July 18, 2001

OFFICE OF THE HEARING EXAMINER KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON 850 Union Bank of California Building 900 Fourth Avenue Seattle, Washington 98164 Telephone (206) 296-4660 Facsimile (206) 296-1654

FIRST1 DECISION ON CODE ENFORCEMENT APPEAL

SUBJECT: Department of Development and Environmental Services File No. E0100105

MICHAEL RICHARDS Code Enforcement Appeal

Appellant: Michael Richards, represented by Jon G. Schneidler, Attorney at Law 4100 Wells Fargo Center, 999 Third Avenue Seattle, WA 98104 Telephone: (206) 624-9400 Facsimile: (206) 464-9559

King County: Department of Development and Environmental Services, Site Development Services Division, Code Enforcement Section, represented by Chris Tiffany 900 Oakesdale Avenue SW Renton, WA 98055-1219 Telephone: (206) 296-7049 Facsimile: (206) 296-7055

EXAMINER PROCEEDINGS:

Hearing Opened: June 7, 2001 Hearing Closed: July 9, 2001

Participants at the public hearing and the exhibits offered and entered are listed in the attached minutes. A verbatim recording of the hearing is available in the office of the King County Hearing Examiner.

1 The parties agreed to divide the issues of this case in such a manner as to require a second report. This first report addresses occurrences prior to service of stop work order. The second report will address allegations of activities following stop work order issuance.

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ISSUES/TOPICS ADDRESSED:

Sensitive areas Stop work order Wetlands Grading Wetland buffers Clearing

SUMMARY:

Denies appeal from stop work order regarding clearing and filling within protected sensitive areas (wetlands) and associated buffer areas.

FINDINGS:

1. Stop work order served. On February 3, 2001 the Department of Development and Environmental Services (“Department” or “DDES”), represented by Chris Tiffany, Site Development Specialist, posted a stop work order at 4615 West Lake Sammamish Parkway. The stop work order required all persons on the premises to stop activities related to clearing/excavation or filling without the required grading permit. It further advised that, in order to bring this property into compliance, it would be necessary to “apply for and obtain a grading permit, restore sensitive areas and their buffers.” Since service of the stop work order, DDES claims additional prohibited activities have occurred. Those allegations are not addressed in this report. See footnote no. 1.

2. Appeal filed. Michael Richards (“Appellant”), contract purchaser of the subject property, timely filed appeal from the stop work order. Mr. Richards’ appeal makes the following arguments:

a. At the outset of these proceedings, the Appellant contended that the County had not established the property as a legal wetland. However, the Appellant later conceded that at least a small portion of the property, lying along its northernmost boundary, qualifies as wetland. However, the Appellant argues that the wetland was created pursuant to the regulatory exemptions described below.

b. The Appellant argues that water flowing south from I-90 and “trapped on the property by the failure of the government to maintain the drainage ditch and the culvert along West Lake Sammamish Parkway,” thereby creating a wetland, is exempt due to language contained in KCC 21A.06.1415 (the code definition of wetland). Specifically, the Appellant argues that, using KCC 21A.06.1415 language, the wetlands at issue do not include artificial features created from non-wetland areas including “wetlands created after July 1, 1990, that were unintentionally created as a result of the construction of the road, street or highway.”

c. The Appellant argues further that due to “limited clearing of the property continued annually to permit fruit to be harvested from the fruit trees,” the clearing activity at issue in this review is exempt from a grading permit requirements pursuant to KCC 16.82.050.A.17 and KCC 21A.24.050.B.2.

d. Finally, based upon the circumstances of the contract seller, Loretta Lewis, the Appellant asks for equitable relief.

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Appellant Richards is a landscape professional and performed or caused to be performed the work at issue in this review.

3. Wetland characteristics. The Appellant does not disagree with the Department’s determination that a wetland exists along the northern boundary of the subject property. However, the Appellant takes a rather restrictive view of the extent of wetlands. Neither the Appellant nor the Department offer evidence of specific wetland boundaries. A wetland delineation study, by which such boundaries are determined, has not been conducted.

