DOCSLIB.ORG

Brexit: There Is No Guarantee That Parliament Can Prevent No-Deal, but the Political Will Is There

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Brexit: There Is No Guarantee That Parliament Can Prevent No-Deal, but the Political Will Is There Dods Monitoring: no-deal Brexit Brexit: there is no guarantee that Parliament can prevent no-deal, but the political will is there This report examines what options are available for Parliament to prevent a no-deal Brexit and what the likelihood and possible outcomes for each scenario are. 10th July 2019 Dods Monitoring: no-deal Brexit Executive summary British politics has been through turbulent times since the 2016 referendum: Brexit has turned UK parliamentary democracy on its head. Three years on from the result that gave the Leave campaign a narrow victory, MPs have been unable to break the deadlock that has plunged the Government into paralysis – resulting in two extensions to Article 50 and two Prime Ministerial resignations. Both contenders to become the next Conservative Leader and Prime Minister have signalled they would be willing to put the option of ‘no-deal’ back on the negotiating table, and one is insisting he will take Britain out of the European Union on the 31st October exit date with or without a deal. The way forward for MPs seeking to prevent no-deal is not straightforward. There is no guaranteed way MPs can seek to prevent this form of exit, or even bind the Prime Minister to request an Arti- cle 50 extension if a deal is not reached before exit day. It remains the legal default that the UK will leave the EU on the 31st October unless a Withdrawal Agreement is ratified, and the means pur- sued in the run up to the last Article 50 deadline are unlikely to be available under a new Prime Minister. But Parliament is opposed to no-deal, with 312 voting against the Government in March to reject it under any circumstance. The new Prime Minister will lack a personal mandate for no-deal and will face a number of difficulties in the coming months creating significant political pressure to prevent the UK from crashing out. Under existing orders and parliamentary process, there is no one clear or guaranteed route availa- ble to MPs seeking to block no-deal. Any opportunity is likely to come about by chance, not design, and at the last minute, with some MPs wishing to give the new Prime Minister a chance to break the deadlock and wishing to exhaust all other options before turning against the Government. This report: • takes an in-depth look at the ways in which Parliament could seek to prevent a no-deal exit; • assesses the likelihood and possible outcomes of each scenario; and • provides recommendations for stakeholders and industry. 10th July 2019 Dods Monitoring: no-deal Brexit Definitions What ‘no-deal’ means in practice The UK’s new EU exit deadline under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty is 31st October 2019. If this deadline is reached and no formal agreement between the UK and EU has been ratified by Parlia- ment, and no extension of Article 50 has been requested and agreed by the EU 27, then the UK will leave the European Union on a ‘cliff edge’ exit at midnight on 31st October. It would mean an overnight change in the UK’s relationship with the EU. The UK would immediate- ly cease to be a member of the Customs Union and Single Market, losing access to a number of agreements and databases, and creating significant issues at the ports and borders. The UK would fall back on World Trade Organisation trade rules which state that under the princi- ple of non-discrimination no country can offer to trade with another on preferential terms, unless it is party to a free trade area of customs union or where there is special tariff treatment for devel- oping countries. This means that the UK would be forced to trade with the EU and third countries with higher tariffs. No GATT get-out clause There was some suggestion that the UK could exit under a no-deal but avoid any tariffs due to Arti- cle 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 24). This clause means countries can sign up to “interim arrangements” whilst plans for a free trade agreement or customs union are being discussed. The interim period can last up to 10 years, as long as there is a schedule for an end agreement being drawn up. These suggestions, however, were dismissed recently by the Governor of the Bank of England who was clear that GATT only applies to countries that are already working towards an agreement, so not in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Importantly, GATT 24 doesn’t apply to services either – which accounted for 40 percent of the UKs exports to the EU in 2017. 