The National Guard’s Response to the 2010 Pakistan Floods

Early in the morning on August 3, 2010, six members of the Illinois Air National Guard climbed into a C-130H “Hercules” aircraft and took off from Bagram Airfield, a large U.S. military base just north of Kabul. Since deploying to Afghanistan earlier in the year, the crew had transported supplies to and conducted other support missions for U.S. combat units in the NATO-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Now, they were flying to Pakistan to deliver 6,000 halal meals to victims of recent flooding. As the crew flew over the mountainous bowl of northeast Afghanistan and crossed into Pakistani territory, the views were staggering. Above, they could crane their necks at the towering slopes of K2, the world’s second-highest mountain. But the scene below was more eye-opening: the Indus River—an 1,800-mile body of water that originates in Tibet and wends through India before carving a lengthy corridor through Pakistan—had swollen more than ten miles beyond its banks. At first, the image reminded Lieutenant Colonel George O’Bryan of flooding he had witnessed on the Mississippi River in 1993; but looking more closely, he realized that what he was seeing now was worse. Traveling along steep, mountainous slopes, the floods had “washed away” villages of mud-built homes and caused people “to disappear into the terrain.”1

From July 26-29, 2010, northwest Pakistan received over 300 millimeters (11.8 inches) of rain, triggering the country’s worst flooding in more than 80 years.2 Over the next four weeks, the rain continued, and the floods moved southward along the Indus River and its tributaries.3 By September, the swirling water – which United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki Moon likened to a “slow-motion tsunami” – had spread over a portion of the country the size of Florida; killed more than 1,700 people; and left 20 million others needing food, water, shelter, and medical care.4

1 Andy Kravetz, “182 Airlift Wing Flies Supplies To Flood-Ravaged Pakistan,” Journal Star, August 5, 2010, available at http://www.pjstar.com/article/20100805/News/308059861 (accessed on May 1, 2015). 2 For much of its general description of the events surrounding the 2010 flood response, here and in the following pages, this case draws on the more detailed discussion in David L. Tannenwald, “Inundation: The Slow Moving Crisis of Pakistan’s 2010 Floods (A, B, and Epilogue),” Harvard Kennedy School case studies 2015.0, 2016.0, and 2016.1 (2014). 3 Dr. Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudry, “Super Floods in Pakistan: Early Warning and Monitoring,” Workshop on ICT for Disaster Risk Reduction and Sustainable Economic Development, September 28-30, 2010, slides from talk available online at http://www.unescap.org/idd/events/2010_Reg-ICT-DRR/PAKIST-1.pdf (accessed on January 4, 2012); and Salman Masood, “Pakistan Floods Worst Since 1929,” The National, available at http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/pakistan-floods-worst- since-1929 (accessed on September 12, 2012). 4 Andrew Clark and Allegra Stratton, “Pakistan Floods Are A ‘slow-motion tsunami’ – Ban Ki-Moon,” The London Guardian, August 19, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/19/pakistan-flood-ban-ki-moon (accessed on January 23, 2012); and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pervaze A. Sheikh, and Bruce Vaughn, “Flooding in Pakistan: Overview and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, p. 1, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/150191.pdf

This case was written by David L. Tannenwald for Dr. Arnold M. Howitt, Executive Director of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Funds for case development were provided by the National Guard Bureau, United States Department of Defense, through the Homeland Security Institute, an initiative of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in support of Harvard Kennedy School’s General and Flag Officer Homeland Security Executive Seminar and the Leadership in Homeland Security executive education program. HKS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion and are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 2016 Program on Crisis Leadership, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA.

When the floods began, Pakistan’s government and military mounted a response, but by early August, with the government of Pakistan coming under increasingly severe domestic criticism for ineffectiveness in the face of the mounting disaster, Pakistani officials turned to the international community for assistance. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Pakistan’s nascent disaster management agency, solicited $62 million and in-kind support (e.g., temporary bridges, tents, and halal meals) from foreign countries.5 At the same time, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who as Chief of Army Staff was Pakistan’s senior military official, telephoned Anne Patterson, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, to ask for U.S. military assistance. Patterson then relayed the request to Vice Admiral Michael LeFever and then-Brigadier General Michael Nagata, the Commander and Deputy Chief, respectively, of the Office of the U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan. They reached out to General David Petraeus, the head of the International Security Assistance Force (the NATO-Led coalition in Afghanistan) and

6, 7 senior officials at U.S. Central Command, the coordinating body for U.S. military forces in the region.

After securing presidential authorization through these channels and working with Defense Department and other federal officials in Washington, D.C., U.S. military leaders in the region organized a multi-pronged response that drew on the National Guard. First, General Petraeus provided eight aircraft from Afghanistan to deliver relief supplies to flood-affected communities in northwest Pakistan—the beginning of a substantial U.S. military commitment to the Pakistan floods response that included C130 units from the Minnesota and Illinois Air National Guard.8 At the same time, Central Command deployed five officials from its Air Mobility Division to Pakistan’s Chaklala Air Base to coordinate the receipt and distribution of relief supplies across Pakistan. This unit was led by Colonel Greg Nelson, a member of the Kentucky Air National Guard then serving as the Deputy Director of Mobility Forces for Central Command.9 Finally, Brigadier General Nagata secured permission from the Pakistani army to

(accessed on March 8, 2012). 5 “International Donors Pledge 62m-Dollar Aid for Pakistan Flood Victims,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, August 4, 2010. 6 Interview with Major General Michael Nagata, Deputy Director for Special Operations/Counterterrorism, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, April 29, 2013. Hereafter cited as “Nagata interview.” Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Nagata, who was a Brigadier General during the 2010 Pakistan floods but was promoted to Major General in October 2012, come from this interview. 7 CENTCOM is one of the U.S. military’s nine “unified combatant commands,” six of which (Northern, Southern, Africa, European, Central, and Pacific Command) are responsible for maintaining command and control of U.S. forces in a set geographic area. (The other three groups are Transportation, Special Operations, and Strategic Command.) CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, which lies between those of European and Pacific Command, encompasses 20 countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. CENTCOM’s mission is to collaborate with other countries to “promote cooperation among nations, respond to crises, and deter or defeat state and non-state aggression.” “United States Unified Combatant Command,” U.S. Department of Defense, available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/1213_cocom/ (accessed on June 10, 2015); and “About U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),” United States Central Command, available at http://www.centcom.mil/en/about- centcom-en (accessed on June 10, 2015). 8 Nagata interview; Jonathon Orrell, “National Guard Aids with Pakistani Flood Relief,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 20, 2010, available at http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60535 (accessed on March 2, 2016); and Interview with Greg Nelson, Vice Director of Strategy, Policy, Plans, and International Affairs, National Guard Bureau, by telephone, May 20, 2014. Hereafter cited as “Nelson interview.” Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Nelson come from this interview, a follow-up telephone interview conducted on June 27, 2014, and personal communications via e-mail on December 2, 2015 and March 4-6, 2016. 9 Nelson interview.