However, the hearing record contains considerable evidence of a wetland comprising the northern portion of the subject property. A King County Tax Assessor’s map of the area (exhibit no. 7) shows the wetland boundary extending southward from West Lake Sammamish Parkway Southeast right-of- way 100 to 150 feet.2 The general boundaries of the wetland depicted in the Tax Assessor’s map roughly correspond to the “upland” and “lowland” areas of the property that can be seen in the photographic exhibits of record (see for instance, exhibit nos. 5-6, 5-11 and, particularly, exhibit no. 18-26). The photographic evidence also shows a substantial presence of wetland obligate and wetland facultative plants generally within that area: horsetail, red alder, dogwood, skunk cabbage, Oregon ash, salmonberry, willow, and sedge. Exhibit nos. 10 and 5; testimony, Hanson and Douglas.

Site inspections conducted by DDES staff (Tiffany; Douglas) confirmed the presence of all wetland indicators required by Washington State and Federal Wetland Identification systems; that is, hydric soils, hydrophytic vegetation and water inundation or saturation (even if only seasonal). Gleyed, mottled, and dark rich organic soils are present in the area generally described as the wetland area identified in the tax assessor map. The dark, rich organic soils at those locations where sample holes were dug on the property were at least 12 inches deep. The DDES staff, educated and trained in wetland assessment, testifies that the depth of these dark rich organic soils means that the wetlands have been present for a very long time – many decades or even longer. Even with intentional composting, such depths of organic soil will not be achieved in the short run. Nor will inundation due to a plugged street culvert for a decade or two create such depths of hydric soils.

Only two of the three indicators are required to establish the presence of a wetland. The presence of hydric soils and hydrophytic vegetation as described in this finding thus far, certainly accomplishes that. The saturated soils are certainly present, a fact that is not disputed in this record. There is considerable disagreement, however, regarding how the water got there. See finding no. 4, following.

Mrs. Lewis testified that her husband did not plant crops in the lower portion of the property adjacent to West Lake Sammamish Parkway Southeast because it was “too wet.” Douglas testified that application of organic material in the form of compost would not cause the uniform coloration of the top ten inches of very dark brown soil. Hanson, King County Senior Ecologist and wetlands expert,

2 We are uncertain as to how that boundary delineation was determined. Tax Assessor maps are generally for the purpose of locating properties and features, not for identifying accurate measurements. Typically, the Tax Assessor places wetland boundaries on a property, identifying the general dimensions and area of the wetland, as a basis for reducing taxes for that portion of the property ownership. Neither the Appellant nor the Department researched that aspect of this case, however. Neither the Appellant nor his witness, Mrs. Lewis, knew whether a sensitives areas related tax reduction benefit accrues to this property.

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testified that it would take many years to develop the depth of organic material found. Tiffany testified that the soil characteristics match the description of Norma soil series, a hydric soil. The King County Soil Survey map prepared by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Soil Conservation Service) indicates that one should expect Norma-type soils on the property, exhibit nos. 28 and 29.

4. Presence of water. The Appellant argues that the water presence results from a (previously) plugged culvert under West Lake Sammamish Parkway Southeast. Once the Appellant unplugged that culvert, he testifies, much of the water drained away. Further, he states, it continues to drain. In addition, the Appellant offers exhibit no. 24 which plots various elevations on the subject property. From this spot elevation survey, the Appellant draws the conclusion that the water somehow climbs up the hillside from the approximate elevation of 100 feet (actually a range from 98.5 feet to 101.67 feet) to 103.5 feet when the culvert is blocked. The Department responds that, “this is not physically possible;” that is, that it defies fundamental laws of physics, that water runs down hill and seeks its own level. The Appellant replies that the stoppage of “branch ditches” created the problem. This argument is based on the notion that the roadside ditch filled with mud and debris which, in turn blocked the ditches on the subject property that drained to the roadside ditch. The hearing record lacks hard corroborative evidence regarding the source of the waters which saturate the northern portion of the subject property. The Appellant argues that the water comes from Interstate 90 due to a broken commitment made by WSDOT when it acquired I-90 right-of-way from Mr. & Mrs. Lewis. The warranty deed granted to WSDOT by Clifford and Loretta Lewis contains the following proviso:

As a further consideration the State and/or its agents agree, during the construction of this project, to permanently stop the flow of water into the culvert on the southerly side of the highway. The outfall from said culvert is at or near a point opposite and northerly of highway engineer’s station LL640.20 on the LL line survey of said highway project.

