INTERESTGROUPS AS POLICYINSTRUMENTS: The Role of ENGOs in the NAFTA Environmental Side Deal Negotiations

Michael S. Southem Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario. Septernber, 1997.

O Michael S. Southern 1997 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 ofCanada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibiiographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K1AON4 OttawaON K1A ON4 Canada Canada

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fiilm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in ths thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othewise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author' s ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This thesis examines the use of non-governmental organizations as instruments of government. It focuses on the policy-making processes in Canada and the United

States. An evolution of the Canadian and American policy-making processes is outlined. Three distinct stages in that evolution are identified. The first is that of non-govemrnental organizations (NGOs) acting as advocates of public policy. The second describes the institutionalization of NGOs in the policy-making process.

During the second stage. NGOs became important policy resources of govenunent for the provision of expertise and the delivery of services to the public. In the third stage of the evolution of the policy-making process, the daim is made that non- govemmental organizations are increasingly being recruited as instruments of governrnent for the promotion of po 1itical agendas.

In order to demonstrate the use of NGOs as instruments of governrnent, this thesis examines the negotiation and ratification of the environmental side deal of the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the relationship that existed among members of the environmental movement, and policy-makers in Washington and Ottawa. The number of people 1 would like to thank in this project are far too nurnerous to mention individually. There are a few, however, without whose help 1 could not have succeeded. First and foremost, to my advisor, Professor Donald Abelson. Despite my repeated efforts to try your patience, you have always ken there. Whenever 1 lost sight of the big picture or couldn't keep my mind focused on 'the hook' of this project, you led me back with your wisdorn and experience. Without your guidance and motivation early on, it is unlikely that 1 would have ever undertaken this project or this degree. You have been an inspiration, a mentor and a friend. To Say thank you simply isn't enough. To Professor Michael Lusztig, now at Southeni Methodist University in Dallas, Texas and Christine Carbeny. You have both always provided me with such sound advice and a willing ear io bend whenever I needed it. Your fnendship over the past two yearshasmeantsomuchtome. Iamlookingforwardtospendingtimewithyoufor years to corne. To Professors Martin Westmacott and Doug Long, thank you for the encouragement that you have given me over the last year. Your support and consideration during this process have been as indispensable to me as the lessons I have leamed fiom each of you on how to be an outstanding teacher. It is those skills upon which 1 will now rely so heavily. Most importantly, to my parents Robert and Charlotte Southem and my sister, Leslie. Thank you for the unfailing support that you have given me despite my shifting moods and need to be alone with my thoughts throughout this process. In the completion of this work, 1 hope that you will share in my pride, as 1 have shared in your love for so many years.

And last, but certainiy not least, to the myriad of friends who 1 have banished fiom my office while trying to finish this thesis.. . My door is once again open! Page

. . .. Certificate of Examination ...... -11... Abstract...... 111 Acknowledgrnents...... iv Table of Contents...... ,., v ...... List of Figures ...... vli... List of Acronyms ...... VIII

CHAPTER ONE .The Changing Nature of the Policy-Making Process ...... 1

The Case Study...... 2 Chapter Breakdown ...... -4

CHAPTER TWO .A Look Inside the Policy-Making Process in Canada and the United States...... 6

Interest Group Behavior and the Policy-Making Process ...... 7 The Canadian Policy-Making Process and the Policy Comrnunity Mode1...... 13 Issue Networks and the Arnerican Policy-Making Process ...... 19 The Expansion of Policy Cornrnunities and Issue Networks ...... 22 Advocacy Coalitions and the Coalescence of Non-Govemrnental Organizations ...... -26 The Emergence of Interest Groups as Instruments of Govemment ...... 30 Conclusion ...... -33

CHAPTER THREE .Case Study: the negotiation and ratification of the environmental side deal of the North American Free Trade Agreement ...... -36

Background ...... 37 The Readiness of the Environmental Movement...... 39 The Amencan Perspective...... 41 The Environmental Movement as Policy Advocate ...... 43 CHAPTER THREE .(cont.)

The Environmental Movement and the NAFTA Environmental S ide Deal ...... 49 Clinton. the Environmental Movement and the North Amencan Commission for the Environment WACE) ...... 55 The Environmental Movement and the Provision of Policy Expertise...... -56 NAFTA and Environmental NGOs as Legislative Tools...... 57 The Canadian Perspective ...... 62 ENGO Activity and NAFTA in Canada...... 63 Observations and Discussion ...... 1

CHAPTER FOUR .ConcIusions and Implications for Further Study ...... 77

Methodological Constraints...... 78 Implications of this Study ...... 80 Questions for Future Study...... 83

.. Bibliography...... 85 Vita 93 Descri~tion Page

2- l(a) Pressure Groups as Policy Advocates ...... 1 1

2- 1(b) Pressure Groups as Policy Resources ...... 1 3

Pressure Groups as Instruments of Govemment...... 3 1 CCP Court Challenges Prograrn CEC Commission for Environmental Cooperation CELA Canadian Environmental Law Association CIEL Center for International Environrnental Law CUFTA Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement EDF Environrnental Defense Fund ENGO Environmental Non-govemmental Organization FOE Friends of the Earth FTA Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1JC International Joint Commission ITAC International Trade Advisory Cornmittee NAAEC North Amencan Agreement on Environmental Cooperation NACE North American Commission on the Environrnent NACEC North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NGO Non-govemmental Organization NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council NRTEE National Round Table on the Environrnent and the Economy NWF National Wildli fe Federation SAGIT Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade USTR United States Trade Representative WWF World Wildlife Fund WWW World Wide Web

... Vlll CHAPTER NE

The Chanahg Nature of the Pol& Making Procas

The purpose of this thesis is to examine and explore the extent to which

interest groups serve as policy instruments of govenunent. Although several scholars of interest group behaviour have consistently claimed that interest groups are constantly engaged in an adversarial relationship with government, in recent yem, it appears that policy makers and leaders of interest groups have developed a more cordial relationship. Indeed, as this thesis will demonstrate, while many interest groups continue to employ a number of lobbying strategies to convince policy makers to pursue poficies compatible with their institutional goals and objectives, in some policy areas, govemrnent leaders have relied on and in fact actively recruited non- governrnental organizations (NGOs) to advance their political agenda. The implications of building coalitions around specific interest groups are only beginning to corne to light.

The efforts of policy makers to enlist the support of interest groups to promote their particular mandate in a particular policy area has not been well documented. In fact, with the exception of a smattering of academic and newspaper articles commenting on how the federal governrnent interacted with a handful of interest groups during various rounds of constitutional negotiations, little research has been conducted on this topic. This thesis is intended to help fil1 that void. The Case Studv

In order to demonstrate the use of NGOs as policy instruments this thesis will incorporate a smdy focusing on the negotiation and implementation of the environrnental side deal of the North Arnerican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

This case has been chosen for a number of reasons. First, the environrnental movement demonstrates a well-established network in the domestic politics of both

Canada and the United States. There have been significant links between Canada and the U.S. in regard to the environmental movement since the creation of the

International Joint Commission in 1909 as a result of the

Boundarv Waters Act of 1909. Second, the negotiation of the environmental side deal will help to demonstrate that there is significant interaction between similar environmental groups on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border. This will be particularly usehl in demonstrating the types of advocacy coalitions that cm be established in a policy cornrnunity that spans national borders. Third, because of the longevity of the environrnental movement, and the number of well established groups within it, strong ties have been established between different environrnental NGOs

(ENGOs) and government policy-makers in both Canada and the United States.

These ties will be helpful in demonstrating that as the relationship between government and NGOs has evolved, govemrnent has been able to use that relationship in order to gain access to environrnental networks in an effort to advance their own political agendas. Fourth, this case study can be used to demonstrate each of the different stages in the evolution of the policy-making process that will be identified in this thesis. Furthemore, the involvement of NGOs in the NAFTA negotiations

represents a significant change fiom previous roles that were given to them when

compared to similar negotiations for other agreements such as the Canada-U.S. Free

Trade Agreement (CUFTA) during which the environmental movement was almost

completely excluded from negotiations. Fifth, the case study will also prove useful in

demonstratïng two more characteristics of the policy-making process: first, that one

stage in that evolution does not exist to the exclusion of the others, and second, that

NGOs cm serve many functions within the policy-making process ranging from

policy advocates, policy resources and most interestingly policy instruments. Finally,

since the North Amencan Free Trade Agrement is a multilateral agreement, it allows

for the study of more than one experience within a single case. While the negotiation

of the environmental side deal in Canada and the United States demonstrates

considerable sirnilarities on both sides of the border, there are also some important distinctions that can be seen, particularly in the ways in which govement has attempted to use NGOs as policy instruments.

Given these criteria, a case study of the environmental side deal of NAFTA will be particularly effective in addressing the two primary questions of this thesis:

How has the relationship between government and non-govemmental organizations changed, and secondly as a result of that evolution, to what extent are non- governrnental organizations being used by govemments as instruments of public policy in an attempt to advance their own political agendas? Cha~terBreakdowu

This thesis will consist of three additional chaptee. The second chapter

examines the literature on the policy-making process in Canada and the United States.

This is necessary in order to outline the evolution of the policy-making process as it

has been described in the introduction of this thesis. In addition to examining the evolution of the policy-making process, the second chapter will introduce a number of

concepts such as the policy comrnunity model as described by A. Paul ~ross'and that of advocacy coalitions as discussed by Paul A. ~abatie?. These concepts will be used as the theoretical frarnework that will lay the foundation for the case study in the third chapter.

The third chapter, building on the policy cornmunity model, will be an extensive exarnination of the negotiation and ratification of the environmental side deal of NAFTA in both Canada and the United States. This case study will draw heavily on primary sources. The negotiation of the NAFTA side deal on the environrnent will show clearly that govemments are increasingly using NGOs as instruments of public policy. Furthemore, not only do govements use NGOS to promote policies as concepts, but in the case of the United States, it will be shown that the Clinton administration used a number of NGOs such as the National Wildlife

1 While the idea of a 'policy cornmunity' will be dealt with extensively in the second chapter of this work for a detailed exarnination of that theoty, see A. Paul Pmss, Grouo P olitics and Public Policv IZ*' edition), (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1992). ' See Paul A. Sabatier, b'Knowledge,Policy Oriented Learn hg, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework," Knowledae: Creation. Difiion. UtiZ~a~iom,v8, no. 4 (June 1987), pp649-692; See also, Paul A. Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition Framework of policy change and the role af policy oriented leaming therein," Policy Sciences, Volume 2 1.2 1 nos. 2-3, 1988. pp 139- 168. Federation as a legislative tool in their efforts to get NAFTA passed through

Congress.

Chapter Four will conclude with a sumrnary of the investigations included in this thesis. A discussion of the implications of this work on areas of curent and future study will be included in this chapter. An acknowledgrnent of the methodological constraints of this thesis will also be included as an integral part of this concluding chapter. FinaIIy, as a result of the suggestion that governrnent policy- rnakers are recruiting NGOs to be used as policy instruments, a number of new questions arise fi-om this examination. A number of those questions dong with suggestions of how they may be addressed will also be posed at that time. A Look Inside the Evolution of the Policv-Makinp Process in Canada and the United States

nie policy-making process in Canada and the United States has been evolving significantly in recent years. In the not-too-distant past, policy decisions were taken largely by the governrnent executive often having consulted with only the bweaucracy and a few of the most prominent interest groups. Ln recent years, however, that appears to have been changing and the decision-making process now involves a greatly increased number of participants including such organizations as lobbyists, think tanks, other non-govemmental organizations and govenunent consultants as well as trade unions, professional organizations and sub-national governrnents. The relationship that these various organizations share with government is very important to understanding how and why policy-makers tap into the networks of non- governmental organizations in an effort to prornote their own political agenda both within and across national borders.

Considerable academic study has been devoted to understanding the policy- making process in Canada. The work of A. Paul Pross, Michael M. Atkinson,

William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad is notable in this field. Similady, in the

United States Jeffrey Berry, David B. Truman and Hugh Heclo, arnong others, have attempted to explore the policy-rnaking process of the United States. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it will explore the relationship between govemment and non-govemental organizations and examine how NGOs interact with governrnent decision-makers. In particular, the changes in the relationship between government and non-govemmental actors will be exarnined. Second, the increase in

the number of participants in the policy-making process and the expansion of policy communities and the idea of advocacy coalitions will be explored. It is important to understand how different coalitions are formed and the ways in which various groups are encouraged to coalesce around certain policy issues. Furthemore, it is important to consider the Frequency with which different WOs attempt to participate in the policy-making process. Finally, this chapter will begin the exploration of the ways in which NGOs are now being used by govemrnent as policy instruments to promote their own political agendas. Much of the academic research that has been conducted in the area of public policy formulation has investigated the way in which interest groups attempt to pressure government. This chapter will demonstrate the nec es si^ of examining in more detail the ways in which governrnents are trying to tap into the various NGO networks to advance their own agendas.

Interest Grour, Behavior and the Policv-Makine Process

A significant amount of academic study has been devoted to exarnining how outside interests pressure government. The first section of this chapter will review the idea of policy cornmunities in Canada and the United States and lay a foundation fkom which to explore the way in which non-governmental interests put pressure on governrnent and have become institutionalized parts of the policy-making process. Pressure groups have been an integral part of Canadian and Amencan politics

throughout the histories of both of these countries.' They have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years and several explorations of their role in both

Canadian and Amencan politics have been undertaken. In his book, Group Politics and Public ~olic$. Paul Pross identifies nurnerous exarnples of pressure groups participating in the policy-making process in early Canadian politics.3 Much of the early work on the relationship between govemrnent and non-governmental actors attempts to demonstrate how these groups tried to influence govemment decision- makers in an attempt to change policy outcornes. The early role of non-govemmental interests was clearly that of an advocate of public policy. They sought the promotion of one particular position over others in the hope of influencing decision-makea to adopt their position over that of other interested parties.

Jererny Richardson undertakes an in depth exploration of the role of pressure groups in the Canadian policy-making process. He offers the definition of a pressure group as, ". ..any group which articulates demands that the political authorities in the political system or subsystem should make an authoritative allocation."" Richardson limits his definition of pressure groups by excluding any group which is itself seeking

I For further information, see A Paul Pross, Groq Politics and Public Polin, /Y.' Edition), (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), chapters 2-4; Jeremy J. Richardson, Pressure Croups (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993); David B. Truman, The Governmenfal Process: Political Interests and Public Ooinion 2"d edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1971) provides a very useful look at the historical role of interest and pressure groups in the United States. A. Paul Pmss. Grour, Politics andpublic Policv (2nd ed).(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). 3 Pross, chapter 2. ln particular, see table 2-1 (pp22-23) for his description of the evolution of pressure groups and their in the Canadian political system. 4 Richardson, pl . control of political office.' This is an important restriction because many

organizations - particularly political parties - while they are often actively seeking

to influence government policy. are also seeking the political control of the

governrnent. For this reason. Richardson excludes them from his definition of a

pressure group.

