgment, the object of justification, the believing person, was liberated for a purely religious relationship, a personal-spiritual relationship with God. Freed from nature, the person by justification was freed to serve, in fact, to rule over nature, by the Spirit of God, and that all for the coming of his kingdom (reconciliation). The Reformation, according to Ritschl, did not find its birth in a theological doctrine, as perhaps wedded with philosophical knowledge, but in a
"practical self-estimate of believers according to the standards of grace—an estimate that excludes all value of merits.... [This] practical consciousness was the root of the
127 Ibid., 122. 128 Ibid., 119. 79
Reformation activity of both Luther and Zwingli."129 And upon this root idea Ritschl sought to express his unfinished Reformation.
According to Ritschl, soon after the Reformation sight was lost of this practical root idea, in relation to a proper estimation of the self in light of God's revelation. The
Reformation was followed by deformation. This was already occurring with Melanchton, and it was finally entrenched in the Book of Concord as the start of confessionalism. With their drive to become objective in defining justification as forensic and imputed, the
Lutherans "failed to pay attention to all the conditioning elements under which the religious conception was brought by Luther"130 and so justification lost its religious value. It is this religious value of justification and reconciliation that Ritschl desired to safeguard and with it continue the Reformation in the ethical realm of the will and kingdom of God.
Not Metaphysics but the Church and the Kingdom of God
In light of Ritschl's rejection of traditional metaphysics, Ritschl's own articulation of the doctrine of justification did not operate in a vacuum. As the context of his own doctrine,
Ritschl stressed the Christian community, the church, whose founder is Jesus Christ:
"Authentic and complete knowledge of Jesus' religious significance—His significance, that is, as a founder of religion—depends then, on one's reckoning oneself part of the community [that] He founded, and this precisely insofar as it believes itself to have
1T1 received the forgiveness of sins as His peculiar gift."
lUlU., J. X ~S, 130 Ibid., 123-124. 31 Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, 2. 80
Significant here is Ritschl's stress that the initial Reformers should be understood from within the church. In this context he maintains that to understand the Reformers and their doctrine of justification, one must approach them from the point of view of the question of the assurance of faith, all from within the church.
According to Ritschl, what was new with the Reformers was that their doctrines of justification and regeneration functioned as comfort and consolation within the context of the church. Ritschl writes, "The assurance of justification by faith through Christ, as it is laid hold of by the believer who already has a standing in the church and is striving to do the will of God, it was to both men alike [Luther and Zwingli] the common lever by means of which they seek to achieve the Reformation of the Church."132 As Ritschl sees it, the Reformers' doctrine of justification was in this way a critique of the sacramental mechanism and hierarchy of grace as present in the Roman Catholic Church, which also showed itself more and more in the Reformers' own subsequent doctrines of the sacraments.
So while Ritschl maintained an emphasis on the individual and his or her own proper self-estimation and on the centrality of the church as proper context or place for understanding justification, he was intending to desubstantialize the church or deontologize it by being critical of the hierarchy of grace as rooted in the sacramental nature and function of the church in Roman Catholic theology and practice. However, had the Reformers themselves remained true to their own principles, according to
Ritschl?
132 Ritschl, A Critical History, 108, 155. Thus, for Ritschl, the Protestant principle of justification finds its proper context within the church, within the communion of saints both as communal and objective as personal and subjective, the main focus being the assurance of salvation. See ibid., 157. 81
According to Ritschl, the Reformers after Luther fell again into the same objectification of faith, justification, and reconciliation as the Roman Catholics had manifested with their doctrines of grace in conjunction with their understanding of the nature and function of the church, however in a different way. Therefore, the time had come to finish the unfinished Reformation.
Not Doctrine or Confession but God as Love as Theological First Principle
Ritschl claimed that the Protestant principle of Luther's Reformation was not the doctrine of justification or an objective confession: "Luther's theological first principle is rather the thought of the abiding revelation of love as the essence of God in Christ."133 This claim was to be the motif upon which and whereby he sought to finish the unfinished
Reformation. Grace as love cannot be objectified, but only religiously and ethically understood and lived out. This Protestant principle was later neglected, and instead of
Reformation, deformation had occurred.
Melanchton's system of loci and Coccejus' covenantal system, according to
Ritschl, were "method [s]... predominately inspired by purely rational ideas of God and sin and redemption. [This] is not the positive theology which we need, and which can be defended against the objections of general rationalism."134 This development was a
133 Ibid., 159. Here, Ritschl goes beyond the Reformers in the attempt to establish his own principle for further Reformation in terms of his doctrine of God as founded on his particular interpretation of Scripture. 134 Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, 5. Ritschl, seeing himself as the completer of the Reformation, initially points to the importance of Melanchton's statement concerning the importance of the benefits of Christ, which he seeks to follow by emphasizing that the effects of revelation are of prime importance for salvation and not empty speculation about God's nature. Also throughout his works, Ritschl refers to the Augsburg Confession and Melanchton's Apology. In these works Melanchton remained sharply 82 departure from the initiative of Luther (thus "deformation"), who started with faith as received by a sinner who lived in the community of the church, which in turn lived under and from the forgiveness of sins (justification) as a particular gift given to it. Ritschl writes, speaking within the context of the church and alluding at the same time to his intent of further Reform,
But [the] system proper must all the more certainly be conditioned by the fact that every part of theological knowledge is construed from the standpoint of the Christian community, since only so can the worth of Christ as Revealer be employed throughout as the basis of knowledge in solving the problems of theology. This constituted the new principle, which Luther set forth .... Melanchton merely echoes in a feeble way the principle that God is knowable only through the mediation of Christ.... He builds Christian doctrine on a foundation of natural theology, after [the] model of the Scholastics. All this is a result of his return to Aristotle. Not only does the close affinity between Humanism and Scholasticism betray itself here, but Melanchton abandons the task of constructing theology according to Luther's principle. That task I essay in the full consciousness that my action is justified and rendered imperative by the standard writings of the Reformation.135
Ritschl goes further. Starting from the standpoint of the redeemed community, the regenerate community, Ritschl writes that this standpoint
conforms likewise to the maxim that theology must emanate from the Holy Spirit. But if anyone builds Christian theology on a substructure of pretended Natural Theology, the rationalistic arguments of Augustine about original sin [creation and propagation], and those of Anselm about the nature of redemption [the idea of the satisfaction theory of atonement, first satisfying God "metaphysically"], he thereby takes his stand outside the sphere of regeneration, which is coterminous with the community of the believers.136
religiously oriented. However, in later editions of the Loci, Melanchton fell into scholastic speculation, as did the Orthodox Confessionalists later on. 135 Ibid., 5-7. 136 Ibid., 8. 83
In other words, any other standpoint is by its very character contradictory, as it does not
first emanate from the regenerate community, from the Holy Spirit, where God is
understood and experienced as love.
From this—the standpoint of the spiritual community of believers, which lives by
the word of forgiveness (by the word of justification as synthetic judgment as positively
informed by the Word of Scripture theologia positiva)—Ritschl develops his doctrine of justification and reconciliation and so seeks to correct what had already gone wrong with
Melanchton and present his further Reformation.137 Such a standpoint can, in fact, be
called Ritschl's 'place' of theologizing. This is not foremost a confessional stance, or a
purely subjective reality, but Ritschl's point of departure is the church as the community
of the regenerate religiously and ethically interpreted,138 as informed by a proper
understanding of God as grace (religiously understood) and love.
As unifying thought one might consider the community of believers, that is, the regenerate community, as unit for thought and practice. However, does this not itself fit the description of a "metaphysic?" Is the community not a whole preceding the part and its meaning? Is it not a unity that certainly at first is not given in an experience of the particular but in fact presupposes an inferred speculative whole? "When he [Ritschl] assumes the Church, and not its individual members, to be subject of justification, he assigns to the Church a permanent unity which is certainly not given in experience, but which is a speculative inference, and so in the wide sense 'metaphysical.' It may be even maintained that this 'metaphysical idea' of'permanent unity' of the Church has less warrant in experience than some of the 'metaphysical ideas,' such as the unity and identity of the soul, which he neglects, if he does not deny." Alfred E. Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology Critical and Constructive: An Exposition and Estimate (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1899) 63. This concept also spells a difference between Ritschl and the Socinians. 138 Bohl did not confuse this religious and historic "place" with the places of the loci-method, as it is first and foremost a real historic and existential situation under the Word dialogically understood. But here the difference between the two theologians also immediately surfaces. Bohl, in the context of his interpretation of the image of God, conceived of a situation under the Word, as conditioned by the Word, which encompassed a much wider circumference, namely, creation as well, and not only the regenerate community. This is indeed a fundamental difference between the two, which will inform the differences in their theology as well. 84
In continuity with his emphasis on the importance of the proper estimate of the self, as freed from empirical-rational-ontological strictures and justification as a strictly religious conception, for him such a religious conception is not anchored to, tied to, or grounded in (insofar as its explanation and significance is concerned) a theology of the righteousness of God, as, for example, related to the original state of righteousness, i.e., the image of God. Rather, it is primarily rooted in the work of Jesus Christ, as the historical Founder of the spiritual religious community, as manifestation of God's grace and love.
A doctrine of justification grounded in a theology of right, of satisfaction of God, and of righteousness, is rooted in and follows the thought of a "legal world-order."139 For
Ritschl, in such a context of reference the old metaphysics would rear its head again and it would destroy the unifying thought of God as primarily love and the Christian faith as primarily religious and ethical, mediated through the church. It is, in fact, a denial of the practical root ideas of the initial Reformers.
Restating the Teachings on Christ as Founder of Church and Kingdom
For Ritschl, this has implications for how one finally and principally ought to think of
Christ as the Founder of the Christian church. One must not think of Christ fulfilling the righteousness of God with His passive and active obedience as the basis for the justification of the sinner, for at the back of that functions a false duality in God,140 as if
Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, 63-64. 140 To give a fuller explanation of what happens in the theology of Ritschl in regard to the 'traditional' doctrines of God, one must consult his "Geschichtliche Stiidien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott" Jahrbucher fur Deutsche Theologie, Erster Artikel (1865): 277-318, and his studies under the same title in Jahrbucher fur Deutsche 85
to say that His righteousness is in conflict with Himself as love and as merciful, as if to
say that He is at once wrath and grace towards the human being. God's oneness is
expressed in God being love. Therefore, if one wants to speak of Christ's obedience
(passive and active) then one must not understand this in contradiction with the thought
that God is love, as Christ in some way satisfying God's wounded justice, wrath, or
honour.
According to Ritschl, one must instead think that Christ, in His life here below, in
His vocation, persevered in God's love in spite of the opposition that finally ended his life
on the cross. Christ's obedience is thus not a fulfillment of an abstract eternal
righteousness as an attribute of God, or of a creational or legal world order, but of a
Theologie, Zweiter Artikel (1868): 67-133, and his Drifter Artikel (1868): 251-302. Briefly summarized, Ritschl prefers to speak of God's will as primary. With this the emphasis on this more personal characteristic of God, Ritschl desires to break through thinking of God in terms of'"being,"' or '"essence."' He sees in figures like Thomas Aquinas, who adopted and adapted Aristotle, blatant contradictions arising as they think of God primarily in terms of '"being,"' contradictions, which arise when trying one tries to think of God as ad-intra, as an abstract being-in-himself, and at the same time to think of God in relation to the world, ad-extra, all within the category of being. The contradiction arises when they must think of God either as an abstraction, a bare metaphysical reality, or when they try to think of God as in relation to the world and the human being. To be consistent, God must involve himself totally, bordering an idea that borders on certain forms of pantheism. However, thinking of God as personal, with a holy but loving will as primary attribute, circumvents such dialectical unnecessary difficulties, such contradictory philosophical knots. All theologians, including Scotus, who differentiated God from in terms of degrees of'"quantities,"' could not in the end escape these dialectical knots. Ritschl decided to cut the Gordian knot by henceforth speaking of God no longer in terms of "'being,'" but as person, with the primary attribute being will. In fact, God must not be thought of in terms of any abstraction at all,; neither nor can he be thought of as pure will, or absolute will, nor of God as somehow hidden behind, above, or beyond what he has revealed historically, personally, as love and in grace. Here already, we see Ritschl engaged in '"demetaphysizing.,"' Here already we see Ritschl even trying to rescue the Reformers and certainly later (post-Reformation) Reformers (post-Reformation) from certain features of a metaphysic, which that had held Christian thought captive for so long. We must focus on God as revealed in Christ, primarily as loving will, and gracious Father. 86 personal and particular, even practical, fulfillment of His love towards His Father and of the Father's love towards Him. It is this position and fulfillment of love toward the Father and of the Father's love to Him that is imputed to believers when God the Father, for
Christ's sake, takes them also up into His love.141 In this way righteousness is not an abstract concept, a general idea, but, again, a personal religious and relational concept:
"The point at issue is the imputation of the position relative to God, which Christ likewise occupies through his practice of righteousness, to those who ... belong to Him through faith, in order that they may be taken effectively into the love of God."142 In this way the person is not taken up into an 'abstract general system,' or absorbed into it, but the person is maintained as a person, and precisely so freed from the strictures of system or substantial 'fusions' of God and the human being. The human being is freed for a spiritual relationship with God in love and grace for reconciliation and the establishment of the kingdom of God.
141 Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, 72. For Ritschl, "the goodness of God, as the general presupposition of everything, is embraced in the specific attribute of the Divine Fatherhood; or in other words, the truth that He has revealed Himself to the Christian community as love." Ibid., 273. Furthermore, Ritschl emphatically states, "[There] is no other conception of equal worth beside this which need be taken into account." Ibid., 273. God as Father is personal and loving will. Christ did not fulfill the law, God's righteousness, per se, but fulfilled God's perfection as loving will. The Father who lets the sun and the rain fall upon the just and the unjust, came to declare and fulfill such divine love and grace in Christ even toward His enemies (see ibid., 259). This clearly is against the whole structure or thought of penal retributive justice, as the latter, according to Ritschl, assumes a duality in God himself. But God is love, and God is a person who loves, who has a will to love. The idea of penal retribution and substitution is abstractly vague and impersonal. Undeniably there is God's wrath, spoken of in the Scriptures, but Ritschl contends that this is not wrath against moral, ethical disobedience but, "according to the New Testament, God's wrath signifies His determination to destroy those who definitively set themselves against redemption and the final end of the kingdom of God." Ibid., 323. 87
The Self as Properly Understood in Light of Revelation, Church, God's Love, and Christ
With these articulations Ritschl saw himself as being continuous with Luther's personal
and religious conception of justification, in which at the same time the freedom of the
person is maintained as active in and for the spiritual kingdom of God (i.e., as perfectly
religious, perfectly ethical).143 Again to be noted as important is that this is all to be
perceived in the context of the community of believers, for the gift of justification first
and foremost belongs to the spiritual community.144 However, we may ask, what happens
to the individual members upon acknowledgement of the richness of justification?
As a general possession of the spiritual community, justification, upon
acknowledgment by the believer, has certainly also an individual effect. Forgiveness of
sins (as the 'negative' side of the imputation of righteousness, which is in turn the
'positive' side of the same reality) removes personal estrangement and restores relationship with God. The imputation of the love and obedience of Christ and of His position relative to the Father removes guilt.145 Nothing, however, changes with regard to the substance or qualities of the believing person. No infusion of grace or deification of
any sort takes place in justification. What does happen is that, in the acknowledgment of justification, the believer is absolved from the feeling of guilt and restored into a spiritual relationship with the Father. In this liberation by the Spirit the will of the believer is redirected towards the will of God, to be engaged practically in and for the kingdom of
Ibid., 13. Ibid., 28. Ibid., 64-65. 88
God. It is thus religious and practical at the same time, and justification, as God's synthetic judgment upon the sinner, stands at the back of this.146
In Ritschl's articulation of justification and its effects, as we have seen, the recognition of God as love is primal. And precisely because God is love, God must be thought of as the author of forgiveness,147 and such forgiveness, in turn, must be thought of in order not to fall back into a legal or penal retributive category of thought, as "extra judicial,"148 as personal, as particular, and as finally mediated through the community.149
In terms of effects upon the individual believer, as faith clings to this forgiveness, the personality of the believer is maintained in freedom, and the will is turned toward
God.150 Guilt is overcome with the recognition that it is sinful to think of God as a judge to be feared. In Christ, God has shown himself to be love:
The species of fellowship with God ... reconciliation [effective justification] cannot be derived from the presupposed reciprocity of rights between God and men.... It must be based upon a different conception of God's relation to man . . . namely, upon his grace. . . . For it is impossible to conceive sinners at the same time and in the same respect, as objects both of God's love and God's wrath.... The doctrine of the scholastic theologians of the Reformation exhibits no inconsistency so plain and open as these.151
By returning to the idea of the self, as properly estimated in the light of the other critical and positive motifs discussed, we have come full circle. In light of the quote
146 Ibid., 81. Ritschl explains further, "[Insofar] as justification is viewed as effective, it must be conceived as reconciliation of such a nature that while memory indeed preserves the pain felt at the sin [that] has been committed, yet at the same time the place of mistrust towards God is taken away by the positive assent of the will of God and His saving purpose." Ibid., 85. 147 Ibid., 92. 148 Ibid., 88. 149 For Ritschl, the primal category is not the "state," but the family. Ibid., 95. 150 Ibid., 101-102. 151 Ibid., 263-264 (my emphasis). 89 above, one notes, finally, that the general impulse of the theology of Ritschl, who seeks to reform even the Reformers, is rooted in the thought of understanding sin as being essentially ignorance, that is, ignorance of how we ought to understand and relate to God.
Proper biblical exegesis and theology ought to remove this ignorance so that one finally has a proper estimate of the self under God for the organization and ethical establishment of God's kingdom in this world. With this observation we have at the same time hit upon the important thought of the nature and function of revelation itself.
For Ritschl, the purpose of revelation, in the context of his understanding of sin, is principally the removal of ignorance. It is not in the first place spiritual-relational, in the sense that the law of God as Word of God condemns the human being as sinner and so points to Christ pedagogically; revelation first and foremost appeals to the intellect, which in turn ought to influence the will, practically. Revelation is 'positive' in the scientific sense of the word. The subject of revelation is positive history, with as primary content the kingdom of God established by Christ and mediated by the church.
Understanding the nature and function of revelation in this way, Ritschl proposes his system of theology for finishing the unfinished Reformation along the lines of the motifs discussed in this chapter.
All this having been said, and as it were the 'positive theology' of Ritschl having been described, it is beyond doubt that in his context Ritschl contributed to the increase of a greater respect for the Scriptures because he emphasized, against the subjectivistic 90 consciousness theologians of his time, the objectivity of God in Christ.152 This in itself manifests a return to the Reformation as he sought to go back to the Scriptures.153
Evaluation ofRitschl as Further Reformer
There is no doubt that Ritschl "constructed his system in conscious dependence on the fundamental motifs of Luther's theology,"154 as I have also shown to be true in this chapter. Lotz says that in particular Ritschl loved Luther's early writings of 1515-19. For
Ritschl, it was Luther "who loosed the bonds of medieval intellectualism, sacramentalism and clericalism."155
However, for Ritschl, Luther had not shed all of the medieval skin, for example, with his fateful law-gospel distinction, implying also existentially the movement from one's acknowledgement that one is a sinner to one's being a forgiven sinner by way of law and gospel. To hold to such a scheme, according to Ritschl, is to work from or reintroduce a general metaphysics connected with the presuppositions of some kind of duality in God, of natural law theology, or of a preestablished legal order outside the regenerate community: "In the church the consciousness of grace always determines from the very outset the believer's sense of sin."156 This is, according to Ritschl, what the
See also Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 1:443. 1 ^^ To this effect Bavinck mentions Bohl and Ritschl together in a footnote on page 208 as opposing Schleiermacher and standing for a return to biblical dogmatics. See ibid., 208. 154 David W. Lotz, Ritschl and Luther: A Fresh Perspective on Albrecht Ritschl's Theology in the Light of His Luther Study (New York: Abingdon Press, 1974) 27. 155 Ibid., 31. 156 Ibid., 33. 91 young Luther also had expressed by locating "justification strictly within the context of the regenerate life within the Church."157
Upon the latter, as early theme and leitmotif of the Reformation, Ritschl sought to put the emphasis and consequently draw its theological inferences. Any general metaphysic had to give way, even if present in the early Reformers. So Ritschl sought to further the Reformation against what he called "unseemly mingling of metaphysics with revealed religion."158
In this process Ritschl desired to leave no stone unturned in his furthering of the
Reformation. Even the concept of the absolute must give way as "a metaphysical concept which is entirely foreign to the Christian" religion.159 His concern is again religious, personal, and practical. The absolute is simply a metaphysical idol, "which, moreover cannot support the distinction between Creator and creature."160 It is a concept used for what we have called metaphysical absorption; it is a concept that militates against the
Ibid., 34. Lotz draws attention to strong similarities and even continuities between Luther and Ritschl; they both view justification as Gerechtsprechung, not Gerechtmachung, as synthetic judgment, and their theologies are both christocentric. But Lotz views Ritschl as one-sided and even wrong in his interpretation of Luther. Luther, even in his early writings, in On the Liberty of a Christian (Ritschl's favorite source) and his lectures on the Psalms, has a different doctrine of God. God in his eyes and experience is very much one of wrath and one of grace, which even the Christian believer experiences at the same time as being sinner and saved, according to His judgments, coram Deo. Ritschl not only underestimated and neglected Luther's theology of the cross but also missed Luther's own theocentricity in this regard. This counts also for the concept of God's righteousness in Luther. For Luther it is about God's righteousness first, that righteousness that holds good before God (iustitia coram Deo). Luther always held that the proper use of the Law, its spiritual use, condemns, but the Gospel saves. Certainly, Luther views God's proper work as mercy, but that does not make His strange work less real. Ritschl's difference with Luther has to do with with the experientially real, with where God's godness itself is at stake! Ibid. 158 Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, 164. 159 Ibid., 165. 160 Ibid, 167, 92 proper personal estimate of the self and the deeply religious and practical character of the
Christian faith.161
Finally, Ritschl writes, "In keeping with the concept of the kingdom of God, I emphasize the supernatural and the supra-mundane character of man's ethical calling, and
I have expressly shown how the believer exercises spiritual dominion over the world in accordance with his justification through faith."162 With the help of these two primal points of concentration, as of an ellipse—justification and the kingdom of God, freedom from nature (metaphysics) and spiritual dominion, respectively—Ritschl sought to finish the unfinished Reformation. He sought to do so against all later Hellenistically influenced deformations of the Christian religion in accordance with the principles of the positive theology of Christian teachings as grounded in the Scriptures and mediated by the historic
Christian community, the church.
Conclusion
As we have textually and contextually revealed both Bohl and Ritschl as 'further'
Reformers, several similarities between the two contemporaries have emerged. Both Bohl and Ritschl sought to go back to a system of theology (Ritschl) and a Reformed dogmatics (Bohl) as positively grounded in and created out of the Word of God. In the process, both saw in the developments of Reformed theology after the Reformation tendencies toward deformation rather than advancement. In particular, they both saw the
161 Ritschl again brought to light true religious self-estimation in light of grace alone, freeing believers in community for their moral vocation in the world, under the umbrella of the concept of the kingdom of God. Ritschl thought that he had rediscovered Luther's Lebensideal and his practical root idea, extending it now from the monastery, negation of the world, to the world in embracing secularity in vocation and mastery of spirit over nature in lordship under an ultimately forgiving, loving, and gracious God. 162 Ibid., 175. 93 return to an analysis of the human being and his or her qualities or experiences occasioned by the hypostatization, schematizing, or mechanizing of grace as a root cause for the deformation that occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Both saw a return to the objective centrality of the Word of God as necessary in light of the pantheistic and mystical tendencies of many post-Reformation theologians.
However, despite these similarities, differences between Bohl and Ritschl have also emerged from the investigation so far. In the area where they share the most similarities, namely, in their intention to return to the historicity and objectivity of the
Word of God as proper source and domain for Christian theology, they also show the greatest difference. They understand in fundamentally different ways the question as to what constitutes revelation—that is, how we are to understand it and stand under it, in both the creational and ecclesial-spiritual situations we find ourselves in. To come to a clearer understanding of this difference, I turn in the next chapter to a thorough contextual and textual investigation of both Bohl's and Ritschl's doctrines of revelation. 94
CHAPTER 3
THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORD OF GOD AND JUSTIFICATION IN THE THOUGHT OF BOHL AND RITSCHL
A. BOHL'S DOCTRINE OF THE WORD OF GOD: THE BIBLICAL CONTEXT OF HIS DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AS A CRITIQUE OF RITSCHL
Introduction
In light of what I have noted with respect to Bohl and Ritschl as further Reformers, and since this dissertation is primarily seeking to trace Bohl's understanding of Ritschl and the manner in which Bohl sought to minimize the influence of his contemporary and critique him, in this chapter I will seek to come to a clearer understanding and evaluation of Bohl's critique of Ritschl, which I believe is principally rooted in the presuppositions behind Bohl's doctrine of revelation.
The Judgment ofHo-Duck Kwon
Ho-Duck Kwon claims that Bohl's and Ritschl's understanding of the Word of God are comparable and dependent upon one another: "It is beyond a doubt that Bohl works from the same perception of the Bible as Ritschl does, and frequently calls upon Ritschl's statements concerning the Scriptures." I will seek to prove that precisely because of the fundamental difference between these two theologians on the nature and authority of the
"Es steht au(3er Zweifel, dap Bohl von Ritschl's Bibelanschauung ausgeht und sich haufig auf dessen Aussagen beruft." Kwon, 115. (All translations from this work into English are my own). 95
Word of God they diverged and that this difference actually formed the basis of Bohl's critique of Ritschl.
Thomas Schirrmacher hints also at this: "Bohl lived during the high-point of
Ritschl's dogmatic school, which dominated evangelical theology in a liberal sense. The root difference for Bohl was their attitude towards Scripture."164 Bohl himself notes,
"Right here we are at the essential difference between Ritschl and orthodoxy. But the difference is evident at the very outset, namely at the definition of what constitutes revelation."
In light of these observations, the first question to be answered is, What is Bohl's understanding of the nature and character of God's revelation, and how does it inform his critique of Ritschl, particularly as this issue relates to both Bohl's and Ritschl's exposition of the doctrine of justification?
Bohl's Doctrine of the Word of God: Introductory Comments
From the outset I must state that Bohl, as critic of his time particularly in the area of biblical and historical criticism, was himself not so much concerned about the claims of theoretical, rational, or even liberal dogmatic positions themselves but more precisely with what threatened to undermine all sound historic biblical interpretation and its results, namely, faulty presuppositions (vorgefasste Ideen), which, according to him, began to muzzle the Word of God as it had been transmitted. Bohl's fundamental or primary concern from which all else flowed was the authority of the Scriptures themselves and
Thomas Schirrmacher, foreword to Dogmatik, by Eduard Bohl, 33. (All quotes translated from this work are my own). 165 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211 (my emphasis). 96 following from that a "really ... and direct[ly]-out-of-the-Scriptures-created ... acknowledgment of the truth."166 In order to come to an understanding of Bohl's doctrine of revelation and the word of God as a first primary source, I will turn to his
Prolegomena voor eene Gereformeerde Dogmatiek.
Bohl's Prolegomena
What is important to realize from the start is that Bohl begins his discussion of the Word of God with the question of whether or to what extent Christian doctrine has a point of contact with the nature of the human being and in what relation the Christian religion
"Wirklich ... directe, aus der Heiligen Schrift geschopfte und abschliesende Erkenntnis der Wahrheit." Bohl, Dogmatik, 47. 1 Bohl, Prolegomena. This work was published in Dutch as a translation of earlier articles written by Bohl for the Evangelische Sonntagsbotejiir Osterreich (1867) and the Reformierten Kirchenzeitung of Stahelin and Thelemann (1875). All translations of direct quotes that follow are my own. As a historical note, at the time of Bohl's conflict with Kuenen and when he wrote his prolegomena as articles for the Evangelischer Sonntagsbotejiir Osterreich and Reformierte Kirchenzeitung, Ritschl and his school were not a major concern yet for Bohl. In his Prolegomena, Bohl neither mentions nor refers to Ritschl. However, when Bohl wrote his Dogmatik in 1887, he took much from what he had already written in his Prolegomena articles and reworked it in his Einleitung to his Dogmatik, with the difference that at the time he published his Dogmatik, Bohl did see it necessary to evaluate and critique Ritschl as well. To do so Bohl added an extensive evaluation and critique of Ritschl and his theology in the Einleitung, as well as throughout his Dogmatik, to what he had already written and reworked from his Prolegomena articles. As a further note, the translators and publishers of these articles, originally written by Bohl in German, state that some of the articles were written for the Reformirte Kirchenzeitung. In actual fact it was the Evangelisch-reformirte Kirchenzeitung in which some of them were published. Also the year 1875, indicated on the front of the translated articles as Prolegomena, is not exactly correct. I have found one of the articles originally written by Bohl for the Evangelisch-reformirte Kirchenzeitung, translated as paragraph 12 in the Prolegomena, which indicates that it was published in the year 1874. See Eduard Bohl in "Streisziige durch das Gebiet der reformirten Dogmatik I. Entstehungsgrund der reformirten Kirche Evangelisch-reformirte Kirchenzeitung herausgegeben von Consistorialrath Otto Thelemann in Detmold und Pfarrer D. Ernst Stahelin in Basel. 24 Jahrgang Nr. 19. 20, Mai 1874, 145-156. This does not, however, diminish the fact that these articles were written by Bohl and as such claim authority. 97
stands to other religious systems.168 What is remarkable is that with this first investigative
question he seeks to probe into the existential situation in which human beings find
themselves before turning to the discussion of special revelation, inspiration, and the
canon of Scriptures as an answer to that existential situation. In fact, this latter turning to
special revelation Bohl perceives as an exercise in apologetics, of defending the doctrine
of the word of God against those whom he understands as detractors of the traditional
churchly and biblically grounded presuppositions of a Reformed dogmatician.169
To give an answer as to what extent the Christian doctrines have a point of
contact with the natural human being, Bohl begins by stating that he does not approach
this from a neutral, autonomous point of view: "The religion that we confess is the
Christian one."170 What is more, he states from the outset that "this Christian religion is
the only true one, among all others."171 The exclusive statement of Christ, when He said,
"I am the Way, the Truth and the Life" (John 14:6), testifies to the truth of this presupposition. Because of this, all other religions are vain, as only the Christian religion
can satisfy the needs of the natural human being as creature of God. To show that this is
so, Bohl proceeds to point out how the religious questions of the whole human race find
their ultimate answer in the Christian religion.172
According to Bohl, what first of all is the existential situation of the human being
for which the Christian religion is the answer? His observation is that in all human beings
Bohl, Prolegomena, 1. 169 In a general sense Bohl can be understood as an apologetic theologian, whose theology depends entirely on his understanding of Scripture. "Bohls ganze Theologie [ist] von seinem Schrifrverstandnis abhangig.... Bohls ansatz is sehr apologetisch." Kwon, 132. 170 Bohl, Prolegomena, 19. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid., 19. 98 there is a deep need to be satisfied, to be, filled."Ther e is an immeasurable emptiness in the inner recesses of the human heart that demands to be fulfilled."173 As such and by nature the human being is subjected to vanity (emptiness, nothingness; Rom 8:19-20), and naturally the human race gropes for something that fills, satisfies, this emptiness.
Bohl remarks that the most beautiful verses in poetry, the most beautiful words of Greek tragedies are cries, which longingly send up their pleas to the heavens to be delivered from this vanity and to find rest. Correspondingly, in the Bible we find the same cry:
"Watchman what of the night? Watchman what of the night?" (Isa 21:11).
In response to such deep cries, in terms of comparing the answer of the Christian religion to other religions, the Hindus seek to be absorbed into the infinite, the All, and the Buddhists seek to be dissolved into nothingness. In other religions people are spurred on to do good works to fill the void, for example, in Judaism and Islam.174 However, it is truly only the Christian religion that gives light and understanding to find the answer to these groaning questions of the human soul. How does Bohl perceive the Christian religion answering this void?
First of all, according to Bohl, the Christian religion comes with the explanation of why our situation is as it is. The fall took place, a fall out of the original situation of innocence and order into a situation of guilt and disorder, and we cannot deliver ourselves by virtue of an autonomous act out of this situation like Prometheus stealing the fire and light of the gods. We need to remain and wait, in dependence upon the Word of
God and upon God Himself, to be satisfied, fulfilled, and set free.175 And in this way it is
173 Ibid., 19-20. 174 Ibid., 21. 175 Ibid., 23. 99 only in terms of the revelation of God that we can find an understanding and a solution to the problem of our emptiness, of our feeling of guilt, and of the abyss, which exists between the human being and the Eternal One, God Himself.
It is true, Bohl admits, that all religions exhibit a sense, a consciousness, of the existence of God (notitia Dei innata), of sin, and of the need for reconciliation and holiness. However, they have not the right standard whereby to measure such knowledge.177 The natural human being, without the revelation of God, either falls into the temptation to identify God with reality (pantheism and mysticism) or radically to abstract God from this world in a Deistic sense, as in Islam or rationalism. And so they either downplay sin's seriousness or fall into some extreme Gnostic form of dualism.
Furthermore, other religions attempt to answer this need for reconciliation either by sacrificing to appease the gods or by putting holiness entirely into the hands of the human being so they can climb a ladder back into the heavenlies.178
Over against all this there is the Christian religion, which in the deepest sense satisfies and fulfills, according to Bohl. There one finds, first of all, the biblical concept of the Trinity, which on the one side prevents the radical abstraction of God from the world (Deism) and on the other side the identification of God with reality or nothingness
(pantheism and Buddhism respectively). Bohl states that only with the biblical concept of the Trinity can we walk uprightly by faith between the cliffs of Deism and pantheism.
176 Ibid., 8. In The Reformed Doctrine, Bohl describes it as follows: "Here there is at the very beginning an intuition of God (anticipatio Deorum, Cicero) in the man prior to any effect; and the human soul is not the tabula rasa upon which the Divine effects (revelation) are inscribed, for without accepting such an anticipation of the gods the effect (i.e., the revelation) would have no influence upon us." Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211. 1 77 Bohl, Prolegomena, 24. 100
Furthermore, Bohl emphasizes that without the Trinity there is really no bridge between the fallen situation and God Himself. God Himself has come (Immanuel) to be that bridge, and the Holy Spirit comes to bring the human being back into communion with
God.179 "Created out of nothing man only has 'in' God his support."180
In the context of speaking about God, as only in God the human being can find his or her support, for Bohl it is particularly important to consider the function of God's law in order to bring people to a right diagnosis of the desperate human situation and to find its solution. It is the case that the human being, when there is no more regard for the
Law of God, loses his or her support, that is, comes to stand on a declining slope where all the efforts of his or her own strength only serve to make his or her corruption
(damnation) greater. This is so to such an extent that Bohl says with Augustine that even
"the virtues of the pagans are only shining sins." One must understand, therefore, that by way of law or good works there is no way back, that is, no fulfillment, no filling of the emptiness of the human soul or of the vanity in which we exist. The law itself teaches us this impossibility, gives us the diagnosis of our sinful and desperate existential situation.
In light of this, what then is the way back?
Bohl conceives that the way back is possible only when the human being has been made aware that he or she is a sinner. This occurs with the entrance of God's law into the heart of the human being, whereupon the human begins to feel and understand what sin is. It is important to note that Bohl did not understand sin as negation of being or as a material substance or as simply ignorance, as did Ritschl. But sin in its deepest sense is
0 Ibid., 27. 1 Ibid., 29. 101
transgression of God's law. In other words, the basic human problem is ethical. The law
of God exposes the nature of evil and the evil of our nature. The reason for our emptiness
and guilt is transgression, sin, and iniquity (moral corruptness and perversity). Our whole
fleshly existence is carnally (body and soul) sold under sin (Rom 7:14) and as such is
against the will and law of God.
However, the Christian religion not only diagnoses the situation but also, and at
the same time, reveals the solution to the problem of our existence. Against the dark
background of our existence God placed from the beginning the promise of deliverance,
and God provided a covering (Gen 3:15), that is, a way back to God Himself. God's
initial promise for faith and hope is the Gospel, the beginning and midpoint of the
Christian religion. Where there was no more way back, there was the promised Seed, the
Son of Man, who was to take His place in this situation of darkness and emptiness, under
the judgment of sin and death, to fulfill the law and to pay for and carry the load of sin
against the law for those who lie under its curse in guilt, emptiness, and death, and that all
for the purpose of bringing the human being back to God, that is, into communion with the Triune God.182
This way of satisfaction, reconciliation of God to the human being, is not an
empty idea that floats in the air, but this satisfaction, redemption, really takes place in history, in a people, a family, from the inception of this world and its fall. The great promise, the mother-promise of Gen 3:15, (protoevangelium) is, in fact, the midpoint of the Christian religion, having its ground and anchor in eternity. It was the midpoint for faith and hope for the first family and so for all of history, and the world in its course. It
82 Ibid., 27. 102 is the sure Word and promise of the coming of Jesus Christ, the Seed and the Son of God, of the righteousness of God "without the law" (Rom 3:21), and of new life and deliverance.
Finally, concerning holiness, the Christian religion teaches that God is the
'actualizer' of this need to be satisfied. For this God sent the Holy Spirit, the Comforter, the third person of the Trinity. "Man came forth out of nothing, is not the author of his redemption, but also not the author of his holiness. For out of Him, and through Him, and unto Him are all things" (Rom 11:36). This is the threefold cord that binds the soul of every Christian to eternity. So one finds a satisfying answer to all one's questions— questions that all confessors of non-Christian religions also carry with them—in the
Christian religion, in Christ, and in the Spirit.
Bohl articulates the uniqueness of the Christian religion as answer to the human existential situation in comparison with other religions; defending this biblical perspective, however, Bohl goes further and also enters his own camp, that is, the
Christian circle, which has the word of God, the promise, Christ, and the Holy Spirit as the eternal and everlasting midpoint of history and reality. There he also seeks to combat foreign elements that some have unknowingly or deliberately allowed to enter. Bohl observes that also within the Christian camp the same tendencies of pantheism and Deism are present; that is, of mysticism and Pelagian dualism.
For Bohl some of these enemies, or some of these elements, are represented by the main figures of the historical-critical school and their systems of thought and exegesis. However, the impetus of the creeping in of these foreign elements was in
Ibid., 28. 103
particular the theology and methodology of Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher—who in his
defense of the Christian religion against its cultured despisers had actually capitulated to
foreign elements and, in fact, had brought them into the Christian camp—had capitulated
to the demands of the modern and fleshly human being by having denied fundamental
biblical Reformed principles and presuppositions.
According to Bohl, in a manner of speaking, Schleiermacher in his defense of the
Christian religion had attempted to stand on the side of its cultured despisers. In this way
he had attempted to draw them back into the circle of the Christian religion with, in
particular, the romantic idea of the 'feeling of absolute dependence.' In reality, however,
he had fallen into a black hole of undetermined immeasurable feelings. The reason and
cause for this was that "he elevated feeling to the midpoint of spiritual life.... However,
this feeling is incapable of producing an objective measure for our understanding, which
alone the Holy Scriptures can realize."184
Bohl expands this discussion on feeling by adding that neither understanding nor
rationality nor will have in themselves the ground of the truth of God, nor can they
support it. To illustrate this claim he uses the analogy of the rainbow: "It is only in
appearance that the rainbow stands upon the earth; in truth it stands above (arches over)
the earth. Truly enough it is observed by us as we stand upon the earth, yet it stands not upon the earth but is higher and elevated above the earth. Even so it is with Divine truth.
The Divine truth also does not need the human support just as the rainbow does not need
the earth."185
Ibid., 8. Bohl later incorporates this illustration of the rainbow as analogy of how the Word of God is related to the earth and us human beings into the introduction to 104
What is more, in Schleiermacher's theology, Christ is reduced to becoming the
'"religious genius', and in his feeling the religious stream finds its origin,... with Christ begins the first true and revival of God-consciousness, which continues itself in the
Church."186
With this idea and in terms of this approach, letting in these foreign elements,
Schleiermacher had, in fact, entered the comparative religious stream, as Christ, in terms of His God-consciousness, can so be compared with a Mohammed, a Buddha, or a
Confucius. Objective truth can no longer be spoken of. In this way an even plain was created, and "that which is Godly was reduced to that which is human, and that which is his Dogmatik, 55. Karl Barth approvingly quotes the expanded version of this illustration as found in Bohl's Dogmatik in its entirety under paragraph 6, The Knowability of the Word of God, section 3, The Word of God and Experience. '"It is but an appearance that the rainbow stands on the earth, in reality it is vaulted over the earth; true it lets itself down to the earth, but it stands not upon our earth, but is perceived only from there. So it is with the divine truth; the same needs no human support, as little as the rainbow needs the earth. True it illumines man and he notices it. Still it is never dependent on man. It withdraws and man remains in darkness: it returns and man walks in the light. But man is not its assistant; he cannot produce the light; likewise he cannot hoard it up!' (Bohl, Dogmatik, 1886 p. xxv)." Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God: Prolegomena, vol. 1 of Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), 255. On this same page, in the same paragraph Barth quotes Kohlbriigge's famous skull poem. '"Therefore if I die— but I die no more—and some one finds my skull, let this skull still preach to him, saying, I have no eyes, yet I behold Him; I have no lips, yet I kiss Him; I have no tongue, yet I praise Him with you all, who call upon His name. I am a hard skull, yet am I quite softened and melted in His love; I lie outside here in the churchyard, yet am I within in Paradise! All suffering is forgotten. That hath His great love done for us, since for us He bore His Cross and went forth unto Golgotha' (H. Fr. Kohlbrugge, Passionspredigten, 1913, 173ff)." To all of which Barth adds, "Thus speaks true Christian experience." Ibid, 255. It goes beyond the scope of this research to explore what influence Kohlbrugge and Bohl had on the theology of Karl Barth. These positive references, however, indicate that Barth was familiar with their writings and appreciated their insights in crucial sections of his Church Dogmatics. I have previously investigated the relationship between Karl Barth and Kohlbrugge in a master's thesis. Meine Veldman, The Word of God and its Anthropological Implications in the Thought of Karl Barth and Herman Friedrich Kohlbrugge, master's thesis, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo: 2000. 1 Bohl, Prolegomena, 9. This is first mediated by the Apostles, and so to the New Testament believers and the present. 105 human is elevated to that which is Godly."187 So finally the mystic and pantheistic elements of other religions also entered the camp of the Christian religion. Revelation had been robbed of its objectivity as the original source and only standard, that is, as God's
Word and His personal revelation. The Scriptures had been reduced to a secondary source, and the religious consciousness of the feeling of absolute dependence had been placed above them.188
What was the result? What we find in Schleiermacher found its culmination in D.
F. Strauss. Even the whole historical revelation we find in Scripture must, according to him, now be considered as anthropological myth. And so a reference point that was above all things absolutely rational began to reign supreme,189 with the result that according to
Bohl, with Strauss, and following him other rationalists, the other extreme of Deism had entered the camp of Christian religion. Finally, human subjects had become the only point of reference in terms of their own subjectivity. The striving and seeking for an above-the-senses reality became senseless. Instead, the development of the human spirit or the history of the world became the substitute for God and God's direct, absolute, and personal revelation. The so-called autonomous individual began to reign supreme, and rationalism finally "became Egoism. [And in this] the true nature of rationalism revealed itself, and the being and doing of man was reduced to nothing but a game of trickery."1
Such is the analysis of Bohl of what had happened to the Christian religion in the
West and its major developments and currents of Christian theology. The secularization of the Divine and the divinization of the secular had celebrated its victory, and with that,
187 Ibid., 10. 188 Ibid., 11. 189 Ibid., 16. 190 Ibid., 19. 106 as first Victim,' the Holy Scriptures were naturalized so that the human spirit and its development could tread upon its sacred ground and make the Bible speak what it wanted in accordance with its own hypotheses, experimentations, and verifications.
In this way, Bohl saw and experienced the spirit of his time, in the midst of which, in fact, he had received his own education as an Old Testament scholar. Such was his analysis and critique in the broad lines of his time. And against this he saw the need to defend what he perceived to be the biblical and Reformed presuppositions in conjunction with the authority, necessity, and clarity of Scriptures and its exegesis, to build thereupon a Dogmatik created directly out of the Scriptures.191
191 It is amply proven in other dissertations written on Bohl that Bohl himself was shaped and formed, in terms of his understanding of the Old Testament in relation to the New, generally in his hermeneutic and particularly in his doctrines, by Dr. H. F. Kohlbriigge (later, his father-in-law) and his professor in Halle, Dr. Johannes Wichelhause. Kwon writes, "E. Bohl (1836-1903) ein Schiiler sowie der Schwiegersohn H. F. KOHLBRUGGES," Kwon, 3. In the other recent unpublished dissertation on Bohl's theology, Forster traces this historical-theological link in detail. Under the heading "Bohl's endorsement of Kohlbrugge's Theology," Forster specifically mentions the influence of Kohlbriigge on Bohl in the areas of hermeneutics (importance of the Old Testament and the unity of both testaments historically and typologically interpreted), anthropology (the exegesis that the human being was created in the image of God as life- sphere, i.e., in wisdom, righteousness and holiness), christology and soteriology. See Forster, 43-69. 107
Bohl's Defense and Hermeneutic of the Scriptures
In order to get a clearer understanding of Bohl's defense and hermeneutic of the
Scriptures and his doctrine of the Word192 as foundational for his doctrine of justification in the climate of his own time, I will turn to a dispute he had with a prominent representative of the developing historical-critical tradition of the Scriptures, Abraham
Keunen,193 who wrote a long and very critical review of Bohl's first published book,
ZwolfMessianische Psalmen erkldrt. Nebst einer grundlegenden christologischen
Einleitung}
In the above-mentioned dissertation of Kwon, Bohl's hermeneutic has been exposed in detail. In Forster's dissertation Bohl's hermeneutic is presented from a historical-theological point of view in general. However, for my own purposes of comparing Bohl's biblical principles for his doctrine of justification with those of Ritschl, it is necessary that I also pay some serious attention to his hermeneutic. Rather than simply using the outcome of the aformentioned research, I will turn to the primary sources themselves, seeking to draw my own conclusions, paying particular attention to the apologetic thrust of Bohl's articulation of his hermeneutic in the context of his time. 193 Abraham Keunen was a professor in Leiden, the Netherlands. He was a representative of the "moderns" who articulated and defended the historical-critical exegesis of the Bible. His influence reached outside the borders of the Netherlands to England and beyond. See Gabler, 109. 194 Eduard Bohl, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen. Keunen's review was written two years later. Abraham Keunen, "Verklaring van twaalf messiaansche Psalmen," Godgeleerde Bijdragen, 38 (1864). To receive such a critical review from such a prominent scholar and writer, one that accused Bohl of theosophy and unhealthy mysticism (see page 209), is an indication of the theological and scholarly struggle Bohl found himself in soon after publishing his first work. With this review, Keunen drew a certain line in the sand with respect to Bohl and in particular the Dutch historical-critical school and movement. Bohl responded to this critical review in Eduard Bohl, Erwiderung aufProf A. Kuenen's Beurteilungen der, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen (Elberfeld: Sam Lucas, 1864). In spite of this attack, Bohl continued to follow his hermeneutic set out in Zwolf Messianische Psalmen erkldrt. In particular he continued to defend and follow his christological introduction in his later works. In 1882 he wrote and published Christologie des Alten Testamentes oder Auslegung der wichtigsten Messianischen Weissagungen (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1882), in which he expanded upon the christology already found in his earlier work, just mentioned. With his Zum Gezets und 108
In the introduction of his first published work, Bohl had first of all set out to explain his understanding of the character and development of the biblical soteriological truths as founded upon God's council of redemption in eternity as reflected in and by the
Scriptures—in other words, what his own presuppositions were with regard to God's
Word and God's special revelation. In the rest of the book he sought to 'prove' these presuppositions historically, philologically, and theologically.
First of all it needs to be noted, as Kwon also observes, that Bohl, as exegete, was very conscious of the historical background of the texts in the Bible and that in this he was actually close to the historical-critical method; however, there was one major difference: he did not subject the text itself to historical-critical proof. His overall approach remained theological and typological, evidencing primarily an exegesis 'von oberi195 (from above).
