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XVI legislatura

Materiali su temi attuali di politica estera

settembre 2008 n. 39

ufficio ricerche nel settore della politica estera e della difesa

Servizio Studi Direttore Daniele Ravenna

Segreteria tel. 6706_2451

Uffici ricerche e incarichi Documentazione

Settori economico e finanziario Documentazione economica Capo ufficio: ------Emanuela Catalucci _2581 M. Magrini _3789 Silvia Ferrari _2103 Simone Bonanni _2932 Questioni del lavoro e della salute Luciana Stendardi _2928 Capo ufficio: M. Bracco _2104 Michela Mercuri _3481 Domenico Argondizzo _2904 Attività produttive e agricoltura Capo ufficio: ------Documentazione giuridica Vladimiro Satta _2057 Ambiente e territorio Letizia Formosa _2135 Capo ufficio: R. Ravazzi _3476 Anna Henrici _3696 Gianluca Polverari _3567 Infrastrutture e trasporti Chiara Micelli _3521 Capo ufficio: F. Colucci _2988 Antonello Piscitelli _4942

Questioni istituzionali, giustizia e cultura Capo ufficio: ------A. Sansò _3435 S. Biancolatte _3659 S. Marci _3788

Politica estera e di difesa Capo ufficio: ------A. Mattiello _2180

Questioni regionali e delle autonomie locali, incaricato dei rapporti con il CERDP Capo ufficio: F. Marcelli _2114

Legislazione comparata Capo ufficio: V. Strinati _3442

______I dossier del Servizio studi sono destinati alle esigenze di documentazione interna per l'attività degli organi parlamentari e dei parlamentari. Il Senato della Repubblica declina ogni responsabilità per la loro eventuale utilizzazione o riproduzione per fini non consentiti dalla legge. I contenuti originali possono essere riprodotti, nel rispetto della legge, a condizione che sia citata la fonte.

XVI legislatura

Materiali su temi attuali di politica estera

settembre 2008 n. 39

a cura di: A. Mattiello hanno collaborato: V. Satta, S. Bonanni, L. Stendardi, G. Polverari

Classificazione Teseo: Relazioni internazionali. Politica estera.

AVVERTENZA

Il presente dossier è stato predisposto in occasione dell’Informativa resa dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri al Senato della Repubblica il 17 settembre 2008 sui più recenti sviluppi della politica internazionale. La raccolta di documentazione intende offrire spunti di riflessione su alcuni temi di politica internazionale, quali la crisi del Caucaso, la situazione in Afghanistan, in Iraq e i recenti sviluppi dei rapporti italo-libici. Particolare attenzione è dedicata alla questione della crisi in Georgia, dove viene proposta una cronologia degli eventi più recenti affiancata da alcune schede informative, un’ampia raccolta di documenti delle organizzazioni internazionali (UE, NATO, ONU, OSCE, Consiglio d’Europa), nonché una selezione di articoli di dottrina. Elementi informativi più sintetici e maggiore selezione dei documenti e dei contributi dottrinari vengono riservati agli altri temi suindicati. In relazione al tema dei rapporti italo-libici, non essendo disponibile il testo del Trattato di amicizia e cooperazione, si è ritenuto opportuno riprodurre una breve rassegna stampa utile a reperire, tra l’altro, elementi informativi sulle clausole del Trattato stesso.

Su altri temi non contemplati nel presente fascicolo, si ricorda che i più recenti dossier disponibili sono i seguenti:

• sulla questione mediorientale e sugli sviluppi relativi ai singoli Paesi, Osservatorio mediterraneo e medioriente, n. 24, (a cura del Servizio studi e del Servizio Affari internazionali del Senato);

• in merito al Trattato di Lisbona:

- Il Trattato di Lisbona: nota introduttiva e testo a fronte con le disposizioni dei Trattati vigenti. Dossier n. 83, dicembre 2007 (a cura del Servizio Affari internazionali, Ufficio dei rapporti con le istituzioni dell’UE);

- Lo stato delle ratifiche del Trattato di Lisbona. Dossier n. 5DN, giugno 2008, (a cura del Servizio Affari internazionali, Ufficio dei rapporti con le istituzioni dell’UE);

• in relazione al G-8 (di cui l’Italia assumerà la presidenza nel 2009): G-8: un forum di governance mondiale? Contributi di Isituti di ricerca specializzati, (a cura del del Servizio studi e del Servizio Affari internazionali del Senato), n. 93, maggio 2008.

Si ricorda infine che i predetti dossier sono disponibili in formato elettronico nel sito Internet del Senato, nonché su Intranet per gli utenti interni.

I N D I C E

GEORGIA

La crisi in Georgia. Cronologia dei principali avvenimenti. Aprile - settembre 2008, (a cura del Servizio studi del Senato)..... Pag. 3 Rapporti tra l’Unione europea e la Russia, (a cura dell'Ufficio rapporti con l'UE della Camera dei deputati) ...... " 11 Le aree principali del conflitto, (a cura del Servizio Rapporti Internazionali della Camera dei deputati)...... " 29 Elementi sulla situazione in Georgia, aggiornati a martedì 19 agosto 2008, (a cura del Ministero degli affari esteri)...... " 35 Resoconto stenografico delle Comunicazioni rese dal Ministro Frattini il 26 agosto 2008 alle Commissioni esteri di Camera e Senato sulla situazione in Georgia...... " 39

DOCUMENTI

Consiglio dell'Unione europea, Consiglio europeo straordinario del 1° settembre 2008 (conclusioni della Presidenza)...... " 51 Consiglio dell'Unione europea, Extraordinary meeting - General Affairs and External Relations (Conclusioni del Consiglio sulla situazione in Georgia), Bruxelles, 13 agosto 2008...... " 57 NATO, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters - Statement, Bruxelles, 13 agosto 2008...... " 67 Nazioni Unite, Resolution 1808 (2008), 15 aprile 2008...... " 71 Nazioni Unite, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 23 luglio 2008...... " 75 Nazioni Unite, Georgia UNOMIG Mandate, scheda illustrativa della missione reperibile presso il sito delle Nazioni Unite: www.un.org ...... " 93 OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision n. 861, Increasing the number of military monitoring officers in the OSCE mission to Georgia, 19 agosto 2008...... " 95 OSCE, Consiglio Permanente, Decisione n. 334, 15 dicembre 1999 ...... " 99 OSCE, Mission to Georgia - Overview, scheda illustrativa della missione reperibile presso il sito dell'OSCE: www.osce.org ...... " 103 Consiglio d'Europa, Comunicato stampa 589(2008), Il Commissario Hammarberg in visita in Russia e in Georgia per valutare la situazione dei diritti umani e l’accesso all’assistenza umanitaria, 21 agosto 2008 ...... " 105

CONTRIBUTI DI ANALISI E DOTTRINA

International Crisis Group, Russia vs Georgia: the Fallout, Europe Report n. 195, 22 agosto 2008 ...... " 109 Congressional Research Service, Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, 13 agosto 2008, in http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html...... " 159 D.J. Smith, Non solo petrolio: la Georgia nella Nato conviene anche a Mosca, in "Limes: Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica", n. 4, 2007 ...... " 179 P. Migliavacca, La Russia, l'energia, la Georgia e l'Europa, in "Affari Esteri", n. 153, anno XXXIX, gennaio 2007...... " 187

AFGHANISTAN

Scheda Paese, "Afghanistan. Sviluppi recenti" (a cura del Ministero degli Affari Esteri) ...... " 203 La situazione in Afghanistan. Note di politica internazionale, n. 3, 29 maggio 2008 (a cura del Servizio Studi della Camera dei deputati) ...... " 207 Le missioni militari in Afghanistan. Difesa - Missioni militari, n. 2, 29 maggio 2008 (a cura del Servizio Studi della Camera dei deputati) ...... " 211

DOCUMENTI

Consiglio dell'Unione europea, 16 giugno 2008 ...... " 217 Consiglio dell'Unione europea, 18 luglio 2008 ...... " 223 Consiglio dell'Unione europea, 23 luglio 2008 ...... " 239 ONU, Consiglio di sicurezza, Risoluzione n. 1746 del 23 marzo 2007 ...... " 253 ONU, Consiglio di sicurezza, Risoluzione n. 1776 del 19 settembre 2007...... " 259 ONU, Consiglio di sicurezza, Risoluzione n. 1806 del 20 marzo 2008 ...... " 263 ONU, Consiglio di sicurezza, Risoluzione n. 1817 dell'11 giugno 2008 ...... " 271

CONTRIBUTI DI ANALISI E DOTTRINA

CeSI (a cura di), Afghanistan: punto di situazione, Contributi di Istituti specializzati (a cura del Servizio Affari internazionali e Servizio Studi del Senato), n. 94, giugno 2008 ...... " 279 International Crisis Group, Taliban propaganda: winning the war of world?, Asia Report n. 158, 24 luglio 2008 ...... " 299

LIBIA

Scheda sui rapporti italo-libici (tratta dal sito Internet del Ministero Affari Esteri) ...... " 347 Libia. Aspetti economici (tratta dal sito Internet dell’Ambasciata italiana a Tripoli) ...... " 349 Libia. I rapporti bilaterali Italia-Libia (tratta dal sito Internet dell’Ambasciata italiana a Tripoli) ...... " 353 Comunicato Governo italiano su accordo Italia-Libia agosto 2008 " 365 Sintesi discorso Presidente del Consiglio, on. Silvio Berlusconi, alla firma del Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra Italia e Libia, agosto 2008 ...... " 367 Testo del Comunicato Congiunto Italia-Libia del 1998 ...... " 369 Interrogazione a risposta scritta. Camera –Legislatura XV- n. 4/00411 ...... " 371

CONTRIBUTI DI ANALISI E DI DOTTRINA

A. VARVELLI, L’Italia, la Libia e l’indebolimento del rapporto privilegiato, ISPI Policy brief, n. 97, luglio 2008 ...... " 377 A. SINAGRA, La “normalizzazione” dei rapporti Italo libici e i diritti dei rimpatriati, anno 1999 (tratto dal sito Internet della Associazione Italiana Rimpatriati dalla Libia) ...... " 385

RASSEGNA STAMPA RELATIVA ALL’ACCORDO ITALIA-LIBIA ...... " 393

IRAQ

Camera dei Deputati. Servizio Rapporti Internazionali, Iraq, Scheda Paese n. 27, settembre 2007 ...... " 421 IAI (a cura di), Il conflitto in Iraq. Prospettive da Washington, Contributi di Istituti specializzati, n. 83 (a cura del Servizio Studi e del Servizio Affari Internazionali del Senato), dicembre 2007 ... " 441

GEORGIA

La crisi in Georgia. Cronologia dei principali avvenimenti (aprile - settembre 2008)

Nel corso del vertice Nato di Bucarest (2-4 aprile 2008), gli Stati dell'Alleanza atlantica respingono temporaneamente la candidatura di Georgia e Ucraina al Membership Action Plan, primo passo in vista dell’ingresso nell’Alleanza. Tuttavia il Segretario generale della Nato Jaap de Hoop Scheffer annuncia l'avvio di un dialogo ad alto livello per affrontare le questioni ancora aperte, sottolineando il forte impegno da parte dell'Alleanza affinché il procedimento di adesione vada a buon fine. Il 16 aprile un comunicato del ministero degli Esteri russo rende noto che il Presidente uscente Vladimir Putin ha dato istruzione ai suoi ministri e ad altre agenzie statali di stabilire “relazioni ufficiali” con le controparti delle regioni secessioniste georgiane d’Abkhazia e Ossezia del Sud. Il portavoce del Ministero degli Esteri russo Mikhail Kamynin fa sapere che la Federazione Russa non intende entrare in conflitto con la Georgia, quanto piuttosto “di prendersi cura degli interessi delle popolazioni dell’Abkhazia e dell’Ossezia del Sud, inclusi i cittadini russi che vivono lì”. Il Segretario generale della Nato, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, e l’Alto Rappresentante per la Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune dell’Unione Europea, Javier Solana, esprimono profonda preoccupazione per l'iniziativa di Mosca. Lo stesso giorno, il portavoce del Dipartimento di Stato USA, Sean Mc Cormack, ribadisce il fermo sostegno di Washington all’integrità e sovranità territoriale georgiana. In un discorso al Consiglio dei Ministri il successivo 17 aprile, il Presidente georgiano Mikhail Saakashvili definisce "una provocazione" l'ordine impartito da Putin. Il 20 aprile la Georgia annuncia che un caccia Mig-29 russo ha abbattuto un aeroplano radiocomandato che volava sopra l'Abkhazia. La Russia nega il proprio coinvolgimento ma un'inchiesta Onu confermerà la versione georgiana dell'accaduto. Il 29 aprile la Russia invia truppe in Abkhazia per contrastare un ipotetico attacco georgiano. Il 21 maggio si svolgono in Georgia le elezioni politiche. Il Movimento Nazionale, il partito del Presidente Saakashvili, raggiunge il 59% dei voti superando abbondantemente la maggioranza parlamentare di due terzi, necessaria per emendare la costituzione. L'opposizione contesta i risultati e non mancano segnalazioni di criticità nel procedimento elettorale da parte degli osservatori Osce. A partire dalla metà di giugno, intanto, aumentano le tensioni in Ossezia del Sud e in Abkhazia. Mosca definisce un "atto di aggressione" gli attacchi ad alcuni villaggi e alla città di Tskhinvali, capoluogo dell'Ossezia del sud, da parte delle truppe georgiane. Secondo le fonti di Mosca, sarebbero state le forze georgiane ad iniziare le ostilità, mentre Tbilisi respinge categoricamente l'accusa di aver iniziato le ostilità. Il giorno 8 luglio caccia russi sorvolano l'Ossezia del Sud all'interno dello spazio aereo georgiano.

3 Il 10 luglio il Segretario di Stato americano Rice, in visita a Tbilisi, esprime pieno sostegno alla Georgia nel far fronte alle tendenze separatiste in Abkhazia e nell'Ossezia del Sud. Ai primi di agosto la crisi georgiana precipita. Il 1° agosto cominciano intensi scontri tra le forze georgiane e quelle dell'Ossezia del Sud. Il 3 inizia l'evacuazione dei civili osseti verso la Russia. Il 5 l'ambasciatore di Mosca, Yuri Popov, avverte Tbilisi che la Russia interverrà in caso di esplosione di un conflitto. Il 6 agosto truppe georgiane entrano in Ossezia del Sud. Il 7 agosto il presidente georgiano Saakashvili offre un cessate il fuoco: a seguito del fallimento di tale proposta le truppe georgiane attaccano la capitale sudosseta Tskhinvali. Il giorno successivo, l'8 agosto, la Russia invia altre forze in Georgia per respingere tali attacchi. Il Presidente russo Medvedev dichiara che difenderà i compatrioti russi. Il 9 agosto le forze russe lanciano raid aerei e via terra in territorio georgiano e il Parlamento di Tbilisi approva un decreto presidenziale che dichiara lo stato di guerra. Il 10 agosto la Georgia dichiara il cessate il fuoco unilaterale. La Presidenza francese, a nome dell'Unione europea, avvia la mediazione per la fine delle ostilità e il Ministro degli esteri francese Kouchner arriva a Tbilisi per avviare il dialogo. L'11 agosto il G-7, il gruppo dei sette Paesi più industrializzati, chiede alla Russia un cessate il fuoco immediato. Il 12 agosto il Presidente russo Medvedev ordina la fine dei combattimenti perché "l'aggressore è stato punito e ha riportato perdite cospicue". La Russia annuncia inoltre che le sue truppe manterranno le posizioni raggiunte in Georgia. La Georgia dichiara di aver bisogno di una prova maggiore dell'interruzione delle ostilità da parte della Russia e che resterà pronta per qualunque nuovo attacco. Poco dopo aver annunciato la fine delle operazioni, Medvedev incontra il Presidente francese Sarkozy, giunto a Mosca in veste di mediatore. Lo stesso giorno si riunisce, in sessione straordinaria, il Consiglio Nato che esprime forte preoccupazione per la crisi in Georgia, condanna l'uso sproporzionato della forza da parte russa e sostiene la sovranità e l'integrità territoriale della Georgia. La Nato conferma l'appoggio all'azione dell'Osce e dell'Unione europea finalizzata alla cessazione immediata delle violenze e al raggiungimento di una soluzione politica della controversia. Il 13 agosto i Ministri degli esteri dell'Unione europea riuniti a Bruxelles esprimono pieno sostegno ai tentativi della Francia, in qualità di Paese che detiene la presidenza di turno dell'Unione europea, di trovare una soluzione al conflitto fra Russia e Georgia. Viene inoltre dato il via libera all'invio eventuale di osservatori Ue sul posto. Il piano di pace europeo si articola in sei punti: impegno a non ricorrere alla forza per la soluzione della controversia in Georgia; cessazione immediata dei combattimenti; via libera all'arrivo di aiuti umanitari; rientro delle forze armate georgiane nelle caserme; ritiro delle forze russe nelle posizioni che ricoprivano prima della guerra; apertura di un dibattito internazionale sullo status di Abkhazia e Ossezia del Sud.

4 Lo stesso 13 agosto, il Presidente americano George W. Bush annuncia una "missione umanitaria", coordinata dal Pentagono con mezzi aerei e navali, per aiutare le zone della Georgia disastrate dagli attacchi russi e chiede il pieno rispetto, da parte della Russia, del cessate il fuoco. Il 14 agosto l'Ue si dichiara disposta ad effettuare un'azione di monitoraggio ed il Ministro degli esteri Frattini annuncia la disponibilità ad ospitare una conferenza di pace a Roma. Il piano di pace viene sottoscritto prima dalla Georgia (15 agosto), indi dalla Russia (16 agosto). Con il viaggio del Segretario di Stato Rice a Tbilisi, gli Stati Uniti confermano l'appoggio all'integrità territoriale georgiana. All'indomani della firma russa dell'accordo, Mosca non inizia ancora le operazioni di ritiro delle truppe. Il Presidente americano Bush invita di nuovo la Russia a rispettare gli accordi e il Presidente Medvedev assicura Sarkozy che il ritiro russo avrà inizio alle 12 del 18 agosto. Intanto il cancelliere tedesco Merkel, in visita a Tbilisi per sostenere il piano di pace, sancisce il sostegno della Germania, precedentemente contraria, all'ingresso della Georgia nella Nato. Per tutta la giornata del 18 agosto le notizie circa il ritiro rimangono contraddittorie: mentre Mosca lo conferma ufficialmente, Tbilisi nega che le truppe russe stiano effettivamente lasciando il territorio georgiano. Il Presidente Medvedev, confermando la fine dell'azione militare, dichiara che in ogni caso la Russia punirà ogni azione condotta contro cittadini russi. Da parte sua, Saakashvili, in un appello televisivo, si dice pronto al dialogo ma solo dopo il completamento del ritiro russo, condizione indispensabile per la ripresa di trattative, confermando comunque la volontà di mantenere l'integrità territoriale della Georgia. Lo stesso giorno desta ulteriori polemiche la notizia, riportata dal New York Times che avrebbe citato fonti dell'intelligence statunitense, del dispiegamento in Ossezia del Sud di missili tattici in grado di raggiungere Tbilisi. La notizia, smentita dai russi, verrà confermata da fonti non identificate del Pentagono. I vertici militari russi, intanto, confermano la permanenza di navi militari nel Mar Nero in prossimità del confine georgiano e la presa di possesso di un centrale idroelettrica a Ingoeti, vicino al confine osseto. Gli stessi vertici militari russi ammettono che è difficile fissare un momento preciso per l'inizio della ritirata. Lo stesso 18 agosto, a Vienna, si riuniscono i Paesi membri dell'Osce per valutare l'avvio di una missione ampliata a cento membri. Il Ministro Frattini, durante un colloquio con il Presidente di turno Osce, Alexander Stubb, sottolinea la piena adesione dell'Italia al progetto, offrendo subito un contributo di dieci unità. Nonostante la aperture del Ministro russo Lavrov a tale ipotesi, prima di dare il suo assenso all'ampliamento della missione Osce, la Russia chiede che vengano precisati alcuni aspetti quali la nazionalità dei nuovi osservatori, il luogo del loro dispiegamento e il loro mandato. A seguito di ulteriori mediazioni, la Russia acconsente ad un ampliamento immediato della missione a venti osservatori. Successivamente il 21 agosto il Presidente Osce, Stubb, si reca in missione in Georgia per una verifica sul campo della situazione umanitaria e

5 politica. Sempre il 18 agosto un comunicato del Ministero degli esteri russo rende noto che la Russia chiederà che una risoluzione delle Nazioni Unite sancisca il piano europeo. Prende inoltre l'avvio una missione del Consiglio d'Europa per la verifica sul campo del rispetto degli impegni presi da parte dei due contendenti. Il 19 agosto si svolge una riunione dei Ministri degli esteri dei Paesi membri della Nato per decidere la linea politica dell'Alleanza in relazione alla crisi nel Caucaso. Di nuovo la Nato esprime profonda preoccupazione per la situazione in Georgia ed afferma che l'azione russa ha profondamente modificato il quadro delle relazioni Nato-Russia che non potranno più proseguire come prima. Secondo il documento finale Nato, l'azione militare della Russia è sproporzionata e non conforme alle finalità di mantenimento della pace che tale azione dovrebbe raggiungere. La Nato quindi richiama con forza la Russia al rispetto del piano di pace. Il documento Nato esprime poi grande preoccupazione per la situazione umanitaria, condanna le perdite civili e le distruzioni alle infrastrutture provocate dalle azioni militari e richiama tutte le parti a fare in modo che i soccorsi raggiungano le popolazioni colpite, in conformità con gli obblighi assunti dal diritto umanitario internazionale. La Nato, si afferma, agisce di concerto con l'Osce per valutare le questioni chiave relative alla situazione georgiana. Viene inoltre confermata la piena collaborazione con la Georgia e la volontà di continuare il dialogo con essa anche in vista della sua adesione all'Alleanza. Le reazioni di parte russa alle posizioni Nato sono estremamente critiche. Secondo Mosca, infatti, è venuto a mancare l'equilibrio e l'obiettività nella valutazione della crisi che erano state richieste dalla Russia alla vigilia del vertice. In relazione ai tempi del ritiro, il Ministro degli esteri Lavrov ha annunciato che si completerà in tre o quattro giorni, sempre tenendo conto del rispetto degli impegni assunti da parte del governo georgiano. Commentando il documento Nato, infine, lo stesso Lavrov ha confermato che la Russia non ha intenzione di annettere alcun territorio. Alle Nazioni Unite, il 20 agosto, una prima bozza di risoluzione per l'attuazione del piano di pace, proposta dalla Francia a nome dell'Unione europea, non viene neanche messa ai voti a causa dell'opposizione della Russia. Il punto contestato sarebbe quello sull'apertura dei negoziati sullo status futuro della Georgia: secondo l'ambasciatore russo all'Onu, Vitaly Ciurkin, il testo proposto dalla Francia non rispecchierebbe quanto sottoscritto da Medvedev, in quanto non si farebbe menzione proprio del paragrafo riguardante l'avvio dei negoziati sul futuro dello Stato caucasico. Tale punto dell'accordo non sarebbe stato inoltre sottoscritto dal presidente georgiano Saakashvili. Lo stesso 20 agosto, mentre il parlamento della repubblica secessionista georgiana dell'Abkhazia approva l'appello del presidente Serghei Bagapsh alla Russia di riconoscerne l'indipendenza, il presidente del Consiglio della federazione russa, Mironov, dichiara che il ramo del Parlamento da lui presieduto sarebbe pronto a riconoscere l'indipendenza delle regioni separatiste in caso

6 queste lo chiedessero e ci fosse un pronunciamento favorevole da parte del Presidente Medvedev. In un comunicato i ministri delle finanze dei sette maggiori paesi industrializzati (G-7) affermano di essere pronti ad aiutare la Georgia per sostenere la ricostruzione economica. La mattina del 21 agosto il portavoce del Ministero della difesa russo annuncia l'inizio del ritiro delle truppe russe da Gori ma i rapporti Nato - Russia conoscono un ulteriore peggioramento: anche a causa della firma dell'accordo USA - Polonia per lo scudo missilistico, Mosca continua a criticare fortemente l'Alleanza atlantica e ritira il proprio ambasciatore presso la Nato. I vertici militari russi annunciano ulteriori rallentamenti nella ritirata. Si svolgono manifestazioni in Abkhazia ed Ossezia favorevoli al riconoscimento dell'indipendenza. L'annuncio da parte del governo russo del completamento del ritiro, la sera del 22 agosto, viene accolto con scetticismo. Bush e Sarkozy parlano apertamente di mancato rispetto dei punti del piano di pace da parte di Mosca. Il Parlamento georgiano, su richiesta del presidente Saakashvili, proroga lo stato di guerra. Il presidente francese Nicolas Sarkozy convoca per il primo settembre, nella sua qualità di presidente di turno dell'Unione europea e su richiesta di numerosi Stati membri, un vertice straordinario dei capi di Stato e di governo dei 27, dedicato alla crisi nel Caucaso. Il 25 agosto il Parlamento russo si riunisce per discutere sullo status futuro di Ossezia del Sud e Abkhazia ed approva una risoluzione favorevole al riconoscimento dell'indipendenza delle due regioni secessioniste. Il 26 agosto Medvedev rende noto che la Russia riconosce unilateralmente l'indipendenza dei due nuovi Stati. L'annuncio, che arriva durante l'intervento del Ministro degli esteri Frattini presso le Commissioni esteri di Senato e Camera, registra il coro unanime di critiche della comunità internazionale. Saakashvili parla di annessione da parte della Russia. Il 1° settembre si svolge a Bruxelles il Consiglio europeo straordinario sulla situazione in Georgia. Nelle conclusioni del Consiglio si esprime la profonda preoccupazione per la crisi georgiana e si condanna fermamente il riconoscimento unilaterale dell'indipendenza di Ossezia del Sud e Abkhazia. Il Consiglio esorta poi le parti ad attuare in maniera completa l'accordo sottoscritto scaturito dalla mediazione europea, dichiarando inoltre urgente la predisposizione del meccanismo di supervisione, previsto dal quinto punto dell'accordo e a cui l'Unione è pronta a partecipare, "per sostituire le ulteriori misure di sicurezza russe nella zona adiacente all'Ossezia del Sud". Viene inoltre sottolineata l'urgenza dell'avvio dei colloqui sullo status futuro dei territori oggetto della contesa. L'Unione europea si dichiara quindi pronta a impegnarsi sul terreno, rafforzando la missione Osce e predisponendo una missione di osservatori europei che dovrà essere avviato a partire dal 15 settembre, in coordinamento con l'Osce stessa e con le Nazioni Unite. L'Unione ribadisce poi di voler continuare e potenziare la cooperazione con "i vicini orientali",

7 incrementando la politica di vicinato e istituendo nuovi strumenti di partenariato. In tale quadro il Consiglio decide di nominare un Rappresentante speciale UE per la soluzione della crisi. Si richiama poi la necessità di intensificare gli sforzi diretti ad assicurare la sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti energetici, invitando il Consiglio, in collaborazione con la Commissione, ad adottare tutti gli strumenti necessari a tal fine in particolare per quanto riguarda le rotte di approvvigionamento e la diversificazione delle fonti. Il punto 10 delle Conclusione afferma che "la crisi georgiana pone le relazioni fra l'UE e la Russia di fronte a un bivio", rimarcando al contempo che non vi sia alternativa reale "ad una relazione forte, fondata sulla cooperazione, la fiducia e il dialogo, sul rispetto dello Stato di diritto e dei principi riconosciuti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite e dall'Osce", esortando la Russia a ritornare sulla strada del dialogo e del partenariato. Il Consiglio incarica quindi il suo Presidente di proseguire la mediazione per l'applicazione del piano di pace e annuncia una nuova missione a Mosca per l'8 settembre. Viene inoltre decisa la sospensione delle riunioni di negoziato sull'accordo di partenariato finché le truppe non si saranno ritirate sulle posizioni antecedenti al 7 agosto. Il 4 settembre il Vicepresidente degli Stati Uniti, Cheney, si reca a Tbilisi e rinnova l'appoggio americano alla Georgia e alla sua integrità territoriale. Il 6 settembre si svolge ad Avignone un consiglio informale dei ministri degli esteri della UE che raggiungono un accordo politico sull'invio di una missione europea che dovrebbe essere approvata ufficialmente dal Consiglio dei ministri degli esteri del 15 settembre e dovrebbe avere inizio entro la fine del mese. La missione europea si svolgerà parallelamente a quella Osce, avrà anche compiti di polizia civile e consisterà nel dispiegamento di 150/200 che si dispiegheranno prima in territorio georgiano e poi nella zona di sicurezza temporanea tra la Georgia ed il confine amministrativo dell'Ossezia del Sud. I Ministri mettono anche a punto un pacchetto di aiuti che prevede l'erogazione di 500 milioni di euro per tre anni (fino al 2010) "su progetto". L'8 settembre il Presidente Sarkozy si reca di nuovo a Mosca. La Russia accetta di ritirare i militari dal territorio georgiano (quindi, stante il riconoscimento russo, non da Ossezia del Sud e Abkhazia) entro un mese. L'impegno di Medvedev viene salutato dal Presidente della Georgia come un importante passo avanti. Il giorno successivo, 9 settembre, Medevedev rende nota l'intenzione di installare basi russe, con 7.600 uomini, nelle due regioni contese. Lo stesso giorno il Vicepresidente americano Cheney incontra il Presidente del Consiglio Berlusconi a Roma. Il 10 settembre, però, è giornata che vede riacutizzarsi le tensioni: smentendo quanto annunciato dopo l'ultimo colloquio Medevedev - Sarkozy, Mosca dichiara l'infondatezza del documento firmato a Tbilisi relativo all'invio di una missione UE. Inoltre, in relazione alla questione dello scudo antimissile, il Cremlino fa sapere che punterà missili sullo scudo installato in Polonia e Repubblica Ceca. Tbilisi denuncia il permanere della presenza russa e segnala un incidente in cui

8 ha perso la vita un poliziotto georgiano in seguito a colpi sparati da una postazione russa.