10th July 2019 Dods Monitoring: no-deal Brexit Key political influencers in and on Parliament The table below summarises the main influencers and groupings within Parliament: Anti-no-deal Pro-no-deal Pro-no-deal in some cir- cumstances Backbench MPs Backbench MPs The DUP The Speaker of the House of The Brexit Party Jeremy Hunt Commons The Opposition Boris Johnson Anti-no-deal parliamentarians Anti-no-deal parliamentarians are united in the belief that a no-deal Brexit would be deeply dam- aging to the UK’s economy and standing in the world and would plunge the UK into a recession and see a prolonged period of instability and uncertainty. Tariffs on imports, they argue, would be dam- aging for key sectors such as the motor industry, and British products would also no longer be au- thorised for sales in the EU. Politically, opponents to this version of Brexit argue that there is no mandate for it. People voted to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, but they did not vote to exit on these ‘cliff edge’ terms and a fresh mandate would be needed for any Prime Minister seeking this option. Backbench MPs In normal times, backbench MPs only say over legislation and policy is their ability to cast a vote in favour or against Government proposals or occasionally introduce a Private Members Bill on the odd Friday. However, Brexit has transformed UK politics and backbench MPs have exerted signifi- cant influence over this process. The anti-no deal cross party group of backbenchers, led by Yvette Cooper, Nick Boles and Sir Oliver Letwin, managed to wrangle control off the Government earlier this year and pass legislation that effectively created a legal mechanism whereby Parliament could instruct the Prime Minister to seek an extension of Article 50. They also have their traditional power: votes. The failure to win over backbenchers was Theresa May’s downfall as they consistently voted against her Withdrawal Agreement. They have also demonstrated the will of the House, or lack of, by voting over several Brexit options during indica- tive votes. The round of votes in March saw MPs reject a motion for No Deal by 160 to 400. Their opinions and actions will hold significant weight over coming months, with the new Prime Minister still operating on a wafer-thin majority. 10th July 2019 Dods Monitoring: no-deal Brexit Speaker of the House of Commons The Speaker is the ‘chief officer and highest authority’ of the House of Commons, and its repre- sentative to the monarch. Traditionally, the Speaker is always rigidly impartial but the current speaker, John Bercow, has been heavily criticised by some Brexiteer MPs who claim he uses his po- sition to push forward a ‘Remain’ agenda. His influence over the Brexit process has proven to be immense. His rulings and interpretations of procedure can force the Government to alter their strategy, which we saw this year when he pre- vented Theresa May from bringing back her unchanged Withdrawal Agreement for further votes. It is also up to the Speaker which amendments are chosen, whether to grant emergency debates and he even has a deciding vote when votes are tied. He also holds the deciding vote in the rare event that a vote is tied. In a Parliament where every vote matter, the importance of this cannot be overstated. The Speaker used this vote in April to break a tie and vote with the Government (as is expected) against an amendment by Hilary Benn which, if passed, would have seen the Opposition take control of the parliamentary timetable again. Bercow has gone against previous commitments to stand down by stating that he will remain in post during the Brexit crisis in Parliament, which will be seen as unwelcome news by MPs seeking to leave without a deal. The Opposition The nature of being in opposition means that power over the course of the country is limited, but by no means inconsequential. The Leader of the Opposition poses a constant political threat to the Governing party: so long as they can demonstrate support in the polls or at the ballot box, they ex- ert significant political influence over events. A new Conservative Prime Minister is likely to be reluctant to engage with the official Leader of the Opposition to the extent that Theresa May did towards the end of her premiership, given the criti- cism she received for this. The Opposition, however, is also instrumental in tabling leading amendments, deciding motions for Opposition Day debates and deciding how to whip its MPs on crucial votes. Most significant, perhaps, is the likelihood of the Opposition seeking to bring down the Govern- ment through a no-confidence motion in the Commons. If one was called, and successfully passed, then the country could find itself heading back to the polls very soon indeed. Smaller pro-remain opposition parties will also be essential in brokering any coalitions, or alterna- tive Government’s and under current polling their position could be strengthened in the event of an early General Election.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Parliamentary Conventions
    REPORT Parliamentary Conventions Jacqy Sharpe About the Author Jacqy Sharpe is a former Clerk in the House of Commons. Her period as Clerk of the Journals provided her with significant insight into the historical and contemporary context of parliamentary conventions and procedure. Message from the Author With thanks to Dr Andrew Blick, Sir David Beamish, Helen Irwin and Sir Malcolm Jack for their comments on drafts of this paper. The conclusions, and any errors or omissions, are, of course, the responsibility of the author. Parliamentary Conventions Executive Summary “General agreement or consent, as embodied in any accepted usage, standard, etc”1 “Rules of constitutional practice that are regarded as binding in operation, but not in law”2 “[B]inding rules of behaviour accepted by those at whom they are directed. A practice that is not invariable does not qualify.”3 A list of various conventions with a note on how, if at all, they, or the approaches to them, have lately been modified or changed: CONVENTION CURRENT POSITION Conventions relating to behaviour in the House of Commons Speaking in the House of Commons Members should address the House through the Chair Although both questioned and frequently breached, and refer to other Members in the third person, by the convention is generally accepted constituency or position. Except for opening speeches, maiden speeches and Accepted and generally observed where there is special reason for precision, Members should not read speeches, though they may refer to notes Attendance at debates Members
