Naval War College Review Volume 56 Article 18 Number 3 Summer 2003 The eP nobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and theMassachusetts Conspiracy of 1779 James B. Goodman Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Goodman, James B. (2003) "The eP nobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and theMassachusetts onC spiracy of 1779," Naval War College Review: Vol. 56 : No. 3 , Article 18. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/18 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOOK REVIEWS 171 Goodman: The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and theMassachuse attack out to three hundred miles from inherited Stalin’s schemes and built up naval bases, and to limit Soviet Kuznetsov’s fleet, extensive deploy- land-based air support. In 1946, ments did not replace deeply held Kuznetsov’s close associate Admiral positional and defensive assumptions. Vladimir Alafuzov developed a posi- Had Stalin’s “oceanic” fleet actually tional scheme of supremacy under been built, whether a shift of orienta- land-based air cover up to one hun- tion by him or his admirals toward dred miles from naval bases, and con- “global naval power” would have oc- ditional sea control by large surface curred remains undemonstrated and vessels with limited air support in a problematic. “far zone” out to three hundred miles. WILLARD C. FRANK, JR. This fell short of command of the ex- Old Dominion University panses of the Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas or of most of the Sea of Japan. Only submarines with long endurance could operate in the open ocean, but Stalin preferred medium submarines, Buker, George E. The Penobscot Expedition: Com- conceived for operations in near seas modore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspir- against an amphibious threat. The pro- acy of 1779. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, jected battleships would have had an 2002. 195pp. $32.95 operational radius only half that of In the various history books on the their contemporaries in oceanic na- American Revolution, the Penobscot vies. Only current Italian battleships, expedition is rarely mentioned in any also designed for near seas, had such detail, being overshadowed by the more limited autonomy. To operate across widely known and successful battles the open ocean was a ludicrous con- and campaigns. Perhaps this is due to cept to Stalin in 1945, arguing for a the dismal outcome of this early joint defensive posture for at least ten to fif- amphibious operation and to the desire teen years to come. Stalin’s projected by some, especially Massachusetts poli- “large sea and oceanic navy,” to use ticians of the time, to forget what had the Soviet term, was likely created for happened. a hoped-for more robust traditional This hastily conceived expedition was strategic defensive in contiguous seas. launched from Boston in July 1779. The The evidence in this book, if not its expedition was given the task of ex- title, lends support to Herrick’s judg- pelling the mounting British military ment of a Stalinist strategy of limited presence on coastal Maine, centered command of the near seas. To suggest around Penobscot Bay, but specifically that it was “the first step on the road at Castine. The expedition set off with to global naval power,” as does series full expectation of success on the part editor Holger Herwig in the preface, of the Massachusetts political leader- would require Stalin and his navy to ship. But from the beginning, the force demonstrate a conceptual leap for assembled was hampered by inadequate which neither had shown a proclivity. leadership, divided command author- Mind-sets resist change. Even in the ity, poor training and support, and a navy of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003 1 172 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 18 significant lack of understanding of the loss of almost forty ships, recrimina- tactical situation. In this book, George tions were made against various leaders, Buker, a retired Navy commander, pro- including allegations against naval force fessor of history, and an accomplished commander Captain Dudley Saltonstall author, provides a significant account of responsibility for the overall result; of this much overlooked effort by the and against Paul Revere, an icon of the combined forces of the Massachusetts Revolutionary War who served in the and Maine militia, Continental Navy expedition as a lieutanant colonel in and Marines, and various privateer charge of the artillery, of unsoldierly groups. Buker also provides an interest- conduct. In the end, it was Captain ing glimpse of the internal politics and Saltonstall who bore the brunt of the personalities of the colonies, especially smear campaign by Massachusetts poli- in Massachusetts during the American ticians to shift the blame. Revolution. He further provides a com- In the final chapters, and through the plementary argument that the Massa- lens of history, Buker argues that in- chusetts political authorities, when deed a conspiracy by the Massachusetts confronted with the dismal failure of politicians, through their committee of the expedition, set in motion an inquiry inquiry, manipulated the results of their that may have been a conspiracy of po- investigation and attempted to influ- litical self-interest. ence the outcome of the court-martial The book appears well researched, with of Saltonstall by Continental Navy au- significant endnotes and bibliography. thorities. Their efforts ensured the de- Reading almost like a novel, it tells the sired results of exonerating their native story of the Penobscot expedition in son, militia general Solomon Lovell, great detail and addresses the issues that and provided the justification needed to led up to its failure and the resulting in- assess the Continental government for a quiry. In appropriately titled chapters portion of the monetary cost. Buker, Buker provides a historical overview however, provides technical and tactical leading up to the expedition, including reasons that may have led to the failure the British policy, orders for military of the expedition. Further, he indicates operations along coastal Maine, and, that only Captain Saltonstall fully ap- of course, the colonial response to the preciated the tactical and operational threat to the extended territory of circumstances, as well as the limited ca- Massachusetts, now the state of Maine. pability of his resources and ships in the As expected, the majority of the book confined waters around Penobscot Bay. deals with the actual operations, from These considerations were evidently ex- outfitting and the order of battle to the cluded or ignored by the politicians in assaults and resulting siege at Castine, their single-minded desire to find a to the hasty retreat and then rout of co- scapegoat for the failure. lonial forces when superior Royal Navy Overall, this is a fine historical account- forces arrived, and finally to the sequel, ing of this chapter in American history. in which the expedition’s personnel My one large criticism is that the one walked back to Massachusetts from simple map provided is inadequate for Maine after burning their ships. After a full understanding of the operations. the failure of the expedition and the This reviewer has the benefit of having https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/18 2 BOOK REVIEWS 173 Goodman: The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and theMassachuse been stationed in Castine, Maine, and is attack, endures brutal weather, and cre- geographically aware of the area; I have ates an increasingly difficult political walked the earthen ramparts of Fort situation for senior national security George and the various other entrench- leaders who believe the Pepperdogs are ments around Castine. It would have risking diplomatic solutions. There is at been most helpful to the general reader one point the suggestion that even the had additional detailed military maps murder of one Marine would not be been included with each phase of the worth upsetting diplomatic peace ini- expedition. Well placed photographs of tiatives. The Pepperdogs make political the area would have further added to matters worse by leaving a path of de- the historical understanding of the struction while ignoring direct orders events, as would photos of the various to end their chase. earthworks, trenches, the defensive Setbacks are many, but perseverance canal, and Fort George, which all still and tactical teamwork always (well, al- exist as historical landmarks. most always) gets them out of tight JAMES B. GOODMAN spots. One remembers those great mo- Commander, U.S. Navy ments when the cavalry arrived and Naval War College everyone cheered. But this team is dif- ferent from the cavalry; the Pepperdogs take performance-enhancing drugs and rarely need to rest. One team member creates an Internet website that pro- West, Bing. The Pepperdogs. New York: Simon & vides the public with real-time informa- Schuster, 2002. 365pp. $25 tion on their progress and problems. The Pepperdogs ranks with The Hunt for The public cheers them on, reducing Red October. It is a work of fiction con- the policy-making flexibility of political structed around reality, brimming with leaders. West skillfully introduces the action and genuine insight into the Internet as a source of potential direct emerging warfighting capabilities of the information from individuals in the new ground soldier. West develops his battle to the public. That information story around a Marine reconnaissance would have obvious constraining effects team. That team, the “Pepperdogs,” is on future national security decision- made up of six reservists of varying ci- making latitude and would yield differ- vilian backgrounds; all have extraordi- ent perspectives on progress and nary courage, physical and mental problems.