2 of 21 travel to northwest Pakistan where the U.S. and Pakistani militaries mounted a joint operation to rescue people in and transport supplies to otherwise inaccessible areas. 10

In some respects, the flood response represented a significant opportunity for National Guard members: they could glean insights about disaster management that might both help a country in need and provide useful experience in their disaster response roles in their home states. At the same time, the situation was rife with challenges, including pivoting quickly from a war footing in Afghanistan to disaster response; operating in an unfamiliar, hazardous environment; and engaging with new partners like the Pakistani military, NDMA, aid providers from other countries, and international relief organizations. Thus, the Guard members engaged in the flood response faced a difficult dilemma: Could they balance their responsibilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and mitigate the dire consequences of one of the worst natural disasters of the 21st century, or would the uncertainty and risk interfere with their ability to carry out both missions and therefore detract from the U.S. military’s impact in one of the U.S. military’s most important international theaters?

Background

Pakistan exists in a challenging geopolitical environment in south Asia and at the time of the floods was grappling with an array of both domestic and international challenges. (See map of Pakistan in Exhibit A.)11 Pakistan has tense relations with two neighboring states: India, which lies to the east and with which it has fought three wars since 1947; and Afghanistan, from which the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda had spilled over into Pakistan in recent years.

The spread of this conflict was particularly alarming because Pakistan was already grappling with domestic tensions, which stemmed in part from deep ethnic and religious cleavages. The country, which was the sixth most populous state in the world with 190 million people, had six major ethnic groups, some of which had sought greater autonomy from the central government and distrusted one another. Religious tensions occasionally pitted Muslims, who made up 95% of the population, against non-Muslims (mostly Hindus and Christians) and, more frequently, Shia and Sunni Muslims against one another. Pakistani society was further divided along socioeconomic lines. Nearly a quarter of the population lived below the poverty line, and the country suffered from severe underemployment. At the same time, a small cadre of elites lived in mansions, rarely paid taxes, and wielded enormous political clout. This divide was especially noticeable in the agriculture sector (which accounted for 43% of the workforce) where feudal landowners ran vast estates and relied on tenant farmers for labor.

In the summer of 2010, Pakistan was formally a federal parliamentary democracy; nonetheless, as had been the case throughout Pakistani history, the military was the country’s most powerful institution. The military’s sway stemmed in part from the clout of its spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Often

10 Nagata interview. 11 This section draws heavily on The CIA World Factbook, “Pakistan,” available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/pk.html (accessed on January 23, 2012); Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), pp.1-13, 25-96, 124-160, 201-229; and Stephen Cohen, The Future of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2011).

3 of 21 compared to a “shadow government,” ISI detained citizens outside the judicial process, interfered with elections, and operated with little oversight.12 The military also wielded power through the omnipresent threat of a coup, of which there had been four since Pakistan obtained its independence in 1947. At least temporarily, the military preferred cloaking its influence behind the civilian government because the most recent military ruler, President Pervez Musharraf, had failed to address Pakistan’s problems before losing power in 2008. Still, the military remained in effect a parallel and largely independent center of authority.

Natural Disasters in Pakistan and Pakistan’s Nascent Disaster Management System

Pakistan has regularly suffered extensively from floods, earthquakes, cyclones, droughts, landslides, and avalanches. Nonetheless, the country’s disaster management strategy for most of its history has been ad hoc and reactive. More specifically, it has relied on the military (which was constitutionally required to assist civilian authorities when a disaster occurred), emergency services, and assistance from the international community to respond to crises -- but only after they occurred.13 However, the shortcomings of the government’s response to an earthquake in northern Pakistan that killed over 70,000 people in October 2005 revealed the limitations of this ad 14 hoc approach.

Consequently, in 2006, then President Pervez Musharraf promulgated the National Disaster Management Ordinance, which called for a new federal agency – the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) – tasked with improving disaster preparedness and coordinating responses to disasters. Over the next three years, NDMA

12 “Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/interservices_intelligence/index.html (accessed on February 14, 2012); and Declan Walsh, “Court Challenges Put Unusual Spotlight on Pakistani Spy Agency,” The New York Times, February 6, 2012, A8. 13 National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), “Annual Report 2010,” pp. 1-3, available at http://www.ndma.gov.pk/BooksPublications.html (accessed on January 28, 2012); “A Review of Disaster Management Policies and Systems in Pakistan for WCDR 2005,” SAARC Disaster Management Center, January 2005, p. 4, available at http://saarc- sdmc.nic.in/pdf/pakistan/file3.pdf (accessed on July 13, 2012); and Ajay Madiwale and Kudrat Virk, “Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93, Number 884, p. 1090, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale-virk.pdf (accessed on February 19, 2013). 14 After the earthquake, the government created the Federal Relief Commission and Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority to coordinate the immediate relief and rebuilding efforts. Pakistan also received extensive assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, other countries, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropists. These resources, nonetheless, took time to get in place and proved difficult to coordinate. Many actors – ranging from the chairman of the Federal Relief Commission to representatives of the Asian Development Bank – concurred that these efforts would have been more effective had the government had an emergency response system ready to lead the domestic response and coordinate international aid. Asia Development Bank and World Bank, “Pakistan 2005 Earthquake: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment,” November 12, 2005, pp. 1-22, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/Publications-and- Reports/Damage-Assessment-Main.pdf (accessed on August 7, 2012); “ERRA,” Government of Pakistan, available at http://www.erra.pk/aboutus/erra.asp - Mission (accessed on July 13, 2012); National Disaster Management Authority, “Earthquake – 8/10: Learning from Pakistan’s Experience,” pp. 1-6 and 73-78, available at http://ndma.gov.pk/Publications/EQBook.pdf (accessed on January 28, 2012); and Farooq Ahmad Khan, “The Response To The Earthquake in Pakistan: The View From The Federal Relief Commission,” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, June 2006, pp. 2-3, available at http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-34/the-response-to-the-earthquake-in-pakistan (accessed on February 13, 2012).

4 of 21 made some progress; but in part because the Pakistani government had not provided pledged funds, it had a budget of only $740,000 and was unable to implement the full setup the National Disaster Management Ordinance 15 had envisioned. The Pakistani government also continued to create ad hoc response organizations after disasters had occurred. From NDMA’s perspective, this underscored a larger problem: the new disaster management system “entail[ed] a paradigm shift from the traditional reactive emergency response-oriented approach” and was “bound to face numerous challenges in its acceptance as a concept and practice by the relevant stakeholders.”16, 17

The U.S. Military Presence in South Asia and U.S.-Pakistani Relations

In the decade before the 2010 floods, the United States had developed a growing military presence in south Asia, contributing to a tense relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The bulk of U.S. forces in the region were concentrated in Afghanistan where after the 9/11 terrorist attacks the United States had led a coalition to root out Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2010, the Obama administration announced a revised Afghanistan policy focused partially on the tenet that victory in Afghanistan was impossible without helping Pakistan gain control of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwest Pakistan. FATA was technically under the control of Pakistan’s federal and provincial governments; but FATA’s tribal leaders often resisted the Pakistani government, and the region had become a haven for the Taliban and other extremist groups. With northwest Pakistan becoming an important front in the Afghanistan War, the United States was pressuring Pakistan to assert control in the increasingly anarchic region and conducting attacks using unmanned aircraft (or “drones”) there. The linkage of Afghanistan to Pakistan and the drone attacks, however, were extremely unpopular among Pakistanis and contributed to a tense relationship between the United States and Pakistan.18