Il 15 settembre i ministri degli esteri dell’Ue adottano l'azione comune e “il concetto operativo” necessario per permettere alle istanze del Consiglio di preparare l'invio di 200 osservatori europei, soprattutto funzionari di polizia, prima del 1° ottobre. L'obiettivo della missione civile PESD è di garantire il rispetto integrale dell'accordo in sei punti firmato dalla Russia e dalla Georgia il 12 agosto scorso e dell'accordo concluso tra la delegazione europea e il presidente russo, Dmitri Medvedev, l'8 settembre a Mosca.

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RAPPORTI TRA L’UNIONE EUROPEA E LA RUSSIA

La Federazione russa è uno dei principali partner dell’Unione europea, oltre che il più grande dei paesi confinanti, peraltro ancora più vicino dopo gli allargamenti del 2004 e del 2007. Come evidenziato nella strategia europea di sicurezza approvata nel 2003, la Russia è un attore chiave in termini geopolitici e di sicurezza sia a livello globale sia a livello regionale. Per storia, prossimità geografica e vincoli culturali è inoltre uno dei principali protagonisti nell’ambito del comune vicinato europeo e centro-asiatico. In aggiunta, la Russia è anche uno dei maggiori fornitori di prodotti energetici dell’UE e, a dispetto della sua relativamente limitata economia, rappresenta un ampio mercato per i beni e i servizi dell’UE, con considerevoli potenziali di crescita. D’altro canto, il mercato dell’UE è la più importante destinazione per le esportazioni russe. In considerazione di tali elementi, una priorità dell’Unione europea è dunque rappresentata dalla costruzione di un partenariato strategico con la Federazione russa, fondato su comuni interessi e valori condivisi. Unione europea e Russia stanno già cooperando in un ampio spettro di settori - dalla modernizzazione dell’economia russa e dalla sua integrazione nel sistema globale, alla protezione dell’ambiente, alla sicurezza nucleare - ed hanno un intenso dialogo su temi di interesse internazionale, ivi inclusi la risoluzione dei conflitti in Medio Oriente, Afghanistan, Balcani occidentali e Sudan e la lotta alla proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa, come nei casi di Iran e Corea del nord. Peraltro, a seguito della situazione di crisi verificatasi con la Georgia (vedi paragrafo successivo) e del mancato ritiro delle truppe russe, in ottemperanza a quanto stabilito nel piano di cessazione delle ostilità sottoscritto il 12 agosto 2008 da Russia e Giorgia, le relazioni diplomatiche tra UE e Russia stanno subendo un inasprimento. Da notizie stampa risulta, infatti, che Nicolas Sarkozy, Presidente di turno del Consiglio dell’UE, ha annunciato che ci saranno serie ripercussioni sulle relazioni tra la Russia e l’UE se il contingente militare russo non si ritirerà dal territorio georgiano.

Posizioni dell’UE sul conflitto tra Russia e Georgia Il Consiglio dell’UE, al termine di una riunione straordinaria, convocata il 13 agosto, a seguito del’escalation del conflitto tra la Russia e la Giorgia, ha adottato delle conclusioni nelle quali: • impegna ad una soluzione pacifica e duratura dei conflitti in Georgia basata sul pieno rispetto dei principi di indipendenza, sovranità e integrità territoriale riconosciuti dal diritto internazionale e dalle risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite; • si compiace dell'accordo sottoscritto dalle parti sulla base degli sforzi di mediazione intrapresi dall'Unione ed esorta le parti a rispettare l'insieme di tali impegni, cominciando con un cessate il fuoco effettivo,

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e ad assicurarne l'attuazione effettiva in buona fede sia sul terreno sia nei consessi interessati. I principi sottoscritti dalle parti sono i seguenti: 1) impegno di non ricorrere alla forza; 2) cessazione definitiva delle ostilità; 3) concessione del libero accesso all'aiuto umanitario; 4) ritiro delle forze militari georgiane nel luogo di acquartieramento abituale; 5) ritiro delle forze militari russe sulle linee precedenti allo scoppio delle ostilità. In attesa di un meccanismo internazionale, le forze di pace russe porranno in atto ulteriori misure di sicurezza; 6) apertura di discussioni internazionali sulle modalità per la creazione di condizioni di sicurezza e stabilità in Abkhazia e in Ossezia del Sud. • ritiene cruciale il rapido rafforzamento degli strumenti di osservazione dell'OSCE sul terreno ed agirà in tal senso presso l'OSCE. Il Consiglio invita le parti a non creare ostacoli alle attività degli osservatori; • ritiene inoltre che l'Unione europea debba essere pronta ad impegnarsi, anche sul terreno, a sostenere tutti gli sforzi, tra cui quelli dell'ONU e dell'OSCE, in vista di una soluzione pacifica e duratura dei conflitti in Georgia. Invita il Segretario Generale/Alto Rappresentante, di concerto con la Commissione, ad elaborare delle proposte in merito, in vista della riunione informale di Avignone del 5-6 settembre prossimi; • mette in risalto l'emergenza umanitaria e la volontà dell'Unione di apportare l'assistenza indispensabile alle popolazioni e richiama tutte le parti al rispetto del diritto internazionale umanitario ed a facilitare l'inoltro senza ostacoli dell'assistenza umanitaria a tutte le popolazioni colpite, senza discriminazioni; • sottolinea - tenuto conto delle distruzioni causate dal conflitto - la necessita di individuare sin d'ora i bisogni in termini di ricostruzione e di prepararsi ad apportare un contributo significativo a nome dell'Unione. I ministri degli Esteri degli Stati membri dell’UE dovrebbero si riuniranno nuovamente, a livello informale il 5 e 6 settembre 2008 ad Avignone. La Commissione europea ha stanziato un aiuto umanitario di urgenza pari ad un milione di euro, suscettibile di essere aumentato per tappe successive a dieci milioni di euro. L’aiuto è destinato a coprire i bisogni umanitari d’urgenza dei civili coinvolti nei conflitti. La Commissione ha anche inviato sul posto esperti del servizio d’aiuto umanitario della Commissione europea (ECHO). L’Unione europea presta al momento assistenza a 100.000 civili georgiani nell’area

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interessata dai conflitti. Gli aiuti stanziati dalla Commissione consistono in aiuti medici d’urgenza, rifornimento d’acqua, di strumenti sanitari, rifornimenti alimentari e assistenza di prima necessità in generale (vestiti, cucine da campo, tende). Il 20 agosto 2008 si è svolta a Bruxelles una riunione straordinaria della Commissione affari esteri del Parlamento europeo dedicata alla situazione in Georgia, cui sono stati invitati a partecipare anche rappresentanti dei Parlamenti nazionali. Nel corso della riunione, che si è svolta a porte chiuse, ha avuto luogo uno scambio di vedute con la Presidenza di turno francese dell’UE, rappresentata da Jean-Pierre Jouyet, Segretario di stato per gli affari europei, sulle iniziative della Presidenza dell’UE per risolvere la crisi. Nel corso della riunione, inoltre, l’on. Isler Beguin, Presidente della delegazione del PE per le relazioni con il Caucaso del Sud ha svolto una relazione sulla missione ad hoc in Georgia dal 12 al 17 agosto 2008 (vedi rapporto in allegato). Alla riunione ha, infine, partecipato Eka Tkeshelashvili, Ministro degli affari esteri della Giorgia. Il Ministro degli affari esteri, Eka Tkeshelashvili, ha indicato che la Georgia richiede l'invio rapido d'una missione di osservatori dell'Unione europea nell'area, nell'ambito di una missione PESD, affinché possano verificare le flagranti violazioni dell'accordo firmato con la Russia. Il Ministro, facendo riferimento al piano dell'Organizzazione per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa (OSCE), che consiste nell'invio immediato di 20 osservatori internazionali supplementari nelle aree adiacenti all'Ossezia del Sud, ne ha auspicato un notevole rinforzo, deplorando il fatto che gli osservatori non possano operare direttamente nella provincia dell'Ossezia del Sud dove le truppe russe e i miliziani osseti partecipano a grosse operazioni di pulizia etnica. La ministra ha pertanto esortato l'UE a inviare i suoi osservatori e ha suggerito l'idea di una riformulazione dell'organizzazione del mantenimento della pace in Georgia, che è ancora affidata in parte alle forze russe da quando è stato smantellato il blocco sovietico agli inizi degli anni ‘90. Il Presidente della commissione Esteri del PE, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (PPE-DE, Polonia), ha dichiarato che proporrà prossimamente una risoluzione del Parlamento europeo per creare una missione PESD in Georgia. Alla riunione hanno partecipato per la Camera dei deputati l’on. Edmondo Cirielli, Presidente della Commissione Difesa, e l’on. Roberto Antonione, membro della Commissione Affari esteri; per il Senato il sen. Gianpiero Carlo Cantoni, Presidente della Commissione Difesa, e il sen. Massimo Livi Bacci, membro della Commissione Affari esteri. Prima dello scoppio del conflitto tra la Russia e la Giorgia, le Istituzioni europee erano intervenute in più occasioni in merito alle relazioni tra i due paesi, anche in considerazione del fatto che i delicati rapporti tra la Georgia e la Russia - che appoggiava le rivendicazioni indipendentiste delle regioni georgiane dell’Abkhazia e dell’Ossezia del Sud – erano stati resi più difficili dalla decisione della Russia di rinforzare il proprio contingente, presente in Abkhazia su mandato

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ONU. La Russia aveva anche dichiarato di voler stabilire relazioni ufficiali con le repubbliche separatiste georgiane. In particolare, l’Alto rappresentante per la PESC, Javier Solana, durante una visita in Georgia del 6 giugno 2008 aveva esortatato tutti gli attori ad agire in maniera responsabile, evitando di assumere misure che potessero contribuire ad aumentare la tensione. Analogamente, intervenendo alla Duma il 4 giugno 2008, il Commissario europeo per le relazioni esterne e la politica di vicinato, Benita Ferrero Waldner, aveva espresso la preoccupazione dell’Unione europea per le recenti iniziative della Russia, ribadendo che l’UE avrebbe continuato ad adoperarsi per un approccio che rispettasse pienamente la sovranità e l’integrità territoriale della Georgia e, al tempo stesso, perseguisse misure di confidence-building e promuovesse un dialogo reale tra le due parti in Georgia. Sulla situazione in Georgia era intervenuto anche il Parlamento europeo che il 5 giugno 2008 ha approvato una risoluzione, in cui – con riferimento al ruolo svolto dalla Federazione russa: − esprime la sua profonda disapprovazione per l'annuncio della Russia di voler stabilire legami ufficiali con le istituzioni delle autorità separatiste dell'Ossezia meridionale e dell'Abkhazia e deplora, a tale riguardo, la decisione adottata il 31 maggio 2008 dal Ministro della Difesa russo di inviare le sue forze militari in Abkhazia per ristabilire le infrastrutture ferroviarie e stradali nella regione secessionista; − ribadisce il suo pieno sostegno a favore della sovranità e dell'integrità territoriale della Georgia nell'ambito delle sue frontiere riconosciute a livello internazionale ed esorta la Russia a revocare tale decisione che pregiudica gli sforzi internazionali per la pace ai quali partecipa anche la Russia; − sostiene gli sforzi compiuti per stemperare la tensione attraverso colloqui tra l'Alto rappresentante per la Politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC), il Presidente georgiano e il ministro degli Affari esteri russo e sollecita il rappresentante speciale dell'Unione europea per il Caucaso meridionale a trovare soluzioni per promuovere il dialogo tra tutte le parti interessate e per cercare di ripristinare un certo grado di fiducia reciproca; − sollecita la Federazione russa a ritirare immediatamente le sue truppe supplementari presenti in Abkhazia. Il Parlamento europeo ritiene infatti che l'attuale modalità di mantenimento della pace debba essere rivista dal momento che le truppe russe hanno perso il ruolo di mantenitori della pace neutrali ed imparziali. A tale proposito chiede un maggiore coinvolgimento europeo nei conflitti congelati al fine di far avanzare i processi di pace; − invita il Consiglio e la Commissione a sollevare con fermezza la questione dell'Abkhazia e dell'Ossezia meridionale con i loro omologhi russi durante il prossimo vertice UE-Russia e durante i negoziati su un nuovo accordo di partenariato rafforzato ed esorta le autorità russe a non osteggiare una eventuale

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missione della PESD nella regione, compresa una presenza dell'Unione europea nelle operazioni civili e militari di mantenimento della pace.

L’Accordo di partenariato e di cooperazione tra l’UE e la Russia La base giuridica delle relazioni bilaterali tra l’Unione europea e la Russia è costituita dall’Accordo di partenariato e di cooperazione (APC), entrato in vigore il 1° dicembre 1997 per un periodo iniziale di 10 anni e successivamente esteso automaticamente su base annuale. L’Accordo, che fissa i principali obiettivi comuni, copre le seguenti aree: • commercio e cooperazione economica; • cooperazione nel campo delle scienze, dell’energia, dell’ambiente, dei trasporti e in altri settori civili; • dialogo politico; • giustizia e affari interni. L’Accordo istituisce un dialogo politico regolare a diversi livelli, prevedendo vertici semestrali a livello di Capi di Stato e di Governo, consigli di cooperazione annuali a livello ministeriale, comitati di cooperazione a livello di alti funzionari ogni qual volta sia necessario. Inoltre, è stato istituito un comitato parlamentare misto tra membri del Parlamento europeo e della Duma russa che si incontrano su base regolare1. Inoltre, nel quadro dell’accordo a partire dal 2005 si tengono consultazioni sui diritti umani (vedi infra). A completamento delle previsioni dell’APC esistono un certo numero di accordi settoriali ed internazionali, cosi come altri meccanismi di cooperazione: • acciaio e tessili sono i principali settori disciplinati da accordi bilaterali di scambio. A tale proposito si ricorda che il più recente è l’accordo sul commercio di determinati prodotti di acciaio firmato ed entrato in vigore il 26 ottobre 2007; • un accordo di cooperazione scientifica e tecnologica è entrato in vigore nel 2004. Nel maggio dello stesso anno è stato firmato un accordo di cooperazione nel settore della protezione civile; • nel Vertice bilaterale di Samara di maggio 2007, le parti hanno convenuto di collaborare nell’ambito del sistema europeo di navigazione satellitare Galileo2; • negoziati sono stati avviati per un accordo sul commercio di materiali nucleari. Inoltre l’UE intende riprendere le discussioni del gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza dei reattori di prima generazione; • nel 2002 riconoscendo il grande sforzo compiuto nella trasformazione dell’economia, l’UE ha concesso lo status di economia di mercato agli esportatori russi. A tale proposito va sottolineato che le misure anti-dumping non

1 L’ultimo incontro si è tenuto il 12 marzo 2008. 2 Galileo è il programma europeo di radionavigazione e di posizionamento via satellite, lanciato dalla Commissione europea e sviluppato insieme all'Agenzia spaziale europea.

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rappresentano un aspetto rilevante nelle relazioni commerciali UE-Russia: al momento solo 10 misure anti dumping sono in atto, vale a dire meno dello 0,5 % delle importazioni UE dalla Russia. Si ricorda inoltre che i negoziati bilaterali UE- Russia per l’adesione della Russia all’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMC) si sono conclusi nel 2004 e sono in corso i negoziati a livello multilaterale, cui l’Unione europea dà il suo pieno sostegno. In vista della scadenza dell’APC, il 3 luglio 2006 la Commissione ha presentato una proposta3 relativa alle modalità di negoziato di un nuovo accordo volto a fissare obiettivi più ambiziosi per le relazioni UE-Russia. La Commissione propone un accordo che riguardi tutti i settori di cooperazione tra l’UE e la Russia, atto a sviluppare e approfondire, in particolare, le relazioni commerciali e a sviluppare apertamente ed in modo equo le relazioni tra l’UE e la Russia nel settore dell’energia. La proposta è stata approvata dal Consiglio del 26 e 27 maggio 2008, a quasi due anni dalla sua presentazione, per l’opposizione prima della Polonia – a causa dell’embargo russo alle carni polacche – e poi della Lituania, sulle questioni dei conflitti latenti, dell’approvvigionamento energetico e della cooperazione della Russia in materia giudiziaria. Approvato in tal modo il mandato negoziale per la Commissione, l’avvio formale dei negoziati è stato deciso in occasione dell’ultimo Vertice bilaterale che si è svolto a Khanti Mansiisk (Siberia) il 26 e 27 giugno 2008 (vedi paragrafo successivo).

Il Vertice di Khanti Mansiisk L’ultimo Vertice bilaterale UE-Russia, che si è tenuto a Khanti Mansiisk il 26 e 27 giugno 2008, ha deciso l’avvio dei negoziati per un nuovo accordo di partenariato. La dichiarazione congiunta sull’avvio di tali negoziati specifica che l’accordo di partenariato e cooperazione esistente rimarrà in vigore fin tanto che non sarà sostituito dal nuovo. Il nuovo accordo strategico, inoltre, dovrà rafforzare basi giuridiche e gli impegni legalmente vincolanti relativi alle principali aree di cooperazione, con particolare riferimento ai quatto spazi comuni EU/Russia (vedi paragrafo successivo). Come previsto dalla dichiarazione congiunta, un primo ciclo di negoziati si è svolto il 4 luglio 2008 a Bruxelles. Secondo notizie di stampa al termine della prima riunione di negoziato, i due negoziatori responsabili - Eneko Landaburu, Direttore generale relazioni esterne della Commissione europea, e Vladimir Chizov, ambasciatore russo presso l'UE - hanno espresso apprezzamento per l'ambiente positivo e costruttivo dei negoziati. Non sono tuttavia emerse informazioni sulla durata prevedibile negoziati.

3 Cfr. Comunicato della Commissione europea, Rapid, IP/06/910 del 3 luglio 2006.

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Le parti hanno raggiunto un accordo globale sul campo d'applicazione e la struttura dei negoziati; si è deciso di creare quattro gruppi di lavoro misti che tratteranno ciascuno di uno dei quattro grandi settori che saranno inclusi nel futuro accordo: dialogo politico e sicurezza esterna; commercio e cooperazione economica; giustizia/libertà/sicurezza; ricerca, istruzione, cultura. I lavori in questi quattro gruppi di lavoro saranno coordinati da uno steering group copresieduto da Landaburu e Chizov. L’ambasciatore russo ha indicato che la Russia cerca di negoziare un accordo-quadro conciso e giuridicamente costrittivo al quale potranno seguire, in futuro, accordi settoriali più dettagliati. Nel settore commerciale, l'accordo prevederà la conclusione di una zona di libero scambio tra l'UE e la Russia, ma i negoziati propriamente detti a questo proposito potranno cominciare soltanto una volta che la Russia avrà aderito all'OMC. Per quanto riguarda i negoziati sul capitolo energetico – che dovrebbero essere i più difficili – da ambo le parti è stato espresso un cauto ottimismo. L’ambasciatore russo Chizov ha sostenuto che l'energia è il settore di cooperazione più promettente per l'UE e il Direttore generale relazioni esterne della Commissione europea Landaburu ha indicato che alla fine dei negoziati dovrebbe esser possibile ottenere un buon equilibrio tra domanda europea e riserve russe. Secondo notizie di stampa la Russia sembra ormai pronta accettare che i principi di base del trattato della Carta dell'energia - che Mosca rifiuta di ratificare - siano inclusi nel nuovo accordo con l'UE. Questi principi riguardano in particolare la protezione degli investimenti, la non discriminazione, il commercio delle materie e prodotti energetici, il transito ed il regolamento delle vertenze. Sempre secondo notizie di stampa, al vertice di Khanty-Mansiisk, il presidente russo Dmitri Medvedev avrebbe la disponibilità della Russia a discutere dei principi della Carta dell'energia, ma non riterrebbe di riprendere nell'accordo con l'UE gli strumenti d'attuazione di tali principi. Sempre secondo notizie di stampa, Medvedev avrebbe indicato che se l'UE insistesse sulla ripresa di questi stessi meccanismi d'applicazione (della Carta), allora i negoziati diventerebbero molto difficili. In occasione del vertice di Khanti Mansiisk è stata inoltre adottata una dichiarazione congiunta sulla cooperazione transfrontaliera, con la quale è stato deciso di lanciare sette programmi di cooperazione transfrontaliera per il periodo 2007-2013. I programmi, che hanno l’obiettivo di promuovere lo sviluppo socioeconomico delle zone transfrontaliere, la tutela dell’ambiente ed agevolare i contatti interpersonali, saranno finanziati da 307 milioni di Euro a carico del bilancio dell’UE e 122 milioni di euro a carico della Federazione russa. A tali stanziamenti potranno aggiungersi contributi supplementari stanziati direttamente dagli Stati membri dell’UE o da altri paesi terzi.

I quattro spazi comuni Nel corso dell’undicesimo Vertice UE-Russia, che si è svolto il 31 maggio 2003 a San Pietroburgo, è stata adottata una dichiarazione congiunta in cui le

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Parti hanno deciso di approfondire la cooperazione al fine di creare, a lungo termine, quattro spazi comuni: uno spazio economico comune; uno spazio comune di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia; uno spazio comune di cooperazione nel settore della sicurezza esterna; uno spazio di ricerca e istruzione che comprenda anche gli aspetti culturali. Nel maggio 2005, in occasione del quindicesimo vertice UE-Russia, sono state adottate le tabelle di marcia per la creazione, a lungo termine e nella cornice dell’APC, dei quattro spazi comuni. Le quattro tabelle di marcia identificano gli obiettivi condivisi da UE e Russia e le azioni concrete necessarie a realizzarli, definendo l’agenda di medio termine della cooperazione tra le due Parti. Lo spazio economico comune. L’obiettivo dello spazio economico comune è la creazione di un mercato aperto e integrato tra UE e Russia, attraverso la rimozione delle barriere al commercio e agli investimenti e la promozione di riforme, basandosi sui principi di non discriminazione, trasparenza e governance. Nel quadro dello spazio economico comune, si prevede l’avvio di sedici dialoghi nonché una maggiore cooperazione in diversi settori, tra i quali investimenti, concorrenza, servizi finanziari, telecomunicazioni, energia, trasporti. Per quanto riguarda l’ambiente, la cooperazione si concentrerà in particolare sui cambiamenti climatici e sull’attuazione del Protocollo di Kyoto (la Russia ha ratificato il protocollo di Kyoto nell’ottobre 2004. La ratifica da parte della Russia ha rappresentato una delle questioni rilevanti nell’ambito della cooperazione fra le due parti). Il dialogo bilaterale sull’ambiente è stato avviato a Helsinki nell’ottobre 2006. Sono stati compiuti importanti passi avanti nella realizzazione dello spazio economico comune mediante una serie di iniziative, quali: • la firma, il 3 ottobre 2005, da parte della Commissione europea e delle autorità russe, di un Memorandum of Understanding sulla creazione di un Dialogo UE-Russia nel settore dei trasporti; • l’istituzione, il 6 dicembre 2005, di due quadri permanenti di dialogo tra la Commissione europea e le autorità russe: un dialogo regolamentare e un dialogo sulla politica industriale e delle imprese. L’obiettivo è quello di migliorare l’ambiente normativo, amministrativo e di investimenti per le imprese che hanno la propria sede in Russia mediante una cooperazione più stretta, lo scambio di informazioni e una armonizzazione delle legislazioni delle norme tecniche sui prodotti industriali. Lo spazio comune di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia La cooperazione in questo ambito, che ha assunto un’importanza determinante con l’espansione delle frontiere comuni, a seguito dell’allargamento del 1° maggio 2004, intende contribuire all’obiettivo generale di creare una nuova Europa senza linee divisorie e di facilitare gli spostamenti per

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tutti gli europei combattendo efficacemente nel contempo l’immigrazione illegale. A questo proposito si segnala che sono stati fatti notevoli progressi con la conclusione dei negoziati sugli accordi di riammissione per gli immigrati illegali e in materia di facilitazione dei visti. Gli accordi sono stati firmati in occasione del vertice UE-Russia del 25 maggio 2005 a Sochi e sono entrati in vigore il 1° giugno 2007. Il dialogo in materia di visti proseguirà per esaminare le condizioni per un regime reciproco di viaggi visa free in una prospettiva di lungo termine. Le consultazioni regolari UE-Russia in materia di diritti umani, avviate con successo nel marzo 2005, ricadono in questo spazio così come la cooperazione in materia di lotta al terrorismo, al crimine organizzato e alla corruzione nonché il sostegno dell’UE alla gestione delle frontiere e alla riforma del sistema giudiziario russo. Tra le iniziative previste nell’ambito di questo spazio, si segnala l’intensificazione della cooperazione tra l’Agenzia europea per le frontiere (FRONTEX) e il servizio federale russo di sicurezza frontaliera. Inoltre, sono stati avviati i negoziati su un accordo tra EUROJUST e l’Ufficio del procuratore generale russo. Lo spazio comune di cooperazione nel settore della sicurezza esterna. La tabella di marcia in questo settore sottolinea la responsabilità condivisa di UE e Russia per un ordine internazionale basato su un effettivo multilateralismo e la loro determinazione a collaborare per rafforzare il ruolo delle Nazioni Unite nonché di rilevanti organizzazioni internazionali, quali OSCE e Consiglio d’Europa. Si lavora per rafforzare la cooperazione in cinque aree prioritarie: dialogo e cooperazione sulla scena internazionale; lotta al terrorismo; non proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa; gestione delle crisi; protezione civile. Nell’ambito della prima area prioritaria particolare attenzione verrà dedicata alla stabilità internazionale, con riguardo anche alle regioni poste lungo le frontiere di UE e Russia, dove le due Parti coopereranno per promuovere la risoluzione dei diversi conflitti latenti (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ossezia meridionale). Lo spazio di ricerca e istruzione Identifica misure significative per promuovere la crescita economica, rafforzare i vincoli tra ricerca e innovazione, incoraggiare una stretta cooperazione nel settore dell’istruzione e promuovere la diversità culturale e linguistica. Attraverso la partecipazione della Russia alle attività dell’UE in materia di ricerca e sviluppo e in particolare al programma quadro, si intende promuovere attività di ricerca congiunta in aree di comune interesse. Tra le iniziative già avviate si segnalano il programma INTAS (International Association for the promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New indipendent States of the former Soviet Union) che conduce varie attività di ricerca cofinanziate, organizza programmi di aggiornamento per giovani scienziati, conferenze internazionali e seminari, nonché l’ISTC (international Science e Tecnology Center) di Mosca che offre a scienziati russi e dei nuovi Stati indipendenti nuove

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opportunità nell’ambito di partenariati internazionali. Si segnala inoltre che il 26 maggio 2008 si è tenuto il primo Consiglio di cooperazione UE-Russia sulla ricerca che è stato dedicato principalmente alle misure di attuazione dell’accordo di cooperazione scientifica e tecnologica e agli incentivi per favorire la partecipazione della Russia al settimo programma quadro di attività comunitarie di ricerca, sviluppo tecnologico (2007-2013). Nel settore dell’istruzione le autorità russe e la Commissione europea partecipano al processo intergovernativo di Bologna4 che si prefigge di creare un’area comune dell’istruzione superiore entro il 2010. Si segnala inoltre l’inizio delle attività dell’Istituto europeo di Mosca, che beneficia di un finanziamento comune e che ha accolto i primi studenti nell’autunno del 2006.