    [Show full text]
  • The House's Power to Call for Papers
    House of Commons Procedure Committee The House’s power to call for papers: procedure and practice Ninth Report of Session 2017–19 Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 15 May 2019 HC 1904 Published on 20 May 2019 by authority of the House of Commons Procedure Committee The Procedure Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to consider the practice and procedure of the House in the conduct of public business, and to make recommendations. Current membership Mr Charles Walker MP (Conservative, Broxbourne) (Chair) Bob Blackman MP (Conservative, Harrow East) Mr Peter Bone MP (Conservative, Wellingborough) Bambos Charalambous MP (Labour, Enfield, Southgate) Sir Christopher Chope MP (Conservative, Christchurch) Nic Dakin MP (Labour, Scunthorpe) Chris Elmore MP (Labour, Ogmore) Sir David Evennett MP (Conservative, Bexleyheath and Crayford) Helen Goodman MP (Labour, Bishop Auckland) Mr Ranil Jayawardena MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) Sir Edward Leigh MP (Conservative, Gainsborough) David Linden MP (Scottish National Party, Glasgow East) Melanie Onn MP (Labour, Great Grimsby) Nick Smith MP (Labour, Blaenau Gwent) Gareth Snell MP (Labour (Co-op)) Alison Thewliss MP (Scottish National Party, Glasgow Central) Mr William Wragg MP (Conservative, Hazel Grove) Powers The powers of the Committee are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No. 147. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication Committee reports are published on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/proccom and in print by Order of the House. Evidence relating to this report is published on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
    [Show full text]
  • Votes and Proceedings for 9 Sep 2019
    No. 341 Monday 9 September 2019 Votes and Proceedings Corrected consequent to the Speaker’s Statement of 25 September 2019 The House met at 2.30 pm. Prayers 1 Questions to the Secretary of State for Education 2 Speaker's Statement: Intention to stand down as Speaker 3 Royal Assent The Speaker reported that the Queen had signified Royal Assent to the following Acts under the Royal Assent Act 1967: Kew Gardens (Leases) Act 2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 4 Applications for emergency debate (Standing Order No. 24) (1) Mr Dominic Grieve proposed that the House should debate the matter of prorogation with imminence of an exit from the European Union and that an humble Address should accordingly be presented to Her Majesty. The Speaker put the application to the House. Leave was refused by the House, but the assent of not fewer than 40 Members standing in support was obtained. Debate to be held as the first item of business today for a maximum of two hours. (2) Jeremy Corbyn proposed that the House should debate the matter of the welcome completion of all Parliamentary stages of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill and the matter of the importance of the rule of law and Ministers' obligation to comply with the law. The Speaker put the application to the House. Leave given. Debate to be held as the second item of business today for a maximum of ninety minutes. 2 Votes and Proceedings: 9 September 2019 No. 341 5 Emergency Debate (No. 1) (Standing Order No.
    [Show full text]
  • Parliament and Brexit
    and Brexit Foreword The Brexit process revealed many things. Not least, it taught us a lot about Parliament’s somewhat contested place in our system of government. Throughout the Article 50 period the House of Commons in particular wielded significant influence over a minority government – so much so that Theresa May was moved to criticise Parliament in a live address to the British people. So what have we learned? And where does Parliament go from here? This report draws on the expertise of some of the leading scholars in the field. They’ve been asked to explore the role that Parliament has played to date on Brexit, as well as the challenges and opportunities that Parliament is likely to face during phase two of the UK-EU negotiations. I’d like to express my heartfelt thanks to Tim Bale, Adam Cygan and Meg Russell (very ably assisted by Lisa James) for pulling this report together. It is they who have marshalled the various contributors and ensured that what follows is of the highest possible standard. I’d also like to thank the contributors for responding enthusiastically and efficiently to comments, suggestions and edits. Finally, thanks also go to Navjyot Lehl, who has coordinated the whole process and managed the design of the report with her customary professionalism and good humour. The report that follows makes an important and original contribution on an extremely important topic. I hope you find it both interesting and enlightening. Professor Anand Menon, Director, The UK in a Changing Europe Printed March 2020 The UK in a Changing Europe is an impartial and independent organisation created to make the findings of academic research easily available to the widest possible audience.