Although U.S.-Pakistani relations were strained, the United States considered Pakistan an important ally in the war on terrorism, both because of Pakistan’s relevance to the Afghanistan war and the United States’ fear that Pakistan could become a haven for anti-American extremists. The United States had therefore given Pakistan

15 NDMA, “2010 Annual Report,” p. 6; Salman Masood, “At Least 170 Die in Quake In Southwestern Pakistan,” New York Times, October 30, 2008, A14; “Pakistan Intensifies Relief Work in Quake-Hit Baluchistan,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 11, 2008; NDMA, “Annual Report 2009,” pp. 42-45, available at http://www.ndma.gov.pk/BooksPublications.html (accessed on January 28, 2012); “Ordinance No. LIII of 2007,”National Assembly of Pakistan, available at http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1302737552_451.pdf (accessed on July 13, 2012); and “National Disaster Management Act of 2010,” available at http://ndma.gov.pk/Publications/ordinance.pdf (accessed on September 10, 2012). 16 NDMA, “Annual Report 2009,” p. 57. 17 For additional context on NMDA, see, “After The Deluge,” The Economist, September 16, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17037131 (accessed on January 28, 2012); “Policy Recommendations: A Year after Pakistan Floods 2010,” July 27, 2011, available at http://www.sdpi.org/policy_outreach/policy_recommendations_details73.html (accessed on July 13, 2012); and NDMA, “Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief – Learning from Experience,” available at http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%202010%20Flood%20Relief- Learning%20from%20Experience.pdf (accessed on January 28, 2012). 18 Another source of friction between the United States and Pakistan was that U.S. officials believed that some elements of the Pakistani government were helping to shelter members of the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Issues and Current Developments;” James Traub, “Can Pakistan Be Governed?” The New York Times Magazine, April 5, 2009, p. 26; Carin Zissis and Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-tribal-areas/p11973 (accessed on February 16, 2012); and Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Ally From Hell,” The Atlantic, December 2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/308730/ (accessed on May 5, 2015).

5 of 21 nearly $20 billion in aid since the 9/11 attacks, approximately two-thirds of which was for security.19 In the year before the floods, the United States had broadened its aid to Pakistan, most notably through Congressional approval of a five-year, $7.5 billion development package. 20 The United States had also sent to Pakistan approximately 100 military personnel as part of an effort to partner with and train the Pakistani military to root out insurgents.21 Still, at the time of the floods, due primarily to the unpopularity of drone strikes, 60% of Pakistanis viewed the United States as an enemy, and only 11% saw it as a partner.22

The bulk of U.S. forces in Pakistan were concentrated in the Office of the U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP), a group of military officials in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad that had expanded substantially over the past decade. In 2001, prior to the September 11 attacks, the group—which was responsible for building the capacity of, bolstering the United States’ relationship with, and coordinating specific joint missions (e.g., counterinsurgency efforts) with the Pakistani military—had had only four staff members; but by the time of the floods, it had more than 40 members and was led by Vice Admiral Michael LeFever and Brigadier General Michael Nagata.23 The rapid expansion of the group—which included members of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army—meant that it was hard to find space for all of the personnel at the Embassy.24 “It was so chaotic at that

19 The United States also provided extensive aid and disaster assistance to Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake. In particular, the United Stated donated over $500 million and deployed to Pakistan disaster response specialists from USAID and a substantial U.S. military contingent that contributed to a coalition force that peaked at more than 1,200 troops. Working closely with the Pakistani military, the U.S. forces distributed more than 14,000 tons of humanitarian aid supplies. Richard Wike, “Does Humanitarian Aid Improve America’s Image?” Pew Research Center, March 6, 2012, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/03/06/does-humanitarian-aid-improve-americas-image/ (accessed on March 2, 2016); and Kenneth Braithwaite, “U.S. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Keys to Success in Pakistan,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 44, 1st quarter, 2007, pp. 19-22, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518195 (accessed on January 15, 2014). 20 Traub, “Can Pakistan Be Governed?” The New York Times Magazine, April 5, 2009, p. 26; Carin Zissis and Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-tribal-areas/p11973 (accessed on February 16, 2012); and Susan Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, July 1, 2013, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf (accessed on January 14, 2014). 21 Jim Wolf, “U.S. Withholds $800 Million in Aid to Pakistan,” Reuters, July 10, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/10/us-usa-pakistan-aid-idUSTRE7691O520110710 (accessed on May 2, 2015); and Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, “Distrust Slows U.S. Training of Pakistanis,” The New York Times, July 11, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/world/asia/12training.html (accessed on March 2, 2016). 22 “Highs and Lows in U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,” The Washington Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- %20srv/special/world/us-pakistan-timeline/ (accessed on January 14, 2014); and Rania Abouzeid, “Despite Aid, Pakistanis Are Suspicious of the U.S.,” Time, August 30, 2010, available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2014480,00.html (accessed on January 17, 2014). 23 Although ODRP staff was part of the U.S. military, the officials served in a diplomatic status in Pakistan and therefore reported to the U.S. Ambassador. Craig Cohen, “A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2007, p. 4, available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070924_pakistan.pdf (accessed on June 10, 2015); and Interview with Cameron Munter, Professor, Pomona College, and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cambridge, MA, April 8, 2013. Hereafter cited as “Munter interview.” Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Munter come from this interview. 24 John Redfield, “US, Pakistan Discuss Military-To-Military Engagements, Exercises,” Central Command, March 24, 2015, available at http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/us-pakistan-discuss-military-to-military-engagements-exercises (accessed on June 10, 2015); Lieutenant General Anthony Rock, U.S. Air Force, July 2014, available at http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/108226/lieutenant-general-anthony-j-rock.aspx (accessed

6 of 21 time that we had military people with their offices in the halls of the Embassy,” recalled Cameron Munter, who became the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan in October 2010. “We were jammed up.”

The National Guard’s International Deployments and Presence in the Region

By 2011, over half of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan were National Guard members, part of a growing—and to some observers, problematic—trend of increased deployments for Guard personnel in the War on Terror.25, 26 The National Guard has participated in every war in U.S. history, but the extent of that participation has varied as a result of broader shifts in U.S. military policy. For example, Guard members accounted for a small fraction of U.S. forces participating in the Vietnam War because at that time, the military employed conscription and had less need for Guard and reserve forces. (In fact, many people enlisted in the Guard to avoid the draft.27) In 1973, toward the end of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense announced the “Total Force” policy, which stipulated that Guard and reserve forces would be the “initial and primary source” for backing up active duty military in overseas missions. 28 Paired with the shrinking of the U.S. military over the next three decades and other tactics to bind the Guard more closely to active duty forces, the “Total Force” policy resulted in the Guard and the reserves accounting for nearly half of all U.S. troops in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.29, 30

