14 The praetorian network Civilian politicians hoping to remain in power The Study have to accommodate extraconstitutional praetorian interests.

Fig. 1 (above): General Eduardo Manahan Año shakes U.S. Marine Corps Lance-Corporal Barrett’s hand at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows Beach, Hawaii, 2017. Photo: Corporal Robert Sweet. Image in Public domain, from www.pacom.mil. Fig. 2 (right): Balikatan 2019 Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercise, Tarlac, Luzon, Philippines. Photo: Sargeant 1st Class John Etheridge, U.S. Army. Wikimedia Commons.

Praetorian network politics in the Philippines

Mesrob Vartavarian The recent rise of right-wing demagogues issuing unsettling challenges to liberal democracies has garnered no shortage of academic commentary. Populists have deployed inflammatory rhetoric and contrarian policies to slaughter more than a few sacred cows. Nevertheless, such figures face structural constraints to enacting their unorthodox agendas. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte’s demagogic warlordism has been contained by an extensive praetorian network. For the past five decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have constructed, consolidated, and sustained a power network that exercises influence over local, national, and supranational affairs. Since Marcos’s ouster, civilian politicians hoping to remain in power have had to accommodate these extraconstitutional praetorian interests.

From colonial enforcers assistance. President Ferdinand Marcos spent Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) units worked in tandem with local commanders, his first term in office (1965-1969) cultivating insurgency. Consequently, cronies allowed providing a force multiplier and plausible to the oligarchy’s soldiers military support for his creeping authoritarian military units to partake in their fiefdoms’ illicit deniability for atrocities brought to light by Under Spanish rule, Philippine military takeover by distributing state patronage to key economies in exchange for praetorian protection. church and human rights groups. forces wielded despotic power over society units and senior commanders. Having tasted Marcos’s corruption of the military ultimately Most infractions were initially confined on behalf of foreign overlords. Armed service power, the AFP supported the imposition of expanded praetorian political networks beyond to fringe areas. In the mid-1970s, 85% of the overseas served Spanish colonial, rather martial law in 1972 as a means to expand its his control. While an officer’s commission military’s combat troops were based in Muslim than domestic proto-national, concerns. prerogatives and influence. brought great social prestige to men of regions. After 1980, the CPP-NPA insurgency The mercenary character of Philippine humble means, it seldom led to great wealth. gained traction as crony rule ran much of the troops disconnected them from indigenous This changed under martial law. Budgetary Visayas and eastern Mindanao into the ground. communities. Subalterns viewed soldiers with Praetorian politicization increases and slush funds obtained from the This compelled Marcos to widen the swath of deep suspicion, whereas soldiers themselves United States in return for sending civic action territory subject to military repression. By 1984, remained reliant on the privileges granted and network expansion troops to Vietnam garnered the loyalty of senior 50% of the AFP was deployed to Christian by alien political elites. American rule As the most autonomous element of officers. Personnel expanded exponentially. The areas of Mindanao, including most of its special developed, but did not fundamentally alter, the Marcos regime, the Philippine defense AFP grew from a force of 35 thousand in the forces.3 More and more Filipinos were exposed this coercive structure. Philippine Scout and establishment derived lasting benefits late 1960s to over 113 thousand in 1976.2 Military to AFP brutality and criminality over time. Constabulary units projected power through from authoritarian rule. Increased budgets, liaison officers inserted into corporations AFP linkages with the United States predated society more effectively than their Spanish-era weapons procurements, illicit rackets, and the became the main points of contact for foreign and circumvented the Marcos regime. From predecessors, yet they remained an internal formation of militias enriched and empowered investors. They received percentages and 1950 to 1976, 16 thousand Filipino servicemen army geared toward domestic repression.1 the military to a point where it could no longer kickbacks in exchange for facilitating contracts. received training in American military schools American policymakers handed off this be