Sirnilarly, in the United States, the role of pressure groups was to apply

pressure to government in an attempt to affect public policy. Jeffrey Berry, in his

book The Interest Group society6, suggests that the emergence of interest groups is

rooted in the fundamental idea of fieedom of expression in the United States.

Govemments, he suggests, must allow the people to pursue their own self-interest or else government cm be said to have "(taken) away their political freedom."'

According to Berry, the original role of interest groups was to represent their constituents' interests before government. David B. Truman in his work, The

Governmental ~rocess'also presents a comprehensive view of the historical role of interest groups in the American policy-making process. In the first part of The

Governmental Process. Truman explores the historic nature of interest groups in the

American political system. Both he and Berry refer to James Madison's Federalist papers9 in their exploration of the nature of these groups. In particular, they refer to

5 Richardson, p 1. 6 Jefiey M. Beny, The Interest Grouri Societv. (Tu& University: Harper Collins Publisher, 1989). 7 Berry, p 1. 8 David B. Truman, The Governmental Proceçs: Political lnreresrs and Public Opinion /Y.' ed). (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197 1 ). 9 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalisr: A Cornrnentarv on the Constitution of the UnitedSmes with an introduction by Edward Mead Ede. (New York: the Modem Library (Random House), 193 7). Federalist IO which examines the right of different interests - or factions as Madison

referred to them in 1788 - to participate in society and represent their views before

government. Even at that early tirne, Madison recognized that factions would be an

integral part of the public process when he stated, "[the] latent causes of faction are

thus sown in the nature of man."1° Madison's goal was therefore to seek a method of

"curing the mischiefs of faction."" This suggests that he recognized the potentially

pernicious effect of factions within society. However, since the source of faction -

liberty - must not be removed, and is according to his defense of liberty, "essential to political life."12 Madison was left with the task of seeking to control the effects of

faction. To do away with liberty, he notes, would provide a remedy that is itself

"orse than the disease." ' In the more modem-day sense, interest groups have become an integral part of the political system not because of their constitutional guarantees of liberty, but rather because they have a vital role representing differing views to government who then have the responsibility of devising public policy.

Figure 2-l(a) illustrates how different non-governrnental organizations have historically tried to pressure governments and act as policy advocates in an attempt to affect the outcome of public policy decisions.

10 Madison, The Federalist. No. 10, p55. II Ibid, pp54-55. " Ibid, p55. l3 ibid, p55. mre2-Ua): Pressure Grouos as Policv Advocates

1 Think Tanks 1

Departments & d-b Policy Agencies Outcornes

Parties

As govemments such as that in Canada grew larger in the mid-1900s, the nurnber of interest groups attempting to gain a place in the decision-rnaking process also grew extensively. Pross suggests that governrnent decision-making processes becarne ovenvhelmed as government grew larger and this led to interest groups becoming more involved in the policy-making process in those areas in which they held particular expertise.'" This led to the eventual institutionalization of many significant interest groups'5 which then becarne partners with govemment in the creation and delivery of public policy. Hugh Thorburn, a noted specialist on interest

14 Pross, p68. 1s Many studies have been completed on the growth of the nurnber of interest groups in the Canadian political scene. Pross cites nurnbers suggesting that the nurnber of "nationally relevant associations" in Canada rose From 70 in 1900 to as more than 700 by 1980. He also suggests that the most significant growth in the number of associations oçcurred in the inter-war period , and between 1960 and 1975. See Pross, p65. group behavior. suggests that as the reiationship between govenunent and non-

govemmental actors progressed, it became "hardened into a more bureaucratic

relationship."16 As govemment departrnents grew in size and scope, *'interest groups

in the areas of activity that were closest in relation to these govemmental initiatives

were called into being."" Thorburn suggests that in fact, interest groups paralleled

government and were able to apply significant pressure towards various policy issues

in the way of **advice,supplemented by at times considerable pressure."'8

Figure 2- 1(b) illustrates how the level of interaction between government and

non-governmental interests increased and how non-governrnental interests gained

increased input into the policy-making process. Similarly, govements were able to

consult with various organizations in an effort to gain input on policy issues and matters of service delivery.

16 Hugh G. Thorburn, "Interest Groups and Policy Making in Canada," in Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Partv Polifics in Canada (6" edifionl,(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 199 l), p2O. 17 Ibid, p20. " Ibid. p22. Figure 2-l(b): Pressure Grour>sas Policv ~esources'~

1 Think Tanks 1

] Interest ~rou~sl

Sub-national Government Governments 1I Departments & Policy Agencies ( Outcornes 1

Govemmentai Organizations

1 Political Parties 1

Other Interested I parties I

The Canadian Policy-Makine Process and The Policy Cornmunitv Mode1

As noted earlier, the policy-making process traditionally included only a few key participants such as members of the government, related bureaucrats and a few closely related interests such as business organizations or key interest groups. More recently, however, that process has been expanded to include other important

19 For an in depth discussion of the role of NGOs as policy resources of govemment which helps to explore the two-way interaction between government and NGOs, see among others the works of Hugh Thorburn, "Interest Groups and Policy Making in Canada"; R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," PS: Political Science & Polirics, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1989) pp.563-578; Donald E. Abelson, "From Policy Research to Political Advocacy: The Changing Role of Think Tanks In American Politics," &J Canadian Review ofAmerican Studies. vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter 1995). pp.93- 126; Abelson, American Think Tanks and Their Role in US. Foreign Policy. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996); Jeffiey M. Berry, The hterest Grour, Society. (Tu& University: Harper Collins Publisher, 1989); James G. McGann "Academics to Ideologues: A Bnef History of the Public Policy Research Institute," PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 25, no. 4 (December 1992), pp. 733-740; Susan Phitlips, "Fuzq Boundaries: Rethinking Relationships Between Governments and NGOs," Policy Options, April 1994. pp. 1 3- 1 7; James Rosenthal, "Heritage Hype: the Second Generation Think Tank," The New Reoublic. September 2, 1985; and Howard J. Wiarda, Foreign Policy Without Illusion, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990). cornrnunity members such as numerous interest groups, lobbyists. NGOs and other members of the policy-making cornrnunity involved either in the provision of advice or in the delivery of services to the public. In Canada, some of the most comprehensive examinations of the policy-making process have, as mentioned earlier, been undertaken by A. Paul Pross. Throughout his work, Pross explores the changing relationship between govemment and the various participants in the decision-making process. He explores how the decision-making body has expanded far beyond that of government oficials and bureaucrats. It is this newly expanded policy-making process that has attracted much scholarly attention in both Canada and the United

States.

Pross's work focuses on an exploration of how pressure groups are involved with various government partners and other non-governrnental participants in the policy-making process. He explores the nature of the relationship that exists between governent decision-makers and various non-govemmental actors and how that relationship has evolved.

In trying to identiQ and define key parts of the decision-making process, Pross suggests that societies have given up authonty to make policy-decisions to specialized groups with a particular expertise in certain policy areas2' He refers to these

"specialised publics''21 or decision-making bodies, as polis, cornmunifies. A policy cornmunity 9s that part of a political systern that has acquired a dominant voice in

'O Pross, p 1 18. " Ibid, pl 18. determinhg governrnent decisions in a field of public acti~ity."~Along with the notion of policy communities, Pross discusses the idea of what has been referred to by him and others as a poliq network." A policy network describes We relationship among the particular set of actors that form around an issue of importance to the policy corn~nunity.''~~

William Coleman and Grace Skogstad also explore the characteristics of policy networks. In their definition of a policy network, they contrast a highly integrated network with ones that are more loosely organized and suggest that a highly integrated policy network is:

... characterized by stable relationships among members of the network, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, hi& interdependence and shared responsibility for policy implementation, and insulation fiom other net~orks.~~

The distinction that can be drawn between a policy cornrnunity and a policy network is an important one. A policy cornrnunity exists because a policy issue exists.16 It encompasses al1 those who are involved in or aflected by a particular policy issue. A policy network, on the other hand, describes the types of interaction that take place among different memben within a policy community. For instance, a policy network is likely to include parties who share a particular point of view on a

33 " Pross, p 1 19. 23 Ibid, pl 19; See also William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "Policy Cornmunites and Policy Neiworks: A Stnicîural Approach," in Policv Communities and Public Policv In Canada: a Structural Aqriroach, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1990)- pp25-27; and Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, "Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance," Governance: An International Journal of Policv and Administration, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1992, pp 154- 180. '' Pross, p 1 19. Coleman and Skogstad *'Policy Communities and Policy Networki...", p26. 26 Ross, p 1 19. policy issue." As an exarnple, Pross uses the case of the policy cornrnunity that

encompasses international trade. He suggests that this particular cornmunity may

contain within it one policy network consisting of members who support the idea of

free trade. and an entirely different network consisting of economic nationalist~.~'

While each of these networks is both afTected by and may attempt to influence policy

issues dealing with international trade, they would view the sarne issue from very different perspectives.

In developing the notion of a policy comrnunity, Pross moves his description a step beyond by further sub-dividing a policy community into two smaller groups: the sub-government and the attentive 29 The sub-govemment, he points out, is %e policy-making body of each corn~nunit~."~~11 is comprised of government agencies and institutionalised interest groups.3' The sub-govemment is responsible for such activities as most routine policy decisions, the daily communication between agency officials and representatives of companies or groups, work on advisory cornmittees, and input on government policy.32 When exarnining this definition, it is evident that during the first stage in the evolution of the relationship between government and non-governrnental actors - that which descnbes non-govemmental interests purely as advocates of public policy - the preponderance of activity would have taken place pnmarily at the level of what has corne to be known as the sub-governrnent. In the

27 P~OSS,p 1 1 9. '' Ibid, p 1 1 9. L9 Ibid, pp 120- 127. 'O Ibid, p 1 20. " Ibid, p120. 32 Ibid, p 12 1. second stage of the development of the relationship, now under investigation, Pross

introduces a new level to the policy-making process - that of the attentive public.

He defines the attentive public as:

.. . neither tightly knit nor clearly defined. It includes any government agencies, private institutions, pressure groups, specific interests and individuafs - including academics, consultants and journalists - who are affected by or interested in, the policies of specific agencies and who follow and attempt to influence, those policies, but do not participate in policy-making on a regular ba~is.~~

The attentive public, while much more diversified, also has a very important part to

play within a policy cornmunity. Its members may not always be involved in the most

intricate operations of a policy cornmunity; however, its role remains vital. They are available for the provision of expertise that may not be readily available to decision- makers in government or the sub-govement. Members of the attentive public, while not always directly involved in the decision-making process, are often keenly aware of the issues at hand. They are eager to participate in the formulation of new policy and make known the views of those members of society who they represent.

When considering what is the most effective role of the attentive public in the policy-making process, Pross suggests that they are most influential when trying to affect long-range policy issues.34 Since they are not intimately involved in the daily operation and activity of a policy community, the voice of members of the attentive public is ofien best heard in the policy review process.35 The attentive public often is excluded from the decision-making process and Pross suggests they are even then

" Pross, p I 2 I . " Ibid, p 1 26. heard only '~ke~ticall~"~~or sometimes even "patronizingly.'"7 This often limits their contribution to the gradua1 process through which "policies and programs are amended, extended and generally adapted to the changing needs of the ~ornrnunit~."~~

In their edited collection, Policy Communities and Public polid9, William

Coleman and Grace Skogstad build on Pross's exploration of interaction bebveen government and non-governmental participants in the policy-making process. They write, "that if Canada is an adversarial polity, conventional pressure group politics becomes the normal mode of state-society re~ations."~~Coleman and Skogstad reject the notion that public policy is formed exclusively as a result of either state actors formulating policy independently or as a result of the pressures of social forces or interest groups. Rather, it is necessary to examine closely the interaction between state and societal actors." Policy outcornes will be the result of extensive interaction between both govemment and non-govemmental interests.

Another issue that is critically important for this study is the fact that policy cornrnunities need not be restricted by national boundaries. As Pross indicates, the attentive public can include interested parties 6.om other countries as well as various international organizations who may have no defined national afiliation at alLJ2 This aspect of a policy cornmunity is important in that it helps to reveal how policy

35 Pross, p 126. 36 Ibid, pl2 1. "Ibid, P121. '' Ibid, pl2l. 39 William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policv Communiries and Public Policv In Canada: A Sfructural Approach, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1990). JO Coleman and Skogstad, "Policy Communities and Policy Networks...," p 19. 41 Coleman and Skogstad, Policv Communiries and Public Policv In Canada, pp 3 13-3 14. 42 Pross, p 1 24. communities may stretch across national borders and thus provide a much wider audience for govemrnents wishing to access not oniy policy inputs, but also the ability to put pressure on other rnembers of a policy community - in particular, members of

various policy cornmunities that may cross national Doundaries.

Issue Networks and the American Policy-Makine Process

Similar to what has occurred in Canada, the policy-making process in the

United States is no longer restricted simpiy to government agencies. One of the

leading scholars exploring the policy-making process in the United States is Hugh

Heclo. Hecto was the first to use the term issue network in his exploration of the

American policy-making process. Using Heclo's definition of an issue network as "a shared knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or, as defined by the network, some problem) of public policy,'43 it can be noted that issue networks are not entirely dissirnilar to what Paul Pross described as a policy cornmunity. Heclo, however, identifies a key distinction between the Canadian and American system in that the Amencan system does not have a "high level, government-wide civil ser~ice."~The avoidance of "bureaucratie giantism,'A5 as he refers to it. is largely the result of the fact that the American federal govenunent has avoided mass delivery of government programs directty to the general population. Rather than create an administration to deliver programs directly to members of the public, Heclo suggests

53 Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King (ed.) The New American Political Svsfem, (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p103. JJ Ibid, p88. that these prograrns are delivered through a series of "intennediary ~r~anizations'~~

- including %tate-level governrnents. city halls, third party payers. consultants [and] con tract or^'^' - who then administer the funds provided by the federal govemment.

In his exploration of the idea of issue networks, Heclo goes further to suggest that the most common analysis of the American system indicated that "control [was] said to be vested in an informal but enduring senes of 'iron triangles' linking executive bureaus, congressionai cornmittees and interest group clienteles with a stake in particular programs.'d8 He writes that this analysis is "disastrously in~orn~lete?~

While "looking for the closed triangles of control. we tend to miss the fairly open networks of people that increasingly impinge on govemment."50 This idea emphasizes the point that the number of participants in the decision-making process has grown significantly beyond the simple 'triangles' that have been considered previousiy. It is no longer sufficient to consider the closed triangles between the most closely interested parties. It is necessary to look beyond to the larger pool of participants now trying to influence the decision-making process and consider how al1 of these groups act and interact in that process.

Heclo's research moves the study of public policy decision-making in the U.S. beyond that of the 'iron triangle'. In his exploration of issue networks, Heclo suggests that they "comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of

45 Heclo, p92. lbid, p92. 47 lbid, p92. Ibid, p88. I9lbid, p88. H) lbid, p88. mutual conunitment or of dependence on others in their environment."*' Heclo provides a very interesting view of the influence that issue networks are seeking. He appears to suggest that their influence does not corne fkom gaining responsibility over certain policy areas; rather, with an understanding of how the choices of govemment are made, non-governmental interests cm then influence those decisions and affect the policy outcomes of the decision-making pro ces^.^* This is important because it moves the power of influence beyond the iron triangles and extends that ability to any organization or interested party that is able to gain an understanding of the decision- making process and use that understanding to its advantage.