Without going into too much detail with regard to the philological, grammatical, and historical observations Keunen made in his review of Bohl's first published work on
Zum Zeugnis: Eine Abwehr wider die neu-kritische Schriftforschung im Alien Testament (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1883), Bohl published a full-scale defense of his hermeneutic as against the basic principles and presuppositions of the historical-critical school of Vatke, Wellhausen, and Keunen, among others. 195 Kwon, 148-152. He writes that Bohl "geht iiber die Reformatoren hinaus, weil sein Augenmerk sich eher auf den historischen Hintergrund des Textes richtet als auf die kirchliche Tradition. Uberdies geht Bohl iiber Kohlbrugge hinaus, weil er den historischen Hintergrund des Textes im blick auf die historisch-kritische Methode konkreter als dieser gepriift hat. ... Daraus ergibt sich, da(3 Bohl's Auslegung im Grande historisch, literarisch und philologisch ist. Das hei(3t, Bohl's Auslegungsmethode steht der historische-kritischen Methode sehr nahe, doch mit der Einschrankung, da(3 er die Bibeltexte selbst nicht kritisch priift. Bohl's Beriicksichtigung des historischen Hintergrandes bezieht sich eigentlich sehr eng auf seine typologische Auslegungsmethode . .. Bohl's Unterscheid zur genuin historisch-kritschen Methode liegt nur darin, dap er in bezug auf die Typologie den 'Von-Oben-her-Gedanken,' bzw. die heilige geschichtliche Linie vom Weibessamen bis Christus voraussetzt." Kwon, 149, 152. 109 the Messianic Psalms, I can say that the overarching difference between Keunen and
Bohl lies primarily in their respective presuppositions. Let me begin with pointing out
Bohl's articulation and defense of his own inherent presuppositions.
Bohl begins the introductory comments that defend his exegesis of Scriptures with an important analogy. The scriptures, as God's Word, have this in common with the powers of nature, namely, that from the start the powers are already at work and are, in fact, present in nuce, even though they are not yet fully expressed and understood in their inner and mutual relations and connections.196 As the powers of nature also are already slowly working before they are acknowledged and understood for what they actually are, so it is with the Scriptures.
To be noted is that Bohl uses the powers of nature merely as an analogy to understand the character and nature of the Word of God. At the same time, Bohl notes that here one must not think something analogous to the human spirit and its development, i.e., in an evolutionary sense. When we speak of Scriptures we are not dealing with the inner development of the spiritual life of a people or of a nation, which comes to a certain consciousness. The example of Abraham, who saw from afar off the day of Christ, speaks contrary to such a conception of revelation (John 8:26), as does the going back into history to Abraham as the example of the doctrine of justification of the ungodly by Paul (Rom 4:5). Both Abraham and Paul, regardless of the time difference, lived essentially from and for the same standpoint, that is, that offestwerden im Glauben
107 1 OR an Christum. From this perspective Bohl approached the Messianic psalms as well.
Bohl, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen, 1. 110
Having set out with this analogy and these comparisons, Bohl then begins to speak of Gen 3:15 as theprotoevangelium, that is, as the "invisible working cornerstone"199 of which Christ is the content. Christ is the object of faith and salvation for all people in the Bible, whether they looked forward to Christ or backward to him.
This is the content of the promise that God, throughout the history of the Bible—the psalms, the wisdom literature, and the prophesies—reproduced, in a different Gestalt
(form), that is, by way of His Word and by way of embodiments of the message of this
Word in the lives of personalities, with the Word. In this way Christ was already proclaimed and believed throughout history and in the Scriptures. So it was for Adam and
Eve, and no less for John on the Island of Patmos: always afestwerden im Glauben an
Christum (a becoming strong or being established in faith in Christ). For this to have been a possible reality, all was already present in the first mother-promise of the satisfaction of
God and the salvation of the human being; it needed only to be made clearer and reproduced time and again in the rest of the Old Testament and to finally be fulfilled in the New Testament.200
Abraham Keunen's Critique of Bohl's Christology and Hermeneutic of the Old Testament
The historical critic Abraham Keunen, in a review of Bohl's christology, called Bohl's hermeneutic and defense of Scriptures simply unhealthy mysticism, or theosophy. He
198 That is, in terms of, "festen Grundfassen auf dem Grundstein, der da heipt, und ausser welchem kein anderer gelegt werden kann (1 Cor 3:11)." Ibid. 199 Ibid., 19. 200 "So regulirt dieser Grund ... (1 Pet 2:4) schon von Anbeginn an alle auf ihm sich griindenden Bausteine ... Gottes. Obschon erselbst verborgen ist, so wirkt er doch gleich den Gesetzen in der Natur und verschaft sich Anbildungen order Verkorperungen." Ibid., 18. Ill adds that such an approach and interpretation rests on a faith in absolute authority, and texts are treated and played with until they bring forth what is in line with this mystic, theosophical vision (theory) of Bohl's.201 Couple this with a quasi-mechanical view of inspiration, and what you are left with is a most subjective interpretation of Scriptures, of
202 mystic proportions.
In light of this general critique, Keunen then proceeds to probe the worth of the theory Bohl presents. Turning to the actual texts Bohl treats in his work, Keunen sees that the promised seed of the women is to be interpreted as merely her natural offspring and the struggle mentioned in the mother-promise (Gen 3:15) to be understood as the ethical moral struggle between good and evil.203 To see Christ in the promised seed and the devil in the snake is theosophical and mystical. To interpret this promise as reproduced in
Word and act, or actualities, until its final fulfillment is simply dreamery.
Turning to the Messianic Psalms, Keunen notes that the subject is not ultimately
Christ but merely the immediate historical situation of the authors. This must be determined historically-critically.204 So also the New Testament letters and writings reach no further than themselves and their historical context.205 Bohl is simply unhistorical in his interpretation, as already predetermined by his altogether faulty vision and hermeneutical principles.206
Finally, Keunen notes, in truth Bohl never really had the Prophets and the Psalms before him in a historical sense, for he was from the start predetermined by his departure
201 Keunen, 224. 202 Ibid., 224, 206. 203 Ibid., 216. 204 Ibid., 223. 205 Ibid., 225. 206 Ibid., 230. 112 point, having the authority of New Testament for the explanation of the Old Testament.
This is complete foolishness: Bohl is so bound by his theosophical and mystical presuppositions and to such an extent that he is even blind to his own slavery.207
Such was the scathing review Bohl received from this prominent biblical historical-critical scholar. Bohl, for his part, could not leave it unanswered. His own name as upcoming biblical Old Testament scholar208 and theologian was discredited and at stake.
Bohl's Defense
In his response Bohl began by noting that not he but Keunen was working with implausible and contradictory presuppositions. Against the comments that Bohl's approach to the Scriptures was mystical and theosophical and that Keunen's approach was natural and 'organic,' Bohl asks, whose approach is truly organic?
According to Bohl, the historical-critical approach of the moderns is better to be termed, 'organizational.'209 They do not seek something in the Old Testament as a lively organism in which the thoughts of God come to expression, but in their historical-critical research they first determine their own object for inquiry from below. Then they seek to
20' Ibid., 237. 208 For his doctoral work and his acceptance for a professor's chair in Germany Bohl specialized in the Old Testament. In his first dissertation, E. Bohl, Aramaismis Libri Koheleth: Dissertatio historia etphilosophica, qua librum Salomoni vindicare conatur (Erlangen: Blaesing, 1860) he defended Solomon as author of Ecclesiastes against the current of the time. His second dissertation was likewise on the Old Testament, Vaticinium Jesaiae Cap. 24-Cap. 27: commentario illustration (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1861), which dealt with the book of Isaiah. 209 Bohl, Erwiderung, 3. 113 organize the Scriptures accordingly in terms of literary criticism,210 with principles that are also merely their own brain-children, their own preconceived ideas. In other words, they too have their own dogmatic points of departure, in accordance with which they then wish to organize what they have deconstructed first in terms of their own historical- critical approach.
Bohl names three such dogmatic departure points. The first is that God does not and cannot speak directly to human beings, as the Bible indicates with the words, "Thus spoke the Lord." The second is that they do not believe that miracles exist. And the third is that they do not believe or presuppose the possibility of prophecies.211 On the basis of these three preconceived 'dogmas' they then seek to reorganize the Scriptures. Such an approach, with such presuppositions as basic, they then call organic. However, Bohl asks, organic according to whom and in what way? According to the principles of natural history, or in terms of developmental scientific theories of the evolution of the human spirit? Indeed, for them, the only options are the latter.
According to Bohl, what is furthermore objectionable is that the historical critics, or at least Keunen and Wellhausen, presuppose that the Hebraic spirit worked in an evolutionary fashion, that is, from point zero to the present, or to the date of inquiry. This all began with simple expressive poetry like that of Deborah or the blessings of Jacob.
Following that, anonymous writers entered the stage, the so-called Elohist followed by the Yahwist with their rich ideas.212 This then is the so-called natural-historic and organic developmental perspective in terms of which the Scriptures are scrutinized and
210 Literary criticism is the term for what we today call source criticism or redaction criticism. Bohl, Erwiderung, 3-4. 114 interpreted. It is from this so-called organic perspective that Keunen approached and criticized Bohl's interpretation of the messianic psalms.214
In short, with this Bohl desired to point out that before these critics seek to organize the Scripture, they had first deconstructed it with the literary interpretative methods that were rooted in their presuppositions. The problem, however, is that they never came to build any new 'house,' even as they desired to do. Instead of seeking to learn from the tree of life (the Bible), to benefit from its fruits, they had cut it down at its root and chopped it into pieces, never again to be able to 'create' a new one, except to hear the echo of their own rational would-be autonomous critical voices. Against all this
Bohl posits his own organic understanding of the Scriptures.
In contrast with Kuenen's approach, Bohl describes an organism as that which is governed by one idea, one principle, using a definition of organism by a famous physiologist of his time, Cams.215 This one idea, or principle, appears throughout all its actualizations. Every member of the organism is, in fact, determined by way of this idea, or principle. So, the Old Testament also "is a faithful expression of the organism of the revelations of God."216 God, according to the real organic understanding of revelation, reveals and continues to reveal in a clearer way that which was already present in His counsel of redemption (Acts 15:18). The end is already in the beginning, as, for example,
213 Ibid., 6. 214 Ibid., 7. 215 Ibid. Carl Gustav Cams (1789 -1869) was a German physiologist and painter, born in Leipzig. A friend of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, he was a many-sided man: a doctor, a naturalist, a scientist and a psychologist. In 1811 he graduated as a doctor of medicine and a doctor of philosophy. In 1814 he was appointed professor of obstetrics and director of the maternity clinic at the teaching institution for medicine and surgery in Dresden. Bohl refers here to his, System der Physiologie (1847-1849), 2 auflage, Theil I, P-28ff. 216 Ibid., 8. 115 in Gen 3:15. In fact, Gen 3:15 functions as the one principle idea that throughout the
Scriptures unfolds itself as the invisible working cornerstone, the substance of which is
Christ Himself. This, Bohl contends, is the real organic understanding of the special revelation of God. This is true biblical theology from which dogmatic theology is derived.
Against the charge of mysticism and theosophy, Bohl writes to Keunen that insofar as his book testifies to the wisdom of God (theosophy) and presumably works from a mystical approach, "in soweit stimme ich beiden Richtungen bei."217 Backed by his own organic conception of special revelation, Bohl is not shy to admit that here we have to do with the eternal wisdom of God, that is, with a principle and point of view from which to interpret the Scriptures that is from 'above.' And if this brings the interpreter to stand before a mystery only to be overcome by the gift of the Spirit of God and true faith, then Bohl is even ready to admit a certain mysticism, but this mysticism is only to be understood and conditioned by what he calls the true organic nature and character of special revelation, as grounded in the three faith presuppositions: that God can and did speak directly to human beings, that miracles did and do exist, and that prophecies have been uttered and fulfilled in history.
Bohl adds that this point of departure and these 'dogmatic' presuppositions are not simply ideas that have arrived on the scene of biblical interpretation out of thin air but are in turn biblical themselves. In other words, Bohl is not fearful of making a commitment
2,7 Ibid., 9. 218 "Ich ging aus von dem Streben die Exegese Jesus unter der Apostel in Harmonie zu setzen mit der alttestamentlichen Wirklichkeit. Es lag mir daran, das wirklich und wesenhafter Weise im A. T. zu finden: was jene hohen Exegeten mich dort zu finden gelehrt." Ibid., 9. 116 and admitting that he seeks to reason from within the circle of revelation itself. The faith presuppositions themselves, on the basis of which he articulates his organic conception of revelation, are derivative from and grounded in the special revelation God has given to the human being about God Himself, the world, and human beings, who exist before God in their respective, dependent natural and spiritual relations.
With this approach, Bohl refuses to take his stand outside of the camp or the circle of the Christian religion as determined by God's own revelatory words and actions. To do so would be neither necessary nor beneficial.219 Bohl is unapologetic about this kind of circular reasoning, as according to him there really exists only one true circle, and that is the circle of the Christian religion as it is grounded in, conditioned by, and informed and sustained by God's own revelation, whether that is in terms of general revelation, as in the case of the anticipatio Deorum, or special revelation.
/,yIbid., 10-11. 220 At the back of Bohl's approach stands his overall assumption that the Bible is historical. "The historical authenticity and the unity of Genesis material was crucial for Bohl, and he held that this was safeguarded by a claim to Mosaic authorship." Forster, 123. This implies that the account of the creation of the human being presents us with a true picture of reality, which continues to be the reference point for coming to a true understanding of the situation and the nature of the human being (anthropology), what went wrong (the Fall) and how it can be rectified (the christological and soteriological answer God Himself provided with the Protoevangelium, Gen. 3:15) and its reiteration throughout the rest of the Scriptures as the object of a true faith worked by God the Spirit. See Forster, 105-170. For the purpose at hand of clarifying the larger context of Bohl's apologetic approach, I draw particular attention to Forster's overall argument that Bohl presents us with a "sphere theology." Forster writes, "Though the Kohlbriigge circle saw itself fundamentally in continuity with the Reformers, it did not hold slavishly to classical formulations of their insights. This is clearly seen in Bohl's theological formulation of 'sphere theology,' which can be regarded as his proprium, and as such a major contribution to theological inquiry." Forster, Introduction, 6. As grounded in Bohl's interpretation of the image of God as sphere, for him to think, interpret and operate from a sphere other than God's established sphere for us, i.e., God Himself, His authoritative Word and Spirit, will merely result in illusions created by the would-be autonomous human being concerning our creation, fall, redemption, and consummation. For Bohl (as 117
The Word and Anthropology
At the center of Bohl's doctrine of the Word of God stands his interpretation of the image
of God, the fall, and his christology as God's soteriological answer to our fallen situation.
For Bohl to understand the human being biblically and theologically, which for him is the
only way to properly understand the human being, he goes back to the original idea of the
image of God. That, in fact, is Bohl's point of departure also for beginning to think properly about a biblical christology. In this context it is important to understand how
Bohl interprets the idea of the image of God in a more expanded way than we have noted
so far.
Bohl describes the image of God (Gen 1:26, zelem) as a 'situation,' or 'sphere' in which the human being was created.221 This sphere is furthur defined by Bohl as a
"sphere harmoniously moving according to God's law."222 In his Reformed Doctrine of
Justification Bohl expands on this thought by stating that it is to be understood in its
original reality as a state that was capable of being lost if "Adam, obeying Satan, rebels
against God's definite commandment."223 It was thus a state constituted by law, righteousness, and holiness (Eph 4:24), and it required from the human being obedience we have seen), Schleiermacher and much of the historical-critical tradition are prime examples of such attempts. The sphere of God's revelation is the only proper sphere in which to come to a proper self-understanding, an understanding of this world and God in their relations. 221 "Wie eine Sphare umgiebt ihn das Bild, es lagert auf dem Erstmenschen und begabt ihn mit gottlicher Hoheit und Majestat; es haucht iiber den Erdentkommenen einen gottlich strahlende Glanz, den zu reflektiren seine Bestimmung ist." Bohl, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen erkldrt, iv. For a defense of this unique exegesis, in which he followed H. F. Kohlbriigge see, Johann Caspar Stephanus Locher, Toelichting en Verweer (Amsterdam: Gereformeerde Geschriften, 1908) 14-33. 222 Bohl, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen, v. 223 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 136. 118
and faithfulness if the human being were to remain in it as his or her element for life. In
paradise the human being accomplished this obedience and faithfulness, and it "was
perfectly natural to man."224 It was thus a historic, spiritual, and relational state, all in
accordance with the divine law. The commandment that God gave the first human being
was at the same time to maintain the boundary between Creator and creature and to
indicate the human being's total dependence on God.225
What happens in the fall is existentially and historically of extreme importance for
an understanding of Bohl's christology and doctrine of justification as the theological
answer to the existential and spiritual situation in which the human being finds himself
after the fall. By the instigation of the devil, the human being, by expressing his
allegiance with the prince of darkness, i.e., trusting in his word instead, Bohl says,
literally fell out of'th e image of God as his sphere of life. He fell literally into the
opposite of the sphere of the image of God, namely, into the sphere of death.226 By
transgressing the commandment of God (Gen 2:17) as recorded in Genesis, the human
being literally became dependent on other powers, which the Bible calls the devil and
death (Gen 2:17; John 8:44; Rom 5:12). And so, alienated from life as it was in the state
of the image of God, the human being, and all his actions from now on (living under the judgment of God), was marked by death and rebellion: with death, as it were, coming
forth from his pores.227 It is in this context and from such an existential situation under
God, judgment, and law that B6hl comes to speak of christology and justification as his
biblical theological answer.
224 Ibid., 138. 225 Bohl, Christologie des Alten, 43. 226 Bohl, Zwolf Messianische Psalmen, v. Bohl, Christologie des Alten, 45. 119
The fall as described above, in Bohl's eyes, is really a description of everyone's state and condition, as they are born and conceived in sin (Ps 51:5) and under the judgment of God with its effect, which fell upon Adam and all his posterity (Rom 5).
This must not be understood in terms of substance or qualities. No, the state of sin is again to be defined as a sphere; one is in sin and iniquity according to God's law, in rebellion, and under the power of the devil and death as flesh (Rom 7:14). The human being in terms of his createdness with all his or her faculties remains as such intact but is impoverished and walks in the wrong direction under the guidance of the powers of death and the devil.228 What then is the answer of God in terms of christology? Bohl states, and here we have come full circle, "Now over against such a state of death a new sphere of life must be created ... [However,] a 'planless' waiting for a hopeful improvement by way of new attempts at obedience is not according to God's dignity.... Would this not secure the sharpest of dualism in terms of God's relationship to man?"229 And this new sphere of life God creates in accordance with the initial promise of righteousness, the protoevangelium (Gen 3:14-15). This is the Word of life, of which John speaks as already having been there from the beginning (John 1:1-4), meaning Jesus Christ. It is the Word of life that the human being existed in as his element of life as long as he continued to trust in God's guidance and to respect the boundary situation God had created with his commandment not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But now this
Word of light, this protoevangelium, shone (and shines) against the dark background of
Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 140. Bohl, Christologie des Alien Testamentes, 45. 120
our fallen existence and gave life, secured Adam with a full restoration, and brought
righteousness and salvation.230
Now, under this Word of promise, by this word-promise of righteousness, the
Patriarchs and the Prophets were guided and received life and light as a star that shone in
the darkness of the time of the advent as a beam of light that shone before their feet on
their difficult road. And it is finally christology that teaches us that in the nightly
darkness of the time of the advent, it was the coming of Christ to which all of it pointed
(Rom 10:4). Upon this word, by faith in this word, they walked, and we walk today in, as
it were, a desubstantial present, walking under the guidance of the Word of God between
the cliffs of dualism and mysticism, Deism and pantheism, in the circle of God's own
revelation.
As Bohl sees it, most historical-critical research presumes to take a stand outside
of this circle under God. It presumes an autonomous stand, over against which Bohl posits that interpreters must subject themselves in obedience to Christ (2 Cor 10:5).231
The Scriptures must be compared with Scriptures themselves, as "da(3 sich diese Heilige
Schrift selbst richtig auslege [that the Holy Scriptures rightly interpret themselves, i.e., the autopistia of the Bible]"232.
Conclusion
In the battle one learns the character, necessity, and sufficiency of one's weapons. What
can we conclude from the exchange between Bohl and Keunen and our previous
1 Bohl, Prolegomena, 3. 2 Bohl, Dogmatik, 51. 121 observations with respect to Bohl's critique of Schleiermacher, Strauss, and the rational modernists in general?
What is clear is that here we are dealing with the axiomata, the basic principles of theology. Bohl understood and sought to make clear what the real debate was about, the defense of an objective standard for doing biblical theology and dogmatics. He saw that the authority, clarity, and sufficiency of God's revelation was being attacked and undermined from the side of modern theology, of which he saw Schleiermacher as the father. In fact, it was Schleiermacher who could in the end not answer the critical-biblical scholarship of his time. It was Schleiermacher who first destroyed the unity of the
Scriptures to in turn construct theories to piece them together from the standpoint of the would-be autonomous human being but added instead more confusion to the debates.
Under his influence, the Christian religion began to be assumed as simply a religion among other religions, to be evaluated with the same standards of interpretation with which the natural history of the world and the spirit of the human being was interpreted, that is, in terms of natural and historical evolution from zero to today, and so the Bible also became an ordinary book among other religious texts.
In light of all this, we can observe that Bohl was an apologetic theologian, defending the heritage of the Reformation. The Bible was his first point of reference, from which he desired to create a dogmatics in accordance with the presuppositions and principles with which he exegeted the Scriptures. Therefore, again, the answer to the question of what constitutes revelation was of paramount importance.
Having exposed Bohl's critique of Schleiermacher, Keunen, and the modernists as the context of the articulation of his doctrine of the Word of God, we conclude with 122
respect to Bohl's doctrine of revelation and the Word that Bohl as apologist was a presuppositional thinker and theologian. This emerges especially clearly from his response to Keunen. He responded to his critics from within the circle of the Christian religion, presuming it, on the basis of the self-interpreting principle of Scriptures
(autopistis) and its inherent assumptions, to be the only circle of revelation in which one
could stand to obtain a true understanding of God, self, and the world in their relations.
As we have noted, he refused to take his stand on the same departure point as his historical critics and their assumptions, which he also called simply "dogmatic."
More specifically, he posited his own approach as being von oben (from above),
and so really organic, against the approach von unteren (from below), which in his eyes was more organizational than organic. It was really Schleiermacher who had represented this approach in a most general sense. To come to grips with the Christian religion against its cultured despisers (also in light of the approach to the Christian religion in general that was merely rational and more destructive than constructive) he had posited a unifying principle, the idea of the subjective feeling of absolute dependence, over and above the Scriptures themselves. From this perspective, what in the end prevented others from postulating their own unifying principle over and above God's revelation and so subjecting it to autonomous human inquiry and letting the Scriptures say what was in accordance with their own point of departure for interpretation? 123
Bohl's Critique ofRitschl: The Living God and the Metaphysics of Revelation
Having unearthed Bohl's general understanding of Scriptures from controversial and particular historical contexts and texts, I will turn to his specific critique of Ritschl in the hope of coming to an understanding of Bohl's doctrine of inspiration and authority of the
Scriptures as God's special revelation.
Bohl's principle starting point was that the Bible is sacra et totum uno. One cannot prove this except from within the Scriptures themselves. To take one's stand outside even this position is to leave one's stronghold. In his book on justification, Bohl, in fact, expands on this notion in the context of discussing the difference between Ritschl and orthodoxy in relation to the question of what constitutes revelation. Bohl notes that
Ritschl, rejecting metaphysics as intruding in the domain of special revelation, believes that God can only be experienced and known by His effects. Bohl confronts Ritschl by saying that God goes beyond His effects as a personal being who can and does establish direct relations between Himself and other personal beings; "Person faces person."234
Bohl expounds on the notion of the notitia Dei innata we have seen him employ, widening the circle beyond the positive special historic revelation. This is, according to
Bohl, in fact, something extraordinary, "of a religious character, united and dependent on
Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211-212. Ibid., 211-213. 124 the Word."235 It is with this in mind that Bohl begins to speak of the Bible as sent to us by a personal God who lives and speaks in the way of providence, untethered.236
Bohl begins his speaking of the special revelation of God with the observation that doubts concerning the truth of God's Word are grounded in weak conceptions people have of God, preconceptions that they build up before they approach the Bible. Following that, all that does not square with their own conception of God must needs be rejected, including notions in the Scriptures.
Against this, Bohl remarks that this is because many fail to have a conception of
God as the one living God who existed before anything else and as such was independent of all that was created.237 He not only begins with assuming a certain creational point of contact created by God Himself, but at the same time he is eager to point to the presupposition of the importance of God's self-existence as a God who is free and independent, a living personal God. In other words, we must understand God to be metaphysically, and as such ontologically, distinct from the world and the human being.
Thus not only do we not seek to acknowledge God by way of His effects, as Ritschl does, but we must understand God as a metaphysical reality, as a person who is the living source and Sovereign Lord over his effects, His creation, and His revelation, out of whom, through whom, and unto whom are all things (Rom 11:39). Again, one cannot come to this understanding outside the standard of God's own special revelation; these attributes and this essence of God lie anchored in the names by which he has revealed
Himself—e.g., Elohim and Yahweh, that is, God of all gods and "I am who I am, I will
Ibid., 212. See Bohl, Prolegomena, 31. Ibid., 31. 125 be who I will be." He is the personal, living God who spoke these words to Moses (Exod
3:14).238 "That is the living formula of the Holy Scriptures, according to which God is the beginning, the center and the end of all things."239 These words come again from within the circle of God's own revelation, from which He reveals Himself without placing His
Word in the realm of human flesh and rationality.
Furthermore, moving towards his understanding of the inspiration of the
Scriptures, Bohl remarks that the most important mark of this God of the Scriptures and creation is that for God speaking and doing are one (Isa 34:16): "the word is the guarantee of the deed."240 Or stronger yet, "His Word comprises the fruitful seed for the deed (Gen. I)."241 Thus God ought to be understood, as Scriptures inform us, as a living
God who speaks, and for whom word and deed are one.
Again, turning specifically to the Scriptures, Bohl notes that the Scriptures themselves claim to be God's Word (Eph 6:17; 1 Pet 1:23, Col 3:16, Rev 1:9). In the
Scriptures and with the Scriptures God speaks and reveals Himself as He has spoken and acted.
Bohl begins with the being of God as the source of the effects the human being can experience, as the object of human faith. Bohl begins with assuming the personal reality of God as the one who is One and Holy and who lives and speaks. This, then, leads in turn to the character of the Bible as His Word, as Sacred and One: sacra et totum uno. In other words, the sacred and unified character of the special revelation we have
238 Ibid., 32. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid., 34. 241 Ibid. 126 received is grounded in the sacredness and unity of the One Who has spoken it; it is never to be subjected to anyone but God Himself.
For, Bohl, in contrast to Ritschl, metaphysical assumptions condition and determine the nature and character of the Holy Scriptures. However, there is a mutual relationship here. One could also say that when we speak of the Scriptures, we can also speak of the 'metaphysics' of the Scriptures themselves, as grounded in God, who nevertheless as such is free and independent of what he has created by His Word and revealed in His Word.
To be noted further is that, precisely rooted in this, the speaking of God with His
Word comprises theoretical judgments, judgments of being—and not only and not even first value-judgments, as Ritschl assumes. "Die Heilige Schrift ist voll von theoretischen
Urteilen uber die hochsten Fragen des Daseins (zumal der Apostel Paulus) [The Holy
Scriptures are full of theoretical judgments about the highest inquiries into existence
(Especially the apostle Paul)]."242 Furthermore, and finally, the speaking of God in terms of His revelation is not only existentially determinative for Bohl but also historically determinative. In other words, history itself as factual and objective is derivative of God's speaking. History answers to the Word of God, which makes it a fact (Josh 3:9-10),243 not the other way around.
This whole understanding is at bottom diametrically opposed to the presuppositions of many modern critics of revelation, who by and large deny the possibility of God speaking directly to the human being, the possibility of miracles, and
242 Bohl, Dogmatik, 64.1 will return to this important observation after I have presented Ritschl's doctrine of the Word of God. 243 Bohl, Prolegomena, 39-40. 127 prophecies. Without the metaphysics here presupposed by Bohl, which is in fact itself grounded in his understanding of the nature of Scriptures and its own theoretical judgments, this is unavoidably the result. The modern, rationalistic critics of God's revelation assume at bottom a form of Deism or Pelagianism, since the Triune God of creation and of the Scriptures, who lives and speaks and from Whom (God the Father), through whom (God the Son), and to whom (God the Holy Spirit) are all things (Rom
11:39), is denied and sin is minimized.
Bohl judges Ritschl precisely as falling into the latter category, that is, of
Socinianism and Deism.244 However, before I judge whether or not Bohl is right in this regard, I will have to turn to Ritschl's own works to let him speak for himself. What emerges from the primary sources themselves will then also answer this question in terms of my evaluation of Bohl's critique of Ritschl. But before I do so, I will expose Bohl's doctrine of inspiration and his critique of Ritschl.
The Doctrine of Inspiration and Bohl's Critique of Ritschl
As a final consideration of Bohl's hermeneutic and understanding of the nature and authority of revelation, I come to his articulation of inspiration, of which he says that it is
"the most important and strongest foundation for our Christian faith, on which dogmatics stands or falls."245
Again, the importance of the unity of Scriptures resurfaces here insofar as Bohl holds that the whole of Scripture as we have received it in our canon is inspired. He who breaks through this unity has broken through the trustworthiness of the Scriptures and so
244 See Bohl, Dogmatik, 64-65, 69. Bohl, Prolegomena, 43. 128 has weakened and dismantled the power of God's word.246 Here Bohl again militates against the modern critics who, according to him, fragment the Scripture in an attempt to glue it together in terms of their own theories, which are developed from their own presuppositions.
Bohl is not a theologian who simply restated old doctrines of inspiration, who advocated more or less a mechanical view of inspiration. The writers of the Bible were not calami Dei (pens of God), as they were sometimes described in theologies of the seventeenth century.247 On the other hand, Bohl warns also against seeing the Bible as primarily revealing certain fundamental thoughts, essential feelings, or religious ground sentiments. This has resulted in understanding and dealing with the Scriptures as simply source instead of norm, as Schleiermacher did.
Bohl also places Ritschl in the latter category of those who understand the
Scriptures as primarily a source book. Having rejected metaphysics, he was left with the
Bible as primarily a historical book. Certainly he had slapped the philosophers on the fingers, that is, in terms of their metaphysics with their often pantheistic tendencies and consequences, and so secured the Christian religion a domain for itself, that is, a spiritual domain of its own where philosophy should not intrude. Yet with the bathwater
(metaphysics) he had thrown away the baby (the self-existent, ontological Triune God, who lives and speaks). With the rejection of the symbols of the church, as too influenced by Greek philosophy, he was left with God's word as a historical book and, in fact, with a
246 Ibid., 46. 247 Ibid. 248 B6hl, Dogmatik, 62. 129 denial of the importance of the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the Spiritus sancti internum, as person.2*9 And what was necessarily the result?
According to Bohl, Ritschl, contrary to his own wish, fell back into the same subjectivism as Schleiermacher, though this time in a Socinian-Deistic sense, not in a mystic or pantheistic sense.250 The Bible became simply a historical book, subject to historical criticism,251 and so Ritschl failed to retain any foundational Festigkeit
(stability/trustworthiness). In this he went so far as to become the judge of a Paul and a
Peter rather than subject to the authority they had as holy men led by the Holy Spirit.252
Over against all this, Bohl posits his own doctrine of inspiration, which is first of all coupled with the understanding that the men led by the Spirit who wrote the books of the Bible were merely human beings and, as such, grass that today is and tomorrow is thrown in the oven. Yet by and through such men God the Spirit spoke directly. Bohl does not deny hereby the inspiratio mentalis or verbalis but precisely in this way seeks to maintain it: they spoke by God the Spirit, and not from themselves as merely human beings. However, this does not also imply for Bohl a sort of dictation, however. No, they were led a hundred percent by the person of the Holy Spirit, yet they remained a hundred
249 Ibid., 62, 64. 250 "Er geht ahnlich wie Schleiermacher vom Subjekt aus und will von dessen Bedurfhissen ausgehend, nunmehr Forderungen stellen, welche die Offenbarung Gottes in Christus liquidieren soil... wo hatte denn Ritschl einen objectiven Ma|3stab bei der Beurteiling der Offenbarung? Er, dem das testimonium sancti internum fehlt und dem daher das Band fehlt, um die Offenbarung zusammenzuhalten?" Ibid., 61-62. 251 "Er kann die Offenbarung nur historisch sich begriinden und mu|3 sie kritisch serfassern lassen." Ibid., 62. 252 "Kritisiert er doch selbst Paulus und Petrus: empfangt man doch den Eindruck, die neutestamentichen Schriften seien nor Quellen und nicht Normen; halt er doch Umschau iiber die Propheten und Apostel, wie einer Feldherr uber seine Soldaten und nicht, wie es sich geziemte, als ihr Schuler." Ibid. 253 Bohl, Prolegomena, 47. 130 percent human as they spoke and wrote down the word. Thereby, again, God did not override their own personalities or their peculiar historical circumstances but used all this for the purpose of His direct and clear revelation.
To make it clearer how this came about, Bohl uses the analogy of good works. On the one hand good works appear to be human works. Human beings speak and perform them. And it is true that they are truly and totally included in their performance. They are not robots, performing the work of God. Yet it is clear that the Scriptures speak of good works as works of God, as fruits of the one Spirit (Gal 5:22-23) and that God has established them beforehand so that we should walk in them (Eph 2:10). Are they also works that are performed mechanically, as by slaves, which notion would deny the personality of the one who performs them? No! "So it is also with the inspiration of the
Prophets and the Apostles; it does not supersede or cancel out the particularity of the individual."254 This, in fact, is in line with what Peter writes in 2 Pet 1:20: "For the prophecy came not in the old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spoke[,]... moved by the Holy Spirit." Thus the Scriptural word is entirely the product of the breath of God (2 Tim 3:16) as verbi Dei. It is the word of people who are like grass and yet at the same time speak the word of God. "Ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God, which effectively worketh also in you that believe" (1 Thess 2:13).
Bohl finishes his treatment of the inspiration of the Bible with the observation that
God has articulated it not mechanically, nor to the exclusion of the human factor or factors of the human's situation, but as the object of faith. Even the doctrine of
Bohl, Prolegomena, 51. 131
inspiration is to be accepted as presented in the Bible as an object of faith,255 just as good
works flow from faith and are worked in faith, as worked by God the Spirit, who blows
wherever and whenever he desires (John 3:8). Such is the sum of Bohl's doctrine of
inspiration.
Where does Bohl place Ritschl? I have shown that he regards Ritschl's position as
Socinian and Deistic. But where does Bohl consider Ritschl in terms of the history of
Christian thought? Does he identify him as essentially a follower of Schleiermacher?
Bohl discusses Ritschl in the context of his discussion of Schleiermacher, Vatke,
Keunen, and Wellhausen, on the one hand, and the school of Baur, on the other. Bohl posits the opinion that in comparison with these major figures of modern theology and
modern criticism, Ritschl goes a unique third way to defend a certain objectivity and
authority of the Scriptures against the feeling-subjectivism of Schleiermacher and the
speculation of Socinus and the rationalists.256
The Historico-Theological Defense of Bohl's Hermeneutic
Where does Bohl see himself situated within the history of interpretation, in particular of the Old Testament? What are the sources of his own approach, and how is it to be located within the history of the interpretation of the Old Testament?
These are important questions in light of the fact that Bohl shares, curiously enough, an approach similar to those of Schleiermacher and Ritschl against the threat of
255 Ibid., 58. 256 Bohl writes, "Wenn dann neuerlings Ritschl einen dritten Weg ersonnen hat, indem er die Religion auf eine mehr praktische Basis ... stellt." Bohl, Dogmatik, 50. He adds later, "Ritschl ist dagegen fern davon, die Autoritat der Bibel herabsusetzen und sie durch ein lebendiges religioses Gefiihl oder die Speculation derartig uberwuchern zu lassen, daj3 nichts Objektives mehr iibrig bleibt." Ibid., 61. 132 the undermining of the authority of the Scriptures exemplified by the rationalism of their day. Together with Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Bohl's departure point is also to start with the Christ of the New Testament, to reach back to the Old Testament through the interpretation of the Apostles in such a way as to answer to the rationalism and historical- critical approaches of that time. In particular, Ritschl sought to follow this approach, in his attempt to find the ground ideas of the New Testament concerning Christ and salvation in the Old Testament, to so seek unity in the special revelation of God.257
Formally, Bohl in this regard does not distinguish himself from Ritschl; in fact, as we will see, Bohl applauds Ritschl's approach. However, the question of how far Bohl differentiates himself from Ritschl in particular, that is, historically and materially, remains.
This characteristic of Ritschl's hermeneutic he articulated first in his early work, Die Enstehung der altkatholische Kirche, Eine Kirchen-und Dogmengeschichtliche Monographic (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1850). The early version of this work was still written in the tradition of the influential critical scholar F. C. Baur, who had been influenced by Hegel and had been Ritschl's teacher. In the second publication, this work underwent a major revision whereby Ritschl distanced himself from the school of Baur and his approach. This break precipitated Ritschl becoming a more or less independent scholar and theologian who began to establish his own direction and following. The second and revised version of this book was also translated into Dutch, Het Ontstaan der Oud- Katholieke Kerk. Eene Monographic behoorende tot de Geschiedenis der Kerk en der Leerstukken (Utrecht: L. E. Bosch en Zoon, 1868). That Ritschl stands in the tradition of Schleiermacher, seeking to begin with Christ as the originator of the Christian religion, Kuipers clearly shows in his dissertation on Ritschl. See R. Kuipers, De Theologie van Albrecht Ritschl eene Historisch-Dogmatische Studie (Harlingen: Firma F. van der Zwaag & Zoon, 1914) 37. However, instead of seeking to ground the Christian religion in the subjectivity of the feeling of ultimate dependence, with Christ as example and prototype of the true God-consciousness to be emulated, Kuipers points out that Ritschl desires an objective approach, basing his dogmatics on the positive historical revelation of Christ as found in the Scriptures. Kuipers argues strongly that Ritschl's departure point is the Bible. See ibid., 31-41. The question, of course, remains: how did Ritschl approach the Scriptures, and what did he see as the principle of unity of the special revelation of God? 133
For the answer to the questions posed, I need to turn to Bohl's Christologie des
Alten Testaments. In this work Bohl directs the reader to Diestel's Geschichte des A. T. in der Christliche Kirche;259 this work delineates three approaches prevalent in the history of the Christian church in terms of interpreting the Old Testament christologically.
The first one is the 'direct-messianic' approach. This approach was represented by
Augustine, Luther and many Lutheran interpreters of the Old Testament. Among the
Reformed Bohl mentions Theodore Beza as standing in this tradition. This approach emphasizes that all the promises and Messianic prophecies directly speak of the Christ.
Generally speaking, with this approach there is a tendency to disregard the mediate- historical approach, that is, of neglecting the immediate historical context of the authors of the Bible.
The second approach mentioned by Diestel in his work, B6hl following him, is the middle approach. Melanchton had already steered in this direction in his exegesis of the Old Testament. In the Old Catholic Church it had been practiced by Chrysostom in particular. The general conviction of the interpreters standing in this tradition is that the
Bohl, Christologie des Alten. I will refer to the Dutch translation, translated under supervision of Bohl himself, Christologie des Ouden Verbonds ofverklaring der meest gewichtige messiaansche Profetieen (Amsterdam: Scheffer & Co., 1885). 259 Ludwig Diestel (September 28, 1825 - May 15, 1879) was a German Protestant theologian who was a native of Konigsberg. He studied at several universities, and in 1851 became a lecturer at the University of Bonn, where in 1858 he became an associate professor of theology. Afterwards he became a professor at the Universities of Greifswald (1862), Jena (1867) and Tubingen (1872). Diestel was known for his liberal- minded theological views, and specialized in Old Testament exegesis. He was the author the highly acclaimed Geschichte des Alten Testamentes in der christlichen Kirche (Jena, 1868) (History of the Old Testament in the Christian Church), to which Bohl refers on more than one occasion in his, Christologie des Alten Testamentes oder Auslegung der wichtigsten Messianischen Weissagungen (Wien: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1882). 134
prophets intertwined and interconnected the Messianic prophecies with their immediate
historical context and human situation. This treatment of the Old Testament can be most
keenly observed in the commentaries and sermons of John Calvin. With the help of the
grammatical-historical exegesis he applied to the text, he sought to 'search out' the places
where the Old Testament spoke of the Messiah. According to Bohl, however, Calvin,
sometimes paid so much attention to the historical circumstances and situation of the writers that not much was left to speak of the promised Messiah. With his historical
approach he at times 'exegeted away' indications in verses that spoke of the Messiah where others saw direct references to Christ, the promised Saviour.260 His historical
concentration sometimes seems to undermine or negate the 'heavenly meaning' of the
verses, which even the Apostles attached to certain of the verses in question. However,
Bohl notes, Calvin still acknowledged most Messianic promises and prototypes generally
so regarded. This middle approach was generally accepted and adopted by most
Reformed exegetes, following Calvin, and further back, Chrysostom.261
The third way is described by Diestel and Bohl as the historical approach. This way differs from the middle approach in that here the focus is almost entirely on the historical context and aspect of the text. In the Old Catholic Church this way of
approaching the Scriptures had been represented by Diodorus and Theodore of
Mopsuestia; it was, however, rejected by the early church during the Fifth Ecumenical
For example, Bohl mentions Calvin's exegesis of Ps. 40, where he applies the verses so explicitly to David and his historical situation that not much is left that could point to Christ, so not doing justice to Heb 10:5, which refers to this Psalm speaking of Christ, see Bohl, Christologie des Ouden, 30-31. 261 Ibid., 32. 135
Council.262 During the time of the Reformation this approach again began to be practiced by the Socinians, who thereby bereaved the church of all mysteries and the possibility of direct Messianic interpretation. Bohl mentions Socinus, Smalcius, and Schlickting as belonging to this third way. It was Grotius who first consequently applied this method to the Scriptures, explaining what traditionally were considered Messianic prophecies and promises exclusively out of and for the immediate historical context. Hereby Grotius paved the way for modern rationalism.263
In light of these observations, Bohl seeks to situate himself and his hermeneutic in the middle: "Our task is now to search out that which is true of the direct-Messianic approach and the historical approach of explanation and to unite them."264 He thereby indicates that he desired to hold on to the truth of the direct-Messianic exegesis of such interpreters as Augustine and Luther but at the same time to honour the results of the historical exegesis of even such men as Diodorus of Tarsus, V. Hoffman, and Grotius.
This is what Bohl then termed his own middle way between two extremes. With his approach he sought to be more consistent than certain Reformers had been by maintaining a greater respect for the direct-Messianic approach and so the heavenly meaning of the text, but also to pay close attention to what historical research and exegetes have written and expounded. With this middle way, Bohl considered himself to
262 Ibid., 33. 263 Ibid. Bohl in particular mentions Calvin's accomodation theory as informing his historical approach. According to this theory the Old Testament writers did not think in the least about the Messianic import of their writings. The writers of the New Testament, seeing Old Testament Messianic prophecies and promises fulfilled with Christ, merely went back to certain places in the Old Testament and accommodated the text to their times and situation. Ibid., 34. 264 Ibid., 39. 265 Ibid. 136
be in the same tradition as his father-in-law, H. F. Kohlbriigge, who had, according to
him, presented a "clear and true exegesis of the Old Testament."266
In fact, with this reference to Kohlbriigge and his approach Bohl closes his
introductory remarks to his Old Testament christology and the defense of the lightness of
his way of interpreting the Messianic Psalms, which he was about to expose in more
detail. With these remarks he also sought to situate himself within the history of biblical
interpretation.
Bohl's Dogmatic-Biblical Postulates of the Doctrine of Justification
Having exposed Bohl's doctrine of revelation, his understanding of the nature and
character of the authority of the Bible, and his hermeneutic as background to the work in
question, his Reformed Doctrine of Justification, I will turn to the middle chapter of this
work, where he treats of the biblical-dogmatic postulates of the doctrine of justification
and critiques Ritschl, expanding on what we have noted up to this point.
It is important to note that in his Christologie, he does not deal extensively with the historical-critical tradition of his time. After the work was published, certain readers did comment that this lack made the work weak in a scholarly sense. See Bohl, Zum Gesetz, Foreword. In response to this critique, Bohl wrote Zum Gesetz und Zum Zeugnis, which was translated into Dutch as Tot de Wet en tot de Getuigenis een Verweerschrift tegen de Nieuw-Critische Studie van het Oude Testament. About ten years later an important work was published with the same intention by Ph. J. Hoedemaker, De Mozai'sche Oorsprong van de Wetten in de Boeken Exodus, Leviticus, Numeri. Lezing over de Moderne Schrift-Critiek des Ouden Testaments (Leiden: D. A. Daamen, 1895). In this book Hoedemaker refers to Bohl's Zum Gesetz on pages 10, 197, 206, and 207 as standing in the same line with him in terms of his defense of the Orthodox-Confessional Reformed hermeneutic and its fundamental presuppositions against the modern critique of Scriptures. In this work, Hoedemaker also defends his Reformed position specifically against Kuenen, his fellow countryman and scholar colleague, as Bohl had done previously. As the last important remark, I need to mention Bohl's close attention to the Rabbinic traditions of interpretation. Here the influence of Franz Delitzsch, his teacher at Erlangen, can also clearly be observed. 137
In this middle chapter Bohl begins the treatment of his biblical postulates for the positive and systematic articulation of justification by considering the law, that is, the
Torah. After doing so, he considers the historical books of the Old Testament and the prophets and finally the New Testament gospels, and the letter of Paul to the Romans. In my presentation and analysis of this chapter I will pay particular attention to how Bohl interacts with Ritschl.
On the Law and the Prophets
Speaking of the law, Bohl, characteristically starts with a quote from the New Testament:
"But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets" (Rom 3:21), which he notes as being the long-forgotten theme in the church. In fact, according to Bohl, rationalism forgot this important theme.
Bohl's first comment about the Ritschlian school is that this school deserves praise for having made it its business to read the New Testament in dependence upon the
Old.269 Immediately, however, he adds that because of Ritschl's approach to the Old
Testament, "little remains of what reminds us of the sometime orthodox doctrine, when the OT is thus interpreted or rather abused."270 Yet Bohl remarks that Ritschl's effort is commendable in "[presenting] the doctrine of justification by faith from the standpoint of experience in intimate relation to the Scriptural doctrine. The mediating theology with its
268 Bohl, Von der Rechtfertigung, 68. 269 Ibid. 270 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 11. 138 disorganizing tendencies might learn more here than it desires and accordingly censures
Ritschl more than it profits by his investigations."271
Bohl saw the immediate critique he had heaped on Keunen and the historical- critical school—with its (dis)organizing natural historical hermeneutic that never was able to construct anything whole but left the Bible in a deconstructed state—as not applicable to Ritschl. In fact, this school and the mediating theologies of his time, which sought a hermeneutic over and above the Scriptures to find unity and truth in the
Scriptures, either in terms of an evidential rational construct or a philosophical system
(Baur and Hegelianism) or subjective feeling (Schleiermacher), could learn something from Ritschl's positive historical approach to Scriptures and his attempt to interpret
Scripture with Scripture.
As noted, Bohl's own approach also stands radically opposed to the historical- critical school, against the school of Wellhausen. This school had reversed the order of the law and the prophets: "The prophets furnished the material of which, after the exile, the law was prompted."272
Again in this Bohl praises Ritschl, whom he sees as not following this particular reversal but instead historically placing the law before the prophets as spiritual treasure.
Ritschl saw going back to Moses as important, and he regarded the books of Moses as historical, holding them as such to be interpreted in accordance with the principle of interpreting Scripture with Scripture. Especially significant is that Ritschl left the
Levitical laws of sin offering as important by interpreting them not as the historical critics had done but as preceding and elucidating Christ and the apostles, energetically
271 Ibid., 77. 272 Ibid., 78. 139 mentioning the significance of the righteousness of God and the divine wrath.273
Furthermore, Ritschl also deserves praise for not going along with the historical-critical deconstruction of the Old Testament with reference to the books of, for example, Isaiah,
Job, Jeremiah, and Psalms but regarding them as authentic testis veritatis, including the
New Testament authors.274 In addition, Ritschl, according to Bohl, "flays the critical absurdity of Schleiermacher and opportunely rejects Baur as well as Schneckenburger.