The language of this proviso is interesting because it discusses a culvert entry on the south side of I- 90. This distinction makes clear that the water received via that culvert is not “new” I-90 storm runoff. Rather, the culvert accommodates flows from further upland and south of both the subject property and I-90. This interpretation is consistent with the Tax Assessor’s map (exhibit no. 7) which shows a stream thread running generally from southwest to southeast under I-90 and through the subject property. That stream thread appears to drain the wetland located in Sammamish Hills, south of the I-90 corridor, abutting the south boundary of Southeast Newport Way (also depicted in exhibit no. 7). See, also, aerial photographs in evidence. These facts make clear that the water entering the Lewis/Richards’ property from the south has flowed that direction for a very long time and certainly before I-90 construction during the 1970s and 1980s. Combining this historical circumstance with the other wetland identification information of record (see finding no. 3, preceding) easily supports a finding that although a blocked culvert on West Lake Sammamish Parkway Southeast could reduce drainage rates and thereby increase the quantity of standing water along the roadside during peak storm season, such a culvert blockage cannot explain away the historical drainage patterns across the subject property and cannot explain away the substantial presence of hydric soils (not to mention hydrophytic vegetation). In exhibit no. 22-A2, Mrs. Lewis also indicates that when the I-90 predecessor Sunset Highway was constructed, “the state piped water under the highway from a spring we had used for years on the back of our property.”

5. The extent of work at issue. The Department has not contended that the Appellant moved more than 100 cubic yards of earth material or cut deeper than three feet or filled more than five feet.

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Thus, the stop work order at issue is not based upon an assertion that the Appellant exceeded the general requirements for a grading permit. Rather, the stop work order is based upon activities undertaken within a wetland area. Within such areas – “sensitive areas” regulated pursuant to KCC 21A.24 – any clearing or grading may be cause to require a grading permit. The photographs of record, particularly exhibit nos. 5 and 18 clearly document extensive clearing of the subject property within the wetland portion of the subject property. Although the wetland boundaries are disputed, the extent of clearing work is not. As mentioned earlier, however, the Appellant argues that the work shown in the photographs is exempt from grading permit requirements. The photographs show recently-dug and/or “cleaned” ditches networking upland from the Sammaish Parkway roadside ditch, extensive cleared areas interrupted occasionally by hydrophytic [wetland] vegetation, and the recent application of substantial quantities of pea gravel on much of the cleared area. The Appellant testifies that the application of pea gravel is a first step in “soil preparation.”

6. Agricultural history. The contract seller, Mrs. Lewis, and her husband conducted some “agricultural” activities on the property since the late 1920s or 1930s. The record is unclear as to whether the agricultural activity on the property should be more properly categorized as commercial or as home gardening. Mrs. Lewis indicates that by 1988 they had abandoned that activity for health reasons. Since that time, the northern portion of the property has lost that garden appearance and assumed the wetland vegetation pattern extant before the Appellant began the activities that were stopped by DDES in February of this year. Some photographs of the property show Mr. Lewis with mounds of vegetation which at first blush appeared to be “hay,” but which were identified as bull rushes, similar to exhibit nos. 30 and 31, by DDES experts. Several fruit trees are also located on the property. The Appellant argues that because Mrs. Lewis or friends of hers have picked fruit from some of those trees from time to time, the property should still be regarded as “agricultural.” DDES takes the position that the act of clearing a narrow path to a fruit tree which is otherwise lost in dense wetland vegetation and brambles certainly may qualify that tree as a continued agricultural use, but does not qualify the remainder wetland acreage.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The preponderance of evidence amply shows that wetlands comprise a substantial portion of the subject property – approximately the most northern 100 to 150 feet at the very least. The fact that Appellant Richards accomplished substantial clearing of this area without any permits is uncontested. See finding nos. 3, 4, and 5 above. Rather, the dispute in this review centers around whether the work undertaken by the Appellant was exempt from permit requirements.

2. The work undertaken by the Appellant – clearing, ditching and pea gravel application – is not exempt due to any definitional exclusion contained in KCC 21A.06.1415, which states in relevant part:

Wetlands do not include artificial features created from non-wetland areas including, but not limited to irrigation and drainage ditches, grass-lined swales, canals, detention facilities, wastewater treatment facilities, farm ponds and landscape amenities, or those wetlands created after July 1, 1990 that were unintentionally created as a result of the construction of a road, street, or highway (emphasis added).