The emergence of issue networks has also had an affect on the behavior and nature of policy-makers themselves. Particularly in the U.S., because of the relaxed practice of party discipline, politicians have become much more closely related to different policy issues rather than parties - what Heclo refers to as a "policy politician" rather than a -'party po~itician".~~This has had a drarnatic effect on the way in which policy decisions are made and to whom the decision-rnakers appear to be responsible. As policy-makers become more attached to particular issues, it seems inevitable that they will become increasingly detached from the electorate who have chosen them to manage the affairs of public policy. Furthemore, in recent years, the utility of political parties in the United States as policy resources has declined tremendously and they have corne to be relied on almost solely for the provision of the

" Heclo, p 102. " Ibid, p 1 03. " Ibid, p 106. rnachinery of elections. This fact, combined with the notion that as the relationship

between politicians and various groups representing an issue has grown stronger,

leads to the conclusion that more power and influence has been placed in the hands of

diflerent non-governmental interests. This relationship has become increasingly solid

as the various groups have become institutionalized partners in the policy-making

process in the U.S..

The Expansion of Policv Communities and Issue Networks

In addition to the way in which groups involved in the policy-making process interact, the actual number of groups involved in the process has dso increased drarnatically. This can be seen in both Canada and the United States. Both

Pau1 Pross and Evert Lindquist have identified a drarnatic "increase in the amount of expertise Iocated outside govemments in anad da."'^ Pross notes simiIar characteristics when he States that:

Without the policy comrnunity's special capabilities for studying alternative courses of action, for debating their merits and for securing administrative arrangements for implementation, govemments would have great difficulty disceming and choosing between policy options?

This demonstrates the essential nature of interaction amongst the govemment and non-govemmental participants in a policy community in the modern decision-making process. It allows access to expertise located outside govenunent and the civil service

Even A. Lindquist, *'Public Managers and Policy Comrnunities: Learning to Meet New Chai lenges." Canadion Public Administration, Volume 35, No. 2 (Suer), p 13 1. that the principle decision-makers may not have previously had available to them.

Along with that, it allows non-govemmental interest groups entry to the decisiorl- making process, a process to which they may not have previously had significant access. Heclo suggests that while the number of public oficials at the national level has remained somewhat constant in the US.. the number of people who are attempting to lobby those national policy leaders has increased drarnatical~~.'~

Other scholars such as Jefiey Berry have focused very closely on specific actors in the policy-making process particularly in the United States. In me Interest

Group Society, Berry focuses on the specific role played by numerous types of specific non-govemmental actors such as interest groups, political action cornmittees

(PACs), lobbyists and think tanks that exist within the American political system. He examines the types of relationships that exist amongst these different non- govemmental organizations and their decision-making counterparts in government.

Beny focuses his research on how the relationship between government and non- govemmental groups has been changing in recent years and what the new roles are that are being taken on by each of these different types of organizations within the political system.

As a result of the increase in the size and scope of the policy-making process,

Heclo is able to identiQ several advantages and disadvantages to the increased participation of NGOs in the policy-making process. First, the expanded notion of issue networks is consistent with changes in society towards an increased involvement in public policy. Heclo suggests that "voters are apparently less constrained by party identification and more attracted to an issue-based style of politi~s."57 This has the effect of causing govemment decision-maken to look to the public to see what issues they feel are important to them. Consequently, government policy-makers draw to a much greater degree on specific policy experts in certain issue areas in order to gain the benefit of their experience and knowledge.

Second, in a system which focuses on issues of public policy rather than political parties, issue networks increasingly provide a link between Congress and the executive branch in a way that political parties ca~ot.~~Traditionally, political parties acted as the liaison between these two branches of governrnent. In recent times, however, as Heclo has previously suggested, the general public is identiwing itself less with a particular party and more with different policy issues. As a consequence, non-governmental policy experts will begin to assume the role of the link between the branches of government that had previously been provided by the political parties.

Finally, Heclo explores the advantage that is provided as a result of the maneuverability of public managers within issue networks. As issue networks become increasingly profuse, it allows policy managers to draw Born many different parts of the network to gain support. The increase in the nurnber of actors seeking influence in the decision making process allows government decision-makers the

56 Heclo, p95. 57 Ibid, pl 16. 58 Ibid, p 1 16. luxuiy of being able "70 split and recombine the many sources of support and opposition that exist on policy i~sues.''~~This hints at the government's wiilingness to choose between one group and another and be increasingly selective in the information that it will consider in the development of new policies.

In addition to the advantages that exist as a result of increased participation in the decision-making process, Heclo also acknowledges several disadvantages that have resulted from that sarne increased participation. While the advantages to policy- makers of increased participation in the decision-making process rnight be considered to outweigh the disadvantages that may occur as a result of the expansion of issue networks, those disadvantages must not go unnoticed.

The most significant disadvantage that Heclo discusses is the idea of legitimate participation. He questions whether or not non-govenunental organizations have the legitimate right to participate in a democratic process given the fact that they are in no way democratically elected to the decision-making body. His main criticism appears to be that the more a 'political administrator' becomes involved with very specialized interests, the more disconnected he or she will become fiom the general population."

His second criticism of issue network involvement cornes from the fact that political cornpetition fin& its roots in the simplification of issues into a few broad choices.

The presence of extensive issue networks in the system promotes a situation in which policy-decisions can become far more complex than they need to be. Rather than promoting consensus building arnongst decision-makers, issue networks have a tendency to promote dissension amongst members of the decision-making body.61

Finally, Heclo presents one of the most damning perspectives of the system of issue networks in that they do not promote closure of a policy issue. He writes that "part of the genius of dernocratic politics is its ability to find a non-violent decision-nile (by voting) for ending debate in favor of a~tion."~'Issue networks as they exists now, work in the exact opposite manner preventing the closure of varying policy decisions.

As long as the nurnber of groups participating in the system is increasing, the arnount of input that can be brought to bear on the decision-making process is vimüilly limitless.

Advocacv Coalitions and the Coalescence of Non-Governmental Oreanizations

Having introduced the idea that several different types of groups exist in the policy-making process, and that these groups have entered into a relationship with government and policy-makers, it is useful at this point to review how the relationship between these groups has evolved. The first part of this chapter describes how the relationship began as one in which non-governmental interests initially played the role of policy advocate. As the relationship progressed, many non-govemmental interests became more institutionalized in the policy-making process. Such organizations became usehl resources of public policy, capable of providing either expertise to government or services to the public that had not previously been readily available.

60 iieclo, p 1 18. 6' Ibid, p 119. 62 Ibid, p 120. In what cm be identified as the next stage in the evolution of the relationship between govemment and non-governmental organizations, the rnanner by which non- govemmental participants are increasingly being used as instruments of government will be explored. That is to Say, govemment decision-makers are attempting to use non-governmental participants in the policy-making process in a way that promotes their own political agenda.

In order to betîer understand the notion of non-govemmental organizations as policy instruments, it is necessary to look at the way in which the policy decision- making process continues to evolve. One concept that is integral to understanding the way in which decisions are made is aided by fürther developing the idea of advocacy coalitions. Paul A. Sabatier provides one of the most comprehensive examinations of advocacy coalitions and their particuiar role in the development of public poli~y.63

Throughout his work, Sabatier explores the idea of advocacy coalitions and how such coalitions are formed and interact during the process of policy formulation.

He suggests that actors within a policy-making community cm be "aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert."" Advocacy coalitions may consist of individuals corning fiom a nurnber of different areas of a

63 See Paul A. Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Frameworù," Knowfedne: Creation, Difiion. Utifizations, v8, no. 4 (June 1987), pp649-692; See also, Paul A. Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition fiamework of policy change and the role of policy oriented leaming therein," Poficv Sciences, Volume 2 1, nos. 2-3, 1988. ppI29-168; For a further discussion of Sabatier's advocacy coalition fi-amework see Evert A. Lindquist, "Behind the Myth of Think- Tanks: The Organization and Relevance of Canadian Policy Institutes," Doctoral dissertation, (Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkley 1989), pp103-110. 64 Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition framework.. .," p 133. policy comrnunity including "elected and agency officiais, interest group leaders [and] researchers who share a particular belief ~~stern.?'~~Sabatier also suggests as part of his definition that members will also "show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time."66 He goes further to argue that %e nurnber of significant advocacy coalitions will be quite srna11."~~Sabatier suggests that it is likely that in most policy areas there will be two to four significant advocacy coalitiond8

As part of his exploration of advocacy coalitions, Sabatier introduces two new actors into the decision-making process: one which he refers to as a policy broker6' and the other as a decision sovereign. Policy brokers, according to Sabatier serve as mediators in the policy-making process trying to reconcile diffenng strategies arnongst advocacy coalition^.^^ AAer the input of the different advocacy coalitions, decisions are then taken by the sovereigns. The outcome of those decisions then leads to govemmental programs.7'

Sabatier provides a very usefül figure illustrating how he suggests the creation of public policy may occ~ir.~~Part of that figure - the section describing a 'policy subsytem'- provides a usehl mode1 of how he sees advocacy coalitions contributing to the development of new governrnent policies. However, Evert Lindquist points out

'' Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition framework.. .," p 139. Ibid, p 139. " Ibid, p 140. 6a Ibid, p 140. 69 Ibid, p133. 70 Ibidl p133. " For a view of this activi[y. see Figure 1 in Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition framework ...," pl 32; Sabatier aIso includes this figure and a detaited explanation in "Knowledge, Policy Onented Learning and Policy Change.. .," pp652-653. 72 See Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy Oriented Learning, and Policy Change ...," p653; and Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition framework.. .," p 132. that this figure tends to give a false impression that decisions are taken solely by the

sovereigns who, aside fiom the pressure that the various coalitions bnng to bear,

formulate their decisions completely independently of the advocacy coalition^.'^

Lindquist suggests that this is not entirely tme. He states that "Sabatier mentions

dominant coalitions can be composed of both elected and appointed govemment

oficials. Decision sovereigns, then, may well be more than mere arbitrators, they cm

be active members of an advocacy coalition."74 Lindquist argues that since govemment members may be a part of one coalition and not another, they %il1 be

more cornfortable reaching out to members of the coalition network for suppon and

information than other parts of the govemment."75 It is not inconceivable then that if government participants are going to be a part of an advocacy coalition, they may then take an active role in trying to lead that coalition which then may seek to influence public policy. Furthemore, even if they do not take a leadership role in the particular coalition to which they belong, it is certainly possible that they will find support from other non-governmental members of the coalition and be able to encourage those groups to promote what might be considered the government agenda.

73 Lindquist, "Behind the Myth of Think-Tanks.. .," p 107. 74 Ibid, p 107. 75 Ibid, pI08. The Emereeuce of Interest Groups as Instruments of Government

Another important aspect of the concept of issue networks and policy communities is that as the number of groups with specialized interests increases, govemments are often placed in a position to detemine who will and who will not have influence. Many organizations have been created either directly or iridirectly, as a result of the needs of the government. Heclo acknowledges that in the American policy-making process, "some groups are numired by the government's own need for administrative help.o'76 Similarly, Coleman and Skogstad explore such activity in the

Canadian policy-making process. They suggest that governrnent often has a hand in the promotion of various non-govemmental organizations. This aspect of the relationship between govement and non-governmental organizations is emphasized in their examination of the Canadian policy-making system when they suggest that certain groups gain govement favour that ultimately works to the advantage of both

~rganizations.~~Their work explores the idea that govemment not only has contact with various NGOs but more importantly will encourage the activity of various non- governmental groups. In their specific examples, Coleman and Skogstad cite the examples of the Nova Scotia fishery, women's groups and offcial language minotities, al1 of whose strength was greatly increased by the encouraging hand of go~ernment.~~

76 Heclo, p96. n Coleman and Skogstad, Poliq Communities and Public Policv, p3 14. Ibià, p3 14. 3 1

Governrnent has the ability to "promote particular interests [in a policy comrnunity] and undermine other~."'~ This is a particularly significant finding. It introduces the possibility that government decision-makers recognize what policies they would Iike to implement and then attempt to advance their own agenda by capitalizing on the ability and willingness of a 'sympathetic' organization to promote the govemment side of a public policy issue. With the idea that NGOs cm be used as an instrument to promote policy, a new stage in the evolution of the reiationship between govemment and non-govemmental organizations emerges.

Figure 2-2 demonstrates how the practice of using non-governmental organizations as instruments of policy promotion might occur.

Figure 2-2: Pressure grouDs as instruments of government

Government Promotion of Departments & Non-Governmental IL Actors Agencies Agendas 17Gove-ent

In addition to his work on advocacy coalitions, Lindquist has also closely exarnined how govemment officiais act as stewards of public policy. In particular, he has explored how al1 memben of a policy community - including both govenunent

79 Coleman and Skogstad, Poiicv Communiiies and Public Polint, p3 14. and non-govermnental participants - can cooperate to the advantage of al1 parties involved. Lindquist implies that public officials can impede the process of

*'~earnin~"~~and the policy-making process within a policy cornrnunity. In response to that, he suggests that decision-maken or "public managers"8' as he refers to them have an important role in the bbstewardship"82of policy cornmunities. He sets out in his study three fundamental goals that public managers should attempt to achieve in order to best benefit al1 parts of the policy community and society:

1. They must work to improve their skills for analyzing and shaping extemal environrnents; 2. Public managers must now go beyond furthering bureaucratie interests and look to the interests of larger policy cornmunities; 3. Public managers are positioned to take up a stewardship role in those c~rnrnunities.~~

These three points emphasize the idea that Lindquist is trying to stress, that government officials have a role to play in shepherding a policy community. When taken along with the work of Sabatier on advocacy coalitions, and that of Coleman,

Skogstad, and Heclo - each of whorn have suggested that govements cm take an active role in the promotion of various groups - it becomes increasingly clear that a new stage in the evolution of the relationship between govemment and non- governmental organizations has begun: one in which non-governrnental organizations have gone from advocates of policy, to resources of policy to now being used as instruments of public policy.

80 Lindquist, "Public Managers and Policy Cornrnunities.. .," p 129. " Ibid, p 129. " Lbid, p130. Conclusion

A review of the current academic literature in this field is very useful in outlining several points. First and foremost, the examination of the available literature has shown that there has been a steady evolution of the relationship between govemment and non-governrnental actors. In the begiming, the relationship was mostly adversarial with non-governmental interests trying to put pressure on govemment and affect the outcome of various policy decisions. This was demonstrated in figure 24a) which illusîrated that the participation of non- govemental organizations in the policy making process was largely limited to the role of advocate of policies before govemment.