We are accordingly better situated at present than at the middle of the century, when, notwithstanding the customary attempts to restore pristine orthodoxy, they did not properly seek to advance the Church by the means within itself."275
Seemingly Bohl could not have praised Ritschl more positively. Again, I note,
Bohl had found in Ritschl an ally in his critique of the modern contemporary, subjectivistic theology of his time. In particular, Bohl here praised Ritschl's positive, objective turn to Scriptures, his hermeneutic of seeking to elucidate the Bible by means of itself in, with, and for the church.
We turn now to Bohl's own articulation of the biblical-theological postulates of the doctrine of justification. With regard to the theme of the righteousness of God in relation to God Himself and the human being, he remarks that it was God's intention that human beings should never walk in their own righteousness but always in His. After the fall, this is only accomplished by divine imputation, by faith in Christ, inforo Divino.276
This righteousness does not come up from the world or history now, nor did it in the
273 Ibid. 274 Ibid. Bohl here refers specifically to Ritschl's second volume of his doctrine of justification and reconciliation, 214. 275 Ibid., 78. Bohl mentions his work, Zum Gesetz undZum Zeugnis, in which he opposed this reversal of law and prophets. 276 Ibid., 80. 140 beginning. Rather, it propels history forward towards its purpose, namely, the righteousness and the glory of God. These come from God alone and are the means whereby God attains honour and is satisfied. As such, this promised and accomplished righteousness is to be conceived of as the moving center of history, to be participated in for the glory of God's name. "The history of man is not a tedious development from nil to infinity, but it proceeds in concentric circles."277
According to Bohl, the purposes of creation and the history of paradise were directed upward "to apprehend Jesus Christ, the seed, as the only ground of [man's] justification before God, and as his salvation."278 When Adam fell and God removed
Himself from the world, or the human being fell from God and His Righteousness, Adam soon learned the justification of the ungodly (Rom 4:5). In other words, the human being was never righteous or saved, never had spiritual life of his or her own; it was always another's, i.e., God's. In paradise they walked in it and had life, that is, in the image of
God in which they were created, as wisdom, righteousness, and holiness. After becoming ungodly, after the fall, they could only have it again by faith, meaning they neither had it nor could obtain it naturally or historically in their own strength; they could only obtain it in an alien way, that is, from above the world by faith in the promise, by faith in Christ, who, as the object of faith is the eternal center of history.
With his hermeneutic of Scripture, backed by his organic conception of revelation as rooted in his primary conception of the protoevangelium (Gen 3:15), Bohl arrives, in his particular articulation of the doctrine of justification grounded christocentrically, at a conception of history in terms of concentric circles.
277 Ibid. 278 Ibid., 80-81. 141
This demonstrates that in the process of articulating his doctrine of justification, which was rooted in his christocentric hermeneutic, against the modernistic attacks on such things as the unity of Scriptures, Bohl at the same time presents a radically different understanding of history against all naturalistic and evolutionistic tendencies of science and theology. His conception of history is not linear but concentric; it is not horizontal but rooted in and carried by the vertical dimension, which finds its anchor in the heavenlies, in eternity. By its very nature, as grounded in his hermeneutic of Scripture, history itself is metaphysically rooted and oriented.
Intermezzo: Bohl's Conception of History
Bohl's conception of history as rooted in his metaphysics cuts deep into the modern conception of the human being as developmental or evolutionary. To be sure, through the concentric circles there runs a line of historical promise and fulfillment from the beginning of history to its end, but the force and the spring for this trajectory of history, with the human being in it as the only upright being created with his or her face towards heaven, lies above the physical world in eternity, in God Himself, who propels it forward to its—to His—own end. Without this 'above' the physical world and its history are nothing, and will return to nothing; that is, after the fall, it is sin (it misses the mark of its existence, i.e., God Himself and His glory), and it will finally be judged accordingly by and under God, from whom, through whom, and to whom are all things.
This conception itself deserves some particular attention, especially for our postmodern world, in which the human being has become 'history-less,' as the modernistic horizontal and optimistic evolutionary conception is on the verge of collapse. 142
It also deserves attention in that the human being has become 'center-less,' except to seek the center in the self in a solipsistic and narcissistic way that precludes the possibility of real communion and communication, that is, of having another over against the self in whom unity and truth—yes, the sense of history and the self—is to be found, carried about, and propelled from without.
In light of this critique by Bohl, we may observe that modern historical criticism of the Scriptures has precisely contributed to the deconstruction of a sense of grounded historicity, identity, and unity in the West by fragmenting the Word; that is, the
Scriptures, which is, as we see here Bohl articulating, metaphysically grounded in the unity and truth of its eternal center, the righteousness and the life of God, Christ, and the
Spirit. A further investigation into the relationship between historical criticism—with its deconstructive effects on what once was the book of books in the West, the Scriptures— and the consequent loss of a real extra nos metaphysical orientation, the fragmentation of reality, and the loss of the possibility of communication, of history, and of a sense of a unified identity of the self (the postmodern one is by and large narcissistic and nihilistic) goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, I suggest that Bohl's conception as here articulated could be fruitful in such a comparison and, in fact, could be helpful in finding an answer to the existential situation the postmodern human being finds himself or herself in.279
Bohl's answer must be understood more from within the context of the law, sin and the righteousness of God in Christ and grace. It is important to note again that for Bohl, righteousness, as the central aspect of the lost image of God, is not only an ethical concept, but also includes a spiritual dimension. The righteousness of God, wherein the ungodly is justified before God in Christ, was also the human being's original context for living; that is, the element in which the human being found his or her identity and life. 143
Returning to Bohl's Biblical-Dogmatic Articulation of Justification
Throughout his articulation of the doctrine of justification, Bohl continues to consistently combat two extremes: the Osianderian/pantheistic tendency to infuse the essential righteousness of the Triune God Himself by way of His Word in a unio personalis, and the Pelagian/Deistic tendency to leave the human being in history walking 'parallel' to a
God without being carried by Him but being left more or less to his or her own devices for moralistic or ethical purposes. Essentially, the latter is a denial of the living Triune
God that is often grounded in a denial of the total depravity of the human being, as it is coupled with a Pelagian tendency to assert and maintain a free will. Into these two camps
Bohl continually divides his opponents, proposing the Reformed middle way of walking and being established by faith in Christ, that is, in His righteousness as an alien imputed righteousness.
In his defense of the doctrine of justification, also in this chapter of his book on justification, Bohl relies heavily on the Apology of the Augsburg confession written by
Melanchton in his struggle with Osiander and the Roman Catholic Church. Bohl's own aim is to maintain the ontological distinction between Creator and creature also in the realm of soteriology, that is, to maintain God as Triune God, as ontologically distinct from His creatures, yet economically present, as from Him, through Him, and to Him are all things. According to Bohl, in the realm of soteriology this must continually be defended as well, falling neither into the Deistic nor the mystic, pantheistic extremes. In
See the above discussion of B6hl"s "sphere" theology. Bohl himself works this out in nuce in his, Allgemeine Pddagogik (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1872). 280 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 81. 144 salvation, quoting Melanchton, "Deus se parabaliter adest nobis, ut in domicilia separabili—God dwells in us but continues separate from us, even as the Holy Ghost dwells in us but remains separate from us." From Melanchton and other Reformed authors, Bohl writes, "we learn the two tendencies to be rejected as to the problem in hand. On the one hand, we must reject the pantheistic flowing together of the Divine and the human nature, and on the other the Pelagian separation of God and man."282 He says:
"Orthodoxy goes the middle way between these two standpoints."283
For Bohl, Adam, not Christ, is the historical figure who best exemplifies how God deals with and saves human beings. "In paradise we are concerned with God the judge, with the sinner, and with the divine declaration: the latter is creative and also specifies the cause of his proceedings, the cause being the merits of Christ, the seed of the woman
(Gen. 3:15)."284 Quoting Melanchton again, he says, "The Logos speaking directly to
Adam utters the audible word without and imparts knowledge within and shows the
Father, and through the Logos the Holy Spirit is given into Adam's heart; thereby he is comforted; he feels revived and knows that he has been freed from death."285
For Bohl, this dealing of God with sinners does not imply an infusion of new substances or a renewal of certain qualities. As Adam and Eve were sent out of paradise,
281 Melanchton as quoted by Bohl in ibid., 38. 282 Ibid., 82. 283 Bohl, Von Rechtfertigung, 73. 284 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 84. The fact that Bohl stresses Adam as a historical figure is of utmost importance here. If Adam is not a historical figure, he cannot function as the real biblical prototype of how God deals with historical beings to this day. He who denies this historicity under God denies the historicity of God's dealings with fallen sinners. Religion becomes an idea, or simply a mystic reality, as in the case of the pantheism of Spinoza and religious mysticism, respectively, or merely a motive for ethical behavior, as is the case with many Deists. 285 Melanchton, quoted in Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 82. 145 comforted with the Spirit and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ by faith in the promised seed and covered with new clothes made from animal skins (the first historical lamb slaughtered), they were to live by faith alone, amidst the contraries of their actual situation of sin, afflictions, blood, tears, and death. B6hl concludes his specific discussion of Adam as a 'prototype' of and for the doctrine of justification of the ungodly (Rom 4:5) by saying, "The imputation of an alien righteousness is the only safeguard against pride and is the mean between two extremes, pantheism and Pelagianism, just as the thesis of the creation out of nothing pursues the golden mean between pantheism and dualism."286
In the rest of the first chapter on the law, Bohl points to biblical examples that continually demonstrate that God deals directly with the human being in a way that satisfies and answers to God Himself, that is, to God's own freedom, sovereignty, righteousness, holiness, majesty, and grace and that satisfies and answers the need of the human being as fallen sinner. With all these examples as reinforcement, the concept and reality of standing before the tribunal of God is a recurring theme. The clearest example of this is Joshua in Zechariah 3. "The pardon or justification of the sinner before the tribunal of God (vs. 3, 4), the clothing of Joshua with the garments of salvation (vs. 4, 5) following; the certainty of perseverance and the victory (vs. 6, 8)—all this is founded upon the righteousness of God—upon 'For' in verse 8: 'For behold, I will bring forth my servant, the Branch, [the Messiah].'"287 So all God's children, like Job, face the Divine tribunal in the course of their lifetimes,288 to be condemned and pardoned and declared righteous because of the person and work of the Messiah, the Mediator, Jesus Christ. This
l*b Ibid., 84. 287 Ibid., 85. 288 Ibid. 146 judgment seat remains erected, as God is always both righteous and holy, loving and gracious, and as even the Christian always remains totally sinner (Rom 7:14) and saved at the same time. The final cautionary word here is that one must not be led away from the
Mediator to the self or the World.289
Again, up to this point, Bohl has been minimally critical of his contemporary
Ritschl. In fact, he refers to him positively, welcoming Ritschl's advice to turn to Luther's
Larger Catechism to correct mystical and Pietistic tendencies in Christian theology. In particular, what is important in this advice with which Bohl concurs is that Ritschl refers to Luther's claim that justification is experienced in the womb of the church. "This congregation is the mother—she gives birth to each and every Christian and nourishes him with the Word."290 In other words, it is the church that is first in order "and not a
Pietistical gathering of souls followed by organizing conventicles."291 Bohl concurs with these Ritschlian observations by stating that this indeed was so from the beginning. The family of Adam came first, in which the parents worked hard and exercised discipline
See ibid., 86. Bohl again follows Melanchton's Apology for the Augsburg Confession closely. This feature is to be noted throughout his book on justification. His historical treatment of the doctrine of justification is, in fact, divided into the time up to Melanchton and the time after his death. Melanchton is presented, thus, as a hinge figure within the history of the doctrine of justification. In the same spirit as Melanchton, Bohl's articulation of the doctrine of justification is also an apology for this doctrine, using in particular the same ground-concept of justification as declaration and the imputation of an alien righteousness, all founded principally on the work of Christ. One could legitimately ask whether Bohl is more a defender of the Lutheran Melanchton and his articulation of justification than of specific Reformed theology in the spirit of Calvin. It is a curious fact that Calvin does not function prominently in Bohl's book at all. Bohl prefers Melanchton's defense of the doctrine of justification against Osiander over that of Calvin's defense of the same in the Institutes. See Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 57-58. 290 Ibid., 86. 291 Ibid., 89. 147
and taught their children to offer sacrifices (likewise Noah, etc.).292 This is a scarlet cord
throughout the Scriptures. So has the doctrine of justification (by the sacrifice) "been
active from the beginning,"293 that is, in and through the church family.
I must elaborate on this positive statement of Bohl in regard to Ritschl's
articulation of the doctrine of justification. Kuipers, in his dissertation on Ritschl,
remarks that this is the principle Ritschl had found in his Vorarbeit for his doctrine of justification,294 namely "that not the individual but the Christian congregation in her
totality is the object of justification."295 This was the 'arsenal' with which Ritschl went to
describe the history of the doctrine of justification, as we have pointed out under the
heading 'Ritschl as Further Reformer' above. This became the litmus test whereby he
began to measure all possible Christian directions and stood against pure rationalists,
mystics, and Pietists "with their direct personal consciousness of salvation."296 And with
this gained insight Ritschl began to write his first dogmatic work, the history of the
doctrine of justification as the polemical side of his later-developed biblical and
theological articulation of the doctrine of justification.
As I have observed in the first chapter about Ritschl as further Reformer,
positioning his theology within the regenerate community was the 'weapon' wherewith he
sought to eliminate all metaphysical speculation from Christian theology. Precisely this
'discovery' during his Vorarbeit enabled Ritschl to critique metaphysics and Pietism:
292 Ibid., 87. 293 Ibid., 86. 294 With this Vorarbeit Kuipers points to the articles Ritschl wrote under the title, "Geschichtliche Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott" in 1868. 295 Kuipers, 17. 296 Ibid. 297 Ibid. 148
large philosophical preconceptions and individual Pietism, which both often ended up
either in pantheism or mysticism, that is, the church as object of the verdict of
justification in its totality, became the vehicle to replace both.298
When we see the importance of this insight for Ritschl, it is curious to see Bohl
applaud it and integrate it into his biblical postulates for his doctrine of justification.
Again, I observe that Bohl is not shy here about using positive elements of the theology
of Ritschl for his own polemical purposes. Bohl also saw as problematic the pantheistic
and mystic tendencies that had crept into the doctrine of justification. They shared in this
regard a common front. I think that it is from this point of view that we need to view
Bohl's use of Pvitschl's biblical and theological insights. Bohl proves in this regard to be
an eclectic theologian.
The question, however, is, how can Bohl seem to be such an eclectic theologian,
and still remain consistent with his own presentation, principles, and polemics? Or is
Bohl's interpretation of Ritschl perhaps deficient or simply too selective for his own purposes and therefore a hindrance to his doing justice to Ritschl? Perhaps one could
argue that precisely because of the principal thought of Ritschl's system being that his point of departure is the church and not the individual, Ritschl cannot be called a
In my treatment of Pvitschl's doctrine of justification I will need to come back to this important issue. For now it is sufficient to raise some questions in light of Bohl's positive evaluation of this insight, questions which turn out to be fundamentally important for the whole polemical and positive side of Pvitschl's presentation and the presuppositions of his theological system. Here again we stand before the question whether Ritschl was first a Kantian or neo-Kantian philosopher a priori and so sought help for Kant's anti-metaphysical approach in the history of the church with this concept of the church being the primary object of reconciliation and justification, or was he first and foremost a biblical and church historian and merely used Kant and/or neo-Kantian themes as help or verification of the truth he found in his biblical and historical studies? 149
Socinian. These will be some of the questions that will continue to occupy this research in comparing these two theologians.
Returning to Bohl specifically, we note that an essential aspect of Bohl's biblical doctrine of justification is his defense of the justification of the ungodly (Rom 4:5). This doctrine in principle, according to Bohl, forbids one to think of justification in terms of infusion of an essential righteousness or new qualities into the human being. Even believers remain ungodly in themselves. The Old Testament example Paul uses in Rom
4:5 is Abraham. B6hl comments, "In Abraham's history every thought as to the infusion of new qualities must be rejected—God justifies the ungodly (Rom 4:5), that is, He has so accepted him as if he himself has achieved the perfect righteousness, which, however, no one, but Abraham's Seed, in whom all the nations are blessed, had presented and should present to God."299 Thus, as far as humans are concerned, all is simply the word of imputation and stays the word of imputation as object of a naked faith. So it was in the
Old Testament with Abraham, and so it was with the children of Abraham: "Israel is born and becomes an holy nation unto the Lord: all by imputation."300 And so it is still with
God's children, with Abraham the father of all believers.
On the Historical Books
In his treatment of the historical books, Bohl follows the same thought patterns as established in his treatment of the law and the prophets. The historical figures in such books as Judges are treated as types of Christ and prototypes of God's justification of the ungodly. In this section Bohl delineates his biblical theology, as already expressed in
299 B6hl, The Reformed Doctrine, 90. 150 principle in his early work, Christologie des Alten Testamentes and already considered in previous chapters of this research in some detail. Therefore, we will consider only certain important points found in this section, which are significant for the rest of this chapter and what follows.
Bohl's doctrine of justification rejects the idea that the union with Christ, unio mystica, implies a mingling of substances or of an infusion of essential righteousness.301
In contrast with such an understanding of the union with Christ, Bohl emphasizes that the union with Christ only happens perfidem spiritualer.
Another theological conviction based on his treatment oflheiiistorical books of the Bible is the assertion that "justification and regeneration are synchronous—both proceed from the divine act, after the measure of an alien righteousness (signified in the promise). Abraham was called ungodly when God justified him (Rom 4:5), and
Jerusalem lay without helper ... when God spoke, 'In thy blood, live' (Ezekiel 15:6)."303
In the forgiveness of sins, because of the blood of the Lamb, one received new life in the
Old Testament and not before justification by the forgiveness of sins. Outside the sacrifice of the Lamb there was no life.
im Ibid., 105. 302 Ibid. I will need to return to this in light of the fact that Ritschl also stresses that the unio mystica ought not to be understood in a substantial way, i.e., in terms of a mixing of substances or infusion of qualities; rather, he considers it in terms of his understanding of the centrality of the church as a whole, as object of the verdict of justification. In his discussion of Osiander and Calvin, Ritschl states, "For Calvin's unio mystica indicates the individual's membership in the Church as the condition under which he becomes conscious within himself of justification through Christ's obedience." Albert Ritschl, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872) 233. See also page 192, where he defends this interpretation with regard to Calvin. 303 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 104. 151
We will see how this biblical postulate will be foundational for Bohl in his critique of later Calvinistic and Lutheran orthodoxy, which placed regeneration (life) before justification or forgiveness of sins and thus introduced a substantial or qualitative change in the human being before justification. On account of the latter, justification had become an analytic verdict rather than a synthetic judgment of God. Justification had remained justification not of the ungodly but of the believer, of the regenerated one, who already had life (in whatever way this was expressed) before forgiveness of sins, before his or her spiritual union with Christ by faith. We will expand more on this in the following chapter.
Thus we observe that in this middle section of Bohl's book he only sparingly refers to or opposes Ritschl, even though the book is a critique of Ritschl. This is surprising, for in this section Bohl deals with the biblical postulates and the basic aspect of his doctrine of justification, as Ritschl had done also in his second volume of his magnum opus. This is either explained by a lack of knowledge of Ritschl's biblical underpinnings of his doctrine of justification or as a misjudgment on the part of Bohl, who did not recognize that the second book of Ritschl's magnum opus was also a pivotal hinge for the articulation of his own doctrine of justification. As well, Bohl may have accepted Ritschl here. Or finally, perhaps Bohl saw Ritschl not as primarily a biblical theologian but as a systematic, perhaps even philosophical, theologian, and therefore decided to critique him more in that area of concentration.
To answer these latter questions we will first need to take a closer look at Ritschl's doctrine of the word of God, his hermeneutic, and, based on that, his biblical articulation of the doctrine of justification; then we will see how Bohl deals with Ritschl in the 152 historical and systematic theological sections of his book, The Reformed Doctrine of
Justification.
However, before finishing Bohl's treatment of the Old Testament, I need to note a final observation with regard to his critique of Ritschl. In the last part of this section of his book, Bohl does in fact allude to a substantial disagreement between himself and
Ritschl. Bohl expresses that he does not share Ritschl's fundamental conviction that the consequence of justification consists of ruling over this world.304 Bohl does not share the ethical or this-worldly thrust of Ritschl's doctrine of justification. Against Ritschl, for whom the effect of justification ought to be primarily this-worldly, Bohl seeks to reckon with the eternal judgment of the Triune God and His Word and work. For him, the doctrine of justification ought to guide the believer into a proper use of the created world, not a present ruling over the world305 as the coming of God's Kingdom. This does not slight the importance of ethics and the kingdom of God but seeks to relate these notions directly to the Triune God and to the concrete place for which God created us. The present is not to be sacrificed for the sake of the future but is to be used as directed by
God's Word, power, and Spirit. Precisely in this way the human being and history are acknowledged for what they are and so preserved under God until the final day.
This difference between Bohl and Ritschl is fundamentally important, as it touches upon the reason and the effect of justification. In general, we can observe that
Bohl remains theocentrically oriented, whereas Ritschl's orientation becomes anthropocentric. Ritschl's doctrine of justification avoids a change of God towards humans but involves a change of humans towards God and thus leads to the
304 Ibid., 117. 305 Ibid. 153
establishment of God's kingdom in an ethical sense. Thus, humans are called upon to be
ethical and moral catalysts of change for the establishment of the kingdom of God here
below. Perhaps his theology cannot escape the tendency of being reduced to ethics. In
Bohl's theology, God is acknowledged and called upon as the 'catalyst' for change in
primarily a relational-spiritual way. Ethics means here knowing one's place and situation
and acting accordingly as informed and guided by God's Word and Spirit. Ethics remains
God centered and God dependent. However, here too, flesh never will be transformed
into Spirit, and the present world never into God's Kingdom as promised in Revelation:
only faith counts here. With this last observation, Bohl closes his discussion of the Old
Testament.
On the New Testament: the Gospels and the Letter of Paul to the Romans
Bohl begins his discussion of the New Testament with the gospels. He states that here he
can be brief, since it is not his intention to insert "a complete biblical theology."306 He
thereby indicates that this middle section of his work on justification is essentially an
articulation of his biblical theology as foundation for his positive expression of justification.
The New Testament: The Gospels
His treatment of the New Testament is indeed brief. He simply states that here too the
ground principle is imputation, as already learned from the Old Testament. In the New
Testament the sacrifices of the Old Testament, as basis for the verdict of the imputation
306 Ibid. 154
of the righteousness of Christ, are accomplished by the Lamb of God for the forgiveness
of sins and for the gift of the Holy Spirit. Again here Bohl continues to underline that this
has nothing to do with infusion of substances or new qualities. "With respect to the
sacrificial death of Christ, the question does not relate to an imparting of real
righteousness or an infusion of new life but merely of the acceptance of a sinner as
righteous in virtue of the shed blood of Christ, who is the antitype of all sacrifices .. .per
imputationem."307 Again Bohl continues to underline that forgiveness of sins is
synchronous with justification and regeneration, "as forgiveness of sins is accompanied
by the donatio Spiritus Sancti."30S First the tree must be good, then the fruit will follow.
In this way the religious and the ethical aspect of justification, also in relation to
regeneration and sanctification, are related to one another. The central event is the
donatio fidei as donatio Spiritus Sancti, which happens with the act of justification. So
regeneration and justification are related. To deny this effective simultaneity is to deny
the possibility and even the reality of ethics and one's active incorporation into the kingdom of God.
The Letter of Paul to the Romans
Lastly, Bohl turns to the letter of Paul to the Romans as a summary of the doctrines and teachings of the New Testament. Bohl hereby desires to show that the message of the Old and New Testaments must be regarded as one. There is not a specific theology of Peter or
James, but all speak the same truth. For that reason, even with respect to this letter, having already treated the Old Testament in detail, Bohl does not say anything essentially
307 Ibid., 118-119. 308 Ibid., 120. 155 new or different. Yet we would like to draw attention to several points stressed by Bohl in this last section, which will be important for the rest of this comparative research as well.
Bohl specifically states that he stands in the tradition of seeing the person and work of Christ for justification as substitutionary atonement. "Righteousness accordingly is the process according to which God forgives man's sins, but on such a basis where satisfaction is made to the justice of God by the Surety and Mediator—thus forgiveness of sins not without atonement. God is not gracious without ransom."309 In other words, the object of atonement is God first, then the human being. God's holy nature is answered, whereupon he can again be in relation with the human being by way of the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the giving of faith and the gift of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the ungodly.
As we will see, here Bohl opposes Ritschl, who understands reconciliation in terms of the Old Testament sacrifices and finally the sacrifice of Christ as 'covering.'
Ritschl begins with the idea that God had always already intended to be a gracious God.
The sacrifice is not to appease God's wrath but to express God's grace towards the sinner.310 The sacrifice for reconciliation of the human being as sinner is an expression, thus, of God's grace. By it the sinner was covered, protected from the wrath of God as being part of the covenant people of God. "In the O.T. Ritschl finds in this way the evidence that the apostolic understanding of the sacrifice of Christ never makes the connection between sacrifice and substitutionary punishment, or between sacrifice and
"Der religiose Begriff der Gabe an Gott welche durch die bekannte priestlichen Handlungen volzogen wird, hat mit einer StrafVollziehung nichts gemein." Ritschl, quoted in Kuipers, 59. 156 the appeasement of God's wrath, or between sacrifice and the covering of human sins."311
In this way, it is not God who is the object of and for reconciliation but the human being.
Reconciliation is an effect of God's grace towards the human being because of Christ.
How Ritschl expresses this I will demonstrate in the next chapter, in which we will consider his biblical exegesis as ground for his doctrine of justification and reconciliation. We observe that on the point of what reconciliation is Bohl and Ritschl differ fundamentally.
Bohl closes his discussion of the biblical-theological postulates for his doctrine of justification with a summary. In this section he returns to Ritschl more directly. Speaking of the justified remaining ungodly in themselves, even after justification, Bohl stresses that therefore a daily repentance is necessary: the Old Man daily needs to be "drowned and exterminated."312 He asks, "Is this done for mere pastime and was it peculiarly
Luther's way of salvation who passed through cruciatus conscientiae—an exceptional case which according to Ritschl's advice need not to be followed?"313 And why can and does Ritschl say this? Well, Bohl answers, because for him God's wrath is not such a serious matter, as the fullness of His grace quenches the flames of His wrath in accordance with His holiness; and holiness as attribute of God in the Old Testament is merely superseded by God's love in the New Testament. In contrast, Bohl says, the
311 Kuipers, 60. See the rest of Kuipers' dealing with Ritschl's exegesis of Old and New Testament in this regard. He observes that there Ritschl's exegesis evidences a certain randomness. The exegesis of the New Testament is strained at places, even to the point of a forced exegesis of certain texts, meddling with the verses at hand. Kuipers demonstrates this in footnote (a) on pages 60-61. As stated, I will deal with this in more detail in the next section. 312 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 130. Bohl refers to Luther here as the theologian Ritschl also sought to revive. 313 Ibid., 130. 157 sacrifices of the Old Testament and Christ as their fulfillment as the Lamb of God in the
New presuppose the constant need for reconciliation, and a sin-offering must be offered for sinners and their sins, who otherwise would have to be totally burned as unclean.314 A vicarious sacrifice is necessary for atonement. Therefore, Bohl continues, "Ritschl's perversion of sacrifices into their contrary meaning" is in vain. Ritschl's doctrine of justification is wrongly informed in terms of his doctrine of reconciliation, i.e., his Old
Testament doctrine of God and sacrifice.
314 Ibid. 315 Ibid.,131. 158
B. THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORD OF GOD IN THE THOUGHT OF RITSCHL
Some Introductory Comments
In this section I will present Ritschl's doctrine of justification and its biblical and dogmatic presuppositions. I will do this with particular reference to Ritschl's biblical and exegetical foundation for his doctrine of justification as expressed in the second volume of his magnum opus. This is one of the least researched areas of Ritschl's theology, yet it is central for my own comparative and evaluative analyses and conclusions, as it corresponds to Bohl's central and fundamental chapter of his doctrine of justification.
However, before I deal with Ritschl's doctrine of revelation and the biblical- theological postulates of his doctrine of justification, I need to answer some questions on
Ritschl's methodology, as I have done with respect to Bohl. In the process, it is important that the following questions be kept in mind: Was Ritschl primarily a biblical theologian or a systematic theologian (or perhaps can the two not be separated in his system)? Or was Ritschl so influenced by a particular philosophical approach that his exegesis and dogmatic presentation of the doctrine of justification were predetermined by these a priori considerations?
As I have pointed out, Bohl, in the middle section of his book on justification, which corresponds to the second volume of Ritschl's magnum opus, saw himself as presenting a biblical theology. Is this how we can evaluate Ritschl's second volume? The answer to this latter question is important for the purposes of comparison and evaluation of Bohl's critique of Ritschl. Were they doing the same thing, or are we comparing two different approaches from the start? 159
James Orr, in his book The Ritschlian Theology?16 very clearly takes the position that, according to his analysis of Ritschl's method, Ritschl's theology is predetermined by his philosophically influenced systematic viewpoint and principles of thought, i.e., those gleaned from both Immanuel Kant and the phenomenological philosophy of value judgments of Hermann Lotze. Others take the opposite point of view.317 However, to make such definite prejudgments about Ritschl's method and theology is not in the interest of my approach. Honouring my own 'nominalist' approach in this study, I will
"\ 1 ft James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1905). 317 James Orr observes, with respect to Ritschl's method, "The mere summation of exegetical results will not yield it [that is, the thoughts of Christ and His Apostles], any more than it can prove it when obtained. It can only be produced through a speculative effort, working on the material submitted to it, and the test of its validity must be thought not in its internal coherence, but in something beyond itself. The nerve of the theological method, therefore, now lies in the means by which this scientific validity of the Christian view of the world is established." Ibid., 54. Orr makes this observation in light of the recognition that Ritschl himself made, the claim that his theology obtained its foundation from the pure source of the revelation in Christ without mixing it with philosophy or natural theology. This is, however, a promise of Ritschl that is not fulfilled, observes Orr. See ibid., 53. The philosophical presuppositions of Kant and Lotze had left their mark on his theology to such an extent that they had become predeterminative of his exegesis. Ibid., 61. In fact, they "cut ... deeply into its vitals." Ibid., 56.1 simply note here again that my primary intention is an evaluation not of Ritschl's theology but of Bohl's interaction with Ritschl's theology and what we could glean from this interaction. I am not interested in providing another look at Ritschl and his school per se. To do so, it would be necessary to consult other secondary resource opinions, as, for example those of Alfred E. Garvie, who disagrees with Orr and his somewhat one-sided approach (186, 297, 342). On these pages Garvie points out that the thought of Ritschl and his intention is more nuanced and perhaps biblically and theologically positive than Orr leads the reader to believe. It is perhaps not even possible to take a definite stand on Ritschl's methodology, as Ritschl in several places merely considers philosophical viewpoints as aids for thinking in a particular way that need not influence the substance of the thoughts expressed at all. In fact, on p. 46 Garvie states almost the exact opposite conclusion to Orr's in light of his own critical analysis of Ritschl's methodology: "But it seems to the writer that we must not take too seriously Ritschl's claim to be guided by an epistemology of which he is fully conscious, and which he has fully justified to himself. What he does rather present to us is an empirical method in theology, for which he seeks justification in an epistemology with which it is brought into external connection, but with which it has no necessary relation." 160 first attempt to present Ritschl in his own right, and for that purpose use mainly primary resources and as few secondary resources as possible, thereby seeking to let him speak for himself as I have done with Bohl.
As for Bohl, so no less for Ritschl, the biblical foundations for his doctrine of justification were crucial. In Albrecht Ritschl and His School,31* Robert Mackintosh remarks that the second volume of Ritschl's magnum opus on justification and reconciliation, which deals with its biblical foundations, was "regarded by the author and by his son as the central stronghold. Hence it stands after the history of doctrine and before the positive theory as the supreme court of appeal."319 Therefore, for my purposes, as I seek to come to a comparative analysis of Bohl and Ritschl with respect to both their
Robert Mackintosh, Albrecht Ritschl and His School (London: Chapman and Hall, 1915). 319 Ibid., 102. It is a curious fact that, in spite of this claim by the author, this volume has never been translated into English. Also to be noted is that during his life as professor, Ritschl taught as a biblical—in particular, New Testament—scholar! One of his first major works, Die Entstehung der altkatholische Kirche (1857), is, in fact, a study of the development of the church, starting in the New Testament. In this study Ritschl is very conscious of the fact that the New Testament church and her thought-world cannot be separated from its foundations in the Old Testament. Mackintosh notes, "Ritschl stands upon the whole for the assertion of harmony between different types of Bible teaching. The master discovery of his career as a Bible student, announced in edition two of A. K. Kirche, dominates his work ever after—the need of interpreting the New Testament in light of the Old." Ibid., 102-103. This fact was much appreciated by Bohl, who was himself an Old Testamenticus by training and interest. One very important feature of this work, central for our comparison, is that Ritschl expresses agreement with the then-new hypothesis that the law was a later and higher development of the religion of Israel, promulgated by the exilic and post-exilic prophets (see ibid., 103). This will become extremely important in terms of our comparison, for Bohl, as a trained Old Testamenticus, disputes this hypothesis in Zum Gezets und Zum Zeugnis. This difference is also central to their eventual understanding of justification, as based on the grace and sacrifice theology of the Old Testament. Bohl articulates the necessity of the law as a priori, as necessary context for the gospel and the doctrine of justification. This is again reflected in his doctrine of God, who for him is both righteous and gracious (love). Ritschl rejects this necessity and biblical foundation together with all a priori "metaphysical" presuppositions; this rejection is also reflected in his doctrine of God, interpreting God to have primarily one overriding attribute, namely, love. 161 doctrines of revelation and the biblical presuppositions and foundations for their respective doctrines of justification as 'supreme court of appeal,' it is fitting that here we give a somewhat extensive treatment of Ritschl's expressed doctrine of the word of and his biblical foundations for the doctrine of justification.320
Ritschl's Doctrine of Revelation: His Prolegomena
Expressing the biblical foundations of justification in the introduction to volume 2 of
Ritschl's doctrine of justification and reconciliation, Ritschl first defines what dogmatic or positive theology is. For Ritschl, Christian theology finds its scientific foundations in the domain of its own interest, just like other particular sciences find their regulative principles in accordance with their own particular domain of interest, expertise, and purpose. As such, Christian theology is not first to be understood as a systematic historical discipline, a la Schleiermacher and Rothe, or a systematization of the doctrines of the church existing at a particular time. Ritschl, in fact, judges Schleiermacher to be utterly contradictory on this score: taking on the one hand the Christian doctrine of the
Referring to the general reception of Ritschl as primarily a systematic theologian, Lotz also notes this aspect of Ritschl's theology, that is, the biblical foundations for his doctrine of justification: "The great majority of interpreters have focused on the third volume of Justification and Reconciliation, the subtitle of which is The Positive Development of the Doctrine. Hence relatively little attention has been directed to the two foundational volumes of Ritschl's magnum opus: the critical-historical recounting of the doctrine's development since the Middle Ages (volume 1) and the critical-exegetical unfolding of the doctrine's biblical content (volume 2)." Lotz, "Ritschl in His Nineteenth Century Setting," in Ritschl in Retrospect: History, Community and Science, ed. Darell Jodock (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995) 11. Furthermore, Lotz notes that "this traditional approach to Ritschl is misleading, because it is much too narrow in scope." Ibid, 12. 321 Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre, vol. 2. One must thus start from the particular, without again first consulting or even presupposing a priori general or dominating metaphysical or ontological ground-structures (principia), which arise only from the desire to embrace all of reality in a system of thought, being, or ethics. 162
church at a particular juncture in history as his point of departure and reference point, and
on the other hand bringing his whole dogmatics in subservience to a pious religious
consciousness that itself presupposes a metaphysical worldview and a Pietistic doctrine
of salvation.322 For Ritschl, Christian theology is first and foremost to be grounded in
biblical revelation itself, thus becoming what the early fathers called Theologia
Positiva.
The important question for our purposes becomes, How is biblical revelation to
function as the norm or source for Christian theology for Ritschl? Is it first to be
determined by the church's doctrines, or by the church as such (Roman Catholicism), or
communal inspiration (Anabaptists), or human reason (Socinianism)? Has Ritschl fallen
into the temptation of placing the biblical and dogmatic question into such realms as that
of human rationality?
Traditionally the Protestant-Reformed answer was that the Scriptures must be
explained by the Scriptures themselves, and all that under the guidance of the Holy Spirit
who inspired the very words. Thus, as answer to this question, they would subscribe to
verbal inspiration and emphasize at the same time the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit.
However, Ritschl objects to this answer.
According to Ritschl, the doctrine of verbal inspiration as connected to the
doctrine of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit is too mechanical and does not do justice to the estimate of the self'as person, and that includes the biblical writers.
Experience presupposes a self, a movement of the self in terms of reception and
acknowledgement of revelation and experience of salvation. The traditional seventeenth-
322 Ibid., 4 323 Ibid., 2. 163 century Protestant answer, with its mechanical understanding of revelation, reduced the self, the 'I,' to an object of another power (the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit) and together with the notion of verbal inspiration threatened to subsume it under a mystical- mechanical system.324 It is therefore simply not useful, according to Ritschl. Furthermore, the idea of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit is also too nebulous for Christian theology as a specific domain with its own 'positive' scientific norms and result,325 not to speak of all those who make thereby the experience of the individual normative. Again, a loss of personhood would be the result.
Ritschl's rejection of the necessity of a doctrine of the inner testimony of the Holy
Spirit and his rejection of a doctrine of verbal inspiration lead us to interrupt our presentation of Ritschl's biblical presuppositions and his view of revelation for a moment and compare it with a section from Bohl's writings on Ritschl. Bohl writes,
Right here we are at the essential difference between Ritschl and orthodoxy. But the difference is evident at the very outset, [namely], at the definition of what constitutes revelation. Ritschl at the very beginning subjects God to the same standard according to which all other objects of cognition reach the understanding. This object or "the thing in itself [das Ding an sich] exists merely in its effects: accordingly God exists only in His peculiar revelation, which, however, is felt and recognized by us. We immediately challenge this position of Ritschl. The "object" indeed lives in its effects, but the personal being, God, goes beyond this and establishes relations between Himself and other personal beings. Here not merely does nature face nature, but person faces person—God facing the creature, created in His image. Here there is at the very beginning an intuition of God {anticipatio Deorum, Cicero) in the man prior to any effect; and the human soul is not the tabula rasa upon which the Divine effects (revelation) are inscribed, for without accepting such an anticipation of the gods, the effect (i.e., the revelation) would have no influence upon us. But to be sure, this anticipatio Deorum has nothing to do with the blending of the nature of God and believers, which Osiander assumes was present in Adam before his apostasy as a mingling of God and man. This led to
Ibid. 164
pantheism. But the same anticipatio Deorum is not to be defined with many modern theologians as the ability to know God and to voluntarily submit to his effects (revelations). This led to dualism (Deism). No, it is something quite extraordinary,—of a religious character, united to and dependent on the Word.326
To be noted is that Bohl does affirm a form of what Ritschl perhaps would call natural theology or a general creational 'metaphysic' with the notion of anticipatio Deorum. I discussed this aspect of Bohl's approach when I presented his thoughts on this matter as presented in his Prolegomena above. But for the sake of immediate comparison let me expand on that discussion here.
Bohl claims here that without such a notion, that is, of an anticipatio Deorum,
God's special revelation would simply hang in the air: it could neither meet a point of contact nor find a point of contact for real communication between God and the human being personally, historically, and face to face.
At the back of this functions an equally important presupposition of Bohl's, namely, that God is not only to be known in his effects, as Ritschl would have it, but that over, above, and beyond His historic word-revelation God is there as a real and distinct ontological subject, or better, as personal subject, affirming His own metaphysical existence. Against Ritschl, Bohl therefore exclaims, "Zuriick zur Metaphysik der
Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211-212. The beginning of this quote in the original German edition is as follows: "Wir stehen hier vor dem Kernpunkt der Differnz, die zwischen Ritschl und der Orthodoxie sich geltend macht. Die differenz aber zeichnet sich schon deutlich ab, wenn wir ins Haus entreten, bei der Beurtheilung dessen, was offenbarung sei." Bohl, Von der Rechtfertigung, 214 (my emphasis). In light of this observation and rejection of Bohl vis-a-vis Ritschl, Kwon's statement that Bohl's and Ritschl's understanding of the Word of God are comparable and dependent upon one another is unfounded. He writes, "Es steht ausser Zweifel dap Bohl von Ritschl's Bibelanschauung ausgeht und sich haupMg auf dessen Aussagen beruft." Kwon, 115. 165
Kirchenlehre [Back to the metaphysics of the doctrines of the Church]!"327 Why?
Precisely for what we find in this quote: to retain an objective, distinct, and personal referent, even of and for the historic word-revelation of God itself.
Summarizing the important polemical elements of this quote, we note that for
Bohl, if both the creational context of the anticipatio Deorum and the personal but distinct ontological Trinity are denied, revelation will simply be absorbed into history and be subjected to the judgment of the human subject first; thus revelation will be placed in the domain of human rationality. With this in mind, Bohl writes with respect to Ritschl that the latter ends up subjecting "God to the same standard according to which all other objects of cognition reach the understanding."328 The Word of God will become simply ineffective vis-a-vis the purpose for which it is given, namely, to judge and inform us, even with respect to the highest theoretical judgments concerning being itself.
For Bohl, both these notions, however, should be biblically informed so as not to again fall prey to the ever-present temptations of either a mystical or pantheistic mingling of the Creator and the creature or a dualistic Deistic reduction of theology to anthropology and ethics. In the reductionist camp Bohl places Ritschl, as Ritschl seeks
327 Bohl, Dogmatik, 73 (my emphasis). Bohl writes in another place, "diese Metaphysik hat dazu beigetragen, der Kirchenlehre das Leben zu erhalten, was auch die Ritschl'sche Schule dagegen sagen mag." Ibid., 65. 328 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211. 329 Ibid. "Das 'Ding-an-Sich' ist eine schones Ding, aber es hat 'keine Horner und Klauen, kein Bestehen, wenn es nicht in Worte kleiden La|3t. Und in Worte ist es gefafk—die heilige Schrift is voll von theoretische Urteilen iiber die hochsten Fragen des Daseins (zumal der Apostel Paulus)." Bohl, Dogmatik, 64. 330 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211. He writes on the nature of the anticipatio Deorum at the end of this quote: "But the same anticipatio Deorum is not to be defined with many modern theologians as the ability to know God and to voluntarily submit to his effects (revelations). This led to Dualism (Deism)," ibid., 211-212, which Bohl very 166 to make room not for a personal God who lives and speaks but primarily for the individual self as person and subject. In fact, the latter dynamic in Ritschl's theology is a cause for placing God's revelation in the realm of human rationality and its subsequent consequences in relation to the doctrine of justification and, at the back of that, the doctrine of the Triune God. The God who lives, speaks, and works is virtually denied a central place. In effect, human life in all its manifestations is robbed of a central, authoritative, and effective foundation and reference point for living and acting.
However, before evaluating Bohl's critique, as backed by my presentation of
Bohl's understanding of the character and nature of God's revelation and his understanding of inspiration, let me first return to Ritschl's positive exposition of his own doctrine or idea of the authority of revelation and his biblical presuppositions for his doctrine of justification in order to avoid any prejudiced or premature general conclusions.
How then does Ritschl affirm the authority of Scriptures for his own theology of revelation and the biblical foundations for his doctrine of justification?
In answer to this question, for Ritschl, what satisfies the desire to call the
Scriptures authoritative is the testimony of the first apostles (disciples) of Jesus Christ, that is, to His person and work as the founder of the Christian religion, as embodied in the early Christian communities and recorded in the New Testament. These apostles, in turn, stood in the tradition of the prophets of the Old Testament.331 In this context or with
nearly ascribes to Ritschl's position as he understands it. Here Bohl seems to simply interpret Ritschl as predetermined by his philosophical presuppositions. 331 Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 2:13-14. Mackintosh describes it as follows: "We must look to the first generation of the Church—apostles and apostolic men; men who also enjoyed a right understanding of the Old Testament presuppositions of the 167 this approach there is no need to talk of an infallible Bible, however, or of a verbally inspired Bible as foundation for Christian dogmatics, because for Ritschl even the apostles did not speak with one voice and were contradictory in their own writings.332
In contradistinction to Bohl, for Ritschl the Scriptures are therefore not sacra et totum uno. No, the historical tradition and ground ideas found in the Scriptures are in a certain way fluid; there is room for a continuity of interpretation of the doctrines and thoughts of the apostles. He does not claim that the Bible is not to be viewed as the primary source or the historic source as measure for theology; however, the present historic Christian community can complement a perspective for the purpose of systematic cohesion. Mackintosh writes, commenting on this issue, that Ritschl in effect says, "We cannot settle in advance just where the boundaries of authority are to be drawn. We can only decide that point when we have constructed our system."333
Behind this fluid nature of the authority of scriptures as source for dogmatic theology operates Ritschl's understanding of how to understand the nature of the writings of the authors of the Scriptures. Ritschl repeatedly emphasizes, in continuity with
Schleiermacher, that neither Jesus as the founder of Christianity nor the Apostles spoke and wrote as dogmatic theologians; they did so as religious persons.334 The Bible, therefore, presents the dogmatician with a multitude of religious thoughts that are, as
Gospel. These men of the first generation, in supplement to Christ and in due subordination to Him, have given us our norm in the New Testament... .the authority of Scripture is polemically absolute, the religious life itself is fed much more by the teaching of the living Church than by Scripture." Mackintosh, 110. 332 For example, Ritschl calls the idea of being partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4) simply a seeping in of a heathen-Christian idea of the highest good. Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 17 n.l. We will later see how Ritschl discovered an inconsistency in Paul's theology of law. 333 Mackintosh, 110-111. 334 See for example Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 22, 26. 168
such, sources and norms for theological concepts and constructs. These religious
thoughts are subject for the establishment of systematic connections to form a more or
less scientific system that searches out the necessary mutual relations between these
expressed religious thoughts.335 This is the task of the dogmatic theologian who stands in
the Christian church and so in continuity with the early church and Christ in his own time
and so theologizes for the church of his own time.
In light of these observations a clear line of demarcation between being a biblical
theologian and being a systematic theologian is, in fact, not to be found in Ritschl.336 This
is also seen by the fact that it was not Ritschl's intention that volumes 2 and 3 of his
Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation would be published separately. "Ritschl had
J" See Kuipers, 40. See also Gerard W. McCulloh, "A Historical Bible, A Reasonable Faith, A Conscientious Action: The Theological Legacy of Albrecht Ritschl" in Ritschl in Retrospect, ed. Darell Jodock, 31-41. On these pages McCulloh expresses the opinion that "the movement from biblical sources, critically received, to a reconstruction of the understanding of traditional Christian thought, and, finally, to the application of these ideas in a constructive statement of the Christian life in the midst of history appears to me to be consistent with Ritschl's own work in the preparation of his major work, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation." Ibid., 31. Furthermore, McCulloh notes, consistent with my thesis that the second volume, which presents Ritschl's dogmatic and biblical presuppositions for his doctrine of justification, is central: that "the biblical basis of the doctrine of justification and reconciliation occupied the second, pivotal volume of his study of systematic theology, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. The biblical materials constituted both a source and a regulative norm for further doctrinal statements." Ibid., 32. 336 Clive Marsh writes that for Ritschl, "studying the Bible theologically is already dogmatics, for the Bible provides the basic material to be reworked in the present. But the biblical material is not our theology, for it belongs to a past age." Clive Marsh, "Christocentricity and Community," in Ritschl in Retrospect, ed. Darell Jodock, 56. Marsh notes further that "Ritschl saw clearly that to construct a biblical theology one does not simply quarry material from the Bible and re-present it in uninterpreted fashion. Nor can one easily read off a single train of thought from the Biblical material and revise it for the present. The Bible contains, after all, different theologies. One needs justification for a particular approach to the biblical material, a filter through which to read and understand its content." Ibid., 55. Marsh proposes that Ritschl's interpretative keys are his christocentricity and community (church). 169 as plan to combine the [biblical and dogmatic] material in one volume, because according to his opinion it was one whole. However, because the volume would become too thick, he published the second volume in 1872, followed by the third volume in 1874."337 Thus, in general terms we can conclude that Ritschl was a historian of the Bible critically received, and in this way became at the same time a historical dogmatician, all the while honouring the Bible as the fundamental source for constructing normative theology in and for the church of his time.