The Appellant argues that this exemption may be read to include wetlands created after July 1, 1990 even if the construction of a road, street or highway occurred prior to that time. That interpretation

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may be acceptable, but is not useful in making a conclusion in this case. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the wetland was not created by construction of any road, street or highway. It is the area of poor drainage referred to in Mrs. Lewis’ testimony. It is the wetland shown in the Tax Assessor’s map. The evidence strongly suggests that it is hydrologically connected as a receiving catchment of waters from the spring located on the southern portion of the Lewis property (prior to acquisition by WSDOT) and connected to the wetland south of Newport Way. Not to mention the 10 inch depth of organic wetland soil (which, expert testimony reveals, cannot accumulate in a mere 10 years). All of these facts are contained in the record and are reviewed in the findings above. They conclusively lead to the conclusion that the wetland at issue here substantially predates I-90 construction or the plugged West Lake Sammamish Parkway Southeast culvert. Thus, there is no basis for exempting the work undertaken by Mr. Richards pursuant to the road-street-highway exemption contained in KCC 21A.06.1415.

3. The clearing, ditching and pea gravel application work undertaken by the Appellant is not exempt as normal and routine maintenance. The Appellant seeks permit exemption pursuant to KCC 16.82.050.A.17.A, which states:

Within sensitive areas, as regulated in KCC 21A.24, the following activities are exempt from the clearing requirements of this chapter and no permit shall be required;

a. Normal and routine maintenance of existing lawns and landscaping subject to the limitations on the use of pesticides in sensitive areas as set out in KCC 21A.24.

The Appellant argues that he was doing nothing more than undertaking normal and routine maintenance of the landscaping established by decades of gardening and fruit tree growing on the subject property. This question is not new to DDES. Consequently, the Department, pursuant to KCC 2.98 (Administrative Rules) issued “DDES Administrative Code Interpretation No. 12” contained in this hearing record as exhibit no. 20. The Department in that administrative interpretation sets out a clear and easily understandable distinction between “normal and routine maintenance” and more substantial activity. The Department bases its interpretation in part upon ordinary dictionary definitions (Unabridged Random House Dictionary) for “maintenance,” “normal” and “routine.” The definition for “routine” is particularly instructive: customary or regular course of procedure, common place tasks, chores, or duties done at regular intervals. The findings above amply show that what this Appellant has undertaken far exceeds “routine” care. As the Department’s Administrative Interpretation No. 12 states at page 2:

Normal maintenance is clearly seen as a preventative measure.

Moreover, a clear distinction is made between “maintenance” and “repair.” Whereas maintenance is preventative, repair is restorative.

Demonstrating that the Department did not make up this stuff all by itself it refers in Administrative Interpretation No. 12 to the Shoreline Management Act definition of normal and routine maintenance, in which WAC 173-14-040(B) states, in part:

. . . . normal maintenance includes those usual acts to prevent a decline, lapse, or cessation from a lawfully-established condition. Normal repair means to restore a development to a state

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comparable to its original condition within a reasonable period after decay or partial destruction except where repair involves total replacement which is not common practice.

As the Department’s interpretation states further at page 2:

These definitions lead one to consider normal and routine maintenance as commonplace activities carried out at regular intervals to provide upkeep or support. By definition, maintenance means that a facility would not fall into disrepair to begin with.

The Department obviously has given this matter consideration and thoughtful review. This interpretation is sound and reasonable. In such circumstances, the Department’s interpretation of its own rules will be given deference or substantial weight. The bottom line, then, is that the extensive and substantial work undertaken by Appellant Richards as shown by the photographs in evidence cannot by any measure be regarded as “normal and routine maintenance.” The clearing, ditching and pea gravel application activity undertaken by the Appellant is not exempt from the provisions of sensitive areas protection pursuant to KCC 21A.24.050.B. That provision exempts the following:

a. Agricultural activities as described below, in existence before November 27, 2990, and performed not less often than once every five years thereafter:

(1) Mowing of hay, grass or grain crops; (2) Tilling, discing, planting, seeding, harvesting, soil preparation, crop rotation and related activities for pasture, food crops, grass seed or sod if such activities do not take place on steep slopes; (3) Normal and routine maintenance of existing irrigation and drainage ditches not used by salmonettes; (4) Normal and routine maintenance of farm ponds, fish ponds, manure lagoons and livestock watering ponds; and (5) Grazing by livestock.

We have already established that there is nothing about this operation which may be regarded as “normal and routine maintenance.”

4. Certainly, agricultural or gardening activities occurred on the subject property prior to 1990. However, with the exception of picking fruit generally within the upland areas, the agricultural/gardening use of the property has not been normally and routinely maintained for 12 or 13 years – substantially beyond the five year window provided by KCC 21A.24.050. The Appellant’s argument that occasional fruit picking exempts this entire clearing operation – however “restorative” – cannot be accepted. The Department correctly responds that the pruning and maintenance of such fruit trees is exempt from sensitive areas regulation when a path has been hacked through the blackberries and other vegetation to reach the fruit trees. That highly selective “maintenance” effort, however, cannot justify disregarding sensitive areas regulations as they apply to the remainder of the property.