on June 10, 2015); and “Defense Attaché Office,” Embassy of the United States Islamabad, Pakistan, available at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/daopakistan.html (accessed on June 10, 2015). 25 “10 Years Into Afghan War, National Guard Sees Bigger Role,” NPR, October 10, 2011, available at http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2011/10/10/national-guard-afghanistan (accessed on April 28, 2015). 26 When a Guard member deploys abroad, he/she experiences a shift in his/her “duty status” and, in turn, the commander or commanding group to which he/she reports. When executing domestic missions, National Guard members operate under State Active Duty or Title 32 status. In the former, the funding comes from the state, while in the latter, the financing comes from the federal government; but in both cases, the governor has command and control over the Guard. By contrast, when serving abroad, the Guard operates in Title 10 status. This means that the financing comes from the federal government and that the President of the United States exercises “command and control” over the Guard. “NGAUS Fact Sheet: Understanding the Guard’s Duty Statuses,” The National Guard Association of the United States, available at http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf (accessed on June 11, 2015); and “2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement,” National Guard Bureau, p. 20, available at http://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2015%20National%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture %20Statement.pdf (accessed on June 11, 2015). 27 Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, “Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, September 19, 2005, pp. 14-15, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf (accessed on May 1, 2015). 28 “International Guard: How the Vietnam War Changed Guard Service,” NPR, April 25, 2015, available at http://www.npr.org/2015/04/25/402045128/international-guard-how-the-vietnam-war-changed-guard-service (accessed on April 29, 2015); and Michael Doubler and Vance Renfroe, “The National Guard and Total Force Policy,” The Minuteman Institute for National Defense Studies, 2003, available at http://www.minutemaninstitute.org/publications/National%20Guard%20and%20Total%20Force.pdf (accessed on April 29, 2015). 29 One of the ways the Department of Defense bound the Guard more closely to Activity Duty units was equipping the Guard with specific skills—such as combat engineering and air refueling—that made them more useful to active duty units in combat. David and Mady Segal, “America’s Military Population,” Population Bulletin, Population Reference Bureau, available at http://www.prb.org/source/acf1396.pdf (accessed on May 1, 2015). 30 Although the Guard at times accounted for as much as half of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the Guard’s share of U.S. military forces in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars varied over time. For example, as of January 2008, the Guard accounted for 7% and 15% of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O’Bryant, “National Guard Personnel and

7 of 21 Analysts and government officials offered conflicting opinions about the impact of the Guard’s extensive participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Some felt that serving in challenging conditions abroad provided valuable training and experience that enhanced the Guard’s response to domestic disasters. For example, former North Dakota Congressman Earl Pomeroy noted that the North Dakota National Guard seemed far more like a professional military force in its response to the 2009 Red River floods than it did after similar incidents in the 1990s; he attributed this shift to the experience North Dakota National Guard members had accrued while serving in Iraq and on other international deployments.31

Others worried that the increased foreign deployments detracted from the Guard’s ability to carry out its domestic responsibilities, including responding to natural disasters. In the response to Hurricane Katrina, for example, there were anecdotal reports that some National Guard units were underequipped (e.g., they did not have enough tactical radios or High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles) because the units had left some of their equipment in Iraq.32 The Department of Defense, however, resisted the notion that international deployments interfered with the Guard’s domestic operations. “There is not a state or territory that its governor does not have the Army or Air National Guard forces and equipment it needs to do its homeland defense or its support to homeland security mission,” said then National Guard Bureau Chief Lt. Gen. Steven Blum in 2005.33

The Floods and the U.S. Response Begin: July 26-August 9, 2010

In late July and early August 2010, the floods caused enormous hardship throughout Pakistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan’s northern-most province, the floods had stranded tens of thousands of people and left 500,000 others in need of food, water, shelter, and medical care. Meanwhile, Sindh, Pakistan’s southern-most province had to reinforce flood barriers and evacuate several million people in low-lying areas in advance of the floods expected to reach them at the end of the first week of August. However, it was Punjab, a province in eastern Pakistan, which arguably faced the greatest difficulties. Like KP, it was suffering from the effects of the rain and flooding in late July; but like Sindh, it also had to monitor and reinforce its flood barriers as the floods in KP 34 moved southward, intensifying the situation elsewhere. (See map of Pakistan’s provinces and other administrative units in Exhibit B.)

Deployments: Fact Sheet,” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 17, 2008 available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22451.pdf (accessed on May 5, 2015). 31 Interview with Earl Pomeroy, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2013. 32 The Department of Defense often had units serving in Iraq leave equipment there so that personnel on subsequent deployments would have access to it. Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, “Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response,” Congressional Research Service, September 19, 2005, pp. 14-15, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf (accessed on May 1, 2015). 33 Donna Miles, “States Won’t Be Left Short of Guard Assets, General Vows,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 19, 2005, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16612 (accessed on June 11, 2015). 34 Zulfiqar Ali, “Thousands in KP Need Immediate Relief,” The Dawn, August 6, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/43680 (accessed on January 9, 2012); “Flood Rescue Operation ‘Almost Complete,’ Says Pak Army,” Right Vision News, August 6, 2010; Khaleeq Kiani, “Rivers Breach Century-Old Record,” The Dawn (Pakistan), August 2, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/35562 (accessed on January 29, 2012); “Floods Continue To Ravage KP,

8 of 21 When the floods began, Pakistan’s government and military mounted the response but struggled mightily. Initially, provincial governments and the military led the effort, which focused on rescuing stranded citizens; reinforcing flood barriers; and providing food, water, and medical care. Within days, if not hours, provincial governments, overwhelmed by the scope of the crisis, urgently requested assistance from Pakistan’s federal government.35 Unfortunately, in the eyes of much of the Pakistani media and public, the federal government’s leaders seemed disengaged. Most notably, Pakistan’s President, Asif Ali Zardari, was heavily criticized for being in England and France when the floods began and for visiting his family’s 16th century French chateau and staying in five-star hotels while abroad.36 More broadly, citizens expressed concern that the government seemed unable to provide for the millions of Pakistanis who had been displaced from their homes and were now in desperate need of food, shelter, water, and medical care. For example, Nabi Gul, a 70-year old man, trembled while standing next to a pile of rubble that had been his house one day earlier. “I built this house with my life’s earnings and hard work, and the river has washed it away,” he said. “Now I wonder, will I be able to rebuild it?” Another man from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa simply asked, “Where is the government?”37

U.S. Response to International Disasters

Against this calamitous backdrop, Pakistani officials turned to the United States for assistance, and the U.S. military forces began deploying to Pakistan. But even though the military plays an integral role in the U.S. government’s response to disasters abroad, it does not lead those efforts. That responsibility instead lies with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an office within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that helps countries prepare for, respond to, and recover from humanitarian crises.38 Thus, the U.S. military’s emerging flood relief operation in Pakistan would be part of a greater effort driven by OFDA.

