Roads to Peace in Afghanistan: Fighting for Peace

ROADS TO PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN – FIGHTING FOR PEACE

By Hekmatullah Azamy, Research Analyst

The last 12 years of fighting has taught all players involved in the Afghan conflict to end the ruthless battle through peace talks. In other words, all parties want peace more than ever before, even if faced with great challenges. This piece studies the background of peace initiatives in Afghanistan after 2002, analyses recent trends and sheds light on the current status of the peace drive. It also looks at the challenges ahead and presents some recommendations suggesting how to boost its momentum.

Background to the Afghan Peace Drive

After the collapse of the Taliban regime in the early 2000s, the Afghan government and its international allies were overoptimistic about defeating the insurgency. They underrated the degree and presence of insurgents in Afghanistan which ultimately undermined security. Afghanistan was comparatively peaceful until early 2005, a time when Afghans were anticipating durable peace. This has yet to be true.

When security deteriorated in 2005, Afghan President Hamid Karzai established the Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission (a.k.a. Programme Tahkim Sulh or PTS) in May of the same year. However the belated and short-lived PTS started working with low capacity and limited coverage in few provinces of the country. When President Karzai was re-elected in 2009, reconciliation and peace processes became a central priority of his second term. President Karzai along with his consultative group pushed all the necessary buttons to come up with substantial strategies toward the reconciliation process, which led to the creation of the High Peace Council in 2010.

The HPC not only engaged Afghanistan’s security institutions, but also gained the full support of the Afghan development ministries and various other international establishments. With great resources and tremendous support from international and national partners, the HPC has undertaken the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) and has begun implementing the program through its operational cells at the provincial level. Via the APRP, thousands of insurgents have been reintegrated across the country. These include mid level commanders and foot soldiers from various insurgent networks – mostly fighting for their own reasons. The high profile commanders were rarely seen in the reintegration list. Although insecurity remains a concern in most

2 provinces, HPC engagement in the peace process has had some, albeit varying, level of impact in opening up portions of the country that were previously inaccessible. It should be admitted that the costs to the peace process has already exceeded when compared to its benefits.

Things changed in a peculiar way in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The troops surge in Afghanistan in 2010 was a consequence of President Obama’s administration belief that they could either defeat the Taliban and other insurgent groups or pressurize them for peace talks.1 His top generals opposed peace talks with the Taliban, professing the use of military action instead. Over time, however, they realized that a military solution to the war was practically impossible. Taliban and US officials started negotiating soon after the surge. By March 2012, they were on the verge of a conditional cease-fire, when the Taliban demanded the release of their five high value commanders detained in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The list included Mullah Khairullah Khairwa, who had served as Minister of Interior and later Governor of western Herat province during the Taliban regime. The fact that the US government had had bitter experiences from 2007 when they released Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir from Guantanamo Bay in a bid to enhance peace talks,2 meant that US officials responded negatively to the demand, which induced the Taliban to suspend the dialogue.

The Paris conference, held in late 2012, allowed for resumption of the talks after a long pause. This conference, as well as other visits and publicized moves like the Brussels trilateral meeting in April 2013,3 paved the way for inaugurating the Taliban’s Political Office in Doha.

Taliban Office in Doha a “failed marriage”

The Taliban’s political office, also referred to as the Taliban Liaison Office, was officially inaugurated on 18 June 2013. Led by Sayed Tuyab Agha, the head of the Taliban mission in Qatar, some 15-20 Taliban leaders, hailing from various regions and

1 “Peace Talks With the Taliban”, The New York Times, 4 October 2012 accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/opinion/peace-talks-with-the-taliban.html?_r=0 2 “Former Gitmo detainee leads top Taliban council”, The Long War Journal, 23 March 2010 accessed at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/former_gitmo_detaine_2.php 3 “U.S. seeks to ease Afghan-Pakistan tensions in Brussels talks”, Reuters, 24 April 2013 accessed at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-afghanistan-talks-idUSBRE93N0MU20130424 3 various ethnic backgrounds, represented the group. Presence in Doha gave the Taliban a sense of legitimacy and also served as a reliable address where militant commanders could congregate.