5. No equitable relief will be granted to Appellant Richards. He owns a landscape company employing approximately 100 employees. He clearly knew or should have known of the sensitive areas restrictions on the property. His hearsay conversation with The Watershed Company, Environmental

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Consultants, provides no basis for exemption or equitable relief either. In fact, when The Watershed Company told him that the area was “seismic” – another category of protected sensitive area – he most certainly should have known as an earthwork professional that he needed to consult with DDES.

The Appellant cites Rodriguez v. Department of Labor and Industries, 85 Wn. App. 949, 540 P.2d 1359 (1975) to argue that equitable relief is due in this case. The decision below will not be based upon any language contained in that decision for two reasons (at least). First, Rodriguez is concerned with “extreme illiteracy” and mental incompetence, considerations which are wholly unrelated to this case. Second, by adopting KCC 23.36.030 and KCC 23.32.050, the Metropolitan King County Council established and strictly limited the Examiner’s equitable authority. From Chaussee v. Snohomish County Council, 38 Wn. App. 630, 689 P.2d 1084 (1984) and similar cases we learn that the Examiner has no more authority than the express or implied authority granted legislatively to the office.

KCC 23.32.050 which allows waiver or reimbursement of civil fines and penalties under certain circumstances, none of which have been argued by this Appellant. KCC 23.36.030.B states:

If an owner of property where a violation has occurred has affirmatively demonstrated that the violation was caused by another person or entity not the agent of the property owner and without the property owner’s knowledge or consent, such property owner shall be responsible only for abatement of the violation. Strict compliance with permit requirements may be waived regarding the performance of such an abatement in order to avoid doing substantial injustice to a non- culpable property owner.

In this case, Mrs. Lewis, the property owner and presumed beneficiary of any equitable relief that might be granted, did not personally undertake the land-clearing actions at issue. Nor is she the responsible or culpable person. Nor is she the Appellant.

Also, KCC 23.02.130.A requires, in part, “it shall be the responsibility of any person identified as responsible for code compliance to bring the property into safe and reasonable condition to achieve code compliance.” KCC 23.02.130.B provides some equitable relief provided that,

If a property owner affirmatively demonstrates that the action which resulted in the violation was taken without the owner’s knowledge or consent by someone other than the owner or someone acting on the owner’s behalf, that owner shall be responsible only for bringing the property into compliance to the extent reasonably feasible under the circumstances. Should the owner not correct the violation, only those abatement costs necessary to bring the property into a safe and reasonable condition, as determined by the Director, shall be assessed by the County. No civil fines or penalties shall be assessed against such an owner or his/her property interest.

The record in this case shows conclusively that Appellant Richards cleared the property, including the wetland area, at Mrs. Lewis’ request. However, there certainly is no evidence that she ever desired anyone to undertake any unlawful activity. Rather, it shows that she placed immense trust in him. She should be granted the full extent of relief provided by KCC 23.02.130 and KCC 23.36.030.B. Appellant Richards, on the other hand, has no basis for such relief.

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DECISION:

The appeal of Michael Richards from the stop work order dated February 3, 2001 is DENIED.

ORDER:

A. The stop work order of February 3, 2001 is reinstated.

B. To this date, no civil penalties have accrued.

C. Appellant Richards is directed to immediately resolve all violations by filing complete application, including all fees then due, for required permits, consistent with KCC 16.82 and KCC 21.A.24. The complete grading permit application shall be filed with DDES no later than August 20, 2001 or civil penalties shall be imposed consistent with Section D. of this order.

D. Civil penalties due shall be determined administratively by DDES consistent with the assessment schedule established by KCC 23.32.010. All civil fines and civil penalties shall be paid by Michael Richards, not Loretta Lewis. Further, any liens which may be established pursuant to this order shall be placed upon the real or personal property of Michael Richards, not Loretta Lewis.

E. Nothing in this order shall be construed as precluding abatement by the County or prosecution of this matter in any other manner provided by law.

ORDERED this 18th day of July, 2001.