La cooperazione energetica UE-Russia La cooperazione energetica rappresenta un aspetto rilevante e di mutuo interesse delle relazioni bilaterali. La Russia infatti è destinata a restare un importante fornitore di energia dell’UE anche per gli anni a venire, avendo il potenziale per fornire quantitativi significativi di risorse energetiche aggiuntive che l’UE potrebbe dover importare nel medio termine5. D’altra parte, l’energia che l’UE acquista dalla Russia contribuisce in maniera significativa alla crescita economica del paese e al miglioramento delle condizioni di vita della popolazione. In tale ambito, a partire dal 2000 il dialogo UE-Russia sull’energia fornisce l’opportunità a livello politico e tecnico di promuovere la cooperazione nel settore e favorire la soluzione ai problemi. Tra i temi di discussione, si segnalano: il miglioramento del clima per gli investimenti, in termini di trasparenza reciprocità e protezione degli investitori; la cooperazione in materia di nuove tecnologie; i progetti infrastrutturali. La rilevanza di un rafforzamento della cooperazione energetica con la Russia è stata evidenziata dalla Commissione nella comunicazione “Le relazioni esterne nel settore dell'energia: dai principi all’azione” (COM(2006)590), del 12 ottobre 20066.

4 Il processo di Bologna è inteso a creare uno spazio europeo dell'istruzione superiore (SEIS) e a promuovere il sistema europeo di istruzione superiore su scala mondiale, per aumentarne la competitività internazionale, entro il 2010. Il processo si propone, perciò, di far convergere i sistemi nazionali di istruzione superiore dei Paesi europei verso un sistema comune più trasparente e armonizzato, caratterizzato da una architettura comune, nel contempo basato sul rispetto dell’autonomia delle istituzioni universitarie, della libertà d’insegnamento, del principio di pari opportunità e dei principi democratici. 5 Dalla Russia proviene già il 25% del petrolio e del gas consumato nell’UE. La crescita della domanda energetica fa ritenere che le importazioni di energia dalla Russia aumenteranno ancora. 6 Il documento riprende le grandi linee della relazione della Commissione e dell'Alto rappresentante in materia di politica esterna energetica dell’Unione europea “Una politica esterna al servizio degli interessi europei in materia d’energia” (9971/06), accolta positivamente dal Consiglio europeo del 15-16 giugno 2006 quale solida base per tutelare gli interessi energetici europei.

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In particolare la comunicazione auspica che la conclusione del nuovo accordo di partenariato e di cooperazione (APC) con la Russia offra la possibilità di individuare principi e obiettivi in campo energetico, in modo equilibrato e reciprocamente vincolante. Secondo la Commissione l’accordo, confermando i principi dell’economia di mercato e quelli del trattato sulla Carta dell’energia, potrebbe al contempo eliminare molti ostacoli che oggi impediscono la ratifica da parte della Russia del trattato sulla Carta dell’energia7. Affinché la Russia sia in grado di rispondere in modo adeguato alla crescita della domanda energetica da parte dell’UE, l’Europa dovrebbe impegnarsi per rafforzare l’efficienza energetica dell’economia russa, introducendo condizioni quadro per la regolamentazione e la promozione del commercio dell’energia e degli investimenti incrociati tra l’UE e la Russia. Secondo la Commissione dalla conclusione di un nuovo accordo siffatto deriverebbero vantaggi reciproci basati: • sull’interdipendenza tra il bisogno della Russia di soddisfare la domanda energetica proveniente dal mercato dell’UE e la necessità dell’Unione delle risorse energetiche russe per garantire la sua sicurezza energetica; • sulla volontà della Russia di rafforzare la sua presenza sul mercato interno dell’energia dell’UE, attraverso, ad esempio, contratti di approvvigionamento di gas a lungo termine, l’acquisizione e controllo di attrezzature energetiche dell’UE a valle (gas e elettricità) nonché beneficiando della tecnologia e degli investimenti dell’UE per sviluppare le risorse energetiche russe; • sulle richieste dell’UE di accesso non discriminatorio e parità di trattamento agli approvvigionamenti dalla Russia, di accesso al mercato russo per gli investitori dell’UE, di accesso di terzi alle condutture e gasdotti naturali situati sul territorio russo, di rispetto delle norme in materia di concorrenza nonché di sicurezza e protezione ambientale. Sulla comunicazione si è registrato il consenso del Vertice informale dei Capi di Stato e di Governo dell’UE - tenutosi a Lahti (Finlandia) il 20 ottobre 2006 – che ha convenuto che i principi in essa contenuti debbano guidare la futura partnership energetica UE/Russia. In particolare, è stata rilevata l’esigenza

7 Il trattato sulla carta dell'energia, entrato in vigore il 16 aprile 1998, intende rafforzare la sicurezza degli investimenti provenienti dall'Unione europea nei paesi produttori di energia dell'Europa centrale e orientale nonché nella Comunità degli Stati indipendenti (CSI) e rendere più sicuro l'approvvigionamento energetico proveniente da tali paesi, facilitando il transito dei prodotti energetici tra l'Est e l'Ovest. Il trattato è stato firmato dai paesi dell'Europa centrale e orientale, dai paesi dell'ex Unione Sovietica, dai quindici Stati membri dell'Unione europea e dall'Unione europea stessa e da altri paesi dell'Organizzazione per lo sviluppo e la cooperazione economica (OCSE). Tra i 51 firmatari della Carta dell’energia, 46 paesi, tra cui l’Italia, hanno ratificato il trattato, mentre altri 5, tra cui la Russia, non l'ha ancora fatto.

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di richiedere alla Russia di accettare i seguenti principi enunciati nella Carta dell’energia: • apertura del mercato; • accesso non discriminatorio alla rete di trasporto; • reciprocità e convergenza delle politiche energetiche e di regole sul funzionamento dei mercati, in particolare per concorrenza e sicurezza. Tali principi dovrebbero essere inseriti nel nuovo accordo bilaterale tra UE e Russia ed integrati in un accordo vincolante giuridicamente. La necessità di negoziare e mettere a punto un accordo con la Russia in relazione alle questioni energetiche è stata inoltre sottolineata nel piano d’azione per l’energia adottato dal Consiglio europeo dell’8 e 9 marzo 2007. Si segnala, peraltro, che nel terzo pacchetto legislativo per la liberalizzazione del mercato interno dell'energia – presentato dalla Commissione europea nel settembre scorso – è stata introdotta la c.d. “clausola Gazprom”, contenente misure di salvaguardia volte ad assicurare che, nell'ipotesi in cui le imprese di paesi terzi vogliano acquisire un interesse significativo o il controllo su una rete dell'UE, esse sarebbero tenute a dimostrare in modo inequivocabile di conformarsi alle norme di disaggregazione applicate alle imprese dell’UE. Tali misure prevedono la facoltà di intervento, da parte della Commissione, in caso di mancato rispetto di tali norme. Da ultimo, si ricorda il raggiungimento di un ampio accordo strategico tra ENI e GAZPROM in campo energetico, la cui firma è stata annunciata agli organi di stampa il 14 novembre 2006.

Assistenza finanziaria A partire dal 1991 e fino al 2006, il programma Tacis8 è stato lo strumento principale di assistenza nel processo di transizione della Russia. In base alla nota informativa della Corte dei conti europea dell’aprile 20069, dal 1991 al 2006 oltre 7 mila milioni di euro sono stati assegnati dell’UE al programma Tacis; in particolare, la Federazione russa che ne è il maggiore beneficiario ha ricevuto annualmente circa 200 milioni di euro, pari a circa il 40% dei fondi erogati da TACIS. Con le nuove prospettive finanziarie 2007-2013, nell’ambito della riforma dell’assistenza esterna fornita dall’UE, il programma Tacis è stato sostituito dallo Strumento europeo di vicinato e partenariato, denominato ENPI, istituito con il regolamento CE 1638/2006 del 24 ottobre 2006.

8 Il programma Tacis è stato istituito nel 1991 per fornire assistenza finanziaria a 13 paesi dell’Europa centrale e dell’Asia centrale sorti dalla disgregazione dell’URSS (Armenia, Azerbaigian, Bielorussia, Georgia, Kazakhistan, Kirgizstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tagikistan, Turkmenistan, Ucraina e Uzbekistan). Il 29 dicembre 1999 il Consiglio ha adottato il nuovo regolamento Tacis per il periodo 2000-2006. 9 Nota informativa della Corte dei conti europea concernente la relazione speciale n. 2/2006 sui risultati dei progetti finanziati nel quadro del programma TACIS nella Federazione russa.

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Il quadro strategico in cui si inseriscono le iniziative dell’UE verso la Russia per il periodo 2007-2013 è fornito dal Country Strategy Paper (CSP), adottato dalla Commissione il 7 marzo 2007, che definisce gli obiettivi e i settori prioritari dell’assistenza alla Russia. Il CSP prevede un’allocazione annuale a livello nazionale di 60 milioni di euro, destinati ad iniziative nel settore giudiziario e al sostegno istituzionale, nonché alla promozione della stabilizzazione e dello sviluppo delle regioni del Caucaso settentrionale e di Kaliningrad (vedi infra).

Altre questioni Kaliningrad Con l’allargamento del 1° maggio 2004 Kaliningrad è divenuta un’enclave russa nel territorio dell’Unione europea. Tale particolarità è stata tenuta in considerazione anche nel protocollo che ha esteso l’Accordo di partenariato e di cooperazione tra UE e Russia ai dieci nuovi Stati membri. Il protocollo prevede la libera circolazione delle merci, compresa l’energia, fra Kaliningrad e il resto del territorio russo, senza alcuna restrizione ed esente da dazi doganali e da altre accise legate al transito (con l’eccezione delle spese di trasporto). Alcune restrizioni potranno essere poste soltanto per motivi di sicurezza pubblica e protezione della salute umana. Più in generale, gli obiettivi della politica dell’UE nei confronti della regione sono: • promuovere lo sviluppo socio economico di Kaliningrad; • assicurare che Kaliningrad possa beneficiare dello sviluppo della regione del Baltico e contribuirvi; • assicurare un efficiente funzionamento del transito di beni e persone. Con riguardo all’ultima questione, le autorità lituane e russe cooperano con l’Unione europea per favorire una gestione del transito il più agevole possibile, anche attraverso incontri tecnici e consultazioni tra Commissione e autorità competenti su temi specifici (transito di animali vivi, controlli veterinari e fitosanitari, limitazione delle quantità di beni consentite ai passeggeri via treno). Si ricorda che, in seguito al declino economico che ha attraversato la regione all’inizio degli anni ’90, l’UE ha adottato una serie di iniziative volte a sostenere lo sviluppo e la stabilità nella regione. Fino al 2003 l’UE ha stanziato più di 50 milioni di euro per l’assistenza tecnica; 50 milioni di euro aggiuntivi per il periodo 2004-2006 sono stati messi a disposizione nel quadro di un programma speciale per la regione di Kaliningrad, dei programmi di vicinato e dei programmi volti a facilitare l’attraversamento delle frontiere. Ulteriori 50 milioni di euro sono stati stanziati a favore di Kaliningrad nel quadro delle prospettive finanziarie 2007- 2013. Gli obiettivi dei progetti finanziati includono: la promozione delle attività innovative di piccole e medie imprese; la cooperazione e gli scambi tra università; i programmi di lotta alla droga e all’HIV/AIDS; la tutela ambientale, con

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particolare riguardo alla gestione dei rifiuti nel mar Baltico e al miglioramento degli indicatori sanitari.

Cecenia Dall’inizio del conflitto in Cecenia nell’autunno 1999, la Commissione europea ha fornito circa 200 milioni di euro in aiuti umanitari, facendo dell’UE il maggior donatore della regione. L’aiuto, finalizzato a favorire i gruppi vulnerabili, è stato destinato ai seguenti settori: protezione della popolazione civile; attività generatrici di reddito; salute e assistenza psico-sociale. I relativi miglioramenti registrati negli ultimi due anni per quanto riguarda la situazione socio-economica della regione, hanno consentito nel 2007 di ridimensionare i programmi umanitari per la prima volta dall’inizio della crisi per favorire programmi di sviluppo. A tale proposito, si segnala che l’UE ha appena lanciato un programma speciale per il recupero economico del Caucaso settentrionale, con un budget di 20 milioni di euro destinati a sviluppo economico, salute ed istruzione.

Democrazia, diritti umani e libertà di espressione Come già anticipato, UE e Russia tengono, a partire dal 2005, consultazioni regolari in materia di diritti umani. Il settimo round si è svolto il 17 aprile 2008 ed ha affrontato la situazione dei diritti umani nell’UE ed in Russia, nonché i temi relativi alla protezione dei diritti umani a livello internazionale. In occasione dell’incontro l’UE ha espresso la propria preoccupazione circa la situazione in Russia, in particolare per quanto riguarda la libertà dei media, di opinione e di assemblea, soprattutto in vista delle elezioni parlamentari e presidenziali. Altre preoccupazioni riguardano il funzionamento della società civile, i diritti delle persone appartenente a minoranze e diritti dei bambini. La discussione ha riguardato inoltre gli obblighi internazionali in materia di diritti umani di UE e Russia, inclusa la cooperazione con le Nazioni Unite e con il Consiglio d’Europa nonché l’attuazione delle sentenze della Corte europea dei diritti umani, particolarmente quelle relative al Caucaso settentrionale. In conformità con la sua politica di coinvolgimento della società civile nel dibattito sui diritti umani, la delegazione dell’UE ha incontrato rappresentanti delle ONG russe il giorno prima delle consultazioni UE-Russia. Il prossimo round si terrà in Russia, nel secondo semestre dell’anno, durante la Presidenza francese. Sulla situazione dei diritti umani in Russia le istituzioni dell’Unione europea si sono espresse più volte. In particolare il Parlamento europeo ha affrontato l’argomento in diverse occasioni, con riferimento a specifici avvenimenti10 o

10 Tra gli interventi più recenti si segnalano le risoluzioni: del 13 marzo 2008 sulla repressione delle manifestazioni organizzate dai partiti d'opposizione "Altra Russia" per protestare contro le elezioni presidenziali del 2 marzo 2008; del 26 aprile 2007 sulle repressioni delle

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nell’ambito più generale delle relazioni UE-Russia11 nonché nelle risoluzioni sulla situazione dei diritti umani nel mondo. A tale proposito si ricorda che il 18 ottobre 2007 la Commissione europea e il Segretariato del Consiglio hanno presentato la nona relazione annuale dell’UE sui diritti umani, che viene sottoposta all’esame del Consiglio e del Parlamento europeo. La relazione – che copre il periodo dal 1º luglio 2006 al 30 giugno 2007 - comprende un resoconto delle iniziative intraprese all’interno dell’UE, nei confronti dei paesi terzi e nei consessi internazionali, oltre che una sintetica informazione sulla situazione dei diritti umani nel mondo. Per quanto riguarda la Russia, la relazione segnala gli eventi e le situazioni di maggiore preoccupazione nel periodo di riferimento, tra le quali in particolare: la repressione di diverse manifestazioni; la chiusura di molti giornali o stazioni radiotelevisive; l’assassinio di giornalisti; la limitazione delle libertà di opinione ed espressione derivanti dall’applicazione delle nuove norme contro estremismo e terrorismo; la situazione in Cecenia e nel Caucaso settentrionale; la scarsa indipendenza e la mancata tutela dei diritti umani da parte del sistema giudiziario, in particolar modo a livello dei tribunali di primo grado. In sostanza, benché i diritti umani siano garantiti dalla Costituzione e la Russia partecipi a varie convenzioni internazionali sui diritti umani, la relazione conclude che la situazione continua a destare preoccupazione. Sulla relazione annuale sui diritti umani per il 2007 e sulla politica dell'Unione europea in materia, l’8 maggio 2008 il Parlamento europeo ha approvato una risoluzione in cui ha deplorato in particolare la mancanza di risultati ottenuti nelle consultazioni Unione europea-Russia sui diritti umani e ha chiesto di essere associato a tale processo. Ha inoltre incoraggiato gli sforzi esplicati dal Consiglio e dalla Commissione affinché le consultazioni si svolgano alternativamente in Russia e nell'Unione europea, con la partecipazione di altri ministri russi oltre al ministro degli esteri e affinché la delegazione russa prenda parte alle riunioni di organi parlamentari o ONG russi e europei organizzate in concomitanza con le consultazioni. Per quanto riguarda in generali la situazione dei diritti umani in Russia, nella medesima risoluzione il Parlamento europeo: − ha invitato la autorità russe a proteggere le minoranze nazionali nella repubblica di Mari-El e ad assicurare il rispetto dei diritti umani e delle minoranze conformemente alla costituzione del Mari-El e alle norme europee; − ha espresso il timore che la nuova legislazione russa sulle ONG – entrata in vigore nel 2006 – sia suscettibile di applicazione arbitraria e selettiva e sia stata

manifestazioni verificatesi il 14 e 15 aprile 2007 a Mosca, San Pietroburgo e Nizhny Novgorod; del 26 ottobre 2006 sull’omicidio della giornalista russa Anna Politkovskaya. 11 Risoluzioni del 14 novembre 2007 sul Vertice UE-Russia ; del 19 giugno 2007 sulle Relazioni economiche e commerciali UE/Russia; del 14 maggio 2007 in vista del successivo Vertice del 18 maggio.

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usata per impedire, limitare e punire attività legittime delle ONG, contribuendo in tal modo ad accrescere l'insicurezza e la vulnerabilità di queste ultime; − ha deplorato le perduranti persecuzioni di giornalisti, difensori dei diritti umani, prigionieri politici e ONG, esortando la Russia a prendere ulteriori misure per tutelare la libertà di espressione; − a tale proposito, ritiene che l'Unione europea dovrebbe considerare prioritarie la cooperazione della Russia con l'OSCE, il Consiglio d'Europa e i meccanismi delle Nazioni Unite inerenti ai diritti umani nonché la ratifica di tutte le convenzioni in materia di diritti umani, in particolare la ratifica del Protocollo n. 14 alla Convenzione europea sui diritti dell'uomo (CEDU), che modifica il sistema di controllo della Convenzione; − ha deplorato l'indisponibilità della Russia ad invitare osservatori internazionali delle elezioni in numero adeguato e con sufficiente anticipo per permettere loro di monitorare correttamente le elezioni conformemente alle norme dell'OSCE, impedendo in tal modo all'Ufficio dell'OSCE per le istituzioni democratiche e i diritti umani (ODIHR) di effettuare la missione di osservazione elettorale pianificata a norma del suo mandato, ed è pertanto costretto a mettere in dubbio le credenziali democratiche delle elezioni parlamentari del 2007 e di quelle presidenziali del 2008; − ha esortato il Consiglio e la Commissione a sollevare questioni sui diritti umani, compresi i casi singoli, con le autorità russe al massimo livello e nell'ambito del nuovo accordo di partenariato e cooperazione con la Russia; − ha chiesto con insistenza alla Commissione di stabilire obblighi più chiari e prevedere meccanismi di controllo più efficienti, oltre alla clausola sui diritti umani, per giungere a un vero e proprio miglioramento della situazione dei diritti umani.

La dimensione settentrionale La Russia partecipa, unitamente alla Norvegia e all’Islanda, all’iniziativa dell’Unione europea denominata dimensione settentrionale. La dimensione settentrionale era originariamente rivolta a Danimarca, Estonia, Finlandia, Islanda, Lettonia, Lituania, Norvegia, Polonia, Russia e Svezia, con l’obiettivo di incrementare la cooperazione tra l’UE e la vasta area geografica che comprende le regioni baltica, artica e subartica nonché la Russia nord-occidentale. Inaugurata al Consiglio europeo di Lussemburgo del dicembre 1997, in considerazione dei cambiamenti verificatisi lungo il limite settentrionale dell’UE (raggiunta indipendenza dei paesi baltici, adesione all’UE della Finlandia e della Svezia, 1.300 chilometri di frontiera in comune con la Russia), è stata formalmente varata al Consiglio europeo di Helsinki del dicembre 1999, quando la Commissione è stata invitata a predisporre il primo Piano

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d’azione12. Il Consiglio europeo di Bruxelles del 16 e 17 ottobre 2003 ha approvato il secondo Piano d’azione sulla dimensione settentrionale per il periodo 2004-2006. In vista della scadenza del secondo piano d’azione, il 21 novembre 2005, i ministri degli esteri dell’UE e di Russia, Norvegia e Islanda hanno raggiunto un accordo sulle linee direttrici di una dichiarazione politica e di un documento quadro delle politiche, destinati al rilancio della dimensione settentrionale. Sulla base di tali documenti, adottati nel novembre 2006, la dimensione settentrionale fornisce un quadro comune per la promozione del dialogo e della concreta cooperazione, per il rafforzamento della stabilità, per la promozione dell’integrazione economica, dello sviluppo sostenibile e della competitività nell’Europa settentrionale. I settori prioritari di intervento individuati dalle Parti sono: cooperazione economica; libertà, sicurezza e giustizia; sicurezza esterna; ricerca, istruzione e cultura; ambiente, sicurezza nucleare e risorse naturali; benessere sanitario e sociale. In particolare, nel documento quadro si segnala che la dimensione settentrionale sarà un’espressione regionale dei quattro spazi comuni UE- Russia: Russia ed Unione europea faranno della dimensione settentrionale un tema trasversale ed uno strumento per l’attuazione delle road map, con la piena partecipazione di Islanda e Norvegia, nelle materie rilevanti per la dimensione settentrionale. Si segnala inoltre che il dal 28 febbraio al 1° marzo 2007 si è tenuta, presso la sede del Parlamento europeo a Bruxelles, una conferenza congiunta sulla dimensione settentrionale, che ha riunito eurodeputati e deputati nazionali dell'UE, della Norvegia, dell’Islanda e della Russia per approfondire il dibattito sui problemi comuni, primo fra tutti il cambiamento climatico. Nel corso della conferenza infatti sono state richieste azioni congiunte immediate per affrontare il problema del riscaldamento globale del pianeta e proteggere il fragile ambiente delle regioni marine artiche e baltiche. Altri temi in evidenza della nuova dimensione settentrionale sono stati le popolazioni indigene, la diversità culturale e il benessere sanitario e sociale.

La sinergia del Mar Nero Nell’ambito della politica europea di vicinato e, in particolare, dopo l’adesione di Bulgaria e Romania, è di grande importanza per l’UE potenziare le relazioni con la regione del Mar Nero, un'area geografica distinta, ricca di risorse naturali e strategicamente situata al punto d'incrocio fra Europa, Asia Centrale e Medio Oriente. A tal fine l’11 aprile 2007 la Commissione ha presentato la comunicazione “Sinergia del Mar Nero”13, in cui propone una nuova iniziativa, complementare

12 Il Piano d’azione, valido fino alla fine del 2003, è stato approvato dal Consiglio europeo di Feira (giugno 2000). 13 COM (2007) 160

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rispetto alle diverse politiche dell’Unione europea verso i singoli paesi, che concentri l'attenzione sul livello regionale e che rinvigorisca i processi di cooperazione in corso per promuovere la stabilità e le riforme nei paesi che si affacciano sul Mar Nero. La Sinergia del Mar Nero prenderà spunto dai programmi e dalle iniziative settoriali attuati dall’UE in settori come la governance, la circolazione delle persone e la sicurezza, l'energia, i trasporti, l'ambiente, la politica marittima, la pesca, il commercio, la ricerca, l'istruzione, l'occupazione, gli affari sociali, la scienza e la tecnologia. Si tratterà di un quadro flessibile, tale da migliorare la coerenza e il coordinamento fra le diverse attività tenendo conto degli interessi comuni di tutti i partner. Ai finanziamenti comunitari di cui beneficiano i paesi della regione si aggiunge un programma specifico di cooperazione transfrontaliera per il Mar Nero volto a promuovere le attività della società civile nelle regioni costiere. Il Consiglio del 14 maggio 2007 ha accolto con favore l’iniziativa della Commissione e ha invitato le future presidenze e la Commissione a proseguire i lavori finalizzati ad un maggiore e coerente coinvolgimento dell'UE nella regione. Tenuto conto dell'importanza strategica che l'area del Mar Nero riveste per l'UE, la Commissione è inoltre invitata ad effettuare nel corso del 2008 un esame dell'evoluzione dell'iniziativa "Sinergia del Mar Nero", sul quale il Consiglio baserà un eventuale ulteriore coinvolgimento nei confronti della regione nel suo complesso. Si segnala inoltre che il 14 febbraio 2008 si è tenuta la prima riunione dei ministri degli affari esteri dell’Unione europea e della regione del mar Nero. Nella dichiarazione congiunta adottata in conclusione, i ministri hanno espresso il proprio favore all’iniziativa assunta dall’Unione europea ed hanno concordato sul fatto che l’obiettivo primario di tale sinergia è rappresentato dalla promozione della cooperazione all’interno della regione nonché tra l’intera regione e l’Unione europea. Come rilevato nella dichiarazione, i singoli aspetti della sinergia saranno discussi, concordati ed attuati dai paesi interessati in modo pienamente flessibile e trasparente, fondato su interessi reciproci.

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LE AREE PRINCIPALI DEL CONFLITTO

OSSEZIA MERIDIONALE (PROVINCIA AUTONOMA DELL’OSSEZIA MERIDIONALE)

Presidente della regione Èduard Džabeevič KOKOJTY

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L'Ossezia del Sud è una provincia autonoma della Georgia (3.900 km², 95.000 abitanti) La capitale è Tskhinvali (38.000 abitanti).

La moderna Ossezia del Sud fu annessa dalla Russia nel 1801, insieme con la Georgia, ed assorbita all'interno dell'Impero russo. Dopo la Rivoluzione Russa, l'Ossezia del Sud divenne parte della menscevica Repubblica Democratica Georgiana, della quale il nord a sua volta divenne parte della Repubblica Sovietica del Terek. L'area vide brevi scontri tra le forze governative Georgiane e gli Osseti, che chiedevano l'indipendenza. Il governo Georgiano accusò gli Osseti di cooperare con i Bolscevichi. Secondo gli Osseti circa 5.000 persone furono uccise e più di 13.000 morirono in seguito a causa della fame e delle epidemie. Il governo sovietico georgiano, istituito dall'11esimo reggimento dell'Armata Rossa nel 1921, creò l'Oblast Autonomo dell'Ossezia del Sud nell'aprile 1922. Sebbene gli Osseti avessero una loro lingua, il russo ed il georgiano furono garantite come lingue amministrative dell'Oblast. Al giorno d'oggi, il russo è il solo idioma amministrativo usato dal governo separatista di Tskhinvali. All'epoca dell'Unione Sovietica, sotto l'amministrazione del governo georgiano, vi era un certo livello di autonomia, che comprendeva l'uso comune e l'insegnamento della lingua osseta.