    [Show full text]
  • Brexit Timeline
    BREXIT TIMELINE BREXIT TIMELINE 1 BREXIT TIMELINE 6 December 2005 David Cameron becomes Conservative leader David Cameron wins the leadership of the Conservative Party. In the campaign, he promises to take the party out of the European People’s Party (EPP) grouping in the European Parliament 1 October 2006 Cameron first conference speech In his first conference speech, David Cameron implores his party to stop ‘banging on about Europe’ 4 June 2009 European Parliament elections The 2009 European Parliament elections see the UK Independence Party (UKIP) finished second in a major election for the first time in its history. 22 June 2009 Conservative Party form new grouping Conservative MEPs form part of a new group in the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), as the party formally leaves the EPP. 20 May 2010 Coalition agrees to status quo on Europe The Coalition Agreement is published, which states that ‘Britain should play a leading role in an enlarged European Union, but that no further powers should be transferred to Brussels without a referendum.’ 5 May 2011 Alternative Vote referendum The UK holds a referendum on electoral reform and a move to the Alternative Vote. The No to AV campaign – led by many figures who would go on to be part of Vote Leave – wins decisively by a margin of 68% to 32%. 9 December 2011 David Cameron vetoes The Prime Minister vetoes treaty change designed to help manage the Eurozone crisis, arguing it is not in the UK’s interest – particularly in restrictions the changes might place on financial services. 23 January 2013 The Bloomberg Speech In a speech at Bloomberg’s offices in central London, David Cameron sets out his views on the future of the EU and the need for reform and a new UK-EU settlement.
    [Show full text]
  • Brexit: Status and Outlook
    Brexit: Status and Outlook Derek E. Mix, Coordinator Analyst in European Affairs Shayerah Ilias Akhtar Specialist in International Trade and Finance Kristin Archick Specialist in European Affairs October 4, 2019 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R45944 SUMMARY R45944 Brexit: Status and Outlook October 4, 2019 After the 2016 referendum in which 52% of voters in the United Kingdom (UK) favored leaving the European Union (EU), Brexit was originally scheduled to occur on March 29, 2019. In early Derek E. Mix, Coordinator 2019, however, Parliament repeatedly rejected the withdrawal agreement negotiated between Analyst in European Affairs Prime Minister Theresa May’s government and the EU without supporting any alternative. In [email protected] April 2019, the EU granted the UK an extension until October 31, 2019. Shayerah Ilias Akhtar Specialist in International Recent Developments and Possible Scenarios Trade and Finance After becoming Prime Minister in July 2019, Boris Johnson asserted that Brexit will take place [email protected] on October 31 and that he will not request another extension. Johnson declared his intention to Kristin Archick renegotiate a new agreement with the EU that drops the Northern Ireland backstop provision, Specialist in European which would keep the UK in the EU customs union until the two sides agreed on their future Affairs trade relationship. The backstop provision was included in the rejected withdrawal agreement as [email protected] an insurance policy to maintain an open border between Northern Ireland (part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (an EU member state) while safeguarding the rules of the EU single For a copy of the full report, market.
    [Show full text]
  • Brexit: Status and Outlook
    Brexit: Status and Outlook Updated February 13, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45944 SUMMARY R45944 Brexit: Status and Outlook February 13, 2020 The United Kingdom (UK) formally withdrew from membership in the European Union (EU) on January 31, 2020. Under the withdrawal agreement negotiated by the two sides, the UK is to Derek E. Mix, Coordinator continue applying EU rules during a transition period scheduled to run through the end of 2020. Analyst in European Affairs During the transition period, the UK and the EU are expected to begin negotiating the terms of their future relationship, including trade and economic relations as well as cooperation on foreign policy, security, and a range of other issues. Shayerah Ilias Akhtar Specialist in International Trade and Finance Overview of Developments After the 2016 referendum in which 52% of voters in the UK favored leaving the EU, Brexit was Kristin Archick originally scheduled to occur in March 2019. In early 2019, Parliament repeatedly rejected the Specialist in European withdrawal agreement negotiated between then-Prime Minister Theresa May’s government and Affairs the EU. Boris Johnson became prime minister in July 2019, following May’s resignation. Given continued deadlock over Brexit in the UK, the EU granted the UK a series of extensions. In October 2019, EU and UK negotiators reached a new withdrawal agreement altering the Northern Ireland backstop provision, which was a main sticking point to Parliament passing the original deal. Under the new deal, Northern Ireland (part of the UK) is to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU (essentially creating a customs border in the Irish Sea) to preserve an open border with the Republic of Ireland (an EU member state) while safeguarding the rules of the EU single market.