controlled. The AFP maintained separate Personnel expansion and provincial and academies.4 This consolidated trans- revamped security apparatus to their Filipino linkages with the United States, an imperial counterinsurgency allowed the AFP to embed national connections between the two defense charges as they indigenized the colonial state. benefactor that could provide vast quantities its predatory practices across the archipelago. establishments and gave Washington valuable Oligarchic elites directed army units towards of supranational patronage. Marcos managed Insurgencies put a premium on military intelligence on Philippine military developments. external defense during the Commonwealth to endow his kin and cronies with huge wealth protection and corporations regularly paid off American strategic priorities for the AFP era (1935-1942), while retaining the while keeping most of them loyal. He could not, commanders to provide security. Senior officers shifted as the 1970s progressed. A gradual Constabulary for internal security. However, however, prevent senior military officials from also engaged in smuggling, extortion, and rapprochement with the People’s Republic of social upheavals generated under Japanese carving out autonomous means to enrichment. black market weapons sales. Ending hostilities China altered the AFP’s remit from external occupation precipitated an embedded Defending these means ultimately came before would only cut into profit margins. As a result, defense to internal security. Vietnam-era agrarian insurrection that necessitated a defending the regime. counterinsurgencies became institutionalized. surplus weaponry, most of it designed for military shift towards counterinsurgency. Authoritarian rule promised extensive Giving the military a vested interest in seeing counterinsurgency, was sold in increasing Special operations coupled with civic action socioeconomic development, but only ended conflicts continue made them very difficult to quantities to the Philippines. These newfound programs aimed at winning hearts and minds up exposing resource-rich provinces to a new end. Civilians in insurgent zones were subjected capabilities helped contain Muslim separatist made the AFP a more visible presence in layer of plunderers. Regime predation was to strategic hamlet programs, sexual violence, aspirations, but they also raised civilian postwar Philippine society. Soldiers protected particularly virulent in the Visayas and eastern torture, and extrajudicial killings. Militia casualties. Furthermore, escalating state oligarchs from leftist movements and derived Mindanao. These crony-run zones became units of the Civilian Home Defense Forces violence against leftist groups only increased substantial benefits from continuing American epicenters of the Communist Party of the committed some of the worst abuses. These popular support for the CPP-NPA. The Newsletter No. 84 Autumn 2019 15 The Study

In addition to facilitating predatory Upon winning the 1992 presidential twenty-first century, Philippine institutions control over pork barrel projects and budgetary enrichment, counterinsurgency campaigns elections, Ramos established the National have mutated into criminal enterprises that transfers guaranteed outward obedience created deep divisions between junior and Unification Commission (NUC) to facilitate cannot be reformed, only dismantled and among most Manila politicos. Unlike Marcos senior ranks. Recent graduates from the a negotiated settlement with all rebel forces replaced by more democratic ones. Quimpo’s or Ramos, however, Duterte had not spent prestigious Philippine Military Academy in the country. Although the NUC had point is well taken, but the degree to which prolonged periods hovering around the center were brutalized and politicized as state some success in curtailing Muslim and NPA the state’s coercive institutions have achieved of power. He lacked a solid Manila client base violence turned inward. They faced execrable insurgents, it appears to have been primarily autonomous means of predation and the that previous parvenu oligarchs mobilized conditions in combat zones as well-connected directed at incorporating RAM rebels into ability to impose conditions on chief executives to consolidate control. As Duterte began to commanders siphoned off resources to line government. Negotiations made mutinous merits further consideration. Presidents neglect threaten established patrimonial and political their own pockets. Having experienced severe soldiers into legitimate political players. praetorian network interests at their peril. relationships he faced significant praetorian depravation, junior officers felt entitled to Gregorio Honasan, RAM’s principle leader, used In more recent years, the military has tried pushback. AFP senior