As pointed out above, Ritschl's thoughts on Scripture thus permit him space to regard revelation as dynamic and therefore permit him to play, at times, fast and loose with what has been recorded, as he holds to no theory of inspiration as such, least of all to the idea of verbal inspiration, but he approaches the Scriptures historically and critically received. In other words, what is normative about the Scriptures could be supplemented by the living Christian community of the present. Thus Ritschl granted biblical students
jj/Kuipers, 18. 338 The question of presuppositions here is, of course, important. How did Ritschl approach his task as historical biblical dogmatician? Hefner, in his introduction to Ritschl's Three Essays, states very forthrightly, "In his decision against Hegelian metaphysical speculation, Ritschl relied upon the Kantian critique of metaphysics and the Kantian ethics and religious emphasis. Ritschl was sharply critical of Schleiermacher's romanticism and individualism, which he thought were pietistic in their consequences. But in his decision for Kant and his subsequent concentration on the ethical and religious self-consciousness of man, he found Schleiermacher's detailed and methodical discussion of that self-consciousness invaluable. In the long run, Ritschl linked his work to Schleiermacher's in both historical studies and in probing the dynamics of the religious consciousness, albeit modifying the latter with a Kantian concern for the will" 31. However, before I come to such a "dogmatic" conclusion, in remaining faithful to my "nominalist" approach, I will seek to delve into the primary and foundational resources. It remains to be seen whether his Kantian presuppositions and methodological procedure, as expressed in his Theology and Metaphysics, were predeterminative of all his work, or came more as a help for verification of the conclusions of his own historical investigations. If I am to honour Ritschl as an independent historical biblical dogmatician, it is incumbent upon me to take the latter approach as preferable. 170 like himself certain room to contribute in an important way to the normativity of revelation, as to what it says or ought to say. (Certainly, to do so one must be part of the
Christian community.) This, then, is precisely what we see Ritschl doing in his second volume on the doctrine of justification and reconciliation, as it seeks to present its biblical basic ideas and religious thoughts in a systematic and cohesive manner. Let me therefore turn to this volume and unearth Ritschl's approach to revelation and the systematic basic ideas or doctrines. In so doing, I will also consult his previously written work, Die
Entstehung der Altkatholischen Kirche (1857), in which Ritschl had already presented his understanding and exegesis of biblical concepts like Christ and the Mosaic law, Paul's doctrines, sin, faith, righteousness, life, and walk in the Holy Spirit.
The Biblical Postulates of Ritschl's Doctrine of Justification: Sacrifice, the Christian
Community, and Christ
Following his friend Thikotter, who suggested that nothing in the New Testament is normative unless it finds its grounding in the piety and doctrine of the Old Testament,
Ritschl begins his treatment of the biblical foundations for his doctrine of justification with the self-understanding of Jesus in connection with the notion of forgivenness of sin as found in the New Testament as contextually conditioned by the Old Testament.
To begin with, Ritschl describes Jesus as the Proclaimer, the Herald of the reign of God, the kingdom of God. As such, in fact, Jesus can be characterized as an Old
Testament Jewish prophet proclaiming the fulfillment of the covenant of God with His people, namely, that with Him, God's reign has come near.339 This must not, however, be
Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 27-28. 171
confused with political deliverance or literal earthly reign. The way to enter into and under the reign of God is by way of repentance, forgiveness, and salvation, that is, repentance from sin, which means acceptance into the presence of God, who is the ruler of a spiritual and ethical kingdom. Ultimately, Jesus' task was to perfect ethical and spiritual teaching (Matt 5:17). Yet that is not all.
The reign of God is always a reign of grace. In this context, Ritschl pays the fullest attention to Jesus as founder and fulfiller of His task to inaugurate this reign of grace as corresponding to the will of His Father. In the end the fulfilling of this vocation would cost Him His life,340 and it is precisely His death that is of utmost significance for the forgiveness of the sins of His people and their entrance into the reign of God.
As Christ proclaimed that he came to serve (Mark 10:45), He spoke of himself and the significance of His own death to His disciples during the last supper (Mark
14:24).341 In congruence with one of Ritschl's basic principles of interpretations, this is to be interpreted in the context of the Old Testament, that is, from the idea of the passover and from the whole ceremonial law concerning the sacrifices in connection with the thought of the forgiveness of sins. How Ritschl understands forgiveness of sins in light of Jesus and the Old Testament sacrificial and ceremonial law is basic for understanding his doctrine of justification.
For Ritschl, sacrifice as the way for the forgiveness of sins must always be interpreted positively. It is by way of sacrifice, that is, by God's institution of it that God desired to continue his interaction of grace and love with His people whom He had called
Ibid., 41-42. Ibid., 42-43. 172
out?47. Thus the graciousness and faithfulness of God, who will remain faithful to his own
name and covenant, is to be seen as the conditioning background of sacrifice as a means
for the forgiveness of sins and a return of the people into his presence.344
I must note that with this interpretation of the meaning and function of sacrifice,
Ritschl proposes a relatively new way of understanding the whole Old Testament
sacrificial system, which was instituted for the forgiveness of sins (justification) and the
reconciliation of the people with God Himself. When Ritschl portrays Jesus in the New
Testament not as a political liberator but primarily as a religious-spiritual liberator by
way of His sacrifice for the demonstration and the realization of the grace and the pouring out of God's love, Ritschl in fact, cuts the ground from under the feet of those
who still think about His sacrifice in terms of a ransom payment to God or vicarious
'payment' for His people. As if Christ had come to deliver His own people from the wrath
of God because of sins, wrath that God their Father had brought upon His people!345 With
the rejection of ransom payment or vicarious action on the part of Christ, we have, in
fact, come to Ritschl's own particular but central conviction of how to understand
sacrifice through which forgiveness of sins is brought about and communion with a
gracious God restored.
Writing from this point of view, Ritschl, in the context of the Old Testament with
respect to Jesus' sacrifice and death on the cross, rejects or eliminates the thought of
vicarious suffering at all points throughout his exegesis. He also thereby rejects the idea
343 Ibid., 52-53. 344 Ritschl makes the connection with the parable of the tax collector and the Pharisee, as told by Jesus himself. The tax collector goes home justified, as he confesses his sin, counting on a gracious God. Ibid., 59. 345 Ibid., 60-61. See, Ritschl, Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche, Dutch translation, Het Ontstaan der Oud-Katholieke Kerk (2nd expanded edition), 86-90. 173 of substitutionary atonement. For example, Ritschl interprets a passage such as Isaiah 53, which speaks of the suffering servant, traditionally referred to as Jesus' vicarious suffering and as such also quoted in Acts 7:35 and the passion narratives of Luke and
Mark, as being about some royal sufferer in the past who because of his covenant faithfulness suffered at the hands of the people. This is not suffering in the place of or under the weight of another's sin but suffering because of doing good, because of fulfilling the will of God the Father. For Ritschl, the connection between Christ and the suffering servant of Isaiah is at most hypothetical, if not completely historically and theologically unwarranted.346
It is not surprising then that Ritschl spent a great deal of energy on Mark 10:45, where Jesus Himself proclaims, "For the Son of man did not come to be served, but to serve and to give his life a ransom for many" (see also Matt 20:28). Going back to the
Hebrew background of the word ransom, which normally includes the idea of payment on behalf of someone or for someone who has incurred a debt (sin), Ritschl notes that it is better understood as 'covering' (Prov 6:35, Exod 21:30, 30:12, Ps 49, Job 33).347 This idea of covering corresponds with what we find in Ps 49:8 and Job 33, namely, with the idea of a 'gift to God' and not to the devil. Jesus must be understood as indicating that He will give Himself to God, that is, in His service and faithfulness to Him. This does not imply at all that He gives Himself over to God and suffers under the power of imputed sin, a notion fundamental for Bohl and his doctrine of the incarnation, nor does it imply that He gives Himself over as an act of vicarious suffering to the devil. He as the only One who could do this gives Himself to God as a death-destroying gift for others, even though he
346 Ibid., 62-63, 66. 347 Ibid., 70. Translated from the German word, Deckung. 174 was not personally liable (Job 33:24). The purpose was to deliver His church from the fear of death. Jesus thus is said to explain in Mark 10:45 that His service that will culminate in a gift to God will have as effect, because of its worth before God, that God will protect others from ultimate death and separation from Himself.349 Jesus' task thus was to deliver His people from death and the fear of death, unto life under the reign of
His Father, not from sin and the condemnation of the law, as in the theology of Bohl.
For Ritschl, therefore, Jesus is not to be understood as a vicarious liberator but a liberator of the members of the community of saints, the church, from death. He is not to be viewed as one who pays for the sins of others or as one who satisfies the justice of
God with his death as payment for sins. No, simply because of his willing faithfulness unto death Jesus is to be understood as a gift to God and a covering for His people and
God, and because of the worth of His death He will deliver His church from the fear of death and will give them life in communion with Himself. The category of sin is simply to be understood as a negation or the negative of what is meant positively with the gift of life, all the while under the presupposition of the one and ultimate gracious and loving character of God towards his church.
On this point, that is, of judgment, sin, and death, Ritschl is not afraid to disagree with Paul when the latter, in Rom 5, sees death as the consequence of sin. For Ritschl to accept this connection would mean to accept a relation of Christ's death to the moral law and thus to be obliged to underwrite some kind of legal penal system contrary to his theological vision. Therefore, Ritschl writes, "Certainly Paul traced the validity of the
1U1U., KJ~>. Ibid., 85. 175 universal destiny of death to the sin of Adam. Nevertheless, just for this reason, that the apostle has formed this idea, it is not yet suited to be a theological rule."350
A question, of course, remains as to what the justice or the righteousness of God and His expressed holiness mean. And connected to that, what about the law of God?
This was a central question in the theology of Bohl. Does Ritschl consider only the ceremonial law, that is, the cult and all that was expressed around it in terms of sacrifice, which Christ fulfilled as sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins and reconciliation, of primary importance? For answers to these fundamental questions we must turn to
Ritschl's treatment of the attributes of God in relation to justification.
The Centrality of the Doctrine of God
Ritschl addresses the issue of God's holiness, righteousness, and love in relation to the doctrine of justification by treating God and His attributes in the second chapter of the second volume of his Dogmatics.
Before we deal with the attributes in particular, it must first be noted that Ritschl does recognize the centrality of the doctrine of God to all of theology, even affirming that this doctrine controls theology to a great extent.351 However, Ritschl insists, it ought not to control theology in the way it did during the Middle Ages—that is casually or
350 Ritschl, as quoted in Garvie, 213. Besides the theological implications of this disagreement with Paul, it again shows that Ritschl in his exegesis seems to play fast and loose with the text of the Bible. To this effect, O. Pfleiderer states, "But I miss in it one thing, which I certainly hold as indispensable condition of every sound exegesis, the unbiased objectivity which, without squinting to right or left, looks simply on the text and allows the biblical writers to say what their words according to the plain grammatical sense are intended to express. Ritschl's exegesis stands throughout in the service of his dogmatics, he twists and trifles at the passages of Scripture so long, until they yield a result which fits his purpose." Quoted in Garvie, 214. 351 Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 89. 176 arbitrarily—for that would mean separating God from the God we find in the Bible.
Therefore, Ritschl guards himself against speaking about God in a priori terms.
According to Ritschl, we are simply to accept what we know about God on the basis of the historical facts of revelation, that is, on the basis of His effects.
We read that God was pleased to make a covenant with His people. This determines the Old Testament religion, according to Ritschl. The New Testament follows subsequently with God revealing Himself as the Father of the saved ones in Christ's kingdom. Essentially, and this is important for seeing the groundedness of the New
Testament in the Old Testament, we have the same notion of God in both Old and New
Testaments: God has a positive concern for the history of His world.
Holiness
With respect to God's attributes, for Ritschl it is unavoidable to see the attribute of holiness as looming large in the background of all the other attributes, particularly in the
Old Testament. God by his power and greatness desired to protect His holy name, which
He had attached to the people of Israel, against its defilement by other nations and by those unfaithful in Israel itself. Furthermore, for Ritschl, holiness must be understood in the context of cultic cleanliness or uncleanness. And finally, holiness must be brought into connection directly—not with sin, but above all with unfaithfulness and distrust in the goodness of God. Therefore, for example, according to Ritschl, God may be shown to be angry in his holiness, but that must be understood as anger against the unfaithful and those who distrust His grace and goodness. Holiness is thus ultimately positive
See Mackintosh, 115. 177
protection of His own holy name and the gracious elected status of the children of Israel.
And so, in the light of His holiness, the people discover their weakness, while in His
grace God desires to redeem and care for His covenant people, elected in mercy and love.
Holiness and grace, are, in fact to be seen as the central attributes of God on account of which he desires and can have a relationship with His people, as all the while holiness is
to be understood as the expression of His desire to protect His holy name and the
Israelites against themselves/or the acceptance of His grace.
In contrast to the Old Testament, in the New Testament it is love, not holiness, that furnishes the overarching background of God's relationship with His church: His
creative will of love as revealed in His Son Jesus Christ (who stood and remained in His
abiding love, resulting in His suffering and death for His people). This is in fact so much
the case that in the New Testament God's will as love cancels out the prevailing thought
of God's holiness of the Old Testament. The few times that holiness is mentioned in the
New Testament are negligible and simply not substantively determinative, according to
Ritschl.354
Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 89-96. Ibid., 101. 178
Righteousness
When speaking of the attribute of righteousness, Ritschl, in accordance with his high view of the importance of the Old Testament, begins his discussion about this attribute of
God by looking at the Old Testament first. Here Ritschl recognizes that generally orthodox theologians acknowledged that God saves out of love, but traditionally they have added a juridical framework in the context of which righteousness and the person and work of Christ began to be understood. That is, however, not warranted, according to
Ritschl.
Ritschl notes that righteousness according to the orthodox system is the expression of God's law and at the same time the measure in the light of which the acts of the human being ought to be judged. Since the entrance of sin into the world through the human being, God is obliged to respond with punishment, as principally His honour is denied by sin against Him. Reconciliation takes place only when Christ takes upon
Himself the punishment in the place of His people, whereby the righteousness of God is satisfied and his people are saved from eternal damnation.355 However, even though the
New Testament seems at the surface to agree with this view, we must again first go back to the Old Testament to see what righteousness means and so determine its New
Testament significance.
Ritschl notes that even to Moses (Exod 34: 6,7) God did not reveal Himself first and foremost as righteous but as merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth. Correspondingly, even when the Old Testament speaks of retribution, it always presupposes a kind of retribution in terms of forgiveness in accordance with the
Ibid., 103. 179 idea of God as a gracious and as a sovereign King and Ruler. In fact, the idea of righteousness must be seen and interpreted primarily in connection with God as King and
Potentate of Potentates. Accordingly, one must interpret judging in the context of God as Kingly Judge and not as Righteous One. Certainly God judges, but God judges so as to save, particularly His chosen ones. The world is the domain for the execution of God's will, and to that end He directs and judges His people so that His will will be accomplished. When there is talk of God judging in terms of punishment, i.e., of other nations, or the unfaithful in the land, this must always be seen as subservient, that is, as means for the restoration of the justified and pious ones, who live by God's faithfulness and grace, for the calm possession of the promised land (Ps 33: 4, 5). For that purpose the poets in the Psalms in particular always appeal to the Sovereign power of God.357
Punitive justice as primary focus for interpreting God's righteous dealings with His people simply cannot find its grounding in the Old Testament. And so the very foundation for a penal and substitutionary theory of atonement is hereby eliminated.
The New Testament teachings on the concept of righteousness must be grounded in the message of Jesus Himself as recorded in the Gospels. For Ritschl, Jesus was not a schoolman; he had not attached himself to any particular Pharisaic or other school for interpreting the Bible. His message was consistently one of sacrifice and grace for the
Ibid., 102-104. For Ritschl, particularly the Psalms should be consulted for a correct understanding of this attribute in this context (Ps 97:1-6, 89:7-15). Therefore, and in light of this, the postexilic writings, with their emphasis on law and retribution, should not be consulted as primary authorities on righteousness, particularly not in the way certain references were transmitted in the Alexandrian Canon with their emphasis on justice in connection with penal retribution. The latter were further expounded by New Testament Phariseeism, with which authentic Christianity, according to the message of Jesus, had no continuity! Ibid. 357 Ibid., 106-108. 180 forgiveness of sins in line with what we have observed Ritschl says about the Old
Testament concepts of holiness, righteousness, and grace. However, this cannot consistently be said about the other writers and writings of the New Testament. There we find contradictions and mixings of traditions.
To give an example of such contradictions or mixing of traditions, Ritschl notes that Paul, in Rom 3:3, 5 uses the expressions, 'righteousness' and 'faithfulness of God' synonymously, thus staying in line with the Old Testament concept of righteousness as
God's judgment and execution of God's faithful and gracious involvement with His people, calling them time and time again back from their backsliding for their own good
Hereby we see that Ritschl received the biblical text critically. If certain strands of religious thoughts found in the Scriptures did not logically follow with his overall findings, i.e., did not fit what he thought was cohesive and constructive, these findings must be either interpreted in such a fashion that they do fit or be rejected. In this sense we see Ritschl's systematization or organizing of biblical thoughts overriding the idea of the totally inspired word of God as Sacra et Totum Uno. In other words, here we see a demonstration of Ritschl's fluid conception of the authority of the Scriptures in accordance with and in line with a "contemporary" systematization of the religious thoughts found in the Bible. The question, of course becomes again, with what presuppositions or, perhaps, preconceived ideas did Ritschl approach the text? His delineation of God—as primarily loving will for the purpose of having this will established here upon earth by justified, forgiven human beings who have been brought back into God's graces, in congruity with his understanding of the human being as primarily will—is fundamental here. See also his "Die Rechtfertigungslehre des A. Osianders," 821-22, where he describes the human being as primarily and essentially will. "In the moment of his reflective self-judgment, only the regenerated one can grasp his situation as will-situation, in that he places God's work on himself under the exponents of the measuring and working will of God." Ibid., 822. Here, indeed we must raise the question whether Ritschl defends Kant's ethical concentration on the will, in and through his exegesis and for his systematic reflection. Is Kant's rejection of metaphysics and his concentration on the will and the reserving of religion for practical purposes here to be seen as predeterminative of Ritschl's understanding of God and the human being, and thus predeterminative of his exegesis as well? His somewhat random and forced exegesis for the sake of his overall systematic reflection with an antimetaphysical bent in service of a religious and practical purpose, i.e., the establishment of God's Kingdom here upon earth, seems to point in this direction indeed. 181 and the protection of His holy name. Yet within the New Testament Ritschl also notes that, as there were hints of Phariseeism in the Old Testament, especially influenced by the postexilic writings with respect to the interpretation of the law and the righteousness of
God, these Pharisaic elements are also found in the New Testament, particularly in Paul.
For example, when speaking of the important idea of sacrifice, Paul in Rom 6 seems to indicate that Christ died for our sins, insinuating the idea of a substitutionary sacrifice and reconciliation having as first object God satisfied and man reconciled to
God (Rom 6:10). However, according to Ritschl, Paul hereby simply contradicts the principal thought of Rom 3, which is in line with the idea of righteousness and sacrifice expressed in the Old Testament. Ritschl, therefore, suggests that one must interpret passages in Rom 6 in light of passages like Rom 5:10, where the idea of sacrifice is consistently interpreted as having its principal effect on the human being as being reconciled with God by the death of Christ.360 After all, that is the focus and purpose of the sacrifice as the ground for justification in the sight of God: a change in the human being's understanding of and relationship with God as grace and love (Rom 5:8) and not in any way a satisfaction of God's broken honour or law (justice) or as a direct substitutionary payment for sins. Hints of the latter in Paul's letters might indeed very
Ritschl regards wrath as one of the most misunderstood and misrepresented attributes of God. He does not like the sentimental interpretation that the word wrath signifies nothing more than the negative side of God's love for correction or that the wrath of God is simply an expression of God's holy jealousy. Instead, wrath must be understood from its effects upon covenant breakers, that is, upon the unfaithful within the Church losing their life and fellowship with their gracious God. Wrath towards surrounding nations must be understood as God's dealings with them who set themselves up against His intention of mercy towards His own people. It is not directed against sin per se but against those who do not faithfully remain within the righteousness of God, the grace of God; it is directed against those who resist God's purposes of mercy. In other words, it has nothing to do with penal justice. Ibid., 118-129. 360 Ibid., 228-231. 182 well be Paul dealing with his past as Pharisee, as he was not entirely free from its influence.361 In any case, however, such references in Paul are sparse, and the reasoning expressed in correspondence with these thoughts on the law are 'unclear,' to say the least. In addition, Ritschl notes that Paul was not a systematic thinker but a prophetic orator (dithyrambic) with polemic intentions. So, perhaps we cannot fault him for the occasional contradictions, as he still was in the process of overcoming his Pharisaic past.
The Idea of Righteousness as Connected to the Idea of Law as Found in the Theology of
Paul
With these concessions of Ritschl with respect to Paul's understanding of righteousness and the law, we have hit upon a central point of difference between Ritschl and Bohl. In particular, on the point of interpreting Rom 7 this difference surfaces clearly.
Ritschl claims that those who have extracted from this chapter a worldview that leads to an understanding of Christ's sacrifice as a fulfilling of God's unbreakable order of law on behalf of those who have transgressed it and have to be punished for it are still entangled in a vision of law, of God, and of salvation that has more to do with a pre-
Christian understanding of law, world-order, and salvation, one that corresponds to that of either the Pharisees or the Hellenistic understanding of retribution and salvation or
In fact, when Ritschl treats the question of Paul and the law, he expressly states that when Paul really seems to support an interpretation of Moses as prescribing a legal order with the law as "metaphysical" background as God's requisite for fulfillment (Rom 4:5, 15; Rom 7), Paul in these instances is still holding on to remnants of his Pharisaic past (interpreting the law as legal order). Ibid., 314. 362 Ibid. 363 Ibid., 338. This helps Ritschl to discern within Paul systematic inconsistencies, as Ritschl as dogmaticus is attempting to discern the kernel of the message of the New Testament. 183
both. However, Ritschl deems such understandings un-Christian. Such understandings
and worldviews function as wrongful presuppositions. Over against this, Ritschl points
out that he has shown that Paul's understanding of sacrifice as grounded in the Old
Testament never had retributive justice as presupposition, only the grace of God.364
The desire to undo Paul of his Pharisaical tendencies and refute the idea of the
existence of an overarching legal world order is in no place clearer than in Ritschl's
exegesis of Rom 7, which seems to indicate some kind of retributive justice system or
natural law theology. Ritschl states categorically that Paul is not guilty of this weakness
of presenting the religion of redemption in terms of a religion of law.365 In fact, one
ought not to interpret Scripture in accordance with a presupposed system or a
presupposed world order. Yet it is undeniable that Paul as former Pharisee was not able to
entirely shake off all the traces of such presuppositions.366 Here again, Ritschl stands in
364 Ibid., 316-317. Ibid., 320. "Paulus hat sich nicht die schwachheit schuldig gemacht, die Erlosungsreligion in den Formen der Gezetsreligion darzustellen." 366 To elaborate on this point, according to Ritschl, during his transition from Phariseeism to Christianity, Paul carried along with him certain contradictory thought patterns about the law, which can be found in his letters. He sways between opinions, which is confusing for the reader. However, this needs to be understood in order to come to grips with the real meaning of Paul's theology and understanding of law that finds it roots in the Old Testament theology of the sacrifice (especially as found in the Psalms) to eliminate the legal worldview of the Pharisees that was added later. It is true that much of Christianity after Paul took its cues from these pharisaic aberrations, which is to be regretted; however, now is the time to reform these tendencies within the thought of Paul himself, just as Luther needed to be reformed of aberrant medieval traces. Ibid., 318, 320- 322. Alluding to pages 308-322 of vol. 2, Die Christliche Lehre, Mackintosch exposits Ritschl's biblical presuppositions: "It is no satisfactory reproduction of Pauline thoughts to say that, if only man had not sinned, his own legal righteousness would have saved him! The truth is, Paul has two inconsistent views of the Old Testament law, which go back to two different sets of experiences in his Jewish days. Edition three insists that self- righteousness, or 'blamelessness,' must have belonged to an early period and despair at the law's high moral ideal to days when Judaism was becoming impossible for Paul. Yet, as a Christian apostle, Paul is sometimes swayed by the one thought of the law and 184 direct opposition to Bohl's exegesis of Rom 7 and his insistence upon the importance of the function of God's law as we have delineated above.
Ritschl's Understanding of Justification by Faith
Speaking of justification by faith and being consistent with his own point of view that ultimately Paul was not Pharisaic in his principal presuppositions, Ritschl claims that the
Lutheran or Protestant thought of imputation, whereby Christ's righteousness is transferred to sinners, is not Pauline: Christ is primarily the bearer of God's righteousness of grace; He in continuity with the Old Testament religion of sacrifice by way of His death became the means for salvation and restoration with God.367 The obedience of Christ, in contrast to the disobedience of Adam (Rom 5) must be understood as being the positive worth of His self-sacrifice. On the basis of Christ's obedience (His sacrifice) God pronounces the sinner righteous with the effect that he or she will live.368
Life, eternal life, peace, and hope are the benefits of justification and certainly not
•5/TQ substantial change or any individual subjectivistic Pietistic peculiarities.
What Paul does stress is that the justified person's self-estimation or self-feeling is augmented and that by glorying in the cross of Christ, whereby the believer has died to the natural world, he or she is called to live by the Spirit in and for the coming of the sometimes by the other. Again, Rom. 2:6 is adjusted to the prejudices of the Pharisaic Jewish Christians at Rome; later editions add that Roman Gentile Christians may probably have been legalists too. A footnote in edition one declares that St. Paul's belief in a recompense of evil deeds at the judgment is 'more apparent than real.' The deepest and most Christian thing in Paul is his belief in God's purpose to save the Church of Christ." Mackintosch, 126-127. 367 Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 327. 368 Ibid., 327. As we have seen, Ritschl's principle categories are life and death, not sin, legal or "law-bound." 369 Ibid., 339-344. 185 kingdom of God. It is in this self-estimation and by this self-feeling, in light of the grace of God, that the believer is delivered from any entangling system or dominating worldview, precisely because he or she has died to it all, to live and spiritually reign in a free and restored relationship with God. To be sure, this is all already present as God's gift of grace to the community of saints, in which the individual participates by faith on account of His declaration of forgiveness, because of Christ, i.e., justification. It is not the individual who is first the object of God's declaration of justification but the community, the congregation in which the individual participates.
Finally, we notice that Ritschl also desired to biblically reform the Reformers' anthropology in connection with justification. Paul did not know of the Reformers' insistence on the feeling and self-judgment of continual imperfection after justification.
In fact, according to Ritschl, Paul sees every Christian as ethically perfect (Phil 3:12-15): perfect in faithfulness to their calling371 in correspondence with their feeling of self and religious self-estimation and within the context of the gift of justification to the church as the community of saints.
Luther, who spoke of the ethical and moral imperfection of the regenerate person on the basis of expressions found in places like Rom 7:15, 25, must be understood as basing his point of view on faulty exegesis. According to Ritschl, the expressions in Rom
7 do not speak of the regenerated Paul but speak about Paul's life before his conversion.372 The only place where the New Testament does speak of habitual moral imperfection is in 1 John, but there too it must be interpreted as subordinate to the
u Ibid., 352-358. 1 Ibid., 370. 2 Ibid., 371. 186 faithfulness of God (1:9), the cleansing working of the sacrifice of Christ (1:7), and the intercession of Christ (2:1). Therefore, the pessimism that marks Luther's point of view concerning the moral or good works of the Christian by insisting on their continual imperfection and worthlessness is not to be found in John and least of all in Paul.
Ibid., 372-373. 187
C. SUMMARY AND COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Even though Bohl certainly understood Ritschl to be influenced by the rationalism of
Immanuel Kant also in terms of expressing biblical ideas,374 and is critical of Ritschl's doctrine of revelation and justification, as we have noted, Bohl nonetheless praised
Ritschl for his biblical approach. For making the New Testament ideas of justification dependent on the Old, and seeking to present the doctrine of justification by faith from the point of view of personal experience in intimate relation with Scriptural doctrine,
Bohl praised Ritschl to such an extent that he reminded the mediating theology of his time, with its disorganizing tendencies, that they could learn from Ritschl on this score.3
The biblical and exegetical underpinnings of Ritschl's doctrine of justification having been delineated in an extensive fashion above, it is evident that Bohl no doubt is right that Ritschl worked from a consistent and unifying point of view in his
"Dort, bei Ritschl, ist doch wieder nur die Kantische Uebersetzung der biblischen Ideen und Vernunftideen unter Beibehaltung der biblischen Terminologie." Bohl, Von der Rechtfertigung, 154. 375 "Die Ritschl'sche Schule hat das unbezweifelte Verdienst, in einer fur den Rationalismus vernehmbaren Weise die abhangigkeit des Neuen Testamentes vom Alten verkiindigt zu haben, und demgemass macht Ritschl es sich zur aufgabe, die neutestamentlichen Ideen auf der Grundlage der alttestamentische zu verstehen.. ..wichtig ist Ritschl's bestrebung doch—sie stellt wirklich einen Versuch dar, von dem erfahrungs- centrum der Rechtfertigung durch den glauben aus die Schriftlehre in strengen Zusammenhang vorzutragen. Die Vermittlungs-theologie mit ihrer Zerfahernheit hatte hier mehr zu lernen, als ihr lieb ist, und daher schilt sie auch mehr auf Ritschl, als dass sie Gebrauch von seinem Forschungen machte" Ibid, 68-69. English translation: "The Ritschlian School has unquestionably the merit of having published in a manner appreciable even by rationalism the dependence of the New Testament on the Old, and Ritschl attempts to explain the New Testament ideas on the basis of the Old Testament accordingly. That little remains of what reminds us of the sometime orthodox doctrine when the Old Testament is thus interpreted or rather abused, is, of course obvious. But Ritschl's endeavor is important nevertheless—it is really an effort to present the doctrine of justification by faith from the standpoint of experience in intimate relation with the Scripture doctrine. The mediating theology with its disorganizing tendency might learn more here than it desires, and, accordingly, censure Ritschl more than it profits by his investigation." 188
interpretation of the New Testament concepts in terms of their Old Testament context and
his seeking to promote a unifying exegetical base for his doctrine of justification.
However, on the how and what of this unity and unifying principle of the Scriptures'
nature and message Bohl and Ritschl differ distinctly.
Two points ought to be noted here. First, the unity that Ritschl sees between the
Old and New Testament in terms of the concept of sacrifice is strictly, and one would say
stubbornly, defended by him, eliminating any thought of penal substitution or retributive justice. We have seen that Ritschl goes so far in maintaining and defending his point of
view as to say that sacrifice should strictly be understood as an expression of God's grace
and love (thus having nothing to do with His justice being fulfilled or his wrath appeased
or his own attribute of righteousness or holiness honored or satisfied); all verses that
seem to indicate the contrary are either simply historically-critically reduced to being
insignificant or interpreted in such a manner as to fit his own systematic purposes.
Ritschl, in his striving for a unitive vision between the Old and New Testament in
the end, in fact, seeks to affirm the exact opposite of what Bohl emphasizes in his own
exegetical and dogmatic works in terms of unity between the two Testaments in relation
to the doctrine of justification. For Bohl, as we have seen above, the thought of
retributive justice is fundamental, and the understanding of Christ's person and work in
terms of penal substitution is essential for understanding the doctrine of justification.
Even the central thought of imputation in Bohl's doctrine of justification of the ungodly is
lost in Ritschl's unitive exegesis of the Old and New Testament.
Secondly, and this point touches another related nerve of Bohl's critique of
Ritschl's theology of justification, Ritschl's unitive exegetical impulse eliminates any 189
overarching metaphysical presuppositions, including those points where Scripture itself
pronounces judgment upon the nature of the human being in general or the nature of God
in particular. Together with his insistence on starting from the particular, that is, from the
regenerate community, and his central emphasis on sacrifice as grounded in the primary
attribute of God as love, Ritschl denies what Bohl affirms as central to his own
understanding of justification, namely, a creational point of contact for communication
(anticipatio Deorum) and a legal world order as rooted in God's law as eternal norm and
expression of God's own personal nature and existence.
To expand on the importance of the latter point, for Bohl's understanding of justification we note that Bohl, while confronting the historical criticism of his time, in
particular the Graf-Welhausen-Keunen thesis that the law is a brain child of the exilic and
postexilic prophets, defended the traditional view that the law is from heaven and is, in
fact, the basis for a correct interpretation of Scriptures. The rest of the Bible is in
principle no more than a further commentary and further revelation of what was already
present in nuce in the first five books of the Bible, the Torah, as a revelation of God
Himself. According to Bohl, modern historical-critical exegesis had turned this order
around, influenced by presupposed so-called 'scientific' ideas or dogmatic leitmotifs.377
In his Dogmatik, Bohl affirms the third use of the law, as I have noted above, that is, the law as guideline and rule for the Christian's walk by faith in Christ and the Holy Spirit. See Bohl, Dogmatik, 439. It is the Holy Spirit who will lead and guide the Christian in accordance with the law as eternal norm. Ibid., 440. 377 Trained as Old Testamenticus, Bohl was very conscious and critical of what happened in the area of biblical studies as foundation for sound Reformed dogmatics. We have noted this in his debate with Abraham Kuenen (a proponent of the hypothesis for source criticism of K. H. Graf, which later was corroborated and articulated by Julius Wellhausen). 190
For Bohl, from the beginning the revelation of God in the Tor ah was meant to determine the self-consciousness of the human being and history and, as such, form the basis of later wisdom literature and prophecy. Therefore, this standpoint ought to inform all exegesis and dogmatics and so provide a correct, biblically informed personal and
'metaphysical' context for the proper understanding of the human being and the proper expression of the doctrine of justification, which includes such fundamental thoughts as satisfaction, retributive justice, legal world-order, penal substitution, and the central idea of imputation. Behind this is a personal Triune God who lives, speaks, and works until now. Having observed these two points, one could hardly imagine a starker contrast between two theologians in terms of their exegetical presuppositions and foundational principles for interpreting the.doctrine of justification.
We have observed these fundamental differences between Bohl and Ritschl, which will be evidenced as well in subsequent chapters of this research when we deal with the historical and the positive theological articulation of justification in their respective works, but there are nevertheless elements that unite Bohl and Ritschl in their effort to point in the direction of a further Reformation. What are they?
In answering the latter question, I observe that both Bohl and Ritschl were interested in the reconfiguration or the elimination of what I have called the ontological or substantial dimension often expressed in and with the doctrine of justification. This common purpose is what seemed to unite their efforts, albeit in different ways. The different points of view are based on their different approach to Scriptures and subsequently their different interpretation of the overall nature and message of God's revelation. 191
As I noted, Ritschl's concentration was primarily on the gospel and grace; the
basis was the emphasis on the unity principle of God as love and the primary purpose
was a positive estimation and feeling of the self in the context of the establishment of the
kingdom of God here upon earth. The concentration point for Bohl was found primarily
in the law of God, presupposing a personal God who in Christ and by his own Spirit did
and will fulfill his own Word as law and promise for and in the life of the Christian, now
and in the future. This is not to say that Bohl denies the importance of the gospel of
grace—far from it. However, for Bohl the gospel is essentially law fulfilled for sinners
who are condemned by it and ought never to take it into their own hands. He concentrates
on the being and the work of a Triune God who condemns but who has also undertaken
to fulfill His own law in His Son Jesus Christ, in whom the sinners are a new creation and
by whose Spirit they will walk in God's ways. The latter is God's promise as 'hidden' in
His law, which is to be believed and so practiced by the person and power of the Spirit of
God. The emphasis for Bohl falls upon believing, because the law continues to condemn
the believer insofar as he or she remains a sinner and ungodly according to his flesh, even
as regenerate, and the law continues always to play an important function in the area of
sanctification. The latter concentration and function of the law is not present in the
theology of Ritschl, as he had reinterpreted the concept of righteousness in terms of grace
and love as well and eliminated any metaphysics in terms of an overarching world order
as grounded in the nature and being of God Himself.
The greatest difference between Bohl and Ritschl, thus, shows itself in the ethical
dimension and the ultimate metaphysical dimension of Christian theology. Bohl maintains that the law remains important as pedagogue and rule and norm for the 192
Christians life, however differently understood it may be in comparison with the
Reformed tradition in general. With his focus on the human being as person and will, on his or her self-estimation, and on God as essentially loving will, plus his concentration on vocation in and for the establishment of the kingdom of God, Ritschl retained a moral dimension in essentially what Bohl has called a Pelagian or semi-Pelagian way, with a
Deistic conception of God that denies the traditional metaphysics of the churchly symbols. According to Bohl, this finally shows itself in a degree of dualism, which may in fact point back to Ritschl's rootedness in the Kantian dialectic of nature and freedom, together with the elimination of the traditional metaphysics inherent in the creeds of the church. As we will further explore, this difference is finally grounded in Ritschl's understanding of the nature, function, and message of God's Word-revelation.
Essentially, Ritschl placed the biblical and dogmatic questions in the domain and 'control' of human rationality and will instead of being subservient to God's Word-revelation and its personal God, who lives and speaks.
This has brought us to another point of comparison and difference. It has become clear that Bohl's focus is on God, what happens to Him in terms of satisfaction, and what
He does, in light of which the sinner finds complete salvation and eternal life. This stands in stark contrast to Ritschl, who concentrates on the human being's self-estimation, what happens to him or her, and what she ought or ought not to do. In his system sin has become essentially ignorance. The connection between death and sin is severed.
Revelation is given for the purpose of correcting our perhaps wrong conception of God, who is essentially love and gracious will. 193
Finally, in terms of a preliminary conclusion with respect to Ritschl's relation to historical criticism, in particular the historical-critical thesis of Wellhausen, Bohl misjudged Ritschl.
Bohl's concept of righteousness was rooted in the Old Testament concept of God's nature revealed in part by God's law is; this was the foundational concept for his biblical-
•5*70 theological postulates for the doctrine of justification, and he understood that the most serious opposition to his position would come from those who joined themselves to the school of Wellhausen. Bohl writes, "Now at the very beginning Wellhausen's school crosses our way and reverses the matter, saying: 'First the Prophets and then the Law.
The Prophets furnished the material out of which, after the Exile, the law was compiled.'"379 Yet interestingly enough, Bohl spares Ritschl from the criticism he heaped on the critical school in Zum Gesetz und Zum Zeugniss. Bohl states, and I quote it in full, as it contains a number of important issues for my own comparative analysis on this point, The prominent Pelagian characteristic of this thesis is obvious, and here again it is praiseworthy that Ritschl does not take the ground of Wellhausen, but regards the Law as having preceded the Prophets, a spiritual treasure of Israel dating from Moses. And thus, for example, he regards the Levitical law of sacrifices as an historical factor to be seriously considered and peculiarly adapted to elucidate and precede the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles. He energetically emphasizes the significance of the righteousness of God, of Divine wrath; he investigates the signification of the sin-offering, the Passah, etc. Moreover, he investigates these
"If it is true that the Pentateuch and the Prophets testify to the righteousness of God,... [and if] it is permissible to find a way through the entire Scriptures, progressively and retrogressively, from this standpoint, we will then be in the best position to restore an entire structure of doctrine agreeable to the Scriptures. Not indeed from the sphere of consciousness, or from the experience of individuals, but what we learn objectively from the chorus of witnesses in the Scriptures, who testify in the Law and the Prophets,... we have a secure footing." Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 77-78. 194
problems with the aid of the sources named, and at the place where they are, not where the critics of the Old Testament have placed them. In like manner Isaiah, Jeremiah, yea, the Psalms and Job, (even the sayings of Elihu) are to him authentic testes veritatis, as are also the authors of the N.T. .. .We are accordingly better situated at present than at the middle of the century, when, notwithstanding the customary attempts to restore pristine orthodoxy, they did not properly seek to advance the Church by the means within itself.380
Simply put, in my estimation, Bohl is at this point too positive and even inconsistent with himself and his own presuppositions by lavishing elaborate praise upon
Ritschl, particularly considering that here we hit upon the central issues in comparing the biblical foundations for the doctrine of justification: historical criticism and the authority of Scripture (in particular that of the Old Testament), and such concepts as the righteousness of God, Divine wrath, sin-offering, and the Passover. It is actually surprising to see Bohl on this point so uncritical of Ritschl, especially in light of the fact that, according to Bohl, historical criticism is rooted in a seemingly deep aversion to the law or the wrath of God as particularly manifested by the Socinians and Rationalists,381 among whom he placed Ritschl as well. This ambivalence, to say the least, points to the fact that Bohl was an eclectic theologian in regard to Ritschl.
In response to Bohl's statement that Ritschl did not stand on the ground of
Wellhausen, we remark that with this statement Bohl simply seems to be misguided.
Mackintosch, in his book on Ritschl, states quite the contrary. Even though Mackintosch too notes that Ritschl was persuaded of the need to interpret the New Testament in light
380 Ibid. 381 "Der Grundfehler der Gegner liegt in ihrer falschen, von den Socianern und Rationalisten alten Schlages ererbten Auffassung das Gesetzes' uberhaupt." Bohl, Zum Gesetz und Zum Zeugnis, 9. 382 "Von seinem socianischen Urteil iiber den Zorn und die Gerechtigkeit Gottes nicht zu reden." Bohl, Dogmatik, 62. 195 of the Old Testament, Ritschl was also aware of the debate over the relationship between the law and the Prophets:
On this point also he uses fixed language from 1857 downwards; the prophets represent "a higher development" of the religion of the law. Even when Ritschl accepts his pupil Wellhausen's establishment of the Graf hypothesis, and recognizes the dependence of the priestly law upon the work of Ezekiel, he leaves some of his former expressions uncancelled. Other Old Testament literature, notably the Psalms, Ritschl is content to place along with the prophets, beyond the frontier line separating prophets from law.383
Final Concluding Observations
In summary, we return to the most foundational and ultimate difference between Bohl and Ritschl, which lies in the fact that each has a different conception of revelation and of the Word of God, particularly of its authority and function.
As I have shown, Bohl does not deny that there is a creational point of contact between God and the human being, namely, a creational point of contact for communication (Anticipatio Deorum, or Notitia Dei Naturalis) and a world order as rooted in God's law and nature as eternal norm. For Bohl also, commenting on Psalm 14, there are no atheists, only antitheists.386 In connection with Rom 1, because of the fall, this leaves humankind guilty of rejecting and denying the God of their existence. Bohl
TOT very explicitly states that rational proofs will ultimately not convince unbelievers.
383 Mackintosch, 103. See also, Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre, 2:53. 384 See Bohl, Dogmatik, 8\Jf. 385 "In der Schopfung hat er die zu seiner Erkenntnis anleitenden Buchstaben niedergelegt, und der Mensch kann sie lesen. Seinen Namenszug tragt das Geschaffene; allerorten findet man den Konig das Alls eingeschrieben. Alles geht einher nach einer gewissen Ordnung; nach festen Regeln verlauft alles im Weltall; lauter Wahrheit und Gute predigt die Kreatur dem Auge, das nicht kurzsichtig ist." Bohl, ibid., 82. 386 Ibid., 85-86. 387 These proofs are essentially "eine Art von Luxusartikel." Ibid., 88. 196
They point to what believers already affirm and what is true by virtue of God's own creation, as essentially an axiom: a priori, immediate, and given.388 For Bohl, therefore, there is an immediate creational revelation of God. It is inherent in the situation in which we exist.
We have seen that for Ritschl, it is not creation but the regenerate community that is the starting point; any kind of natural or creational theology is left outside the circumference of his reflection. The latter ought not to be the domain of theology, as the theologian begins from the particularity of the Christian community, the regenerate circle, which lives under the judgment of justification, with the purpose of ruling over nature in and for the kingdom of God. And as God is primarily understood as loving will, so also it is the ethical that is primary in the life of the regenerate, not being or metaphysics. Therefore, biblical revelation as historic revelation, for Ritschl, is never immediate but always and only mediatedly given in and by the ongoing hermeneutic of the regenerate community; it is to be understood not in terms of existential implications in the first place but in terms of value judgments in the realm of the ethical. The
Scriptures inform us of no particular metaphysics or ontology. They belong to the realm of the spiritual, not the natural—to freedom and to the practical dimension of the
Christian religion.
The fundamental difference between Bohl and Ritschl lies, therefore, not simply in the fact that Bohl calls Ritschl a Deist, a Pelagian, or a dualist;389 it is more
388 "Das Axiom, da(3 ein Gott sei, geht alien Beweisen voraus. Sie lehren uns im giinstigen Falle dasjenige als vernunftig anzuerkennen, was ohnehin schon unmittelbare Evidenz fur uns hat." Ibid., 87. 389 Kwon divides Bohl's opponents into the pantheistic and the dualistic camps and dedicates a chapter in his dissertation to Ritschl as Bohl's dualistic (or Deistic) 197
foundationally rooted in their different understanding of revelation. For Bohl, just as
creation immediately implies the a priori axiom of the existence of God, so also biblical
revelation implies the a priori existence of the human being in the face God, whether as
created in His image before the fall or as being away from the life of God in death and sin
after the fall, or again as recreated in Jesus Christ as the express image of God by the
Spirit and faith. In other words, biblical revelation involves immediate existential judgments within the context of God's creation with the presupposition that the
onto logical existence of God is the immediate and creational axiom or presupposition. As
said, for Bohl, from the beginning the revelation of God was meant to determine the self-
consciousness of the human being and history, and not to be placed in the realm of
human rationality or control. This standpoint ought to inform all exegesis and dogmatics
and so provide also the essential, biblically informed metaphysical context for the proper
understanding of the human being, and in extension for the proper expression of the
doctrine of justification and its immediate effects. The revelation of God informs us of a
proper metaphysic instead of denying it on its own terms. Here creation and special
revelation are not opposed to one another but in fact complement one another, all seen
and understood in the context of the Triune God from whom, through whom, and unto
whom are all things.
opponent. See Kwon, 104-112. Kwon judges the fundamental difference between Bohl and Ritschl not to be their doctrine of the Word of God (in respect to which he actually sees them sharing similar convictions, which position we have already contested above and will contest further in this research), but their different points of departure vis-a-vis their understanding of God, Christ, and anthropology. He states, "Ritschls' Rechtfertigungslehre legt den Schwerpunkt aufdie Christologie unter dem aspect des Erlosungsratschlusses Gottes, und konzentriert sich dabei auf Gotteslehre und Gottesreich bzw. die Gemeinde Christi. Dagegen behandelt Bohl seine Rechtfertigungslehre vom anthropologischen Aspekt, also aufgrund der Gottebendlichkeit." Kwon, 115. 198
In this light, the theology of Ritschl virtually seemed to remove the content of
what God has already given immediately and desires to give immediately by way of His
special revelation. Ritschl made room for the self and his or her value or estimation. He
made room for the self as a person for history or the future. His doctrine of revelation
essentially concentrates itself on the human being (proper self-estimation), in the process
of which history, including the history of the Word, becomes subject to the hermeneutic
of the historic community of the regenerate (church).
Thus, finally, Ritschl thereby placed the biblical questions about the revelation of
God in the realm of the rationality of the human being in his own particular way. With
this Ritschl himself paved the way for the possibility of his own at times critical exegesis
of the Scriptures and in particular of Paul, thereby demonstrating that present history
must judge past history on the strength of the freed human being as participant in the
community of the regenerate faithful. However, what is this but also a form of 'scientific'
hypostatization of history and consequently of revelation itself?
It is our contention that in his methodology and theology Bohl considered Ritschl
a Pelagian and a Deist because of his critical view of revelation perhaps contrary to
Ritschl's own intentions. Here his critical Kantianism, or neo-Kantianism, showed itself,
against his own best intentions as a biblical scholar.