In the second stage of evolution in the relationship, figure 2-l(b) helps to identiQ the heightened interaction between govemment and non-governrnental participants in the policy-making process. The work of Hugh Thorbuni emphasizes the nature by which non-govemmental interests becarne institutionalized parts of the policy-making process. Furthemore, it was demonstrated by numerous scholars including Paul Pross. Hugh Heclo, JeBey Berry and William Coleman and Grace

Skogstad that the number of participants in the policy-making process, both in Canada and the United States, increased dramatically during this period.

Finally the work addressing the concept of advocacy coalitions by Paul A.

Sabatier and Evert Lindquist has helped to demonstrate that the relationship of the different participants in the policy-making process continues to evolve. As the idea

83 Lindquist, "Public Managers and Policy Comrnunities... ," pp 12%130. of advocacy coalitions has become increasingly prevalent, it has helped to show that government oficials are no longer at the top of a 'decision pyramid' with al1 other actors trying to pressure the decision-makers perched at the pimacle of this process.

As Sabatier in particular has suggested, government representatives may be but one partner arnong many within a given advocacy coalition facing challenges not only fiom within their own coalition, but also fiom other coalitions in a policy comrnunity.

Lindquist emphasizes this idea in his discussion of the fact that govement decision- malcers act as shepherds of various policy cornmunities. The metaphor of 'shepherd' strengthens the idea that govemment decision-makers may have a new role which permits them to influence the policies of those groups who are thernselves trying to influence the governrnent. This emphasizes the idea that governments may attempt to use the members of different coalitions, which have shown themselves to share a sympathetic viewpoint on a given policy issue, to advance their own political agenda.

This chapter has explored a theoretical view of the relationship between government and non-govemmental organizations. It has investigated the available literature on policy communities and networks in both Canada and the United States and taken a look that the emerging literature that concems itself with the use of NGOs as instruments of government. The next chapter will examine the specific case study of the negotiation of the environmental side deal of the North Amencan Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA). It demonstrates in a more practical sense many of the theoretical concepts that have been addressed in the literature to this point. More importantly, it will add to the current literature helping to solidi@ the idea that govemment is increasingly using non-govemmentd organizations as a tool for the advancement of their own political agendas. Case Studv: the nezofiafion arsd ratification ofthe e~virortmentalskie deai of the North Americun Free Trade Agreement

The case study that will be outlined in this chapter - the negotiation and irnplementation of the side-deal on the environment of the North Arnerican Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) - will help to illustrate more clearly that governments are using NGOs increasingly as instruments of public policy. It will examine how the governments of Canada and the United States recruited and used non-govemmental organizations actively in an effort to promote their own political agendas during the negotiation of the NAFTA and its side deai on the environment. For the purpose of this case, it is important to note that while NAFTA is a tri-lateral agreement between

Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, this study will focus solely on the Canadian and

American experiences leading up to the ratification of NAFTA and the side deals associated with if. The primary reason for this exclusion is that while a number of

ENGOs in Mexico raised concems about the environmental implications of a North

Arnerican trade agreement, there is little information, aside from a few english language newspapee and magazines, describing the Mexican experience during the negotiation period for the NAFTA. Furthemore, it is not at al1 clear to what extent there was interaction between the Mexican ENGOs and the PRI, the mling party in

Mexico which had dominated the political scene for more than sixty years. The most important empirical details for this study are captured in a cornparison of Canada and the United States. Background

In 1987, at the cornpletion of the negotiations for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade

Agreement (CLJFTA), very little attention had been paid to environmental issues.

Despite their concem that the CUFTA could have potentially senous ramifications for the environment?groups representing those views had been effectively shut out of the process.l In fact when asked about the lack of environmental representation throughout the process of negotiation and why there was no mention of environrnental issues in the accord, then Canadian Minister of International Trade, John Crosbie replied:

the free trade agreement is a commercial accord between the world's largest trading partners. It is not an environmental agreement. The environment was not, therefore, a subject for negotiations; nor are environmental matters included in the text of the

Crosbie's statement reinforced the claim of the environmental movement that during the free vade negotiations between Canada and the United States, not only were environmental non-govemmental organizations (ENGûs) marginalized during the negotiations, but environrnental concems were not even a part of the considerations taken by either government.

I See Sarah Richardson (ed.) The North American Free Trade Ameement and the North American Commission on the Environment: Re~ortof a Workshir, on NAFTA and NACE. December 7, 1992. (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy and the Ontario Round Table on Environment and Economy), p 1 O. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Po~ufarSecror Ornanizatiom and Trade: A Report io the Minisw of lndustrv Trude and Technolom rGovernmenr of Ontariol, (Ottawa: CCPA, July 1992), pB 1 as cited by Donald E. Abelson "Environmental lobbying and political posturing: the role of environmental groups in Ontario's debate over NAFTA" in Canadian Public Adminsirration, Volume 38, No. 3, p356. In the spring of 1990, following the ratification of the CUFTA between

Canada and the U.S., President Carlos Salinas de ort tari) formally approached

Washington requesting "that negotiations for a fiee trade agreement with the United

States be ~ndertaken.'~The Government of Canada was at first reluctant to seek inclusion in those negotiations having not anticipated a continental fiee trading zone, and just recently cornpleted a heated political battle in order to pass the CCTFTA.'

Many Canadian politicians were not anxious to engage in a similar struggle in order to develop a continent-wide free trade zone, an idea that had already been highly criticized,

However, it would not take long to realize that if it did not participate in the

NAFTA, Canada's economic position could be severely disadvantaged. Furthemore, its lack of involvement in a continental trade initiative could result in a 'hub and

~~oke'~scenario, firmly placing the United States at the center of economic activity in al1 of North Arnerica. Recognizing this, as well as other potential benefits that could be achieved through participation in the accord, Canadian Prime Minister Brian

Mulroney formally infonned the govemments of the United States and Mexico on

September 24, 1990 that Canada was interested in participating in negotiations to

' From here on, the Mexican President will be referred to simply as President Salinas. '' Pierre Marc Johnson and André Beaulieu, The Environment and NAFTA: UnderstandinP and Implementinn the New Continental Law. (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1996), p 1 1. 5 Despite the fact that the 1988 election led to a second majority govemment for the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, the free trade debate was the key issue of that election and the battle that ensued was heated. 6 The 'Hub and Spoke' theory is a metaphor that suggests that the United States wouid serve as the hub of an economic wheet having individual agreements with other countries such as Canada and Mexico, but also other countnes such as those in South Arnerica (e.g. Chile) which would represent the different spokes of the wheel, each having increased relations with the hub - or United States - but much less interaction with the other 'spokes'. build upon previous trade agreements - particularly the CUFTA - to fom a continent-wide trading bloc.'

The Readiness of the Environmental Movement

Having been excluded from the negotiation of the CWTA, the environmental movement made sure that it was ready for the possibility that the governrnents of

Canada, the United States and Mexico would atternpt to negotiate a continental free trade agreement. Since the tirne of the implementation of the CUFTA, the environmentai movement had increased its awareness of trade policies and the effect they had on environmental issues. Trade politics and the politics of the environment, were no longer disunited as they had been in the past. The environmental movement was ready to make its voice heard as part of any trade negotiations in the hiture. Of the environrnental movement's desire for increased input into such agreements, the

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives suggested that:

The Canadian free trade debate highlighted a growing resolve among environmentalists to translate governments' stated cornmitment to integrate economic and environmental decision-making into substantive policy change.. . The involvement of Canadian environrnental groups in the free trade debate was a watershed, heralding the entry of environrnentalists into major trade-policy debates worldwide. lnsights gained by environmentalists in the Canada-U.S. FTA campaign helped stimulate serious international debate on the environrnental consequences of trade policy.8

Once it became evident that the governments of Canada, Mexico and the

United States were going to pursue a continental trade deal, many organizations in

7 Abelson, "Environmental lobbying and political po~~ng...."p356. Canada such as Pollution probe9 and the Canadian Environmental Law Association

(CELA)", as well as their Arnerican counterparts such as the National Wildlife

Federation (NWF) ", the Siema club'', the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)", and Friends of the ~arth"quickly began to voice their concems towards a trade agreement that did not effectively address environmental concems. These organizations began actively lobbying various members of govemment to reject any trade deals that did not include suficient consideration of the environment. In the

United States. the job of fmding allies in Washington was perhaps easier since although the presidency was held by Republican George Bush, both houses of the

--- - ppp ------8 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. pB l as cited by Abelson, -'Environmental lobbying and political posturing.. .," p356. Pollution Probe is a "Toronto based non-profit organization" with approximately 55,000 rnembers. It was created in 1969 and its primary goal is the promotion of awareness of environmental issues. For more information see, Abelson, "Environmental lobbying and political posturing. ..," pp358-359. 10 The Canadian Environmental law Association was created in Toronto in 1970. its primary focus is to study ''the linkage between environmental and trade issues." It has approxirnately 500 members who fimd it through donations along with the Ontario Legal Aid Plan. For more information see Abelson "Environmental lobbying and political posturing ...'*, pp357-358; Refer also to the CELA homepage on the World Wide Web, availabte: http://www.web.net/cela/ II The National Wildlife Federation was created in 1936 and currently describes itself as "'the nation's premiere grass-roots conservation organization." lt has more than 4 million members and 45 different state affiliations. The primary focus of the NWF is education. In their literature, the NWF claims to "educate American's lawmakers, political leaders, business leaders and grass-roots activists about environmental problems." Taken fiom http://www.nwf.org/nw£labout/history.hmii, August 12, 1997. For further information, refer to the NWF Homepage on the World Wide Web. Available: http://www.nwf.org. " According to the Sien Club Homepage on the World Wide Web, The Sierra Club has over 500,000 members. It is "a non-profit membership supported public interest organization that promotes conservation of the natural environment by influencing pubtic policy desicions - legislative, administrative, legal and electoral. " For further information refer to the Sierra Club Homepage on the World Wide Web, available: http://www.siemclub.org 13 The Environmental Defense Fund, headquartered in New York, has more that 300,000 members. It was founded in 1967 by volunteer conservationists. The EDF focuses its attention on "a broad range of regional, national and international environmental issues." It is financially supported Iargely tiom member donations and has an annual budget of more that $20 million. For more information, refer to the Environmental Defense Fund Homepage on the World Wide Web, available: http://www.edf.org/ 14 According the Friends of the Earth Mission Statement, Friends of the Earth is "a national , non-profit advocacy organization dedicated to protecting the planet from environmental degradation; preserving biological, cultural and ethnic diversity; and empowering citizens to have and intiuential choice in decisions affecting the quality of their environment - and their lives." It is headquartered in Washington, D.C.. For Amencan Congress were controlled by the Democrats, many of whom had expressed sirnilar concems about expanding free trade across North Amerka.

The American Perspective

Negotiations for NAFTA began in August of 199 1." The process that would lead to the signing of the NAFTA in December of 1992, and the side-deals that would follow is very usehl in demonstrating much of the theoretical work that has been laid out in exploring the idea of policy cornrnunities and advocacy coalitions in the previous chapter.

During the initial stages of the NAFTA negotiations. it appears that relatively little attention was paid to the environment - a surprise when one considers the fact that US. President George Bush had declared himsel f the 'environmental president '.

This was likely a result of numerous factors, perhaps not the least of which was the fact that two of the principal partners in the negotiations - Canada and the United

States - had recently concluded negotiations for the CUFTA which had effectively marginalized the environmental rnovement.

Even though the Republicans had controlled the presidency since the original negotiations for the CUFTA were conducted, the environmental movement was much better prepared for trade talks in 199 1 and determined that the environment would not be sidelined a second time. At the same time, while attitudes within the environmental policy comrnunity may have changed, there was little reason to expect more information, refer to the Friends of the Earth homepage on the WorId Wide Web, available: that the attitudes of the negotiating teams towards the environment would have been significantly altered since the position of the political leadenhip in Washington and

Ottawa remained essentially the same.

However, in order to get Congressional approval for a 'fast-track'I6 of the

NAFTA negotiation process, President Bush had to promise to include various environrnental specialists on important advisory cornmittees. Perhaps more importantly, he was committed ''net to do anythmg to hurt existing environmental and worker safety laws."" This came as the result of increased opposition in Congress to the advancement of a trade agreement that did not pay significant attention to environmental and labor concerns.

As a part of the deal made with Congress to gain fast track approval,

Congressional leaders such as Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) and

Richard Gephardt (D-MO) made their support conditional on *'a proper action plan for environrnental issues."'* Even then, Bush refused to make the siping of NAFTA conditional on the successful negotiation of environmental issue^.'^ However, this was countered by significant pressure from virtually al1 ENGOs in the United States.

Much of their pressure along with that of various members of Congress was aimed http ://www. foe.org " Johnson and Beaulieu. p29. 16 The fast track process is one by which Congress aIIows the President to negotiate an international trade deal, such as the North Amencan Free Trade Agreement. Once the agreement is concluded, Congress must vote on that deal - either 'yes' or 'no' - without the ability to amend the document. For the specific regulations regarding 'fast &ck authority' see United States, House of Representatives, 0mnibur T'de and Com~etitivenessAct of 1988: Confèrence Re~orr to Accom~anv H.R. 3, (Washington: US. Government Printing Office, 1988). 17 U.S. Govemment, The White House, MW I Action Plan in Res~onseto Concernr Raised bv Congess Remdina a North American Free TdeAgreement, May 1, 199 1 as cited in Johnson and Beaulieu, p27. 18 Johnson and Beaulieu, p27. directly at Carla Hills, the United States Trade Representative (USTR),and the

negotiating team."

The Environmental Movement as Poiicv Advocate

It is interesting to note that at this sarne time while the negotiations for

NAFTA were taking place. the final negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were also concluding. Many members of the environmental movement not only opposed NAFTA, they also objected to the final drafts of the GATT agreement. This provided them with two venues through which to champion the environmental cause. This project has no intention of focusing on the GATT negotiations; however, it is useh1 to note that some similar patterns of activity between NGOs and government offcials were occurring, particularly in areas where considerations about the GATT had similar implications to the NAFTA. The opposition of the ENGOs in the United States to trade agreements that did not properly address environmental concems was expressed in a letter dated January 8, 1992. The letter was signed by 28 of the most prominent environmentai groups in the United States and was sent to every rnember of the U.S.

~on~ress.~'These groups were calling in particular for the rejection of the final

GATT text, but more generally to guard against any trade deal that "[threatened] existing U.S. environmental and consumer laws, [undermined] national sovereignty to

- - -- 19 Johnson and Beaulieu, p27. 'O ibid, p29. " See "Environmental Consumer Group's Letter on Uruguay Round,'' reprinted in lmide U.S. Trade, January 17, 1992. pp12-13. create such laws in the füture, and [attacked] the Arnerican federal system of govemrnent by mandating preemption of state environmental and consumer ~aws."~

U.S. environrnental groups found strong allies arnong some Democratic members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In particular, House

Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO), and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) assumed leadership roles in the fight against the NAFTA as it was being negotiated by the Bush administration. Both Gephardt and Baucus felt that, while they were not entirely opposed to the principle of 6ee trade, they did require that much more attention be paid to issues such as the environment and labor than was the Office of the President. Senator Baucus insisted that any trade agreement must in no way undermine U.S. environrnental protections.u Similarly, Gephardt along with Rep.