officers did not comply demand reform and play a larger role in this opportunity to relaunch his career and to recast itself into an external defense force. with Duterte’s attempted tilt toward China as Philippine society. By 1985, the Reform the win a senatorial seat in 1995. With one of their The AFP disgorged itself of the Philippine this would jeopardize training, weaponry, and Armed Forces Movement (RAM) had emerged own in Malacanang, military coups became Constabulary, now called the Philippine security guarantees provided by the United to issue an open challenge to the Marcos redundant. Ramos reined in extraconstitutional National Police, in 1991. Riddled with corruption States. Furthermore, the AFP felt Chinese regime. Made up of junior officers with praetorian violence in exchange for and responsible for numerous abuses, the military base construction throughout the South combat experience in Mindanao, it had the consolidating the AFP’s institutional privileges. Constabulary could be discarded and left to China Sea impinged on Philippine territorial support of defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile Failure to fully end provincial insurgencies handle domestic order issues while the AFP sovereignty. Given their purported focus on and Constabulary chief Fidel Ramos. The after Marcos gave AFP senior officers focused on defending national frontiers. Fidel external defense, the generals simply could Enrile-Ramos faction took heed of growing continuing access to conflict rents. Beyond Ramos was the main architect of this initiative. not oblige. Senior military commanders cleavages within the military and sought to justifying defense budgets, unrest kept Ramos came from the core of the armed appear to be ignoring Duterte, even going so coopt rebellious elements. In linking up with protection prices high. Corporations continued forces’ counterinsurgency establishment. far as calling in American special operations a groundswell of praetorian discontent from to pay commanders for He knew who the forces during 2017’s Marawi City siege without below, they gambled on drawing enough security while rank-and- rotten apples were, the president’s prior knowledge. In addition, military support for their position when they file soldiers extorted Faced with deepening how to marginalize or the AFP has thus far refused to take part in turned on Marcos after the 1986 snap election. money from urban and redistribute them, and the Drug War, at least as it is being waged The Pentagon had expressed avid support rural inhabitants across political unrest, the could reduce bloated in major metropolitan areas, for fear that for RAM in congressional testimony.5 Senior insurgent zones.8 budgets without facing individual units would be corrupted by engaging U.S. defense officials felt Marcos was losing Post-People Power military abandoned criticism from AFP ranks. in extortion or mutating into de facto drug control of the country to the communists developments also Marcos and focused on Government posts, gangs beyond their superiors’ control. Moreover, and a communist victory would mean losing witnessed the increasing rather than conflict Duterte’s initial efforts to broker a peace with the highly strategic military bases. Only the AFP use of militias. Marcos defending its privileges. rents, appear to have CPP-NPA have collapsed, further increasing his could short-circuit this slow motion collapse, had expanded militia been the primary reliance on the AFP. The Duterte challenge has hence American planners encouraged its organizations as a mode of praetorian indeed shaken up the Philippine political scene, politicization. The Enrile-Ramos-RAM nexus counter-force to the military’s growing power. accumulation during the Ramos era. Yet, but it has also demonstrated the resilience of might not have toppled the regime, that Yet, almost immediately, militia formations fell this trend was reversed during Estrada’s incumbent power structures. required massive support from social activists under the influence of local AFP commanders. and Arroyo’s administrations as the AFP was Duterte’s rise proves that a warlord with a and religious groups, but it did fragment AFP-militia linkages deepened further after deployed to crush internal dissent. compact support base can win the presidency Marcos’s coercive phalanx. Forces still loyal to 1986. The military armed and encouraged anti- Nevertheless, Arroyo’s reestablishment when he forms opportunistic alliances with the regime were reluctant to fire on colleagues communist vigilante groups such as Alsa Masa of close relations with the United States Manila elites and deploys demagogic rhetoric. surrounded by unarmed demonstrators. Faced (masses arise) and Tadtad (chop-chop) to after 9-11 allowed the AFP to reconsolidate This combination allowed a local warlord to with burgeoning popular and praetorian combat the NPA. Several groups were inspired linkages with its traditional supranational become a national oligarch. Upon entering opposition, Marcos had no choice but to flee. by various forms of quasi-Christian fanaticism patron. Closure of U.S. military facilities in office, however, the limits of parvenu oligarchic Senior defense officials utilized authoritarian that viewed leftists as godless heathens. 