La tensione nella regione aumentò insieme all'incremento dei nazionalismi tra georgiani e osseti nel 1989. Prima di allora, le due comunità avevano vissuto in pace con l'unica eccezione del conflitto del 1920. Entrambi i gruppi etnici avevano un alto livello di interazione ed un alto tasso di matrimoni interetnici. Nello stesso anno, l'influente Fronte Popolare dell'Ossezia del Sud (Ademon Nykhas) richiese l'unificazione con l'Ossezia del Nord come un mezzo per difendere l'autonomia osseta. Il 10 novembre 1989, il Soviet Supremo dell'Ossezia del Sud approvò la decisione di unire l'Ossezia del Sud con la repubblica autonoma dell'Ossezia del Nord, appartenente alla Russia. Il giorno dopo, il parlamento georgiano revocò la decisione ed abolì l'autonomia dell'Ossezia del Sud. Oltretutto, il parlamento autorizzò la soppressione dei quotidiani e delle dimostrazioni.

Dopo l'indipendenza della Georgia nel 1991, grazie al leader nazionalista Zviad Gamsakhurdia, il governo georgiano dichiarò la lingua georgiana come l'unico idioma amministrativo permesso nel paese. Durante l'era sovietica invece, come lingua ufficiale della Repubblica socialista sovietica georgiana vi erano il georgiano ed il russo, come assicurato dalle due costituzioni della RSS nel 1936 e nel 1979. La decisione del 1991 causò un forte sconcerto nell'Ossezia del Sud, i cui leader chiesero che la lingua osseta diventasse l'idioma del loro stato. La minoranza osseta continuò a godere di un alto livello di autonomia, ma dovette confrontarsi con il crescente sentimento nazionalista della maggioranza georgiana. Violenti scontri animarono la fine del 1991, durante

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i quali molti villaggi sudosseti furono attaccati e dati alle fiamme, così come subirono attacchi case e scuole georgiane a Tskhinvali, capoluogo dell'Ossezia del Sud. In conseguenza di questi scontri, circa 1.000 persone persero la vita e tra i 60.000 e i 100.000 profughi lasciarono la regione, rifugiandosi lungo il confine con l'Ossezia del Nord e nel resto della Georgia. Molti profughi furono accolti nelle aree disabitate dell'Ossezia del Nord, dalle quali Stalin attuò l'espulsione degli Ingusci nel 1944, a risoluzione del conflitto tra Osseti ed Ingusci. Solo il 15% della popolazione Osseta vive oggi nell'Ossezia del Sud.

Nel 1992, la Georgia è stata costretta ad accettare un "cessate il fuoco" per evitare uno scontro a larga scala con la Russia. Il governo georgiano e i separatisti dell'Ossezia del Sud raggiunsero un accordo per evitare l'uso della forza tra di loro, e la Georgia scelse di non applicare sanzioni contro la regione. Fu istituita una forza di peacekeeping costituita da osseti, russi e georgiani. Il 6 novembre 1992 la Conferenza sulla sicurezza e sulla cooperazione in Europa (CSCE)14 organizzò una missione in Georgia per monitorare le operazioni di peacekeeping. Da allora fino alla metà del 2004, l'Ossezia del Sud è stato un territorio sostanzialmente pacifico.

La crisi si è riaccesa nel maggio 2004, ed ha rischiato di sfociare in una nuova guerra civile (se non in una vera e propria guerra tra Georgia e Russia). La crisi è iniziata con un tentativo di ripresa di sovranità da parte di Saakashvili: l’invio di truppe georgiane a presidiare un segmento dell’asse stradale sud-ossetino, centrale per i traffici di armi e droga gestiti dai ribelli. Questa misura contravveniva a quanto disposto dall’accordo di Dagomysh (1994), che impone la smilitarizzazione della zona ad eccezione dei soli peacekeepers. La vittoria del presidente indipendentista ossetino Kokoity alle elezioni amministrative, la sua richiesta ufficiale di riconoscere l’Ossezia del Sud come stato indipendente (in vista di una riunificazione con l’Ossezia del Nord, nell’orbita della federazione russa) e il sequestro di 160 missili aria-terra in un convoglio di peacekeepers russi, hanno gettato benzina sul fuoco. Scontri armati (anche con artiglieria pesante) tra georgiani e sud-ossetini hanno provocato circa 20 morti. Solo l’interessamento dell’OSCE e l’incontro (il 5/08/2004) tra Saakashvili e l’allora Segretario alla Difesa USA, Rumsfeld, hanno permesso di riaprire il dialogo tra Russia e Georgia. La proposta di Tbilisi è stata subito chiara: presentare all’ONU un nuovo progetto di soluzione della crisi secessionista, togliendo a Mosca il monopolio dei peacekeepers (la Turchia si è proposta come possibile sostituta). L’allora Presidente russo,

14 Dal 1 gennaio del 1995 la CSCE si è poi trasformata in un'organizzazione stabile, prendendo l'attuale denominazione di "Organizzazione per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa" (OSCE) e dotandosi di organi permanenti per lo svolgimento delle proprie attività.

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Putin, ha comunque rifiutato decisamente, dichiarandosi disponibile ad una soluzione confederale, ma non all’internazionalizzazione del peacekeeping. Nel frattempo la Georgia non escludeva l’opzione militare, acquistando aerei da combattimento SU-25 dalla Macedonia e dalla Bulgaria, elicotteri Mi-8 dall’Ucraina. Il 15 febbraio 2006, con una risoluzione, il Parlamento georgiano ha chiesto all’unanimità il ritiro delle forze russe stanziate in Ossezia meridionale e la loro sostituzione con un contingente internazionale di pace. Il Cremlino ha accusato i parlamentari georgiani di aver consapevolmente inasprito i rapporti tra i due Paesi compiendo un nuovo passo verso la destabilizzazione di tutta la regione.

Una serie di eventi hanno successivamente contribuito ad aggravare le tensioni: l’incidente missilistico del 6 agosto 2007 (lancio di un missile, rimasto inesploso, da parte di un velivolo di provenienza sconosciuta per cui i georgiani hanno responsabilizzato Mosca); la dichiarazione di indipendenza del Kossovo, che ha stimolato Kokoity a ribadire le sue pretese secessioniste; la risoluzione del 21 marzo scorso della Duma russa (non vincolante) che invita il governo di Mosca a riconoscere Abkhazia ed Ossezia del Sud qualora la Georgia acceda alla NATO e a potenziarvi la presenza dei militari russi della missione di pace CSI; i nuovi gravi episodi di violenza, tra febbraio e marzo (3 in meno di un mese), che hanno visto due morti ed il ferimento di un peacekeeper russo.

ABKHAZIA (REPUBBLICA AUTONOMA DI ABKHAZIA)

Presidente della regione Sergei BAGAPSH

L’Abkhazia (Nord, capitale Sukhumi) costituisce la regione nord-occidentale della Georgia, ed a composizione etnica mista (37% abkhazi, 29% georgiani, 34% tra russi, armeni, georgiani, greci, ecc.).

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Ribellatasi nel 1992 ha vinto l’anno successivo la guerra per rendersi indipendente da Tbilisi. Sempre nel 1993 è stata costituita una Missione ONU di osservatori (UNOMIG) il cui mandato è stato ininterrottamente rinnovato a scadenza semestrale (prossima scadenza: 15 ottobre 2008). Durante lo svolgersi della guerra tra la Repubblica della Georgia ed i separatisti abkhazi vi sono stati moltissimi episodi di violenza e di espulsioni di massa di migliaia di abitanti di etnia georgiana dall'Abkhazia. Tristemente famosi sono rimasti i nomi dei luoghi dove avvennero alcuni dei massacri più terribili: Ochamchira, Gali, Gagra, Kamani.

Le organizzazioni internazionali (ONU, OSCE, Ue, ecc.) riconoscono l’Abkhazia come parte della Georgia ed hanno esortato entrambe le parti a porre fine con mezzi pacifici al conflitto sull’autonomia dell’Abkhazia. Anche se Tblisi ha recentemente concesso l’autonomia alla regione, il governo separatista abkhazo considera la regione uno stato sovrano. Fin dall’inizio del conflitto, la Federazione russa ha contribuito politicamente e militarmente alla creazione di un movimento separatista in Abkhazia ed ancora oggi mantiene una forte influenza militare e politica sul governo de facto dell’Abkhazia, L’unica area – almeno fino all’inizio del recente conflitto – sotto il controllo dei georgiani, è costituita dalla regione di Kodori.

Prima dello scoppio della guerra, nel perdurante stallo del negoziato di pace, alcuni eventi hanno contribuito ad aggravare le tensioni e a vanificare le iniziative di pace:

- la decisione del governo di Tbilisi nel luglio 2006 di insediare nella regione di Kodori (l'unica parte dell'Abkhazia ancora sotto il controllo georgiano) il governo abkhazo filogeorgiano in esilio; - i bombardamenti dell’11 marzo 2007, sempre a Kodori, per i quali Tbilisi ha responsabilizzato Mosca (ma le successive verifiche di un Joint Fact Finding Group composta da georgiani, abkhazi, membri della missione UNOMIG e della peacekeeping force della CSI non hanno permesso di chiarire le reali dinamiche dell’episodio); - l’incidente del 20 settembre 2007 sempre a Kodori (scontro a fuoco tra forze speciali del Ministero degli Interni georgiano ed un gruppo armato abkhazo, in cui hanno perso la vita due miliziani abkhazi di nazionalità russa); - la dichiarazione di indipendenza del Kossovo, che ha stimolato il leader abkhazo Bagapsh a ribadire le sue pretese secessioniste;

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- abolizione da parte russa delle sanzioni contro l’Abkhazia decise nel 1996 dalla CSI (6 marzo u.s.); - la risoluzione (non vincolante) del 21 marzo scorso della Duma russa che invita il governo di Mosca a rafforzare i legami con l’Abkhazia e l’Ossezia del Sud ed a potenziarvi la presenza dei peacekeepers russi; - il riconoscimento della legalità dei documenti rilasciati dalle autorità secessioniste e assistenza consolare alla popolazione residente (16 aprile); - l’abbattimento da parte di caccia intercettori russi di un “drone” georgiano in ricognizione in Abkhazia (20 aprile: la circostanza continua ad essere negata da Mosca ma un recente rapporto UNOMIG non lascia dubbi al riguardo); - l’aumento del contingente di peacekeepers russi nella regione (29 aprile); - la richiesta georgiana (maggio 2008) al Comitato Esecutivo della CSI di rivedere la composizione della missione di peacekeeping in Abkhazia chiedendo la costituzione di un contingente di pace multilaterale, - l’invio in Abkhazia da parte della Federazione Russa (inizi di giugno) di 400 unità del Genio militare, asseritamente per motivi umanitari (riattivare i collegamenti ferroviari alleviando la situazione di isolamento della popolazione). Per la Georgia tale ultima mossa ha costituito il punto culminante della crisi e ne ha provocato l’immediata reazione. Innanzitutto, con la formale richiesta alla Russia di prendere fin da subito tre decisioni: l’annullamento del decreto del 16 aprile, il ritiro dei 400 genieri e quello dei nuovi peacekeepers inviati il 29 aprile.

La Georgia ha poi rivolto due richieste all’UE: 1) la modifica del quadro negoziale, attualmente affidato al “Group of Friends” in ambito ONU ( USA, Regno Unito, Francia, Germania e Russia) includendo la presenza dell’UE in quanto tale; 2) il cambiamento del formato del contingente deciso in sede CSI e ora composto da soli russi, considerati non più imparziali da Tbilisi. Ove la Russia accettasse di ritirare il proprio contingente di pace, la Georgia sarebbe disponibile a formalizzare un impegno al “no use of force”; in caso contrario, ha minacciato che denuncerà l’Accordo di Mosca regolante l’attuale PKO della CIS.

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Elementi sulla situazione in Georgia, aggiornati a martedì 19 agosto 2008, h.17,30

Cenni storici sulla crisi in Ossezia e in Abkazia Il tentativo di secessione dell’Ossezia del Sud dalla Georgia al momento dell’indipendenza portò ad un conflitto in cui gli ossetini prevalsero sul piano militare (1992). L’accordo raggiunto grazie alla mediazione russa sancì il cessate-il-fuoco e l’istituzione - sotto l’egida della Comunità degli Stati Indipendenti (CSI) - di una forza congiunta di pace sotto comando russo, composta da georgiani, sud-ossetini e russi (ciascuno con un battaglione di 500 uomini). Per vegliare sul rispetto degli accordi venne istituita una Joint Control Commission (JCC) composta da Georgia, Russia, Ossezia del Sud ed Ossezia del Nord (quest’ultima facente parte della Russia), con la partecipazione anche la Missione OSCE a Tbilisi (presente sul terreno con 8 osservatori militari non armati). L’Abkhazia proclamò la secessione da Tbilisi nel 1992, provocando un conflitto da cui uscì vittoriosa. Dopo un primo cessate-il-fuoco mai rispettato nel 1992, un nuovo accordo sul cessate-il-fuoco, nel maggio 1994, mise fine alle ostilità, permettendo il dispiegamento di una forza di peacekeeping della CSI, composta quasi esclusivamente da russi (2.000, aumentati lo scorso aprile a 3.000, numero massimo consentito). Nel 2003 il Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU decise (Risoluzione 858 del 24 agosto 2003) la costituzione di una Missione di osservatori (UNOMIG), il cui mandato è stato continuamente rinnovato ogni sei mesi (da ultimo ad aprile scorso, fino al 15 ottobre 2008).

La crisi attuale Per molti anni i conflitti sono rimasti sostanzialmente “congelati”. Negli ultimi mesi, anche in connessione con il deterioramento del quadro generale dei rapporti tra

35 Russia e Occidente, si è assistito a un crescendo di frizioni alimentate in particolare dal dibattito sulla possibile adesione della Georgia alla NATO . Il fattore Kossovo, con la proclamazione dell’indipendenza in febbraio e i rapidi riconoscimenti di Paesi occidentali (una ventina, su 43, europei) ha prestato il fianco a rivendicazioni indipendentiste di Sud Ossezia e Abkhazia, non formalmente avallate, ma in qualche modo coltivate ambiguamente dalla Russia (per altri versi preoccupata di ripercussioni all’interno del proprio territorio, Cecenia, Daghestan, Inguscezia, etc). Tali frizioni, sempre più accompagnate da richieste georgiane circa la necessità imperativa di cambiare formato negoziale e di sostituire, o almeno arricchire con nuovi apporti, le unità di peacekeeping della CSI in prevalenza russe, sono degenerate nella prima settimana di agosto. Dopo una serie di reciproche provocazioni e scontri tra forze georgiane e sud-ossetine, che hanno coinvolto anche i peacekeepers russi con vittime da entrambe le parti, il 7 agosto il Presidente Saakashvili ha proclamato la mobilitazione generale, cui ha fatto seguito l’occupazione militare della capitale sud-ossetina Tskhinvali da parte di truppe georgiane (8 agosto). La Russia ha reagito inviando truppe regolari in Ossezia del Sud a tutela dei cittadini russi residenti e delle proprie forze di peacekeeping, ed estendendo le operazioni militari fino al territorio georgiano vero e proprio (centro di Gori, snodi ferroviari, ponti, e soprattutto infrastrutture militari). L’Abkhazia ha, a propria volta, proclamato lo stato guerra ed occupato la valle di Kodori, unica regione abkhaza fino a quel momento sotto il controllo delle forze georgiane, allargando il teatro del conflitto. A fronte del rischio di una ulteriore escalation e dell’emergenza umanitaria - di cui mancano ancora stime credibili - la Presidenza francese dell’Unione Europea, dopo aver emesso due dichiarazioni a nome degli Stati Membri (8 e 10 agosto) , ha preso l’iniziativa a nome dell’UE di tentare una mediazione con l’obiettivo prioritario di far cessare le ostilità. Il 10 agosto è iniziata la missione diplomatica congiunta UE (Kouchner)/OSCE(Stubb) a Tbilisi e Mosca, sostenuta soprattutto da Italia e Germania. Il 12 agosto il Presidente Sarkozy si è recato a Mosca e a Tbilisi, riuscendo a raccogliere il consenso politico di entrambe le parti su una piattaforma sottoscritta il 15 agosto dal Presidente georgiano e il 16 agosto dal Presidente russo, con lo stesso Sarkozy. La piattaforma si articola in sei punti: 1) Non ricorso alla forza; 2) Cessazione immediata di tutte le ostilità;

36 3) Libero accesso agli aiuti umanitari; 4) Ritorno delle forze armate georgiane alle postazioni permanenti; 5) Ritiro delle forze russe alle posizioni precedenti al conflitto. In attesa di un meccanismo internazionale, le forze di interposizione russe prenderanno misure supplementari di sicurezza; 6) Inizio di un dibattito internazionale sulle modalità di sicurezza e stabilità in Abkhazia e Ossezia del Sud.

Il Consiglio dei Ministri degli Esteri dell’UE, riunito in sessione straordinaria il 13 agosto, ha avvallato la piattaforma in sei punti proposta dalla Presidenza francese, integrandola con un riferimento al principio dell’indipendenza, sovranità ed integrità territoriale ai fini di una soluzione pacifica e sostenibile della crisi e con una forte raccomandazione a Mosca e Tbilisi perché assicurino il rispetto degli impegni presi, in particolare sulla cessazione delle ostilità. Allo stesso tempo il Consiglio ha sottolineato l’urgenza di mettere a punto il meccanismo internazionale menzionato nella piattaforma, al fine di garantire la sicurezza nelle aree interessate dal conflitto. La Presidenza francese ha potuto svolgere un ruolo efficace, riuscendo a contenere al proprio interno le forti spinte in senso anti-russo provenienti da diversi Stati membri, grazie al forte appoggio di Italia e Germania.

E’ stata, invece, rinviata alla ministeriale informale (Gymnich) del 5 e 6 settembre ad Avignone la discussione sulle forme e modalità di partecipazione dell’UE all’attività di monitoraggio (o di peace-keeping) nelle aree interessate dalla crisi, e più in generale all’atteggiamento da tenere nei confronti della Russia. Ad Avignone Solana formulerà della proposte sul tipo di partecipazione della UE al monitoraggio sul terreno. La Commissione coordinerà gli aspetti relativi all’assistenza umanitaria e di ricostruzione, in vista del CAGRE del 15 settembre.

In sede ONU è in corso di elaborazione una Risoluzione del Consiglio di Sicurezza che recepisca i punti dell’accordo in parola e apra la strada ad una futura missione internazionale con partecipazione della UE. Mosca condivide in principio l'opportunità di una Risoluzione del CdS basata su quanto concordato tra le parti, ma vuole preservare il proprio ruolo in area quale “facilitatore”, non direttamente coinvolto nel conflitto.

37

Alla Riunione dei Ministri degli Esteri della NATO in data odierna (19 agosto), è stata ribadita l’urgenza dell’attuazione dell’accordo di cessate il fuoco, ed è stata decisa la creazione di una Commissione NATO-Georgia (sulla falsariga dell’esistente NATO- Ucraina), senza peraltro congelare il formato della collaborazione esistente NATO- Russia: la Russia viene tuttavia sollecitata fortemente a ritirarsi e a dimostrare nei fatti la sua lealtà ai principi che ispirano tale collaborazione. Si statuisce inoltre che “non può esservi soluzione militare ai conflitti irrisolti”.

La posizione italiana La posizione italiana è di pieno sostegno all’attività della Presidenza francese, ritenendo fondamentale che l’UE mantenga un fronte compatto. Consideriamo che solo se l’Unione saprà mantenere una posizione unitaria e al contempo un atteggiamento di equilibrio tra Russia e Georgia, essa riuscirà ad essere un fattore credibile di facilitazione/mediazione. La nostra priorità è l’applicazione dell’accordo in sei punti, con la cessazione effettiva delle attività militari e il ritiro sulle posizioni precedenti il conflitto, nonché l’emergenza umanitaria. La Farnesina ha erogato un contributo di 200.000 euro in risposta all’appello rivolto dal Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa, che si aggiungono ai 500.000 euro già erogati recentemente al Programma Alimentare Mondiale per fornire assistenza alimentare alla popolazione vulnerabile della Georgia. L’Italia contribuisce inoltre attivamente alle discussioni nei fori internazionali NATO, OSCE, ONU, facendosi portatrice di un approccio equilibrato, basato sul rispetto della sovranità e dell’integrità territoriale della Georgia, ma anche sulla consapevolezza della necessità di mantenere aperto il dialogo con la Russia, fattore imprescindibile per il superamento della crisi. Siamo inoltre aperti all’ipotesi di contribuire alla formazione di quei “meccanismi internazionali” previsti dal punto 5 dell’accordo, con il consenso delle parti ed entro la cornice delle istituzioni UE, OSCE, ONU.

38 Comunicazioni del Ministro Frattini sulla situazione in Georgia alle commissioni del Senato e della Camera

Roma 26 Agosto 2008

Comunicazioni del Ministro Frattini alle Commissioni Riunite e congiunte: 3ª (Affari esteri, emigrazione) e del Senato della Repubblica

RESOCONTO STENOGRAFICO

PRESIDENTE. L'ordine del giorno reca le comunicazioni del Governo sulla situazione in Georgia. L'odierna seduta acquista particolare rilievo anche per il fatto che la Presidenza Francese ha proceduto alla convocazione straordinaria, come voi ben sapete, del Consiglio europeo il prossimo primo settembre, nonché a seguito del voto del Parlamento russo per il riconoscimento dell'indipendenza dell'Ossezia del sud e dell'Abkhazia.

Invito il Ministro Frattini, che ringrazio della presenza, a svolgere la sua relazione.

FRANCO FRATTINI, Ministro degli affari esteri. Grazie molte, presidente. Ringrazio per la loro presenza anche i senatori e i deputati. Certamente il grande tema di cui oggi ci occupiamo, la crisi che si è infiammata nelle scorse settimane, riguarda una materia che per l'Italia riveste un particolare interesse. È materia che ci interessa molto da vicino, per almeno due ragioni. La prima ragione è che l'area dei cosiddetti «conflitti congelati», il Caucaso in particolare, dopo la fine della guerra fredda è diventata parte di quello che chiamiamo comunemente il vicinato europeo, cioè un'area politica ed economica con cui l'Unione europea, ma anche la comunità euro-atlantica, hanno stabilito un rapporto strutturato di dialogo e di cooperazione. È un'area - credo che possiamo dirlo con certezza - di assoluta importanza strategica anche per la sicurezza. Intendo riferirmi a vari aspetti della sicurezza: dalla sicurezza in senso proprio, ossia la prevenzione delle pulsioni estremistiche e terroristiche, fino alla sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti energetici. La stabilità di questa area veniva in passato assicurata, secondo le regole della dittatura sovietica, dall'Unione Sovietica. Oggi è, invece, un diretto interesse di tutte le democrazie occidentali. Vorrei dire che quell'area oggi è una responsabilità comune - nostra, come Italia - dell'Europa, degli Stati Uniti, ma è anche, ovviamente, una responsabilità della Russia, con la quale ci troviamo a condividere questo «vicinato allargato», come l'Europa lo definisce. È evidente, quindi, che una crisi che si dovesse espandere e aggravare avrebbe costi particolarmente immediati e alti, anche e soprattutto per la nostra sicurezza, come Italia e come Europa. La seconda ragione di diretto interesse è che la dinamica dei conflitti congelati nell'area caucasica influisce direttamente sui rapporti tra l'Occidente e la Russia. Ed è evidente che questi rapporti sono e saranno cruciali per la stabilità internazionale complessiva. Questa crisi georgiana, al di là del suo carattere specifico, di cui ovviamente dirò, assume un

39 rilievo particolare perché mette a dura prova i rapporti fra Occidente e Russia, rischiando di comprometterli e di incrinarli, anche gravemente. Io credo, onorevoli parlamentari, senatori e deputati, che questo rischio sia l'Occidente sia la Russia abbiano interesse comune ad evitarlo. Nessuno di noi può permettersi il lusso di una compromissione - ancor peggio se definitiva - nei rapporti tra il quadro strategico occidentale e la Federazione russa.