One of OFDA’s main tools for responding to a crisis is deploying a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a team of disaster response specialists that is often mobilized within 24 hours of a disaster. The precise structure, size, and activities vary depending on the scope and nature of a crisis. The DART conducts assessments of disaster impacts and humanitarian needs, reports on the disaster situation, and recommends follow-up actions—including the targeting and implementation of U.S. relief assistance—to ensure an effective and efficient response. Specific activities include 1) analyzing the existing capacity within the affected country’s infrastructure as well as the response capabilities of relief agencies; 2) reviewing and recommending grants to partner organizations (e.g., the

Punjab,” The Nation (AsiaNet), July 30, 2010, Vol. XXIV, No. 173; Khaleeq Kiani, “Flood Protection Projects Mostly Substandard,” The Dawn (Pakistan), August 3, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/43985 (accessed on February 27, 2012); and “Pakistan Floods: Maps and Graphics,” The BBC, August 16, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10986220 (accessed on February 27, 2012). 35 “Desperate Call for Help: KP Devastated by Severe Flood,” The Dawn, July 30, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/41409 (accessed on January 28, 2012). 36 “Zardari Criticized Over Europe ‘Joy Ride’ During Floods,” The Dawn (Pakistan), August 5, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/32723 (accessed on February 14, 2012). 37 Salman Masood, “Floods in Pakistan Kill at Least 800.” The New York Times, July 31, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?_r=0 (accessed on April 14, 2016). 38 “Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance,” USAID, last updated on July 23, 2014, available at https://www.usaid.gov/who- we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-us (accessed on October 10, 2015).

9 of 21 United Nations or Save the Children); 3) coordinating U.S. relief efforts with the affected country, other donor governments, relief agencies, and other U.S. government entities, including the U.S. military; 4) monitoring and evaluating OFDA-funded relief activities; 5) coordinating the receipt and distribution of relief supplies; 6) coordinating the DART’s operational activities on the ground (e.g., search and rescue missions); and 7) providing technical expertise on specific humanitarian issues (e.g., health, shelter, and water).

Overseeing these groups is a DART Leader, who ensures that the U.S. government’s disaster relief efforts are well coordinated and that the DART’s mission is being carried out. The DART Leader reports to both the U.S. Ambassador in the affected country, as well as to the OFDA Response Director.39 It is the team leader—not a member of the military—who coordinates the overall U.S. response to the disaster.

Establishing Operations at Chaklala Air Base

One of the first U.S. officials to arrive in Pakistan was Colonel Greg Nelson, a Kentucky National Guard member then serving as the Deputy Director of Mobility Forces for Central Command, based out of the Combined Air and Space Operations Center at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. In that post, Nelson—who had extensive experience organizing aerial support in disaster response operations—was responsible for coordinating all air mobility operations (e.g., airlift and air refueling missions) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the surrounding gulf area.40 Nelson volunteered to manage the airlift for Pakistan flood relief and developed plans to use currently assigned C130s and C17s for that mission as well as support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, Nelson, along with a team of four aerial porters (two of whom were Guard members) who deployed with him to Pakistan’s Chaklala Air Base, was responsible for allocating donations from the United States, USAID, the World Food Program, and other countries and NGOs to the flood-affected areas most in need.41, 42

39 “Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance,” USAID, last updated on July 23, 2014, available at https://www.usaid.gov/who- we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-us (accessed on October 10, 2015); “Disaster Assistance Response Team,” Global Security, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-23-1/appg.pdf (accessed on October 10, 2015); and Interview with Travis Betz, Support Relief Group Field Officer, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (Hanoi, Vietnam), by Skype, July 16, 2015. Hereafter referred to as Betz interview. Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Betz come from this interview and a follow-up personal communication via e-mail on November 23, 2015. 40 Before beginning his assignment at Central Command in July 2010, Nelson had served as the Director of Mobility Forces for Air Force Northern Command. He was responsible for helping to coordinate Northern Command’s air support (e.g., airlift, air refueling, and search and rescue operations) during a natural disaster or enemy attack. He also led a study of the shortcomings in air support operations during Hurricane Katrina; entitled “Joint Concept of Operations, Air Mobility Support to Crisis Response in the United States,” the document helped inform the U.S. military’s strategy during its response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Greg Nelson, LinkedIn, available at https://www.linkedin.com/pub/greg-nelson/3a/710/851 (accessed on October 12, 2015). 41 Nelson interview. 42 An aerial porter—also known as an “air transportation journeyman” or “port dawg”—specializes in loading and unloading large amounts of cargo and personnel from military aircraft. This requires familiarity with heavy machinery (e.g., forklifts and aircraft cargo loaders); the weight and balance requirements of various aircraft; and the policies for (among other things) border clearance, passenger travel authorizations, and cargo labeling and documentation. Scott Sturkol, “Mobility Airman Profile: AMC Aerial Porter at Yokota Supports Operation Tomodachi,” Air Mobility Command, U.S. Air Force, March 24, 2011, available at http://www.amc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123248506 (accessed on June 12, 2015); and Scott Sturkol, “Expeditionary Centers Air Transportation Instructors Give Their Definition of ‘Aerial Porter,’” U.S. Air Force Expeditionary

10 of 21 During his first three days in Pakistan, Nelson and his team had to commute daily from Afghanistan’s Bagram Airfield to Chaklala—a trek that required waking up before dawn and returning late at night—because he and his staff had yet to receive diplomatic clearance to stay overnight in Pakistan. Nonetheless, in these early days, Nelson made a point of establishing relationships with several key stakeholders. One was the U.S. Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP), a group of U.S. military personnel based at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and Nelson’s primary in-country point of contact.43 Another was USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the organization that oversees the U.S. government’s humanitarian assistance efforts overseas. Soon after arriving, Nelson saw an OFDA representative walking around Chaklala, introduced himself, and emphasized that he and his team were enthusiastic about supporting OFDA. To Nelson, this was important to communicate because of the Guard’s commitment to the concept of military support to civilian authorities in disaster response. Nelson told the OFDA official that just as the Guard supports governors and other state and local officials domestically, he would support USAID in this international response. 44 Finally, in an effort to build rapport with Pakistani military officials, some of whom, Nelson suspected, might be “concerned” about the U.S. military’s sudden presence, the Colonel removed his shirt and started pushing pallets with incoming relief supplies. The goal of the gesture, Nelson explained, was to show that even as a high-ranking official, he was willing to work hard and, more broadly, to communicate on behalf of the U.S. military that “humbly, ‘We’re here to help you.’”

C130 Relief Missions in Northwest Pakistan

On August 7, Nelson’s fourth day in Pakistan, he and his staff received permission from the Pakistani government to stay overnight in Pakistan and were given quarters at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad for the duration of the response. By that time, he and his team had also begun working with OFDA, other U.S. military officials, and representatives of the Pakistani military and NDMA to coordinate the receipt and distribution of relief supplies. This included organizing and dispatching boats, temporary bridges, halal meals, bottled water, and other supplies that had been donated by the United Arab Emirates, China, and the United States. It also involved helping to schedule flights and missions for roughly a half-dozen U.S. military C130 aircraft that were stationed in the region and had been assigned to deliver relief goods in northwest Pakistan, tightly coordinating their relief flights with combat duties in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Among the C130 units conducting the relief missions were a pair of crews and aircraft from the Illinois and Minnesota Air National Guard. In many respects, these Guard crews (which typically included six Guard members onboard for each flood relief mission) were well positioned to contribute to the flood relief effort. This was in part because the aircraft they were operating could hold up to 42,000 pounds of relief supplies and specialized in landing on and taking off from dirt strips, much like the flood-isolated areas to which they had to fly in northwest

Center, U.S. Air Force, July 24, 2008, available at http://www.expeditionarycenter.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123107374 (accessed on June 12, 2015). 43 Nelson liaised with ODRP not just because it was his primary point of contact in Pakistan but also because he hoped to learn about disaster response in Pakistan and how he could enhance their efforts. ODRP’s leader, Vice Admiral Michael LeFever, had extensive experience with disaster assistance in Pakistan, having played a major role in the response to the 2005 earthquake; at the time of the floods, however, he did not have an air mobility expert like Nelson on his staff. Nelson interview. 44 “Responding in Times of Crisis,” USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, available at file:///Users/davidtannenwald/Downloads/OFDA%201%20of%202%20(2).pdf (accessed on May 3, 2015).