Finally, we note that at bottom Ritschl's methodology and biblical theology of justification was not first of all the result of an intellectual choice manifesting its own
'logical' consequences, but (in contrast to Bohl's perception of the Word of God) a
consequence of a spiritual-relational and experiential understanding of God, the self, and
the world in their relations. 199
In the light of Bohl's approach, and judging from where he stood in and under the
Word of God, the difference between Bohl's and Ritschl's understanding of the Word of
God must finally also be evaluated from a spiritual point of view. From Bohl's perspective it is perhaps the case that Ritschl never understood the law of God as spiritual and never experienced himself as carnally sold under sin (Rom 7:14). By interpreting the Scriptures solely from the point of grace and love, Ritschl continually shielded himself against the wrath of God in order to preserve himself in terms of a positive self-estimation for history and the future. This is particularly shown in his continual reduction of God's righteousness to grace instead of justification of God as God
(both in His righteousness and love), acknowledgement of the self as a sinful human being and no more, and belief in the Spirit as the personal God who fulfills His own
Word in the life of a believer in His own way.
Perhaps one cannot make such judgments in scholarly contexts, but then again, this is precisely Bohl's point: theology without the relational-spiritual dimension will ultimately be emptied of its actual content. Words, and especially the words of God, refer to existence, real spiritual existence. Scientific endeavors move solely in the realm of the quantifiable, the physical, and the movable, which is ultimately dispensable, because it is empty. Theology, however, is ultimately not a scientific endeavor but a relational- spiritual endeavor.390 Revelation should not be placed in the 'scientific,' or the realm of human rationality, as it is ultimately not for the use of the self for the self but for the use of God by God, who is a living God as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier.
Here Ritschl, in terms of his methodology, is closer to Ramus and those influenced by him, as explained in my first section on methodology, than to Bohl's Hebraic way of thinking, which emerges here again as a critical voice. 200
CHAPTER 4
BOHL'S TREATMENT OF THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AS A CRITIQUE OF RITSCHL'S TREATMENT OF THE SAME
Introductory Comments
Having covered the main subject matter of this research, namely, Bohl's and Ritschl's doctrine of the Word of God and revelation as foundation for their respective doctrines of justification, in the following two chapters we will trace Bohl's basic critique of Ritschl and other Reformed theologians throughout his treatment of the history and positive articulation of the doctrine of justification. In the process we will seek to give further evidence for the basic thesis that, for Bohl, placing the biblical and dogmatic questions into the realm of human rationality is the root problem of Ritschl's and other Reformed theologians' expressions and articulations of the doctrine of justification. Placing the biblical and dogmatic questions into the realm of human rationality etc., is, in fact, according to Bohl's methodology and the content of his theology, a denial of letting God be God as the living God who speaks by His Word and Spirit, letting the world be the world, and letting the human being be the human being. The latter observation is rooted in a spiritual-relational understanding of the relation between God, the human being, and the world as grounded in the very nature, power and function of the Word of God itself.
Added to this observation, I will seek to prove in the following sections and chapters that Bohl's thesis that justification is regeneration—namely, that they fall conceptually and effectively together—ought to be regarded as highly important in his historical and dogmatic treatment of the doctrine of justification as flowing from his 201 understanding of revelation. I will seek to demonstrate that this thesis is fundamentally important for a proper understanding of Bohl's theology of justification and his place and potential influence in the history and the positive articulation of the doctrine of justification.
Bohl's Approach to the History of the Doctrine of Justification
In the introduction to his major work on the doctrine of justification, which starts with the history of the doctrine, Bohl makes the observation that often the opponents of the
Reformers and their doctrine of justification had a clearer understanding of the issues involved than did its later defenders.391 In fact, Bohl observes that its later defenders often fell into some of the same errors of their opponents because they lacked this understanding. According to Bohl, this has also been the case in Ritschl's treatment of the history of the doctrine.
According to Bohl, Ritschl underestimated the correct understanding the
Socinians had of the Reformed doctrine of justification, particularly as related to the teaching of the satisfaction of Christ's person and work: "Even Ritschl falls into this error to blame Socinus for not having comprehended the doctrine of the Reformation."392
Socinus had found that there was no place for the acquisition of merits in the early
Reformed doctrine of justification. Ritschl, by attempting to defend the Reformers, responded to the Socinians that, contrary to their opinion, there was a place for merits in the Reformers' doctrine of justification and that the doctrine of the imputation of the
391 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 13. Bohl refers here to Ritschl's major work on justification, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, vols. 1 and 3. 202
obedience of Christ was not intended to exclude this dimension or to exclude anyone
from acquiring their own righteousness. However, Socinus had, in fact, correctly
understood the doctrine of justification as he found it expressed by the early Reformers.
The frustration Socinus voiced was understandable, and his interpretation of the
Reformed doctrine of justification was, in fact, closer to the truth than Ritschl's defense
of it. In the Reformed doctrine of justification there was, indeed, no place for the
acquisition of merits in light of the satisfaction and obedience of Christ. The imputation
of his righteousness, of his obedience, excluded any notion of the acquisition of merits on
the part of the justified one.
Bohl continues that Ritschl is not the first to show a wrong evaluation of Socinus'
interpretation of the Reformed doctrine of justification with regard to the satisfaction of
Christ and the doctrine of the imputation of the obedience of Christ in justification.
Others before Ritschl had followed the same error of underestimating the understanding
of the Reformation by the Reformers' opponents and had therefore directly embraced the
ideas of Socinus.394
The most significant point that Bohl seeks to make with this observation is that
one must seek out a right understanding and interpretation of the Reformers themselves from within their own context first; this includes taking into account their early
opponents. To obtain this right interpretation one can learn much from the early
opponents who where their contemporaries. To presume that these opponents worked
from a wrong understanding of the doctrine of justification as found by the Reformers,
See Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, vol. 3, 67. 394 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 14. See above about Bohl's charge that Ritschl was a "refined Socinian" himself. 203 whether they were Socinians or Roman Catholics, is historical hubris. For Bohl, it is therefore important to go back to what the Reformers really taught about justification, regeneration, and sanctification. In order to achieve this, one must seek to understand the
Reformers not through later, perhaps aberrant, interpretations but through the Reformers themselves and their contexts, and so again move forward through history to one's own present context. Preconceived ideas, perhaps taken from later centuries, must not be the prisms through which one seeks to interpret the Reformers, far less to control the outcome of one's exposition of their doctrines.
In light of these observations about Bohl's historical approach, we observe, as we have noted at the beginning of this research, that Bohl's historical approach is comparable to what I have called the nominalist historian's point of view. If one is to obtain a correct interpretation of the Reformers' writings and points of view without a display of historical hubris, the immediate text and context of the doctrines and persons in question should be the primary sources for one's investigation, even in regard to their opponents. In fact, the latter should be consulted as valuable and important resources.
Neither is the ultimate truth to be thought of as dependent upon historical development.
The latter has been proven to be more often than not a hindrance rather than a help, according to Bohl.
Comparing Bohl's and Ritschl's historical methodology, in spite of Bohl's criticism of Ritschl's interpretation of Socinus, one can observe a similarity in their respective interpretive approaches to the history of Christian doctrines. Ritschl also desired to break through an approach that attempted to impose preconceived ideas on the interpretation of history, as was practiced by the Hegelian school of F. C. Bauer, of which 204 he was initially a part. He too sought to go back to the historical, particular first. As we have shown, Ritschl as a 'further Reformer' sought to go back to, in particular, the early
Luther before Scholasticism had entered into the camp of the Reformers by way of
Melanchton. His intention too was to lay bare the early motifs and principles of the
Reformers in order to advance the Reformation with these new found principles in
The difference between Bohl and Ritschl, therefore, does not manifest itself in terms of their intent to go back to the Reformers and the Reformers' understanding of the doctrine of justification to incite a 'further Reformation.' Rather, the difference manifests itself in terms of what the principal root ideas were by which the early Reformers were gripped to bring about a Reformation, and on what grounds and in what manner they thought to sustain and exposit these root principles or motivations. Again, what is at stake here is a correct understanding and exposition of the particular in context.
To further elucidate these comparative observations we will in this chapter effectively turn to Bohl's interpretation of the history of the doctrine of justification and his critique of Ritschl and trace these similarities and fundamental differences between
Bohl, Ritschl, and other Reformed theologians. In the process we will 'unearth' and
He distanced himself from this tradition when he republished his, Die Entstehung der altkatholische Kirche, Eine Kirchen-und Dogmengeschichtliche Monographie. 396 See Lotz, 8-27. Lotz very clearly shows the intention of Ritschl as a "further Reformer" who sought to go back to the "practical root ideas" and the "principle of the Reformation" and who read the history of the Reformation with these "root ideas" as principle guides in mind. In this process, Ritschl too was eager to show how soon these principles of the early Reformation had been forgotten, or perhaps misunderstood. This resulted in the introduction of categories of thought essentially strange to the impulse of the Reformation itself, i.e., the introduction of the Scholastic-Aristotelian dogmatic method, or Calvin's idea and desire to be "scholastically precise." See ibid.,14-15 under the heading, "The Idea of the Unfinished Reformation." 205
provide further evidence for the structure of Bohl's Reformed theology, and his critique
of Ritschl's doctrine of justification.
Bohl's Treatment of the History of the Doctrine of Justification and His Critique of
Ritschl
Bohl in his treatment of the history of the doctrine of justification begins by
distinguishing two periods, the first when the doctrine was rediscovered in the sixteenth
century, and the second when this doctrine was defended. In particular, the first period is marked by the controversy between the Reformers and Osiander about the doctrine of justification and its defense and closes with the passing away of Melanchton, who in
Bohl's estimation was the great apologist of the doctrine of justification during his time.
The second period is the period after Melanchton had defended the doctrine of justification and had passed away.
It is significant that as the central figure of these two periods Bohl chose the
Lutheran Melanchton. For Bohl, Melanchton is the hinge figure for the proper
"inn articulation and defense of the doctrine of justification. No doubt it was Luther who first discovered and articulated anew this central doctrine of the Scriptures for the church.
However, it was so new that it came up against much misconception and opposition.
Bohl notes that even though it was the lever of the entire Reformation, it was "difficult at once to become fully aware of the lawful mode of operating this lever,"398 and it is
Melanchton "who deserves the high praise"399 for articulating this doctrine most precisely
397 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 23. 398 Ibid. 399 Ibid., 24. 206 and teaching his contemporaries how to handle it. It is Melanchton who articulated and defended the total and clear conception of the nature of justification as being forensic, imputative, and external judgment, and who maintained it as such against the onslaught of its opponents.
By putting strong emphasis on the ideas of imputation and the forensic nature of justification as the characteristic features of the early Reformed doctrine of justification, following Melanchton, Bohl hit upon what distinguished this interpretation of the doctrine from those that had preceded it. This emphasis on imputation rather than on infusion or impartation must, in fact, be seen as a novum rather than as a continuation of the development of this doctrine in the West.400 In my estimation it is precisely this novum aspect that Bohl will apply consistently to the doctrines of regeneration and sanctification to combat implicit if not explicit returns to a Roman Catholic doctrine of salvation. In fact, according to Bohl, having in part forgotten this novum characteristic feature of the Reformed doctrine of justification, or having related it inconsistently to the other teachings of Scripture like regeneration and sanctification, later Reformers had undermined the uniqueness, strength, and comfort of the doctrine of justification as it had
Alister E. McGrath, in Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), states that, "The Protestant understanding of the nature of justification ... represents a theological novum, whereas its understanding of its mode does not. It is therefore of considerable importance to appreciate that the criterion employed in the sixteenth century to determine whether a particular doctrine of justification was Protestant or otherwise was whether justification was understood forensically. The fury surrounding the Osiandrist controversy only served to harden the early Protestant conviction that any doctrine of justification by inherent righteousness was intrinsically anti-Protestant. The history of the Reformation itself, especially as it concerns Osiander and Latomus, demonstrates that the criterion employed at the time, to determine whether a given doctrine was Protestant or otherwise primarily concerned the manner in which justifying righteousness was understood. It would appear to be historically unsound to use any other criterion in this respect" 215. 207 been expressed by the early Reformers. This had happened in particular in the seventeenth century of the post-Reformation era, the Reformed Middle Ages.401 Bohl's thesis that justification falls conceptually and effectively together with regeneration is of utmost importance here, as it is intimately related to his understanding of the authority, power, and function of the Word of God.
History of the Doctrine of Justification up to the Time of Melanchton
According to Bohl, at the beginning of the Reformation, Luther had come up against several attacks against his doctrine of justification, all of which which he viewed as manifestations of self-righteousness. He believed that the propagation of the idea of inward righteousness, of the many particular understandings of Christ within the believer, of faith as a work, and of certain infused new qualities and substances as necessary consequence of justification all hide within them a form of self-righteousness. However, he believed that Luther himself had not always been clear in his formulation of
See McGrath, 215, on the idea of justification as forensic being a novum. McGrath on the same page concurs with Ritschl's observation that distinguishing between justification and regeneration/sanctification as according to its nature, that is, forensic imputation versus the process of actually making righteous, is to be regarded as a significant sign of discontinuity between the Reformation doctrine and what previously had been understood by justification, namely, as being inherently part of the same process: that of making righteous by way of infusion or habits of grace. The latter was the Augustinian heritage from which the Reformation broke away. The discontinuity with the tradition with the idea of imputation versus impartation or infused inherent righteousness is marked clearly by McGrath by calling this idea a novum (see ibid., 215). I will argue that it was precisely this aversion to the essentially Augustinian tradition of the Reformation that Bohl sought to consistently expand upon also in terms of the doctrines of regeneration and sanctification. This new thought of the forensic nature of justification must also be applied consistently to the doctrines of regeneration and sanctification, emphasizing the Word and work of the Holy Spirit in the context of never mixing flesh and Spirit and never taking away from the complete and finished work of Christ before God. This continues the theme of Bohl's claim for further Reformation, as noted in our first chapter. 208 justification against these tendencies and even seemed to have given room for them at
certain points. This gave a person like Osiander occasion to appeal to Luther and defend
his doctrine of justification as standing in the tradition of the Reformation.402 In this
context Luther too had to extract even himself from "Augustinian errors," which he
helped Melanchton do after the latter had signed what Luther called a "patched-up note,"
the Union-Formula of Regensburg (1541).403 Nevertheless, in spite of his having reminded Melanchton of the essential meaning of justification, a clear exposition on what
faith and justification are was still lacking in Luther, according to Bohl.404 In the end it was Melanchton who finally formulated and defended the doctrine correctly.
For Bohl, the essential point of justification is that it must be understood in such a way that nothing needs to be added to complete it: "Thus if justificatio would be so
incomplete that it needed to be supplemented and completed by sanctificatio, then
Protestantism would really incur the suspicion of teaching that the doctrine of justification merely implies an outward Divine act, without at the same time securely
establishing that this act is effectual for time and eternity."405
402 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 24-25. 403 Ibid., 24. 404 Bohl describes it this way: "Luther, the great writer of the Reformation, constantly presents the appearance of a mighty ship driven by the winds and waves. Sometimes it reclines on the one side, soon after on the other, often well-nigh sinking. But the vessel always regains its equilibrium and continues its majestic course until it enters the haven of eternity, not indeed with full flying sail, but utterly weather-beaten. It was the work of Providence that a man like Melanchton was placed at the side of Luther." Ibid., 26. 405 Ibid., 27. 209
Following this, Bohl, with Loofs, notes that his doctrine of justification stands out even within the Reformed world. This point he will use to critique many later
Reformed and Lutheran theologians and clearly express and advance the Reformation doctrine of justification in relation to regeneration and sanctification as rooted in his doctrine of the nature, power, and function of the Word of God.
According to Bohl, in the early symbols of the church (the confessions) no distinction was made between making righteous and pronouncing righteous. Melanchton showed that
justum efficere to render righteous (to make a righteous out of an unrighteous man, or to regenerate, Apol. 74, 78) did not at the beginning have the false meaning which it subsequently received when Osiander appeared with his doctrine of the substantial infusion of the Divine nature of Christ. The idea of justification coincided with that of regeneration; justification and donatio fidei were united in one, and justificatio at once included everything—even that which a later theology supplemented and designated as sanctificatio justificationis."
For Bohl this renders the thesis that justificatio is regeneratio historically correct.
It is from this point of view in regard to justification and regeneration that Bohl treats and scrutinizes the history of the doctrine of justification. Negatively put, it was the effectual distinction between justification and regeneration that became the point of view of many later Reformers with all its erroneous consequences. It is precisely, thus, from the point of view that justification and regeneration conceptually and effectively fall together, that
Bohl sought to express and advance the Reformation. It is from this perspective that Bohl
Friedrich Loofs (1858-1928) was a historian of doctrine. He studied under A. Harnack in Leipzig, where he became a keen historian of dogma. He also was a student of A. Ritschl at Gottingen who stimulated his interests in systematic theology, especially in the doctrine of justification. Bohl here refers to one of his early articles on the history of doctrine, "Die Bedeutung der Rechtfertigungslehre in der Apologie," 'Studien und Kritiken,' 1884. See Bohl's, Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben, 14 ff. 407 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, ibid. 210
sought to eliminate or reconfigure what we have called, following Kwon, the ontological
dimension implied and expressed in many Reformed doctrines of justification.
To put it in yet a different way, according to Bohl, if the thesis that justificatio is
regeneratio (as understood in the early Reformed way) is given up, sooner or later
Roman Catholicism will reenter into the camp of Protestant Christianity. If this middle
point is given up and if "justificatio forensis must be supplemented by a. justificatio
effectiva, ifjustum pronuntiari does not include justum ejfectiva, to such an extent at
least, as this is possible with the godly, and as far as Divine wisdom has designed, then
the Protestant stand-point as opposed to the Roman-Catholic is surrendered."408 Such is
Bohl's conviction, speaking of the early historic articulation of the doctrine of justification, using Melanchton as his guide.
Here Bohl comments on his contemporary Ritschl and his reading of Luther and
Melanchton as well, again placing Ritschl on the side of the Socinians. He notes that
Ritschl, in his work on the history of the doctrine of justification, "complains that
Luther's and Melanchton's presentation is not sufficiently comprehensive as to guarantee that justification enables believers to perform good works—thus he discovers a great
chasm in the theology of the Reformers—justification and sanctification stand side by
side, and the true logical sequence or how one is dependent on the other, is wanting."409
As we have observed, such a complaint is indeed akin to the 'Socinian complaint' of the lack of place for the acquisition of merits in the early Reformers doctrine of justification.
Defending Melanchton and referring to Loofs in this regard again, Bohl states against Ritschl that the early Reformers sought to bring out the true meaning and
408 Ibid., 28. 409 Ibid. 211 implication of what the Roman Catholic theologians had said with regard to justification being the same as regeneration: "In this matter, however, Loofs has justly defended the
Reformers against Ritschl and has shown that the justification doctrine of the Reformers was actually intended to comprehend what the 'Romanists' mean with their idea. He says,
(p.645): 'Both acknowledge that in justification the ability to the ethical is conferred.'"410
To this Bohl adds, "We say more properly and more according to Scripture: The right to walk in a new life (Rom. V: 4) and not merely the right, but the walk itself."411
In other words, and this is very significant from the standpoint of the history of the Reformed doctrine of justification, the assertion that justification and regeneration fall conceptually and effectively together was not the problem of the Roman Catholic doctrine. In fact, Bohl goes so far as to say that if this correspondence between Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism, namely, that the immediate goal and effect of justification as newness of life is relinquished,
Protestantism would not have been equal to Catholicism. The justifying faith of the Reformers must be perfectly equivalent [parallel] to the gratia gratum faciens of the Romanists, otherwise it does not accomplish its purpose. For certainly the walk in newness of life (Rom. VI: 4) is also the inevitable purpose of the Christian state for the Protestant, and if the church of Rome should offer better guarantees for the same in her doctrine, then we should have to join them on this point of doctrine.412
Thus, according to Bohl, in order to remain truly Catholic, in continuity with the
Scriptural doctrine of justification, the Reformed must not relinquish the thesis that justification is regeneration. If they do, they will have trodden from the true path of understanding the doctrine of justification and relinquished the true insight into the
Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 28. 411 Ibid. 412 Ibid. 212
method and approach of the Word of God itself. However, how this relation between justification and regeneration is to be understood must at the same time be exposed to be
fundamentally different from how Augustine and the Roman Catholics had expressed and
understood it. How, then, is it to be understood in a truly Catholic way?
According to Bohl and following Melanchton and Loofs, it must be understood
that justification is not solely a legal concept but more precisely a comprehensive
religious concept. The latter was also the opinion of Ritschl; however, against Ritschl's
famed idea of the ellipse, which coordinated but at the same time distinguished between
the religious and ethical, Bohl notes that justification as a religious concept incorporates
or consumes the spiritual and ethical dimension, as does the method of the Word of God:
The ethical is entirely consumed by the religious idea, or morality is completely absorbed by religion, as Loofs expresses it,... this being the case with Luther as well as with Melanchton. ... First imputatively, since we believe in Christ, righteousness is imputed to us, as though we had fulfilled the law; and this is the real meaning of this statement. Then it can also be understood of what it affects, since, unless doubting be first removed by faith, the law cannot be fulfilled. Such is also the interpretation of Luther when he explained the Commandments: "We fear and love God, then all will go forward of itself."413
Putting this in the context of what I have noted before, for Bohl, in accordance with the nature and purpose of justification, which are grounded in the spiritual-relational
dimension of the Word of God, the spiritual-ethical dimension must be understood as included in justification. In comparison and contrast to the mediating theologians of
Bohl's time, however, this must not be understood in terms of or by means of employing a mediating principle; philosophically, scholastically, or otherwise. Rather, the reality of justification and regeneration conceptually and religiously falling together, thereby
413 Ibid., 29-30. 213 consuming the spiritual and ethical dimension of the believers' lives, must be understood as the immediate effect of being in Christ, of being led by Word and Spirit, i.e., of being grounded in and affected directly by God's revelation, yes, by the Triune God Himself.
Here Bohl clearly distinguishes himself from Ritschl and his two-dimensional understanding of justification and reconciliation, as symbolically represented by his famed ellipse, which in turn was rooted in his critical-historical understanding and reception of revelation and by his dialectical, Kantian understanding of the relation between nature and freedom, nature and spirit, and, implicitly, the nature and the existence of God. On this point Bohl also constantly corrects Loofs by referring to the
Scriptures themselves as the source and ground of his own understanding of the doctrine of justification.414
What is to be noted here as well is that Bohl—in contrast to Ritschl, who, in accordance with his critical reading of the Scriptures, saw the legal aspect of Paul's doctrine of justification being a remnant of his Phariseeism—does not remove but retains the importance of the legal aspect of justification. For Bohl, the law is and remains fundamentally important, both for an understanding of justification in connection with the thought of imputation and for the life of the justified in sanctification. He does not eliminate the legal and penal category, as we have seen in Ritschl's exegesis, but incorporates it in his understanding of both justification and sanctification from within the context of the religious dimension of justification determined by the spiritual- relational character and function of the Word of God.
"That Loofs' mode of expression is modern while ours is according to the Scriptures is evident." Ibid., 29. 214
Here also, the differences between Bohl's and Ritschl's respective doctrines of
revelation show themselves in their respective retention or rejection of classical
metaphysics. Bohl's theology is essentially and effectively grounded in God as Trinity as
mediated by God's Word, by which the living God speaks and acts directly in and for the
life of the believer. Ritschl's concentration on the effects of the historic revelation of God
critically received, and his focus on the human being's self-estimation in this context, has
as a result that his theology remains anthropocentrically oriented. The result of Ritschl's
understanding of revelation is, according to Bohl as mentioned previously, that Ritschl
cannot come further than a Deistic understanding of God. The one point involves the
other, as both are rooted in his critical reception of God's revelation. In other words, if
from the existential and the spiritual-relational point of view of Bohl the law is no longer
acknowledged experientially as God's Word, neither will its fulfillment be understood for
and in the believer as God's Word and work. The result will be that the human being is
left to hear only the echo of his own autonomous intellectual voice in a universe emptied
of a Triune God who lives, speaks, and acts according to His own being, standard, will,
and affection.
Returning to Bohl's specific treatment of the history of the doctrine of justification, we note, as we have done before, that because of his view of the word and
direct effect of revelation, as this is intimately connected to his thesis that justification is
regeneration, Bohl was not shy to critique other Reformers.
In the context of our observations comparing and contrasting Bohl and Calvin, we have noted that for the latter the theme of restoration was important. Bohl notes, however, that for Luther Christianity was never to be understood as restoration of the old 215 in terms of the infusion of grace, new qualities, or simply good works in sanctifi cation.
The proper understanding of the relation between justification, regeneration, and sanctification, in fact, will give one an entirely different understanding of the idea of restoration.
This thought connects us back to the discussion as to whether the image of God is ontological or not. As we noted, for Calvin an ontological dimension that was subject to restoration always remained. For Luther, the image of God was entirely lost at the fall, as
Luther interpreted the image primarily as spiritual and ethical, that is, in terms of wisdom, righteousness, and holiness.
Bohl clearly follows Luther here. He also saw Christianity as founded upon an entirely new creation, understood as both spiritual and relational. This new thing, is first of all faith in conjunction with the Word of imputation and its religious implications, which is the work of the gift of the Holy Spirit in the justified as a whole new creation:
"This effects peace with God (Rom. V:l) and whoever believeth in the Son hath eternal life."415 He adds, quoting Melanchton, "And through the Holy Spirit there are kindled in us a love of God and a joy resting in God, and other such motives as the Holy Spirit himself is."416 Nothing is renewed or restored, but the old is redirected by the Holy Spirit, as by faith the believer is new in Jesus Christ in a spiritual and relational way {a religious way properly understood).
It was not surprising that against such an articulation and such an understanding of justification and its effects opposition arose also from within the camp of the
Protestants themselves. In particular, the doctrines of Osiander portrayed a significantly
415 Ibid., 34. 416 Melanchton in ibid. 216 different understanding, and against him Melanchton was called to defend the Reformed understanding of justification, which according to Bohl, as we will see, Calvin failed to do.
According to Osiander, "Christ's righteousness or the divine nature of Christ is infused into the believer, and by this presence of Christ in the believer the latter becomes essentially righteous."417 In light of Osiander's understanding, Melanchton admits that certainly a change is procured with respect to the justified. However, in justification one ought not to speak of a mystical or substantial union with the divine nature of Christ. In
Melanchton's view a change takes place, "but only by an extra-ordinary working of the
Holy Ghost... although God dwells in His saints, nevertheless the nature of all of us continues to be full of gross impurities and sinful infirmities."418 This being so, the saints continue to be in need of comfort not by being transformed, looking at themselves, but by faith in the promise of God and faith in the forgiveness of sins, also in the state of regeneration.
Here Bohl continues his emphasis on the old man remaining sinful, needing comfort in something other than him or herself, namely, in the forgiveness of sins or
God's re-creating word of justification in Christ on the strength of the word of imputation of Christ's righteousness. In this regard, according to Bohl, the emphasis should not fall upon the nature of Christ but on his obedience, active and passive. The latter, not his divine nature, is imputed.
For Bohl, therefore, also in the context of soteriology, what is important is that the limits and distinction between God and creature be continually observed. There must be
417 Ibid. 217 no mixing of the two, but in fear and love and by faith a holy difference and distinction needs to be maintained.419 Thus, the Creator-creature distinction also needs to be safeguarded in the area of soteriology if Reformed theology is not to fall into the errors of mysticism and pantheism.
In spite of Melanchton's defense of the doctrine of justification, the Osianderian heresy survived in various ways, particularly in the whole debate about how justification was related to sanctification. Many argued that justification was indeed founded upon imputation; however, sanctification followed where righteousness was infused so that the effects of justification would take place. Certainly in all this justification by imputation remained the linchpin of the comfort for weary souls; however, those who followed the latter argument would take comfort only because they discovered that their sanctification was imperfect and deficient; they would not consider themselves total sinners
(ungodly) whose justification had nothing to do with their degree of sanctification. The gaze began to be directed to the human self and his or her progress in sanctification in the context of which imputation became merely a safeguard against total despair in light of human imperfection.
With this turn of events, Osiander was allowed in through the back door.
Essential, inherent, and imparted righteousness was confirmed after all. With this emphasis and concentration the Reformed doctrine of justification was back in the camp of the Roman Catholic Church, with its emphasis on justifying and sanctifying grace.421
A form of dualism—of renewal that was in progress but never achieved—had slipped
9 See ibid., 40. :0 Ibid., 44. 1 Ibid. 218
back into the Reformed camp. What God had brought together in Christ was put asunder,
and the human being and his or her religious experiences began to take centre stage
again.
Again, according to Bohl, Melanchton had warned against these tendencies by
focusing on Christ and the work of His three offices for and in the believer. This work
was to be acknowledged and appropriated by faith alone, in Christ alone, in the midst of
the congregation.422 One must not be led away from the Mediator, Melanchton's call had
warned, but his call, sadly, had gone unheeded.
Conclusion
Bohl closes his treatment of the history of justification up to the time of Melanchton, who
for him served as the important hinge figure, especially as he had expressed himself in his
Apology of the Augsburg Confession, by saying,
Whatever is intended to be conferred by iustum effici, if rightly understood, is already contained in iustum pronuntiari. Whenever we attempt to go beyond this in order to open a special experimental field in the sphere of sanctification, we depart from the standpoint of the Reformation and must deliberately ignore Melanchton's writing's subsequent to 1550.423
It is again clear from this statement, albeit stated in a different way, that what is important
for Bohl is to maintain the thesis that the religious dimension, or the spiritual-relational
dimension of the Word of God and justification, consumes the ethical dimension. As we
treat the history of the Reformation up to Melanchton, this becomes particularly clear in
his insistence on the idea that regeneration and justification fall conceptually and
422 Ibid., 44-45. 423 Ibid., 46. 219 effectively together, which he shows was in fact the position of Melanchton in his
Apology for the Augsburg Confession. It is from this point of view that Bohl, drawing out all its logical and effectual consequences, sought to advance the Reformation—in fact, in his words, to keep the Reformed church truly catholic.
Ritschl, even though he too had combated the dangers of mysticism and pantheism, fell into the other extreme of separating God from this world in a Deistic sense; and that all as grounded in Ritschl's critical reception of the revelation of God, assuming a position in relation to it from out of the virtually autonomous regenerate community of the present.424 Finally, this must be interpreted, from Bohl's standpoint, as the result of Ritschl's rejection of the law of God, or his exegeting it away as spiritual; for
Bohl, however, the law is the primal reference point for understanding God, the self,
Christ, and the doctrines of justification and sanctification.
Bohl's Treatment of The History of the Doctrine of Justification After the Death of
Melanchton and His Critique of Ritschl
Even though Melanchton for a moment had achieved a clear understanding and articulation of the doctrine of justification, the controversy with Osiander and
Osianderianism had been far from concluded. A fierce exchange of positions erupted between the Osianderianists and Gnesio-Lutherans and those who followed
Melanchton.425 However, besides these internal struggles among the Lutherans, many
Lutherans vehemently opposed the Reformed and their confessions. Some indeed seemed
See also Ritschl, "Die Rechtfertigungslehre des A. Osianders." Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 49-53. 220 to be more occupied with fighting the Reformed than getting their own house in order against the threats of Osianderianism.426
In all of this Bohl singles out the Osianderian controversy as one of the main threats to the Reformed doctrine of justification, expressing that this threat was not recognized enough during its own time. Melanchton had understood the threat and its implications; however, he too began to be caught up with other controversies only to be tempted and fall into a position of synergism himself.427
But what about the Reformed theologians? Had they understood its danger and leaven properly? Bohl notes that also in this camp the controversy was not seriously considered and entered into until later. To be sure it was a German, Lutheran controversy; however, the leaven could not and was not restricted to the German-speaking areas alone but reached far beyond its principalities. And so Bohl observes that only later, after the death of Osiander, did Calvin add a significant chapter to his Institutes to combat this heresy.428 But was this sufficient?
In answer to that question, Bohl observes that Calvin's treatment of the controversy in his Institutes (1.15.5, 3.11.5-12), speaking specifically of the image of
God and justification, was far from sufficient.429 Calvin, perhaps also because of his lack of knowledge of German, missed the mark. In his articulation and defense of justification what again stands as central is the restoration of the image of God through regeneration
{Institutes. 3.1.5). According to Bohl, Calvin had not really understood Melanchton's
426 Ibid., 53. 427 Ibid. 428 See the following works on this controversy, from both Lutheran and Calvinistic perspectives; 1.15.3-6, 2.12.5, 3.11.2ff;" 429 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 53. 221 view of vivification. In Calvin's understanding it becomes "an ardent desire and endeavor to live a holy and pious life, as though it were that a man dies to himself that he may live unto God."430 Calvin conceived of regeneration "as a new leaven effecting such a result and ignored the important position taken by Melanchton in his Apology in opposition to the Romanists'."431 In other words, for Calvin justification and forgiveness of sins are not regeneration (new life) in a legal and religious sense, as they are for Melanchton. Rather,
Calvin, in opposition to Osiander, begins to speak of the difference between justification and regeneration: "The manner of their justification must of necessity be very different from that of renovation to newness of life. For the latter God commences in His elect and as long as they live carries it out gradually."432
Bohl concludes therefore, that in Calvin's controversy with the doctrine of
Osiander he defended the orthodox position of justification as forensic and imputative strongly; however, he did not do this to actually strengthen the latter. "Treating of sanctification as sustaining a most intimate relation to justification, he reserves for sanctification what Osiander included at once in justification, namely, the real transformation of man. But this does not sufficiently demolish Osiander's and the
Romanists' position."433 With this distinction, Calvin tended, in fact, to diminish the reality and the comfort that goes along with what is already established in justification as a legal and religious concept. He even moved away from the Catholic and biblical understanding of justification as conceptually and effectively falling together with regeneration and rooted in a correct understanding of the doctrine of God's word.
430 Ibid., 57. See Calvin, Institutes, 3.3.3. 431 Ibid., 57. 432 Calvin, quoted in ibid. 433 Ibid., 58. 222
At the same time, however, Bohl defends Calvin against later developments, as
Calvin only modestly periphrases the change effected in the human being in sanctification.434 Even though this 'ontological' dimension is to be observed in Calvin, as we have noted above as well, the mixing of the Divine and the human is safely guarded against. "Calvin, to be sure, wisely avoided (what the Epigoni did not) basing the verdict of justification on the mystical union of the believer with Christ. To him the mystical union merely meant a spiritual union in which faith is realized, but is strictly limited to the intercourse with God, which is brought about by means of the Word and by the Holy
Ghost."435 This, however, Bohl notes, cannot be said about the later Reformed theologians, who abused this idea of mystical union. Herein Bohl shares Ritschl's defense of Calvin. "Calvin knows nothing of the error of the later Reformed theologians who do not sufficiently guard against a mixture of the objective and the subjective and according to whom faith in Christ immediately effects union with Christ (unio mystica), which approached Osiander's influx of iustitia essentialis."436
Continuing his treatment of the subsequent history of the Calvinist Reformation,
Bohl comments that this history portrays time and again a weakening of the causes and principles of the initial Reformation itself. He begins by commenting on Zanchius, who beautifully described the imputative character of justification but however added the idea of inherent righteousness, referring to the deplorable union formula of Regensburg
434 Ibid. 435 Ibid. In the footnote to this point Bohl, referring to Calvin's Institutes 3.11.10, notes that for Calvin the Church precedes all this, as in the Church the believers are united with the body of Christ; they there receive the Word and the Spirit by Word and Sacrament. 436 Ibid., 59. To which Bohl adds, "Calvin must be interpreted as being entirely in harmony with his great contemporaries; he did not depart from them even if he did not so immediately experience the struggles as did Melanchton." 223
(1541), which Luther had called "patchwork." Such an addition of inherent righteousness under the idea of sanctification caused more confusion than it cleared up. In fact, it supplemented the doctrine of justification with a more or less substantial renewal of the being over and above the legal and religious concept of justification.437
Bohl points out that this development is something entirely different from what the answer to the first question of the Heidelberg Catechism had intended: "That Christ by His Holy Spirit assures one of eternal life, and makes me heartily, willing and ready henceforth to live unto him."438 This is not to be confused with the idea ofiustitia inhaerens or new instilling of qualities in the soul.439
Of the Synod of Dort Bohl is critical as well. Because of the Arminians, the
Synod of Dort was forced to treat preeminently the doctrine of predestination. This in itself was a shifting of focus and centrality, which even Calvin himself cannot be found to have wanted. Bohl asks why they ignored the doctrine of justification in the debates as central, and, for that matter, the Lutherans in the country. With the agenda having been more or less determined by the Arminians, the Reformed theologians, having shifted the focus to predestination and free will, "were summoned, and lengthy opinions were formulated in endless repetitions concerning a subject that could have been elucidated to far greater advantage from the standpoint of justification."440 "At Dort, instead of raising justification as a shield against the Arminians, they found no better way of helping themselves than making statements that expressed certain qualities of the regenerate and interposed the quickened or sanctified will between man and the Holy Ghost and thus
437 Ibid. 438 Ibid. 439 Ibid., 60. 440 Ibid., 61. 224 really obscured the matter after the manner of Osiander."441 What was the result? "They calmly awaited [the time] when the effects of election should manifest themselves."442
In this context, Pietists came to the rescue: "They sought to remedy the unfruitfulness of justification by subjoining the doctrine of sanctification."443 Voetius promoted the conventicles and was very much "inclined to a praxis pietatis."444 This turn of events Bohl marks as nothing but the Reformed Middle Ages.445
In his treatment of the post-Reformation period, Bohl singles out Peter Von
Mastricht as "a genuine type of the Reformed Middle Ages." According to Bohl, in his theology "justification by faith grows very dim."446 For Mastricht the mystical union stands central; it "is introduced by faith; this faith has been cast into the heart as a seed to sprout and grow."447 In Mastricht's doctrine of salvation regeneration precedes justification: "By regeneration the seed of faith is cast into the heart of the called; in conversion the seed comes forth from the soil and now follows the mystical union with
Christ, and among the attendant results justification comes first, followed by sanctification."448 In this Mastricht was typical of much of the seventeenth century, as a summing up of many during this time as the successor of Voetius.
With Mastricht and others, Bohl concludes, "It is impossible to extract oneself from the physical processes"449 or what I have called the hypostatization of grace, or of
441 Ibid., 62-63. 442 Ibid., 63. 443 Ibid., 64. 444 Ibid. 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid., 65. 447 Ibid. 448 Ibid. 449 Ibid. 225 revelation, and the 'scientizing' of theology. Here, in fact, the ultimate effects of placing
Scriptural and dogmatic questions in the domain of human rationality or experience by way of appropriating a language and methodology strange to the character and nature of revelation itself are manifested negatively in the doctrine of justification.450
A. Neele's dissertation about Petrus Van Mastricht places Mastricht clearly in the line of what we have described above as the Ramus-Ames influence on Reformed theology. He interprets Mastricht as falling totally in line with Alsted, who was in his time the representative of Ramism in terms of the method in theology. He writes, "Mastricht understands scholastic theology as method, in the sense of Alsted's scholastic theology." A. Neele, The Art of Living to God: A Study of Method and Piety in the Theoretica-practica theologia of Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706) PhD. diss., University of Utrecht, 2005, 89. See also footnote 38 on same page. In the area of Scripture, Neele explains that for Mastricht, reason must be seen as "an instrument and argument but not as norm." Ibid., 100. The instrumental use of reason with regard to revelation must function for questions of the veracity of the Scriptures (see ibid.). Specifically, when Neele discusses the biblical subject of faith in the theology of Mastricht, it becomes evident that when one appropriates philosophical method and terminology to explain faith, i.e., in terms of the habitus-actus scheme (as Mastricht does), one can no longer extract oneself from the ontological implications of this scheme as borrowed from the philosophy of Aristotle and others. Neele writes that for Mastricht there is "a resident principle, in man, upon which theology might rest, or in the language of Scholasticism, a habitus of the soul upon which theology might be internally grounded. For Mastricht this disposition was the habitus fidei and not the habitus sciendi." Ibid., 107-108. Faith is thereby no longer understood as an empty hand, but when the language of habitus-actus is used, the ontological implication that faith must be understood as a full hand can no longer be avoided. This is further illustrated by the next sentence: "Once theological truths are received by the habitus credendi, then reason can use this truth as a basis for drawing conclusions." Ibid., 108. Here clearly the biblical question of what faith is has fallen into the domain of human rationality, and attached to it are the ontological implications of Greek theological "place-thinking." The subject of investigation becomes what is received internally for the purpose of orderly arranging and methodizing. The spectre of a regenerational theology manifests itself on the horizon. The Word of God becomes essentially a "scientific object" as it is drawn ontologically within the domain of human rationality. Bohl precisely sought to clear theology of such "Augustinian vestiges." Speaking of faith also described as habit by Maresius, Bohl comments that according to Maresius, "God infuses faith as a habit...; he speaks ... of an inborn faith in man, falsely quoting I Cor. 12:9, which passage does not speak of saving faith. In this error, that faith is an inborn power and disposition [habitus] in man, the Fathers of Dort preceded him, and such writers as Owen and all those who belonged to the Reformed Middle Ages followed him." Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 266-267. For this very reason no doubt, Bohl's teacher, J. Wichelhause, when describing the task of biblical theology, 226
Fom Bohl's own point of view of regarding justification and regeneration as on one line that consumes the religious and ethical dimension, he continues his treatment of the history of justification by crossing the channel to England. In the Westminster
Catechism justification is subsumed in its description of regeneration and sanctification.
To note, in the Larger Catechism, "the Spirit of Christ infuses grace in sanctification
(gratiam infundii) sustaining us in the practice of the same [and] sanctification is not present in all to the same degree,... but it gradually approaches perfection."451 Such talk of infusing saving graces is entirely absent from the earlier other Reformed Confessions like the Belgic Confession and therefore also objectionable.452
Conclusion
Such is Bohl's treatment of and verdict concerning the history of the doctrine of justification, particularly of the seventeenth century and beyond: it had simply derailed. It had deformed itself from the initial principles as articulated, in particular, by Luther and
Melanchton, and Calvin was misapplied. The majority of orthodox theologians "more or less approached Osiander, while on the other hand, the Socinians and the Arminians
explicitly notes, "Wir gehen hierbei von keiner theologia regenitorum aus, auch nicht von einer sogenannten glaubigen oder hoheren oder pneumatischen Schriftauslegung. Denn wenn die Bibel Gottes Wort und ihre Lehre Wahreit ist, so muss diese Wahrheit allgemeingultig und allgemeinfasslich sein und muss nicht erst den Glauben voraussetzen, sondern in sich selbst ihren Beweis und ihre Glaubwiirdigkeit tragen, der man nur durch eigenwillige und absichtliche Verblendung sich entziehen kann." Wichelhause, 30-31. 451 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 67. 227 converged with the Romish system."453 Such is Bohl's analysis of the history of the doctrine of justification in the West and of Ritschl, whom he placed in the latter category.
Soon after Melanchton's death, the Reformed had either fallen prey to the tendencies and tenets of Osiander's thought or had fallen back into the dualism present in the theology of the Roman Catholic Church. Ritschl, according to Bohl, could also not escape the charge of dualism, but for different reasons. His maintaining of the two dimensions, namely, of the religious and the ethical as beside each other also showed that he had not sufficiently grasped the meaning and implication of regeneration and justification falling conceptually and effectively together; that is, as the religious dimension incorporating the ethical dimension. This, in turn, was conditioned by Ritschl's critical reception of revelation itself, which presupposed the relative autonomy of the regenerate community as the starting point for his hermeneutic of Scripture, the latter of which may be termed Socinian in principle. In Ritschl's case, revelation had been drawn into the realm of human rationality in a refined Socinian fashion. I will turn to this charge in more detail in the next chapter on Bohl's more systematic treatment of the doctrine of justification.
Nevertheless, Ritschl remained an important and helpful reference point for
Bohl's own treatment of the history of the doctrine of justification and of the doctrine itself. Both shared a common object of critique, namely, the substantialization of the doctrine of justification, or in our words, the ever-recurring tendency of Reformed orthodox thinkers and Pietists to hypostatize grace and return to Osianderian and mystic
453 Ibid., 72. 228 tendencies. From Bohl's perspective, in all this the clear doctrine of the word of God had been compromised by the method and substance of human rationality and subjectivity. 229
CHAPTER 5
THE POSITIVE ARTICULATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER DOCTRINES AS A CRITIQUE OF RITSCHL'S TREATMENT OF THE SAME
A. CONSIDERING THE CHRISTOLOGICAL BASIS AND BIBLICAL EXPOSITION
OF BOHL'S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AS FOUND IN HIS DOGMATIK
In his Dogmatik Bohl concentrates on exposing the doctrines of the Christian church in a positive and biblical way without getting entangled in lengthy philosophical or polemical debates. His word-oriented approach, or what I have called his lively dialogical approach, is hereby evidenced and further demonstrated. It is also demonstrated by the way Bohl explains justification in his Dogmatik. There Bohl treats the doctrine of justification within the larger context of his exposition of Rom 8:29-30, which is the classic passage for treating this doctrine as part of what has been called the ordo salutis.
According to Bohl, speaking of soteriology one must begin with considering the person and work of Jesus Christ, who is the Word of God, the Redeemer.454 The significance of putting the discussion of the person and work of Christ at the beginning of the doctrine of soteriology should not be overlooked. It is, in fact, inextricably intertwined with our central thesis that in Bohl's theology of justification the Word of
God is not to be absorbed ontologically, rationally, or even ethically into the sphere of human subjectivity first.
454 Bohl, Dogmatik, 271. He writes, "Diesen Teil nennen wir Soteriologie, denn derselbe hat zunachst und hauptsachlich vom Erloser (vom O(oxr\p) zu handeln. Erst aus der Erkenntnis der Person der Erlosers flie|3t uns die Erkenntnis seines Erlosungswerkes, welches in einem besonderen Lehrstiick zur Sprache kommen wird." Ibid. 230
In many Reformed dogmatic works, speaking of the person and work of Christ precedes speaking of the doctrine of soteriology proper. This is done from the point of view that one must first speak of what God has done for us before one moves to speaking of what God does in us. In other words, first one considers God's objective work and following that how this objective work is subjectively applied and appropriated. Bohl seeks to break through such an objective-subjective division with respect to what the
Word of God says about redemption. He does not desire to first treat of the person of
Christ in a more or less scholastic, objective way and then speak of the application of the person and work of Christ in a Pietistic, subjective way. Instead, he chooses to walk the middle road of the Word of God; this road, when considered, knows of no such divisions but works and understands God's Word and work as one that totally confronts and involves the whole human being. In other words, the word of God is not to be appropriated by a so-called scientific division of object and subject, nor can there be a scholastic distinction made between the material and the formal aspects of a particular reality. Rather, revelation is to speak directly and historically to the whole human person living in the face of the Word and deed of the Triune God. With this approach Bohl, I believe, underlines the dialogical and spiritual-relational dimension of the Word and work of God without falling into unnecessary and many times all-too-subjective and rational distinctions.
At this point the question can be raised, why then did Bohl choose to treat the teachings of the Word in accordance with the loci-arrangement prevalent in the writings of later Reformed dogmaticians? This not-unimportant question can be answered by drawing attention to what we have observed earlier: Bohl did not seek to be a theologian 231
unaware of his time and context. He sought to reform theology from the inside out as
rooted in the character, power, function, and exegesis of the Word of God. Let me expand
on this.
Bohl's subtle, or not-so-subtle, change in speaking of the person and work of
Christ at the beginning of his soteriology indicates that Bohl sought to insert into the
traditional way of doing theology his own biblical method. We can say that here, as it
were, two worlds meet for the purpose of Reformation, that is, the loci-arrangement and
the Hebraic dialogical approach of word-revelation, the latter to reform the former. This,
in fact, is further evidenced by Bohl, who stated that it is not the Greek concepts and
meanings of words that should determine the interpretation of New Testament words;
rather, the Hebraic speech of the Old Testament ought to be the treasury that fills the
profane Greek words with true content.455 This, I believe, is also the reason why,
according to Bohl, soteriology should begin with the biblical teachings of Christ's person
and work, as He is the one who is called the Deliverer or Redeemer (acoxrip).