The office was opened as a consequence of the Brussels meeting and President Karzai’s visits to Qatar in March and June 2013, respectively. US Secretary of State, John F. Kerry, who hosted the meeting, strived for peace talks and pressurized Pakistani officials in the Brussels meeting to cooperate with the Afghan Peace campaign. Key officials from Afghanistan and Pakistan including Afghan President, Hamid Karzai and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, attended this trilateral meeting where Secretary Kerry stated that ―we’re all going to go home and do our homework‖.4 For Pakistan, homework meant bringing a letter of assurance from the Taliban and agreeing to their opening an office in Qatar. Pakistan obtained a letter of assurance immediately from the Quetta Council – Taliban leadership council – which brought the ball in President Karzai’s court.

President Karzai also wanted the office to operate but with certain conditions. He secretly sent two of his special envoys, the Minister of Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs, Zulami Rasool, and Head of Joint Secretariat for HPC, Masoum Stanikzai, to Qatar to talk with Qatari officials regarding signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the office. After the envoys returned with a positive message, Karzai himself paid a second visit to Doha in June 2013 to sign the MoU with Qatari officials and made sure that the office would be directed to negotiate with the HPC.

The day after the Taliban office was inaugurated, President Karzai suspended the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) talks between US and Afghan officials. Public statements suggest that Karzai was upset that the Taliban had used a flag and a plaque — the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — that were not internationally recognized and were an affront to the Afghan government. He believed that this was an attempt by the Taliban to create a parallel institution to his government. After strong reaction from the Afghan side, Secretary Kerry assured President Karzai that the Taliban’s flag and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan logo would be removed from the office, and that they would only

4 “Kerry: Pakistan-Afghanistan meetings end „on a good track‟”, Washington Post, 24 April 2013 accessed at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-24/world/38775518_1_taliban-s-pakistani-taliban-afghanistan 4 call it ―The Political Office of the Afghan Taliban‖. Taliban envoys were reluctant to enter the building thereafter.

Where we stand?

Many competitors are attempting to prove their importance in the current fighting season and peace processes. Every side is also trying to gain more from negotiations. One of these ringmasters is Iran who has already widened its support to insurgent groups operating in South and West Afghanistan. Iran and international actors like itself fuel the insurgency so that their role is not neglected in the peace process while they seek their own interests in doing so.

Despite the fact that the Taliban are financially debilitated and their supporters are unable to contribute as before, they are very much struggling to have an impact on insecurity. Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs), the weapon of Taliban’s choice, and clashes with ANSF, have increased while other security incidents have declined. Below is a comparison chart which illustrates changes in security incidents from January-August 2012, to the corresponding period in 2013. This change could be also related to the split in the Taliban caused by the opening of the office in Qatar.

Security Incidents

Jan-Aug 2012 Jan-Aug 2013

302 367 245 332 57 24 40 70 23 28 50 30

The Qatar office is expected to be replaced by another office, either in Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Meanwhile, neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, continue to have a role in bringing peace to Afghanistan. The fact that Nawaz Sharif has influence over the

Taliban’s leadership council in Quetta and has predominant support from the army and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), he may succeed in changing policies for the positive. At the same time, Nawaz Sharif is keen to intensify his country’s relations with the world in particular with the Washington. Most importantly, Pakistan may have realized that violence in Afghanistan has made Pakistan more insecure.

President Karzai paid a two-day visit to Pakistan in late August this year and his meeting with Nawaz Sharif is likely proved useful, as a sequence to President Karzai’s visit, Pakistan so far set free eight Taliban detainees. Those detainees included the Taliban number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar who was set free on 21 September.5 It was hard for anyone to anticipate Mullah Baradar’s release. Mullah Baradar’s release clearly indicates a good change in Pakistan’s intentions towards Afghan peace settlement. Besides, it is also not clear whether the detainees are loyal to the Taliban and if the Taliban will listen to them after they are released. If Mullah Baradar is still respected in the Taliban he will certainly be able to play a crucial role in political settlement but first he needs to be transferred to a third country, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, so that HPC members can access him and resume stalled peace talks. Since Mullah Baradar was closest to Taliban Supreme Commander, Mullah Muhammad Omar, he may enable Afghan peace mediators to reach out to him. There is also the fear that Baradar’s family might be held hostage by Pakistani officials who choose to speak for him.

