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India Review, vol. 7, no. 2, April–June, 2008, pp. 115–154 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN 1473-6489 print; 1557-3036 online DOI:10.1080/14736480802055455 TheFIND1473-64891557-3036India Review,Review Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2008:First pp. 1–20 Kashmir War Revisited SHUJATheIndia First Review Kashmir War Revisited NAWAZ The seemingly endless Indo-Pakistan conflict that became an integral part of the history of twentieth century and continues to reverberate into the twenty-first century had its origins in the birth pangs of these two independent nations. They went to war almost as soon as the Brit- ish colonial authorities announced the end of their rule in India in August 1947. Fueled by a religious and ethnic conflagration across much of northern India and the area that is now Pakistan, the conflict in Kashmir took on a life of its own and continues to echo in the political rhetoric in both states even today, affecting their ability to craft rational and mutually advantageous economic and political relationships and play a joint role as regional actors not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the New Central Asia: the area that includes Iran, Afghanistan, and the Muslim Republics or ‘stans’ of the former Soviet Union. This article takes a fresh look at the origins of the Kashmir conflict in the period surrounding the partition of India. Much of the earlier literature has relied on political records and memoirs of key individu- als on both sides of the conflict, in India and Pakistan. A key element that was missing was the military thinking that prompted the conflict and how the armies of both sides managed their operations. Insights into the thinking behind this conflict on the Pakistani side are now available as a result of access to the previously secret files of the Paki- stan army relating to this conflict. These provide a fresh and detailed look at the military planning and frustrations of military commanders Shuja Nawaz is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press, April 2008) from which this article has been adapted. He was a newscaster and producer with Pakistan television and covered the India–Pakistan War in 1971 on the western front. He has also worked for the World Health Organization and The New York Times. He was a division chief for the International Monetary Fund and director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He was also Editor of Finance and Develop- ment, the joint quarterly of the IMF and the World Bank. Currently he is a political analyst and author and speaks widely on radio, television, and at think-tanks on South Asia and Central Asian issues. 116 India Review in conducting a war with serious logistical and political constraints and may give a useful counterpoint to the many published accounts of this conflict in India. This article puts the Kashmir War in historical perspective, examines its causes, and then presents the thinking of the military officers who surreptitiously managed the tribal incursion into Kashmir from Pakistan. It then analyzes the effects of this war on the officers involved and its possible effects on the emergence of a praetorian tradition in Pakistani politics, as evidenced in the attempted coup d’état of 1951. And it examines the lack of decisive thinking in the political leadership of Pakistan on Kashmir that led to an ill-planned incursion and a delayed involvement of the Pakistan army, making it a doomed venture from the outset. The origins of the First Kashmir War lay in history but were given impetus by the lack of coherent and centralized decision making at both the military and political levels in Pakistan. India had inherited the central political, administrative, and military command structure of the departing British. Pakistan had to start from scratch. Its capital Karachi was distant from the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, 1000 miles to the north. Both countries continued with British commanders of their forces. Below them was generally a well trained and compliant batch of native officers who were imbued with the British tradition of an apolitical officer corps. Most of them had had little opportunity to interact with politicians or to consider political issues. But the sudden conflagration of ethnic and religious violence and exchange of refuges between the two states at partition exposed them to the deep political and religious conflicts that lay beneath the surface of what was British India. Against this background, it became possible for some activist young officers in Pakistan to seize the opportunity provided by a wavering ruler in Kashmir, who had failed to decide on acceding to either India or Pakistan, to force his hand. Their initially surreptitious actions were later on recognized by the political leadership but were kept largely secret from the British higher command. As a result they did not benefit from any organized strategic planning or official sup- port at the level of the army command. Essentially, the conflict became a tactical exercise that was searching for a strategy and drew opportunistic politicians into its fold. A higgledy piggledy approach in Pakistan to military and political actions on Kashmir produced The First Kashmir War Revisited 117 unsatisfactory results on both levels and created a simmering conflict that continues to bedevil relations to this day between India and Pakistan. And in the process, it helped create a pattern of relationships between the military and civil authority in Pakistan that has allowed the military to influence and even control external policies. With the issue of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan hang- ing in the balance, feverish activity proceeded in the corridors of power of New Delhi. Mountbatten was trying to get the Hindu Maharaja of this state with a majority Muslim population not to take precipitate action but to ascertain the wishes of his populace before committing. With a view to keeping options open and under Jinnah’s careful approach so as not to upset the delicate balance of accession of a number of key states that were still weighing their options (Kashmir and Hyderabad, being major illustrations of this case), Pakistan signed a Standstill Agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir. India held off from doing so. The Viceroy’s special aide V. P. Menon was deputed to discuss matters with the Maharaja, who showed himself to be in a state of indecision, raising alarms in New Delhi. The concern among Indian political leaders was that the longer Kashmir held out, the greater the possibility that the Maharaja might either take an autono- mous position or, much worse, opt for Pakistan or allow Pakistan to enter Kashmir. Nehru sat down and wrote an assessment to Sardar Patel on September 27, 1947 that summed up the situation succinctly from the Indian point of view: It is obvious to me that the situation there [Kashmir] is a dangerous and deteriorating one. The Muslim League in the Punjab and the NWFP are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers. The approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The only normal route then is via the Jhelum valley. I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kash- mir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated. He then proposed the release of Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference leaders followed by a declaration of “adhesion to Indian 118 India Review Union” for once this was done “ . it will become very difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union.”1 Patel joined forces with Nehru in continuously pressing the Maha- raja to accede to India. V. P. Menon meanwhile acted as the Viceroy’s emissary and a flurry of visits to Kashmir ensued. The Maharaja meanwhile made matters worse by reacting badly to efforts by the people of Poonch in Jammu to assert their political rights. Poonch in the region of Western Jammu Province is at a strategic location between the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, and the Pir Panjal Range the border of Kashmir with Pakistan. The southern spurs of the Pir Panjal Range gradually descend into hilly areas to the south, merging into the plains of Gujrat district in Pakistan. Before independence, a road that ran from Jammu to Bagh, crossing over the Chenab at Akhnoor and from there on to Beri Pattan, Noashera, Mendhar, and then Poonch, was improved. With Indian help, the Dogra government tried to establish an alternate route from Bagh across the Jhelum River valley to the Srinagar Valley to provide year-round access. The track from Poonch to Uri over the Hajipir Pass was also improved but remained unusable due to snow for much of the year.2 (Many of the key battles of the First Kashmir War centered on these roads and this region and the names of even small towns such as Akhnoor entered military lore in both India and Pakistan.) This critical location gave the region great importance in a strategic context. Its population, largely Muslim, also had close ties to the contiguous regions in Pakistan in the districts of Jhelum, Rawalpindi, and Gujrat. The people shared a strong military tradition with their relatives across the border. The so-called martial tribes (defined as such by the British, who used such categorizations to recruit and retain soldiers for their armies in India) in Poonch were mainly Muslim and included Sudhans, Abbasids, Chibs, Rajputs, Dainyals, Mardyals, and Gakhars, mainly from the Poonch and Mirpur districts.

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