Filling in the meaning for the word Redeemer or Deliverer from the context of the
Old Testament, Bohl notes that this word should be understood as 'the one who makes room.' Christ is the one in whom the believer has room again, that is, by way of His
incarnation, life, work, death, and resurrection. In and by Him the Old has entirely broken
Ibid. He writes, "Was nun Erloser bedeutet, ist nicht zunachst aus dem Griechischen zu entnehmen, sonder wir mussen aufs Hebraische zuruckgehen. Diese heilige Sprache ist die Vorratskammer, aus der die profanen griechischen Worter erst mit ihrem wahren Inhalt erfullt werden mussen." 232 up, and new life is given to the one who is delivered from the narrow bonds of sin and death.456
If, as I have noted, the loci-thinking involves space-thinking or place-thinking— often dialectically intertwined with Greek thought of quantification, movement, or a turning to the visual—then here Bohl points out that Hebrew thought already included a notion of place and space; however, it was to be understood radically differently, namely, from within a dialogical framework in which the Word and its spiritual and personal dimension are central. In Christ, the eternal Word of God, there is made room, and in him there is a place of rest, deliverance, and a new way. Profane Greek thoughts and words are to be filled in with the meaning of Hebraic thoughts and words from the context of the Old Testament. Common places in theology are not receptacles to be filled with the ideas of humans, which in turn are subject to being linked or "glued together" to form a systematic whole, dialectically or historically, but the room that Scripture speaks of is
Jesus Christ Himself, who in actual fact makes room for Himself as He has broken through to fulfill and deliver human beings bound in sin, death, and the claws of the words and works of the devil. To this breaking through all of revelation testifies.
As I have noted, Ritschl, as a biblical-historical theologian, misses this point too.
His concentration is ultimately on the historical, which is subject to the interpretation of the regenerate community, thereby assuming an historical independence of the word by appropriating the word as mediated by thoughts and ways of thinking that are not derived
456 Ibid. "Der Erloser ist also eigentlich einer, der da Raum macht, ein Bahnbrecher, der alien Widerstand iiberwindet, so da|3 andere es leicht haben, vgl. Mi 2,13... In Jesu ist Erlosung, der weite, freie Raum fur uns in der Beengung Sitzende in persona erschienen.... Wer in Jesu bleibt, ist im weiten Raum, im neuen Leben, das der Enge und dem Tode entgegentritt." Ibid., 271-272.. 233 from the word itself.457 In Ritschl's case, his stance towards revelation is conditioned by the present in which he lived and thought, having appropriated categories of thought that find their bedding in Kant's dialectical distinction between nature and freedom, or rationality and revelation, and are ultimately expressed and in danger of being reduced by a this-worldly ethical interest in the establishment of the kingdom of God.
This stands in sharp contrast to what we find at the center of Bohl's theology of revelation and justification, namely, his biblically derived conception of history, which is to be understood in terms of concentric circles as determined from above, or by the revelation and work of the Eternal One. Revelation must confront the human being always from its own center; that is, from out of eternity in his or her totality. Ultimately the space the human being needs for the satisfaction of both God and himself or herself is not visual space or a historic space that can be filled in by concepts or ideas, experiences or even our own words or actions, which in turn can be seen as linked together dialectically or rationally. The space or room the human being needs, and which can only satisfy both God and the human being, is from above; it is spiritual, a heavenly room in which the believer is called to abide as in Christ and by the Holy Spirit in accordance with God's law and will. Neither in the realm of creation nor in the realm of soteriology can this space be conceived of dialectically, which tends to result in the human being speaking from himself and towards himself in monologue. It can only be conceived dialogically; that is, as determined and conditioned by God's own personal word and
Spirit, without reducing God, the human being, and the world to one another.
In Ritschl's theology, the fides historica trumps the fides Revelatus in Ecclesia. Or perhaps one can say, the former tends to absorb the latter. 234
This distinction is critically important, for here a subtle reformation of the traditional loci-approach is to be observed. With Ramus and those who were influenced by his pedagogy and method, the gaze had turned to an analysis of the Christian experience of grace and salvation, or even to its historical unfolding with the idea of the history of redemption or of the ordo salutis. Although outwardly many of them still perhaps subscribed to the Word as the norma fidei, the concentration had shifted to the unfolding of salvation in the here and now, either historically or personally, which in turn could be linked together historically or experientially as in a golden chain. With Bohl's dialogical Old Testament word approach as he interprets Rom 8:29-30, the gaze is redirected to Christ as the Way, as the 'place' in whom alone we have and find salvation, rest, and work.
Conjoined with Bohl's hermeneutic of the Old Testament—or better said, as grounded in his understanding and interpretation of revelation, in which the vertical incorporates the horizontal, in which eternity determines and directs time, with the Word being the foundation of creation and history—even in its development, according to which history is to be conceived of concentrically moving outward and forward (the beginning organically including the end), Bohl stands in direct contradistinction to both the systematization (hypostatization) of the way of salvation and the systematization of the history of redemption itself. Surely one must speak of a development from promise to fulfillment, from law to fulfillment, but the primary gaze should never be the historical, or human personal. Only faith counts here as resting in the Word of God, in which the end is already included in the beginning. The spiritual-relational dimension of the word of God as law includes the promise for its fulfillment also in the life of the believer, who 235 rests in the Spirit of the Word and in the Word of the Spirit as he or she listens to the voice of the living God who still speaks and acts. In this manner, Bohl's theology, which reaches all the way back to the Reformation, can thus be seen as a reestablishment of dialogue over against all the methodical or dialectical movements that precipitated its decay.
From this perspective we must also understand Bohl's decrying of Ritschl's elimination of metaphysics. But again, this is not metaphysics in the sense of the Greek word, but metaphysics that is 'filled in' with the treasures of the Old Testament and from a Hebraic way of thinking, that is, from a true understanding of revelation itself and its inherent 'Way/58 who is Christ the Redeemer, who breaks open and provides room, rest, and strength from what is beyond the physical and the visual.459
From this perspective Bohl proceeds to say that the New Testament word, gospel, or glad tidings, must also be understood from the perspective of the Redeemer making room or delivering out of the prison of sin and death. This is essentially different from how the Socinians, the Roman Catholics, and the Rationalists present the gospel as if it
458 Bohl called Ritschl's christology Socinian and his soteriology Pelagian, precisely because Ritschl's doctrine of revelation leads him to Deism, as it is ultimately rationalistic. The spiritual-relational dimension in Ritschl is ultimately still dialectically determined, with as focus the self-estimation of the human being in his or her this- worldly space, or time (future). In this way, Ritschl remains true to the Schleiermacherian methodology he inherited and embraced. Here also Ritschl can be seen as an inheritor of the Ramist tradition, which through Ames anticipated Schleiermacher, but again in his own peculiar dialectical way and/or scientific way. 459 Here too the analogy of faith cannot be replaced, or mixed with the analogy of being or the analogy of history. 236 were given for perfection (lex perfecta), or as a new sum of commandments, or for a new life and ethical view of and for the world.460
It is also remarkable, in light of my comparison between Bohl and Ritschl, and in the context of Bohl's comments on soteriology and Christ, that at this point Bohl turns to the teachings of the Bible on the eternal council of God concerning Redemption, thereby directly connecting soteriology with the eternal, or the vertical, as informed by the Word.
Again, no room is given to think in terms of an abstract, or objective decree theology, or in terms of subjective evidences in one's life of having been elected. An immediate dialogical and vertical line is maintained, as rooted in the personal word-revelation of
God.461 Bohl maintains that only from this standpoint can one truly speak of the Trinity, not abstractly or subjectively but concretely as informed by the Word of God itself and its power. From this point of view a look is offered into the deep mystery of the Trinity. All other treatments of the Trinity that do not first and foremost find their point of departure in this concrete word-revelational context are futile speculation.462 And in turn, it is from the standpoint of the Trinity revealed by word-revelation that one considers the eternal council of Redemption. In fact, this was the position of Adam before the fall, as he was
Bohl writes: "Damit entfallen alle irrigen Meinungen, als ob das Evangelium etwa eine neue vervollkommnete Lehre, eine lex perfecta, eine neue Summe von Geboten, Lebensanschauungen und Lebenssitten enthalte, wie solches die Socianer (Catech Racov. p. 145), die romisch-katholische Kirche (s. Bellarmin, De iustificatione L. IV, Kap 2 und 3), und nach ihnen die Rationalisten annehmen." Bohl, Dogmatik, 272. 461 "Dieser Ratschlu(3 Gottes hatte aber nicht mit einem Abstraktum zu tun, etwa mit der Erlosung im Allgemeinen, sondern er bezieht sich auf eine ganze konkrete Person, auf Christus; als das neue Haupt und den neuen Anfanger aller Dinge (Eph 1:10)." Ibid., 272-273. 462" Alles andere Verhandeln uber die Trinitat, das nicht im Hinblick auf dieser Offerbarung geschieht—ist Miipige Spekulation. Nur von dem festen Grunde dieser Offerbarung aus konnen wir auf eine ewige Wesenstrinitat zuruckschlie|3en, von der wir ohne solche Manifestation nichts wu|3ten." Ibid., 273. 237 created in the image of God but did not remain in it.463 The human being must be brought back to that position to participate again in the Trinity as a human being; he or she must be brought back by way of Jesus Christ (the Word), that is, by way of His incarnation, satisfaction, and reconciliation in accordance with the eternal council of God464 and the
Spirit of God.
Bohl's Claim: Ritschl As a Socinian, No More, No Less
In light of Bohl's speaking of the person and work of Christ, and after he has considered the idea of universal redemption in his Dogmatik, he proceeds to show how the eternal counsel of Redemption was executed in both the Old and New Testaments in a unified way. In chapter 2 of this dissertation I have considered the same thoughts with respect to
Bohl's christology as expressed in his early works, which are in this section of his
Dogmatik expanded upon in the context of other teachings of Scripture. Therefore, I do not need to repeat what was pointed out there. This counts the same for the following section, in which Bohl exposes the biblical teachings on the incarnation as part and parcel of the execution of God's eternal council of redemption in time as fulfillment of what was promised in the Old Testament. As I have also already considered in detail Bohl's doctrine of the incarnation in the context of his controversy with Abraham Kuyper, as have others, it is not necessary to repeat it here.465
However, as I am dealing in this chapter with Bohl's positive articulation of the doctrine of justification in its relation to other doctrines of Scripture and his critique of
463 Ibid., 273. 464 See ibid., 274-275. 465 For an additional and clear treatment of Bohl's hermeneutic, christology and doctrine of the incarnation see Forster, 70-169. 238
Ritschl, it is important to consider Bohl's critique of Ritschl in this part of his Dogmatik on soteriology and christology, as it deals with my central thesis: that, at bottom, what differentiated Bohl from Ritschl is their understanding of the Word of God as connected with Bohl's claim that Ritschl ought to be understood as a "refined Socinian."466
According to Bohl, like Socinus, Ritschl rejects the biblical doctrine of satisfaction, which according to him is grounded in juridical concepts. For Ritschl, Christ is not to be interpreted as the answer to God's retributive justice as given to the believer in justification.467 Also, according to Ritschl, Christ did not share in the guilt of the human being vis-a-vis God's justice, and therefore Christ's death cannot be understood as a substitutionary atonement.468 Christ could not suffer the eternal death on account of sin against a righteous and eternal God, as his person and work and what he did for God's people were primarily the manifestation of God's love and not of his wrath.
Because of this interpretation of Scripture and understanding of Christ, Ritschl can, in fact, be said to have brought about a secularization of thoughts concerning Christ and the apostles.469 In his treatment of the biblical foundation of the doctrine of justification, Ritschl even simply omits to speak of Christ's miraculous birth and its
466 The charge that Ritschl was very much a reviver of Socinianism is also stated by Herman Bavinck, a later contemporary of Bohl: "Even Ritschl has factually done nothing else but revived Socinianism," Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 2: 297 (my translation). See also ibid., 3:346. 467 "Gleichwie Socin, ebenso verwirft Ritschl iiberhaupt die Kombination der Satisfaktionslehre mit gewissen durch die Heilige Schrift dargebotenen juristischen Begriffen. Christus is fur Ritschl und die Socinianer kein Aquivalent, das Gott gebracht werden konnte." Bohl, Dogmatik, 369. 468 Ibid. 469 "Ritschl hat in seiner Darstellung der christlichen Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versohnung (2 Auflage, 3 Bande), eine Sakularisierung jener Gedanken Jesu und seiner Apostle vorgenommen, welche in diese Lehren einschlagen." Ibid., 366. 239 prehistory and portrays Christ, in Socinian fashion, as primarily an Israelite prophet who was the founder of a congregation with the purpose of moral activity in and for the kingdom of God.470
Furthermore, in Ritschl's system, sin is not what Gal 3:22 says it is, i.e., something that envelopes the human being as bondage or as breach of covenant; rather, it is the plurality of actual sins, which find their cause in ignorance or blindness.471 Simply put, Ritschl reduces sin to 'rational weakness,' just as in the tradition of the Socinians.472
Even Paul, finally, is interpreted as overcoming Pharisaic doctrine, according to which all people are trespassers of the law. Paul, according to Ritschl, does not have such a negative doctrine of the human being; the wrath of God will be reserved for the last day, but for now it is virtually irrelevant.473
Thus, according to Bohl, in Ritschl's theology the biblical ideas of God's retributive justice and wrath seem simply to be eliminated. In this way, Ritschl has created the room he needs for interpreting Christ's work of reconciliation from an entirely different standpoint than that of the Catholic Church.474
For Ritschl, redemption through Christ must not be understood in accordance with the measuring rod of a pre-Christian understanding of law, nor in light of the Pharisaic idea of retributive justice. The law was given by angels and not by God. God, in contradistinction, established another order, that is, an order based on promise.475 His righteousness is not retributive, or punishing, but for salvation. The new exegesis
470 Ibid. 471 Ibid. 472 Ibid. 473 Ibid. 474 Ibid., 367. 475 Ibid. 240 prevalent in Ritschl's time that righteousness must be understood positively, namely, for salvation and healing, all of a sudden becomes the leitmotif for explaining this attribute of God.476 The idea of God's retributive justice, which is clearly present in the Old
Testament economy of the ceremonial law, where the animal (goat, lamb) was to bear the sins of the people as a substitutionary sacrifice, is again, in true Socinian fashion, simply eliminated.477
According to Bohl, this is all clearly against what the Scriptures teach about the offering of Christ. Do not Heb 2:17 and 1 John 2:2 teach that Christ is the one who takes away the sins of his people, meaning that he covers with His person and work the sins of the world, and this all on account of what happened to Christ, which actually should have happened to the world? The same thoughts we find in Rom 3:25, where it is said that God has appointed the sacrifice of Christ's life so that human beings can obtain reconciliation through faith. Hebrews 10:12 also shows that Christ is equated with the sin offering of the high priest. From these verses, it is clear that Paul derives his doctrine of reconciliation from the Old Testament and not in accordance with the ideas of Albrecht
Ritschl.478
So, Bohl comes to a summing up of the similarities between Socinus and
Ritschl.479 Ritschl's understanding of righteousness as synonymous with grace is like that of Socinus, who also emphasized that the idea of God's righteousness does not include
476 Ibid. 477 Ibid. 478 Ibid. 479 „'ET s muss nun jedem, der die Socinianische Bestreitung der satisfactio vicaria Christi kennt, die Ahnlichkeit zwischen den Resultaten, zu denen Socin einerseits und Ritschl's andrerseits kommen, einleuchten." Ibid., 368. 241 the necessity to punish.480 Like Socinus, Ritschl denies the doctrine of substitutionary atonement, as understood in the context of fulfillment of God's retributive justice, as satisfaction. Isaiah 53 is not the text to come to an understanding of Christ's person and work. Christ is primarily a Redeemer not of sin but of death as something threatening and evil.481 And so redemption becomes not redemption from evil, understood biblically as deliverance from being sold as a slave to sin and death, but redemption from a subjective judgment over evil, i.e., of death.482 Therefore, as for Socinus, the death of Christ belongs to His prophetic office. Furthermore, as a real Socinian would say, the offer of Christ did not satisfy the wrath of God, since this offer had as primary context God's grace towards the Israelites. In like fashion the Socinians claim that, according to the Holy
Scriptures, it is solely by God's love and compassion that He forgives sins and this excludes the necessity for a substitutionary atonement. According to Bohl, this demonstrates that Ritschl, together with the Socinians, understands that the love-will of
God is to be understood as in contradiction with his righteousness.484 For Ritschl, therefore, instead of satisfying God's justice, Christ's offering is meant to bring about repentance from the human side. That the possibility and basis of true repentance is
480 Rather "[es] ist die Gerechtigkeit das billige Verhalten gegen Geschopfe." Ibid. He adds, "Gerade wie Ritschl wirft Socin der Orthodoxie vor, dap sie nur Strafeifer und Zorn unter der Gerechtigkeit verstunde (vgl. Ritschl a.a.O. I. S. 332, II, 154)." Ibid. 481 Ibid. 482 Ibid. 483"Socin ergeht sich in ahnlichem Subjektivismus, wenn er sagt: Christus bezeuge durch seinen Tod den Gehorsam gegen den Willen Gottes, und dieser sein Tod ist das Siegel auf sein siindloses heiliges Leben. Derselbe macht Eindruck auf uns, dap wir den Entschlup fassen, Gott also gehorsam zu sein. Bei Socin wie nicht minder bei Ritschl gehort also der Tod Christi in den Bereich seines prophetischen Amtes." Ibid. 484 Ibid., 369. 242 anchored in Christ as substitutionary mediator, in the Old as well as in the New
Testament (Rom 3:25, Col 2,17), Ritschl does not see.485
In spite of these similarities between Ritschl and Socinus, Bohl does note that there is also a significant difference. While Socinus was clearly opposed to the orthodox doctrine of reconciliation and did not make any apologies for being so, Ritschl on the other hand did not see it necessary to distance himself from the Reformation in this way.
True, having considered Ritschl's affinities with the Socinians, one would expect a judgment of condemnation directed against the Reformers' doctrine of reconciliation.
However, that could not be further from the truth. Instead, by way of Ritschl's creative genius, as we have noted above, the Reformers are duly rehabilitated. Ritschl's doctrine of reconciliation should really be considered the consistent outcome of the Reformers' doctrines of justification and reconciliation.486 Towards his pupils, Ritschl proclaims this in yet another way: they must begin to see that he understands the Reformers better than the orthodox theologians do and that, in fact, his system is the fulfillment, or the finishing of theirs.487 However, in spite of this attempt at revising history on the part of Ritschl, or precisely in light of its danger, Ritschl must nonetheless be seen is a Socinus redivivus, and one should not understand him as being in the camp of the Reformers.488
485 Ibid. 486 Ibid. 487 Ibid. 488 "Es ist aber ein Socinus redivivus, den wir in Ritschl vor uns haben—nichts mehr, nicht weniger." Ibid. 243
Summary and Conclusion Concerning the Context ofBohl's Positive Exposition of the
Doctrine of Justification as Exhibited in His Dogmatik and his Critique ofRitschl
With this explicit placing ofRitschl in the camp of the Socinians and with the reasons attached to this placing, what has become clear is that the fundamental difference between Bohl and Ritschl and their doctrines of justification is grounded in their respective approach to, doctrines of, and hermeneutic of the Word of God. Throughout his discussion ofRitschl in his chapter on the doctrine of soteriology, Bohl continually refers to the second volume of Ritschl's work on justification and reconciliation. Bohl refers directly neither to Ritschl's understanding of the authority of the Scriptures as grounded in Ritschl's understanding of inspiration and the church as the interpretive regenerate community, nor to Ritschl's understanding of theology as scientific endeavor.
Nevertheless, he exposes the contents of Ritschl's interpretation of the Word, in particular, his understanding of the biblical concept of righteousness in connection with the doctrine of reconciliation. On the basis of investigating Ritschl on these points, which allows him to infer Ritschl's understanding of the authority of Scripture and his hermeneutic, Bohl claims that Ritschl is a Socinus redivivus. 244
Justification as Explained in the Context of Romans 8:29-30
As we move forward from the center of Bohl's soteriology, namely, Bohl's articulation of his christology as expounded at the start of his treatment of soteriology, it is to be noted as important that Bohl does not treat the ordo salutis as revealed in Rom 8:29-30 in a chronological way. Again, Bohl refuses to first draw revelation into the domain of history or of human experience, or of rationality. Faith must continually think uprightly (i.e., it must be ortho-dox). Therefore, according to Bohl, the distinctions made between being called, being justified, and being glorified in this passage are to be understood from the grammatical point that Paul used for all of them the aorist tense in the original, i.e., as divine deeds done in the past having continual significance for the present and the future.
This means that these deeds, including justification, must be understood as part of a whole and unbreakable chain, with the consequence that if one by faith has one, one has all parts.489
Continuing to speak of justification—in particular, as the principle text for the exposition of the doctrine of justification itself—Bohl takes Rom 3:21-28, calling verse
28 the locus classicus for the right understanding of this doctrine:490 "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law." It is evident that throughout his biblical, positive exposition of the doctrine of justification, the righteousness of God is the central concept. As the central question, Bohl repeats the traditional Lutheran interrogative, "How do I become righteous before God?" To which
489 Ibid., 397. 490 Ibid. 245 the answer is, only by and through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ before the judgment seat of God (inforo Dei), which in turn finds its reason and ground in the substitutionary work and atonement of Christ. Rom 3:28 is to be seen as the summary of what is written before verse 28, stating that justification, i.e., the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, happens without any regards to works of the law, as one is called and counted righteous by faith alone.
Following his specific exposition of Rom 3:28 as locus classicus, Bohl enlarges upon his own exposition of justification, adding several important points. Continuing to stress the central concept of the righteousness of God, seeing Christ's person and work as the fulfillment of that righteousness in terms of both moral and ceremonial law, Bohl emphasizes that the act of justification happens according to right, that is to say, in accordance with God's own justice. God forgives sins (no longer sees sins in the justified) only when His own righteousness has been satisfied by the work of Christ. Positively this means that one is accepted into the presence of God as actually righteous, so much so that one can consider Christ's righteousness, that is, his obedience (both passive and active),
! 491 as one s own.
In addition, Bohl is adamant in pointing out that faith, as simply an opened and empty hand, or perceived as the mouth of the soul, is never to be taken as a meritorious condition for justification. It should not be regarded as a work,492 as it is by the
Arminians and the Socinians. The obedience and merit of Christ is the only ground of
With this thought Bohl simply refers the reader to question and answer 60 of the Heidelberg Catechism. 246 justification.493 Justification is justification of the ungodly (Rom 4:5), of the one who lies in the midst of sin and misery. In other words, to put it in terms used in theological discussion, it is always and completely a synthetic judgment (a judgment without any regard to anything that is in the subject) and never in anyway an analytic judgment (a judgment taking into account something present within the subject justified).494
Bohl ends his treatment of the doctrine of justification by faith proper in his
Dogmatik by connecting the doctrine of justification with the doctrine of creation. As we have noted, Bohl sees an essential connection between justification and the idea of the image of God in which the human being was created (Gen 1:26-27). This original state of righteousness Bohl defines as the human being having been created in true righteousness, holiness, and wisdom as the image of God (cf. Col.3:10, Eph 4:24). By drawing on the parallel between Adam and Christ alluded to by Paul in Rom 5:15ff, Bohl makes the connection that through justification—as grounded in the obedience of the Second Adam,
Christ, who is called the express image of God the Father (Hebrews 1:3)—by faith in
Christ the ungodly person is reinstated (stands again before God as God desired to have him or her in the original state) in His image (in true and complete righteousness, wisdom, and holiness) (cf. 1 Cor 1:30).495
493 Ibid. 494 The language of synthetic and analytic judgments is Kantian. Ritschl uses this language following Schneckenburger. Mackintosh writes, "God 'justifies the ungodly.' As Ritschl expresses it in Kantian language, the decree of justification is 'synthetic' He thinks Protestantism is deteriorating when the divine sentence comes to be viewed as 'analytic'; the believer is justified!" Mackintosh, 88. 495 Bohl, Dogmatik, 420. 247
B. BOHL'S DEFENSE OF THE PROTESTANT DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AS FOUND IN HIS VONDER RECHTFERTIGUNGDURCHDENGLAUBENAND HIS CRITIQUE OF RITSCHL
Introductory Comments of Analysis and Intent
Bohl's positive defense of the doctrine of justification against its contemporary and
historic detractors is expressed in the last chapter of his book Von der Rechtfertigung
durch den Glauben, where he accomplishes what he does not expressly do in his
Dogmatik, namely, putting the doctrine of justification in specific relation to other
theological doctrines in order to apologetically demonstrate how to understand it as the
proper way of understanding the Word of God and defend it against deformations. He
speaks of justification in relation to the original state and sin, anthropology, the Holy
Spirit, the incarnation, faith, regeneration, predestination, sanctification, the 'old' and
'new' man debate, the idea of the unio mystica, and the life of the justified. In this way
Bohl becomes an apologist for the Reformed doctrine of justification, which makes this
work polemical in nature, in contradistinction to his Dogmatik.
In my consideration of this last section of Bohl's book on justification, I will
sharply focus on Bohl's critique of Ritschl and thereby seek to demonstrate what I have
already sought to establish in the previous chapters of this dissertation. In the process of
analyzing this last chapter I will attempt to verify, using Bohl's own positive exposition of justification in its relation to other teachings of Scripture, the thesis of this dissertation as
expressed and demonstrated in the first two chapters, namely, that Bohl was consistently
apprehensive about placing biblical and dogmatic questions into the realm of human
rationality and control. 248
In general, I will seek to further prove in this chapter in a more thorough fashion
that Bohl's critique of Ritschl is best understood and evaluated from the standpoint of his
doctrine of the Word of God, which is also inextricably intertwined with his
understanding of the image of God and its dogmatic theological consequences. I will
therefore pay close attention to Bohl's anthropology as rooted and related to his doctrine
of the Word of God, his doctrine of justification, and his critique of Ritschl as an
important component of my thesis, as described at the beginning of this research.
Justification and the Original State
It is significant that in his dogmatic delineation of the doctrine of justification, Bohl starts
with his interpretation of the original state and the idea of the image of God. In previous
chapters we have dealt with Bohl's interpretation of the image of God in the context of
his controversy with Abraham Kuyper and his claim that a further Reformation was
needed. In this chapter, I will consider the dogmatic implications of this important aspect
of his theology in connection with his doctrine of revelation and his doctrine of justification. The latter connection must, first of all, be considered in light of Bohl's
spiritual-relational theology as informed by his doctrine of the Word of God, of which his
doctrine of the image of God is its actual manifestation in relation to justification. We
must observe that here too the basic thesis, that Bohl refuses to place revelation in the
realm of human rationality, and what that entails is fundamental also in relation to
Ritschl. 249
Bohl notes that the great question of Scripture is the possibility of the human being's conduct according to God's law.496 In the original state the human being was in the image of God, so constituted "that the highest excellence in God, righteousness and holiness, [was] also expressed in man's works.... There was a reciprocal relation in the human organization, that no other conclusion could be formed of its activity than that this being is an image of the Divinity."497 In other words, the original state must be understood in spiritual and relational fashion: all thoughts, feelings, will, and action were in accordance with God's Word as law. In this way righteousness in this state appeared
"in the entire constitution of man, and it... consisted] in clearly comprehending with the mind what pertains to God and Divine things and endorsing with the will the law of
God."498
In light of this understanding of the original state, Osiander's doctrine of original righteousness being infused and essential is to be rejected. With him one would be caught in the circle of the material, of the substantial, of physical categories with Christ's righteousness after the fall being necessarily conceived of as essential, infused righteousness, in accordance with the physical indwelling of God himself. "He thus goes from one material righteousness to another and is unable to extricate himself from the circulus vitiosus of the material—from reckoning with physical categories."499
According to Bohl, this was also the error that many seventeenth-century theologians committed as they considered "Adam's righteousness as a state (habitus) which is to be restored in the renewing. In this false assumption the law was again
496 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 136. 497 Ibid., 138. 498 Ibid. 499 Ibid., 139. 250 assumed in sanctification as an aid, and the matter was confused more than ever: the Holy
Ghost acting [as] a pedagogue and not as Creator and God."500 The word and Spirit again were mixed with flesh, human works, and rationality.
Justification and Original Sin
Under this heading, Bohl again emphasizes the importance of the Word of God as law.
The human being under the imputation of Adam's sin has entirely departed from the original state. However, even under these conditions the law remains in effect, with this difference: after the fall the human being can no longer "accomplish anything by the aid of the law that will stand the test."501 However, the human being's inability with respect to the law must not go unnoticed. His or her insufficiency, in fact, "is of the nature of sin, and for it he is continually held responsible by God."502 The law, as the word of God, remains in force, but the human being is found entirely unable to respond positively, as concluded under sin.
However, one may ask, how should one then understand the human nature as sinful? Bohl, in answer to this question, adamantly rejects the idea that sin must be conceived of as something qualitative or substantial (material); sin must be understood on the basis of the doctrine of justification. The imputation of the righteousness of Christ must be understood as the antidote to the imputation of sin. The words of Rom 5:12-21 are of cardinal importance here. In verse 18, Paul "contrasts condemnation and
500 Ibid. 501 Ibid., 140. 502 Ibid., 141. 251 justification as the two cardines of the entire discourse."503 As the word of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, the Second Adam, must never be understood substantially or qualitatively, neither should the word of condemnation of sin upon Adam. Neither in salvation nor in sin is the word of God to be placed in the realm of flesh or rationality as if to be ontologically predicated from the human being. "We have here judgment over against judgment, imputation over against imputation—Paul assumes the standpoint of justice [Rechtsstandpunkt]."504 In this point too, "of condemnation on the one hand and of justification on the other, we are beyond all subjectivities of man."505
Thus, in accordance with the nature, power, and function of God and His Word, neither grace nor sin is to be hypostasized in the realm of flesh. Real sin is simply
"aversio a Deo, apostasy from God, of which Adam was guilty."506 This again, in accordance with the nature and character of God's word and Spirit, must be understood spiritually and relationally.
What must dawn before our eyes and in our lives as human beings, according to
Bohl, is the tribunal of God. And "in the heavenly tribunal, God Himself is the highest consideration, and the transgressions of the first commandment is the constant theme of all the Prophets; in comparison to these, all others disappear like an impure drop in the great ocean." In fact, any personification or hypostatization of God's word by placing it
503 Ibid., 142. 504 Ibid., 143. 505 Ibid. Bohl expounds on this: "It profiteth nothing to remain standing at Adam's fall and rack your brains concerning the inheritable nature of sin and how it harmonizes with the righteousness of God. Such halting and theorizing and wondering leads only too easily to philosophical byways." Ibid., 145. Again, one must leave God's Word and its effects in accordance with faith, and never experience or rationality. 506 Ibid., 146. 507 Ibid. 252
into such realms as human flesh and rationality, either as law or as grace, can be
considered a sin against the first commandment, as idolatry or as a Promethean attempt
to steal fire from God. Such is the nature of sin under law and under grace, as both are
anchored in the Word of a Triune God who speaks, lives, and acts. Here too the
dialogical trumps the analytic, and the dialectical, in fact, must be considered as its polar
opposite.
And so we observe under the heading of sin that Bohl also defends the Word of
God in accordance with its reality and effects. In fact, sin manifests itself mostly when the
Word of God is taken into our own hand, when it is placed into the domain of flesh, to be manipulated according to our own wishes, whether they be religious wishes or otherwise.
"Man left to himself now becomes ever more and more sinful, and sin manifests itself most of all when the commandment is taken into hand (according to Rom 7:8) whereby all lusts are again called into activity."
At this point, Bohl turns to Ritschl and his anthropology. He asks, must we then say with Ritschl that "original sin is an article of doctrine that we do not believe"?509 For
Ritschl, righteousness was grace alone, and sin was being ignorant of grace. So why believe in original sin from such a point of view? However, according to Bohl, precisely at this point Ritschl has taken the word of God into his own hands and reduced it to a
'scientific' subject; he received it critically, to be subjected first to the judgment of the present regenerate community. Therefore, Bohl comments, "Certainly, original sin is a very real factor, a factor which cannot be properly disposed of by a mere pronouncement of Ritschl, but it receives its true disposition in its relation to its center, that is, to
508 Ibid, 148. 509 Ibid. Ritschl as quoted by Bohl. 253 justification. This is the way orthodoxy proceeds."510 And what is this way? It is the way of standing as a human being before the face of God, first bound in enmity and desperately wicked (Jer 17:9), but upon a change of relation, which takes place by the forgiveness of sins in the blood of Jesus Christ, free and joyful.511
What then about sin and the regenerate human being? Again the idea of the Word of God as law is central here, and corresponding to this idea is the spiritual-relational character of the Word, which does not permit one to fall into the error of speaking of qualities or new, infused substances. For the regenerate human being the Bible speaks of a law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, which has freed us from the law of sin and death
(Rom 8:2) "and not of new qualities that combat the old."512 The Word of God as law is never to be understood as if in the hand of the sinner nor to be predicated from the sinner.
Rather, the hand of the sinner, who remains total sinner even as regenerate, which the law continues to point out, is taken by the hand of the Holy Spirit. Again, this is a spiritual- relational reality to the exclusion of any substantiation of the present. "It is walking by the hand of the Holy Ghost, where the regenerate has no more to gain, nor anything to lose, but is in a position to glory of a law which has been fulfilled in Christ."513
Thus sin and the human being cannot be understood except in light of the commandment. Neither holiness nor grace can be usurped by the natural human being or by the regenerate believer. In fact, with the regenerate the threat of sin is even greater.
Precisely in the life of the regenerate is ever present the temptation to idolatry, which seeks to place the Word of God as either law or grace in the realm of flesh and rationality
510 Ibid. 511 See ibid. 512 Ibid., 150. 513 Ibid., 150-151. 254 and in human control. Therefore, it is to be observed that Ritschl does not understand the reality of sin; he does not reckon with the law of God either for a natural human being under law or for the regenerate under grace. What does this mean more concretely in terms of Bohl's and Ritschl's respective anthropologies?
The Anthropological Consequences of Ritschl's Doctrine of Justification
Having shown how to think of sin from the high point of the law and from the divine viewpoint of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, Bohl asks, what about the historical connection with Adam's apostasy?
In many theologies it seems as though everything really begins with the historical coming of Christ or with the new influx of life granted because of his sacrifice. What matters most in many theologies is the infusion of new life into the human being in conversion. However, does my real history begin with regeneration? Does it begin with
Christ? Or does it begin with baptismal regeneration, as some Reformed claim?514
In answer to these questions, Bohl posits that the regenerate must learn to know that God justifies the ungodly. In this way the regenerate remains historically connected with the apostasy of Adam—in fact, connected with history itself as in it all things are concluded under sin. According to Bohl, even those who are baptized in the church are not renewed unless effectively called by the Holy Spirit of God, who convicts of sin, righteousness, and judgment.515
In this way, the Word of God is to be understood not only as spiritual and relational but also as pointing to our own historicity. Even believers do not somehow
514 Ibid., 154. 515 TU:A 255 hover above history but as sinners are inextricably part of it and will remain so until the eschaton. Precisely by attempting to draw the Word of law and grace into this world and into our domain of rationality, even in terms of a regenerational or ethically reduced theology, we will lose the proper perception of the human being in his or her historicity under God; in fact, we will lose touch with history itself. The central word of God justifying the ungodly must be erected against all such tendencies as the true word of regeneration in Christ, by the Spirit.
At this point Bohl comments that Ritschl's interpretation of Rom 5 is right: Paul entirely excludes the idea of righteousness imparted or infused into life; such an idea is merely a Pietistic reaction against dead orthodoxy,516 and against this, Ritschl posits his idea of the verdict of righteousness falling together with the ideal form of the church, that is, "the ideal congruity of the members of Christ's Congregation with God, which is established by the divine verdict."517 All this is to be called good, according to Bohl, inasmuch as Ritschl resists the idea of righteousness of life having to do with the infusion of righteousness. Also, Bohl notes that Ritschl does not understand the individual realization of this ideal congruity in terms of a mystical process, that is, with the aid of
SIR the idea of unio mystica, which Ritschl calls an apocryphal product. With this Bohl agrees. However, as far as Ritschl himself is concerned, Bohl does note that Ritschl does not speak biblically of history, sin, and the human being.
According to Bohl, Ritschl loses the human historical connection with Adam's apostasy; in fact, Ritschl loses history in favor of a future based upon moral persuasion.
516 Ibid. 517 Ibid. 518 Ibid., 155. 256
In the theology of Ritschl the synthetic divine verdict of righteousness upon and for the
congregation is understood indirectly, that is, as an ideal to be realized directly by the
obedience of faith and worked out in love for the kingdom of God here below. "Thus
Ritschl also leaves the past out of view and takes notice only of the future. There is no
past for man."519 And why is there no past for the human being in Ritschl's system?
Again, the answer is that Ritschl does not reckon with the law as the first word to the
human being by which he or she is to be discovered as a sinner, as a historical being in
historical connection with Adam's apostasy. In Ritschl's system, justification too is the
beginning of real life, with righteousness interpreted as grace. The problem is that the
human being is received into divine judgment without law, and so sin as biblically
understood and the historical connection with the apostasy of Adam evaporates.
Therefore, only the future counts for Ritschl; it is to be realized by humanity for the
kingdom of God as ideal.
Paul, Bohl notes, teaches differently in Rom 3:21. In this verse he reckons with all
of history under the justice and law of God. It is the justice and righteousness of God that
gives history its meaning and the individual human being a true self-understanding, as
acknowledged by the experience of faith in justification.520
Thus, we can conclude that, insofar as the word of justification or of the
imputation of righteousness is never to be placed in the domain of human flesh in terms of the doctrine of mystical union, Ritschl is correct. We should never think under any circumstance that when God imputes righteousness to human beings it results in a change in their essence. Such a union, and consequently such a predication, contradicts the word
519 Ibid. 257 of justification, "which purely by imputation renders the ungodly acceptable to God."521
However, insofar as the law is not reckoned with in Ritschl's theology as the living Word of God, Ritschl has also lost his connection with the apostasy of Adam and thereby with history as understood, determined, and directed by a Triune and living God.
Finally, we underline that, for Bohl, it is specifically the word of imputation, that is, of the justification of the ungodly, that ought to safeguard the word of God from falling into the domain of and consequently into the control of human rationality. A deep and consistent understanding and application of the word of imputation is the means par excellence whereby the character and function of the Word of God is demonstrated, properly defended, and applied. An apology for the doctrine of justification, properly understood, is an apology for the character and function of the Word of God, and vice versa. The two are inextricably intertwined. In other words, when one properly understands the doctrine of justification, one understands also the spiritual-relational character of the Word of God to the exclusion of all hypostatization, or substantialization of this Word, which occurs when one introduces foreign methodologies and terminologies to interpret the Word of God. The result of the latter will always be that one begins to predicate of the human being what belongs properly only to God, Christ, and the Spirit, whether one speaks of righteousness as infused, or of works; one takes the law again in one's own hand in the domain of ethics. Conversely, one can say, by removing foreign elements and methodologies from the interpretation of the Word of
God on the strength of a deep understanding of the Word of justification as a central word
1 Ibid., 156. 258 of the living God who speaks, Bohl seeks to restore the true dialogical and Hebraic character of revelation and the human being in relation to God and the World.
Having said this, nevertheless, Bohl found a welcome ally in Ritschl's defense of the doctrine of justification against a mystical and substantial interpretation. Though
Ritschl's refined Socinianism had placed him outside the camp of Christian orthodoxy,
Bohl, as an eclectic theologian, still referred positively to Ritschl and his critique of the mystical and pantheistic tendencies in Reformed theology: "As opposed to these theologians, Ritschl is right. For they are all entangled in the meshes of the substance. ...
Against such excesses within the Protestant church itself, Ritschl directed his History of
Pietism."522
However, though we have observed that Ritschl, as later Bohl, discarded all metaphysical imagery concerning the human being and returned to sober experience,523 he fell into the other extreme, that is, of separating God from the world and the human being in a Deistic-dualistic fashion.524 This has serious consequences for Ritschl's anthropology in particular, as the concentration fell solely on the self-consciousness of the human being and on a union in terms of a common purpose of will with God. In
Ritschl's system, mystical or ontological union was simply replaced by ethical union.
In this way as well, "man with his experience is entirely isolated"526 as an abstraction for the realization of the will of God in His Kingdom.
522 Ibid. 523 Ibid. 524 Ibid. 525 Ibid. 526 Ibid. 259
So, if the human being in the theology of Osiander and many seventeenth-century
theologians was in danger of being mystically and ontologically absorbed because of
their understanding of such things as the Word of God, Ritschl's theology, as rooted in his
understanding of revelation and the church as the hypothetical idea of the congruence of
all its members, was in danger of entirely isolating the human being. His concept of the
human being became "suspended in the air and has no foundation in history."527
In light of this, according to Bohl, the human being in Ritschl's system too is
unreal, contrary to Ritschl's claim of his return to sober experience, as the human being in
the mystical-pantheistic doctrines of justification. And so finally, in both systems, in fact,
a loss of history is to be observed, as in the one, real history begins only in regeneration
as ontologically conceived, and in the other, history begins in accordance with the
abstract ideal construct of the congregation as regenerate community. With that, in short,
Bohl notes, "the man whom Paul's justification doctrine requires, in order to be saved
through Jesus Christ, is to be found neither with Ritschl nor with his opponents."528 The human being has either become an ideal abstraction, in community or of will, or the human being is in danger of being absorbed into something other than what he or she is and remains as a historical being under God, namely, ungodly. In Ritschl's case, why is this so? Very clearly, the biblical and dogmatic questions are placed in the domain of human rationality. Bohl writes, "With Ritschl we find merely the Kantian translation of the biblical ideas into the sphere of reason, the Biblical terminology being retained—thus a relapse into Pelagianism!"529 Against these two fronts, Bohl defends the biblical notion
527 Ibid. 528 Ibid. 529 Ibid., 157 (my emphasis). 260 that as subject of justification and regeneration the human being is an d remains ungodly.
The human being remains sold as a slave under sin (Rom 7:14). What both extremes presuppose as subject of justification is either a transformed individual in the formal or ideal sense (as being part of the Christian community) or a transformed individual in the material or 'real' sense (being under the influence of an inherent or infused righteousness). In both cases the Word of God is subsumed into the realm of either human rationality or human experience and the sovereign work of a Triune God denied.
In reality these two fronts are merely flip sides of the same coin, the coin being the human being as the object and the subject of the Christian justification doctrine. This is necessarily the result when one places God's revelation into the realm of human rationality as a 'scientific' object of investigation for seeing, grasping, feeling, ordering, arranging, and finally controlling. However, such an approach and procedure will ultimately result in the Word of God being brought into the world of silent objects or into a world in which only the voice of the religious or rational human being and his experience can be heard. But what is this, or what will this be, but listening to the echo of one's own voice or to the monologue of one's own soul? Bohl's defense of the Christian doctrine of justification is therefore also a defense of the living Word of God, so that God yet may speak as the living God and so that the decay of dialogue may be reversed and true communication restored between God and the human being.
For this reason, Bohl points out to Ritschl, as it were, that the Bible is not a dead book but that the language of justification must assume a living aspect, a truly existential aspect, a truly dialogical aspect. Bohl writes, referring to Luther as well, '"When God begins to justify a man, He first condemns him, and whom He desires to build, He 261
destroys, whom He desires to heal, He wounds, whom he wants to make alive, etc'
Therefore, in life the matter assumes a lively aspect, and justification already is carried
out in life."530 Precisely this aspect seems to be lacking in the system of Ritschl because
of his doctrine of the Word of God, that is, it lacks this lively, spiritual-relational
dimension. In his doctrine of justification the human being seems to be suspended in the
air, entirely isolated and without foundation in history precisely because the Word of God
is seemingly reduced to the world of silent objects, and God is Deistically projected to a
realm entirely of His own.
Moreover, in the theology of Ritschl the law is silenced. For Bohl, however, the
law is a living reality that must begin its work with our souls, when "the law takes us by
the hand and makes sinners of us."531 And again, here our historical connection with
Adam's apostasy and our history are learned, before and after regeneration. But here also
our spiritual relation with the Second Adam, Christ, is learned, which gives us true
comfort and joy. Ritschl's ideal construct of the church can bring no comfort here, as it
misses real subjects as the church is without the true working of the law532 as the Word of
God. Ritschl's idea of the church is ultimately an empty concept as the design of Divine
revelation is not accomplished therein.52.
530 Ibid., 158. 531 Ibid., 160. 532 Ibid., 161. 533 Ibid., 163. In the German version in a footnote Bohl refers here again to Ritschl's Theologie und Metaphysik: "Wonach Ritschl, gemass dem Zeugniss Christi und der dem Glauben an ihm feststehenden Erfahrung, das Reich Gottes in der Gemeinde Christi als wirklich in irgend einem Umfang voraussetzt, wenn er von der Relationen der Liebe Gottes und der im Reich Gottes vereinigten Menschen rede." Bohl, Von der Rechtfertigung, 160. 262
Bohl expresses the same critique by saying that Ritschl does not duly and truly acknowledge God's faithfulness: "Human speculation limits the glorifying of God's faithfulness to those who of their own determination restrain their faithfulness and cooperate in a dualistic manner. This is making God dependent on man."534 In such extreme systems as pantheism and mysticism God's faithfulness is slowly reduced to a mere appearance, as gradually the purpose of creation is fulfilled in restoration and substantialization of the world in a monistic manner. "The Holy Scripture occupies a middle position."535 Clearly, Bohl's fundamental critique of Ritschl and others acknowledges the fundamental importance of the doctrine of the Word of God as the proper context and guide for a correct understanding of the doctrine of justification of the human being, of the church, and of the world.
Justification and the Holy Spirit
On the point of the teachings of the Holy Scriptures concerning justification, the Holy
Spirit, and the human being, Bohl forwards this thesis: "The character of justification, as being at the summit of the whole can only be safeguarded when we, along the entire course of the Christian life, discard every change that might take place in man by the help of physical categories, whether in regeneration or in justification and finally in sanctification."536 In light of this thesis, what is Bohl's critique of Ritschl's understanding of the Holy Spirit and the human being?
534 Ibid., 164 535 Ibid. 536 Ibid., 178. 263
Bohl agrees with Ritschl that "there is scarcely a subject in the whole Christian system of theology that has been so much neglected as this one."537 For Ritschl the Holy
Spirit reveals the self-knowledge of God, which is at the same time an attribute of the
Christian congregation. This does not imply that the human being changes thereby in terms of physical categories.538 In Ritschl's system, however, the Holy Spirit is principally acknowledged for the purpose of "moral influence,"539 which proceeds from faith in God and incites the individual to patience and humility as well as to ethical activity in the kingdom of God. Here Ritschl's system becomes rationalistic.540
In spite of this critique, Bohl welcomes Ritschl's observations concerning the seventeenth-century orthodox theologians in terms of their understanding of the unio mystica. Bohl himself admits that it would be convenient to simply hide behind established and honored orthodox systems on the question of the Holy Spirit and mystical union; however, being the theologian he is, standing between confessional orthodoxy and
Pietism on the middle way of the Word of God, that is, between mysticism (pantheism) and dualism (Deism), Bohl leans over to Ritschl and appropriates his criticism of the unio mystica. With Ritschl, Bohl acknowledges that "the unio mystica is a relapse into the
Middle Ages."541 Bohl continues that certainly the early Reformed and Lutherans do not know of this concept; it crept into the church at the beginning of the seventeenth century with the systematization of the order of salvation.542 The latter development coincided with the appropriation of the humanisitc Scholastic methodology of Ramus and others in
537 Ibid., 167. Ritschl as quoted in Bohl. 538 Ibid., 168. 539 Ibid. 540 Ibid., 169. 541 Ibid. Ritschl as quoted in Bohl. 542 Ibid. 264 terms of the interpretation of Scripture, and revelation was placed into the domain of human rationality and ontology; as a result, the gaze turned to an analysis of human experience and its ordering. The nature of justification, which corresponds to the nature of God's revelation in the theology of Bohl, "was corrupted, and was debased from its exalted height to the level of the unio mystica."543 Also, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and a proper understanding of the human being were thereby subsumed and absorbed.