______R. S. Titus, Deputy King County Hearing Examiner

TRANSMITTED this 18th day of July, 2001, by Certified mail to:

Michael Richards Jon G. Schneidler Loretta Lewis 18826 SE 42nd Street Attorney At Law 200 Newport Way Issaquah, WA 98027 999 Third Avneue #4100 Issaquah, WA 98027 Seattle, WA 98104

TRANSMITTED this 18th day of July, 2001, to the following parties and interested persons:

Loretta Lewis Michael Richards Jon G. Schneidler 200 Newport Way 18826 SE 42nd Street Attorney At Law Issaquah, WA 98027 Issaquah WA 98027 999 Third Avenue #4100 Seattle, WA 98104

Roger Bruckshen Randy Sandin Heather Staines DDES/BSD DDES/LUSD DDES/BSD Code Enforcement Section Site Development Services Code Enforcement-Finance MS OAK-DE-0100 MS OAK-DE-0100 MS OAK-DE-0100

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Chris Tiffany DDES/LUSD Site Development Services OAK-DE-0100

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

The action of the hearing examiner on this matter shall be final and conclusive unless a proceeding for review pursuant to the Land Use Petition Act is commenced by filing a land use petition in the Superior Court for King County and serving all necessary parties within twenty-one (21) days of the issuance of this decision.

MINUTES OF THE JUNE 27, 2001 PUBLIC HEARING ON DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES FILE NO. E0100105 – MICHAEL RICHARDS:

R. S. Titus was the Hearing Examiner in this matter. Participating in the hearing and representing the Department were Chris Tiffany and Dan Douglas. Participating in the hearing and representing the Appellant was Jon G. Schneidler. Also articipating in this hearing were Michael Richards (Appellant), Loretta Lewis, property owner and Jon Hansen, Sr. Ecologist, Department of Natural Resources.

The following exhibits were offered and entered into the record:

Exhibit No. 1 Staff report to the Hearing Examiner, dated June 7, 2001 Exhibit No. 2 January 9, 2001: Complaint information filed by Jon Hansen Exhibit No. 3 January 31, 2001: Complaint file cover sheet Exhibit No. 4 February 3, 2001: Stop Work Order and Appeal Exhibit No. 5 February 3, 2001: Photographs of the site Exhibit No. 6 February 13, 2001: Email response from Jon Hansen Exhibit No. 7 King County Assessor’s map of subject parcel Exhibit No. 8 1996 Aerial photo of the site from the DDES GIS Exhibit No. 9 2000 Aerial photo of the site from the DDES GIS Exhibit No. 10 February 14, 2001: Site map prepared by Chris Tiffany Exhibit No. 11 February 23, 2001: Notice and Statement of Appeal Exhibit No. 12 April 5, 2001: Pre-Hearing Conference Order Exhibit No. 13 April 20, 2001: Notice of Continued Pre-Hearing Conference Exhibit No. 14 April 27, 2001: Pre-Hearing Order Exhibit No. 15 May 11, 2001: Memo to Dan Douglas Exhibit No. 16 Aerial photo of the site dated 7/16/90 from Walker and Associates Exhibit No. 17 Aerial photo of the site dated 10/7/00 from Walker and Associates Exhibit No. 18 May 15, 2001: Photographs taken by Dan Douglas Exhibit No. 19 Stereo pair of aerial photos of the site dated 6/25/85 Exhibit No. 20 DDES Administrative code Interpretation Number 12 Exhibit No. 21 Case file notes Exhibit No. 22 A-1 Conceptual Plan by Rich Landscaping A-2 Notes from Loretta Lewis A-3 Pictures of the Lewis property A-4 Picture of fruit A-5 Picture of the Lewis Property

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A-6 Picture of goats on Lewis property A-7 Pictures of Lewis property A-8 Pictures of Lewis property A-9 Aerial photo of Lewis property A-10 Parcel description of Lewis property Exhibit 23 Appellant’s Hearing Memorandum Exhibit 24 Site map Exhibit 25 Fax from Paul F. Figueroa, WA State Dept. of Agriculture Exhibit 26 Material Safety Data Sheet Exhibit 27 Recognizing Wetland Hydrology from WA State Department of Natural Resources- Defining Wetlands Exhibit 28 Soil Survey from US Department of Agriculture issued November 1973 Exhibit 29 Hydric Soils of the United States from US Department of Agriculture Exhibit 30 Recognizing Wetlands-Wetland Grasses and Grass-Like Plants from WA State Department of Natural Resources Exhibit 31 Picture of Wetland Plants of the Pacific Northwest

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