Mi preme sottolineare che Occidente e Russia hanno reciprocamente bisogno l'uno dell'altro per fronteggiare le grandi sfide che abbiamo cominciato ad affrontare insieme nel XXI secolo. Ho già accennato al terrorismo. Pensiamo inoltre alla proliferazione e, quindi, alla necessità di fermarla; pensiamo al dossier iraniano; pensiamo alle grandi crisi regionali, dall'Iraq all'Afghanistan. L'Europa e la Russia sono strutturalmente interdipendenti, anche sul piano economico ed energetico. È evidente che questa dipendenza pesa ancora più nell'epoca della globalizzazione. Ecco, questo è il legato che prendiamo dall'accordo di Pratica di Mare, con cui, nel 2002, grazie all'impegno dell'Italia, il Presidente Bush chiese al nostro Paese di svolgere un ruolo e di favorire l'inizio di un rapporto strutturato tra la NATO e la Russia. L'Italia svolse questo ruolo; il Presidente Bush e la NATO celebrarono a Pratica di Mare l'inaugurazione del Consiglio NATO-Russia. Ebbene, credo che questo legato, che oggi rischia di indebolirsi, noi abbiamo - come europei e come primi alleati degli Stati Uniti d'America - il dovere di mantenere. I costi di una nuova guerra fredda sarebbero altissimi per entrambi. Tra questi costi dobbiamo includere, credo, anche l'acquis ormai consolidato dei rapporti tra la Federazione russa e le principali istituzioni europee e internazionali. Questo è un rapporto che abbiamo faticosamente, ma con successo, costruito negli ultimi venti anni, e che dobbiamo difendere. Mi riferisco ai rapporti di partenariato strategico di Mosca con l'Unione europea, al Consiglio NATO-Russia, cui ho accennato, al ruolo della Russia nel Consiglio d'Europa, a cui spesso non si fa grande riferimento, e al ruolo dell'OSCE, il ruolo di una organizzazione internazionale che spesso dimentichiamo e sottovalutiamo. Quanti osservatori si stanno accorgendo soltanto ora, in queste settimane, che l'OSCE, con la missione che si allargherà per monitorare la situazione ai confini dell'Ossezia del sud, può e deve svolgere un ruolo importante! Solo ora ci accorgiamo che avremmo dovuto dare all'OSCE un ruolo più importante, anche nel recente passato. È evidente, in questo quadro, che la decisione di Mosca - che abbiamo voluto scongiurare il 19 agosto scorso a Bruxelles, al Consiglio NATO - di interrompere su alcuni aspetti il rapporto di collaborazione militare con l'Alleanza atlantica è un segnale che preoccupa, rispetto a una traiettoria negativa che occorre immediatamente fermare. Abbiamo una collaborazione in ambito NATO che tocca, tra l'altro, il supporto alla missione ISAF in Afghanistan, i diritti di sorvolo sul territorio russo, il transito attraverso la Federazione russa. Forse qualcuno pensa di poter domani sorvolare l'Iran, per andare in Afghanistan? Questo è soltanto un esempio per chiarire quanto sia importante che questo legame non cada definitivamente. Tutto questo, evidentemente, non riguarda solo la collaborazione con la NATO, ma anche la necessità che Occidente e Federazione russa affrontino insieme le minacce alla nostra sicurezza, che includono l'esame del dossier nucleare iraniano. La Russia che collabora è infatti un alleato potente per isolare le ambizioni iraniane di arricchimento dell'uranio, mentre una Russia che venga lasciata agire da sola, senza un solido quadro di legami con

40 l'Occidente, può diventare un interlocutore preoccupante, a fronte delle sue importanti relazioni, evidenti dalle offerte siriane rivolte al Presidente russo durante la crisi di agosto. Per quanto riguarda il Medio Oriente, mi annovero tra coloro che ritengono necessario cogliere al più presto un'opportunità per la pace, pur nella consapevolezza di come la pace in Medio Oriente contro la Russia non si raggiunga per l'elementare ragione che la Russia costituisce uno dei quattro membri del Quartetto. Questi esempi consentono di concludere che ad essere interessati a una divisione all'interno dell'Occidente e tra l'Occidente e la Russia non siamo noi, bensì coloro che preferiscono un'Europa più debole, un'America più debole. Dobbiamo quindi contenere questi impulsi attraverso una politica estera equilibrata. Come Italia, consideriamo gli Stati Uniti come il primo partner strategico, il primo alleato internazionale. In questi anni, però, indipendentemente dal colore dei Governi, abbiamo sviluppato con Mosca anche a livello bilaterale un rapporto di collaborazione politico, economico-industriale ed energetico. La crisi in corso tocca dunque anche i nostri interessi nazionali, oltre che gli interessi europei e della NATO. La posta in gioco è quindi alta. Si deve registrare positivamente lo sforzo dei grandi attori internazionali: le organizzazioni come le Nazioni unite, l'Unione europea, che si è già espressa e si esprimerà a livello di Capi di Governo tra qualche giorno, l'OSCE, la NATO, il Consiglio d'Europa. Tutti sono al lavoro nell'ambito delle proprie responsabilità. Per quanto riguarda la posizione italiana all'interno di queste organizzazioni e a livello bilaterale, ritengo che le ragioni di questa crisi partano da un'analisi che l'Italia ha il dovere di considerare, guardando a fondo a una regione che conosce e a un Paese come la Russia, che conosce meglio di altri in Europa. Non possiamo ignorare che Mosca esprime con chiarezza la sua tesi, ovvero come gli attuali assetti di sicurezza europei non garantiscano sufficientemente i suoi specifici interessi nazionali, particolarmente nello spazio che apparteneva alla disciolta Unione Sovietica, e che quindi necessitino di revisione. All'inizio del suo mandato, il Presidente della Federazione russa ha espresso con grande chiarezza la sua visione anche al Presidente Napolitano e a me, che lo accompagnavo durante l'ultimo viaggio di alcune settimane fa a Mosca, ribadendo la necessità di una nuova architettura di sicurezza, che nella forma, e non più soltanto nella sostanza, riconosca alla Russia uno status e un ruolo adeguati alla sua riconquistata posizione di grande potenza. L'Occidente ritiene che non si debbano destrutturare i pilastri su cui si è costruita la sicurezza dell'Europa, ovvero la NATO e la politica europea di sicurezza e di difesa, inclusi i nostri rapporti strategici con la Russia. Non destrutturare non significa però evitare di perseguire un'attiva strategia di partenariato rafforzato tra l'Unione europea e la Russia. Ritengo che questo sia perfettamente compatibile con la conferma dei pilastri tradizionali della nostra sicurezza e che Alleanza atlantica e Russia debbano continuare a cooperare. Questa è la posizione dell'Unione europea, che nello scorso mese di giugno, con il nostro Consiglio dei Ministri degli esteri, ha dato via libera al negoziato per un nuovo trattato strategico tra Unione europea e Russia, nella consapevolezza unanime dei ventisette Paesi dell'esigenza di compiere un salto di qualità strutturato tra Unione europea e Russia sui quattro assi della nostra collaborazione strategica, che non si limitano soltanto alla politica energetica. Come Italia, troviamo quindi confermata la nostra visione di equilibrio e di collaborazione rafforzata e strategica negli ultimi sviluppi che nei mesi scorsi hanno segnato l'evoluzione dell'Unione europea verso la Federazione russa. Il dibattito sulla sicurezza europea, specialmente nell'area di vicinato, costituisce dunque un

41 punto cruciale per capire la crisi di oggi, che si può affrontare solo estendendo la nostra riflessione a quella politica di sicurezza europea che non può più essere la stessa in un'Europa a ventisette. Questa ha infatti ormai confini lunghissimi e diretti con la Russia, giunge ad affacciarsi nel Mar Nero e quindi ha un interesse diretto in quell'area in passato di proiezione lontana, che oggi rappresenta invece il nostro diretto vicinato. Per quanto riguarda l'azione diplomatica e il ruolo dell'Italia, malgrado una crisi che non accenna ad attenuarsi, valuto positivamente due aspetti: il ruolo dell'Unione europea, che ha mantenuto la sua coesione interna, e una complementarietà tra le iniziative perseguite dalle diverse istituzioni in questa settimana, in particolare dall'Unione europea, dalla NATO e dall'OSCE. . La Presidenza francese merita apprezzamento per gli sforzi compiuti. Nelle ultime settimane, l'Italia ha registrato una fortissima sintonia con la posizione francese, così come con quella tedesca, collaborando attivamente affinché la piattaforma presentata a Tbilisi e a Mosca dal Presidente Sarkozy, unitamente all'OSCE, con la collaborazione diretta degli Stati Uniti d'America, potesse avere successo. Ritengo che quell'accordo in sei punti costituisca una base adeguata, del quale occorre perseguire l'immediata e piena attuazione attraverso il non ricorso alla forza, la cessazione permanente di tutte le ostilità, il libero accesso agli aiuti umanitari per la ricostruzione, il ritorno delle forze armate georgiane alle postazioni permanenti, ovvero alle rispettive caserme, il ritiro totale delle forze russe alle posizioni precedenti al conflitto. Tutto questo è complementare al sesto punto: l'avvio di un dibattito internazionale sulle modalità di sicurezza e stabilità in Abkhazia e Ossezia del sud. Queste decisioni sono state prese dal Presidente di turno dell'Unione europea, il quale ha firmato un documento a Mosca e a Tbilisi. I Ministri degli esteri hanno ratificato tali decisioni. Successivamente a ciò, si è avviato un dibattito in sede ONU, che è complementare all'azione dell'Europa. In queste settimane, proprio per garantire la piena attuazione dei sei punti contenuti in un accordo politico che non ha un effetto legale vincolante, si è avviato il lavoro per arrivare a una risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza. A questa risoluzione l'Italia sta collaborando, come membro non permanente del Consiglio di sicurezza, e credo che essa potrà, da un lato, recepire i sei punti dell'accordo firmato a Mosca e a Tbilisi e, dall'altro, confermare che il quadro internazionale richiede che tale accordo abbia efficacia legale e vincolante. Questa sarà una delle condizioni per potere, nelle prossime settimane, non solo monitorare l'effettivo ritiro delle forze russe e l'effettivo rispetto da parte di entrambi i contendenti delle condizioni poste, ma anche per attribuire a questo monitoraggio e a questo impegno un'efficacia legale e vincolante, che può derivare unicamente da una risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU. In questo quadro si inserisce, sempre sul fronte dell'Unione europea, il Consiglio europeo del 1o settembre. Sarà un Consiglio al quale, ovviamente, il Presidente Berlusconi parteciperà, da me accompagnato, e durante il quale faremo il punto - questa è l'agenda dei lavori - sull'attuazione dell'accordo in sei punti presentato, a nome dell'Europa, dal Presidente Sarkozy e sottoscritto dal Presidente russo e dal Presidente georgiano. Parleremo dell'assistenza immediata alle popolazioni vittime del conflitto e della ricostruzione delle zone colpite dagli eventi militari. L'Unione europea sta ancora riflettendo - non ne discuteremo in via definitiva il 1o settembre, bensì nel Consiglio informale dei Ministri degli esteri il 5-6 settembre - sulle modalità per contribuire direttamente alla stabilizzazione.

42 Si intende non solo rafforzare la presenza di monitoraggio, ma successivamente - questo è il punto - con il consenso delle parti e in presenza di una risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza, partecipare con una missione europea alle operazioni di peacekeeping. Come Unione europea, stiamo convogliando aiuti di primo soccorso, che ammontano finora ad un milione di euro, ma nei prossimi giorni arriveranno a cinque milioni di euro. Oltre all'Europa si è mossa anche la NATO, che il 19 agosto scorso ha svolto un consiglio ministeriale, al quale ho partecipato, anche per consolidare, come NATO, un messaggio equilibrato di solidarietà alla Georgia e alla sua integrità territoriale, decidendo quindi la creazione di una Commissione NATO-Georgia - che, come sapete, ha un precedente nell'esistente Commissione NATO-Ucraina - per sottolineare un dialogo permanente anche con uno Stato che non è ancora formalmente candidato, senza tuttavia congelare il formato della collaborazione esistente nel Consiglio NATO-Russia. Si è trattato di uno sforzo dell'Italia, che ha avuto successo, sostenuto da molti dei principali partner europei, condiviso dal Segretario generale Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, che ha portato a conclusioni in base alle quali la Russia è stata invitata, con forza, al ritiro completo e a dimostrare, nei fatti, la propria volontà di collaborare con la NATO. A ciò ha fatto seguito, purtroppo, una dichiarazione di parziale disimpegno, della quale ho già parlato. Si è mosso, poi, l'OSCE, attualmente sotto la Presidenza finlandese. Con il collega Stubb, Ministro degli esteri finlandese, abbiamo avuto in queste settimane un contatto permanente, anche perché sono stato richiesto personalmente di numerosi interventi nei confronti del Governo russo, al fine di ottenere quel «via libera» all'espansione della missione OSCE, che infine è arrivato. Si tratta di un negoziato che prevede subito la presenza di 20 esperti e l'ampliamento, nelle prossime settimane, fino a 100 esperti. L'Italia parteciperà a tale missione OSCE di osservazione. Nel primo contingente dei nuovi 20 esperti, l'Europa avrà 12 osservatori, dei quali uno sarà italiano. Ci sarà un tedesco, ci saranno esperti di altri Paesi che hanno dato la disponibilità. Noi abbiamo offerto una disponibilità fino a 7 uomini, su un totale di 100, per dimostrare una particolare sensibilità a questo impegno. Vengo infine ad illustrare la posizione bilaterale. Cosa fa l'Italia? Come ho già detto, abbiamo tenuto contatti non solo con i colleghi europei, ma abbiamo anche mobilitato un contatto, direi permanente, con il gruppo G7. Io stesso, in più occasioni, ho partecipato a conversazioni con colleghi che, essendo membri del G7, spaziano dal Giappone al Canada (Stati Uniti d'America, ovviamente, inclusi), raccogliendo alcune linee condivise capaci di sostenere la posizione di equilibrio dell'Italia e che, debbo dire, i colleghi del G7, come anche i colleghi europei (e non solo) hanno apprezzato. Avrete registrato probabilmente, quasi in contemporanea, le parole di apprezzamento del Governo di Mosca e della mia collega Ministro degli esteri della Georgia verso la posizione che l'Italia sta tenendo. Abbiamo quindi esplorato e utilizzato i nostri canali con Mosca e Tbilisi. Abbiamo ribadito pubblicamente - e lo faccio ancora oggi - che l'integrità territoriale della Georgia rappresenta un principio incontestabile. Abbiamo partecipato, tra i primi, all'assistenza umanitaria. Oggi siamo a oltre 1 milione 700 mila euro di assistenza già erogata (più di quella che l'intera Europa ha finora erogato) attraverso canali bilaterali, attraverso la Croce rossa e l'Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati. La posizione italiana, quindi, continuerà ad essere di sostegno alla Presidenza francese, di piena solidarietà con la NATO e con l'Unione europea. Sono personalmente impegnato su queste linee. Ho avuto ieri un colloquio telefonico con il Ministro Lavrov, al quale ho segnalato, ancora una volta, la grande preoccupazione e la grande complicazione che deriverebbero da una dichiarazione d'indipendenza unilaterale dell'Ossezia del sud e

43 dell'Abkhazia. Ho rivolto un invito alla cautela nel rispetto, ovviamente, delle decisioni che verranno prese. Ieri il Parlamento russo, come sapete, ha deciso. Personalmente mi auguro, ma non sono ottimista, che il Presidente russo non voglia seguire - anche lui - questa strada. Esprimo il mio pessimismo: temo che il Presidente russo adotterà un decreto di riconoscimento. È chiaro che ciò crea una complicazione in sé, per un semplice ragionamento: uno dei sei punti della dichiarazione firmata a Mosca e a Tbilisi parla di un dialogo futuro internazionale sullo status. È chiaro che anticipare i termini di quel dialogo futuro sullo status con una dichiarazione bilaterale, anche se priva di valore legale internazionale, è un fattore di complicazione in più. Mi recherò la settimana prossima a Tbilisi e poi a Mosca, dopo l'invito sia del Governo russo sia del Governo georgiano, un invito che mi ha fatto particolarmente piacere. Lo farò prima del 5 settembre, in quanto per quella data, come sapete, è convocato il Consiglio informale dei Ministri degli esteri. Di ritorno da Mosca, dunque, avrò la possibilità di riferire sugli ultimissimi sviluppi ai colleghi Ministri degli esteri ad Avignone, nella riunione prevista per la mattinata del 5 settembre. Proporrò ad entrambe le parti l'offerta di Roma di ospitare una Conferenza internazionale di dialogo e di riconciliazione per la regione del Caucaso. Abbiamo indicato il mese di novembre, ma siamo flessibili sulla data. Lo faremo in collaborazione con la Presidenza francese, alla quale chiederemo di copatrocinare la conferenza di Roma. Intendiamo utilizzare questo foro come occasione di dialogo con tutti gli attori interessati, compresi gli Stati Uniti d'America, ovviamente, per una riflessione strategica sul piano umanitario, economico, politico e di sicurezza. Questo è il futuro in cui noi crediamo sul vicinato con la regione del Caucaso. Noi non possiamo immaginare una logica di competizione, ma una logica di cooperazione tra la Russia e l'Occidente. Non possiamo avere una gestione con logica a somma zero, in cui diamo qualcosa e togliamo qualcosa; dobbiamo lavorare insieme, altrimenti siamo tutti più deboli. Questa è la nostra volontà. Non pensiamo che «antagonizzare» Mosca sia nell'interesse dell'Italia, dell'Europa e della NATO. Non pensiamo che un futuro da guerra fredda ci aiuti e ci permetta, al di là della necessità di circoscrivere ora la crisi, di guardare a un quadro regionale di sicurezza con più ottimismo. Noi cerchiamo, dunque, la posizione più equilibrata.

… FRANCO FRATTINI, Ministro degli affari esteri. Interrompo per un breve annuncio: come temevo, il riconoscimento è stato appena annunciato dal Cremlino.

PRESIDENTE. L'agenzia è appena arrivata…

… PRESIDENTE. Do la parola al Ministro Frattini per la non facile replica.

FRANCO FRATTINI, Ministro degli affari esteri. Grazie, presidente. Mi preme innanzitutto sottolineare che, mentre eravamo tutti impegnati in questo estremamente importante e utile dibattito, è intervenuta la decisione del Presidente della Federazione russa, che accolgo con rammarico e che con un'espressione francese definirei regrettable. La complicazione di questo nuovo elemento si aggiunge a un quadro già complicato, anche se si tratta di una decisione di riconoscimento unilaterale che non ha evidentemente alle spalle un quadro di legalità internazionale. Come evidenziato dai colleghi della maggioranza e dell'opposizione, che ringrazio tutti, questo ci impone tuttavia di mantenere nella nostra agenda una riflessione con il Parlamento su un nuovo quadro strategico di sicurezza e di stabilità per la regione del Caucaso, per le 44 ragioni espresse nella mia introduzione, per le buone ragioni citate da molti di voi e certamente per la necessità unanimemente condivisa anche da coloro che hanno eccessivamente marcato la debolezza dell'Europa. Credo invece che l'Europa abbia giocato un suo ruolo. Tutti condividono che un quadro di sicurezza e di stabilità imponga una collaborazione tra Occidente, cioè Stati Uniti ed Europa, e la Federazione russa. Considero un grande pericolo per tutti una balcanizzazione della regione caucasica su base etnica, come ribadito da tutti coloro che hanno preso la parola su questo tema, a cominciare dall'onorevole Fassino, giacché si cambierebbe uno dei pilastri del diritto internazionale, quello della cittadinanza, sostituendolo con la base etnica. Alcuni interventi hanno toccato il tema dei rapporti della Georgia con l'Europa e con la NATO, laddove trattando però di Georgia non si può evitare di parlare di Ucraina. Credo che per confrontarci o per contrastare la Russia non si possa scavalcare il percorso che a Copenaghen stabilimmo per l'allargamento dell'Unione europea, che non sia opportuno accelerare ad altri quattro, cinque o sei Stati il percorso di allargamento solamente a causa del problema con la Russia, mentre alcuni Stati dei Balcani per quelle regole ancora non riescono a presentare la domanda di candidatura, come nel caso della Serbia. La reazione deve essere prudente. Ringrazio l'onorevole Antonione per aver richiamato l'impossibilità di far entrare tutti dentro l'Unione europea, dentro la NATO. Dobbiamo lavorare per avvicinare i Paesi che hanno una vocazione europea agli strumenti che l'Europa ha già messo a loro disposizione. L'Europa ha messo a disposizione della Georgia come dell'Ucraina accordi di partenariato che all'interno della politica di vicinato danno sostegno politico, economico e interventi operativi non indifferenti. La Georgia è già membro del Partnership of peace, strumento del quadro NATO, tanto che la NATO al Consiglio del 19 agosto ha deciso di dispiegare gli interventi nell'ambito del partenariato per la pace, non come se quel Paese fosse già membro, ma sulla base degli strumenti che esistono. Gli strumenti ci sono già. L'Europa esiste, la NATO esiste. La Commissione NATO-Georgia non ce la siamo inventata, ma abbiamo seguito il modello che esiste con l'Ucraina nato non sotto un conflitto, ma con l'esigenza di avvicinare l'Ucraina, quando il vertice NATO di Bucarest del dicembre 2007 aveva deciso non sull'adesione, ma sul rafforzamento dei rapporti. Non abbiamo inventato cose. Non trarrei dunque dalle preoccupazioni la conclusione di fare subito un'Europa con altri 5- 6 Paesi membri per contrastare la Russia, errore ancora peggiore del non adottare misure serie invocate dal Presidente Casini, dal Presidente Marini e da altri sulla necessità di rafforzare ad esempio la difesa europea come strumento autonomo per esercitare un ruolo nella politica internazionale. A questo sono assolutamente favorevole, ma sappiamo che il rafforzamento nella difesa europea è una delle priorità della Presidenza francese, non più la primissima, a seguito dell'esplosione di questa crisi. Tuttavia lo era, e tutti eravamo concordi sul fatto che l'Europa diventasse finalmente produttore di sicurezza e non solo consumatore, insieme agli americani. Al senatore Cabras, che cita alcune analisi che riguardano il passato, devo rispondere con franchezza, condividendo una sua analisi, che l'Occidente ha commesso l'errore di umiliare la Russia per almeno dieci anni, dal 1991 all'inizio degli anni 2000, chiedendole di essere grande fornitore di energia, di costituire una grande opportunità di business per le nostre imprese, senza giocare un ruolo politico. Questo è stato un errore. Dovevamo prevedere che la Russia covasse una frustrazione che adesso sta esplodendo. Si è trattato di un errore di

45 valutazione, che abbiamo commesso tutti insieme. Ce ne siamo accorti al vertice di Bucarest, nel dicembre 2007, quando per la prima volta la Russia ha reagito in termini di provocazione frontale all'ipotesi di fare entrare l'Ucraina e la Georgia nella NATO. È stato quello il punto di svolta, in cui la NATO e l'Europa si sono rese conto che, dopo dieci anni di partenariato, la Russia cominciava a rivendicare un ruolo, che non credo, onorevole Guzzanti, debba essere da superpotenza, antagonista degli Stati Uniti d'America. Ritengo che gli Stati Uniti resteranno l'unica superpotenza globale, e che non sia sbagliato. Non posso immaginare, però, che il ruolo che svolge la Federazione russa in tutti gli scacchieri citati, compreso il ruolo di contenimento del fondamentalismo islamico, facciano della Russia una potenza secondaria, aspetto non condivisibile. Gli argomenti dell'onorevole Nirenstein dell'eccitazione jihadista e dell'estremismo islamico inducono a chiedersi se sia opportuno lasciare la Russia nelle braccia dell'eccitazione jihadista, al solo scopo di indebolire gli Stati Uniti d'America. Questo non è il nostro gioco. Dobbiamo tenere collegata all'Occidente la Federazione russa per non indebolire l'Alleanza atlantica, gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa a favore del fondamentalismo islamico. Si tratta di un ulteriore argomento per non lasciarla alla deriva rompendo il rapporto con la NATO, che abbiamo faticosamente iniziato a costruire. Il 19 agosto la NATO ha tenuto presente questi argomenti. Quando colleghi particolarmente duri nei confronti della Russia, come il collega polacco o il lituano, prendendo la parola hanno detto di non voler sopprimere il Consiglio NATO-Russia, mi sono complimentato, perché avevano capito come non fosse interesse dei Paesi più esposti rompere il rapporto NATO-Russia, sebbene soffrano più di altri la presenza forte e invadente nei loro confini della Federazione russa. Il Consiglio NATO ha dunque maturato unanimemente questa proposta, che l'Italia aveva caldeggiato fin dal primo momento. Personalmente, avevo spiegato alla signora Rice le buone ragioni di alcuni Paesi europei, e quella è stata la decisione. Non banalizziamo quindi un discorso importante e profondo. Onorevole Orlando, comprendo le sue preoccupazioni e le condivido per quanto riguarda la difesa europea, come ho già detto riferendomi all'intervento del Presidente Marini. Non vedo però un'Unione europea distinta dalla NATO nel garantire la sicurezza, ma credo che la difesa europea e la difesa della NATO debbano essere indissolubilmente legate, quanto meno per evitare sovrapposizioni e per dispiegare i nostri interventi nel modo migliore. Ecco perché (come avevo detto, magari troppo rapidamente) il 5 e 6 settembre valuteremo l'ipotesi che una missione di peacekeeping europea, proprio una missione PESD europea, possa intervenire in quell'area. Ne cominceremo a discutere su una relazione che Javier Solana ci farà ad Avignone il 5 e 6 settembre. Tuttavia, c'è un piccolo particolare, onorevoli colleghi: per fare questo e per inviare soldati è necessaria una risoluzione delle Nazioni unite. E come è possibile ottenerla se la Russia pone il veto? Ecco che torniamo al punto che queste cose non si possano fare contro, ma si debbano fare con la Federazione russa. Vogliamo un peacekeeping che non sia solo russo, perché è ovvio che la Russia è parte interessata direttamente e non può essere peacekeeper. O meglio, essa può essere anche peacekeeper, ma non come lo è stato fino al 5 agosto scorso. È evidente, tuttavia, che con un peacekeeping assistito da una risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza in presenza del veto della Russia non andiamo da nessuna parte. Questo - scusate la brutalità - vuol dire che dobbiamo lavorare insieme. Non possiamo immaginare grandi idee di difesa europea, se poi non abbiamo lo strumento di legalità internazionale. Noi accelereremo per la Georgia i programmi europei. Non credo che la struttura

46 dell'Unione euromediterranea possa accogliere la Georgia, ma certamente abbiamo una dimensione della strategia di vicinato ad est, e questo è l'altro obiettivo che entro dicembre presenteremo con la Presidenza francese. In quella dimensione - la dimensione del Mar Nero, la dimensione caucasica - certamente la Georgia si può e si deve inserire. Ecco perché l'idea della Conferenza di Roma non riguarda solo la Georgia. Abbiamo pensato anche all'Armenia e all'Azerbaigian. Georgia, Armenia e Azerbaigian sono i tre grandi Stati caucasici. Abbiamo già contattato - l'ho fatto io, rivolgendomi al Ministro Babacan - la Turchia, che deve essere parte di quella Conferenza. Le grandi frontiere della Turchia sul Mar Nero ci permettono di dire che o questo Paese gioca con noi oppure un quadro di stabilità - pensate ai rapporti tra Turchia e Armenia - non si potrà realizzare. Ancora una volta non si può, con un colpo di sciabola, dire che la ragione sta da una parte o dall'altra. L'Armenia avrebbe probabilmente difficoltà a partecipare a una conferenza in cui non si tocchino alcuni temi che le stanno a cuore, con riferimento alla Turchia, ma noi abbiamo bisogno della Turchia perché un quadro di stabilità del Caucaso senza la Turchia è difficile realizzarlo. Credo che a Roma tutti questi Paesi verranno senza difficoltà, perché l'Italia ha sostenuto - anche se qualcuno nutre dei dubbi - la necessità di un percorso della Turchia e l'importanza di un equilibrio nel Caucaso, ragion per cui l'Italia rappresenta una sede in cui tutti si possono ritrovare. Il tema toccato dal senatore Perduca, relativo alle giurisdizioni internazionali, è un tema serio. Io parlerò di questo a Tbilisi con la mia collega, ma lei sa perfettamente, come lo sanno molti dei colleghi presenti, che il ricorso alle giurisdizioni internazionali l'ha già deciso la Serbia per contestare l'indipendenza del Kosovo. Ecco che diventa una bella partita: la Serbia contesta l'indipendenza del Kosovo, la Georgia contesta l'indipendenza dell'Abkhazia. Andiamo avanti con le giurisdizioni o facciamo la politica? Io non sono tra coloro che hanno invitato il collega serbo a ritirare il ricorso, mentre altri colleghi lo hanno fatto. Personalmente credo che il ricorso alle giurisdizioni internazionali sia segno di rispetto per le giurisdizioni medesime, ma, fermo restando il rispetto, non è così che risolveremo i nostri problemi. Ovviamente non conoscevo questo aspetto, ma lo approfondirò. Posso assicurare che la nostra posizione sarà sempre di rispetto per l'accesso a una giurisdizione internazionale. Se, dunque, uno Stato ritiene di rivolgersi a tale giurisdizione, noi non lo contrasteremo, ma sta già accadendo che la Serbia chieda la stessa cosa per l'indipendenza del Kosovo.

… FRANCO FRATTINI, Ministro degli affari esteri. Quello che ho detto oggi al Parlamento è la posizione espressa dal Presidente del Consiglio con tutti i suoi interlocutori. Io non esprimo una mia posizione personale. I termini del colloquio non li conosco perché non ero presente, ma la sostanza politica è esattamente quella che ci ha portato a un riconoscimento e a un apprezzamento della Russia, degli Stati Uniti e della Georgia. Questa è la situazione.

PRESIDENTE. Grazie, signor Ministro. Voglio assicurare a tutti i colleghi che le Commissioni continueranno a seguire l'evolversi della situazione in stretto contatto con il Ministero, come abbiamo fatto finora e, ove necessario, signor Ministro, la chiameremo ancora. Dichiaro conclusa l'audizione.

47

48 DOCUMENTI

COSIGLIO Bruxelles,1°settembre2008 DELL'UIOEEUROPEA (OR.fr)

12594/08 COCL3

OTADITRASMISSIOE della: presidenza alle: delegazioni Oggetto: COSIGLIOEUROPEOSTRAORDIARIODIBRUXELLES 1°SETTEMBRE2008 COCLUSIOIDELLAPRESIDEZA

Si allegano per le delegazioni le conclusioni della presidenza del Consiglio europeo straordinario di Bruxelles (1° settembre 2008).

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12594/08 51 IT La riunione del Consiglio europeo è stata preceduta da un intervento di Hans-Gert Pöttering, presidente del Parlamento europeo, cui è seguito uno scambio di opinioni.

o o o

1. Il Consiglio europeo è seriamente preoccupato per il conflitto aperto esploso in Georgia, per le conseguenti violenze e per la reazione sproporzionata della Russia: il conflitto ha provocato grande sofferenza da entrambe le parti. Interventi militari di questo tipo non costituiscono una soluzione e non sono accettabili. Il Consiglio europeo deplora le perdite di vite umane, le sofferenze inflitte alle popolazioni, il numero di sfollati o profughi, i danni materiali ingenti.

2. Il Consiglio europeo condanna fermamente la decisione unilaterale della Russia di riconoscere l'indipendenza dell'Abkhazia e dell'Ossezia del Sud. Questa decisione è inaccettabile e il Consiglio europeo esorta gli altri Stati a non riconoscere questi proclami d'indipendenza e chiede alla Commissione di esaminarne le conseguenze concrete. Rammenta che una soluzione pacifica e duratura dei conflitti in Georgia deve essere basata sul pieno rispetto dei principi d'indipendenza, sovranità e integrità territoriale riconosciuti dal diritto internazionale, dall'atto finale della conferenza di Helsinki sulla sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa e dalle risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite.

