Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice. Thomas E
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University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1973 Utilitarianism and distributive justice. Thomas E. Gilbert University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Gilbert, Thomas E., "Utilitarianism and distributive justice." (1973). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2234. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2234 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE A Dissertation "by THOMAS E. GILBERT Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY June 1973 Philosophy Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 (c) Thomas E. Gilbert 1973 All Rights Reserved ii https://archive.org/details/utilitarianismdiOOgilb . UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE A Dissertation By THOMAS E. GILBERT Approved as to style and content byj i=^=£_ Lawrence Foster (Chairman of Committee) C, Vere C . Chappell (Head of Department) ^Robertobert Ackermann (Member)I Ann Brentlinger (Member)(M&m June 1973 iii j m Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice University of Massachusetts (June 1973) Thomas E. Gilbert, B. A., Momingside College M. A., University of Massachusetts Directed by: Dr. Lawrence Foster John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory has been subject to criticism- by philosophers, partly because of its alleged inability to account for intuitively compelling principles of justice. It is argued that Mill has been seriously mis- interpreted and that a careful analysis of (primarily) On L iberty and U_ci_l . t i ; ar an i s results in an interpretation of his theory which avoids these objections. A utilitarian theory is developed which is based on this interpretation and which, it is argued, Mill could have accented. After an account of familiar objections to utilitari- anism concerning distributive justice, it is demonstrated that Mill's argument in Util it arianism for a "qualitative pleasure distinction" is plagued with difficulty and that, even if successful, appeal ~co qualitative distinctions among pleasures for determining the morality of actions would re- sult in additional problems for utilitarian theory concern- ing distributive justice. These additional problems are avoided by demonstrating that Mill did not regard his IV argument for a qualitative pleasure distinction as an argu- ment for a necessary consideration--in addition to quantity --for determining the morality of actions; rather, that he is more plausibly interpreted as having considered qualitative pleasure distinctions only in a prudential context--for ap- peal to in determining the prudential rightness and wrong- ness of actions. Consequently, contrary to what has often been supposed, Mill's argument for a qualitative pleasure distinction cannot be regarded, as a major departure from a utilitarian theory like Bentham's. Next, it is demonstrated that Mill, as an empiricist, ma.de a distinction between what is called "metaphysical” and "non-metaphysical" rightness; recognition of this distinction, along with additional considerations, makes it obvious that Mill’s utilitarian theory is committed to a theory of intrin- sic value which holds that "happiness" has intrinsic value, where the substantive content of happiness is to be regarded as unknown. Consequently, Mill (unlike Bentham) does not re- gard 'pleasure' as equivalent to 'happiness,' and so sub- scribes to a eudaemonistic , not a hedonistic, utilitarian theory. A principle of utility is developed which corres- ponds to each kind of rightness; it is then aruged that jus- tice can plausibly be associated only with the principle based on non-metaphysical rightness; that the theory should be re- jected or accepted only by considering justice in accordance v with this nrinciDle and that Mill's theory has erroneously bean rejected because only the other principle of utility- based on metaphysical rightness—has been considered. !o explicate this new (non-metaphysical) principle of utility, it is argued that Mill regarded 'unjust actions' as violations of rights' and associated our moral obligation to be just with the two necessary conditions for happiness—the righ u bo life and the right to liberty. With the principle of utility fully explained, it is shovrn how the utilitarian theory which has been develoned can account for intuitively acceptable principles of dis- tributive justice. A non-utilitarian theory of social jus- tice propounded by William K. Frankena is shown to be deriv- able from the utilitarian theory v/hich has been developed, and attention is focused on the objections and "Canons of Diotributive Justice" in Nicholas Reseller' s Distributive Justice . Finally, it is argued that David Lyons' concept of "fair procedures" (from his Forms and Limits of Utilitarian - i_sm) is contrary to his claim— a principle of distributive justice that can be derived from our utilitarian theory, and employed to resolve additional problems concerned with dis- tributive justice. A brief addendum explains how the theory can function as either an act- or a rule-utilitarian theory. vi C 0 N T E N T S CHAPTER I DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS A PROBLEM FOR UTILITARIANISM . 