According to Bohl, what happened in the seventeenth century was that a contrast was beginning to be made between God and the gifts of God. However, "this contrast between God and the gifts of God that dwell in believers is not admissible in the economy of grace."544 When such a contrast is made, the human being is in danger of simply falling back into the economy of the law, of good works, and the improvement of the flesh. The Word of God and the Holy Spirit are again pulled into the sphere of the rational, the seeable, the graspable. In this process, the faithfulness of God is turned into an aid, and the law and Holy Spirit of God into handmaids of the human being. However,
Bohl writes against this falling back into the economy of works: "This law of works has once for all been abrogated and is an abomination to God—yea, the slightest cooperation on our part (for this would pertain to the law) is an abomination to Him, since Christ bowed His head on Calvary and since the voice came from his lips: 'It is finished.'"545
For Bohl, justification and the gift of the Holy Spirit must be understood as absolute in relation to the human being as well. "The new man that is daily raised up needs no gifts; the one gift, the Holy Ghost in persona is sufficient for him. This first and
543 Ibid..,170 . 544 Ibid. 545 Ibid..,171 . 265
last guarantee of this (the new man's existence (Ps 51:13) he never loses."546 If the Holy
Spirit bestows special gifts on us, it is for the pursuing of a particular calling or office for
the benefit of the church. Good works, or a special goal in terms of fleshly improvement
or transformation, "are not the object of justification";547 being guided by the power of
the Holy Spirit as God's gift to the believer is.
Here Bohl's understanding of justification and the Holy Spirit clearly differs from
Ritschl's, who very strongly emphasizes the establishment of the kingdom of God by
virtue of human ethical behavior as primary goal. However, against this rationalistic and
ethical concentration of Ritschl, Bohl emphasizes that reason fumbles here. The point
again is that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in relation to the human being is a matter of faith. Ritschl's ideal construct and understanding of the church corresponds to his ideal
understanding of the Holy Spirit, and he emphasizes spurring human beings on to ethical
behavior and to cooperating with the spirit so that God's kingdom can be established here
below. However, in Ritschl's theology, this is all rooted in an ingenious reasonable
understanding, which, just as in his view of the church, really has self-willed human
beings, not sinful, historical human beings, as subject. However, for Bohl the Holy Spirit
is present "wherever a broken heart needs Him to be kept on the right road to heaven."
Thus again we observe that, according to Bohl, in Ritschl's theology the true
design of revelation and the Spirit—who takes the law into His hand to wound, to heal, to
break down, and to build up as the precondition for the human being to have a real
historical, existential, and spiritual understanding of the self, the church, and God—is
Ibid., 172. Ibid., 171-172. 266
absent. And when this is so, the human being will theologize in such a manner as yet to
see, have, and do something, either in the way of a. material understanding of the unio
mystica, which Ritschl rightly criticizes, or in the way of Ritschl's own formal alternative
of the congregation-spirit, which tends to reduce revelation to morality. Ritschl's
alternative to mysticism and Pietism, however, is merely the objective, rational side of
the same fallacious approach to divine revelation;549 it is principally an attempt to come
to terms with God's word with structures of thought strange to the word itself "merely for
the sake of finding some kind of adjustment with the Holy Scriptures."550
Thus, when revelation and one's understanding of the Holy Spirit as intimately
connected to it are placed in the sphere of human reason, both Word and Spirit tend to be
materialized or formalized. However, neither Scripture nor the Spirit are to be considered
as objects of 'science,' which happens when Greek categories of thought, methodologies,
and terminologies are introduced. Inadvertently the human being in terms of what he or
she can see, feel, have, or do becomes the focus of concentration and systematization. For
this reason Osiander and those who followed in his tracks are not first pantheists and
therefore to be combated, and Socinians and rationalists are not first Deists or dualists, but both are what they are because they have a certain understanding and appropriation of
God's revelation. This is, I believe, the ground-motif of Bohl's critique of Ritschl and
"In Ritschl's (or Schleiermacher's) conception of the Church, Pelagianism becomes very apparent: it actually chills one. He requires that we exert ourselves to the utmost; that believers thereby prove their life in the Holy Ghost.... that they recognize the gifts of grace.... Do not these learned men know anything whatever as to what transpires in the minds of Christians and what real travail from which the assurance of salvation must always as it were be born again? Does not Melanchton repeatedly and justly say that these things can only be understood in a life-and-death struggle and amid the terrors of conscience?" Ibid., 176-177. 267 many others, namely, a proper understanding of the doctrine of justification as being inextricably intertwined with a proper understanding of the Word of God. Or let me say it differently: from Bohl's perspective, a proper defense of the doctrine of justification is a proper apology for the sovereignty, power, and freedom of the Word and Spirit of God, and as such it is an apology for the faithfulness of God, who lives, speaks, and acts. This was the way of the former Hebrews. As Bohl writes, "This unio mystica [or Ritschl's ideal construct of congregation-spirit, are]. . . not in accordance with the analogy of faith.
God does not dwell in Christians in any other manner than [He did] in the people of
Israel. If we wish to be instructed in regard to the nature and effect of His indwelling, we must adhere to His word and promise,"551 and that not as reduced to such categories as space or quantification but as understood in time, in personal relation, and in Spirit.
Justification, the Incarnation and a Proper Understanding of Revelation
As we have examined Bohl's doctrine of the incarnation extensively above, we need not repeat what was said. Under this heading, I will primarily focus on Bohl's critique of
Ritschl.
For Bohl, the thought of imputation must be central for a proper understanding of the incarnation: "If we now ask which incarnation agrees best with justification;... it is the entering into our sinful nature, which is under the imputation of Adam's sin; so that the Son of God appeared, having been sent in the likeness of sinful flesh (according to
Romans 8:3)."552 "The justification doctrine requires a particular kind of Mediator and
1 Ibid., 176 (my emphasis). 2 Ibid., 182-183. 268
Redeemer."553 And it is the thought of imputation that gives one the right understanding
of the person and work of Christ, for "in incarnation imputation manifests its first
mysterious aspect."554
By the act of imputation Christ was made sin even though He knew no sin and
thus became a substitute. In this way the vicarious action of Christ becomes
understandable in its deepest sense. It is from this point of view that justification is to be
understood; it is "justification of the sinner before God [which] shows us in the clearest
light this aspect of imputation, which is the counterpart of the imputation of our sins to
Christ."555 From this perspective the substitutionary atonement of Christ is most clearly
understood.
When the Word became flesh, it was a spiritual-relational event and reality.
Substitution too must be understood from this point of view. No acquisition or transferal
of qualities or substances is to be concentrated on. The gaze must continue to be solely
directed towards God and not towards the human being. What is important is that "God views what is in us, sin, as if it were not present, and what is not present, namely righteousness, He beholds for the sake of Christ's merits just as if it were present. This
transaction took place in the eternal counsel, and afterwards, when the time was fulfilled, with Christ."556 Here, too, the gaze is continually to be directed uprightly, as the human being is drawn before the eternal One who speaks and it is, who commands and it stands.
And so the incarnation as doctrine of salvation is to be correctly understood only
from the point of view of the spiritual-relational and dialogical character, power, and
553 Ibid.;,183 . 554 Ibid.., 185. 555 Ibid. 556 Ibid. 186. 269 function of Scripture itself. In Christ, as the Word become flesh, God has taken the law into His own hand and fulfilled it to the glory and satisfaction of His own name and for the salvation of His children. This necessarily breaks through all idolatrous rational, qualitative, or substantive strongholds that the human being seeks to erect. In this way the word of justification by imputation finds its foundation in the incarnation of Christ as the fulfiller of the law and righteousness of God in the place of the believer. It is what
God has done, how God judges, and what God sees for the salvation of the believer that is all important, not only for a proper understanding of justification but also for a proper understanding of the self in the present earthly life.
Now such concentration on God seems precisely to be lacking in the system of
Ritschl. In his theology the doctrine of incarnation and reconciliation are seemingly pulled into the sphere of this world. Christ as our substitute by imputation becomes Christ the perfect prototype for vocational obedience: Ritschl, thus, "as is known, eliminates all connection between the death of Christ and the atonement for the sins of the human race and sees in His death only the absolute verifying of the official obedience of Christ. This is a relapse into Socinianism."557 And precisely because of this relapse into Socinianism and its approach to Scripture and doctrines, Ritschl does not seem to understand the subject of imputation as the principal thought of justification and incarnation. According to Ritschl, "Christ could not have regarded His suffering as punitive."558 And this shows that Ritschl has not understood the subject of imputation. He does not seek to reason from
Ibid., 190. We discussed this observation of Bohl regarding Ritschl as a Socinian at length when we considered the place where Bohl deals with this in his Dogmatik, to which he refers to as well. 270 the perspective of God. However, "he that imputes is God."559 This is not to be grasped by reason, or from below, but only by faith in the sovereignty, faithfulness, and omnipotence of the Word of God alone, who became flesh and dwelled among us.
It is of great significance that when Ritschl speaks of the incarnation, that is, of the Word becoming flesh, the charge against him of Socinianism resurfaces. Is it not true that precisely when speaking of the incarnation of God's Word, we also speak of the nature, character, power, and function of the Word of God and its purpose? And so here again we see that the ground-motive of Bohl's critique of Ritschl corresponds to the question of what constitutes revelation.
Speculation concerning the incarnation, or ideal constructs of church and Christ, miss the significance of the Word of God becoming flesh. And what seems to be fundamentally lacking in such speculative theologies? What is lacking, according to
Bohl, is that many people "do not feel what is the anger and judgment of God."560 therefore also they do not understand the thought and comfort of imputation and incarnation. And precisely this existential, spiritual observation from the side of Bohl, as also directed to Ritschl, must not be neglected in our investigation of his critique. In fact, it must be seen, however "unscientific" or 'un-objective' it might be deemed, as centrally important. As standing in the 'place' of B6hl"s theology its neglect would, in fact, be a denial of the existential-spiritual dimension of the Word of God itself, so emphasized by
Bohl.
559 Ibid., 191. 560 Ibid., 192. 271
Justification by Faith
Under this heading Bohl again points out that in justification by faith nothing qualitatively or quantitatively changes in the human being. As we have observed above, faith for Bohl is an empty hand, not a full hand, which rests only in Christ and His word, work, and Spirit, so as not to fall into the extremes of pantheism or Deism.561
Bohl goes on to describe what happens relationally and spiritually between God and sinful human beings in justification. First, Bohl notes that a real change occurs with respect to God's attitude towards the sinner, drawing the attention to God's judgment in light of Christ as Mediator and Surety. The purpose is that "He might receive the creature
... as a child without offending His righteousness."562 Yet, sin can in no wise be minimized in this Divine reckoning. The doctrine of Scripture does not permit it!563 Thus, this change in the attitude of God towards the sinner and the change of status of the sinner, who is received as child in relation to God, can only happen on the basis of
561B6hl, Von der Rechtfertigung, 194-197. Ibid., The Reformed Doctrine, 193- 195. When this thematic emphasis is put in the context of Bohl's own exegetical and theological development, it is to be observed that Bohl already noted the importance of it in one of his first articulations of a specific doctrine. In his Christologie des Alten Testamentes (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1882) (Dutch translation, 1885)—in which, as we have seen, he goes back to the exegetical foundations he had already expressed in his Zwolf Messianische Psalmen—Bohl notes in a footnote that the Holy Scripture treads the only good path between the two extremes of dualism and pantheism. The defense of this statement, however, he adds, belongs to dogmatics. See Bohl, Christologie des Alten Testamentes, 46. Thus, the theme flushed out in this thesis so far was already present in Bohl's mind when he was working out a biblical christology. In this last book we see its dogmatic defense. The fact that he claims that the Holy Scripture itself treads this path, thus claiming that his own methodology is derived from the way Scripture walks between these two extremes—in other words, claiming that his very methodology is informed by the way Scripture deals with aberrant extremes—affirms my overall thesis. 562 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 193. 563 Ibid. 272
Christ's atonement and his substitutionary person and work, from incarnation to exaltation,564 all in congruence with the doctrine of Scripture.
For the purpose of apologetics this implies that Christ did not merely appear as the "universal normal man, or as the God-man of the mediating theologians, or as a
Kenotist Christ, or as a mere Rationalistic pattern."565 No, it is on account of the way of
Christ, that is, of His person and work as the Second Adam, that God's attitude changes towards the sinner and his will becomes a 'voluntas gratiosa.'566 What is at stake here is that the change we speak of in this relation is not merely a different estimation of God's relation and attitude towards the sinner, as Bohl notes is the case in Ritschl's theology, but a real change of sentiments on the part of God through Christ and in favor of the
567 sinner.
Sin, according to Bohl, is to be viewed in relation to the righteousness and the law of God, which is realistic, historic, and spiritual. Sin in Ritschl's theology, as we have seen, is living in ignorance about the actual attitude God has towards man because of
Christ, which is an attitude of grace and love. Thus, according Ritschl, in justification there is no real change in terms of God's attitude towards man. A change needs to be procured only in terms of the sinner's perception of God, a change from thinking about
God as an angry judge to thinking about God as fundamentally grace and love because of 564 Ibid., 195. 565 Ibid. 566 Ibid. 567 Ibid. 568 See also Orr, who states, "In his recognition of'the inevitable'justice of God's moral order, Hermann goes beyond Ritschl, who, in exalting love to the exclusion of everything judicial and punitive in God's character, weakens the ideas of both sin and guilt, resolving the former largely into 'ignorance,' and the latter into alienation and distrust which better knowledge of God removes." James Orr, Sin as a Problem of Today (Toronto: Westminster), 92. 273
Jesus Christ. As stated above, according to Bohl, such an approach and understanding is to be rejected as rationalistic, and this the doctrine of Scripture does not allow.
Secondly, Bohl notes that in terms of the relationship between God and the sinner, not only does a real change occur with respect to God's attitude towards the sinner because of Christ, but also a real change occurs in terms of the sinner's attitude towards
God. Again, once the Word of God is secure against being drawn into the sphere and control of the human being, what is first necessary is that the human being realizes that because we are born and conceived in sin by way of our first birth, a state of indebtedness towards God is ours, a state of death is ours, says Bohl, and, this is important, as "the law and our conscience ever kept us mindful of this."569 In fact, what is present by sight is and remains sinful, as the law as God's word continues to point this out. Faith, therefore, as belonging to justification, is just the means of receiving a new estimation of our relationship with God, a holding for and a trusting in what is just, real, and true in God's eyes concerning ourselves, and of understanding that in Christ we are received as righteous and become heirs of His Kingdom. And as faith remains faith, that is, the evidence of things not seen, justification experientially "gives rise to a mighty conflict within the justified, when the consciousness of being justified is not present in the heart.
And from the feeling of this want of the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins there ever arises a renewed striving towards the center, where God judges in view of the mercy-seat, having set forth Jesus Christ in His blood as such."570 In conclusion, Bohl notes that this then is the new thing in justification as far as the sinner's relation to God is concerned:
569 Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 196. 570 Ibid., 196-197. 274
Instead of turning away from God, turning to God;... instead of fear, love toward God... .Therefore, the Christian, although not free from sins, is freed from the consciousness of sin—His conscience is free. For this is the real humiliation, not that we have sins (this is our inheritance from Adam until death) but our consciousness thereof, which crushes us, keeps us far from God.... It means to make the Apostolic argumentation in Rom. VI, VII entirely your own; to permit sin to be sin, death—death, and law— law; in short to leave everything in its place as it was disposed of by Christ, and not at some convenient time to resume the struggle with sin, death, and the law.571
Thus, once one has understood the true nature of justification, as grounded in the character and function of God's Word, it is faith that acknowledges the true design of divine revelation. Faith leaves God's word what it is itself, in its sovereignty, power, and faithfulness. The result is that the human being is permitted to be the human being, sin is permitted to be sin; death is permitted to be death; and God's law, God's law. Everything must be left in its own place, as also the sinner by faith and justification is placed in
Christ's righteous new life. This, in fact, is again a subtle reforming of the traditional
'place-thinking' with respect to God's word. It assumes the necessity and possibility of dialogue between the irreducible realities of God, the human being, and the world, in which the primary category is Spirit and time, not reason or space. Faith accepts and rejoices in things as they are judged and spoken by the living God. Accordingly, the faith of justification understands and accepts things in their proper place, according to God the
Father, through God the Word Incarnate, and to God as directed by God the Spirit.
1 Ibid., 197-198. 275
Revelation, Justification and Regeneration
Discussing justification in relation to regeneration, Bohl begins by noting that a too-one sided emphasis on justification as forensic does not do justice to the whole reality and concept of justification. It is true that even according to the Hebrew idiom to justify
en") means to pronounce. However, in particular, the Formula of Concorde was not right to assume that that was the definitive side of justification, that is, its forensic character.
Having made the assumption that the forensic character was the definitive side of justification, and in light of the critique of Roman Catholic theology that defined justification more consummately, the Formula of Concorde sought to supplement what was lacking in their almost exclusive forensic doctrine of justification in sanctification.
However, they thereby weakened justification, perceiving it to be some kind of entrance beyond which was to be found the real inner sanctuary and forced justification out of its central place.573 The word of justification was supplemented by the sphere of the subjective to bear fruit there in mystical union, or in terms of cooperation in works.
What happened at the Union of Regensburg, with its formula (1541), was particularly serious. The formulation of two righteousnesses, one imputative and one inherent, seemed to many of no concern or consequence. In addition to the Hebrew meaning of righteousness a Latin rendering of the word was proposed that implied an ontological aspect of justification in terms ofimportation of righteousness. Also, from many within the Reformed camp this formula found no opposition.574
572 Ibid., 199. 573 Ibid. 574 Ibid., 200. 276
However, what was at stake here, in fact, was a right translation and interpretation of the Scriptures. The so-called golden chain of salvation, as expressed in Rom 8:30, was read and interpreted wrongly. "A preliminary actus forensis should not be placed in the second member of the golden chain of salvation (whom He called them He also justified), which should then be followed in the third member (He glorified) by the infusion of new qualities, or the iustitia inhaerens proceeding from justification."575 As we have seen above, Bohl's emphasis on the aorist construction of this verse does not permit us to treat calling, justification, and glorification from a different point of view from which the one is conceived as forensic and the others as referring to something inherent. The construction and character of the Word of God in this place does not allow it to be drawn into the sphere of the flesh, or the rational.
Speaking of the order of salvation, one must duly recognize that this is the order in which God will execute salvation in the life of His children, which is a matter of faith from the side of the human being, naked faith. Therefore, regeneration should be understood as falling together conceptually and effectively with justification. This is the true Catholic understanding of justification and regeneration; however, at the same time one must be on guard against falling into the error of the Latin Augustine, who understood justification and regeneration in terms of infusion and impartation. On the one hand the Reformers had rescued the doctrine of justification from this tendency by emphasizing its Hebraic forensic character, while on the other they had fallen right back into this error by conceiving of a double righteousness, or seeking to 'substantiate' the doctrine in sanctification.
Ibid., 201. 277
The remedy against this tendency is to conceive of justification and regeneration
as falling together in accordance with the Word of God's Spirit and the Spirit of God's
Word and work. This was also expressed, in principle, in Melanchton's Apology for the
Augsburg's Confession. "There is, according to the Apology ... only one act, justification, in which all the other acts of God are included. ... Melanchton ... uses the
expressions 'to justify,' 'to render righteous,' 'to regenerate,' as equivalent and
synonymous expressions and identifies regeneration with remission of sins. With him remission of sins is regeneration or renewal of life."576
With these two observations, the one in accordance with the character and meaning of the word of God (Rom 8:30) and the other expressed in the Apology of
Melanchton reflecting the character and meaning of the Word of God, Bohl seeks to point to the unity of the Word and its living and personal power, in contradistinction to it being
'scientifically' divided and absorbed within the sphere of human history and ontology. In fact, precisely when we deal with justification and regeneration, this unity of the message, character, and function of the Word of God is apparent. Separating or even
chronologically and effectively distinguishing between the two can be considered as the
error that many have committed and can be considered as the cause of such errors as subsuming the word of God under fleshly categories. In terms of Rom 8:30 again, Bohl
concludes,
Yea the vocatio "faith and repentance" proceeds only in apparent chronological separation from the justification—really the separation is only logical—and not effective and chronological. The same is true of glorification, the third part. The correctness of this explication of the
Ibid., 202. 278
Pauline economy of salvation (the so-called golden chain of salvation) appears from the use of the aorist.577
Now with this 'falling together' of justification and regeneration does Bohl not effectively fall back into Osianderian or the Roman Catholic camp, that is, respectively, into monism or anthropological dualism? Bohl responds, "Not so: something else is at hand that, while we journey the narrow way of salvation, absolutely frees us at all points from Osiander's mystical ideas, that is, the efficacy of God's Word, to which faith continually cleaves, enabling it to be active even in the midst of struggles and conflicts."578 And again, on what basis? On the basis of the efficacy of God's Word. "The Word of God is the only medium here."579 Therefore, the ultimate call is not to corrupt the living voice of a personal God. The correct spiritual understanding of the word of justification justifies the
Word of God in accordance with its own sphere and power, i.e., its regenerative power.
Placing regeneration before or above justification, in fact, degenerates the simplicity of the Word and corrupts the voice of God.
How ought Ritschl to be understood in this debate concerning justification and regeneration? With this question we have, also with respect to Ritschl, touched upon the thesis of this dissertation, which we have traced so far.
Ibid. Bohl adds for an explication of the aorist tense, "This tense, as in the classical usage, is here used of future events, which the speaker views as being as certain as having already taken place." Ibid. 578 Ibid., 203 (my emphasis). 579 Ibid. Bohl adds, "Concerning the power of this Word, of the uncorrupted voice of the Gospel, of the Word which is the only vehicle of the Holy Ghost, we would have very much to say. How far have those living at the present degenerated from the simplicity of our Reformers, who with this Word as their weapon defied the whole world, the pope, and the councils and continually recommended this Word and nothing but this Word. The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to all them that believe (Rom. 1:16)." Ibid. 279
With Ritschl, the doctrine of the Word of God falls into the other extreme. In the
theology of Ritschl, the Word of God is absorbed into the ethical sphere of human rationality. "Ritschl has a purely ethical view of conversion, since he regards it as an
absolutely independent act of the human will."580 The Spirit of the Word is entirely
eclipsed by his ideal construct and function of the church, in the spirit of Schleiermacher,
and the Holy Spirit is absorbed and brought into "Pelagian and Deistic ways."581
It is at this point that Bohl states that the essential difference between orthodoxy
or upright spiritual thinking and Ritschl is the answer to the question of what constitutes revelation.582 The answer in terms of a response to Ritschl's theology is that God is
subjected to human understanding. How is this so? It is so because the Word of God is entirely placed in the sphere of human rationality as God is said to be recognized and
understood in accordance with the sphere of the possibility of our cognition, as for
Ritschl God exists for the human being merely in terms of His effects insofar as these effects can enter and have entered the domain of our comprehension as subject to our own rationality.583 What has, in fact, happened in the theology of Ritschl, as it is conditioned by his understanding of revelation, is that God as a personal being who lives and speaks is denied existence. "The 'object' indeed lives in its effects, but the personal being, God, goes beyond this and establishes relations between Himself and other personal beings."584 Thus, the Word of God in Ritschl's theology of justification and reconciliation is depersonalized, just as we have noted in our introduction was the case as
580 Ibid., 210. 581 Ibid., 211. 582 Ibid. 583 See ibid. 584 Ibid. 280 a result of the entrance and influence of the methodology of Ramus. The word of God is placed within the horizon of the graspable, the seeable, and the placeable.585 It is for this reason that Bohl warned against rationally and effectively distinguishing justification from regeneration, for to do so is in effect robbing the Word of God of its spiritual, relational, and personal character. In fact, if one does effectively distinguish between justification and regeneration, then one will prepare oneself to fall into a 'scientific' mode of thinking and acting, where again this world and the human being, not the personal God of the Word and His power and work, will become the center and primary point of concentration. Bohl, speaking of the personal, and spiritual character of the Word, writes,
"Here not merely does nature face nature, but person faces person—God facing the creature created in His image."
At the same time, Bohl widens the circle, for revelation is not only restricted to the church or the regenerate community; rather, we exist in the circle of God's general revelation as well. "Here there is at the very beginning an intuition of God (anticipatio
Deorum, Cicero) in man prior to any effect."587 Bohl refuses, as Ritschl does when he
585 As stated in Ong's presentation of the thought, method, and influence of Ramus (see section on methodology above), Ramism also confounded personality. The text in space was made normative over against the spoken word. In fact, the Ramist approach seems to be suspicious of the spoken word; it downgrades spoken dialogue and prefers textual monologue. Furthermore, by the Ramist methodology a seemingly objective reading of reality is manufactured. The sheer depersonalized order of the logical structure can be deceptive and fool one into thinking that one is dealing with "objective exegesis." However, the Ramist approach, applied to exegesis, will tend to result in the exegete subjectively questioning the text with the Ramean methodology, seeking to categorize its distinct ontology. Clearly, the text is submitted to a preconceived rhetorical system. In this way, the text is treated as closed, and is largely depersonalized: understood more in terms of objects of knowledge to be rationally grasped than a living personal Word. Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 211. 587 Ibid. 281 rejects all forms of natural theology, to give up God's creation as the sphere of human existence. Nowhere is the human being autonomous or neutral.
In light of this observation with respect to general revelation, judged from Bohl's perspective, Ritschl's doctrine of revelation silences the voice of the living God in the church not only by muzzling the Word of God there589 but also by denying any form of natural theology in creation. Thus, as we have seen earlier, in Ritschl's theology the human being is a concept suspended in midair. Bohl sums all this up:
We say that the relation must be defined according to the nature of the religion. God and man are reciprocally related—man was created in the image of God, placed by the side of and in the immediate proximity to the Creator to receive revelation—and thus in the likeness of God he, reflects what is there received. In Him they have their existence and their being, but the "in Him" is not to be taken mystically, as though God descended to the immanent ground of their existence, but it again must be understood according to the nature of religion, that is, determined by the Word and the quickening Spirit—these are the determining limits.590
In other words, God's Word as His revelation—at the pain of repeating the fundamental thought we have traced standing in the place of Bohl's theology—is to be kept from being placed in the circle and grasp of human rationality, ontology, and will.
This, in fact, corresponds to the true nature of religion, as its bounds are determined by
588 In characterizing the anticipatio Deorum, Bohl is again careful to place this concept between the two extremes of mysticism and dualism. An understanding of the human being should be weighed against the error of mixing the Divine and the human and separating them in an independent dualistic sense. Bohl again relates also this idea to the concept of the word of God, upon which all things are dependent. "It is something quite extraordinary,—of a religious character, united to and dependent on the Word." Ibid., 212. 589 Bohl notes that, according to Ritschl, faith and regeneration must develop within the church, and what Ritschl calls church is "a communion in which all are at liberty to talk freely and have experiences at pleasure, the Word of God, however, being muzzled, and must speak strictly in accordance with Ritschlian exegesis. A communion which on the basis of a common exegesis has or simulates a common experience, this and nothing else is Ritschl's Church." Ibid., 220-221. 590 Ibid., 212. 282 the Spirit of God's Word and the Word of God's Spirit. If one fails to do so, one has pursued an incorrect doctrine of revelation and falls into the error of either mixing the human being with the divine or of assuming independent authority over the Spirit and the
Word. Bohl's doctrine of the word of justification as related to regeneration provides us with an insight into his doctrine of revelation as determining the limits and the power of our existence as religious creatures under God. Separating or effectively and chronologically distinguishing the two will result in a religious existence that is one-sided and will tend to find its point of concentration on the human being and the possible horizon of his or her existence in flesh.
Bohl's last observation with respect to Ritschl's understanding of regeneration and church concerns the idea of baptism. According to Bohl, by way of baptism children are neither to be regarded as heathen or as deified persons:591 "We must not with Ritschl's school regard the regenerate within the church as being mere tabula rasa, or as heathen.
This would mean a mere intellectual process. ... Ethical regeneration is substituted for religious regeneration, or at least so closely associated with it that what remains of the latter is only a change of relations [Beziehungen] toward God."592 Inherent in this is again a dualistic understanding of religion,593 which is an overthrowing of the true nature of religion with its boundaries properly determined by the Word and the Spirit. In it, the human being as sinner, as determined by God's word as law, who, as such, receives true comfort from the word of justification and regeneration, is not recognized. True history and true humanity under God, condemned and received by grace, are lacking, as the true
592 Ibid., 222. 593 Ibid. 283
Word is subjected to the sphere of the would-be autonomous human being, and as the
Ritschlians proceed, from the thought of the individual as a "green branch" from the beginning.594
Baptism, Predestination, and the Doctrine of Justification as the True Scriptural Method
Even though Bohl does not explicitly refer to or critique Ritschl on the theme topics of baptism, predestination, and justification, we wish to make some observations about them in connection with our tracing of Bohl's methodology as rooted in his doctrine of the
Holy Scriptures in conjunction with the doctrine of justification.
With respect to predestination in relation to justification, Bohl again is critical of any attempt to draw these two biblical doctrines into the sphere of human rationality and flesh. Bohl connects the doctrine of predestination with baptism, as with baptism "the full state of grace was assured."595 This seems to imply that since baptism in the Reformed churches is universally applied, grace must be universal. "Is therefore the Divine purpose in baptism a universal one?"596 The further question arises, however: if this is so, what about the position, connected with predestination, that not all those who are baptized are and will actually be saved but only those who are elected, according to what Paul says in
Rom 5:19, that many and not all will be saved?
How to understand and live with the tension generated by these biblical questions is Bohl's subject of inquiry under this heading. Here too again, even though the temptation is ever present to 'solve' this apparent contradiction by turning to the domain
Ibid., 223. Ibid., 228. Ibid., 225. 284 of the flesh, precisely this temptation must be given no foothold in the church. The way to prevent this again is to understand the correct relation that exists between predestination and justification, as both are rooted in the character, power, and function of God's word.
In the Roman Catholic Church the question of grace is answered by baptism, removing one substance (original sin) and infusing another, sanctifying grace, in the subject, opus operatum. However, according to Bohl, "No one from the standpoint of justification by faith alone could take such a view."597 The focus of the Bible and the
Reformers in their doctrine of baptism was the word of promise59* not grace infused. This word was a true word of complete justification and salvation, never a word to be confused with an infusion of substance or cooperation from the side of the human being.
The 'evidence' of being saved by the word and promise of baptism, universally applied in the church and particularly applied to individuals, is never to be sought first in the human subject but is and always remains a case of faith in the Word. How is this related to predestination and justification?
For Bohl, predestination and justification are first anchored in the eternal counsel of God: "Now the justification of the sinner takes place, first of all, in the eternal counsel of God."599 The concentration is on what God thinks and does, in predestination as well as in justification. There the believing gaze should be directed first of all. However, because justification of the sinner takes place first of all in the eternal council of God, this is not without regard for what ought to happen and what has happened in time. The sinner
597 Ibid. 598 Ibid., 224. 599 Ibid., 226. 285 is justified, "in view of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead (Rom. 4:25)."600
Here, in principle, predestination, justification, and baptism converge.
The preordination and promise that believers are saved completely and will become inheritors of eternal life could not be effected without the death and the resurrection of the Testator, of which baptism is a sign and seal. The historic events of
Jesus' life, death, and resurrection secured the eternally allotted justification and salvation of His elect. So the gaze is first directed towards eternity, in terms of both predestination and justification, then it is directed towards the historic person and work of Christ as the work of God. However, as foundational as this is, Bohl adds, "only in the moment when the Christian, as yet living unconverted, is effectually called, justified, and glorified (Rom
8:30) by the Spirit of God, [and] not until then, is everything that was eternally allotted to him actually realized by the believer; and now in life the sublime reckoning of God in His eternal counsel comes to a realization."601 But again, this is brought about and realized in no other way than in accordance with the character, power, and function of the Word of
God. God takes these matters into His own hand. As He has ordained and accomplished salvation, God will also apply it: "The Reformers were persuaded that God's Word was alive and that what is promised in baptism is certain."602
What happened in subsequent Reformed churches and doctrines was precisely the undervaluing of the word and of infant baptism. The word in both was not left true and free as in the hands of God as an object of faith but became submerged under a wave of
Pietism, which sought to seek assurance of salvation by making up elaborate schemes and
600 Ibid. 601 Ibid. 286 systems of the evidences and marks of the grace of election and baptism to be found in the believer. With the entrance of Pietism, "the offices of the Church were despised, and believers flocked to conventicles which at first were tolerated, indeed endorsed in
Holland by the Church. They sought to assure themselves of their regeneration in all manner of evidences of grace; they endeavored both to find a guaranty of their state of grace in all kinds of works."603
Here again, the word of justification must prevent "the conceit that predestination very easily nourishes. When predestination becomes allied with the doctrine of gifts and powers infused in regeneration, it becomes the mother of all kinds of fanaticism and ephemeral sect-organizations."604 Behind all this lurks "the thought that man is not daily and hourly in need of a corrective [Corrector]—the corrective of God's Word and
Spirit."605 Bohl continues, and this is essentially the summation of our thesis,
Nothing but the doctrine of justification properly understood brings us the true method. With this doctrine the law is not quiescent, and the Gospel itself receives justice. Indeed, the law retains its full force and meaning for the one justified by faith, and continually appraises him of the greatness of his sins and misery. For only the converted or regenerate—in short, the justified person—begins to reflect on their greatness; formerly he had no conception of the "how great" of sin.606
For this reason, predestination must not be put at the summit of a system of doctrines; Bohl treats it under soteriology, after calling, justification, glorification, and the third use of the law.607 The comfort and meaning of the word of predestination is precisely learned when all that what we think we have, grasp, and see is taken away from
603 Ibid., 228. 604 Ibid., 230. 605 Ibid. 606 Ibid, (my emphasis). 607 see Bohl, Dogmatik, 381-456. 287
us and we let God be God, who by His Word is not only a God of the past but also of the
future.
Justification and Sanctification and the Cause for Further Reformation Revisited
According to Bohl, with the relation between justification and sanctification he has
arrived at a main issue, and he immediately moves into a critique of Ritschl. He concurs
with Ritschl that the doctrine of justification must "again be discovered at the present
time."608 However, Bohl disagrees with Ritschl when the latter complains "that Luther
and Melanchton do not do justice to the practical side of justification."609 According to
Bohl, it is "not the purpose of the wonderful and glorious doctrine of justification that the justified person must now adjust himself to an ethical system in sanctification." 610
Here we have returned also to the issue of Bohl and Ritschl as further Reformers.
This was specifically related to the doctrine of sanctification. Ritschl wished to
emphasize the practical and ethical side of the doctrine of justification, the religious
dimension of Christianity, in conjunction with those of reconciliation, the ethical
dimension. This must, however, also in Ritschl's theology be expressed without the
mystical and pantheistic errors of many later Reformed and Lutheran theologies. Bohl
shared the latter concern in his desire for Reformation.
Bohl's main concern was that what the doctrine of justification had established as
the true method of the Scriptures must be maintained in the doctrine of regeneration and
also in sanctification. The word of God must not again be pulled into the domain of
Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 232. Ibid., 233. 288
human rational and ethical aspirations and systems. God must be left to be God as He
handles His own Word, in and for the life of the believer by the Holy Spirit. This is an
object of faith.
As we have dealt with Bohl's thoughts on sanctification at length above, what is
important is that we focus on some of the polemical elements of his articulation of justification in relation to sanctification and Ritschl. What is centrally important in Bohl's
doctrine of sanctification is what in part has already been noted in respect to the doctrine
of the Holy Spirit. Upon the Word of justification, which is a word spoken by the living
God, as it were before the tribunal of God, the Lord gives the justified human being the
gift of grace. This gift of grace from Rom 5:15 is interpreted by Melanchton to be the
Holy Spirit, who works in us the consciousness of love.611 What is most important in this
regard is that the Holy Spirit, just like the Word of God, must never lose His personal
character, for "He is the abiding personal author of all those effects which are
customarily comprehended under the term 'sanctification' which at the same time
underlines the faith-character of revelation.
What is clear from this that Bohl again emphasizes, now from a positive
perspective, is that precisely because of the personal, dialogical, and spiritual character of
Word and Spirit, the revelation of God cannot be subsumed under rational, ethical, or
systematic categories or methodologies. The true methodology of the Word of God itself,
that is, the doctrine of justification properly understood, does not permit this, and those
who do engage in it, in fact, reduce the Word to a horizontal plane and the object of such
things as 'science.' This is also true for the doctrine of sanctification.
611 Ibid., 236. 612 Ibid, (his emphasis). 289
The main question, which Bohl poses, is, "Are good works foreseen in justification"?613 The method for answering this question is to "let the Holy Scripture furnish its solution."614 In Christ the believer is perfect (Col 2:10). This is an organic reality, as Paul uses the head and body analogy (Col 1:19; etc.,), and the analogy of the tree and its fruits are used in Scriptures in this regard. In justification this is established, as in Christ, which answers to the organic nature of revelation itself. What this means for the individuals in the church, of which Christ is head, is that the good works "may at once be at hand in the Holy Ghost.... Let Him fully exercise His office of reproving (John
16:8-11), also with us. He will effect perfect works."615 The personal, spiritual-relational character, power, and function of the Word of God is so also maintained in terms of the doctrine of sanctification, and the true method of Scripture, as expressed with the doctrine of justification, is exposed as being executed in the life of the believer. So biblical method and 'content' correspond in a consistent fashion.
Here only faith counts, as faith too "is a living thing, insofar as God's Spirit makes it alive—it must come forth and manifest itself. It cannot content itself with an inner mystical enjoyment of God; it must possess itself of the actual affairs of the world and reign in life through Jesus Christ.616
This personal character of Word, Spirit, and faith is precisely what is lacking in the theology of Ritschl, particularly with respect to his doctrine of the church and Spirit as the medium of the Word of God, as we have seen. Bohl contends that "the Ritschlian
613 Ibid., 239. 614 Ibid. 615 Ibid., 239-240. 616 Ibid., 242. 290 idea of the Church is a great departure from all those preceding." It is true that for
Ritschl, justification regulates the life of the believers who are part of the church.
However, the church as ideal construct has also an idealized doctrine of the Spirit. All in the church "may be held by one spirit—have a life-goal which was, in the first place, realized by Christ and is realized by us by patterning after Him.... Having been born within its pale we must test the qualities of Christ for ourselves and hope for the best results, sharing in the communion of the Spirit with all Christians, with whom our whole religious life continues in constant and reciprocal effects which are uncontrollable as to particulars."
In all this, Ritschl's rationalism seems to trump the personal and the secret workings of the Word and Holy Spirit in the life of church and individuals; these workings finally get absorbed in a theoretical and practical way: "Ritschl, by thus identifying the working of the Holy Ghost,... tries to explain incomprehensible things by intelligible formulas [as] he ... insists that what is built on this foundation shall proceed in a natural manner and be disposed of in a theoretical and practical manner."619
The true method of revelation, i.e., the doctrine of justification properly understood, is subsumed and absorbed by the doctrine of sanctification, because it flows from an idealistic conception of both church and Spirit.
Even though Bohl, as we have seen repeatedly, concurs with Ritschl's critique of mysticism and certain strands of Pietism, he does not share Ritschl's apparent rejection of the immediate experience of justification of the human being standing before a living and
617 Ibid., 246. 618 Ibid., 246-247 (my emphasis). 619 Ibid., 247. 291
personal God. This is to Ritschl "a presumption of Pietism, and words which the believer
hears within are hallucinations of the brain."620 Ritschl thereby desires no direct
communication and communion with God, except through the medium of the
congregation. Here too, we note Bohl's rejection of Ritschl's depersonalization of the
immediate spiritual-relational character and function of God's Word and Spirit. Ritschl in
the end too has scientized theology. The true method of Scripture, that being the proper
understanding of the doctrine of justification, is thereby denied. Furthermore, as far as the
relation between justification and sanctification is concerned, because the true method of
Scripture is denied in Ritschl's system, as the Word of God is placed within the domain of
Ritschl's speculative idea of the church, sanctification falls into the hands of the human being. "He sees the certainty of justification attained in this, that the justified person practices the providential faith and exercises patience in suffering."
Thus, in Ritschl's theology, the proper understanding of both justification and
sanctification have fallen into the sphere of human capacity, and what is denied of God is given to the human being. This was first of all precipitated by a rational approach to
Scripture (Socinianism), which denied Scripture's true organic and personal character and made the text of Scripture subject to "Rationalistic fig leaves."622 The Scriptures as a living Word and Tree had become dead. Subsequently, the Eternal is made a personal possession in the form of ethical demands (sanctification),623 which, in effect, completes the rational circle as it turns to human performance. In all this, Ritschl and his school
"has not the courage to permit the Holy Ghost... to assume His function at the decisive
620 Ibid. 621 Ibid. 622 Ibid., 248. 623 Ibid. 292 moment."624 The end result is that "they all belong to Deism. This Deism can indeed censure the weaknesses of mysticism admirably [of which Bohl makes glad use throughout his work on justification and applauds625]—nevertheless, it is but the other extreme, and a church reform cannot proceed from it,"626 as essentially the Word of God has become bound, and the true doctrine of justification is thereby likewise diminished in importance as its true method in the doctrine of sanctification.
So as the self appropriates Scriptures (Socinianism and rationalistic fig leaves) and has removed God (Deistically) and His direct word of justification and imputation far away from the context of actual human existence, Ritschl discards the idea of the direct word of imputation as the alien righteousness of Christ.627 Consequently, Ritschl can only regard the verdict of imputation as indirect?2* as he includes sinners in a relation with the historic Christ as mediated through the present church. This indirectness, in actual fact, is rooted in a denial of the immediate vertical relationship the believer has with God, who is the wholly other and Eternal Triune One. The holiness and sovereignty of God and His Word are, in fact, thereby secularized. And so, in effect, we stand in relation to
Christ just as we stand in relation to others629 in the worldly orders of our existence, in which we need to fulfill our vocation. Christ's preexistence and His Divinity and
624 Ibid., 249. 625 "Yea, the Reformed Church also is indebted to Ritschl, for he necessitated her to revise her history and not to exalt herself in a Pharisaic manner above other churches. . . . It is very true that mysticism went beyond the sound doctrine of the Reformation. And according to Ritschl, this mysticism has early infringed the bounds of our Church. He shows how justification was already forced into the background by the unio mystica." Ibid., 250. 626 Ibid., 249. 627 See ibid., 256. 628 Ibid. 629 Ibid. 293
Lordship become less important, if not rejected in toto. Imputation becomes crediting
Jesus' earthly historical obedience in his vocation towards God to the account of sinners, whereby God makes them objects of His love, as formerly was Christ.630 Concerning these interpretations of Ritschl, Bohl concludes,
All these sentences pervert the true meaning of the Apostles and Reformers and do not contain an interpretation of these noble examples; they are rather an interpolation after the manner of the Socinians and Rationalists.631
Summing it up with Melanchton, Bohl writes, with all this, "Man is led away from the Mediator. "632 They are led away from the Mediator as understood in the truly direct, spiritual-relational and biblical way. As the mystics with Osiander perceive Him ontologically within, Ritschl finally assigns the "restoration of righteousness to the future
. .. for, according to him, what Adam performed as well as what Christ merited, is at hand for general information. Man starts from nullity and proceeds from the small to the great; in short, he develops. Development is guaranteed by Christ. Vicarious sacrifice; salutary merits of Christ that could be of any other significance than a moral, there are none."633 And so they are equally led away from the personal Spirit in sanctification, just as justification and regeneration are not to be separated and the Spirit is not to be separated from the Word.
As the Holy Scriptures were no longer all-sufficient but compromised, Bohl concludes, referring to Ritschl, that with those whom Bohl has denominated as the writers of the Reformed Middle Ages—"Brakel, Lodensteyn, Smytegelt in Holland,
630 Ibid. 631 Ibid. 632 Melanchton as quoted in ibid., 259. 633 Ibid., 259-260. 294
Baxter and others in Great Britain[—a] serpent is hidden in the grass; much heresy amid all kinds of spiritual pretenses and excesses. ... It is the Old Testament idolatry in the high places merely in new forms."634
Justification and the Doctrine of the "Old" and "New" Man: Coming Full Circle
As Bohl started with the conception of the image of God in the context of the discussion of the original state, here we have come full circle in discussing the human being in light of the Scriptures in the area of soteriology. As we have noted, Bohl's interpretation of the image of God is clearly foundational for his critique of Ritschl and others. Just as the
Bible must not be compromised by being placed in the sphere of human rationality and ontology, neither should the understanding of the image of God, as the image of God is also to be understood following the true method of Scripture with the proper interpretation of justification by faith. To this the second part of our thesis speaks: "In particular, Bohl's exegesis of the image of God and its inherent anthropology provide us with the biblical, historical, and theological basis from which to understand, compare, and evaluate Bohl's critique of Ritschl's doctrine of justification." Therefore, we can say that in discussing Bohl's doctrine of justification and his critique of Ritschl and others under this last heading we have come full circle.
The central thought here too is imputation. Bohl states, "Since everything is brought to pass by imputation ... so likewise, the new man is present merely by imputation. The man who had just stood before God as old He looks upon as new."636 As
Ibid., 274. See page 1 of this dissertation. Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 275. 295 we have seen above, for Bohl this new man is no one else but Christ, the Eternal word of
God, in whom the original human being participated, in wisdom, righteousness, and holiness. Just as the Word should not be mixed with human subjectivity, this new man should never be mixed with the old man of flesh. That would result in idolatry of the flesh. Or to say it differently, the Creator-creature distinction must also be maintained in the area of soteriology, as it was in creation.
To maintain this distinction and to prevent the Word from being absorbed into the domain of flesh, it is the thought of imputation that must be consistently expressed and religiously applied. The human being remains the same, sinful and ungodly, the subject of justification. For this reason Bohl at all points combated the idea of an infusion of any sort, be it faith as habitus, or substantial righteousness, or new qualities, or the Eternal in the form of the church, or ethical claims (Ritschl). The 'entities'—God, the human being, and the World—are irreducible to one another. Reducing one to another is in actual fact idolatry, and true dialogue between the human being and the Word of God, as spoken by a God who truly is and lives, will become mute. Not only that, but the human being will lose himself or herself and his or her history.
The Hebrew thought of the Old Testament understands time to be the prism of
Word revelation. As soon as things such as space, place, and quantity are infused with
Greek thought and methodology, as in much "place-thinking," the spectre of idolatry arrives on the horizon. This tendency is what Bohl critiques everywhere in his doctrine of justification, as we have seen. And this is finally also again expressed when we speak of the old man and the new man and the unio mystica, maintaining and defending the 296
Creator-creature distinction in both the areas of creation and re-creation (image of God and justification).
That we are regarded and held as completely new by God in justification by imputation is recognized by faith and in our consciousness. However, the subject of imputation is not to be regarded as altered, either by infusion of substance and consideration of the new man within us or by freeing the ego for activity. The human being remains who he or she is, even as a complete sinner, ungodly. Neither mysticism nor Pelagianism ought to creep in again through a back door. Justification happens and is experienced by the "entire man, that is, to the man in himself old, the sinner, being nevertheless, by imputation, new."
It is very important to maintain the latter thought, for if any alteration of the subject would take place, the subject of imputation would no longer exist, and justification would be a verdict without purpose or comfort. "God would have to deal with an entirely different and transformed subject; consequently the verdict would have no subject."640 Conversely, if the person as subject of the verdict of justification is presumed to be transformed by something like infusion, he or she, in fact, loses his or her grip on reality and history. The person, the ego, begins to be elevated and lose his or her proper place under God in understanding, experience, and work. The person becomes a hypocrite.
Furthermore, Bohl also rejects the notion of the Christian being divided into old and new. This again would undermine the true subject of justification: "Then the new
637 Ibid. 638 Ibid. 639 Ibid. 640 Ibid., 276. 297 portion would no longer have need of imputation, while the old portion would remain the same."641 Conversely, if this were the case, the subject would of necessity become a duo- personality, which is in clear contradiction to the original creation as well.
No, both these two options are comparable to boxing the air. Rather, Bohl comments, "The ego, the personality of man,... sometimes recognizes its relation to
God according to the old man and sometimes according to the new."642 This, again is in perfect correspondence with the character, power, and function of the Word of God, as the one ego "must hear both law and gospel,"643 according to which the believer is old in himself (law) but nevertheless new in Christ (Gospel). The Word of God, as in the hand of God, is thus the proper definer of who I am, according to which I understand my proper existence and place under God and in Christ. Again, Greek method, the 'scientific method,' should not be the domain through which the word of God is heard, neither should it be when we speak of anthropology.
In this context also the theme of restoration of the old must be flatly rejected. The old remains old and sinful and must die.
How, then, does God dwell with the human being and the human being with God?