    [Show full text]
  • UK Sovereign Outlook Tested by Heightened Brexit Uncertainty
    27 August 201UK8 Sovereign Outlook Tested by Heightened BrexitPublic Finance Uncertainty UK Sovereign Outlook Tested by Heightened Brexit Uncertainty In Scope’s view, the most likely long-run end-state is a soft Brexit (Scope’s baseline). Next to this, the second probable is a no-Brexit ‘Breversal’, rather than Analysts hard Brexit (the latter defined as the UK exiting the single market and customs union). In the near term, Scope considers a transitional ‘Brexit-in-name-only’ or an Dennis Shen Article 50 extension as the most probable outcome by 29 March 2019. However, the +49 69 6677389-68 elusiveness of a Brexit ‘deal’ and downside risks of a no-deal Brexit in part inform [email protected] Scope Ratings’ Negative Outlook on the UK’s AA sovereign rating. Dr Giacomo Barisone As well as the significant economic, financial, political and institutional consequences of +49 69 6677389-22 any crystallisation of the no-deal form of hard Brexit, there is meaningful pressure from [email protected] parliament, the devolved administrations, the EU, UK civil society and business for an approach that avoids the destabilisation of such a ‘cliff-edge’ exit. Media André Fischer One factor diminishing the probability of a no-deal Brexit is the asymmetric economic +49 30 27891 147 impact this would have on the UK itself. Next, even stepped up preparations for no deal [email protected] are far from adequate given the significant consequences in this scenario. Instead, in Scope’s view, in the near term, the most likely transitional outcomes by 29 Related Research March 2019 are either i) a ‘Brexit-in-name-only’ with an agreement (and entry into a near- Scope affirms the United identical transition period in which true negotiations on the future relationship would Kingdom’s credit rating at AA; begin) or ii) an extension of Article 50 (and the UK’s status inside the EU).
    [Show full text]
  • Brexit and Delegated Legislation Table of Contents 1.What Is Delegated Summary Legislation? 2
    Library Briefing Brexit and Delegated Legislation Table of Contents 1.What is Delegated Summary Legislation? 2. Parliamentary Scrutiny Delegated legislation is law made by ministers under powers given to them by of Delegated Legislation Acts of Parliament. Reasons for the use of delegated, rather than primary 3.Delegated Legislation legislation, may include: and Brexit: Impacts • providing for the technical implementation of a policy; • filling in detail that may need to be updated frequently or is otherwise subject to change; and • accommodating cases where the detailed policy has to work in different circumstances. This briefing provides an overview of how scrutiny of delegated legislation takes place in both Houses and considers the impact of Brexit on it. Individual pieces of delegated legislation are often called secondary legislation to distinguish them from primary legislation contained in Acts of Parliament. Statutory instruments (SIs) are the most frequently used type of delegated legislation. Parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation most commonly takes the form of negative or affirmative procedures. Brexit has posed legislative challenges. Several parliamentary committees have expressed concern that the volume and scope of secondary legislation necessary to implement the UK’s withdrawal from the EU would be substantial. Initial government estimates were that between 800 and 1,000 statutory instruments would be required, although this number has been revised down to approximately 600 SIs. Amendments were agreed during the passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill to introduce a sifting function in both the Lords and the Commons. This applies to SIs made under certain sections of the act that the has Government proposed should be subject to the negative procedure; each committee (European Statutory Instruments Committee in the Commons, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the Lords) can recommend that the SI would instead be more appropriately subject to the affirmative procedure.