11 of 21 Pakistan.45 Additionally, the C130 crewmembers had experience serving in challenging conditions (including the ongoing war in Afghanistan and in Bosnia in the early 1990s), as well as responding to domestic natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina and flooding along the Mississippi River. According to Captain Brian Rezac, a Illinois Air National Guard member participating in the flood response, that the C130 Guard units had together deployed to and trained for these missions contributed to the sense that the C130 Guard units were a “small community” and had a resilient spirit.46

Nonetheless, each flood-relief flight presented complex challenges. To begin with, because July 2010 was the busiest month for air support operations in Afghanistan, the C130 crews had to balance their responsibilities to support combat units in Afghanistan with humanitarian relief flights across the border.47 According to Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Burda, a member of a Minnesota Air National Guard crew participating in the flood response, it was impressive to see how the crews handled that transition “without blinking their eyes.” Nonetheless, managing missions in both countries simultaneously was challenging because it meant that the Guard had a high volume of work and because both missions were dangerous. In Afghanistan, Guard forces had to worry about the possibility of being shot down by enemy fire. Meanwhile, in northwest Pakistan, the Guard had to deal with not just security concerns (the portions of the region where the flight crews were flying and unloading cargo were believed to be a haven for Al Qaeda and other extremists) but also more restrictive rules of engagement, different cargo loads, and extremely difficult flying conditions. Operating in steep, mountainous terrain without traditional airports, the Guard had to evaluate before each mission whether it was safe to fly to and land in the flood-affected communities.

Finally, the C130 crews had to coordinate with the Pakistani military, sometimes a thorny process. This was in part because of a language barrier that manifested itself when the Guard crews were flying into Pakistan. According to Rezac of the Illinois Air National Guard, the Air National Guard crews were communicating with Pakistani air traffic controllers who were neither completely fluent in English nor familiar with the Air National Guard’s terminology. As a result, it was important to eliminate all “jargon” and communicate as concisely and clearly as possible. After landing, the Air National Guard crews also had to adapt to the Pakistani military’s approach to unloading aircraft. The Guard requires that troops unloading C130s wear gloves and boots for safety and that they operate a K-loader (a machine that unloads pallets from a military aircraft) or forklift to protect the aircraft. However, the Pakistani soldiers often did not wear gloves; sported sandals, not boots; and did not have forklifts or K-loaders but instead used flatbed trucks to unload the aircraft. Rezac and his colleagues made some compromises to their standard operating procedures (e.g., there was no way to get boots for all of the Pakistani personnel unloading relief supplies), but they also had to be extremely vocal when they saw that something might

45 “C-130 Hercules,” U.S. Air Force, September 1, 2003, available at http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104517/c-130-hercules.aspx (accessed on May 3, 2015). 46 Interview with Captain Brian Rezac, Illinois National Guard, by telephone, May 2014. Hereafter cited as “Rezac interview.” Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Rezac come from this interview. 47 The U.S. military set up a schedule that had each C130 crew flying relief operations in Pakistan for about a week at a time, before turning back to missions in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, because the military had used up its in-theater surge capacity, the crews had to be “on alert” at all times to assist with missions on either side of the border. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Burda, Minnesota Air National Guard, by telephone, May 21, 2014. Hereafter cited as “Burda interview.” Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Burda come from this interview.

12 of 21 go wrong, such as when one of the flatbed trucks almost collided with the aircraft. As Nelson emphasized, safety for all involved was a paramount concern for the C130 crews.

In spite of these challenges, the Air National Guard members made an enormous contribution to a relief effort, which as of August 6 had delivered 66,000 pounds of relief supplies and 440,000 halal meals to northwest 48 Pakistan. But these acts of assistance were overshadowed by the immense scale of the crisis, which by the end of the first week of August had affected at least 12 million people and severely stretched the resources of responders. In northwest Pakistan, the government lacked enough helicopters and boats to reach much of the stranded population, and approximately 1.8 million residents remained in desperate need of food, shelter, and medical care. Farther south in Punjab, 500,000 people needed shelter and food, and thousands of those citizens remained stranded. Even in Sindh, which had not yet experienced the worst of the floods, dozens of villages faced serious flooding, and people in relief camps complained of foul food and cramped conditions. Making matters worse, conditions were expected to deteriorate further in the coming weeks when, according to forecasters, the 49 floods would move southward, and Pakistan would receive more rain.

Facing the specter of a months-long crisis, the Pakistani government increased its focus on the floods and requested additional assistance from the international community. On August 8, during a visit to a barrage under duress, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani announced, “The country has been pushed back by many years. Whatever we can do within our resources we are doing and will continue to do. However, the loss is far too great.” That same day, he spoke to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and requested the international community’s assistance in responding to the floods. Gilani’s pleas were not ignored. On August 9, the UN launched a $460 million “flash appeal” to raise money for and coordinate the international humanitarian community’s response to the floods. 50

August 10, 2010-September 8, 2010: The Floods Worsen, and the U.S. and International Response Expands

During the second half of August, as forecasters predicted, the rain continued and the floods spread southward, creating enormous problems throughout the country. (See map showing the extent of the flooding in Exhibit C.) By August 20, the floods had left more than 4.6 million people homeless and killed more than 1,500

48 “U.S. Continues Aid to Pakistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 6, 2010, available at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=103003 (accessed on October 11, 2015). 49 “Pakistan Offers Six Choppers to WFP,” The Dawn (Pakistan), August 7, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/82400 (accessed on September 18, 2011); “Hundreds of Punjab Villages Devastated,” The Dawn (Pakistan), August 9, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/43927 (accessed on September 18, 2011); Issam Ahmed, “Pakistan Floods Displace Millions, Aid Welcome from US or From Militants,” Christian Science Monitor, August 6, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0806/Pakistan-floods-displace-millions-aid- welcome-from-US-or-from-militants (accessed on February 28, 2012); and “Relief Camps Lack Basic Facilities,” The Dawn (Pakistan), August 7, 2010, available at http://archives.dawn.com/archives/79273 (accessed on September 18, 2011). 50 Imtiaz Hussain, “Flood Losses Beyond Govt. Resources: PM,” The News (Pakistan), August 9, 2010, available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=30605&Cat=13&dt=8/9/%202010 (accessed on February 14, 2012).