1992 removed fixed territorial infringements on power became readily apparent. Praetorian rule to construct lucrative predatory rackets They subjected suspected dissidents to Philippine sovereignty. The bases had drawn network interests have placed severe constraints and deepen linkages with the American sexual violence, murder, and mutilation, often sharp criticism from nationalist groups who on national warlord rule. Combat operations military establishment. The AFP managed displaying dismembered corpses as a warning claimed that the Philippines languished under against the NPA continue and the U.S. alliance to institutionalize counterinsurgencies that to potentially disloyal communities. neo-colonial American oppression, a charge has remained intact. Rents associated with provided rents, weapons, and plunder. AFP commanders transferred vigilantes not easily refuted by conservative elites. Rather these realities still flow into praetorian hands. Factional rivalries remained rife but would into more regimented paramilitary formations than using the War on Terror as a pretext to Baring a major political rupture, Duterte will, gradually be contained under Ramos’s as needed. Although given more advanced reconstruct military bases in the Philippines, like Arroyo, have to construct an oligarchic- leadership. Faced with deepening political weaponry and training, they lost none of their American policymakers emphasized close praetorian coalition that maintains established unrest, the military abandoned Marcos and brutality. In addition to standard usages, human relationships with senior AFP officers. interests if he wishes to remain in power beyond focused on defending its privileges. such as giving the AFP plausible deniability Joint training exercises and arrangements current constitutional limits. for human rights violations, militia expansion allowing for the rapid deployment of American gave the military added muscle to let loose on military forces onto Philippine soil in the event of Mesrob Vartavarian, Visiting Fellow SEAP Cacique restoration, tribal minorities, small farmers, and peasant external, namely Chinese, aggression provided Cornell University; latest/forthcoming squatters. The need for military and militia the AFP with patronage outside Malacanang’s publications: (2019) ‘Warriors and praetorian consolidation coercion increased as Philippine logging and direct control. Counterinsurgency operations States: Military Labour in Southern India, circa 1750-1800’, Modern Asian Studies It is unnecessary, at this late date, to mining industries boomed at the turn of the throughout the Sulu archipelago were depicted 53(2):313-338; ‘Warriors and Colonial provide an extensive reiteration of cacique twenty-first century. These low-intensity as defensive measures against foreign Wars in Muslim Philippines since 1800’, in restoration under the Aquino administration counterinsurgencies, interspersed with periodic jihadists radicalized in island Southeast Noor, F.A. & Carey, P. (eds) ‘Race’ and the (1986-1992).6 Corazon Aquino used the accelerations, impeded genuine sociopolitical Asia or the greater Middle East. In addition, Colonial Wars in 19th Century Southeast popular mandate gained from rallying People reform and confirmed praetorian power. AFP commanders continued to profit from Asia, Amsterdam University Press, Power to declare a revolutionary government All this reached a high point during Gloria illicit economic activities conducted across forthcoming. [email protected] in 1986 that vested her with legislative and Macapagal Arroyo’s presidency (2001-2010). highly porous maritime zones. The praetorian executive authority. This allowed her coterie to As Joseph Estrada’s vice-President, Arroyo network was well entrenched by the time promulgate a constitution in 1987 that restored came to power after the former’s downfall Duterte came to power. most old cacique families to power. Yet, a during a second People Power revolution in widespread communist insurgency meant that 2001. Lacking electoral legitimacy, she had Notes the privileges of a politicized military would to construct a political coalition with powerful Praetorian constraints 1 Hernandez, C.G. 1979. ‘The Extent of have to be confirmed and extended. The rapid predatory groups inside and outside civilian Civilian Control of the Military in the dissipation of cacique legitimacy among social government.9 A strategic alliance with the on warlord rule Philippines: 1946-1976’, PhD thesis, activists compelled the national oligarchy to United States aimed at combating Islamic Rodrigo Duterte’s iconoclasm stems less State University of New York at Buffalo, dispense ever greater quantities of patronage extremists provided aid and training that kept from his foul-mouthed tirades and devotion to pp.95-120. and protection to military commanders who the AFP happy. Arroyo skillfully deployed the extrajudicial violence than his political origins. 