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The Rise of Religious Radicalism in the Arab World: Significance, Implications and Counter-Strategies

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The Rise of Religious Radicalism in the Arab World: Significance, Implications and Counter-Strategies The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan The Deposit Number at the National Library (2014-12-5641) 218 The Rise of Religious Radicalism (Amman: 2015) The Rise of Religious Radicalism in the Arab World: Significance, Implications and Counter-Strategies. Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015 (120) p. Deposit No.: 2014/12/5641 Descriptors: /Islamic// Arab World/ يتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولية القانونية عن محتوى مصنفه وﻻ يعبر هذا المصنف عن رأي المكتبة الوطنية أو أي جهة حكومية أخرى. Published in 2015 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 11194 Amman Jordan Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Not for Sale © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. Translation: Tyler Huffman Cover: Ramzi Al Arabi Printing: Dar Al Jeel Al Arabi Publishers ISBN: 978-9957-484 -46-0 The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editor. Table of Contents Foreword 7 Anja Wehler-Schoeck Radicalism in Retreat or on the Rise? Mohammad Abu Rumman: Is It “Al Qaeda Spring?” 9 Beshir Abdel Fattah: Popular Revolutions and the Rise of Religious Radicalism in the Arab World 25 Radical Movements in the Arab World Lebanon Bissane El Cheikh: The Tension of the Sunni Environment in Lebanon Produces Individual Extremism … Not Organized Terrorism 47 Hazim Al Amin: Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon 54 Jordan Murad Batal Al Shishani: Salafi Jihadis in Jordan and the Effects of the Conflict in Syria 60 Iraq Haider Saeed: The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham in Iraq: Integrating the Sunni Policy in the Salafist Ideology 67 Egypt Amr Hashim Rabie: Radical Islamist Movements in Egypt 85 Tunisia Alaya Allani: Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia and the Cost of Terrorism 92 Radical Movements in Europe ElHakam Sukhni: Reasons for and Forms of Radicalization of Young Muslims in Germany 107 Report on the Conference Proceedings 111 Biographies of the Authors 125 5 6 Foreword Anja Wehler-Schoeck Resident Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq The last decades of the 20th century saw a continuous rise of radical Islam. The year 1979 marked the start of a new era with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led to Jihadis joining the Mujahideen from many Muslim countries around the world. With the establishment of Al Qaeda at the end of the 1980s, the first terrorist network was created, which no longer limited itself to attacks in specific countries or regions but developed a global aim. This rise of radical Islam can be attributed to a multitude of factors. Among them are the search for identity and recognition, the feeling or experience of marginalization – both politically and economically, opposition to secular nationalist ideologies, frustration with regimes that are perceived as apostate and corrupt, the weakness of educational systems, only to name a few. Several war-torn countries, where the state has lost control of part of the territory, have served as virtual breeding grounds for terrorists, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and more recently Iraq and Syria. Terrorist groups have also improved their mechanisms of propaganda and recruitment. With the recent Arab revolutions, many observers had hoped that Al Qaeda and its affiliates would lose ground. This was mainly based on the assumption that many followers would be diverted from the path of radicalism and violence through the observation that change could be achieved by peaceful means. However, things developed quite to the contrary. Radical Islam has profited from a dramatic increase in popularity the last few years, and Al Qaeda and its affiliates like Jabhat al-Nusra as well as its split-offs, namely ISIS, have witnessed what Mohammad Abu Rumman ably describes as “Al Qaeda Spring”, having undergone a period of adaptation. The terrorist network has moved from a phase of a single Al Qaeda into one of multiple Al Qaedas operating independently on numerous fronts. With this volume, we are publishing several of the papers, which were presented at our 2014 conference on “The Rise of Religious Radicalism in the Arab World”. The papers present different perspectives on radicalization in the aftermath of the recent Arab revolutions and crises. Mohammad Abu Rumman describes the impact of the Arab Spring on radical Islam and analyzes the transformations, which terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups have undergone since then. Beshir Abdel Fattah argues that not only did the recent Arab revolution not prove a hindrance to radical Islam but 7 that, quite the contrary, radical Islamist organizations have grown and diversified since then. Bissan El Cheikh analyzes the environment for extremism in Lebanon against