13 of 21 others. 51 Many feared that the death toll would increase because of the likelihood of infectious disease outbreaks in unsanitary relief camps and the spread of the floods to Sindh, Pakistan’s southern-most province. Since the beginning of August, Sindhi relief workers had used sandbags and stones to raise and reinforce embankments, sloped barriers on the side of the river made mostly of stone and mud. However, when severe flooding reached Sindh in August, many embankments gave way, resulting in the displacement of over one million people. Complicating matters further, the provincial government’s 450 relief camps, filled to overflowing, lacked the capacity to accommodate millions more displaced people. Consequently, it was common to find citizens lying on mats on roadsides or embankments or camping out in cemeteries and public parks.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government and the rest of the international community swung into action in response to Prime Minister Gilani’s request for assistance and the launch of the UN appeal. For its part, the United States substantially expanded its commitment to the floods response by pledging over $150 million and deploying a total of 18 military helicopters, adding to the C130 aircraft that had already been supporting the relief effort, and over 300 troops to Pakistan. By August 19, the international community had contributed $200 million in response to the UN appeal, and individual countries and NGOs had donated more than 20 million pounds of relief supplies, including halal meals, prayer mats, water bottles, and medical equipment.52

Organizing Relief Efforts at Chaklala Air Base

The expanded response from the U.S. government and the international community led to an increased role for the National Guard. Colonel Greg Nelson, the Kentucky National Guard member helping to coordinate air relief operations at Pakistan’s Chaklala Air Base, and his team, now two weeks into their mission in Pakistan, had developed a clearer structure for coordinating U.S. aerial support for the relief effort. Each day, Nelson would confer with the Pakistani military, the World Food Program, and other organizations to develop a sense of which areas were most in need of aid and what international donations were expected to arrive. He would then provide a daily situation report to Central Command, which would work with Nelson as well as officials at Bagram, United States Transportation Command, and the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) to develop a plan for how U.S. military aircraft could assist with the flood relief effort.53

51 Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Receives More Flood Aid, But Need Grows,” The New York Times, August 19, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/world/asia/20pstan.html (accessed on October 11, 2015); and “Death Toll From Pakistan Flooding Tops 1,500 As Risk of Disease Rises,” CNN, August 21, 2010, available at http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/08/21/pakistan.floods.death.toll/ (accessed on October 12, 2015). 52 Richard Roth, “Pakistan Flood Crisis Hit by ‘Donor Fatigue?’” CBS News, August 19, 2010, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-flooding-crisis-hit-by-donor-fatigue/ (accessed on October 22, 2011). 53 One of nine unified commands in the Department of Defense, United States Transportation Command provides “full- spectrum global mobility solutions and related enabling capabilities for supported customers’ requirements in peace and war.” These customers include “the eight other U.S. combatant groups, the military services, defense agencies, and other government organizations.” The Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) is a U.S. military facility in Qatar that coordinates all attack and surveillance flights in Afghanistan and Iraq. “About USTRANSCOM,” United States Transportation Command, available at http://www.ustranscom.mil/cmd/aboutustc.cfm (accessed on November 12, 2015); and Thom Shanker, “Hagel Lifts Veil on Major Military Center,” The New York Times, December 11, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/world/middleeast/hagel-lifts-veil-on-major-military-center-in-qatar.html?_r=0 (accessed on May 6, 2015).

14 of 21 Nonetheless, Nelson was finding it difficult to manage the logistics of the growing response. As Nelson recalled, there was a sharp uptick in relief flights in mid-August, which had left Chaklala’s once-empty (and relatively small) hangar brimming with hundreds of thousands of relief supplies, such as halal meals and bottled water. As a further complication, the relief effort was unpredictable. As Nelson explained, massive aircraft (including Chinese 777s, the world’s largest twinjet airplane) would just “show up” with no advance warning. But the biggest problem was the lack of planning. The Pakistani Air Force at first attempted to formulate flight plans for the distribution of aid goods with only 24 hours notice, but this did not give foreign troops and aid workers enough time to schedule and prepare aircraft, equipment, and personnel. “We were strapped,” said Nelson, of the U.S. military’s effort to balance its in-theater commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq with the Pakistani military’s last- minute requests.

Joint Aviation Coordination Cell (JACC)

To improve planning, the United States, Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), and international organizations agreed to create a Joint Aviation Coordination Cell (JACC) to develop inter- organizational priorities for goods distribution and flight plans up to a week in advance. But the establishment of the JACC in the last week of August led to a new set of challenges for U.S. military officials. 54 The JACC was supposed to meet once per day and bring together officials from the Pakistani military, NDMA, the U.S. government (including Nelson, other U.S. military officials, and USAID), and representatives of various international organizations (e.g., the World Food Program and other UN bodies). However, during the first two days the body met, the Pakistani military officials did not participate. On those days, to signal that their collaboration was essential, it was decided, without Pakistani input, to send several U.S. aircraft to relief locations based on needs analysis from USAID and the World Food Program. By day three, the Pakistani military started to attend the JACC meetings.

As the JACC took shape, Nelson and Travis Betz, a logistics officer for USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (which had deployed to Pakistan after the first week of August) came to play a major role in the group’s work. Betz emerged as a key figure behind the scenes, working through his connections at USAID and in the international relief community to ensure that the right personnel from the Pakistani government and other stakeholders attended the JACC meetings. For his part, Nelson, as Betz recalled, often served as a leading figure at JACC meetings, sketching out flight plans on large canvasses and employing his interpersonal skills to build rapport with and foster consensus among the many different stakeholders involved. “He [Nelson] puts people at ease,” said Betz, “even when they don’t understand every word he’s saying.”

Nonetheless, Nelson, Betz, and their colleagues throughout the U.S. government still had to wrestle with major challenges. One was that the key decision-makers in the Pakistani government often sent their deputies to the JACC meetings, making it hard for the group to formalize their plans. Betz, who typically met privately with Nelson before and after JACC meetings, recalled one conversation after a meeting in which the Colonel lamented

54 Kali Gradishar, “Joint Aviation Coordination Cell Established To Aid Pakistan Flood Relief,” U.S. Air Force, August 31, 2010, available at http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/115753/joint-aviation-coordination-cell-established-to- aid-pakistan-flood-relief.aspx (accessed on August 17, 2015).

15 of 21 that, “We didn’t get anything done,” and that the day’s JACC meeting “was a waste of time [and] we have nothing for tomorrow because we need decision makers.” Betz—who was sleeping in a storage container at the U.S. Embassy—then stayed up throughout the night to work through his contacts at the UN to ensure that the right decision makers were in attendance the following day.

Another concern, according to news reports, was that some elements of the Pakistani government and military were diverting aid to places where they had political and familial ties, rather than to the flood-affected 55 areas most in need. As news of this alleged activity circulated, Nelson aimed to support NDMA, the civilian authorities formally responsible for coordinating the overall relief effort, as much as possible. Nelson worked during JACC meetings to amplify NDMA’s perspective when it conflicted with the military’s. He would either agree with the point of view of General Nadeem Ahmad (a former senior military officer then heading NDMA) or bring to bear the point of view of a third party (e.g., USAID and/or the World Food Program) that represented a compromise between the Pakistani military’s and NDMA’s perspectives.