Henry Waxman (Democrat-VA) introduced legislation in the House of

Representatives (H.C.R. 246) which outlined "Congress' intention not to approve any trade agreement that [undermines] U.S. environmental, health or labor standard^."^'

Many of the reasons that the 28 envuonmental groups had previously cited for rejecting the final draft of the GATT text in their letter to members of Congress eventually appeared in sirnilar fonn in the GephardVWaxman resolution.

Furthemore, a letter by Waxman seeking support and cosponsors for the resolution, made similar claims suggesting that the text of the Uruguay Round threatened US.

3.3 - See "Envuonmentai Consumer Group's Letter.. .," pp 12- 13. See "Baucus Predicts that NAFTA Talks Could be Completed by March," in lnside US. Tmde, Febmary 7, 1992, pp 1-2. '' See 'WAFTA Negotiators Will Begin Drafiing Final Tea Next Week at Dallas Meeting," in Inride U.S. Trade, February 14, 1 992, pp 19-20. environrnental laws and the Amencan federal stem.'^ A letter to al1 memben of the

House of Representatives by the Chairrnan of the Sierra Club, Michael McCloskey,

also echoed the pleas of Rep. Waxman asking for support for the Waxman-Gephardt

initiative? The reasons cited in both the letter from the Sierra Club and fiom

Waxrnan were similar, suggesting that there must have been some sort of consultation

between the two parties and a strategy to seek Congressional support had been forged.

Even at this early time, in the stages before the negotiations for NAFTA were concluded, strong coalitions were developing between prominent memben of the U.S. government and the environmental movement. In fact, as evidenced by the letters

Eorn the Sierra Club and others soliciting support for the Waxrnan-Gephardt resolution, these groups were being brought into the process to advance the politicai agendas of various govemment policy-makers such as Gephardt and Waxman.

As negotiations progressed, the main Congressional leader in the fight against

NAFTA became Richard Gephardt, the House Majority ~eader." His primary objection - as had been echoed by the environmental movement in the U.S. - was that NAFTA must include strong environrnental provisions. In a letter to Gephardt,

See "Administration Under Rising Pressure frorn Citizens Groups on GATT, NAFTA," in Imide US. Trade: S~ecialReoort, February 2 1, 1992. pp S 1-S2. 26 See "Sierra Club Letter on Waxman-Gephardt Resolution," in lnside U.S. Trade: S~ecialReport, Febniary 21, 1992, pS5. " While Gephardt may have been the 'front-man' for the inclusion of environmental provisions in NAFTA, he was by no means alone. Numerous colleagues in the House of Representatives were also becoming more vocal in their objections to NAFTA. This is evidenced in a letter to Gephardt hmthe members of the flouse. For further information see "House NAFTA Letter to Gephardt" as reprinted in Inside US-Trude - s~eciafRe~ort, July 28, 1992, pS-4. an undisclosed number of memben of the House of ~e~resentatives~~indicated that

many of the promises that President Bush had made in order to gain fast-track

approval were not going to be sufficiently addressed in the final NAFTA te~t.~'As

the negotiations were drawing to a close, Gephardt made it clear that he would not

support an agreement that did not include sufficient provisions for the environment

and labor. Furthemore, he made it clear that he was not in favor of a parallel process

for addressing these issues.30 Gephardt's position was supported by then Govemor

Bi11 Clinton of Arkansas, the Democratic nominee for President in 1992. Clinton had,

to this point, not made his position on NAFTA clear, but there was little doubt that at

a minimum, he shared the viewpoint of many in the environmental policy community

including Rep. Gephardt. Of Gephardt's position on NAFTA, Clinton stated:

If we are to prosper as a nation, we must reject the outdated rhetoric of both the free traders who are oblivious to workers and the environment and the protectionists who ignore the benefits of expanded world trade ... From the outset of this campaign, 1 have stated that 1 wil1 support a free trade agreement with Mexico so long as it provides adequate protection for workers, fmers and the environment on both sides of the bordere3'

The NAFTA negotiations concluded on August 12. 1992.~~Those ENGOs

and Congressional memben who had opposed NAFTA continued to voice their

The letter was repnnted in lnside US. Trade. However, only the text of the letter was included and not the names of members who signed it. For the text of the Ietter, see "House NAFTA Lener to Gephardt," ps-4. 29 "House NAFTA Letter to Gephardt". pS-4. 30 For a better exploration of Gephardt's position on the NAFTA as negotiations were being concluded, see "Leading Democrats Insist on Changes in NAFTA in Labor, Environment," in Inside U.S. Trade - S~eciaf Report, July 28, 1992, pS-5. 3 1 See "Statement by Govemor Bill Clinton," in Inside U.S. Trade - S~eciafReport, July 28, 1992, pS-6. 32 See "U.S., Mexico. Canada Conclude Agreement on North Amencan Free irade," in Inride US. Trade - Speciaf Re~ort,August 13, 1992, pS- 1. objections. The NAFTA text fell radically short of the minimal expectations of the

environmental rnovement and as result, not one ENGO in the United States came out

in support of the deal.)) In fact many NGOs and govemment representatives, in

particular Senator Max Baucus and organizations such as the Sierra Club and the

Natural Resources Defense Council, condemned NAFTA and suggested that nothing

short of re-opening the deal and re-negotiating the environmental provisions would be

sati~factory.~~

During the time that had been leading up to the conclusion of the negotiations

for the formal NAFTA text, it was becoming increasingly apparent that if issues

pertaining specifically to the environment and labor were going to be dealt with, they

would most likely be relegated to a parallel track of negotiations. Many

environmental organizations felt that this was completely unacceptable. They argued

that without being included in the text of the agreement, there was no way that any

side accord could be suficiently enforceable. A coalition of twelve ENGOs issued a

statement suggesting that NAFTA, as it stood, failed to "provide a mechanism to

ensure adequate enforcement of environmental standards among the NAFTA

co~mtries."~~Many groups insisted that NAFTA failed to incorporate sufficient

environmental protections and persisted that a trilateral environmental commission, often referred to as the North Amencan Commission for the Environment (NACE),

33 Johnson and Beaulieu, p30. 34 See "Baucus Calls for Renegotiation of Environment, Labor Issues in NAFTA," in Imide US. Trade, August 14, 1992, p8. 35 Among the twefve signatories to the statement were The Center for International Environmental Law, the Natural Resources Defense Council. the Sierra Club and others. For Mer information, see that was included as a part of the agreement itself, was absolutely necessary to provide

for proper %national environrnental cooperation, planning and monitoring."36

Memben of the Bush administration - in particular USTR Carla Hills -

were under mounting pressure from both Congressional representatives and the

environmental cornrnunity. each of which was promoting a sirnilar agenda. As a

result of that pressure and the perseverance of Congressional leaders like Sen. Baucus

and Rep. Gephardt, as well as similar pressures that were placed on the environrnental

ministers in Canada and Mexico, it was announced on September 17, 1992 that the

three countries would pursue the creation of a trilateral environmental commission

through a parallel system of negotiations - a side deal on the en~ironment.~'

Before proceeding to the analysis of the negotiation of the environrnental side

deal and the involvement of Governor Clinton with members of the environmental

cornrnunity, it is useful to review how the relationship between the ENGOs and

Washington had developed and how it fits into the policy cornmunity model. Two

important ideas can be demonstrated at this point. First, the environrnental movement

was actively lobbying the Bush administration to include a North American

Commission on the Environment (NACE) in the text of NAFTA. Second, it can be

seen that several Democratic members of the Congress had very close ties to these

organizations and appear to have been promoting a similar agenda. Interest in the

"Environmental Group Coalition Issues Five Point Criticism of NAFTA," in Inside U.S. Trade, August 28, 1992, p 16. 36 "Environmental Group Coalition.. .," p 16- 17. " See "Hills Letter on NAFTA Environmental Commission," in Imide US. Trade. October 2, 1992. p6.; "National Wildlife Fedemtion backs Environmental Provisions in NAFTA," Inside US.Trade, October 2, presidential election campaign was beginning to rise and Govemor Clinton had yet to chri@ his position on NAFTA. Traditionally, most of the groups in the environmental community who were most vocal in their opposition to NAFTA had closer ties to the Democrats than the Republicans. This fact would be integral to the relationship that would emerge between Clinton and those members of the environmental movement who would iater help in promoting the NAFTA before

Congress.

The Environmental Movernent and the NAFTA Environmental Side Deal

In response to the September 17 announcement, the National Wildlife

Federation (NWF) was the first major NGO to corne out in support of an agreement that included a NACE of some f~rm.'~However. the NWF made it clear in its statement that their support for the NAFTA environmental provisions "[did] not extend to other aspects of the agreement, nor [did] it constitute an endonement of other actions taken by the Administration on environmental issues."39

Although Clinton had previously hinted that he was not entirely against the principle of a NAFTA," he did not make his position clear until shortly after the

NWF and other environmentai groups came out in favor of an agreement that

------1992, ~5;"EPA Head Says U.S. WiIl Consider Three-Way NAFTA Commission on Environment," hide US.Trade, September 18, 1992, p 16. 38 See "National Wildlife Federation Backs Environmental.. .," p5. 39 "National Wildlife Federation Backs Environmental. ..," p5; See also "Environmentai Provisions of Free Trade Agreement Win Support of National Wildlife Federation," National Wildlife Federation, Press Release, September 30, 1992. 40 See "Statement by Govemor Bill Clinton.. .," July 28, 1992. pS-6. included a side deal to incorporate a trilateral commission to deai with the

On October 4, 1992, Clinton made his most important speech about the

possibilities of North American free trade in Raleigh, North Carolina. This speech

laid out his plan for the tùture of continental fiee vade and what conditions he would

have to see met before he could support such an agreement. In so doing, Clinton

called for the negotiation of three side deals to NAFTA. This distinguished him fiom

Bush's position. The fact that he supported NAFTA in pnnciple disarmed it as a potent election issue, but at the same time Clinton was able to separate hirnself kom

Bush and the deal that he had concluded. Clinton was extremely critical of what Bush was doing to implement an environmental commission at such a late stage. In his speech in Raleigh, Clinton stipulated that he would require three side agreements to go dong with NAFTA: one creating the environmental commission, a second addressing labor issues and a third to address issues of fluctuating imports." Clinton went Mer to insist that those agreements would have to be negotiated and implemented at the sarne time as the NAFTA in order to reflect the importance that he felt his administration would place on these issues. In his speech, he stated:

There are several areas now that we have to negotiate supplemental agreements which I would want to present together with the agreement that's already been negotiated. Before implementing the agreement, we must establish an environmental protection commission with substantial powers and resources to prevent and clean up water pollution. The commission should also encourage the enforcement of

4 I See "Excerpts fiom Clinton's Speech on NAFTA," in Inside U.S. Trade - Special Reoot-2, October 9, 1992, pS2-S3. the country's own environmentai laws through education. training and cornmitment of resources.. . The Bush administration has talked about setting up a commission but it's too linle, too late. It won't even be up for final discussion until next year. By then, the incentives the other countries have to do anything meaningful will have evaporated if the agreement is already adopted. That is unacceptable. Al Gore and I will ensure that the environmental protection commission is up and ming when the free trade agreement is up and nuuiing.J2

That speech finally laid out Clinton's conditions for accepting NAFTA for the presidential campaign. He was clearly supportive of the principle of free trade.

Clinton made it clear that if the side deals were negotiated and included as part of the implementing legislation for NAFTA, he would not seek to re-open the deal. While

Clinton's NAFTA position seemed to fit quite well with what many of the NGOs were calling for, it is important to acknowledge that it was not met entirely without opposition. In anticipation of Clinton's October 4 announcement, ninety six

Democratic members of the House of Representatives urged him "not to endone the

North American Free Trade Agreement and renegotiate the deal upon his ele~tion."~")

In that letter, the members suggested that the "U.S. will lose 500?000 more jobs to

Mexico as factories relocate to take advantage of the ultra-low wages and lax envrionmental and labor laws? It is interesting to note that the signature of

Congressional leaders such as Richard Gephardt who had been active in the anti-

NAFTA debate were conspicuously absent from that letter. This was perhaps an

'' "Excerpts From Clinton's Speech...," October 9, 1992, pS2-S3. 43 See "House Democrats Press CIinton to Reject NAFTA and Re-negotiate Pact," in Imide U.S. Trade, October 16, 1992, pl; See also "House Democrats Letter on NAFTA," as reprinted in Inride U.S. Trade, October 16, 1992, p13. 44 See "House Democrats Letter on NAFTA," p 1 3. indicator that Gephardt was trying to back away from his hardline position that called for the deal to be re-opened in order to accommodate Clinton's position during the election campaign. This also allowed Clinton take the lead on the NAFTA issue.45

Clinton's position remained constant throughout the election carnpaign and many

NGOs such as the NWF seemed to be supportive of Clinton's position, that a NAFTA with sufficient environmental safeguards to be included in a supplemental agreement would be acceptable.

The pressure being exerted on President Bush during the campaign did not subside. Many ENGOs had been criticizing the Bush administration warning that he must not proceed too quickly into negotiations for an environmentai cornmis~ion.~~

One of the reasons that the environmental community was hoping the Bush administration would slow the Pace of negotiations was in order to ensure that there was sufficient participation of non-governmental actors in the negotiations. There was also an apparent fear in the environmental community that the Bush administration was going to push a deal through before Clinton assumed the presidency. This would prevent Clinton f?om "[seeing] additional rules on the environment"" added to the agreement as he had been talking about with the

------45 WhiIe Gephardt did not take an active rofe opposing Clinton at this stage during the presidential campaign, he did later play an active role opposing NAFTA once the side agreements were concluded and the Clinton administration was trying to get the deal passed through Congress. Speaking at the National Press Club on September 21, 1993, Gephardt said that he would ''participate actively" in the debate on NAFTA in Congress and cited labor concerns as his main reasons for not supportkg NAFTA. See "Gephardt Announces Opposition to NAFTA, Plans 'Active' Role," in Imide US Trade September 24, 1993. p5. 46 See "NRDC Wams Administration Not to Rush Creation of NAFTA Environmental Body," in imide U.S. Trade, October 30, 1992. p14. 47 See "U.S.,Canada, Mexico to Meet next Month on NAFTA Environmental Commission," in Imide US. Trade, November 6, 1992, p 1 0. supplemental agreements. Other more politically strategic reasons for the environmental cornmunity wanting the Bush administration to slow dom cm also be considered.