BSA and its link to the peace process

The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is a crucial agreement between the United States and Afghanistan. It is aimed to set conditions for US forces that will be staying in Afghanistan after 2014. President Karzai has already made it clear that his administration is not going to endorse the security pact unless the US government brings peace to Afghanistan and ends the Afghan War – something that requires serious efforts to make possible. The recent visit by Secretary of State, John Kerry, to Pakistan indicates that the

5 ―Update: Mullah Baradar Released From Pakistani Prison, HPC Welcomes Move‖, Tolonews, 21 September 2013 accessed at http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12003-update-mullah-baradar-released-from- pakistani-prison-hpc-welcomes-move 6

US wants to tackle the Afghan problem, facilitated by Pakistan, so that they can get President Karzai to sign the BSA.

How Taliban will react to the BSA is also a tough question. This can be one of the reasons why President Karzai has stalled the signing of the BSA. Again, president Karzai conditioned the signing of BSA upon peace in Afghanistan, which is feasible only through political settlement. It leads us to think that successful peace dialogue with the Taliban will get the President to sign the pact.

Peace Process: Post 2014

The Taliban are neither capable of nor demanding a role in governance in Afghanistan because they know that NATO and ISAF are not going to leave Afghanistan in 2014. The fighting is solely to make power sharing possible. President Karzai’s administration is also willing to reach consensus with the Taliban and give some seats to them but considerable questions remain unresolved: what if the government changes in 2014? Will the next administration agree to negotiate with the Taliban or will it prefer to close the negotiation gate? Few internal parties in Afghanistan are in favour of suspending peace talks with the Taliban, suggesting rather that Afghanistan be split geographically and politically.

Turkey is another important player in Afghan peace settlement issues. Pakistan Prime Minister Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Ankara on 16 September to meet his Turkish counterpart also occurred just days before Mullah Baradar was released. It is certain that Baradar’s issue was also discussed behind closed doors and there is a high likelihood that the new political office will be opened in Istanbul. At the same time, former Taliban leader, Mutasim Agha Jan, also stays in Turkey. Mutasim, who once headed the Taliban’s political commission, has been trying to convince the Taliban leadership council to settle the Afghan conflict through peace talks. However, Mutasim failed in his efforts thus far but once he and his team gain the support of Mullah Baradar, they will be strong enough to push the peace agenda independently.

Challenges

Civil Society Organizations or CSOs are also insisting that the changes that they have been able to bring thus far be secured. The younger generation are hoping for a change in Taliban’s ideology otherwise it will wash out 12 years worth of gains that CSOs have made in women rights, human rights, gender equality, campaigning for girls’ education, etc.

Distinguishing ―real‖ Taliban from others also remains a serious challenge. Any peace process should not bring militants affiliated with the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechens or other minorities fighting in Afghanistan to the negotiation table.

Security from both sides is critical. Many posing as Taliban envoys attacked high profile government officials while some former Taliban are constantly disturbed by ISAF and ANSF6 members, despite being officially recognized as reintegrated allies of the Afghan government.

Recommendations

It should come as no surprise to anyone that Pakistan is an important player in solving the Afghan conflict because majority of the militant leaders have been enjoying ISI’s shelter for more than a decade now. It is believed that the Taliban leadership is not autonomous enough to make their decisions. ―Responsible‖ strategic release of the prisoners is key for political settlement in Afghanistan. However, the previous mid-level strategic release of prisoners particularly by Pakistan has compromised security. In order to work this out, the release must occur in coordination with Afghan security institutions. Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar is also believed to be jailed or kept by Pakistani and it is anticipated that he will be soon facing the same destiny as Mullah Baradar.

The ceasefire must be considered as a first priority in political resolution of the Afghan conflict with the Taliban. Peace talks and fighting cannot get along with one another.

Defeating other insurgents should not be a serious issue. First the Taliban’s issues have to be resolved then the Taliban will be able to conquer other minor insurgent groups and home-grown violence easily. They have very good experience from the 1990s where they terminated civil war caused by seven armed mujahideen parties.

6 Afghanistan National Security Forces 8

In order to make peace possible in Afghanistan, HPC and their partners must reach out to people who really can induce changes in peace talks. Paying a specific amount of cash to the foot-soldiers or the mid-level insurgent commanders is not convincing. Changing someone’s mind and ideology by paying them 100 or 200 US Dollars for three months is not even rational. Can we expect the ANSF members to change sides if insurgents offer them the monthly salary that they get from the Afghan government?