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Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues

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Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues Edited by Joseph F. Pilat About The Nuclear Proliferation International History Program The Nuclear Proliferation International History Program is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources. Recognizing that today’s toughest nuclear challenges have deep roots in the past, NPIHP seeks to transcend the East vs. West paradigm to work towards an integrated international history of nuclear weapon proliferation. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org ISBN: 978-1-938027-86-4 September 2019 THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial to President Woodrow Wilson, is the nation’s key nonpartisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for Congress, the Administration, and the broader policy community. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. Please visit us online at www.wilsoncenter.org. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO BOARD OF TRUSTEES Public members: Alex Azar, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Elisabeth DeVos, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States Carla D. Hayden, Librarian of Congress Jon Parrish Peede, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities Michael Pompeo, Secretary, U.S. Department of State David J. Skorton, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution Private Citizen Members: Peter J. Beshar, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. Thelma Duggin, President, AnBryce Foundation Barry S. Jackson, Managing Director, The Lindsey Group and Strategic Advisor, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck David Jacobson, Former U.S. Ambassador to Canada and Vice Chair, BMO Financial Group Nathalie Rayes, Vice President of Public Affairs, Grupo Salinas Earl W. Stafford, Chief Executive Officer, The Wentworth Group, LLC Jane Watson Stetson, Philanthropist Louis Susman, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom Table of Contents 1 Introduction - Joseph F. Pilat 11 Observations on Latency and Hedging - Michael Nacht 21 Nuclear Hedging and Latency: History, Concepts, and Issues - Ariel E. Levite 43 Latent Nuclear Power, Hedging, and Irreversibility - Andreas Persbo 73 Future Directions in Nuclear Latency and Its Management - Kory Sylvester 119 Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty - Leopoldo Nuti 155 Nuclear Latency and Iran - Richard Nephew 175 Without Reversal: Brazil as a Latent Nuclear State - Matias Spektor 201 International Nuclear Cooperation and Nuclear-Weapon Potential: Japan’s Reprocessing Capability Development in the 1950s and 1960s - Akira Kurosaki 231 Bluff and Bluster: South Korea’s Nuclear Latency in the 1970s - Lyong Choi 247 Policy Implications of Nuclear Hedging: Observations on East Asia - Toby Dalton 275 Nuclear Latency, Deterrence, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament - Joseph F. Pilat 289 Explaining the Proliferation of Latent Nuclear Capabilities - Matthew Fuhrmann 315 Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency - Tristan A. Volpe 358 Contributors Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues Introduction Joseph F. Pilat trategic latency is a critical national security issue that involves the ways in which scientific, technological, and Sengineering advances pose new potential threats and challenges to the global balance of power. Advances in areas such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, materials science, and high-level manufacturing have produced far-reaching benefits, but also risk being used for nefarious purposes. Even older dual-use technologies, especially when used in novel ways, may be exploited for questionable ends. Because the prospective threats from these advances are complex, cutting edge, decentralized, and by definition not well characterized, it is difficult to conceive (let alone develop) possible responses to such strategic and technological surprises. Nuclear latency is one case of strategic latency. Although it has been an issue for nearly seven decades, since the dawn of the atomic age, there is no agreed definition of the term and the concept itself is difficult to characterize and measure. Most observers regard it as involving the pursuit of fissile materials and the means to produce them, as well as interest in their weaponization, including delivery vehicles. In this context— though without any reference to intent—nuclear latency entails the possession of some or all of the technologies, facilities, materials, expertise (including tacit knowledge), resources, and other capabilities needed to develop nuclear weapons, short of full operational weaponization. The views expressed are the author’s alone and are not the views of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Energy, or any other agency. Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues Left: KURCHATOW, RUSSIA - JUNE 23, 2016: The operator monitors the readings of 1 devices and work equipment. Central control unit of Kursk NPP. - Image Nuclear latency has technical and historical dimensions. Technically, it derives from the dual-use nature of the atom. It also must be considered historically by looking at the full range of capabilities possessed by aspiring, existing, and former nuclear-weapon states, and the diffusion of nuclear- weapon-relevant information through different outlets, including nonstate nuclear supply networks and the Internet. Latency is critical to understanding nonproliferation and counterproliferation, as well as arms control and disarmament. From both perspectives, latency is a reality that can be seen as positive or negative, but in any scenario it complicates the achievement of the objective. Is nuclear latency unique? Is latency a condition for nuclear-weapon states and for many non-nuclear-weapon states? Can it be a strategy for proliferant states? Can it be a viable nonproliferation strategy? How has latency been seen and addressed in the past? Will latency be a positive or negative for future efforts to control or eliminate nuclear weapons? To what extent will latency exist in a nuclear- free world? To explore these and other issues from historical and policy perspectives, on May 11 and 12, 2017, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, held a workshop on “Nuclear Latency and Hedging” at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., with support from the Carnegie Corporation through the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project. The workshop followed an earlier one in 2014. The papers in this volume are largely from the 2017 workshop. History, Concepts, and Issues Although nuclear latency is an important issue with significant implications for deterrence, assurance, nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament, the literature on nuclear latency is both limited and flawed. Latency, however conceived, deals with a state’s effort to build and maintain the capacity to “go nuclear” and credibly threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Given the country-specific and structural factors that drive 2 Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues proliferation as well as proliferation threat assessments, one cannot accurately assess latency without considering the strategic environment of the state in question. All states have latency to some degree. To assess a state’s latency, one must assess its human and material resources, technical knowledge and capability, industrial capacity, and access to nuclear materials. Strategic objectives also play a role. The continuum of latent capabilities ranges from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear-energy programs to conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities. At one end of the continuum, in cases like Japan and South Korea, a state’s nuclear power programs and levels of technological and military-industrial development give evidence of its latency. Likewise, Iran’s latency became clear when it mastered enrichment, and even after the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iran nuclear program in September 2015, it has retained a latent nuclear capacity. At the other end, latency may also exist in states with clandestine nuclear programs, before its leaders decide to weaponize their potential capabilities. In such cases, the latency may not be known or recognized as a possible threat. Nuclear latency does not necessarily determine intentions, although a state’s patterns, scales, and timing of investment in nuclear resources and technology could indicate its intent. States’ weaponization, delivery, and support capabilities also provide critical indicators of intent, even if the information that could confirm this capacity is ambiguous or scarce. When assessing proliferation risks, it is essential to look at intentions as well as capabilities, even though motivations and intentions are difficult to assess. In this context, latency
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