It is not inconceivable that anticipating a Clinton victory in the White House,

ENGOs, which had closer relations to Clinton than Bush, wanted to see the conclusion of the NAFTA delayed. Once cornpleted and agreed to by al1 three countries, the NMTA would not be easily re-opened once the new administration took over. Because of the apparent closer relations that Clinton had with members of the environmental movement, it is likely that the environmental comrnunity would have preferred to wait until Clinton could represent their viewpoint more effectively than was President Bush. Furthemore, once Clinton had won the election in

November of 1992, it would be vital to the success of NAFTA in Congress that he be able to fully support the deal once he took over the Oval Office in ~anuar~.'~It is also useful to note that during the transition time between administrations, the environmental movement was not alone in calling for the Bush administration to slow down the process. The negotiating teams of both Mexico and Canada were also becoming somewhat hesitant about concluding a deal before Clinton took over the

See "Canada, Mexico Pull Back From Negotiations For Trilateral Environmental Body," in Inride U.S. Trade December 1 8, 1992, pp7-8. 49 The transition time between the Bush and Clinton administration made it difficult not only for the ENGOs, whose attentions were divided behveen the outgoing and incoming administrations, it also made it dificult for the other negotiating teams who were understandably unsure of any deals that would be struck with the Bush administration during the transition period of November 1992-January 1993. In fact, during the negotiations for the environmental commission in December of 1992, the negotiators of Canada and Mexico lefl the table until such time as President-elect Clinton had his administration in place and the negotiating teams from Canada and Mexico could be assured that any agreements they might reach would There is little doubt that Clinton's agenda for the NAFTA and the environmental side deal was closer to the agenda of the environrnental community than had been President Bush. That shared view of the importance of the environrnent and NAFTA was later reflected in the access that ENGOs were given to key administration officiais during the negotiation process.sO This also resulted in non- governrnental participants becoming more active in the promotion of Clinton's agenda afler the election. Key environrnental groups, such as the Defenders of Wildlife, stated that they and "most of the environmental cornrn~nit~"~'would be willing to support the NAFTA if it had b'strict and enforceableWs2side agreements to go dong with it to safeguard the environrnent. In a letter to the President-elect. they asked

Clinton to "publicly restate his comrnitments on NAFTA made during the Presidential

~am~ai~n.?'~~The close relationships that Clinton apparently established with environrnental groups during the election campaign would be particularly useful later once he had taken office and was working with Canada and Mexico and members of the environmental community to establish effective side accords to accompany the

NAFTA.

be respected by the Clinton administration. As a result, no firm deals were concluded in regard to the supplemental agreement on the environment, only the continued suggestion that such negotiations would take place in order to meei the conditions for passage of NAFTA that Clinton had set out during the campaign. For more information see "Canada, Mexico Pull Back From Negotiations ...," pp7-8. 50 See "Green Groups Push Common Agenda of Basic Elements for NAFTA Side Accord," in hide US. Trade - S~ecialRe~ort, Apnl9, 1993, pS5. 5 1 See "Defenders of Wildlife Say Environmental Side Deal Could Bring Support for NAFTA," in Inside U.S. Trade, December 18, 1992, p IO. 52 Ibid "~ee"Defenders of Wildlife Say Environmental Side Deal.. .," p 10. Clinton, the Environmental Movement and the North American Commission for the Environment (NACE)

The relationship that emerged between President Clinton and the

environmental movement is usehl in exploring the way in which govemment policy

makers take advantage of the reiationship that they have established with other

members of a policy cornrnunity. It effectively highlights the way in which NGOs

may become active participants in the promotion of govemment agendas.

There are two distinct time periods that will help to illuminate these ideas more clearly. The first is during the negotiations for the NAFTA side agreements. This period demonstrates that different NGOs actively lobbied the govemment of the

United States to try to influence negotiators and raise the visibility of their position with regard to NAFTA.'~ Additionally, some NGOs participated in the cirafting of the agreement itself. This Merdemonstrates how govemment policy-makers can use

NGOs to their advantage either when trying to advance an agenda or even when trying to formulate a policy.

The second time period to be considered occurred after the negotiations had been concluded when President Clinton was bying to get NAFTA and the side deals passed through Congress. Several NGOs took a very active role promoting NAFTA alongside the Clinton administration. Their activities promoted NAFTA both to the

El Countless exarnples exist showing that these ENGOs were trying to promote their own agendas to government decision-rnakers. For example, see "Environmental Defense Fund Environmental Defense Fund contacts President-elect Clinton on NAFTA Environmenta1 Defense Fund, Press Release, January 7, 1993, taken from EDF Hornepage July 16, 1997, Avaiiable http://www.edf.orglpubsMewsReleases/I993/Jan/b-naftaltr.htmI; See also "Wildlife Federation Lays Out Proposals on NAFTA Environmental Commission," in Inside US. Trade - S~ecialReoort, February 5, 1993, S7-S8. general public and to Congress. Many of the same groups that had worked against the

Bush administration were now working alongside the Clinton administration charnpioning the cause of NAFTA as a deal they deemed worthy of Congressional support.

The Environmental Comrnunity and the Provision of Policv Expertise

Throughout 1993. it was clear that Clinton was determined to uphold his campaign promise that meaningful side agreements would have to be reached before he would send NAFTA to Congress for a vote. A nurnber of ENGOs had significant input into the American position on the agreement. In particular, the National

Wildlife Federation was instrumental in providing insight on how the NACE could be established most effectively. They helped by providing cirafts of the document to the

American negotiators for their c~nsideration.~~

A nurnber of other groups in the environmental movernent appear to have established particularly close ties to the Clinton administration during this time as well. Seven in particular - the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Environmental

Defense Fund (EDF), the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Defenders of Wildlife,

Nature Conservancy, National Audubon Society and the Natural Resources Defense

Council (NRDC) - announced that they could support a "North American Free

Trade Agreement even if a collateral environrnental commission is not given the

I5in a press release sorne months later, the NWF, in January 1994, took credit along with a 'humber of other non-govermnental organizations" as being "responsible for the initial design of the [environrnental] Commission, and sought to see it included as part of the environmenta1 side agreement to NAFTA." For power to directly sanction polluters or issue subpoenas as a part of its

in~esti~ations."~~The letter that was sent to Clinton represented a "significant scaling

bacv5' of what the majority of the environmental movernent had previously been

calling for? The fact that they were now willing to support an agreement that fell

short of their initial demands, suggests that Clinton may have had significant influence

with these groups and was able to retain their support.59

NAFTA and Environmental NGOs as Legislative Tools

It is important to note that many of the groups that spent considerable time

lobbying USTR Mickey Kantor earlier in the year6°, came on side later when Clinton

was looking for groups to promote the NAFTA in order that it could get passed

through Congress. Once the side deals were signed on Septernber 14, 1993, six major

more information see National Wildlife Federation, "Constructing the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (NACEC): Prelirninaq Views," Press Release, January 23, 1994. '6 See "Environmental Groups Offer to Support NAFTA if Demands Are Met," in Inside US. Trode - Special Report, May 7, 1993, ppS 1 -S. 57 "Environmental Groups Offer.. .," pS- 1. '* lt is important to note that while this letter represented the view of many of the Iargest environmental groups, it did not represent al1 of the environmental policy cornmunity. The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) sent a separate letter that gave their general support of the proposais but said that specification was needed in a number of areas. Other groups such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth reîüsed to sign the letter suggesting that proposais currently being considered did not go nearly far enough. See "Environrnental Groups Offer. ..," ppS 1-S5; For an anaIysis of the position of the environmental organizations, see "Green Groups' Position on NAFTA Environmental Pact," in Inside US. Trade - Special Report, May 7, 1993. 59 For an examination of the persuasive powers of President Clinton during the negotiation process, see Martin A. Nie "It's the Environment Stupid!: Clinton and the Environment," Presidenrial Studies Ouarferlv, Volume 27, No. 1 (Winter), pp 39-51. In that paper, Nie cites Richard E. Neustadt who stated that "presidential power is the power to persuade." See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidentiuf Power and the Modern Presidenrs: the Politics of leaders hi^ from Roosevelt tu ReaganJ (New York: The Free Press, 1 WO), p 1 1. 60 "Environmental Groups Offer. ..," ppS 1-S2; and "Green Groups' Position on NAFTA ...," pp S2 - SS. environmental organizations6' became strong proponents for the NAFTA speaking

out against others in the environrnental policy community who were opposing the

deal. Jay Hair, president of the NWF "accused the Sierra Club of spreading

"misinformation" and charged that opponents of NAFTA "put their narrow political

agenda ahead of the broad public inter est^.""^^ The environmental groups working

with Clinton insisted that the side deal had addressed the issues that they had raised

with the admini~tration.~~

A number of groups became strong advocates of the NAFTA during the time

period when Clinton was trying to get the deal passed through Congress. Again the

National Wildlife Federation became one of the Iead organizations in the promotion of

the NAFTA before Congress. As has been previously discussed a nurnber of groups

had suggested that with a sufficient side agreement on the environment, they would be

willing to support NAFTA. The NWF distributed a number of press releases in the

time ieading up to the Congressional vote. As was made very clear in their

communications at the time, the NWF along with a majority of the environrnental

organi~ations~~in the United States "pledged its support for the North American Free

- 6 1 The six organizations that were rnost supportive of the NAFTA were the NWF, The Naml Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Wildlife Fund, the National Audubon Society and Conservation International. See "Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA, Denounce Opponents," in hide IlS. Trade - S~ecialReporr, September 17, 1993, pp 1 -2. 6L See "Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA.. .," pp 1-2. 63 Inside US. Trade stated that, "feter Berle, president of the Audubon Society, said that the Administration had clearly resolved the issue of protecting state standard, had created an environmenta1 commission open to citizen participation, and had made suffïcient commitments for fimding environmental cleanup in the border region". See "Six Environmental Organizations.. .," p2. 64 See "NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreements: Statement of Dr. Jay Hair," National Wildlife Federation, September 15, 1993 in which Dr. Hair cited the World Wildlife Fund, the National Audubon Society, the Naturai Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund and Conservation International as the other groups who supported NAFTA. He stated that these groups made up the "overwheIming majority of this nation's grass roots environrnental network". Trade Agreement and promised to advocate its passage in ~on~ress.''~~In his support of the trade agreement, Hair suggested that "the NAFTA is clearly a change away

From business as usual. It fully assures environmental protection will not take a back seat to economic ~oncerns.''~~In addition to public statements such as that of Dr.

Hair. the NWF also put out fact sheets that suggested that NAFTA was good for the environrnent and should have the support of Congress. The fact sheets were designed to support USTR Mickey Kantor's attempts to dispel the apparent myths that opponents of NAFTA were promoting. In a letter to the New York Times, Kantor stated:

It is not possible to respond to al1 the fabrications and disinformation that opponents of NAFTA have spread.. . Now that we have negotiated the Supplemental Agreements called for by President Clinton, perhaps the most important task lies ahead - that of insuring that each of us understands what the agreements says, not what its opponents want us to believe is ~a~s.~'

In response to that letter, the NWF put out an eight point fact sheet to try to respond to some of the misinformation that was being spread by other environmental organizations who opposed NAFTA. The NWF stated that *'a vote for NMTA is a vote for the environrnent of North Amerka. This is why [these six ~r~anizations]~~ wholeheartedly endorse this agreement.""

65 "Amerka's Largest Environmental Group Supports NAFTA," NationaI Wildlife Federation, Press Release, September 14. 1993. " National Wildlife Federation, "Amenca's Largest Environmental Group. ..," 67 Taken From a lener from USTR, Mickey Kantor to the New York Times Septernber 23, 1993 pA26. See also National Wildlife Federation, "Eight Essential Reasons Why NAFTA is Good for the Environment," Press Release, October 1, 1993. 68 The six organizations Hair was referring to include the National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Wildlife Fund, the National Audubon Society, and Conservation International. 69 National Wildlife Federation, "Eight Essential Reasons.. ." In addition to circulating press releases such as those mentioned above, which were designed to help educate the public and to sway memben of Congres, rnembers of the pro-NAFTA advocacy coalition within in the environmental policy community, also took a much more direct role hying to promote the passage of NAFTA. The leaders of the Environmental Defense Fund on behalf of the six primary supporters of the NAFTA, spoke before two important cornmittees responsible for oveneeing the negotiations of NAFTA. Fred Krupp, executive Director of the Environmental

Defense Fund, addressed the Senate Finance Committee on September 28, 1993 and called for the support of NAFTA. He was not attempting to suggest that having passed NAFTA, the job of the environrnental movement would be complete.

However, he certainly seemed to imply that the passage of NAFTA was better than no

NAFTA at al1 when he stated:

We in the environrnental community will continue to press our concerns - with or without NAFTA. We cannot solve al1 our environrnental problems by enacting this or any other trade agreement. However, we sincerely believe that with this trade agreement we have moved the process forward, including setting the stage for a long- overdue reform of the GATT''

Similarly before the Houe Subcommittee on Trade of the Cornmittee on Ways and Means, Dr. Peter M. Emerson, Senior Economist of the EDF testitied that:

.. .the likelihood of solving environmental problems in North America is significantly greater if the NAFTA and its environmental side accord become effective on January 1, 1994 than if they are rejected."

70 Fred Krupp, Executive Director, Envuonmental Defense Fund, "Testimony Before the Senate Finance Committee," Washington, D.C., September 28, 1993. '' Peter M. Emerson, Senior Economist, Environmental Defense Fund, "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives," Washington, D.C.,September 2 1, 1993. In summarizing his testimony, he continued:

...the NAFTA debate teaches us that fieer trade can mean greener trade. If approved and fully implemented, the NAFTA and its related commitments will provide institutions and means that are not otherwise available to make environmental improvements in dl three counuies. This is an important step for~ard.~~

There are sorne prelirninary studies emerging suggesting that the attempts by

President Clinton to build coalitions with the environrnental movement during the negotiation process of the NAFTA and the environrnental side deal were integral to its s~ccess.~~This notion was recently ernphasized by Martin A. Nie when he suggested that Clinton ~'prograrnmatically and representatively sought environmentai group support. He sought their numbers and resources to secure policy success and to reinforce his political standing among traditional Democratic con~tiniencies."~~This process also offers a very effective demonstration of how government actors cm take advantage of the participation of NGûs in the promotion of public policy within a policy community. While the experience of the Clinton administration is very useful in demonstrating the changing relationship between government and non- governmental actors, it is not the only example of such activity. The Canadian expenence during the same time period is also very useful in demonstrating many

72 Emerson, September 2 1, 1993. 73 Among those investigating Clinton's coalition building skiIls are Martin Nie. For more information see Nie, "It's the Environment Stupid! .. .," pp39-5 1. "Md, p46. The Canadian Pers~ective

Examining the Canadian experience leading up to the signing of the NAFTA and the negotiation of the environmental side deal offers Mer insight into the changing relationship been government and NGOs. The Canadian example is particularly usefül when juxtaposed with that of the United States. One of the main reasons for this is because of the different styles of govemment - a parliarnentary system in Canada versus a congressional system in the United States. Having said that. there are also some interesting similarities in the types of interaction among government decision-makers and NGOs in the Canadian policy-making process as in the United States.

The decision by the Canadian govemment to enter into negotiations for a

NAFTA was not an entirely surprising one. The Conservative govemment of Bnan

Mulroney had already shown its desire for free trade by signing the Candada-U.S. free trade agreement in 1987. Despite initial reservations about entering into NAFTA, it should surprise no one that Mulroney would be interested in expanding continental

Free trade. As previously mentioned, the Canadian environmental movement was better prepared to take an active role in the negotiations for NAFTA, not only because of their determination that the environment not be excluded from another agreement, but also because their relations within the environmental cornmunity across the

Canada4J.S. border were extensive and similar groups were undertaking similar activity across the border. As will be show, it does not appear that during the negotiation of the NAFTA text itself in 1991-92, the efforts of NGOs to bring environmental issues to the fore were particularly effective. It was only when the decision was taken to pursue the creation of an environmental commission to accompany the NAFTA text that the involvement of NGOs was increasingly welcomed by the federal govemment.