3. Il Consiglio europeo sottolinea che ciascuno Stato in Europa ha diritto di decidere liberamente della propria politica estera e delle proprie alleanze, nel rispetto del diritto internazionale e dei principi di buon vicinato e di cooperazione pacifica. È parimenti legittimo tener conto degli interessi di sicurezza di ciascuno, sempre nel rispetto dei principi fondamentali della sovranità, dell'integrità territoriale e dell'indipendenza degli Stati.

12594/08 1 52 IT 4. Il Consiglio europeo si rallegra che l'accordo in sei punti ottenuto il 12 agosto sulla base degli sforzi di mediazione dell'Unione europea sia risultato nel cessate il fuoco, nel migliore inoltro dell'aiuto umanitario alle vittime e in un sensibile ritiro delle forze militari russe. L'attuazione di questo piano deve essere completa. Il Consiglio europeo esorta le parti a proseguire l'attuazione integrale e in buona fede dell'accordo che hanno sottoscritto. Le forze militari che non si sono ancora ritirate sulle linee precedenti all'inizio delle ostilità devono procedervi senza indugio. Al di là dell'assistenza alle vittime, è ora urgente mettere a punto il meccanismo internazionale di supervisione - cui l'Unione è pronta a partecipare - previsto al punto 5 dell'accordo per sostituire le ulteriori misure di sicurezza russe nella zona adiacente all'Ossezia del Sud. È altresì urgente avviare le discussioni internazionali previste al punto 6 dell'accordo sulle modalità di sicurezza e stabilità in Abkhazia e in Ossezia del Sud.

5. L'Unione europea è pronta ad impegnarsi, anche con una presenza sul terreno, per sostenere tutte le iniziative volte ad una soluzione pacifica e duratura dei conflitti in Georgia. A tal fine gli Stati membri dell'Unione europea apportano un contributo significativo al rafforzamento della missione di osservazione dell'OSCE nell'Ossezia del Sud, sotto forma d'invio di osservatori e d'ingenti contributi materiali e finanziari. L'Unione europea ha altresì deciso d'inviare immediatamente una missione esplorativa incaricata di contribuire alla raccolta d'informazioni e di precisare le modalità di un impegno rafforzato dell'Unione europea sul terreno a titolo della politica europea in materia di sicurezza e di difesa. Il Consiglio europeo invita gli organi competenti del Consiglio a svolgere tutti i lavori preparatori necessari affinché il Consiglio possa eventualmente decidere, fin dal 15 settembre, l'invio di tale missione d'osservazione, in funzione dell'evolversi della situazione e in stretto coordinamento con l'OSCE e le Nazioni Unite. Il Consiglio europeo chiede a tal fine al presidente del Consiglio e all'SG/AR di avviare tutti i contatti e i lavori necessari.

12594/08 2 53 IT 6. L'Unione europea ha già corrisposto un aiuto d'urgenza. È disposta a fornire un aiuto alla ricostruzione in Georgia, anche nelle zone dell'Ossezia del Sud e dell'Abkhazia. È pronta a sostenere misure miranti a rafforzare la fiducia e lo sviluppo della cooperazione regionale. Decide altresì di rafforzare le sue relazioni con la Georgia, anche tramite un'agevolazione del rilascio dei visti e l'eventuale instaurazione di una zona di libero scambio completa e approfondita non appena le condizioni lo permetteranno. Assumerà l'iniziativa d'indire entro breve una conferenza internazionale di aiuto alla ricostruzione della Georgia e chiede al Consiglio e alla Commissione di avviarne i preparativi.

7. Il Consiglio europeo rileva con preoccupazione l'impatto della crisi attuale sulla regione nel suo insieme. Secondo l'Unione europea è oggi più necessario che mai sostenere la cooperazione regionale e potenziare le relazioni con i vicini orientali, in particolare mediante la politica di vicinato, lo sviluppo della « sinergia del Mar Nero » e il « partenariato orientale » che il Consiglio europeo intende adottare nel marzo 2009. A tal fine invita la Commissione a presentargli proposte fin dal dicembre 2008. Il Consiglio europeo sottolinea in questo contesto l'importanza del prossimo vertice del 9 settembre tra l'Unione europea e l'Ucraina.

8. Il Consiglio europeo decide di nominare un rappresentante speciale dell'Unione europea per la crisi georgiana e chiede al Consiglio di prendere le disposizioni necessarie a tal fine.

9. I recenti avvenimenti evidenziano la necessità che l'Europa intensifichi gli sforzi in materia di sicurezza dell'approvvigionamento energetico. Il Consiglio europeo invita il Consiglio, in collaborazione con la Commissione, a esaminare le iniziative necessarie a tal fine, in particolare per quanto attiene alla diversificazione delle fonti di energia e delle rotte di approvvigionamento.

12594/08 3 54 IT 10. La crisi georgiana pone le relazioni fra l'UE e la Russia di fronte a un bivio. Il Consiglio europeo ritiene che, dati sia l'interdipendenza fra Unione europea e Russia sia i problemi globali ai quali entrambe sono confrontate, non vi sia alternativa auspicabile ad una relazione forte, fondata sulla cooperazione, la fiducia e il dialogo, sul rispetto dello Stato di diritto e dei principi riconosciuti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite e dall'OSCE. In quest'ottica abbiamo avviato, lo scorso luglio, la negoziazione di un nuovo accordo quadro fra l'Unione e la Russia.

11. Esortiamo la Russia ad unirsi a noi in questa scelta fondamentale d'interesse reciproco, d'intesa e di cooperazione. È nostra convinzione che sia nel suo stesso interesse non isolarsi dall'Europa. L'Unione europea si è mostrata disposta al partenariato e alla cooperazione, nel rispetto dei principi e valori che la animano. Ci aspettiamo che la Russia dia prova di responsabilità e di fedeltà a tutti i suoi impegni. L'Unione resterà vigile; il Consiglio europeo chiede al Consiglio, insieme alla Commissione, di esaminare attentamente e approfonditamente la situazione e le diverse dimensioni delle relazioni UE-Russia. Questa valutazione dovrà essere avviata da subito e proseguire, in particolare, nella prospettiva del prossimo vertice previsto per il 14 novembre a Nizza. Il Consiglio europeo incarica il suo presidente di proseguire le discussioni ai fini dell'applicazione integrale dell'accordo in sei punti. A tale scopo il presidente del Consiglio europeo si recherà a Mosca l'8 settembre, accompagnato dal presidente della Commissione e dall'Alto Rappresentante. Finché le truppe non si saranno ritirate sulle posizioni antecedenti al 7 agosto, le riunioni di negoziato dell'accordo di partenariato sono sospese.

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12594/08 4 55 IT

56

COUCILOF THEEUROPEAUIO EN

12453/08(Presse236)

PRESSRELEASE

Extraordinarymeeting

GeneralAffairsandExternalRelations

Brussels,13August2008

President MrBernardKOUCHER MinisterforForeignandEuropeanAffairsofFrance

PRESS

RuedelaLoi175B–1048BRUSSELSTel.:+32(0)22818239/6319Fax:+32(0)22818026 [email protected]http://www.consilium.europa.eu/Newsroom 12453/08(Presse236) 1 57 E 13.VIII.2008

MainresultsoftheCouncil

TheCouncildiscussedindepththesituationinGeorgiaonthebasisofaPresidencypresentationof theeffortswhichhadledtoagreementbetweentheparties.

Inparticular,theCouncil:

recalledthattheEuropeanUnionhadexpresseditsgraveconcernatrecentdevelopmentsin Georgia;

welcomedtheagreementsubscribedtobythepartiesonthebasisofthemediationeffortscarried outbytheUnion;

calledonthepartiestohonourallthecommitments,beginningwithaneffectiveceasefire,andto ensurethattheywereimplementedeffectivelyandingoodfaithbothonthegroundandinthe relevantfora;

emphasisedtheUnion'scommitmenttocontributeactivelytoeffectiveimplementationofthese principles;

consideredthattheEuropeanUnionmustbepreparedtocommititself,includingontheground, tosupporteveryeffort,includingthoseoftheUandtheOSCE,withaviewtoapeacefuland lastingsolutiontotheconflictinGeorgia.

12453/08(Presse236) 2 58 E 13.VIII.2008

COTETS

PARTICIPATS...... Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

ITEMSDEBATED

GEORGIA...... 6

OTHERITEMSAPPROVED

one

1  Wheredeclarations,conclusionsorresolutionshavebeenformallyadoptedbytheCouncil,thisisindicated intheheadingfortheitemconcernedandthetextisplacedbetweenquotationmarks.  DocumentsforwhichreferencesaregiveninthetextareavailableontheCouncil'sInternetsite (http://www.consilium.europa.eu).  ActsadoptedwithstatementsfortheCouncilminuteswhichmaybereleasedtothepublicareindicatedby anasterisk;thesestatementsareavailableontheCouncil'sInternetsiteormaybeobtainedfromthePress Office. 12453/08(Presse236) 3 59 E 13.VIII.2008

PARTICIPATS

ThegovernmentsoftheMemberStatesandtheEuropeanCommissionwererepresentedasfollows:

Belgium: MrKarelDEGUCHT MinisterforForeignAffairs Bulgaria: MrIvailoKALFIN DeputyPrimeMinisterandMinisterforForeignAffairs CzechRepublic: MrKarelSCHWARZENBERG MinisterforForeignAffairs Denmark: MrPerStigMØLLER MinisterforForeignAffairs Germany: MrFrankWalterSTEINMEIER DeputyFederalChancellorandFederalMinisterfor ForeignAffairs Estonia: MrUrmasPAET MinisterforForeignAffairs Ireland: MrPeterPOWER MinisterofStateattheDepartmentofForeignAffairs (withspecialresponsibilityforOverseasDevelopment) Greece: MsTheodoraBAKOYANNI MinisterforForeignAffairs Spain: MrMiguelÁngelMORATINOS MinisterforForeignAffairsandCooperation France: MrBernardKOUCHNER MinisterforForeignandEuropeanAffairs Italy: MrEnzoSCOTTI StateSecretaryforForeignAffairs Cyprus: MrMarkosKYPRIANOU MinisterforForeignAffairs Latvia: MrMārisRIEKSTIŠ MinisterforForeignAffairs Lithuania: MrPetrasVAITIEKŪNAS MinisterforForeignAffairs Luxembourg: MrJeanASSELBORN DeputyPrimeMinister,MinisterforForeignAffairsand Immigration Hungary: MsKingaGÖNCZ MinisterforForeignAffairs Malta: MrStevenBORG RepresentativetothePoliticalandSecurityCommittee (PSC) etherlands: MrFransTIMMERMANS MinisterforEuropeanAffairs Austria: MsUrsulaPLASSNIK FederalMinisterforEuropeanandInternationalAffairs Poland: MrRadosławSIKORSKI MinisterforForeignAffairs Portugal: MrLuísAMADO MinisterofState,MinisterforForeignAffairs

12453/08(Presse236) 4 60 E 13.VIII.2008

Romania: MrLazărCOMĂNESCU MinisterforForeignAffairs Slovenia: MrDimitrijRUPEL MinisterforForeignAffairs Slovakia: MsOľgaALGAYEROVÁ StateSecretaryattheMinistryofForeignAffairs Finland: MrAlexanderSTUBB MinisterforForeignAffairs Sweden: MrCarlBILDT MinisterforForeignAffairs UnitedKingdom: MrDavidMILIBAND SecretaryofStateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs MrJimMURPHY MinisterofStateforEurope

Commission: MrOlliREHN Member

GeneralSecretariatoftheCouncil: MrJavierSOLANA SecretaryGeneral/HighRepresentativefortheCFSP

12453/08(Presse236) 5 61 E 13.VIII.2008

ITEMSDEBATED

GEORGIA

TheCounciladoptedthefollowingconclusions:

"1. TheCouncilrecallsthattheUnionhadexpresseditsgraveconcernatrecentdevelopments inGeorgia,andtheopenconflictthathasbrokenoutbetweenRussiaandGeorgia. Militaryactionofthiskindisnotasolution.Thiswarhascausedthelossofmanyhuman lives,inflictedsufferingonthepopulation,resultedinsubstantialmaterialdamageand furtherincreasedthenumberofdisplacedpersonsandrefugees.

ApeacefulandlastingsolutiontotheconflictinGeorgiamustbebasedonfullrespectfor theprinciplesofindependence,sovereigntyandterritorialintegrityrecognisedby internationallawandUNSecurityCouncilresolutions.

2. Inthiscontext,theabsolutepriorityistostopthesufferingandbringthefightingtoanend. InthisrespecttheCouncilwelcomestheagreementsubscribedtobythepartiesyesterday onthebasisofthemediationeffortscarriedoutbytheUnion.

Theprinciplestowhichthepartieshavesubscribedareasfollows:

(1) Nottoresorttoforce;

(2) Toendhostilitiesdefinitively;

(3) Toprovidefreeaccessforhumanitarianaid;

(4) Georgianmilitaryforceswillhavetowithdrawtotheirusualbases;

12453/08(Presse236) 6 62 E 13.VIII.2008

(5) Russianmilitaryforceswillhavetowithdrawtothelinesheldpriortotheoutbreak ofhostilities.Pendinganinternationalmechanism,Russianpeacekeepingforceswill implementadditionalsecuritymeasures;

(6) OpeningofinternationaltalksonthesecurityandstabilityarrangementsinAbkhazia andSouthOssetia.

TheCouncilcallsonthepartiestohonourallthesecommitments,beginningwithan effectiveceasefire,andtoensurethattheyareimplementedeffectivelyandingoodfaith bothonthegroundandintherelevantfora.Theinternationalmechanismshouldbesetup rapidly.

3. TheCouncilemphasisestheUnion'scommitmenttocontributeactivelytoeffective implementationoftheseprinciples.TheywillbeembodiedinaUNSecurityCouncil resolutionassoonaspossible.

RapidreinforcementoftheOSCE'sobservercapabilitiesonthegroundiscrucial.The UnionwilltakeactiontothiseffectattheOSCE.TheCouncilurgesthepartiesnotto obstructtheobservers'activities.

TheCouncilalsoconsidersthattheEuropeanUnionmustbepreparedtocommititself, includingontheground,tosupporteveryeffort,includingthoseoftheUNandtheOSCE, withaviewtoapeacefulandlastingsolutiontotheconflictinGeorgia.Itasksthe SecretaryGeneral/HighRepresentative,inliaisonwiththeCommission,toprepare proposalsonthematterwithaviewtotheinformalmeetinginAvignonon5and6 September.

4. TheCouncilstressesthehumanitarianemergencyandtheUnion'sresolvetoprovidevital assistancetothepopulation.Anoutlinehasbeengivenofinitialmeasuresundertaken, bothbytheCommissionandbytheMemberStates.TheCouncilrequeststhe Commission,inliaisonwiththePresidency,tocontinuetocoordinateEuropeanassistance andtoencouragepoolingarrangementsdesignedtoenhanceitseffectivenessand relevance.

12453/08(Presse236) 7 63 E 13.VIII.2008

Itisessentialthatallpartiesundertaketorespectinternationalhumanitarianlawandto facilitatetheunimpededdeliveryofhumanitarianassistancetoallthepopulationgroups affected,withoutdiscrimination.

Inaddition,inviewofthedestructioncausedbytheconflict,theCouncilemphasisesthe needtoidentifyreconstructionrequirementsasofnowandtopreparetomakeasignificant contributiontomeetingthoserequirementsatUnionlevel.ItinvitestheCommissionto reportbacktoitonthismatterbeforeitsnextmeeting."

12453/08(Presse236) 8 64 E 13.VIII.2008

OTHERITEMSAPPROVED

None.

12453/08(Presse236) 9 65 E

66 Statement Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 19 August 2008

The North Atlantic Council met in special Ministerial session on 19 August 2008, expressed its grave concern over the situation in Georgia and discussed its wider implications for Euro-Atlantic stability and security. A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions. We deplore all loss of life, civilian casualties, and damage to civilian infrastructure that has resulted from the conflict. We are assisting humanitarian relief efforts. We met with the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Alexander Stubb, to discuss the key issues which he believed needed to be addressed.

We welcome the agreement reached and signed by Georgia and Russia, through the diplomatic efforts of the European Union, the OSCE and the US, to end the hostilities and to bring about a political solution to the conflict. We stand fully behind these efforts. We stress the urgency of swift, complete, and good faith implementation of the agreement, including a new international mechanism to monitor respect for these engagements. Military action must cease definitively and military forces must return to their positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Fully international discussions must begin on the modalities for security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Economic activity in Georgia, including international aviation and shipping, must not be hindered.

We are gravely concerned by the humanitarian situation. Allied governments are working together, and in concert with international organisations and others in the international community, to ensure that the civilian populations affected by the conflict have the assistance they need to meet immediate and ongoing humanitarian needs. We call on all parties, in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law, to ensure access for international humanitarian relief efforts to all affected populations.

We have also agreed today to support Georgia, upon its request, in a number of areas. In addition, we have agreed to task the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to develop with Georgia rapidly the modalities for a NATO-Georgia Commission. This Commission will supervise the process set in hand at Bucharest, including the measures of support agreed at today’s meeting. These measures are intended to assist Georgia, a valued and long-standing Partner of NATO, to assess the damage caused by the military action and to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and economic activity. Georgia's recovery, security and stability are important to the Alliance. NATO will continue to cooperate with Georgia in the framework of the Partnership for Peace and Georgia’s Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, and will review any additional Georgian requests for assistance. We also welcomed the fact that a number of our governments have indicated that they will actively support measures to help the economic reconstruction of Georgia.

The conflict between Georgia and Russia has compromised regional stability and security. We deeply deplore the use of force in the conflict between Georgia and Russia. We reiterate that there

67 is no military solution to the unresolved conflicts. We remind all parties that peaceful conflict resolution is a key principle of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

We remain concerned by Russia's actions during this crisis and remind Russia of its responsibility for maintaining security and order in the areas where it exercises control, especially in light of continuing reports of Russia’s deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Russian military action has been disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. We call on Russia to take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the areas it is supposed to leave under the six-principle agreement signed by President Saakashvili and President Medvedev1. The Alliance is considering seriously the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO-Russia relationship. In 2002, we established the NATO-Russia Council, a framework for discussions with Russia, including on issues that divide the Alliance and Russia. We have determined that we cannot continue with business as usual. We call on Moscow to demonstrate – both in word and deed – its continued commitment to the principles upon which we agreed to base our relationship.

We reaffirmed our commitment to the decisions taken by Heads of State and Government at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, including those regarding Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and we will continue our intensive engagement with Georgia to address in December the questions pertaining to its Membership Action Plan application, taking into account developments until that time.

68 Déclaration Réunion du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au niveau des ministres des affaires étrangères tenue au siège de l'OTAN le 19 août 2008

Le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord s’est réuni en session ministérielle spéciale le 19 août 2008 ; il a exprimé sa vive préoccupation à propos de la situation en Géorgie et a examiné les incidences plus générales de cette situation pour la stabilité et la sécurité euro-atlantiques. Une solution pacifique et durable des conflits en Géorgie doit être fondée sur le plein respect des principes d’indépendance, de souveraineté et d’intégrité territoriale de ce pays reconnus par le droit international et les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Nous déplorons toutes les pertes de vies humaines, les victimes civiles, et les dégâts causés aux infrastructures civiles par le conflit. Nous contribuons aux opérations de secours humanitaire. Nous avons rencontré le président en exercice de l’OSCE, le ministre finlandais des Affaires étrangères, M. Alexander Stubb, pour examiner les questions clés qui, selon lui, devaient être abordées.

Nous nous félicitons de l’accord conclu et signé par la Géorgie et la Russie, grâce aux efforts diplomatiques de l’Union européenne, de l’osce et des États-Unis, visant à mettre fin aux hostilités et à parvenir à un règlement politique du conflit. Nous appuyons pleinement ces efforts. Nous soulignons l'urgence d'une mise en œuvre rapide, complète et de bonne foi de cet accord, qui prévoit notamment un nouveau mécanisme international permettant de surveiller le respect des engagements qui ont été pris. Les actions militaires doivent cesser de façon définitive et les forces militaires doivent regagner les positions qu’elles occupaient avant le déclenchement des hostilités. Il est impératif que des discussions s’ouvrent, dans un cadre pleinement international, sur les modalités de sécurité et de stabilité en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du Sud. L’activité économique en Géorgie, y compris les transports aériens et maritimes internationaux, ne doit pas être entravée.

Nous sommes gravement préoccupés par la situation humanitaire. Les gouvernements des pays de l’Alliance œuvrent ensemble, et de concert avec des organisations internationales et d’autres acteurs de la communauté internationale, afin de veiller à ce que les populations civiles touchées par le conflit disposent de l'aide nécessaire pour faire face aux besoins humanitaires immédiats et ultérieurs. Nous appelons toutes les parties, à faire en sorte, conformément aux obligations qui sont les leurs en vertu du droit humanitaire international, que les secours humanitaires internationaux puissent atteindre toutes les populations touchées.

Nous avons également décidé aujourd’hui de soutenir la Géorgie, à sa demande, dans un certain nombre de domaines. En outre, nous avons décidé de charger le Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord en session permanente de mettre au point rapidement avec la Géorgie les modalités de création d’une Commission OTAN-Géorgie. Cette Commission supervisera le processus lancé à Bucarest, y compris la série de mesures de soutien approuvée à la réunion de ce jour. Ces mesures ont pour but d’aider la Géorgie, partenaire estimé, de longue date, de l’OTAN, à évaluer les dommages causés par l’action militaire et à contribuer à rétablir les services essentiels au fonctionnement normal de la société et de l’économie. L’Alliance accorde une grande importance au redressement, à la sécurité et à la stabilité de la Géorgie. L’OTAN continuera de coopérer avec la Géorgie dans le cadre du Partenariat pour la paix et du plan d'action individuel pour le Partenariat conclu entre ce pays et l’OTAN, et examinera les éventuelles autres demandes d’assistance de la Géorgie. Nous avons également noté avec satisfaction qu’un certain nombre de nos gouvernements ont indiqué qu’ils

69 soutiendront activement des mesures destinées à faciliter la reconstruction économique de la Géorgie.

Le conflit entre la Géorgie et la Russie a compromis la stabilité et la sécurité régionales. Nous déplorons profondément l’usage de la force dans le conflit entre la Géorgie et la Russie. Nous réaffirmons qu’il ne saurait y avoir de solution militaire aux conflits non résolus. Nous rappelons à toutes les parties que le règlement pacifique des conflits est un principe essentiel du Document cadre du Partenariat pour la paix.

Nous restons préoccupés par les actions menées par la Russie dans le contexte de la crise actuelle et nous rappelons à ce pays qu’il lui incombe de maintenir l’ordre et la sécurité dans les zones où il exerce un contrôle, eu égard notamment aux rapports qui continuent à faire état de la destruction délibérée d’infrastructures civiles par la Russie. L’action militaire qu’a menée la Russie est disproportionnée et n’est pas conforme à son rôle de maintien de la paix ni compatible avec les principes de règlement pacifique des conflits énoncés dans l’Acte final d’Helsinki, l'Acte fondateur OTAN-Russie et la Déclaration de Rome. Nous appelons la Russie à agir immédiatement pour retirer ses troupes des zones qu’elle est censée quitter en vertu de l’accord en six points signé par les présidents Saakachvili et Medvedev1. L’Alliance étudie sérieusement les incidences de cette action de la Russie sur les relations OTAN-Russie. En 2002, nous avons mis en place le Conseil OTAN-Russie, cadre de discussion avec la Russie, y compris sur les questions qui divisent l’Alliance et la Russie. Nous avons décidé en conséquence que nous ne pouvons pas continuer à agir comme si rien ne s’était passé. Nous appelons Moscou à faire la preuve - en paroles et en actions - de son engagement durable à l’égard des principes sur lesquels nous avons décidé de fonder nos relations.

Nous avons réaffirmé notre attachement aux décisions prises par les chefs d’État et de gouvernement au sommet de Bucarest en avril 2008, y compris celles qui concernent les aspirations euro-atlantiques de la Géorgie, et nous allons poursuivre notre collaboration intensive avec ce pays pour régler en décembre les questions liées à sa candidature au plan d’action pour l’adhésion, en nous appuyant sur les développements qui seront intervenus jusqu’à cette date.

70 United Nations S/RES/1808 (2008)

Security Council Distr.: General 15 April 2008

Resolution 1808 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5866th meeting, on 15 April 2008

The Security Council, Recalling all its relevant resolutions including resolution 1781 of 15 October 2007 (S/RES/1781), Welcoming the reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia of 23 January 2008 (S/2008/38) and 2 April 2008 (S/2008/219), Reiterating the importance of maintaining the separation of forces and the preservation of the ceasefire, Supporting the sustained efforts of the Secretary-General and of his Special Representative with the assistance of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General as well as the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator and of the OSCE, underlining the increased importance of the meetings in the Geneva format as the forum for meaningful political dialogue and welcoming the Georgian and Abkhaz renewed commitment to this process, Noting that whereas the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General will continue to support the process of conflict resolution between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, the primary responsibility to make use of this support and to implement measures to advance the process, in particular measures to build confidence, remains with both sides, Regretting the continued lack of progress in implementing confidence-building measures, and underlining the importance of constructive goodwill between the sides and respect for each other’s concerns, Stressing the importance of close and effective cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force as they currently play an important stabilizing role in the conflict zone, and recalling that a lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict will require appropriate security guarantees, Stressing that economic development is urgently required in Abkhazia, Georgia, to improve the livelihoods of the communities affected by the conflict, in particular refugees and internally displaced persons,

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1. Reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders and supports all efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, which are guided by their determination to promote a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict only by peaceful means and within the framework of the Security Council resolutions; 2. Reaffirms its strong support for UNOMIG, and again urges the parties to cooperate fully with the Mission and to actively and sustainably engage in the political process led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; and welcomes UNOMIG’s continued consultations with the parties on strengthening its observation capacity; 3. Welcomes the recent improvements in the overall security situation; calls on both sides to consolidate and broaden those improvements; underlines the need for a period of sustained stability along the ceasefire line and in the Kodori valley; and stresses the necessity to keep under close observation the situation in the Upper Kodori valley which has to be in line with the Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces of 14 May 1994; 4. Welcomes the renewed commitment given by both sides during the meeting chaired by the United Nations in Geneva on 18 and 19 February 2008 to resume regular consultations within the Quadripartite meetings on security issues without delay, and urges once more both sides to fulfil finally this commitment; 5. Expresses its concern at any violation of the ceasefire and separation of forces regime in the Zone of Conflict; 6. Strongly urges all parties to consider and address seriously each other’s legitimate security concerns, to refrain from any acts of violence or provocation, including political action or rhetoric, to comply fully with previous agreements regarding ceasefire and non-use of violence, and to maintain the security zone and the restricted weapons zone free of any unauthorized military activities; and in this regard recalls the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in S/2007/439 and his subsequent reports; 7. Calls on both sides to finalize without delay the document on the non-use of violence; and calls on both sides to finalize without delay the document on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; 8. Stresses anew the urgent need to alleviate the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons and the need for a perspective of life in security and dignity in particular for a new generation growing up outside Abkhazia, Georgia; 9. Reiterates and reaffirms as fundamentally important the right of return for all the refugees and the internally displaced persons to Abkhazia, Georgia, reaffirms the importance of such people’s return to their homes and property and that individual property rights have not been affected by the fact that owners had to flee during the conflict and that the residency rights and the identity of those owners will be respected, and calls on both sides to implement the UNHCR’s Strategic Directions for their return in the first instance to the Gali region; 10. Calls upon the parties to increase their bilateral contacts by making full use of all existing mechanisms as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to come to a peaceful settlement, and to commit themselves to

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fulfil within a reliable time frame the conditions necessary for the safe, dignified and swift return of refugees and internally displaced persons; 11. Firmly convinced that the confidence-building measures proposed by the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and endorsed through resolution 1752 of 13 April 2007, will serve the development of broader and unbiased contacts between the communities of the divided country, regrets the lack of progress made with regard to confidence-building measures and urges again the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to implement these measures without conditions; 12. Recalls, with a view to achieving a lasting and comprehensive settlement, its support for the principles contained in the “Paper on Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi”, and welcomes additional ideas that the sides would be willing to offer with a view to conducting creatively and constructively a political dialogue under the aegis of the United Nations; 13. Welcomes existing and encourages further contacts between representatives of civil society, and appeals to both sides to continue to promote without reservation the active engagement of citizens and officials in such contacts; 14. Underlines that it is the primary responsibility of both sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure the freedom of movement throughout the zone of conflict of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and other international personnel and calls on both sides to fulfil their obligations in this regard and to extend full cooperation to UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force; 15. Welcomes the efforts being undertaken by UNOMIG to implement the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel; 16. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 15 October 2008; 17. Requests the Secretary-General to make use of this mandate in order to encourage and support the parties in implementing measures to build confidence and to establish an intensive and meaningful dialogue, with a view to achieve a lasting and comprehensive settlement, including the facilitation of a meeting at the highest level, and to inform the Council in his next report on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, on progress made in this respect; 18. Strongly supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and encourages the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General to continue giving him their steadfast and unified support; 19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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74 United Nations S/2008/480

Security Council Distr.: General 23 July 2008

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1808 (2008) of 15 April 2008, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 October 2008. It provides an update of the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, since my report of 2 April 2008 (S/2008/219). 2. My Special Representative, Jean Arnault, continued to lead the Mission. He was assisted by the Chief Military Observer, Major General Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan). The strength of UNOMIG on 14 July 2008 stood at 130 military observers (including 9 medical personnel) and 15 police advisers (see annex).