    [Show full text]
  • “I'd Rather Be Dead in a Ditch”
    “I’d Rather Be Dead in a Ditch” By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies Amidst extraordinary scenes yesterday, as John Bercow announced the date for his resignation as Speaker of the House of Commons, Boris Johnson suffered his sixth parliamentary defeat in six days. Two “humble addresses” were approved by Bercow last night requiring the Government to publish full details for MPs of Operation Yellowhammer – the Government’s “No Deal” preparations; and b) publish all correspondences relating to the suspending (“proroguing”) of Parliament. Dominic Grieve, as the originator of the second humble address had sought to expose the Government’s reasons for proroguing Parliament and the role of “Special Advisors” – namely Boris Johnson’s Chief adviser, Dominic Cummings, in this process. The accusation on the Government here of course is that in contrast to Johnson’s stated purpose of wanting to introduce a new legislative programme, proroguing has solely been done to stifle Parliamentary opposition to a No Deal Brexit. In all this drama, John Bercow as Speaker, has had a key role in interpreting parliamentary “conventions”, which are a key feature of our so-called “unwritten constitution”. Simply put our “constitution” grants that they who command a majority in the House of Commons gain the Monarch’s assent. It is this maxim that made it perfectly (legally) possible for Johnson as PM to gain the Queen’s assent to prorogue Parliament. Moreover, the Government proposes laws and Parliament votes on them, and Government generally determine the order of legislation to be put to Parliament (the so-called “Parliamentary Timetable”).
    [Show full text]
  • Taking Back Control: Why the House of Commons Should Govern
    DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE TAKING BACK CONTROL WHY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SHOULD GOVERN ITS OWN TIME MEG RUSSELL AND DANIEL GOVER TAKING BACK CONTROL WHY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SHOULD GOVERN ITS OWN TIME Meg Russell and Daniel Gover The Constitution Unit University College London January 2021 ISBN: 978-1-903903-90-2 Published by: The Constitution Unit School of Public Policy University College London 29-31 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU Tel: 020 7679 4977 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit ©The Constitution Unit, UCL 2021 This report is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. First Published January 2021 Front cover image by Vladimir Wrangel, cropped by the Constitution Unit. Contents List of boxes and tables ................................................................................................................................... 2 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................... 3 Foreword by Sir David Natzler ....................................................................................................................... 4 Executive summary ........................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Parliamentary Monitor 2019: Snapshot
    Parliamentary Monitor 2019: Snapshot Image area Image to come to top of picture box Joe Marshall | Alice Lilly | Maddy Thimont Jack | Hannah White About this report In September 2018, the Institute for Government launched Parliamentary Monitor, an annual data- driven analysis of Parliament’s activity. As we look ahead to the next full edition – to be published when the current parliamentary session ends – this ‘snapshot’ report draws on currently available data to highlight some of the most interesting aspects of Parliament’s work during the current session to date. Find out more: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ parliamentary-monitor @instituteforgov September 2019 Contents List of figures 4 Overview: key themes at the close of the 2017–19 session 5 1. Time 8 2. Cost 10 3. Primary legislation 12 4. Secondary legislation 15 5. Select committees 18 6. Backbench procedures 20 7. Public engagement 22 8. Conclusion 24 Abbreviations 27 References 29 3 List of figures Figure 1 Parliamentary sitting days per session 2007–08 to 2017–19 5 Figure 2 Estimated proportion of time in the House of Commons chamber spent on Brexit, 2017–19 session 6 Figure 3 Distribution of opposition days across the 2010–12 and 2017–19 parliamentary sessions 9 Figure 4 Spending by IPSA on security assistance for MPs, 2010/11 to 2017/18 (financial years) 10 Figure 5 Government bills introduced during the 2017–19 session 12 Figure 6 Statutory instruments laid by department (21 June 2017 to 13 June 2019) 16 Figure 7 Divisions in the ExEU Select Committee during the 2017–19 session 19 Figure 8 Non-Brexit and Brexit urgent questions per session (2007–08 to 2017–19) 20 Figure 9 Parliamentlive.tv viewers by type of parliamentary activity, annotated with selected parliamentary events (June 2017 to July 2019) 22 Figure 10 Composition of the House of Commons, 28 August 2019 25 4 PARLIAMENTARY MONITOR: SNAPSHOT Overview: key themes at the close of the 2017–19 session In September 2018, the Institute for Government launched Parliamentary Monitor, an annual data-driven analysis of Parliament’s activity.
    [Show full text]