In no other manner than "by the Word and the illumination of the understanding, whereby the sensibility and the will at the same receive direction."644 Bohl concludes, "Every other mode would be at variance with the analogy of faith and would transcend the limits of the creature. It is contrary to the analogy of faith, because since the beginning of the world the comfort that we are united with God by faith is dependent on the assumption of
641 Ibid. 642 Ibid.,,277 . 643 Ibid. 644 Ibid., 278. 298 justification and imputation. 5 Creation and re-creation are understood together only by
the true method of the Word of God.
This way of understanding should not be mixed with the idea of unio mystica, as
it is more often than not understood substantially. No, the example, in particular of
Abraham, as Paul uses the Old Testament, knows nothing of such ideas. One must remain
Hebraic in method and thought. "Neither Abraham nor the Fathers knew anything of such
a change."646 The Hebraic way of interpreting Scripture knows nothing of such notions.
This is also how the New Testament should be understood and read. "If we read that God
is in the midst of Israel, we must not differentiate this from the experience which Paul
indicates in 2 Cor 6:16-17, with the words, 'Ye are the temple of the Holy Ghost.'"647 As
there ought to be no difference between the Old Testament and New Testament way of
salvation and christology, so there also ought also to be no difference between Old and
New Testament anthropology. That is Bohl's Hebraic standpoint as Old Testament
scholar and dogmatician. There is an organic unity between both which must be
acknowledged and avowed in all points of method and teaching from the Scriptures.
645 Ibid., 278-279 (my emphasis). 646 Ibid., 281. 647 Ibid., 281. "The advocates of the unio mystica, according to the view of the fanatics but also of our modern theologians, ought to tell us what is the nature of the difference, and why the union between God and man, the unio mystica, should be more intimate in the New Testament than with Israel in the Old Testament. The very fact that the fanatics like to sunder the New Testament from the Old is a warning to us." Ibid., 281. 299
''''Back to Metaphysics!" and the Concept of the Unio Mystica
The general context of Bohl's discussion of the 'old' and 'new' man having been discussed, how does Bohl deal with Ritschl's concept of the unio mystical In general, he approves of Ritschl's critique of the unio mystica, as we have noted on many occasions.
However, if the pantheistic tendencies of the teachings of the unio mystica often get their bearings from the union that exists between God and Christ as expressed in the Nicene
Creed648 in terms of essence and persons, then Ritschl falls again into the opposite extreme.
Using the same analogy of the union between Christ and God, Bohl notes that
Ritschl "explains the unity of Christ with God as referring to the identity of their operating, and nothing more.... Ritschl... takes an ethical view of unity between the
Father and the Son on the one hand, and between those two and us on the other."649
If we take this a step further, that is, into the metaphysical context, it is interesting to note that Bohl rejects Ritschl's understanding of the idea o/unio mystica by connecting it with Ritschl's rejection of the metaphysics of the Creeds; that is, Bohl connects it with
Ritschl's ethical interpretation of the union between God and Christ, which denigrates their essential and spiritual union as expressed in the early creeds. He writes that Ritschl
"is hindered in the true understanding of the unio mystica by ignoring the true Divinity of
Christ and its part in the work of redemption."650
Again, what is at stake here is Bohl's insistence on the personal character of revelation and redemption as rooted in the Triune God himself. One cannot have spiritual
648 Ibid., 282. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid. 300 union with an idea, whether one of ethical perfection or otherwise. The metaphysics of the
Creeds safeguarded not only the essential union between God, Christ, and the Spirit, which is important for the simplicity and unity of truth found in Scripture and in the work of the Holy Spirit, but also their personhood, which is important in safeguarding the personal and dialogical nature of revelation and the work of salvation. Therefore, Bohl takes issue with Ritschl's statement in Theologie und Metaphysik that "we must avoid all attempts to understand how the work of Christ was accomplished in detail, how it became empirical";651 in other words, one must not seek to look beyond the ethical and its effects.
However, this squarely denies the personal character of revelation and redemption. Bohl responds, "If we do not start out from the true Divinity of Jesus Christ, then all His great acts of redemption are without foundation, and we are utterly in want of a subject from whom the obedience of the Redeemer might and could proceed." And only someone who was not just an ordinary person but also a Divine subject could be obedient in the way Christ was in accomplishing salvation, passively as the Lamb of God and actively as the fulfiller of the law of God's Word. Thus, the personal character of revelation is intimately and necessarily connected with the nature and character of Christ as the center and bearer of that Revelation, as the eternal Word of God incarnate.
The creeds are here not to be reproved for being too speculative, abstract, or idealistic, as standing on the ground and at the back of understanding revelation and redemption, but Ritschl's own construct of the idea of ethical union is, in fact, too idealistic and philosophical. Neither the Scripture of Christ, nor the Christ of Scripture, nor the Word of the Spirit, nor the Spirit of the Word prove to be the true context and
651 Ritschl as quoted in ibid., 282. 652 Ibid., 282. 301 source of Ritschl's theology. Bohl's call to Ritschl—"Back to the metaphysics of the teachings of the Church!" —is therefore at the same time a call back to the personal and lively character of the Word of God itself, refusing to place it in such domains as those of speculative thought and human rationality. In fact, the metaphysics of the creeds, "hat dazu beigetragen, der Kirchenlehre das Leben zu erhalten, was auch die Ritschl'sche
Schule dagegen sagen mag [has contributed to keeping the doctrines of the church alive, whatever the Ritschlian school may say to the contrary]."654 Therefore, too, unio mystica must not be understood as union with an idea, in whatever form this might present itself
(Deism and dualism—Ritschl), or understood in terms of essential or substantial union
(mysticism, pantheism and monism), but in terms of a spiritual union with a person as mediated by the Word and the Holy Spirit. As far as God and the human being are concerned, the parties will and must remain irreducible to one another to avoid the idolatry of ideas, of our own fleshly images, or of works.
Finally, Bohl makes this important distinction in respect to metaphysics in the context of his understanding of the spiritual union of Christ, the Spirit, and the believer.
According to Bohl, the unity of God and Son is of nature; the believer's unity with God is of grace and Spirit.655 However, in light of the latter union, Ritschl's "idea of the ethical is the opposite of the work of grace, which the church ever derived from the personal work of Christ."656 In addition, believers have been given the Spirit to dwell in them and to lead them by the hand (Rom 8:14), "and God thereby brings to pass that we walk in his
Bohl, Dogmatik, 73. 654 Ibid., 65 (my emphasis). 655 See Bohl, The Reformed Doctrine, 283. 656 Ibid., 284. "Neither is it an ethical, harmonious cooperating between God and man for the same end, as Ritschl assumes." Ibid., 285. 302 commandments, (Ezek 36: 23ff)."657 Yet the distinction between Creator and creature is preserved also in the area of redemption when the Bible speaks of the unio mystica, as the
Spirit is His own person658 and therefore is never to be reduced to ethics.
Finally, the gift of the Spirit remains a secret gift, and His work mysterious, only to be accepted in faith. Ritschl's subjectivism overthrows this aspect of revelation and redemption as well. According to Ritschl, "we would only know so much concerning the
Holy Ghost and His being imparted to men as the subject may experience and makes known to others."659 However, this is simply a manifestation of Ritschl's rationalism by which "we revolve around our own axis."660 Again, theology will turn into the science of psychology, and the Spirit and Word will be submerged into the sphere of the flesh and its methods. Thereby the living God will be muted and the work of the Spirit simply secularized, as finally the Christian religion will be relativized. This is finally where a critique and denial of the character, power, function, and authority of the Word of God will lead, as we have seen Bohl expressing in his controversy with Abraham Kuenen and in his Prolegomena. In spite of Bohl's many positive affirmations of Ritschl, which at times seem inconsistent with his own method of the Word of God, Ritschl has in the end more in common with the historical-critical camp than with any other. In fact, it may be said that Ritschl stood at the birth of it and that it was precisely this birth that B6hl desired to prevent from proceeding any further.
657 Ibid., 286. 658 Ibid. 659 Ibid., 287. 660 Ibid. "Would you know what the Holy Ghost works in you? Then ask yourself. And if you receive no answer, then help yourself, and take for granted that the Holy Ghost aided you. Very familiar tones these, but in our youth we learned to know these as coarse rationalism." Ibid., 287. 303
Last Existential Observation: God, the Law, and the Human Being
As a final and existential note, in the last sections of his book on justification, which are
the practical and perspectival sections, Bohl remarks that the life of the justified is a life
filled with real temptations. He asks,
Did not Luther have real temptations and give offense in consequence of which he had to bear the cross? Oh, in abundance.... The flesh, the world, and the devil did not cease to molest him; but he deemed such temptations highly necessary."661
And Bohl goes on to name others of the early Reformers who testified of the same. In
contrast to that, Bohl calls Ritschl poor, as Ritschl reserved such pangs of conscience,
temptations, and struggles only for the extraordinary minds! He adds,
... as if any one could dispense therefrom, save God alone. We as teachers of the Church can at least not do otherwise than to permit the gate to be strait and the way narrow. . . . We must also insist on this conflict and be satisfied with the words of Jesus: "and few there be that find it" (the way).662
Bohl implicitly asks, has this not all to do with the fact that Ritschl does not reckon with
God as judge in the legal sense and thus indeed cannot understand much of real
temptation, sin, and the cross, as he simply transforms the understanding of sin into a
"rejection of the gospel" and postpones judgment to the last day, which will be brought upon those who did not heed the gospel?663 This Bohl deems as an error to the uttermost;
an erring from the true meaning of justification and a surrendering of the foundation of
Lutheran and Reformed dogmatics, the Scriptures themselves. Accordingly, in Bohl's
bbl Ibid., 294. 662 Ibid. 663 Ibid., 307. 304 words, "the entire construction of salvation has been dislocated by the moderns"664 and by Ritschl as one of them. To all of them Bohl finally calls out, "To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, they will not behold the dawn (Isa.
VIII: 20)."665
Such is Bohl's analysis and appraisal of Ritschl as we have very closely considered. In the next chapter we will evaluate Bohl's claims and their ramifications for the doctrine of justification for today.
664 Ibid. 665 Ibid., 308. 305
CHAPTER 6
CRITICAL SYNOPSIS, ANALYTICAL REMARKS ABOUT BOHL'S CRITIQUE OF RITSCHL, AND POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH FOR OUR CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT AND THE DEBATE ON THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION
A. CRITICAL SYNOPSIS OF RESEARCH
Introductory Comments
In this last chapter I will present an evaluative synopsis of each main section of this
dissertation. This in turn will set the stage for some final critical observations with regard
to Bohl's interpretation of Ritschl and point to ramifications this study might have for our
contemporary theological and spiritual context. In the last section of this chapter I will
suggest how the results of this investigation into Bohl's Reformed theology of justification may contribute to the current debate on justification. 306
Bohl the Further Reformer
Bohl's work on the incarnation, in the context of Kuyper's critique of the same, and his desire to complete the Reformation, in which he becomes critical of Calvin's 'ontological dimension,' implies a desire to eliminate or re-configure this ontological dimension, which he regards present in many post-Reformation theologians as well. Throughout the rest of this research I have attempted to show how Bohl desired to eliminate such a dimension, or at least re-configure it in terms of his understanding of the doctrine of the
Word of God within the realm of soteriology.
Bohl's critique of Calvin and other Post-Reformation theologians, which Bohl made because he desired to complete or further the Reformation, is directly related to the idea of restoration in Calvin's theology in terms of regeneration and sanctification. For
Calvin, "God's concern is not only the rule of the hearts of the faithful, but also, in wider scope, the rule of the whole earth."666 Bohl eliminates or re-configures this ontological dimension found in the soteriology of Calvin by pointing to and expanding on the primary spiritual-relational dimension of the authority, character, and function of the
H. Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 238. "Here we have not only a political eschatology, but also a political program, in so far as faith in God is confidence 'a ses promesses non seulement de la vie avenir, mais de la vie presente.'" Ibid., 238. Oberman points to Calvin's French sermons on 2 Samuel as important in this regard. See pages 236-237, where he quotes the content of these sermons extensively. In this context he notes, "Calvin's theme throughout is the rule of God who has appointed Christ as King, as his Viceroy. Reformation is the re-ordering of the lives of the faithful... By the grace and power of God this order is now here and there restored in the local churches as well as in the public life of some cities and regions" Ibid., 237. Here too it shows that the historical dimension as related to the ontological dimension (Bestimmung) is important to Calvin; this is the dimension which Bohl seeks to eliminate or re-configure with his emphasis on the justification of the ungodly as the glory of God and his understanding of history, as rooted in his doctrine of imputation and the Word of God and history proceeding in concentric circles, i.e., as not historicistic or developmental in a humanist modernistic sense. 307
Word of God. Bohl's emphasis on the complete sovereignty of the grace and faithfulness of God in and for the lives of Christians, in justification, regeneration, and sanctification and his desire to maintain the ontological-ethical Creator-creature distinction also in the realm of soteriology, can be seen as an attempt to forestall the tendencies of a theology of glory or any form of subjective enthusiasm in the theology of Calvin and later Reformers.
However, as a Reformed theologian, Bohl maintains the third use of the law against the early and later Lutherans, as he attempts to give it its due respect in such a way that faith establishes God's law as it believes in the Holy Spirit. Thus, it appears that for Bohl the 'ontological dimension' is to be re-configurated in the realm of soteriology in light of a renewed and clearer understanding of the third person and work of the Trinity in relation to law and sanctification.
In light of both Bohl's and Ritschl's desire to complete and finish what the
Reformers had begun, Ritschl's soteriology and theology may be regarded as a theology of glory, as it falls back into a positivistic enthusiasm for God's moral Kingdom here on earth. This is rooted in what we can call Ritschl's 'grace-idealism' versus Bohl's 'biblical- spiritual realism.' Ritschl's program for further Reformation, as he correlates justification and reconciliation (the latter in the spirit of the theory of reconciliation of Abelard— moral influence theory), ultimately rests on his historical positivism with regard to the revelation of God, his 'idealist' conception of the church as the regenerate community, and his optimistic—but according to Bohl illusionary—conception of the place and capacity of the individual human being (will) in history.
However, we ask, was Ritschl not instrumental in reviving the synthetic nature of the verdict of justification? Was he not instrumental in criticizing the pantheistic, mystic, 308 and misdirected pietistic tendencies in Protestant theology? Certainly, Bohl acknowledges this repeatedly. In that, Ritschl as Reformer is helpful. However, precisely in terms of the Reformers' major concern of going back to Scriptures, Ritschl failed them, according to Bohl.
The Doctrine of the Word of God, Justification, and the Critique of Ritschl
That the structure of Bohl's Reformed theology (morphology) is determined by his refusal to place the biblical and dogmatic questions into the sphere of human subjectivity both rationally and morally has proven to be centrally important. This immediately connects with the observation that in Bohl's theology the doctrine of the Word of God and justification are inextricably intertwined.
For Bohl, the doctrine of imputation and its religious effects allows for no neutrality or any form of synergism. The forensic nature of the righteousness of God, as a manifestation of His being in terms of his revealed law, precludes the possibility of assuming any neutrality on the part of the human being. There is no neutral ground between righteousness and sin, as there is no sin that would not make us guilty before
God without whom, in turn, grace would not remain grace (promise). The realization of both sin and grace are rooted in the 'forensic' but at the same time effective character and function of God's Word. For this reason, the Word of God should not be placed in the domain of human rationality as the law, the promise, and justification are beyond the control of human subjectivity. In fact, justification ought to be understood as preceding and supporting the human being in his or her total existence under God. Therefore it will bring about a distortion of history and reality when the revelation of the living God 309 becomes subject to doctrines that are primarily oriented towards ontological mutation and ethical transformation.
Ritschl's 'grace-idealism,' as rooted in his doctrine of revelation, Christ, history and the church, as related to his doctrine of sin as ignorance, makes room for the self in neutrality over against God when the word of God in his theology is placed in the realm of human subjectivity. From this critical point of view of Ritschl, Bohl's rejection of the
Aristotelian dialectical distinction of form and matter applies to Ritschl as well.
From Bohl' s point of view we could ask, is Ritschl still a hidden, or not-so- hidden, Aristotelian in the sense of his grace-formalism (justification/church idealism) and in terms of his focus on ethics as the material principle of his theology (reconciliation as activism for the Kingdom of God)? Does not his famous ellipse with justification and reconciliation as the two foci respectively correspond to a formal and material principle in an Aristotelian sense667 and all that in the spirit of Ramus' anti-metaphysical tendencies?
These questions clearly correspond to Bohl's unwillingness to place revelation, even in terms of methodology, in the realm of human rationality. His critique of the
Scholasticism of the seventeenth century here connects with his critique of Ritschl as rooted in the same perspective, namely, in the structure of his doctrine of the Word of
God as inextricably intertwined with his doctrine of justification. Also, in this context the existential dimension of the power and effect of the word of God as law and promise
Compare Gregory Dexter Walcott, The Kantian and Lutheran Elements In Ritschl's Conception of God, Ph.D. diss., Columbia University (1904), 72-73, 105-106. Reprinted by Kessinger Publishing's Rare Reprints. 310 must be emphasized as virtually absent in the theology of Ritschl, however 'unscientific' such an observation may be.
Finally, Bohl's widening of the circle of revelation to creation stands at the back of his critique of the illusionism he finds in Ritschl's theology and his call to Ritschl to go back to the metaphysics of the symbols of the Church. Ritschl's rejection of natural theology and his dualism are countered by Bohl's (presuppositional) revelational theology according to which all of reality is revelational of a living and personal God. Bohl's specific understanding of the 'metaphysics of revelation' is of utmost importance here.
The History of Justification and Ritschl
Of importance in this chapter is the observation that Bohl's doctrine of the Word of God is correlated to his thesis that regeneration is justification.668 The thought of the effective imputation of the righteousness of Christ, whereby justification and regeneration fall conceptually and effectually together, is crucial if the authority, character, and function of the Word of God itself is to be maintained. For Bohl the actual test of catholicity lies in either the acceptance or rejection of this thesis.
For Bohl, placing regeneration before justification is implicitly placing the absolute Word of God in the realm of human subjectivity. The whole idea of the inner- outer word distinction is, therefore, also to be rejected, as it leads inevitably to forms of substantialization, or hypostatization of revelation and grace (reification), and synergism
Bohl states this thesis very clearly also in the last book he wrote, Eduard Bohl, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Reformation in Osterreich: Hauptsdchlich nach bisher unbenutzen Aktenstilcken des Regensburger Stadtarchivs (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1902), 19. He writes on this page, "Die Grundfeste der echten Rechtfertigungslehre ist aber: renascentia (regeneratio)=iustificatio. " 311 in the realm of soteriology and ethics. In light of this, Ritschl's famous ellipse is subject to the same critique, as his doctrine of justification develops the idea of synergism in the realm of reconciliation. In his theology the will is central in light of the loving will of
God. Value judgments affect the will primarily, as the human being stands central in his theology; thereby Pelagianism is given room.
Bohl's unwillingness to subject biblical revelation to historical criticism stands at the back of the thesis that justification conceptually and effectively falls together with regeneration. The unity of Old and New Testaments is grounded in the unity of Word and
Spirit, i.e., in the metaphysics of revelation. Christ himself is the centre of history for
Bohl, and from this perspective Adam was saved in the same way as the human being today. The ultimate concentration should be on the faithfulness and sovereignty of God and on the oneness of His revelation perceived as organic and not 'organizational.' This all needs to be understood from the point of view of history as proceeding in concentric circles by the power of the eternal Word of God and Spirit, in contrast to revelation being somehow subject to the contingency of history as experienced by the human being.
The Positive Doctrine of Justification and Ritschl
In this chapter we come full circle, as Bohl's understanding of justification is dogmatically related to his understanding of the image of God and other Christian doctrines.
For Bohl, the idea of effective imputation correlated to the doctrine of original sin preserves the historicity of the human being in the face of God as a history of the lost image and as the empty place for the absolute gift of full and free grace in Christ, who is 312
the express image of the Father. In this way no independence of the human being and his
or her capacities, as often rooted in an ontological or ethical understanding of the image
of God, can be maintained. The Word of God, as the express image of God, therefore,
should not be placed in the realm of human subjectivity: neither in creation, nor in terms
of re-creation. In both realms a monergism of grace needs to be strictly maintained and
emptied of any substance-oriented thinking. By imputation and its effects (effective justification is regeneration) the new human being is there by faith in Christ.
Furthermore, faith for Bohl must therefore be regarded as an empty hand and not in terms of the habitus-actus scheme of Scholastic theology. Such scholastisization inherently brought with it a concentration on the 'content' of the otherwise empty hand of the human being in an ontological (being) or moral (will) way. The dialogical character and function of revelation should not be subsumed dialectically. A living faith stands over against reason in the realm of God's revelation of justification, with the latter to be viewed as the effective cause of faith itself. Therefore, also the category of time not space must be preeminent when speaking of God's absolute and immediate communication with the human being by way of His revelation.
For these reasons, Christ must stand at the beginning of soteriology as the one who breaks through and makes spiritual room for himself and God. Christ is our spiritual place before God. Also, in this context, no distinction should be made between Christ and the Scriptures per se.669 If so, one will fall into the subjectivism of the inner-outer word distinction and lose any objective standard as well as the assurance and comfort of salvation.
See Bohl, Prolegomena, 13-14. 313
In light of these observations, Ritschl's regenerational-church theology must be rejected, as it is essentially a form of enthusiasm in a modernistic sense and lends itself to
Pelagianism and synergism in the realm of soteriology. Therefore, against Ritschl and others, Bohl opposes divorcing Christ from the Scriptures, either as ideal prototype of religious consciousness (mysticism-Pantheism in the spirit of Schleiermacher), or as historic Founder of the regenerated Church community as the ideal Revealer of the loving will of God (historical positivism-Deism-Pelagianism-in the specific spirit of Ritschl). If one does so divorce Christ from the Scriptures, the concentration point will shift to the subjective search of a correspondence between the Founder's consciousness, will, or action and the self over and above the objective word and power of God. Barth's threefold distinction with respect to the Word of God must also be rejected for similar
670 reasons.
It goes beyond the scope of this research to explore what influence Bohl had on the theology of Karl Barth, if any. The positive references to Bohl to be found in Barth's Dogmatics (see above), however, indicate that Barth was familiar with Bohl's writings and his insights. I have previously investigated the relationship between Karl Barth and Kohlbrugge in my master's thesis, The Word of God. Seeing that Bohl stood squarely in the line of Kohlbrugge's theology, many of the observations made in this dissertation on Bohl and Ritschl are directly or indirectly applicable to Barth as well, I believe. In this thesis, I have attempted to reach beyond Barth to Ritschl. From this perspective the present thesis could be understood as an indirect critique of certain characteristics of Barth's theology of revelation. I believe that the root of Barth's revelationalpositivism is to be found in Ritschl. This, of course, is a term with which Barth's doctrine of the Word of God was labeled. See D. Bonhoeffer, Act undSein (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 182. The reference here is to his Letters and Papers in Prison, 280, 286, 329.1 would argue that Barth himself, and I concur with Bonhoeffer on this score of his revelational positivism, is an inheritor of Ritschl with respect to this aspect of his theology. It is interesting, to say the least, that even Otto Weber in his Foundations of Dogmatics notes, "[Wilhelm] Herrmann's most influential students, Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) and Karl Barth (1886-1968), are very different from each other and from their teachers, but they still cannot be understood without Hermann and thus without Ritschl. If it is permitted to credit later 'dialectical theology' with having overcome 'Culture Protestantism,' then we must add that the intellectual weapons used 314
Finally, against Ritschl's concentration on the self instead of God, the latter giving the human his groundedness in history as a living God who speaks and acts, Bohl advocates a restoration of real dialogue and a return to the metaphysics of revelation.671
(we are thinking of... Barth's rejection of natural theology) were taken in part from the arsenal out of which 'Culture Protestantism' also came" Weber, 1:149-150.1 add, with the rejection of natural theology—informed by the philosophy of Kant, as this is certainly the case with Ritschl—came the espousal of a revelational positivism, which indeed is part of the arsenal of "Culture Protestantism" used by Barth. 671 See especially chapter 3 on the term metaphysics of revelation. 315
B. ANALYTICAL CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT BOHL'S CRITIQUE OF
RITSCHL
Having considered Bohl's critique of Ritschl primarily from Bohl's own perspective throughout this paper, in this section I deem it necessary to emphasize some points looking at both from a more critical point of view.
Having come to this point of the investigation, I note that Bohl can be considered inconsistent at serious junctures of his critique of Ritschl. This inconsistency particularly applies to Bohl's critique of Ritschl's view of the relationship between Old and New
Testament. In this area Bohl undervalues Ritschl's stance towards the tradition and convictions of the historical-critical school of Julius Wellhausen and others. Bohl thereby tends to undermine his own position vis-a-vis the unity of Old and New Testament. This is particularly exhibited by Bohl's ambivalent appreciation of Ritschl in the context of his disagreements with others.
As we have noted, Ritschl's emphasis was primarily on the gospel and grace; the basis was the emphasis on the unity principle of revelation and God as love. The concentration point for Bohl was found primarily in the law of God, presupposing a personal God who in Christ and by His own Spirit did and will fulfill his own Word as law and promise for and in the life of the Christian, now and in the future. For Bohl the gospel is essentially law fulfilled for sinners who are condemned by it and ought never to take it into their own hands. Ritschl, in his attempt to create a unitive vision between the
Old and New Testament, in fact, seeks to affirm the exact opposite of what Bohl emphasizes in his own exegetical and dogmatic works in terms of the unity between the two Testaments in relation to the doctrine of justification. 316
In light of these observations, Bohl's praise of Ritschl for his biblical approach, for making the New Testament ideas of justification dependent on the Old, and seeking to present the doctrine of justification by faith from the point of view of personal experience in intimate relation with Scriptural doctrine, to such an extent that he reminded the mediating theologians of his time with their disorganizing tendencies to turn to Ritschl for a more sound approach, is inconsistent from his own perspective. Moreover, in light of later research, which places Ritschl at the beginning of the historical-critical approach
(perhaps being its inceptor), Bohl's appraisal of Ritschl on this score seems faulty and inconsistent with his own view of revelation.
These observations point out that Bohl, to a certain extent, was an eclectic theologian. He did not seem to have considered Ritschl's theological system, i.e. Ritschl's fundamental ground-motifs, as a whole in order to criticize it but simply sought to critique Ritschl from his own (presuppositional) point of view and utilize what he could for his own purposes of analyzing and critiquing others and for articulating his own theology.
In his main charge that Ritschl is a Socinian, in my estimation Bohl is also not entirely correct. First of all, Ritschl's insistence upon the church as regenerate community as locus for doing theology,672 which was his 'find' during his Vorarbeit and one of the
See Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine, paragraph 1, "The Standpoint of Systematic Theology in the Christian Community." The fact that this is paragraph 1 of his treatment of the positive development of the doctrine of justification is significant not only in terms of order, but in terms of his standpoint and the approach from which he sought to theologize. "Authentic and complete knowledge of Jesus' religious significance—His significance, that is, as a Founder of religion—depends, then, on one's reckoning oneself part of the community which he founded, and this precisely in so far as it believes itself to have received the forgiveness of sins as His peculiar gift." Ibid., 2. In this sense Ritschl remained a consciousness theologian in the spirit of Schleiermacher, as 317 main characteristics of his theology in terms of which he desired to remain connected to the Catholic tradition, speaks against the individualism of Socinianism and their ecclesiology.673
Secondly, Socinianism was not necessarily anti-metaphysical in the same sense as we see expressed in the thought of Ritschl. In fact, Socinians still held to an idea of the existence of a world and moral order and were not dualistic in terms of the fundamental distinction between nature and Spirit as we find so fundamentally important in the theology of Ritschl.674
Thirdly, Ritschl did not isolate Socinus out of the history of theology for his own theology, but Abelard's thoughts on the atonement. Together with his critical reading of the New Testament and Old Testament, in particular in terms of the idea of substitutionary atonement and the ideas of righteousness, justice, and imputation in the
he also states that the sayings of Jesus about the forgiveness of sins as related to His person and death become "completely intelligible only when we see how they are reflected in the consciousness of those who believe in Him, and how the members of the Christian community trace back their consciousness of pardon to the Person and the action and passion of Jesus." Ibid., 1. 673 According to the Socinians "The sole object of the appearance of Christ upon earth, and of the whole Christian scheme, was merely to communicate to men instruction or information, and to procure for them, and bestow upon them, the forgiveness of their sins,—the enjoyment of God's favour,—and the renovation of their natures,—of course the objects of the church and the sacraments, viewed as means or instruments, must be wholly restricted within the same range. The church is not, in any proper sense, a divine institution; and does not consist of men called by the almigthy grace of God out of the world, and formed by Him into a peculiar society, . . ., it is a mere voluntary association of men, who are naturally drawn together, because they happen to have adopted somewhat similar views upon religious subjects, and who seek to promote one another's welfare, in the way that may seem best to their own wisdom." Cunningham, 182-183. 674 Inasmuch as Christ was primarily a teacher in the system of the Socinians, his teachings and example expressed "the path of duty, and future blessedness, and ... set before them an example of obedience to God's law and will." Ibid., 176. Christ was primarily a teacher and example of moral law and order. 318 theology of Paul, Ritschl critically appropriated Abelard for his theology as belonging, according to him, to the catholic and accepted tradition.675
Fourthly, we conclude that, the fact that Kant and his dialectical thought stands between Socinus and Ritschl is not given sufficient attention in Bohl's claim that Ritschl was a Socinian. Because of this, Bohl is again to be seen as an eclectic theologian.
Finally, I raise the critical question, was Bohl not a Pietist in any sense? In light of
Bohl's many favorable references to Ritschl's critique of Pietism, one is given the impression that Bohl was an anti-Pietist. However, not all of Pietism is to be avoided.
Kohlbriigge and those of his friends were not contra-Pietism, but sought to Reform pietism from its 'un-Reformed' tendencies. In light of this, Otto Webber is right that
Bohl does give the impression that he "relieves ... some of [the] tension" found in
See Ritschl, A Critical History. In the introduction and chapter 1, Ritschl treats Anselm's and Abelard's doctrine of the atonement, and after a careful delineation of both views, concludes, "It appears that the advantage in respect of typical character is to be described to Abelard's view, and not to that of Anselm." Ibid., 40. In chapter 6, Ritschl deals extensively with Socinus. At the end of this chapter he defends the Reformers against the accusations of Socinus on several points, as if Socinus had not understood the Reformers correctly. See ibid., 303-309. It is not to be neglected, however, that Ritschl did also seek to incorporate some of Socinus' ideas within Reformed theology, for example on this important point that "the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience, to the effect that it represents only Christ's inalienable duty, could be admitted within the circle of Reformed theology without disparagement to the substitutionary value of that prestation." Ibid., 308. However, on the whole, in chapter 9, Ritschl speaks of the revival of Abelard's type of doctrine by Schleiermacher and his followers as necessary and positive. At the end of this chapter, Ritschl unashamedly associates himself with the revival of Abelard by stating, "In fact, as a vehicle of religious life and feeling, it is only Abelard's thought that can be directly accepted,—not Anselm's theory" Ibid., 512. 676 Again see my master's thesis, in which I show that Kohlbriigge was not opposed to all kinds of subjectivism, but rather sought to 'reform' wrongly directed forms of subjectivism and/or pietism which had manifested themselves during his time. See also A. De Reuver, 'Bedelen bij de Brori Kohlbrugge's geloofsopvatting vergeleken met Reformatie andNadere Reformatie (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 1992). 319
Kohlbrugge's theology of grace and the Word of God.677 In my view this is because he associates himself too positively and too strongly with Ritschl's critique of the history of pietism. This does not weaken Bohl's own position vis-a-vis Ritschl, in my view, but his sharp critique of pietism in general should have been more nuanced in light of the fact that the circle of theologians he himself was influenced by and sought to propagate was itself influenced by and continued to present itself as a form of Pietism.678
677 See Otto Weber, 1:147, fn. 67. 678 See J. Kommers, Ontwaakt Gij die Slaapt! Het Reformatorisch getuigenis van Gottfried Daniel Krummacher, Hermann Friedrich Kohlbriigge en Paul Geyser tijdens de Erweckung in het Wuppertal van de Negentiende eeuw (Heerenveen: Uitgeverij Groen, 2005). In this work Kommers points out that Kohlbrugge's preaching of the word stood directly in the line of the Reformers, expressed from within a milieu that was heavily influenced and saturated by pietism. According to him, Kohlbriigge is marked by an intense Reformed-pietistic biblical faith. Ibid., 541. In a private conversation with me, Kommers called Kohlbriigge a Lutheran pietist (2007). 320
C. RAMIFICATIONS OF BOHL'S CRITIQUE OF RITSCHL AND DOCTRINE OF REVELATION AND JUSTIFICATION
Introductory Comments
Pointing to the following ramifications, I wish to place the theology of Bohl and the issues raised in my comparison of his theology of justification with that of Ritschl in our contemporary historical and scholarly context. In this way I hope not only to have accomplished the writing of a dissertation as a contribution to the scholarship on Eduard
Bohl, but I hope to create a platform for further dialogue about the issues raised by this historical-theological investigation of two significant contemporary theologians for our times—our times in which the doctrine of justification proves to be no less relevant and as foundational as ever.
No doubt one could expand at length upon the following suggestions of the ramifications of my research. Therefore, by enumerating these ramifications my primary intention is to suggest fruitful areas for further exploration.
For the Contemporary Context
In my estimation, Bohl's conception of history proceeding in concentric circles as rooted in his understanding of the image of God, his doctrine of the word of God, and justification can be seen to affirm the human being's historicity. Seeing human history as history of the lost image is the way back to finding it in a real and spiritual sense by and through the revelation of God. Bohl's biblical realism, in this regard, stands in sharp contrast to a modernist, evolutionary (historicistic) way of thinking, which Bohl terms illusionary (a la Ritschl). 321
From Bohl's perspective, a theology of evolution and a theology that starts with either regeneration, or a substantial conception of the unio mystica, tend to make room for illusionary tendencies. If the boundary distinction between Creator and creature is not maintained in creation and in soteriology, the result will be either a form of pantheism, or
Deism—of mysticism, or Pelagianism respectively. As consequence, an illusionary, or virtual theology in which the realistic, historical and existential connection with the apostasy of Adam is absent will be the result. In theologies of the West, both rationalism and certain strands of Pietism (mysticism) have been instrumental for the incubation of such illusionary or virtual tendencies, whereby a loss of the concrete historical and existential dimension of human existence under God has ensued.
As partially rooted in the technometry of Ramus, under whose influence the visual was advocated over the mystery of the personal word of God,679 the empirical began to be championed over the metaphysical, and our scientific and technological age inaugurated a decline of real dialogue precipitating a demise of the experience of the spiritual-relational character and function of the word of God. Implicitly, virtual reality began to triumph over revelational realism. In this context the historical-critical de- construction of the Word of God has been the context in which post-modern de- constructionism has been able to flourish. The structure and approach inherent in Bohl's
Reformed theology, as exposed in this dissertation, with its implicit critique of Ramus
See more on Ramus under the subtitle, "Some Preliminary Remarks on the Structure of Bohl's Theology" in chapter 1 above. 322 and those influenced by him, might be able to contribute to the revival of orthodoxy against these tendencies and their consequences.680
Furthermore, Bohl's conception of history, as rooted and supported by the Eternal, refusing to place the word of God in the domain of human subjectivity, seeks to relate human existence concretely to the sphere of the eternal Triune God. This can be conceived of as an answer to the post-modern human being who has experienced a sense of history and of the eternal. The modernist, enlightenment paradigm of evolutionary development and scientific positivism has proven to be what Bohl describes as
'illusionary,' or we can perhaps say today, 'virtual'. World wars have given us a sense of realism that no longer corresponds to the paradigm of scientific and historical positivism
(a la Ritschl). However, neither a simple negation of this paradigm by post-moderns, nor a purely individualistic subjective 'filling in' (synergism) of this paradigm is the answer, as the latter will result in a society of windowless monads (Leibniz) in which
Particularly interesting in this regard is Catherine Pickstock's After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). In chapter two of this book she deals with the philosophy, method, and impact of Ramus on the West and how it has contributed to a voiceless, spatial virtualization of our dealing with reality. Another historical study considered as important is an article written by Moltmann, "Zur Bedeutung des Petrus Ramus fur Philosophie und Theologie im Calvinismus," Zeitschriftfur Kirchengeschichte, 68 (1957): 295-318. In academic circles this study has become known as representative of the "Ramus Hypothesis." It forwards a particular interpretation of the significance of Petrus Ramus and his methodology for the history of Protestant theology, specifically of the seventeenth century. It brings to light an important shift in orientation and expression of theology and practice and points to its instrumentality for federal theology and Puritanism (Calvinistic Empiricism), and Calvinistic humanism (Jacobus Arminius [1560-1609]) and Calvinistic 'proto-pietism' (William Ames [1567-1633]) ibid., 318. 681 By postmodern I mean the turning in upon itself of modernism, which has resulted in a shattering of the rationalistic, scientific, humanistic idealism of modernism into self-enclosed subjective entities (monads), because of which also a loss of a sense of history and its continuity has ensued. 323 communication is no longer possible, and the embracing of death and meaninglessness become attractive (Jean-Paul Sartre).
Many contemporary theologians deal with the post-modern context by accepting the often-negative consequences of the evolutionary and scientific-positivist paradigm, namely, the embrace of death and meaninglessness as the consequence of a virtual and narcissistic existence. In contrast, Bohl's Reformed emphasis on law and sin can be seen as a helpful diagnosis and as a solution to the dilemma of the post-modern human being.
As the Bible shows that not death but sin against God is the problem, the primary categories of opposition are not being and non-being, but sin-grace. Many contemporary theologians neglect this order,682as they neglect the method of Scriptures and therefore fail to come to a true realization of the eternal dimension of life as well. As a result the problem as well as the solution remain horizontal, virtual, nihilistic, or narcissistic
(meaningless).683
See G. C. Berkouwer, Karl Barth en de Kinderdoop (Kampen: J. H. Kok N. V. Kampen, 1947). For Bohl, both sin and grace are rooted in the forensic thought of effective imputation. 683 In the context of Moltmann's understanding of the image of God, which implies that the Trinitarian God has entered into the World to redeem it, I note that Moltmann turns from thinking in purely relational non-substantial categories to the category of being and its negation, i.e., life and death. He thereby stands in the existentialist tradition, which builds on Kierkegaard's concept of dread in the face of death. However, I ask, is this not an internal inconsistency? Moltmann's theology, too, is informed by the fear of death, not by the fear of a holy and righteous God who is a consuming fire outside of Christ. With such a turn, Moltmann is pressed into a panentheistic doctrine of God: of a God bound to human beings and the world as the God of liberation and life in the midst of death. It turns into a theological cosmology in which the human being and world as body and creation stand in the centre. The history of creation is finally absorbed by God's Trinitarian history of redemption as its base, reason and power, and for the time being it manifests itself primarily as a public theology: a sanctification of politics in the form of a politics of sanctification. Is this not merely the secular form of the Roman Catholic sanctification of the church, in the way of the church of sanctification? I contend that it is. See, Jtirgen Moltmann, Christian Anthropology in 324
The human being is called to recognize his or her fallenness from the initial upright position in which they were created as in the sphere of the Triune God, with the emphasis on the law as given from heaven by a Sovereign Triune God who lives, speaks, and acts. This is the method to recognize the dark background of our existence in sin and death as living in the realm of the lost image of God. The Word, therefore, is never to be placed in this domain as Christ the Redeemer is given to break through and deliver the human being. Ritschl's grace-idealism, on account of which he rejects the nomenclature of Christ as Redeemer,6*4 precisely highlights the problem of an unwillingness to accept the human being as chained in the sphere of sin and death and of denying the character and function of the Word of God and its way of salvation. More often than not, anarchism is the result, where sin, law, and death are not recognized for what they really are.
In light of God's revelation as von-oben (from above), in accordance with the spiritual-relational character and personal dialogical function of the word, the idea that the problem is ontological ought to be avoided as well. Neither sin nor grace is ontological. This must be seen as contrary to Barth's notion of sin as nothingness, as he
the Conflicts of the Present, trans. John Sturdy (London: SPCK, 1974); On Human Dignity Political Theology and Ethics, trans. Douglas Meeks (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984); The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and the Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000); "Geschichtstheologie und pietistisches Menschenbild bei Johann Coccejus und Theodor Undereyck," Evangelische Theologie Monatsschrift, 19 (1959): 343-361; History and the Triune God (New York: Crossroad, 1992; Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); The Trinity and the Kingdom (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981); Moltmann-Wendel, Kohlbrugge 's Verstdndnis der Kirche in Zusammenhang der Entwiklung sein Theologie, Ph.D. diss., University of Gottingen (1951). 684 See Ritschl,^ Critical History, 1-21. 685 See Wolf Krotke, Sin and Nothingness in the Theology of Karl Barth, Studies in Reformed Theology and History, New Series, Number 10, trans, and ed. Philip G. 325 also ultimately conceived of the human problem as ontological and therefore rational or vice-versa. Barth was clearly still theologizing in the circle of 'Greek' ontology and rationality: he was theologizing in terms of space and place-thinking to which his radical dialecticism and his incipient universalism testifies.686 The word again is objectified.
Bohl's elimination or re-configuration of the substantial in the realm of soteriology, which is rooted in his theology of effective imputation versus ontological mutation, seeks to show that the problem is not ontological but spiritual, personal, and ethical. In this light Bohl's call for Ritschl to return to metaphysics must be seen. It effectively underscores the personal, spiritual, and ethical dimension of the Word of God.
To state the principal point once more, Bohl's doctrine of God's Word in conjunction with the doctrine of effective imputation and the justification of the ungodly maintains the boundary between Creature and Creator in the realms of creation, history, and soteriology. From this point of view, history is 'regained' and the possibility of true and redeeming dialogue restored. Finally, the reality of participation by faith in God, in
Whom one finds his or her support, is restored again. For this Ritschl proved to be a hindrance rather than a help. The effect of his theology is, in actual fact, a loss of a sense of history and of a true conception of reality, as the secular and the historical are divinized and the divine is historicized and secularized. Bohl's observation that in
Ritschl's theology a secularization takes place must be seen as foundationally related to
Ziegler and Christina-Maria Bammel (Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2005). Originally published as Sunde undNichtiges bei Karl Barth, Neukirchener Beitrage zur systematische Theologie, eds. Wolfgang Huber, Bertold Klappert, Hans-Joachim and Jurgen Moltmann (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1983). 686 See my master's thesis, The Doctrine of the Word of God. The objectivation of salvation and grace crush the vitality of the Spirit of God's Word and the Word of God's Spirit. 326 his unwillingness to place the Word of God in the sphere of human rationality and its capacity.
For the Specific Debate on Justification
In our contemporary context, the New Perspective on Paul forwards a considerable change in the way some contemporary New Testament scholars understand and interpret the writings of the Apostle Paul, particularly in regard to Judaism and the common
Protestant understanding of justification by faith and imputed righteousness. The implications of this new estimable scholarly research include a critique of the traditional
Reformed understanding of justification.
In my estimation, this influential scholarly and theological movement has been difficult to answer at points, in part because of a prevalent 'un-Reformed' understanding of the relationship between regeneration and justification688 within the Protestant circles themselves. In fact, the generally accepted and expressed understanding of the relationship between regeneration and justification, as expressed by many Protestant theologians after the Reformation as pointed out by Bohl, could be considered as a weak link in Reformed soteriology.
The New Perspective on Paul is a phrase first used by James D. G. Dunn in his 1982 Manson Memorial Lecture. As a whole it refers to a paradigm shift within New Testament scholarship since E. P. Sanders' 1977 book, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. Both Dunn and Sanders can be considered historical-critical scholars who have been followed in their interpretations with some significant nuances by certain esteemed evangelical writers such as N. T. Wright. 688 This corresponds to Bohl's partial critique of Calvin as well as the Westminster Confessions and Catechisms. His desire to complete the Reformation can be considered helpful here. 327
In my view, Bohl's insistence on justification and regeneration as conceptually and intrinsically linked could be helpful to remove this weak link in the contemporary debate on justification and the defense of the Reformed doctrine of justification. Instead of conceiving regeneration as effectively preceding justification, as is prominent in many
Reformed theologies, this thesis will provide the critics of the New Perspective on Paul and their doctrine of justification689 a firmer ground for a defense of the Reformation doctrine of justification.
Understanding regeneration as chronologically and actually preceding justification, the human being and history became the focus of theologizing as the Word of God was subsumed under categories and methodologies alien to itself. Thereby, a place was given to a personal independence (synergism) and to a soteriology which was dialectically expressed in terms of philosophical categories such as form-matter, habitus- actus, nature-freedom, and historical categories, such as a succession or abolition of covenants, were introduced.690
See Guy Prentiss Waters, Justification and the New Perspectives on Paul: A Review and Response (New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 2004); Stephen Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The "Lutheran" Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004); See also, D. A. Carson, Peter T. O'Brien and Mark A. Seifrid, eds., A Fresh Appraisal of Paul and Second Temple Judaism Justification and Variegated Nomism, vol. 2, The Paradoxes of Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004); Gary L. W. Johnson & Guy P. Walters, eds., By Faith Alone: Answering the Challenges to the Doctrine of Justification (Wheaton: Crossway Books Good News Publishers, 2006); Brian Vickers, Paul's Theology of Imputation: Jesus' Blood and Righteousness (Wheaton: Crossway Books Good News Publishers, 2006). 690 See for example pages 171-189 in Johnson and Walters, By Faith Alone: Answering the Challenges to the Doctrine of Justification, 2006. On these pages John Bolt defends the idea of the covenant of works as a venerable Reformed doctrine. Guy Walters also takes up the challenge against the proponents of the Federal Vision with an adamant defense of the two-covenant theory. See ibid., 19. Even more interesting is David Gordon's retention and defense of the two-covenant theory against what he calls John Murray's mono-covenantalism and Auburn theology. Ibid., 118-125. Bohl's 328
Bohl's opposition to the idea of the covenant of works in his controversy with
Abraham Kuyper, expressed in chapter 1 of this paper, indicates an opposition to any such historisizing, or objectivizing of God's special revelation. In light of this, I note that those who seek to defend the Reformed doctrine of justification against the New
Perspective on Paul have no problem incorporating a defense of the idea of the covenant of works. This, in my view, however, precisely undermines the vitality of the Reformed doctrine of justification, as it undermines the power of the Word of God. To remain within the tradition of these theological developments—in Bohl's eyes de-formations—is, therefore, to weaken the possibility of a true and clear defense of the Biblical-Reformed doctrine of justification in light of the attacks it is enduring today.691
Finally, the historical-critical aspect and the tendency towards synergism in the
New Perspective(s) on Paul—by expressing a soteriology in which by total grace we are placed in a saving covenantal relationship with a faithful God and by efforts we must attempt to remain in 2—can be opposed by staying focused on the Sovereign grace and
agreement with John Murray's theology in terms of their mutual rejection of the covenant of works idea as essentially nonbiblical and non-Reformed would be a relevant and important issue to explore further. It does not follow, however, that one who supports the mono-covenantal model would necessarily be a proponent of the Auburn theology. 691 In the literature written against the New Perspectives on Paul, I have not seen any reference to the thesis of justification and regeneration as conceptually and effectively falling together as a possible answer to the historical-critical and synergistic elements in the theology of the New Perspective on Paul. Instead, most of the time a one sided emphasis on imputation as juridicial and forensic, without its religious character (regeneration), is forwarded as defense of the true Reformed position on justification. Bohl's claim of the catholicity of the thesis that justification and regeneration are conceptually and effectively linked together, might be valuable for this debate. 692 See E. P. Sanders, Paul the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1983); James D. G. Dunn, ed., Paul and the Mosaic Law (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001); and N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1991); What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity? 329 faithfulness of God with the thought of justification and regeneration conceptually and effectively linked together. The later concentration eliminates the tendency to create such
'room' for independence over against God, either in terms of history or in terms of our own personal existence. In this way, Bohl's revival of the catholic thesis that justification is regeneration could be helpful for articulating a response to both the historical-critical aspect of the New Perspective on Paul and their implicit synergistic soteriology.
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997); "The Law in Romans 2," Paul and the Mosaic Law: The Third Durham-Tubingen Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism, ed. J. D. G. Dunn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 130-50. 330
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