1 Section I: Some Traditional Problems and Their Cause . 1 Section II: The Qualitative Pleasure Distinction .... 10 Sub-section II-A: Mill's Problematic Argument for the Qualitative Pleasure Distinction 10 Sub-section II-B: Theoretical Objections to the Qualitative Pleasure Distinction from the Stand- point of Distributive Justice 24 Section III: Ideal Utilitarian Theories--Implausible Alternatives 32 CHAPTER II MISCONCEPTIONS OF MILL'S UTILITARIAN THEORY. ... 3? Section I: The Quantitative and Qualitative Hierarchy Misconception 37 Sub-section I-A: The Extensional Equivalence of Quantitative and Qualitative Hierarchies 40 Sub-section I-B: Theoretical Objections to a Quantitative Hierarchy 45 Sub-section I-C: Mill's Position with Respect to Hierarchies 49 Section II: The Metaphysics of Right Action for Utilitarianism and the Problem of Justice 66 Sub-section II-A: The Right to Life and a Utilitarian Conception of Objective Rightness ... 67 vi 1 Sub section II-B: The Distinction Between Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical Rightness 79 Section III: The Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical Distinction in Mill's Theory / ^uo-section III-A: Utilitarianism as a Theory of Intrinsic Value According to Narveson Sub-section III-B: Mill's Theory of Intrinsic Value --Y/hat Happiness Is: An Open Question oub-section III-C: Mill's Theory of Intrinsic Value —The General Happiness .... ? . Sub-section III-D: Effect of Mill's Theory of Intrinsic Value on the Calculation of Consequences 126 Sub-section III-E: Objectively Rightq, Objec- tively Righto, and the Principle of Utility- Corresponding to Each. Sub-section III-F: Justice--Associated With Only One of the Principles ......... 151 CHAPTER III THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY AND THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR HAPPINESS . 154 Section I: Harm as a Violation of Rights 154 Section II: The Right to Life l 6 l Sub-section II-A: A Corollary to the Principle of Obligation 161 Sub-section II-B: Violation of Any Right: Jus- tified Only by the Corollary ~ 166 Section III: The Right to Liberty I 76 Sub-section III-A: Mill's Commitment to the Right to Liberty 177 Sub-section III-B: The Justifiable Extent of Liberty 181 viii — CHAPTER IV A UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT 0? DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 192 Section I: Reseller's Objections to Utilitarianism . 192 Section II: Frankena's Theory of Social Justice. 210 Sub-section II-A: Frankena and Perelman Equality as the Basic Concept of Justice 210 Sub-section II-B: The Derivability of Frankena's Basic Theory from Utilitarianism 216 Section III: The Utilitarian Theory of Distributive Justice--0ther Considerations 222 Sub-section III-A: A Utilitarian Analysis of Reseller's "Canons of Distributive Justice" .... 222 Sub-section Iil-B: The Problem of Merit 233 Sub-section III-C: The Preemptive Status of Justice 237 Section IV: Fair Procedures 242 Sub-section IV-A: A Utilitarian Principle of Distributive Justice 243 Sub-section IV-B: A Solution to Some Problems of Distributive Justice 253 ADDENDUM 261 BIBLIOGRAPHY 266 IX CHAPTER I DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS A PROBLEM FOR UTILITARIANISM Section I Some Traditional Problems and Their Cause Historically, most critics of utilitarianism have alleged that one of its major defects is an inability to account for intuitively acceptable principles of justice. Among the various kinds of justice, the principles of dis- tributive justice have been central to this claim. As it will be maintained that the source of any difficulty re- garding distributive justice is inherent in "classical** formulations of the principle of utility, it is desirable to begin by explaining what is meant by categorizing a formulation of the principle of utility in this way. A principle of utility is "classical” if it is formu- lated as either a hedonistic or an ideal principle. Thus, the formulation of the principle is such that the utility of an action is determined by its production of some in- trinsic good(s), where the latter is something substantive which always serves as the criterion for determining whether an action is right, wrong, or obligatory. As a hedonistic principle, only pleasure (happiness) is regarded as intrin- sically good? as an ideal principle, there is more than one intrinsic good (perhaps including pleasure). In the former, then, pleasure is always appealed to for determining the 2 utility of any action; in the latter, whatever intrinsic goods are appealed to are determined by the particular ideal theory employed and are the same for each case of determin- ing the utility of any action. A "classical " formulation of the principle of utility may be an act- or rule-utilitarian principle.