When examining the relationship between govemment and non-govemmental actors in the Canadian environmental policy community, it is also usehl to consider both the federal and the provincial levels of governrnent. While there is evidence that the federal govemment encouraged the participation of NGOs during the negotiation of the side deals, there is little doubt that sub-national govemments - especially ontario'' - also actively used non-governmental participants in the policy cornrnunity to oppose the idea of expanded free trade in North ~merica.'~

ENGO Activitv and NAFTA in Canada

The role that environmental groups had in Canada during the negotiation process is interesting. in particular, their role in the promotion of the idea of a North

American Commission on the Environment (NACE) is very usehl in further

'' The govemments of Ontario, British Columbia and Saskatchewan had al1 recently elected New Democratic govemments, each of which was opposed to NAFTA. The Goverment of Ontario, under the leadership of Premier Bob Rae, however, was the most active and vocal in its opposition. 76 Additional evidence of the use of NGOs by govermnents during the NAFTA debate can clearly be found when one looks to the involvement of sub-national governments. In particular, the govemment of Ontario played a very active role in opposing the implementation of NAFTA. It is apparent that the NDP government of Bob Rae had very close ties to organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) - arnong the most vocal opponents to the NAFTA - and that Rae did not hesitate to capitaIize on the position of such organizations and their willingness to speak out against the NAFTA. For a comprehensive review of such activity see Abelson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.. .," pp352-38 1. illustrating the changing relationship between government and NGûs. In contras to their American counterparts, Canadian environrnental groups involved at the federal level during the side deal negotiations seem to have had a much more significant role in the provision of expertise during the negotiations and in promoting the NACE as a policy idea. This is different fkom Amencan NGOs who were not only active in the provision of expertise, but also played an integral role in the promotion of the deal itself once negotiations had been completed. The way in which the Canadian groups became involved in the provision of that expertise, however. provides insight into their relationship with government.

As early as Iune of 199 1, Ianine Ferretti. then Executive Director of Pollution

Probe, released a paper that identified a number of the main concems of the environmental movement." This paper presented a number of criticisms and recommendations with regard to NAFTA and the negotiation process. It is apparent that Ferretti was not ~darnentallyopposed to the principle of free trade; however, she insisted that any such agreement must improve 'Vie quality of life of Canadians, both economically and en~ironmentall~.'"~Furthemore, even at this early point in the negotiations - before the formal negotiations had even begun - Pollution Probe felt that "environrnental problems created or exacerbated by a North Arnerican free trade agreement must be prevented or solved by provisions and mechanisms set out in

77 See "The Environmental Dimensions of Free Trade: A Prelirninary Identification of Issues to be Addressed Within the Context of Negotiations of a North American Free Trade Agreement," Poilution Probe, June 199 1. '* Janine Ferreni, in a letter to Hon. Michael Wilson, then Minister of Industq Science and Technology and Minister of International Trade, June 12, 1 99 1. the agreement it~elf.?"~In testimony before the Standing Senate Cornmittee on

Foreign Affairs, Ferretii persisted that environrnental concerns be included as part of the agreement and not a part of a side-deal. She stated on February 25, 1992 that,

"Pollution Probe would like the Federal Govemment to honour its cornrnitments by pursuing environmental provisions in the NAFTA itself. It is not adequate to address environrnental concems directl~linked (in original) to trade agreements in separate environmentai agreements."*O

In June 1992, in cooperation with the National Wildlife Federation in the

United States, Pollution Probe released a document entitled Minimal Environmental

Safemards to be Included in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which laid out the position that environmental groups felt would most appropnately address environmental concerns in the NAFTA.~'Through that position paper and other press releases throughout the sumrner of 1992, Pollution Probe continued to press for the inclusion in the NAFTA text of an environmental commission.82

It is now apparent that the persistent cries of the environrnental movement were unable to produce significant results. For a large part of the negotiations, the environment was not among the primary concerns of the negotiating tearns of any of

79Janine Ferretti, in a letter to Hon. Michael Wilson, then Minister of lndustry Science and Technology and Minister of International Trade, June 12, 199 1. " See "Statement of Janine H. Ferreni on Behalf of Pollution Pmbe Before the Standing Senate Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs on the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Promotion of Sustainable Developmenr," Pollution Probe, Febntary 25, 1992. 8 1 For more information see, The National Wildlife Federation and Pollution Probe Canada, "Minimal Environmental Safeguards to be Included in the North American Free Trade Agreement," National Wildlife Federation and Pollution Probe, June 1992. '* See other Press Releases fiom Pollution Robe including "Will North American Free Trade Pass the Green Test?," July 23, 1992; and "Canadian Trade Negotiators ShouId Finish the Job in Incorporating Environmental Safeguards in NAFTA," September 8, 1992. the three countries. In fact, Ferretti later testified - echoing previous statements of the former Minister of International Trade, John Crosbie - that at the begiming of the process:

governments [had] maintained that trade agreements have nothing to do with the environment. Even as intentions to negotiate the NAFTA were announced North Amerïcan govemments responded to concems of environrnentaiists by maintainhg that the NAFTA would not include environrnental language, and that al1 environmental concems would be addressed in parallel agreements.83

As has been previously mentioned, when the deal was concluded in August of 1992, not one NGO in either Canada or the United States came out in support of it. The majority of the environmental groups felt that environmental issues had not been sufficiently addressed. Ferretti would later suggest, while testifj4ng before a House of

Commons Cornmittee that ''the Agreement's environmental provisions could be inadequate and fa11 short of achieving the aims set out in the Prearnble84 .,985

Environmental organizations continued to remind the federal govenunent of the importance of an environmental commission with real powers, and how such a commission must be an integral part of the NAFTA. As has already been discussed, as a result of that continued pressure, environrnental ministers of Canada, the U.S. and

Mexico announced on September 17, 1992 that they would negotiate a parallel

83 Janine Ferretti, "Testimony to House of Cornmons Subcommittee on International Trade on The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment," Pollution Probe, November 24, 1992. 84 The Preamble of the NAFTA includes mention of the environment "affming the three countries' commitment to promoting employment and economic growth... in a manner that protects the environment. The Prearnble confims the resolve of the NAFTA partners to promote sustainable devetopment,..." as reprinted in "Sumrnary of NAFTA Agreement," in Imide U.S. Trade - S~ecialRe~ort, August 13, 1992, PSI. " Janine Ferretti, "Testimony to House of Comrnons Subcornmittee on International Trade.. .." agreement to address the concerns of the environmental cornrnunity and create a

North American Commission on the Environment.

When negotiations for the environrnental commission began later that year, each of the three governments were adamant that the NAFTA would not be re- opened. Any agreements to address other issues would have to work alongside

NAFTA but stand alone as an independent agreement? Groups like Pollution Probe becarne instrumental in the Canadian negotiating position for the NACE. The

Govemment of Canada had not been particularly interested in pursuing a side-deal for the environmental commission, but bowed to pressure from environmental groups and the governments of the United States and Mexico, who were facing similar domestic pressures. Since they lacked an initial cornmitment to negotiating side deals, the

Govemment of Canada welcomed the input of organizations such as Pollution Probe which helped hem to develop a position to take into the negotiations.

Pollution Probe, as the lead organization promot ing an environrnental comrni~sion,~~took a very active role in promoting the idea of an environmental commission before Parliament. Furthemore, they were included on several advisory bodies to the federal governent including the National Round Table on the

Environment and the ~conorn~~~,the International Trade Advisory Cornmittee

- --- 86 Johnson and Beaulieu, p30. " Pollution Probe was by no means the only group to become involved in the debate sunounding the NAFTA and the side deal for the environment. They were however the leader in promoting a NACE. Other organizations such as the Sierra Club, Canada and the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) were very actively speaking out against NAFTA with or without an envuonmental commission. They were largely of the opinion that despite what agreements might be worked out, they could not be sufficient to overcome the damage that would be caused as a result of NAFTA. 88 As was noted by Donald Abelson, "membership to the National Round Table on The Environment and the Economy is based in individual expertise, not institutional affiliation. Organizations are not permitted (ITAC) and a number of Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade

(SAGITS)." In addition to their involvement on those advisory bodies, Pollution

Probe - largely through its Executive Director. Janine Ferretti - made nurnerous presentations and prepared a nurnber of documents for the federal governrnent promoting a trilateral commission on the environment. These presentations included testimony before the House of Cornons Subcornrnittee on International Trade on the

North Amencan Free Trade Agreement and the Environment, and presentations promoting the NACE to organizations such as the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto and the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at Carelton

~niversity.~~At the same time they were promoting the idea of an environmental commission through various Parliarnentary cornmittees and at different conferences,

Pollution Probe continued to have very close ties to the federd government. A nurnber of letten were sent to various Ministers along with briefings for the side deal negotiations.9'

membership ..." Janine Ferretti was a member of the Round Table while she was Executive Director of Pollution Probe until the fall of 1994 when she resigned to become the director of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. For more information see Abelson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.. .," p3 5 8 and p3 76. 89 Abelson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.. .," pp358-359; See also Johnson and Beaulieu, p29. 90 Janine Ferretti, "A Preliminary Review of the Environmental Provisions of the NAFTA," Paper presented to A Symposium on "Explaining and Assessing the NARA Agreement." Pollution Probe, October 8, 1992. 91 For further information see, Janine Ferretti, in a letter to Hon. Michael Wilson, Minster of Trade and Industiy, Science and Technology, dared March 3, 1993. A bief to the Minister, entitled "Elements of an ERective North American Commission on the Environment," Pollution Probe, March 4, 1993, was included with that letter; See also a Ietter to Hon. Michael Wilson from Pollution Probe, Friends of the Earth Manitoba Environmentalists, Sierra Club of Canada, the West Coast Environmental Law Association and Union qudbecoise pour la conservation de la nature dated June 9, 1993; and Letter to Hon. Tom Hockin, Minister of International Trade, July 30, 1 993. i It is interesting to contrast the relationship that Pollution Probe had with the

federal government to that which existed with the govemment of Ontario. The

contrast will help to provide Merevidence of the different relationships that can

exist between government decision-maken and non-govemmental organizations.

Pollution Probe attempted to establish similar relations with the Ontario govemrnent in order to increase the likelihood of the establishment of an effective environmental commission. They were however met with a cool reception since the government of Ontario had changed its position and decided that it would have nothing to do with NAFTA or the negotiation of the side dea~s.~~As has been previously mentioned, the governrnent of Ontario was vehemently opposed to NAFTA. It had aligned itself with other organizations who shared its opposition to NAFTA such as the

Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) and to a lesser extent other groups such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the ~arth.~~In January 1992, CELA won a contract with the Ontario govemrnent to research the environmental implications of

NAFTA." Their final report reinforced the position of the Ontario governrnent, and their opposition to NAFTA and the principle of free trade? As a result of that report, other Ontario ministries recognized the importance of having their viewpoints backed up by non-govemental observen and therfore commissioned CELA to provide

" See Donald E. Abelson and Michael Lusztig "The Consistency of Inconsistency: tracing Ontario's Opposition to the North Amencan Free Trade Agreement," The Canadion Journal of Political Science, XXIX:4 (December 1 W6),pp68 1-698. 93 Abelson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.. .," p359 & p370. 94 Abelson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.. .," p365. 95 lbid advice for them a~so.~~This Meradvances the argument that NGOs can be used, or often allow themselves to be used to either promote govemment agendas or add credibility to policies that the govemment would like to see implemented.

The relationship of CELA and Pollution Probe with the Ontario government helps to demonstrate another important point. Govemments have the ability to choose who will hish them with advice. In the case of the Governrnent of Ontario,

Pollution Probe, an organization that had established close ties to the federal govenunent, was almost entirely shut out of the process of providing advice to the

Governrnent of Ontario. Mile their research may have been sound and reliable, the

Ontario government had made the political choice to oppose NAFTA. The

Govemment of Ontario had no desire to participate at al1 in the negotiation process.

To do so would seem to lend tacit support to the process and the deal, something they were trying to avoid at al1 cost~.~'Pollution Probe had taken the position that in al1 likelihood, NAFTA was going to be passed and they therefore sought to promote the negotiation of an effective environmental commission. CELA, on the other hand had taken a stance similar to that of the Ontario govement and therefore, while the advice of Pollution Probe was welcomed at the level of the federal govemment, the Ontario

% In particular, CELA had particuIarly close ties to the Ministry of the Environment and Energy fiom whom they won the original contract, and the Ministry of Intergovermental Affairs and too a Iesser degree the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. For more information about the involvement of the different ministries who were involved in seeking the input of CELA and other groups, see Abelson, "EnvironmentaI Lobbying and Political Posturhg.. .," pp365-367. 97 AbeIson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.. .," p369 govemment focused its attention on CELA and its eagemess to provide reasons why

NAFTA was tlawed and mut not be supported at any ~ost.~'

The examples of both the federal government in Canada and the province of

Ontario are very useful in demonstrating how NGOs can be used in different ways.

They emphasize the lessons that can be ieamed along with the Amencan expenence with NAFTA negotiation process and demonstrate how NGOs cm be used as tools of policy promotion as well as a legislative tool, which is one of the rnost significant lessons to be taken from the Amencan experience.

Observations and Discussion

This case is very useful in explonng many different aspects of the policy community mode1 as outlined in the previous chapter. It demonstrates the changing nature of the relationship between government and non-governrnental participants in the policy-making process. More importantly, it provides a real example of the ways in which governrnents are increasingly attempting to find non-governmental organizations who are wiliing to work with hem in the promotion of various policy agendas. It is also interesting to note that while the second chapter of this work described a theoretical evolution in the activity between government and non- governmental actors, this case is very usehl in demonstrating each of the different stages in that evolution. NGOs had an important role lobbying both the U.S. and

Canadian govemment. They provided expertise in the development of negotiating

98 Abelson, "Environmental Lobbying and Political Postwing.. .," pp365-37 1 positions for both govements and they were used as tools either for the promotion of

NAFTA as a policy or as a legislative tool to promote the deal before Congress.

Furthemore, when considering the advocacy coalition mode1 discussed in conjunction with policy communities, this case snidy provides a very usefil exarnple that demonstrates that within a single policy community, there can be many diflerent advocacy coalitions. In the environmental community, there were not ody coalitions both promoting and opposing NAFTA and the side deals, there were independent coalitions on each side of the border and others which spanned the border with close ties intemationally.