2 Wurfel, D. 1988. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Ithaca: kept reformist movements in line. This further patronage available to incumbent Philippine Coming from a peripheral elite family based Cornell University Press, pp.140-152. consolidated praetorian network power. Presidents to clinch alliances with senior military in southeastern Mindanao, Duterte spent the 3 Kessler, R. 1989. Rebellion and Repression The Aquino years saw an increasingly officers and provincial warlords. This won her 1980s and 90s deepening his hold on Davao in the Philippines. New Haven and London: coherent praetorian bloc drive itself into the re-election in 2004, but only through the use City. As mayor, he successfully marginalized Yale University Press, p.144 heart of Philippine national politics. Military of staggering violence and fraud. Few were and coopted NPA violence while encouraging 4 ibid., Wurfel, p.145. factionalism was reduced as Fidel Ramos fooled by the subterfuge. Several impeachment multinational investment. Japanese and 5 ibid., Kessler, p.130. sidelined rivals and consolidated AFP influence attempts followed and were defused with Chinese corporations repatriated substantial 6 McCoy, A. (ed.) 1993. An Anarchy over civilian officials. Ramos began his further corruption. Junior officers in the AFP profits as Duterte minimized NPA extortion. of Families: State and Family in the association with the Aquino government as AFP frequently rumbled at presidential plunder and Having imbibed radical revolutionary ideology, Philippines. Madison: University of Chief of Staff. After a short period as Aquino’s delayed promotions, going so far as to attempt and reaping rewards from Chinese investors, Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies. defense chief Enrile was replaced by General a coup in 2006. The coup was aborted when the mayor harbored a deep dislike for the 7 McCoy, A. 1999. Closer than Brothers: Rafael Ileto, a seasoned soldier marginalized senior officers refused to join and exposed the United States. He attempted to expand on these Manhood at the Philippine Military during the Marcos era because of his opposition conspirators. Continual government dysfunction connections by sidelining American strategic Academy. New Haven and London: Yale to the declaration of martial law. Ileto quickly led to resurgent leftist activism in the interests in the Philippines after assuming the University Press, pp.274, 283, 303-304. dismantled Enrile’s network in the defense countryside. These political headwinds made presidency. Yet, on catapulting from Davao 8 Sales, P.M. 2009. ‘State Terror in the establishment by purging the latter’s clients.7 Arroyo all the more committed to her military City to Malacanang, Duterte entered a more Philippines: the Alston Report, Human As this occurred, Ramos consolidated his hold and warlord allies. 2006 saw an acceleration crowded political landscape than Marcos Rights and Counter-Insurgency under the over Aquino, using the threat of RAM-directed of counterinsurgency operations by the AFP initially had to deal with. In addition to restored Arroyo Administration’, Contemporary coups as leverage. By early 1988, Ramos had and its paramilitary associates. caciques, he encountered a praetorian network Politics 15(3):321-336. 9 Hutchcroft, P.D. 2008. ‘The Arroyo assumed the defense portfolio and gradually In Nathan Gilbert Quimpo’s view, the that had spent thirty years entrenching its Imbroglio in the Philippines’, Journal of brought RAM to heel. Most officers jailed Arroyo administration was a predatory power. At first, Manila’s structures of illicit Democracy 19(1):141-155. for their role in the attempted December 1989 regime that corroded state institutions into accumulation demonstrated their plasticity 10 Quimpo, N.G. 2009. ‘The Philippines: coup came under his protection and were mechanisms solely geared toward extracting by accommodating the Duterte clique’s entry Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian later granted amnesty. wealth from society.10 Since the turn of the into national patronage networks. Presidential Features’, The Pacific Review 22(3):335-353.