the backdrop of the Sunni-Shia divide. Hazem al-Amin portrays the case of a young Lebanese man who was involved in the suicide attack against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut in 2014. Murad Batal al-Shishani addresses the different phases of the relationship between the Salafi Jihadi groups and the state in Jordan. Haider Saeed outlines the stages of the rise of ISIS in Iraq. Amr Hashim Rabie examines the rise of Jihadi movements in Egypt after the fall of President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013. Alaya Allani explains the spread of terrorist groups and activities in Tunisia following the Arab Spring and discusses its economic and security implications. ElHakam Sukhni provides a perspective on Muslim radicalization in Europe by describing the Salafi scene in Europe. The book concludes with a summary of the conference proceedings, highlighting the most relevant questions and answers from the discussions. FES Amman has created a line of work dedicated to Political Islam to shed light on the various streams and trends, and to promote an educated discourse on Islamist movements. In this context, a publication series was launched in 2007, under which ten books have been published to date. Through these publications, we aspire to provide information on Islamist movements, which both satisfies academic standards and is, at the same time, accessible and understandable to a non-expert readership We wish you an interesting and insightful read, and thank you for your interest in the events and publications of FES Amman. 8 Is It “Al Qaeda Spring”? Mohammad Abu Rumman Introduction In contrast to the initial expectations and indications that emerged with the beginning of the democratic Arab Spring revolutions, the recent years have seen an increase and spread of Al Qaeda and other organizations that are linked to it and adopt its beliefs and ideology. These organizations all descend from radical Political Islam, whether they are recognized as part of Al Qaeda or are simply compatible with its foundations based on ideological Islamic rhetoric, within what has become known as the Salafi Jihadi movement. This movement became remarkably strong in the internal Syrian conflict and regained its power and presence in Iraq, as it entered into a military confrontation with the Iraqi military. Furthermore, it was able to reinforce its presence in other areas, such as Yemen and Somalia, where it enjoys huge capabilities despite the strikes it has received over the past years. A similar increasing role for the organization now seems to be emerging in Libya, as the latter’s political and security situations deteriorate. The paradox lies in the fact that Al Qaeda itself was seriously concerned when the Arab revolutions erupted, especially after the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. Al Qaeda’s organizational and intellectual leadership feared that these revolutions could create a huge setback for the group, as Arab societies would be adopting democracy and opting for peaceful change. However, the situation witnessed a complete turnaround. Instead of the fears and concerns of losing popularity that occupied Al Qaeda members, the organization actually found a vast space to operate in Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and managed to attract many new members and supporters. These indicators on the spread and expansion of Al Qaeda raise two questions that may stand behind this current rise. The first is linked to the factors and reasons that explain this new rise, while the second is linked to future indicators in light of current developments. Namely, are we heading toward the “radicalization” of the arena (i.e. the spread and diffusion of the radical current), or is this rather just a temporary situation and not a hole that Arab societies will be trapped in in the future? 9 This paper aims to answer the aforementioned questions, as well as any others that might arise along the way, by addressing and investigating the following issues: 1. The situation of Al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadi current on the eve of the democratic Arab revolutions and the articulated changes and shifts they have gone through since the September 11 events. 2. Al Qaeda immediately after the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions. 3. Regaining popularity and geographic spread. 4. People’s wagers in the face of tricky options. From Unity and Uniformity to Spread and Pluralism If we want to summarize the situation of Al Qaeda on the eve of the Arab revolutions, we must reference two primary shifts: The first shift is represented in the restructuring of the strategy of Al Qaeda itself following the Afghan war, which led to the death of several of its leaders, the displacement of most of them, and the arrest of others. The war also resulted in Al Qaeda losing its political impunity in Afghanistan, and disrupted ties between the organization’s leaders on the one hand, and its followers and supporters outside Afghanistan on the other hand.
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