II. Political process

3. UNOMIG continued its efforts to help prevent an escalation of tensions in the zone of conflict and facilitate a resumption of dialogue between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides against the background of a severely deteriorated situation on the ground in both political and security terms. In particular, the indiscriminate bombing at a public place in Gali that resulted in four fatalities, including one UNOMIG staff member, represented a significant escalation in violence. 4. As to the overall approach to the settlement of the conflict, in view of the changing dynamics in the conflict settlement process, characterized by increasingly divergent views on the United Nations-led peace process, as mentioned in my report of January 2008 (S/2008/38), I have asked Bertrand Ramcharan to undertake an assessment of the process, which includes consultations with the parties and the main stakeholders. I intend to report to the Council in due time on the conclusions of this exercise. 5. During my visit to Moscow on 8 and 9 April 2008, I discussed the situation in Georgia with the leadership of the Russian Federation. Throughout the reporting period, my Special Representative maintained regular contact with both sides and with the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, both in Tbilisi and in their respective capitals. The Mission facilitated successive visits to Sukhumi by the senior representative of the United States of America in the Group of Friends; the

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High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Javier Solana; the senior representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the Group of Friends; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Per Stig Moeller; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. My Special Representative participated in a meeting of the senior representatives of the Group of Friends in Berlin on 30 June. 6. During the reporting period, the negotiation process remained suspended. The Abkhaz side continued to insist on the withdrawal of the Georgian forces from the upper Kodori Valley and the signing of a document on non-resumption of hostilities as a precondition for re-engaging in negotiations with the Georgian side. The Georgian side focused on President Saakashvili’s peace initiative of 28 March (see S/2008/219, para. 18). It developed its various components, in particular the economic part, sought to acquaint the Abkhaz side with it and shared it broadly with the international community. At the same time, the Government of Georgia continued to emphasize the need to change the negotiating formats, including by granting a prominent role to the European Union, as a condition for substantial progress. The Abkhaz side remained opposed to any modification. 7. Two informal meetings between Georgian and Abkhaz representatives took place, on 12 and 13 May in Sukhumi and from 15 to 17 June in Sweden. While the sides did not comment on their discussions, they publicly reiterated their firm positions on key issues. 8. While negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides remained stalemated, a combination of developments brought about a dangerous dynamic in the situation around Abkhazia, Georgia. One month after the decision of the Russian Federation to withdraw from the 1996 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) restrictions on Abkhazia, Georgia (see S/2008/219, para. 14), on 16 April the President of the Russian Federation issued an instruction authorizing direct relations with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto authorities in a number of fields. The Russian Federation stated that the decision was aimed at supporting Russian citizens and the local population and responded to what it called Georgia’s aggressive intentions. 9. The Georgian side protested strongly what it considered a blatant violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, amounting to legalizing a factual annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It demanded the immediate revocation of both the March decision to withdraw from the 1996 CIS sanctions and the April instruction. With regard to its opposition to the April decree, Georgia received unequivocal support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. 10. On 29 April, citing the possibility of an impending deterioration in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the Russian Federation reinforced the Russian-manned CIS peacekeeping force with a 525-strong airborne battalion stationed in the restricted weapons zone. UNOMIG established regular patrolling in the areas where that battalion was deployed. At the end of May, referring to the presidential decision on the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Abkhaz side, the Government of the Russian Federation also introduced a military railways unit to rehabilitate the railways south of Sukhumi, outside the area of responsibility of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force.

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11. The Georgian side considered both measures aggressive in nature, in particular vis-à-vis the upper Kodori Valley, and demanded an immediate withdrawal of all additional Russian forces, including the railways troops. The Georgian side argued that these military steps confirmed that the Russian Federation was a party to the conflict and could no longer serve in either a mediating or a peacekeeping capacity. It intensified its calls for a change of the peacekeeping format and proposed in particular the replacement of the current peacekeeping operation with a joint Georgian-Abkhaz police force under European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe supervision and training, without excluding the possibility that the Russian Federation may play a role. It announced that if a substantial change in the peacekeeping format was not achieved, it was ready to request formally the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force. 12. For its part, the Abkhaz side insisted that the strengthening of the CIS peacekeeping force was carried out in response to Georgian plans to implement a military option in the period from April to May. It reiterated its opposition to any change in the peacekeeping format and warned that a withdrawal of the CIS peacekeepers would lead to a resumption of hostilities. The Abkhaz side also indicated that if the Government of Georgia should decide to withdraw its consent to the presence of the CIS peacekeeping force, it would propose an agreement of military cooperation with the Russian Federation to retain its military presence in Abkhazia. 13. Concerned over negative developments in the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process, on 30 June senior representatives of the Group of Friends met in Berlin, with the participation of my Special Representative, to discuss ways and means to prevent further deterioration, in particular through the revitalization of the peace process. Unfortunately, the subsequent period saw a dramatic increase in violence, including indiscriminate bombings of public places in Gagra, Sukhumi and Gali on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line, as well as roadside explosions on the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line. The bombings resulted in four fatalities and left 18 people injured, mostly civilians. Among the dead was one UNOMIG staff member.

III. Developments in the Mission’s area of responsibility

14. During the reporting period, the overall situation in the Mission’s area of responsibility remained tense. One of the sources of this tension was the intensification of air activities over the zone of conflict. On 5 April, UNOMIG observers reported two Georgian jet fighters of the SU-25 type flying over the Abkhaz-controlled side of the zone of conflict. A violation report was issued. On 13 April, two jet fighters resembling SU-25s were reported by the local population to be flying along the ceasefire line. On 16 April, the Abkhaz side informed UNOMIG that its radar had detected an aircraft overflying the town of Gali some minutes earlier; UNOMIG military observers heard the sound of jet aircraft at the northern edge of the security zone at approximately the same time. On 20 April, the presence of a jet aircraft was reported by several witnesses (see para. 17 below). On 17 May, two jet fighters were observed entering the restricted weapons zone over the Senaki training area. In addition, UNOMIG was informed that on 3 April an Italian C-130 transport airplane carrying an inspection team in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty flew along the ceasefire line without prior notification to

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UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, thus exposing the team and the crew to the hazards of the conflict zone. 15. The Abkhaz side reported having detected a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) flights over Abkhaz-controlled territory since August 2007. The Mission was able to verify five Georgian UAV flights over Abkhaz-controlled territory, on 18 March, 20 April, 4 May, 8 May and 12 May 2008. The Abkhaz side claimed to have shot down a total of seven Georgian UAVs on those dates; the Mission has been able to ascertain the downing of three UAVs. After initial denials, the Georgian side admitted to losing a total of three UAVs. 16. After the Mission’s fact-finding team investigated the first downing of a UAV, on 18 March, UNOMIG informed the Georgian Ministry of Defence of its position that such flights constituted a violation of the ceasefire and separation-of-forces regime. Indeed, a military reconnaissance mission should be considered a military action and therefore contravenes paragraph 1 of the Moscow Agreement, which stipulates that “the parties shall scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, at sea and in the air and shall refrain from any military action against each other”. UNOMIG also considers actions, whether by air-to-air missile or ground-based air defence systems, taken against Georgian UAVs over the zone of conflict — albeit in a defensive posture — to be violations of the ceasefire regime, since the Moscow Agreement prohibits the introduction and operation of heavy weapons in the zone of conflict. 17. With regard to the second downing of a UAV, on 20 April, on the basis of testimony of witnesses and the analysis of a UAV camera and radar recordings provided by the Georgian side, the Mission concluded that the recordings were authentic and, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, that the UAV was downed by a Russian aircraft. The Mission observed that enforcement of the ceasefire and separation of forces regime was the exclusive responsibility of the CIS peacekeeping force, and enforcement action by third parties, in this case the Russian Federation, was inconsistent with the Moscow Agreement and undercut the ceasefire and separation-of-forces regime. The Mission also reaffirmed that UAV flights are a violation of the Moscow Agreement. The downing of a Georgian UAV on 20 April was considered by the Security Council on 23 April and 30 May (see S/PV.5874 and S/PV.5900).

Gali sector

18. During the period under review, the situation in the Gali sector remained tense, due in particular to the developments referred to above, but also to a general concern about an impending resumption of hostilities. 19. On 29 April an official statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that developments in the zone of conflict required an increase in the strength of the CIS peacekeeping force, which would still remain below the threshold of 3,000 authorized by the CIS Council of Heads of State in August 1994. The same day the CIS peacekeeping force notified UNOMIG of the increase in general terms. 20. Simultaneously, UNOMIG observed an introduction of personnel and military equipment into the zone of conflict, which continued until 1 May. In accordance with its mandate to observe the operations of the CIS peacekeeping force, the

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Mission requested from the commander of the force a detailed clarification regarding the increase. It was informed that the additional force included one airborne battalion group of 525 men tasked with increasing monitoring in the restricted weapons zone in the Tkvarcheli and Ochamchira areas, and 20 men attached to one of the existing CIS peacekeeping force battalions deployed in the lower Gali area. The Mission was also assured that no element of the new forces had been deployed outside the zone of conflict. While UNOMIG was not in a position to verify information outside its area of responsibility, its observations on the deployment of forces in the zone of conflict were consistent with the information provided by the CIS peacekeeping force commander regarding the airborne battalion group and its armaments and operations. 21. The Georgian side stated that lack of advance notification and the introduction of an airborne battalion were in clear violation of a number of CIS regulations relating to peacekeeping and demanded an immediate withdrawal of the newly arrived forces and equipment (see para. 11 above). 22. During the reporting period, the Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on a number of occasions. Its attempts to monitor the camp of the new CIS peacekeeping contingent in the restricted weapons zone were initially obstructed by the Abkhaz de facto police. UNOMIG patrols were prevented by the Abkhaz de facto law enforcement agencies and de facto officials from having access to the northern part of the restricted weapons zone. Twice, de facto police confiscated cameras from UNOMIG patrols and returned them later. Unidentified local residents verbally abused patrols in the restricted weapons zone and obstructed their movement on two occasions. Outside the conflict zone, a United Nations vehicle was confiscated by Abkhaz de facto Ministry of Defence personnel and later returned. After the Mission protested such actions, the de facto authorities issued instructions to heads of de facto law enforcement agencies to ensure cooperation with UNOMIG patrols. No similar incidents have occurred since. 23. During the reporting period, in addition to the violations mentioned above in relation to the Mission’s freedom of movement, UNOMIG issued a violation report to the Abkhaz de facto authorities over the presence of two military vehicles in the security zone on 20 April. 24. On 21 May, the day of the Georgian parliamentary elections, the Mission monitored movements across the ceasefire line at the Inguri bridge. Contrary to allegations at the time, the local population was not prevented from crossing the ceasefire line. However, following a series of bomb blasts in public places in Gagra and Sukhumi on 29 and 30 June 2008, in which 12 people were injured, the Abkhaz de facto authorities, who blamed the incidents on Georgian special forces, ordered the closure of the ceasefire line from 1 July. The Government of Georgia denied any involvement in the incidents and protested the restrictions on the freedom of movement of Gali residents, and in particular that of school students who were to take exams on the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line. 25. The most serious incident in years in the UNOMIG area of responsibility happened late in the evening of 6 July, when four people were killed and six injured following an explosion in a cafe in the town of Gali, near the Mission’s sector headquarters. The fatalities were a UNOMIG language assistant, the head of the Gali de facto Abkhaz security service, another de facto security service officer and a young woman. A second UNOMIG language assistant was among the six wounded.

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Abkhaz de facto authorities have blamed Georgian security forces for the blast, calling the incident “a terrorist attack”. The Government of Georgia stated that this act of violence was in “the interest of forces hoping to prolong the presence of illegally deployed Russian military forces in Georgia … and those who want to derail Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations”. Coming in the wake of the indiscriminate bomb blasts in Gagra on 29 June and Sukhumi on 30 June, the Gali bombing marked a worrying new level of violence. 26. Criminal incidents reported to UNOMIG patrols during the period under review (without counting the casualties from the incident of 6 July) included two killings, one robbery and two abductions. 27. The United Nations police continued to liaise with the Abkhaz de facto law enforcement agencies in Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli districts. Twenty-four training courses were provided for 216 Abkhaz de facto militia officers in traffic security, police tactics, forensics, police management and other policing skills, in addition to donating police equipment and books. 28. From 2 to 5 June, the United Nations police held a seminar in the town of Ochamchira on prevention of domestic violence and juvenile delinquency, bringing together 16 participants from the Abkhaz de facto Supreme Court, State Security Service, General Prosecutor’s Office and Ministries of Interior, Justice, Health and Education, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The seminar was conducted by the NGO La Strada-Ukraine, the de facto Ministry of Internal Affairs and the NGO Association of Women of Abkhazia. United Nations police also organized educational events and distributed learning materials to children on the subject of traffic safety. 29. The spring conscription in the de facto Abkhaz armed forces started on 1 April 2008. No allegation of arbitrary recruitment came to the attention of the Human Rights Office during this period. The Office is providing legal advice in a previous case of alleged arbitrary recruitment of an ethnic Georgian from the Gali district. 30. The issuance of Abkhaz “passports” in the Gali district started formally at the end of March. It appears that during the following two months the issuance was put on hold. In June the de facto authorities in the Gali district restarted the process, with limited results, owing to the reluctance of Gali district residents to state in the application forms that they renounce their Georgian citizenship. 31. The Human Rights Office followed up on a case involving a Georgian priest who was sent from Tbilisi to Gali to conduct religious services in the Georgian language. Abkhaz religious authorities denied him authorization to do so, following which the priest was expelled from Gali. While unable to pronounce on issues of religious jurisdiction, the Human Rights Office found no confirmation of media allegations of physical abuse against the priest.

Zugdidi sector

32. During the reporting period, the situation on the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line remained generally tense because of the developments mentioned in the sections above, as well as a number of incidents that took place in the Zugdidi sector. These included several incidents involving personnel of the CIS peacekeeping force and the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, an alleged attack against two buses in the Khurcha area near the ceasefire line on the day of Georgian

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parliamentary elections, and a number of explosions that took place on 2, 6 and 9 July. This tension notwithstanding, the observation posts of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs operated at the usual personnel and alertness levels. 33. A number of tripartite meetings between UNOMIG, the Georgian side and the CIS peacekeeping force arranged by UNOMIG were held; and since late March, in coordination with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the CIS peacekeeping force has resumed its patrolling of the Georgian-controlled Ganmukhuri pocket north of the Inguri river. 34. In mid-April, the Abkhaz de facto authorities reported a Georgian build-up in the Zugdidi district and along the ceasefire line. The CIS peacekeeping force also conveyed its concern to UNOMIG about a possible Georgian build-up in the restricted weapons zone. UNOMIG carried out extensive patrolling of the security and restricted weapons zones, and while there was apprehension among the local population regarding a possible conflict, there were no signs of substantial increases in the deployment of security forces in the zone of conflict. 35. The period under review has been marked, since mid-May, by a number of incidents involving the personnel of the CIS peacekeeping force and the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In most cases, the Georgian media were present during those incidents, and reports were later broadcast. On 17 May an armoured personnel carrier that was part of a CIS peacekeeping force convoy moving towards its headquarters in the village of Urta was reported to have been involved in a traffic accident with a civilian vehicle; on 17 June, four CIS peacekeeping force personnel travelling in a truck transporting anti-tank missiles were stopped. In both cases, CIS peacekeeping force personnel were forcibly disarmed and detained by a large contingent of heavily armed law enforcement agency personnel, taken to a police station in Zugdidi for investigation and released later. Representatives of UNOMIG Zugdidi sector headquarters were present at the police station until the release of the detainees. 36. In both cases, the Georgian side complained that the CIS peacekeepers had not coordinated their movements with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in the second case it claimed that anti-tank missiles were inconsistent with a peacekeeping mission. The CIS peacekeeping force denounced the arrest and detention of its personnel as provocations and gross violations of the Moscow Agreement. It should be noted that an anti-tank sub-unit is an integral part of the motorized rifle battalion of the CIS peacekeeping force’s Southern Operational Group. The type of missiles transported by the CIS peacekeeping force is compatible with the anti-tank systems held by the sub-unit. These incidents raised the tensions between the CIS peacekeeping force and the Georgian side. In the course of July, a variety of incidents involving the CIS peacekeeping force and the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs continued to take place. Albeit of a less serious nature, they reflect a state of tension that has the potential to deteriorate further. 37. The most serious incident in the Zugdidi area during the period occurred on 21 May, the day of the Georgian parliamentary elections, in the vicinity of the village of Khurcha located near the ceasefire line. On that occasion, heavy firing took place around a football field where a number of people, mainly from the Gali district, were requested to gather to be transported by bus to the town of Zugdidi in order to vote. The account of the event showed that after an initial burst of small arms fire by the would-be attackers, the people assembled on the field fled; the

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empty buses were then hit by rocket-propelled grenades and caught fire. Three persons were brought to the hospital, one severely injured. The Georgian security forces arrived rapidly at the scene and fired for a protracted period in the direction of the ceasefire line. The entire incident was recorded by the Georgian media. The Georgian side immediately accused the Abkhaz side of being responsible for the incident. The Abkhaz side denied any involvement. 38. The Mission’s investigation into this incident was able to establish the locations from which the attackers fired, approximately 100 metres from the buses, on the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line. While no hard evidence has been found so far regarding the identity of the perpetrators, inconsistencies in the circumstances surrounding the incident, in particular the fact that the incident was filmed in such a way as to suggest that events were anticipated rather than simply recorded as they were happening, require UNOMIG to continue its investigation. 39. On 2 July an explosion occurred in the early morning hours next to the M-27 road, near the CIS peacekeeping force checkpoint at the Inguri river bridge crossing on the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line. The Abkhaz side had closed the bridge to movement by persons since 1 July. On 6 July a series of four explosions took place within a span of about 250 metres along the M-27 road between the village of Rukhi and the Inguri river bridge crossing. On the same day, another explosion was reported in a cornfield along the ceasefire line approximately 400 metres north-east of a Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs observation post. No injuries were reported in any of the explosions. UNOMIG is investigating the incidents. 40. On 9 July an incident took place on the ceasefire line when two rocket- propelled grenades and small arms were allegedly fired by unknown perpetrators at former Ministry of Internal Affairs observation post 217, near Akhali Abustmani on the Georgian-controlled side, causing slight damage to the structure of the post. No casualties were involved. This incident is also under investigation. 41. From 27 May to 2 June, the CIS peacekeeping force conducted the yearly rotation of the Southern Operational Group. The 526th motorized rifle battalion (553 personnel and 49 armoured personnel carriers) replaced the 529th motorized rifle battalion (414 personnel). Overall, the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force’s equipment as part of the rotation was transparent and well-coordinated with the Georgian authorities and UNOMIG. 42. In June, UNOMIG patrols noted an increase in the frequency of training conducted by the Georgian side, in terms of both the number of trainees and the number of training areas. The training was conducted either in the security zone, for the personnel of law enforcement agencies, or in the restricted weapons zone, for the personnel of the Ministry of Defence. 43. During the reporting period, UNOMIG continued to observe routine movements towards the upper Kodori Valley by personnel and mostly logistical vehicles belonging to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. These movements were generally rotations of personnel conducted overland and represented a significant increase since the previous reporting period owing to improved weather conditions. The number of flights observed decreased slightly. The procedures agreed by the Georgian side for notification and verification of movements through the security zone to and from the upper Kodori Valley were generally not followed.

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44. Criminal incidents reported to UNOMIG patrols during the reporting period included two killings, one attempted killing, eight robberies and seven abductions. 45. The UNOMIG police component implemented a systematic advisory programme with the Georgian police. A total of 35 joint patrols with the local police were also carried out. In addition, 23 training courses were conducted for 247 police officers in police tactics, self-defence, forensics, community policing, traffic police matters and other policing skills. United Nations police also facilitated the participation of 10 Georgian police officers in a modern-policing training course at the Police School of the Estonian Public Service Academy, from 16 May to 14 June. 46. On 28 May, a model police station with a training facility, planned and overseen by United Nations police in accordance with European standards, was inaugurated in the village of Lia (see para. 63). 47. United Nations police conducted 10 public surveys on public security matters in 16 communities within the security zone. United Nations police also organized educational events and distributed learning materials to children on the subject of traffic safety.

Kodori Valley

48. Over the reporting period, the general situation in the Kodori Valley was calm until 9 July, when a serious incident was reported in the Achamkhara area, in the lower Kodori Valley (see para. 52). 49. The UNOMIG team returned to its base in Adjara, in the upper Kodori Valley on 9 April, after a six-week absence owing to winter weather conditions. Upon return, the team did not observe any visible change in the strength of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel relative to the figure of 578 personnel reported to UNOMIG by the Georgian authorities on 23 June. However, during the period under review, the team was not allowed access to some areas, in particular the Kvabchara Valley, which made it impossible to verify the official figures. While the Abkhaz side and the CIS peacekeeping force expressed their concerns regarding an alleged introduction of additional Georgian personnel, including from the Ministry of Defence, and of heavy military equipment into the upper Kodori Valley, the Mission did not observe signs of a large-scale induction of security forces. However, UNOMIG requested the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs to ensure more transparency, especially in those areas that had been inaccessible, in order to enable the Mission to ascertain fully the facts on the ground. 50. UNOMIG observed new infrastructural development in the upper Kodori Valley, including a road network, accommodation, logistic installations and the storing of fuel. These infrastructural facilities would seem to exceed the requirements for the declared strength of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel. Flying has remained the prevalent mode of transport to the upper Kodori Valley, as the Kalamri Suki Pass and the Khida Pass were not continuously passable for road traffic. Some ground movements observed by the UNOMIG post co-located with the CIS peacekeeping force post at the northern edge of the zone of conflict on the way to the Kodori Valley were not accounted for as among arrivals in the upper Kodori Valley. This suggests that some convoys went to other destinations between that position and the upper Kodori Valley.

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51. As weather conditions improved, the Georgian security forces reoccupied their summer positions at the Maruki Pass north of the Kodori Valley, at the border with the Russian Federation. The Abkhaz side has reportedly done the same at the Adanga Pass, in a neighbouring area. These positions, located away from the Kodori Valley, are beyond the scope of UNOMIG monitoring. The relative closeness of these positions to each other can result in skirmishes between the sides, especially due to differing interpretations of the delimitation between Georgian- and Abkhaz- controlled areas in the Kodori Valley. 52. On 9 July there was a clash between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides on the Achamkhara heights in the lower Kodori Valley. The Abkhaz side claimed that an Abkhaz de facto security post was raided by the Georgian side, resulting in two Abkhaz reservists being injured. The Georgian side stated that one of its patrols was attacked while securing the Achamkhara heights in anticipation of a UNOMIG visit to the Kvabchara Valley. It reported that three Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel were injured. It may be recalled that in June 2007 the Georgian side occupied the Achamkhara heights, creating a potentially serious stand-off between the sides that was de-escalated when the Georgian side subsequently withdrew its personnel. An investigation by UNOMIG is in progress. 53. Despite the Mission’s repeated calls on the sides to cease aerial activity in the zone of conflict, overflights were also observed in the Kodori Valley. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Abkhaz side and the CIS peacekeeping force personnel reported observing UAV flights above the lower and upper Kodori Valley on 8 and 22 April, 22 and 24 May, 6 and 30 June and 4 and 5 July. None of the sides admitted to flying UAVs in the Kodori Valley.

Mission-wide developments

54. Weekly quadripartite meetings have remained suspended since 2 November 2006. The UNOMIG fact-finding team completed the draft report on the Joint Fact- Finding Group investigation into the disappearance of David Sigua and submitted it to the members of the Group for their consideration. 55. With regard to the explosion that occurred in the village of Nabakevi on 29 February 2008 (see S/2008/219, paras. 19 and 30), the fact-finding team’s investigation was inconclusive with regard to the identity of the perpetrators. The investigation will resume if new evidence becomes available. The fact-finding team also concluded its investigation into the events surrounding the operations of UAVs within the UNOMIG area of responsibility, which is summarized in paragraphs 15 to 17 above. 56. With regard to the strengthening of UNOMIG observation capability, the Mission intends to continue consultations with the two sides concerning the acquisition of UAVs with a view to improving transparency in the Mission’s area of responsibility.

IV. Cooperation with the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States

57. UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force continued to maintain close cooperation in fulfilling their respective mandates. Since mid-February, the CIS

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peacekeeping force has been informing UNOMIG of its plans to rectify the insufficiency of armoured personnel carriers and other vehicles in both the Northern and Southern Operational Groups. In total, 81 armoured personnel carriers and 26 miscellaneous vehicles were to be replaced with similar vehicles or, in the case of trucks, replaced by armoured personnel carriers. UNOMIG was unable to monitor precisely the vehicle replacement. 58. The CIS peacekeeping force continued to escort UNOMIG through the lower Kodori Valley during regular rotations of personnel for its Kodori team base. The CIS peacekeeping force also provided assistance to UNOMIG forward bases, which were periodically established adjacent to the CIS peacekeeping force checkpoints or observation points on both sides of the ceasefire line.

V. Human rights issues

59. During the reporting period, the United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, continued its efforts to promote human rights and to provide support to local NGOs. As mandated, the Office carried out its activities throughout Abkhazia, Georgia. 60. The Office continued its regular visits to detention facilities, monitored court trials and provided legal advisory services to the local population. The Sukhumi office received 38 visitors over the reporting period, with the majority of claims relating to property rights and to the treatment of detainees. The Office followed up on alleged violations of the right to freedom of movement and continued discussions with the de facto authorities about the fate of the last remaining death-row inmate in Abkhazia, Georgia. 61. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) began the implementation of two projects. One supports the Human Rights Centre at Sukhumi University and is aimed at raising awareness about human rights issues, and the other provides assistance to schoolteachers and students in training on project proposal preparation, implementation and reporting in order to facilitate participation in mini-grant competitions in schools, organized by OSCE. It also conducted a two-day training session for Abkhaz journalists on the subject of media freedom.