The environrnental movement is extremely active in both Canada and the

United States. In fact, not only is it active within the two countries, there are extensive relations that exist among the NGOs across the Canada-U.S. border as well, as evidenced by the relationship that is shared by Pollution Probe and the National

Wildlife Federation. Janine Ferretti of Pollution Probe also emphasized this international relationship when she was promoting the NAFTA side deal on the environment and described the role of NGOs as 'kinati~nal."~~She stated that %ere was constant discussion among the environrnental NGOs of the three countries about substance and strategy. This was helpful not only in comrnunicating to negotiators similar messages, but also in enriching the position of ~~0s."'~~

It is also useful to observe that there was a similar level of use of NGOs by governent in both Canada and the United States during this process. In both Canada

99 Janine Ferretti, "A Preliminary Review of the Environmental Provisions...," p 1. and the United States, environmental groups took on an active lobbying role as a result of their determination that the environment would not be shut out of the process as it had been dwing the negotiation of the CUFTA. Early on, in the U.S., this role was assurned by some of the larger groups in partnenhip with several influentid

Congressional leaders who shared their reticence to promote a continental free trade agreement. The ties that were forged during this stage became particularly usehl later during the Presidential carnpaign when then Governor Clinton looked to those same groups to try to promote his own position during the elections. By calling for a strong side deal on the environment, Clinton began to address the concerns of the environmental cornrnunity and as a result found a strong ally to promote his own position. That relationship continued after Clinton was elected president and the

NWF played a key role in helping to provide early advice on the American negotiating position for the environmental side deal.

When one looks particularly to the Arnerican expenence. it is evident that

President Bill Clinton actively used the NGO cornmunity in the promotion of the

NAFTA and the side deals before Congress in order to assure the passage of the deal.

Environmental groups that had protested the activity of President George Bush and the way in which he was conducting the NAFTA negotiations eventually becarne close allies of the Clinton administration. Their opposition to Bush demonstrated the very important lobbying role that NGOs can have in the American political system. They had allied themselves with Democratic Congressional leaders who were also actively

. - . . ------.. . . 100 Janine Ferretti, "A Preliminary Review of the Environmental Provisions.. .," p 1. objecting to the NAFTA. Only when then Govemor Clinton began calling for effective side deals did those groups began to change their position so that they could support NAFTA and Clinton.

In Canada, a similar relationship emerged between Pollution Probe and the federal govemment. Pollution Probe became an important contributor to the Canadian position on the NAFTA environmental side deal. They tried to comrnunicate their advice for the most effective type of commission through testimony to various

Parliamentary cornmittees and briefings provided to Ministers. Despite some apparent reservations about the final deal,"' there is no question that Pollution Probe had an integral role in providing advice to the federal government on how such a commission should be created. The federal governrnent sought their advice and expertise and placed representatives of Pollution Probe in very important positions such as lTAC and the SAGITs. This highlights the ability of the federal govenunent to use Nossuch as Pollution Probe who had an expertise that the governrnent required to promote its own interests in the negotiation and creation of the Commission for Environrnental

Cooperation (CEC). 'O2

'O' It should be noted that when the side deals were concluded, Pollution Probe was not satisfied with the final result that emerged fiorn the talks. Immediately Janine Ferretti expressed the displeasure of Pollution Probe ctating that "We appreciate that the North American Environment Commission suggested by Pollution Probe and other groups at the outset of NAFTA negotiations has been adopted, but we are disrnayed that its powers have been severely Iimited. We had hoped the Commission would be able to illuminate environmental shortcomings, but instead of a spotlight, we've ken given a flashlight." See "NAFTA Environmental Side Deal: Good Container, Little Content," Press Release, Pollution Probe, Septernber 14, 1993. IO? The 'CEC' is now the name that is attached to the North American Commission for the Environment. The forma1 name of the side deal establishing the commission is the North American Agreement on Environmentai Cooperation WAAEC). The Commission is located in Montréal, QuCbec, Canada and is commonly referred to simply as the CEC. The current Director is Ms. Janine Ferretti, former Executive Director of Pollution Probe Canada. Finaily, the willingness of organizations such as the NWF and the EDF to participate in the promotion of the side deal on the environment once a deal had been concluded demonstrates another important tool that the govemment has at its disposal.

NGOs willing to cooperate with governrnent can be an effective tool for the promotion of legislation. President Clinton appeared very willing during the ratification process to allow groups such as the NWF and the EDF to speak on behalf of the deal before

Congress. Activity of this type by non-governrnental organizations can provide credibility to the legislation. It allows legislators to support a bill on the grounds that it has the support of experts outside of govemment and not simply the executive branch. This is a very important tool that the President has at his disposal. It is a role that NGOs took on almost exclusively in the United States and was not seen in the

Canadian experience. This is largely a result of the different legislative processes in

Canada and the United States. In the Canadian system, the federal govemment capitalized on the willingness of groups such as Pollution Probe to participate as a policy tool rather than a legislative tool. The task of promoting legislation before the

House of Commons was not necessary because of the much more stringent tradition of party discipline in Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien did not have to rely on the participation of environmental groups to get NAFTA passed through Parliament. He was able to do so because of the fact that the Liberai Party had just won a clear majority in the October 1993 elections - a position that gave him the legislative power to see any bill passed that he was willing put fonvard. Therefore, while

Chrétien did count on the participation of NGOs such as Pollution Probe as policy instruments during the process of negotiation of the side deal, he did not have the sarne need for them as a legislative tool that the U.S. president did.

While there has clearly been an evolution in the relationship between government and non-govemmentd actors, it can also be seen Born this case study that one stage of that relationship does not exist to the exclusion of others. This study has shown that members of the environmentai movement have acted as lobbyists for certain policies over others, have provided expert advice to the govemment and served as important policy resources. They have also allowed themselves to be used by policy-rnakers to promote political agendas. Conclusions and Implications for Furrher Studv

The policy-making process in Canada and the United States is an area that has

attracted considerable scholarly attention. This thesis has built on the exploration of

those processes. In reviewing the literature, an evolution in the relationship between

government and non-governrnental actors cm clearly be seen. The first stage in the

development of that relationship saw NGOs acting primarily as advocates of public

policy. Their function was to lobby government and bhg to light policies that

government decision-maken had either failed to consider or consciously avoided

examining. The second stage in the relationship between govemment and NGOs

witnessed a radical expansion of the decision-making process and the

institutionalization of non-govemrnental participants in the process of public policy development and the delivery of government services. NGOs were no longer

restricted to the periphery of the decision-making process. They became active participants and were essential sources of expertise to government decision-makers.

The case study outlined in Chapter Three provides Merinsight into the first two stages of the evolution of the relationship between government and non- governmental actors. However, the negotiation of the NAFTA side deal on the environrnent is most useful in highiighting what can been identified as a newly emerging stage in that evolution. The defming feature of this new stage in the policy- making process is the active recruitment by govemment policy-makers of non- governmental organizations for the purposes of promoting their political agendas.

The case study of the WTA environmentai side deal was usehl in illuminating these ideas because within that one policy issue, spanning a period of nearly four years, a number of different aspects of the policy comrnunity mode1 descnbed in the second chapter can be exarnined. Not only can that one case be used to iilustrate each of the three stages, it also demonstrates that one stage in the evolution of the policy-making process does not exist independently of the others.

During that four year period, a nurnber of NGOs served as policy advocates, policy resources and finally as policy instruments.

Methodoloeical Constraints

This thesis has provided a qualitative review of the nature of the relationship between government and non-govemmental actors. As such, it relies heavily on work that has preceded it, and on the author's interpretation of events that occurred during the negotiation of the NAFTA side deal. While there is extensive documentation throughout the case study in the third chapter, the interpretation of that information is subject to criticism and debate.

It is unlikely that any non-governmental organization is going to keely admit that it allowed itself to be used as an instrument of government officiais. Such an admission would almost certainly lead to a loss of credibility within the policy cornmunity and with the public at large. Without documentation demonstrating that non-governrnental organizations have allowed themselves to be used as instruments of govemment it is diEcu1t for analysts to establish such links. Therefore, this study has focused on corresponding activity between government and non-governmental participants in the negotiation process of the environmental side deal. While no specific admission of a group acquiescing to the govemment and allowing itself to be used to advance a political agenda has been cited, numerous examples have been identified where it appears that NGOs acted as very willing partners of government.

Second, this thesis set out to explore one case study - the negotiation of the environmental side deal of NAFTA. While that case has proven particularly usehl in demonstrating many of the ideas that the author wanted to establish, it is impossible to provide, especially in a quaiitative analysis, conclusive proof using only one data point. However, one case can be used effectively to demonstrate that a certain type of activity is occurring.

It should dso be noted that while this thesis focused on the NAFTA environmental side deal, that case does not exist in isolation. Additional examples could include the negotiation of the NAFTA labor side deal. There are more exarnples of this type of activity that are not related to international agreements such as NAFTA at all. For example, the relationship between the Canadian federal government and language rights groups, located primarily in Québec, could also be exarnined. Many of these organizations received considerable fundïng tkom the government in order to promote language rights issues. This relationship helps to provide fûrther insight into the way in which govemment uses non-govemmental actors to promote political agendas. A case in point would be the example of the

Department of the Secretary of State and Alliance Québec. an English language rights group in Québec. Alliance Québec was one of a number of groups that received fun& from the Secretary of State in order to promote English language rights within that province. '

Specific programs have also been established by govemment to assist interest groups to challenge government policies. The Court Challenges Program (CCP), established by the Government of Canada in the late 1970s, was instituted primarily

''to fund language rights cases.''2 The CCP would later be expanded to include interest group challenges to 7he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms afier its institution in 1982. Mile this program was abolished in 1992 and only recently re- instated, it provides a very interesting exarnple of the govenunent using, and in fact providing significant funding for, non-governmental organizations to empower them to challenge government policies.3

Im~licationsof this Studv

There are a number of areas where this study could have notable implications.

First, it raises the question of whether the use of non-governmental actors by policy- makers, as has been identified during the negotiation of the environmental side deal,

' For hirther information see among othen. Christopher P. Manfredi. "Constitutional Rights and lnterest Advocacy: Litigating Education Reform in Canada and the United States," in F. Leslie Seidle (ed.), Euuiîy and Communirv: The Charter. inferest advocacv and re~resentation,(Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), 1993). ' Ian Brodie, Interest Grour>s and the Suureme Court, PhD Dissertation, University of Calgary, (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1997), p94. represents activity limited to only a few examples, or whether such behavior represents a trend for the future. This thesis has attempted to illustrate that there has been an evolution in the relationship among govemments and non-governmental organizations. Such an evolution would suggest it cm be expected that such behavior will continue. In fact, there is evidence that a number of NGOs are recognizing the different ways in which the relationship between government and non-govemmental organizations is changing and are attempting to fil1 various niches within that

~rocess.~For exarnple, it is not uncommon for a group to serve as both policy advocate and expert.

Second, assurning that governments will continue to use NGOs to promote political agendas, there may be implications to the study of international relations. It may be useful to revisit the ideas of scholars such as Andrew M. Scott. Scott's work entitled, The Revolution in Stutecrafi: Intervention in and Aae of Interdependence' introduced the concept of infornul penetrution6 among actors on the international stage. The notion of informal penetration suggests that interaction between states occurs not only at the level of direct interaction between states, but also at a more informal level somewhere below - but possibly including - that of national

3 For a more in-depth exarnination of the Court Challenges Program see Brodie, ~~94-108. '' The different roles in the decision-making process were addressed ui the 2 chapter of this work. In addition to that chapter, further evidence of fiups attempting to fùlfill many roles within the policy-making process can be seen in James Rosenthal, "Heritage Hype: the Second Generation Think Tank," The New Revublic. Sepuneber 2, 1985; R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1989) pp.563-578; James G. McGann, "Academics to Ideologues: A Brief History of the Public Policy Research Institute," PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 25, no. 4 (Decernber 1992), pp. 733-740. 5 Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Intervention in and Ane of Interdependence. (Durham S.C.: Duke Press Policy Studies Paperbacks, 1982) 6 For a discussion of the idea of informa1 penetration, see Scott, pp 6-9. govemments. Given that suggestion, it is not implausible that the govemment of

Country A could attempt to use NGOs in Country B to influence the decision-makers of Country B. Particularly in the case that has been descnbed in this thesis, where a policy community spans national borden, Scott's theories complement Paul Pross's policy cornrnunity mode1 and the notion that governments can use NGOs to advance their own political agendas.

Third, this thesis has suggested that in trying to use NGOs to advance political agendas, government oficials can be selective in targeting groups they are going to align themselves with. Does this ability lead to a more or less democratic system?

Paul Pross argues that increasing the role of pressure groups in the decision-making process has led to a more democratic process. This thesis has implied that govemments have the ability to circumvent the democratic process by recruiting those groups they feel will support their agenda. This allows them to move fonvard, giving the public the impression that a policy has the support of members of the non- govenunental cornmunity. Activity of this type would appear to be a direct affront to public participation in the democratic process. And yet, it continues unchallenged.

Finally, this thesis has also demonstrated that within a given policy community, there may be several distinct advocacy coalitions. It could be argued that competing coalitions provide the check on government 's manipulation of the policy- making process. This has not been demonstrated to be the case considering the negotiation of the environmental side ded of NAFTA. The experience of Pollution

Probe with the Ontario govemment would clearly counter such a suggestion. The Ontario government having made a political decision to oppose NAFTA, aligned itself with other groups such as CELA which had taken a similar position against

NAFTA. Pollution Probe, despite its efforts to brhg forward the pro-side deal agenda in Ontario, was alrnost completely shut out of the process.

Ouestions for Future Studv

While this thesis has advanced the discussion of the government policy- making process, it also gives rise to a nurnber of new questions. Perhaps the most important question to arise from this study is how do policy-makers decide which groups to recruit? Much more research is required in this area to detemine what are the variables that are most important when considering which groups will be most usehl to government. The types of factors that would need to be considered in such a study might include: 1) The size and membership of the group. 2) The quality of expertise. What sorts of expertise does a group need to be able to provide in order to promote an agenda? Does it have to be able provide its own independent research in support of a policy, or simply be an active proponent of an idea that has already been established by govemment decision-rnakers? 3) Political affiliation. Most interest grclips tend to avoid being attached to a specific political party for the obvious reason that when that party is no longer in power, that group will no longer have the same access it had with the former governing party. How dependent is the selection of a group on the government in power? Do governments continue to retum to the same group to help advance their agendas, or do policy-makers seek the inclusion of a number of different groups over a penod of tirne?

Having considered why govements choose the groups they do, an equally interesting question is why do groups allow themselves to be used by govemment?

What do groups have to gain or lose by aligning themselves with government in the promotion of a cornmon agenda? What are the most important benefits that a group can gain from partnerships with govemment? Financial? Access? Influence? Does a partnership with govemment increase or decrease the credibility of interest groups in the eyes of the public, or other members of a policy cornmunity? In order to answer questions of this nature, a great deal more snidy mut be conducted on these groups.

Significant survey research would help to illuminate the motivations that drive the participation of different interest groups when considering whether or not to enter into such partnerships. At the very least, such research would help to shed additional light on the changing dynamics of interest group / government behaviour.

While many of these questions need to be explored mer, this thesis has nevertheless demonstrated that NGOs have now become a very important instrument of govemment in the promotion of political agendas. Secondaw Sources

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