Nelson believed that amplifying NDMA’s point of view provided a way not just to increase the likelihood that aid would start going to the areas most in need but also to introduce Pakistani officials to the concept of military support to civilian authorities in disaster response. This was integral to the Guard’s work in domestic and international response but, Nelson believed, was an unfamiliar concept in Pakistan where the military had long been the country’s most-powerful institution and NDMA had only been created recently. Nonetheless, Pakistani officials were slow to embrace this concept and recognize NDMA’s authority. As Betz recalled, “I know that for [the] Pakistan military that…the national disaster agency person who was in the room was certainly not in charge. I remember feeling anxious for him [the NDMA official] because he was anxious around all of these very senior military people.”

By late August, the JACC was operating more smoothly, and NDMA identified this group as one of the main reasons that the U.S. and Pakistani militaries, NDMA, and the international community had been able to deliver tens of millions of pounds of relief supplies to flood-affected communities across the country. “In all future major disasters,” NDMA wrote in its after-action report to the floods response, “a Joint Aviation Coordination Cell must be established immediately.”56

September 9, 2010-December 31, 2010: The Floods Wind Down

55 See for example, Rob Crilly and Damien McElroy, “Pakistan in Political Crisis Amid Allegations of Flooding Aid Corruption,” The Daily Telegraph (London), August 23, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7960923/Pakistan-in-political-crisis-amid-allegations-of-flooding- aid-corruption.html (accessed on March 9, 2016); Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistani Flood Relief Must Start with Fighting Corruption,” The Washington Post, September 6, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/09/05/AR2010090502816.html (accessed on March 9, 2016); and Khalid Kheshgi and Sara Hashash, “Pakistan Relief Effort Hampered By Corruption,” The Sunday Times, August 15, 2010, available at http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Asia/article370642.ece (accessed on March 9, 2016). 56 “Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief – Learning from Experience,” National Disaster Management Authority, April 12, 2011, p. 6, available at http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%202010%20Flood%20Relief- Learning%20from%20Experience.pdf (accessed on May 10, 2015).

16 of 21 In September, the rains finally relented, and by the end of the month, the floods were receding throughout the country (although the water took months to drain fully in Sindh). Nonetheless, 12.4 million Pakistanis still lacked access to clean water or were living in temporary shelters, millions needed food aid, and the World Health Organization (WHO) was predicting 1.5 million cases of potentially life-threatening diarrhea. Pakistan also faced a host of medium- and long-term recovery challenges. The floods killed 1.2 million animals and displaced tens of millions of additional livestock, diminishing the net worth of many farmers who were simultaneously grappling with damage to their crops. Outside of the agriculture sector, inflation – which was already at 13% in September – was expected to rise, and over 3,000 miles of roads, 2 million homes, and 7,000 schools had been destroyed.57

With the Pakistani people still suffering, the U.S. military sustained its relief operations through early December, at which point Pakistani and U.S. officials held a ceremony in Islamabad commemorating the end of the operation. By this point, the United States had deployed more than 25 helicopters and hundreds of troops, rescued more than 40,000 Pakistanis, and delivered more than 25 million pounds of relief supplies.58 Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik, commander of the Pakistan army's 11th Corps, said, “This was not the beginning, and it was not the end. This is a continuation of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.” “We have been honored to partner with the military forces of Pakistan to bring aid and comfort for those in need,” said Brigadier General Michael Nagata, the deputy commander of the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan who had helped to coordinate flood relief efforts in northwest Pakistan. “The support, camaraderie and spirit of cooperation and shared effort have been extraordinary.”59

Soon thereafter, however, the rapport between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries weakened, in no small part because in 2011 the U.S. military conducted an air raid in Pakistan that killed Osama Bin Laden, the Al Qaeda leader who, they learned, had been hiding in Abbottabad, the city in which Pakistan’s military academy is located.

Nonetheless, the Pakistan disaster aid mission made lasting impressions on senior U.S. military officers. One was Lieutenant Colonel Burda from the Minnesota National Guard who had been part of some of the first air relief missions in Pakistan. In 2012, Minnesota National Guard leaders, preparing for a flood event on the Red River, consulted with him about which nearby airfields were suitable for C-130 operations; it was the exact same task, he later recalled, as the one he had faced in the response to the 2010 Pakistani floods. Another was Nelson, who in

57 Erin Aigner, “As Floodwaters Recede, A Crisis Emerges,” The New York Times, September 26, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403E1D91E3CF935A1575AC0A9669D8B63&ref=2010pakistanfloods (accessed on January 31, 2012); “After The Deluge,” The Economist, September 16, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17037131 (accessed on January 31, 2012); Ben Arnoldy, “Pakistan Floods Wipe Out More Than 1 Million Animals – and Farmer’s Livelihoods,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0907/Pakistan-floods-wipe-out-more-than-1-million-animals-and- farmers-livelihoods (accessed on January 31, 2012); and “A Ruined Country,” The Economist, September 16, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17042150 (accessed on January 31, 2012). 58 A large contingent of U.S. forces was operating from Ghazi Air Base in northwest Pakistan. The U.S. forces stationed there conducted joint-relief operations with the Pakistani military. Mark Swart, “U.S. Military Boosts Pakistan Aid Capabilities,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 2, 2010, available at http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60710 (accessed on March 2, 2016). 59 Jim Garamone, “Ceremony Marks End of Pakistan Flood Relief Operations,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 2, 2010, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61920 (accessed on May 10, 2015).

17 of 21 September 2012 became the Vice Director of Strategy, Policy, Plans, and International Affairs at the National Guard Bureau.60 The lessons he learned in Pakistan about interagency cooperation and sensitivity to the turf of domestic authorities were highly valuable as he helped develop plans both for the Guard’s collaboration with USAID in disaster response and for Guard units assisting other countries with disaster response as part of the National Guard’s State Partnership Program.61 He also applied those lessons in planning for domestic disaster response, where he helped state Guard units and FEMA work together on building aviation plans for multi-state disaster response operations. As Nelson explained, “Every disaster response you do is going to be different from the last. [But] you bring the expertise and the flavor that you had from the last one to this one. [Even if] it's going to be different, [y]ou're going to learn some stuff, fix it, and walk away with some more tools in your tool bag.”

60 When Nelson took the post at the National Guard Bureau, he assumed the rank of Brigadier General. “Nelson Selected for General Officer Post at National Guard Bureau,” 123rd Airlift Wing, Kentucky Air National Guard, August 11, 2012, available at http://www.123aw.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123326448 (accessed on May 3, 2015). 61 The State Partnership Program pairs state National Guard units with militaries in foreign countries to conduct joint training missions and “facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic, and social spheres.” “State Partnership Program,” National Guard, available at http://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/JointStaff/J5/InternationalAffairsDivision/StatePartnershipProgram.aspx (accessed on May 10, 2015).

18 of 21 Exhibit A: National Map of Pakistan

Source: CIA World Factbook, “Pakistan,” available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/pk.html (accessed on January 23, 2012).

19 of 21 Exhibit B: Map of Pakistan by Administrative Unit

Source: Wikipedia, “Pakistan Administrative Units,” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PAK_AU_T1.svg (accessed on January 23, 2013).

20 of 21 Exhibit C: Map of Flooding in Late August 2010

Source: “Area Maps of Pakistan Flooding,” U.S. State Department, available at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/pk/flood/maps/ (accessed on February 27, 2012).

21 of 21