VI. Humanitarian and rehabilitation activities

62. During the reporting period, through its trust fund, the Mission continued to implement projects focusing mainly on the health sector and the rehabilitation of electricity lines. The Mission continued working on the rehabilitation of a hospital, a dispensary and a youth house in the Gali sector and the rehabilitation of a hospital in the Zugdidi sector. 63. A new police station was constructed in the village of Lia, with the Mission’s support and funding from the European Commission, to replace the one destroyed in an attack in January 2004. It was inaugurated on 28 May. The second phase of a training project for 24 detainees at Dranda prison, aimed at facilitating their future reintegration into society, began in May.

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64. In April, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began the rehabilitation of the water supply systems in the Gali, Tkvarcheli and Ochamchira districts. During the reporting period, UNDP also initiated a project on assisting female entrepreneurs, providing training on business management and business plan development and organizing a workshop on gender issues. UNDP also continued supporting local farmers by strengthening local pest-management capacity. It provided farmers’ groups in the Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli districts with knapsack sprayers, biopesticides and relevant information. 65. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the support of its partners the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, continued to implement the “Strategic directions for Abkhazia” project, including community-based protection and confidence-building activities, education-related projects, basic shelter repair, income generation, agricultural support and training activities. UNHCR also initiated preliminary discussions on and received positive indications from the sides regarding a profiling exercise aimed at enhancing understanding of the problems and needs of the people living in Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli districts. In April, UNHCR held a three-day planning workshop in Gali and Zugdidi with the participation of representatives of seven donor countries. Donors had an opportunity to visit project sites and beneficiaries on both sides of the ceasefire line and understand that humanitarian needs in the zone of conflict require much broader support from the international community. The Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Craig Johnston, visited Georgia in May and discussed the situation of returnees and prospects for further returns with high-level representatives from both sides. 66. During the first half of May, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) organized a series of training sessions on immunization management for health-care practitioners throughout Abkhazia, Georgia. The training will enable the participants to coordinate the implementation of a mass-immunization campaign against measles and rubella, scheduled for October 2008. UNICEF also provided technical and material assistance in support of the vaccination campaign, including support for local community-based organizations to raise awareness about the benefits of vaccination. 67. The World Food Programme (WFP), in collaboration with World Vision International, continued to assist the most vulnerable categories of the population through food-for-work and food-for-education programmes. Food-for-work projects, benefiting 9,400 persons in the Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli districts, are aimed at rehabilitating agricultural infrastructure, reclaiming abandoned land and planting crops. In view of the impending phasing out of WFP activities in the region, it continued to explore partnership possibilities with other United Nations agencies and with NGOs to ensure the sustainability of its projects. Within the scope of the food-for-education programme, take-home rations were provided to over 1,050 most-at-risk schoolchildren in 71 schools in the Ochamchira, Tkvarcheli, Gali, Gulripsh, Sukhumi and Gagra districts, while also ensuring the children’s school attendance. In cooperation with Médecins sans frontières, food was also provided to 70 tuberculosis patients in the Gulripsh hospital.

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VII. Support issues

68. During the reporting period, UNOMIG continued its HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention campaign. The Mission held training sessions for all mission personnel. Materials were distributed and displayed in the Mission area. 69. UNOMIG continued to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security, and welcomed the expansion of the role and contribution of women as military observers. 70. UNOMIG implemented ST/SGB/2008/5, “Prohibition of discrimination, harassment, including sexual harassment, and abuse of authority”. It circulated the bulletin to all Mission personnel in April, and the corresponding mandatory online training programme was completed by all civilian staff in June. In addition, the UNOMIG conduct and discipline refresher briefing was delivered to all categories of Mission personnel, focusing on recent policy developments and other conduct issues, such as prostitution and pornography. 71. In response to recent misconduct incidents linked to illegal narcotics, UNOMIG is implementing a zero-tolerance policy. 72. Following recent updates in the content of the online training course, the mandatory Integrity Awareness Initiative was relaunched in UNOMIG in March. All civilian Mission staff were requested to complete by 31 May three mandatory online training courses in conduct and discipline (on standards of conduct, the Integrity Awareness Initiative and prevention of workplace harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority).

VIII. Observations

73. I have consistently stressed the need for strict observance of the ceasefire and separation-of-forces regime in the area of responsibility of UNOMIG in order to prevent a resumption of hostilities and create a climate conducive to dialogue between the two sides. Unfortunately, after a period of relative stability in the winter, the last four months have witnessed a resurgence of tensions stemming from, inter alia, clear disagreements as to what constitutes observance or violation of the ceasefire regime. Taking into account the terms of the Moscow Agreement and the volatility of the overall situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process, I underline the need for all involved to observe the most rigorous separation of forces on land, at sea and in the air, with the CIS peacekeeping force having responsibility for the enforcement of that separation. I am aware of the repeated calls by the Georgian side for a change in the peacekeeping mechanism. But while this and other discussions with respect to the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process are ongoing, I call upon every stakeholder in this process to preserve the integrity of the ceasefire regime. Following a number of recent incidents, I appeal to the Abkhaz side to observe the freedom of movement of UNOMIG and to the Georgian side to observe the freedom of movement of the CIS peacekeeping force in their respective areas of responsibility. 74. The increase in tensions during the period under the review did not involve only the ceasefire regime. I have condemned the bombings and roadside explosions that took place from 29 June to 6 July on both sides of the ceasefire line, with the

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indiscriminate bombing in public places on the Abkhaz side leaving four people dead, including one UNOMIG staff member, and 18 wounded. While investigations by UNOMIG into the incidents that have occurred in Gali and elsewhere in the zone of conflict are still ongoing — the bombings in Gagra and Sukhumi took place outside the Mission’s area of responsibility — I am deeply concerned by this resort to indiscriminate violence, an unprecedented development with unpredictable consequences for a fragile peace process. 75. In addition, against the background of already strained relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia, developments during the period under review have brought differences between the two countries to a new level, with Georgia blaming Russia for “accelerated annexation” of Abkhazia and Russia accusing Georgia of preparing for the imminent implementation of a military option in Abkhazia. While the UNOMIG mandate is limited to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, both the conflict prevention and conflict resolution dimensions of its mandate are significantly affected by this deterioration in the relationship between key actors in the process and the polarizing effect it has on the broader international context. By many accounts, the chain of events that began to unfold in March 2008 brought the Georgian, Abkhaz and CIS peacekeeping forces close to major confrontation in the second half of April. 76. This bears out the relevance of the assessment of the peace process that is currently being undertaken, which includes consultations with the two parties and those international organizations and Member States, including the Group of Friends, that have been most directly involved in the peace process. The assessment will, inter alia, explore the possibility of a coordinated international response to avert further worsening of the political and security situation. International consensus remains key if the peace process is to be put back on track. 77. I conclude by expressing my thanks to my Special Representative and the staff of UNOMIG for their persistent efforts in an increasingly difficult environment, as illustrated by the death of a UNOMIG staff member in Gali on 6 July 2008. I convey my condolences to his family, and I wish a prompt recovery to our UNOMIG staff who were injured in the same incident. I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to Major General Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak, who is leaving the Mission after completing three years as the head of the UNOMIG military contingent, and who has served with great distinction as the Mission’s Chief Military Observer during a very challenging period. My thanks go also to the members of the Group of Friends and those Member States and organizations that continue to contribute to the peace process.

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Annex

A. Countries providing military observers (as at 14 July 2008)

Country Number of military observers

Albania 3 Austria 3 Bangladesh 8 Croatia 3 Czech Republic 5 Denmark 5 Egypt 5 France 3 Germany 12a Ghana 1 Greece 4 Hungary 7 Indonesia 4 Jordan 7 Lithuania 2 Moldova 1 Mongolia 0 Nepal 1 Nigeria 1 Pakistan 11b Poland 2 Republic of Korea 7 Romania 2 Russia 4 Sweden 3 Switzerland 4 Turkey 5 Ukraine 5 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 5 United States of America 3 Uruguay 3 Yemen 1

Total 130

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B. Countries providing civilian police personnel (as at 14 July 2008)

Country Number of civilian police personnel

Czech Republic 1 Germany 4 Ghana 1 Israel 1 Poland 2 Russian Federation 2 Sweden 1 Switzerland 2 Ukraine 1c Total 15

a Three military observers and nine medical personnel. b Includes the Chief Military Observer. c Senior Police Adviser.

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92 Georgia - UNOMIG - Mandate

UNOMIG was originally established on 24 August 1993 by Security Council resolution 858 (1993) to verify compliance with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia with special attention to the situation in the city of Sukhumi; to investigate reports of ceasefire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved; and to report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its mandate, including, in particular, violations of the ceasefire agreement. The authorized strength of the Mission was 88 military observers.

After UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the resumed fighting in Abkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993, to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military contingent, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement. Following the signing, in May 1994, by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, the Security Council, by its resolution 937 (1994) of 27 July 1994, authorized the increase in UNOMIG's strength to up to 136 military observers and decided that the mandate of an expanded Mission shall be as follows:

• To monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994; • To observe the operation of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement; • To verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the security zone and that heavy military equipment does not remain or is not reintroduced in the security zone or the restricted weapons zone; • To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted weapons zone in cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping force as appropriate; • To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori Valley to places beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia; • To patrol regularly the Kodori Valley; • To investigate, at the request of either party or the CIS peacekeeping force or on its own initiative, reported or alleged violations of the Agreement and to attempt to resolve or contribute to the resolution of such incidents; • To report regularly to the Secretary-General within its mandate, in particular on the implementation of the Agreement, any violations and their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments; • To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peacekeeping force and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons.

A United Nations office for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia, was established on 10 December 1996 in accordance with Security Council resolution 1077 (1996) of 22 October 1996.It is jointly staffed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Human Rights Office forms part of UNOMIG and reports to the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the Head of Mission of UNOMIG.

93 By resolution 1494 (2003) of 30 July 2003, the Council endorsed the recommendations by the Secretary-General that "a UN police component of 20 officers be added to UNOMIG, to strengthen its capacity to carry out its mandate and in particular contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees".

94

PC.DEC/861 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 19 August 2008 Permanent Council Original: ENGLISH

728th Plenary Meeting PC.Journal No. 728, Agenda item 1

DECISION No. 861 INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY MONITORING OFFICERS IN THE OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA

The Permanent Council,

Striving to contribute to the full implementation of the six principles included in the agreement proposed by the French and Russian Presidents.

Decides to increase for a minimum period of six calendar months the number of Military Monitoring Officers in the OSCE Mission to Georgia by up to one hundred.

Twenty MMOs will be deployed immediately in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia.

The rest of the additional MMOs will be deployed subject to a new decision of the Permanent Council on the modalities of the MMOs, to be proposed by the Chairmanship without delay. This decision will apply to the abovementioned 20 MMOs as well.

PCOEW2553 95 PC.DEC/861 19 August 2008 Attachment 1

Original: ENGLISH

INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of France on behalf of the European Union:

“The European Union is gratified that the Permanent Council has decided to deploy immediately 20 additional observers.

It is the wish of the European Union that it be possible also for these observers and the additional observers to be deployed rapidly in South Ossetia/Georgia.

This decision shall not affect either the terms or the format of the international mechanism referred to in point five of the six-point agreement.

I should like to request that this interpretative statement be attached to the journal of the day.”

The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia∗; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and Serbia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine and Moldova, align themselves with this statement.

* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

96 PC.DEC/861 19 August 2008 Attachment 2

Original: ENGLISH

INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of the United States of America:

“While today’s decision is far from perfect, we believe it is of the utmost importance to get additional MMOs on the ground as soon as possible. If the parties to the conflict can accept this language, we can, too.

The United States offers the following interpretation:

We expect that this decision will not pre-empt the establishment of further international mechanisms, in accordance with the six-point plan.

With regard to paragraph one, we expect the armed forces of the Russian Federation to honor their commitment to withdraw to pre-August 6 lines; that is, the lines where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities.

We also expect the Russian Federation to honor its commitment to provide full access for humanitarian operations throughout Georgia. We deplore reports of looting and attacks on civilians, especially in areas the international community has been unable to access. Withdrawal of Russian forces to pre-August 6 lines will allow for the more rapid re-establishment of normal, civilian policing. Until this occurs, Russia bears responsibility for the safety and welfare of all civilians in areas under the control of its forces.

With regard to paragraph two, we are interpreting the minimum period of six calendar months to become effective immediately upon the arrival of newly deployed MMOs. We expect the Russian Federation to allow the MMOs to fulfill the full range of their responsibilities. This includes monitoring compliance with the conditions of the six-point cease-fire, to include the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

With regard to paragraphs three and four, we expect the Russian Federation to allow MMOs full access to the whole of Georgia, with particular focus on the conflict zones, to include South Ossetia.”

97

98

PC.DEC/334 Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa 15 dicembre 1999 Consiglio Permanente ITALIANO Originale: INGLESE

262a Seduta Plenaria PC Giornale N.262, punto 4 dell’ordine del giorno

DECISIONE N.334

A seguito della richiesta del Governo della Georgia ed allo scopo di osservare e riferire sul movimento transfrontaliero sia di veicoli che di persone a piedi fra la Georgia e la Repubblica Cecena della Federazione Russa, il Consiglio Permanente decide di:

- ampliare il mandato della Missione OSCE in Georgia per includere tale monitoraggio delle frontiere;

- aumentare la consistenza della Missione attuale fino a 20 unità di personale internazionale;

- incaricare il Segretario Generale di elaborare le implicazioni in termini di risorse e preparare un bilancio.

Richiamando la Decisione No. 182 del 17 luglio 1997 sull’istituzione di un Fondo Spese Impreviste e relative modalità e tenendo conto del preventivo fatto circolare dal Segretario Generale (allegato alla presente decisione), nonché in attesa di una rapida adozione di un bilancio, conformemente alle procedure stabilite, il Consiglio Permanente autorizza un esborso di 250.000 EUR del Fondo di Spese Impreviste per finanziare le attività iniziali relative al tale decisione.

I monitori OSCE saranno disarmati e non avranno competenze coercitive. Essi agiranno nel pieno rispetto della sovranità delle autorità georgiane sulle loro frontiere, senza assumere alcuna delle responsabilità che ad esse competono. Il Governo georgiano ha dato assicurazione che provvederà alla sicurezza dei monitori OSCE alle frontiere e garantirà la loro libertà di movimento. Il Consiglio Permanente ritiene che tali assicurazioni costituiscano un elemento indispensabile della presente decisione.

Il Consiglio Permanente incarica la Missione OSCE in Georgia di studiare ulteriormente la situazione nella regione di confine, allo scopo di attuare la presente decisione in un momento e in un modo tali da soddisfare le esigenze di sicurezza della Missione e consente alla Missione di svolgere tale nuovo compito efficacemente. Detta attuazione avrà luogo a seguito di ampie consultazioni.

Il Consiglio Permanente ritornerà su tale questione nel gennaio 2000, per esaminare l’attuazione iniziale della presente decisione ed adottare ulteriori decisioni che possano rendersi necessarie. L’operazione di monitoraggio delle frontiere sarà istituita per un periodo iniziale fino al 30 aprile 2000.

99

PC.DEC/334 15 dicembre 1999 Annesso

Preventivo per 30 giorni Missione OSCE di monitoraggio delle frontiere in Georgia Fase analitica

Principali categorie di spesa EUR N. progressivo

A. Spese per il personale 1.236 1

B. Vitto a alloggio 21.117 2

C. Spese di viaggio 6.315 3

D. Altri servizi e utenze 32.888 4

E. Costi d’investimento 28.895 5

F. Forniture 1.200 6

TOTALE PER LA MISSIONE OSCE DI MONITORAGGIO DELLE FRONTIERE IN GEORGIA 91.651

Membri internazionali della Missione 3 Personale locale 0 Veicoli 0

100 - 2 - PC.DEC/334 15 dicembre 1999 Annesso Preventivo per 30 giorni Missione OSCE di monitoraggio delle frontiere in Georgia Fase analitica (Cont.)

Singole Voci di Spesa Mensile/unità N. di EUR N. Spese (EUR) Unità progressivo A. Spese per il personale Assicurazione rischi bellici: GBP 120 per membro internazionale della Missione all’anno 15.9 3 48 Pagamento rischi: EUR 33 per membro internazionale della Missione al giorno 396.0 3 1.188 Totale 1.236 1 B. Vitto e alloggio Vitto e alloggio per 3 membri internazionali della Missione USD 237 al giorno 7.038.9 3 21.117 Totale 21.117 2 C. Spese di viaggio Biglietti VIE-TBI-VIE (EUR 1,600) 3 4.800 diaria per viaggio a Vienna di 3 giorni (USD 170) 3 1.515 Totale 6.315 3 D. Servizi e utenze Operazioni con elicotteri (3 x alla settimana, 6 ore/settimana) USD 1,300/ora di volo 30.888 Comunicazioni 2.000 Totale 32.888 4 E. Costi d’investimento Equipaggiamento per le Comunicazioni: Telefoni satellitari 3.800.0 4 15.200 Telefoni cellulari satellitari (Iridium) 3.465.0 3 10.395

Altri equipaggiamenti: Completo indumenti da neve 600.0 3 1.800 Giubbotto antiproiettile 500.0 3 1.500 Totale 28.895 5 F. Forniture Altre Forniture 1.200.0 1 1.200 Totale 1.200 6 TOTALE PER LA MISSIONE OSCE DI MONITORAGGIO DELLE FRONTIERE IN GEORGIA 91.651

101

102 OSCE Mission to Georgia

Overview

The tasks of the OSCE Mission to Georgia have been gradually widened since its opening in late 1992. The main activities are:

Politico-military dimension of security

Conflict resolution

The Mission promotes negotiations between the conflicting parties in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict (1992), and supports the UN-led peace process in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (1993).

It is a participant in the Joint Control Commission which is co-chaired by the Georgian, Russian Federation, North Ossetian and South Ossetian sides.

Confidence-building in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict

The Mission monitors the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

The Mission leads an initiative funded by international donors for economic and infrastructure rehabilitation projects in the zone of conflict. Other grass-roots projects contribute to efforts to bring communities together and build the capacity of the NGO sector.

Destruction of surplus stockpiles

The Mission, through OSCE donor States, funds a programme for the dismantling of stockpiles of obsolete ammunition, and also for the neutralizing of dangerous chemicals left on former Russian bases in Georgia.

Assisting police reform and enhancing anti-terrorism capacities

The Mission supports the Georgian law enforcement structures in combating terrorism and organized crime. Assistance for police reform is rendered in areas such as human resource management, community policing and the Police Academy.

Strengthening border management capacities and security

The Mission is engaged in promoting inter-agency co-ordination and international co-operation on border issues. The Mission has undertaken projects addressing the short- and medium-term needs of the Georgian Border Police, through specialized skills and management training programmes for junior officers and senior management.

Human dimension of security

The Mission assists the Georgian Government in fulfilling its OSCE commitments on human rights, rule of law and democratization. The Mission monitors and supports the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and promotes the building of civil society and democratic institutions.

Economic and environmental dimension of security

The Mission regularly monitors, analyses and reports on developments in the economic, energy and environmental sectors. Specific activities have focused on supporting small- and medium-size enterprise development; assisting the Georgian Government in its efforts to improve economic and environmental related legislation and facilitating OSCE regional economic and environmental activities.

Co-operation with other international organizations

103 The Mission co-operates closely with a range of international organizations and institutions on a number of issues relevant to the Mission mandate. Three relationships stand out - those with the United Nations, the European Commission and the Council of Europe. The Mission remains committed to complementary activities in the conflict resolution processes on a practical level on the ground.

104 Consiglio d'Europa Comunicato stampa - 589(2008)

Il Commissario Hammarberg in visita in Russia e in Georgia per valutare la situazione dei diritti umani e l’accesso all’assistenza umanitaria

Strasburgo, 21.08.2008 – Il commissario per i diritti umani, Thomas Hammarberg, darà inizio, venerdì 22 agosto, ad una visita ricognitiva nelle zone colpite dal conflitto dell’Ossezia del Sud. “Lo scopo di tale visita è quello di valutare sul campo la situazione dei diritti umani e le possibilità di accesso della popolazione all’assistenza umanitaria. Mi dedicherò in particolare alla situazione degli sfollati interni e dei profughi, segnatamente nella prospettiva di un loro ritorno volontario e sicuro”.

Il commissario Hammerberg incontrerà le autorità locali e le vittime del conflitto, tra cui le persone sfollate, a Vladikavkaz, Tskhinvali, Gori ed altre città georgiane. Terrà delle riunioni con i rappresentanti delle organizzazioni internazionali, delle missioni diplomatiche e della società civile e visiterà inoltre alcuni luoghi di detenzione, commissariati, ospedali e campi rifugiati. Presenterà in seguito le proprie raccomandazioni alle autorità di Tiblisi e Mosca.

“Sfortunatamente, il conflitto ha già fatto molte vittime”, ha dichiarato il Commissario. “È necessario che tutte le parti coinvolte nel conflitto adottino le misure tali da garantire il rispetto della Convenzione europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo e restaurare così una situazione pacifica nella quale i civili abbiano libero accesso ai beni di prima necessità.”

* * *

Il Commissario per i diritti umani è un’istituzione indipendente e non giudiziaria, il cui scopo è promuovere la sensibilizzazione e il rispetto dei diritti umani nei 47 Stati membri del Consiglio d’Europa. Eletto dall’Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d’Europa, l’attuale commissario, Thomas Hammarberg, è in carica dal 1 aprile 2006.

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Europe Report N°195 – 22 August 2008

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE VIOLENCE...... 1 II. MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE AND KEEPING PEACE ...... 4 III. IMPLICATIONS FOR GEORGIA ...... 7 A. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ...... 7 B. NATO MEMBERSHIP ...... 10 C. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ...... 13 1. Energy...... 13 2. Economy...... 14 3. Politics ...... 15 IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA...... 16 A. RUSSIAN MOTIVATIONS BEYOND GEORGIA ...... 17 B. POINTS OF LEVERAGE WITH RUSSIA...... 19 V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU AND U.S...... 21 A. THE EU APPROACH ...... 21 B. THE U.S. POLICY OPTIONS ...... 25 VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE...... 26 A. THE UNITED NATIONS ...... 26 B. RUSSIA’S R2P JUSTIFICATION...... 28 C. ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY...... 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GEORGIA ...... 31 B. MAP OF SOUTH OSSETIA SHOWING VILLAGES UNDER GEORGIAN AND OSSETIAN CONTROL PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 ...... 32 C. JPKF AND TBILISI MAPS OF GEORGIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS IN SOUTH OSSETIA PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 ...... 33 D. MAP OF GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT ZONE PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 ...... 34 E. 15-16 AUGUST CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND SIDE-LETTER...... 35 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 39 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2005...... 40 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 42

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the con- ity for the humanitarian consequences of the violence, temporary geopolitical world, with large consequences as tens of thousands of civilians in South Ossetia, for peace and security in Europe and beyond. Mos- Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia have been displaced cow’s initial moves into South Ossetia as large-scale amid disturbing reports of atrocities. violence broke out there on 7-8 August were in part a response to a disastrous miscalculation by a Georgian Western nations must eschew the worst of the Cold leadership that was impatient with gradual confidence War mentality that would further isolate Russia, but building and a Russian-dominated negotiations proc- engagement, as UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband ess. But Russia’s disproportionate counter-attack, with has put it, has to be “hard-headed”. Russia cannot be movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into allowed to maintain a military force in Georgia except Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction as part of an international peacekeeping mission with of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy non-Russian command, with a clear and mutually ac- and disruption of communications and movement ceptable mandate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The between different regions of the country, constitutes ceasefire signed on 15-16 August must be respected, a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations. It has and Russian troops must return promptly to the posi- undermined regional stability and security; threatened tions they held on 7 August, honouring the spirit of energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims a loosely worded agreement. International monitors with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities should be deployed in Georgia proper to observe Rus- that could be used to destabilise other parts of the sian withdrawal and return of displaced persons former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; (IDPs) and then serve as an interim measure to help and shown disregard for international law. maintain the ceasefire in South Ossetia and Abkhazia until a peacekeeping mission can be created. Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion Russian participation is probably necessary as a prac- of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from tical matter in the peacekeeping mission, although the independence of Kosovo to the placement of serious questions should be raised about the motives missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a of the Russian forces that Moscow describes as peace- concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet keepers. Command and composition should be genu- states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness inely international. All Georgian and Ossetian civilians in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the displaced since 7 August need to be immediately allowed personality and world view of Russia’s predominant to return to their homes. The Russians and Georgians leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. should agree to and cooperate with investigations to establish responsibility for human rights abuses during Georgia, too, has mishandled its relationships with the conflict, including by the International Criminal Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2004, Court (ICC) and perhaps the Organization for Secu- abandoning real confidence building and often fol- rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). lowing confrontational policies towards the conflict regions. With patience it might have demonstrated None of this will be easy or even possible without a that the regions would be better served by enjoying combination of significant pressures and pragmatic extensive autonomy within an increasingly prosper- incentives to gain essential Russian approval. Mos- ous and democratising Georgia. Instead, President cow must be made to understand the advantages for Mikheil Saakashvili and a small inner circle of belli- its prestige, power and economy of being a partner in cose officials used menacing and arrogant rhetoric ensuring security in Europe rather than an outlier, that made the dispute with Moscow and the conflict subject to threats of exclusion from such institutions regions bitter and personal. All sides bear responsibil- as the G8 and World Trade Organization (WTO).

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The crisis also reflects serious mistakes by the U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS and the European Union (EU) in Georgia since 2004, most significantly failing to adequately press Presi- To the Russian and Georgian Governments dent Saakashvili to abandon a quick-fix approach to- and the De Facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian ward restoring Georgian control over South Ossetia Authorities: and Abkhazia. The Georgian army was trained and sold weapons without ensuring that these would not 1. Implement immediately and fully the six-point be used to recover the conflict territories, and Russia’s ceasefire agreement signed on 15-16 August 2008. anger over these actions and other perceived post- 2. Assist monitoring of compliance by a strength- Cold War slights was misread. Instead of concentrat- ened OSCE Georgia Mission, with full freedom ing on democratic institutions and rule of law, the of movement throughout the country, until a more U.S. too often focused its support on Saakashvili per- permanent and substantial international peace- sonally, even as he engaged in reckless and authoritar- keeping mission can be authorised and deployed. ian behaviour. As the long-frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to heat up, Georgia’s 3. Allow and support the immediate return of all partners did too little to encourage it to engage more newly displaced persons and refugees to their substantially in confidence building and dialogue with homes, provide unrestricted access for humanitar- the de facto authorities and Russia. ian aid, facilitate the exchange of prisoners and detainees, halt belligerent rhetoric and the issuing With regard to NATO, the division evident at its of false press reports, assist with the determina- Bucharest Summit in April 2008 on whether to ap- tion of the fate of the missing and cooperate with prove a membership action plan (MAP) for Georgia the International Committee of the Red Cross has been exacerbated. Those countries, led by the (ICRC) and humanitarian airlifts, as well as with U.S., who support Georgia’s accession are pointing to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other the Russian attacks as clear proof that Georgia needs investigating authorities. the protection of NATO security guarantees; those that oppose it believe that NATO dodged a bullet by To the Russian Government: not committing itself to go to war against Russia in defence of a capricious and reckless government in 4. Withdraw all military and related personnel from Tbilisi. A decision on MAP or membership status Georgia, except initially for the numbers authorised should not be taken in the heat of the current crisis. It as peacekeepers before 7 August 2008 in South will be difficult to finally resolve the membership is- Ossetia and Abkhazia, and subsequently for any sue, in relation to both Georgia and other potential who are entitled to serve in an international members, without addressing the larger question of peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia and NATO’s future role as a security organisation. Abkhazia that may be authorised by the UN Secu- rity Council. At the broader level, the crisis raises significant ques- tions about the capacity of the EU, the UN and NATO To the De Facto South Ossetian and to address fundamental issues. While European lead- Abkhazian Authorities: ers stepped forward to achieve the ceasefire agree- ment, their inability to put forward a forceful response 5. Halt and desist from violence against ethnic to the Russian action reflects a lowest common de- Georgians, destruction of property or forced dis- nominator approach that discourages stronger and placement. more innovative policies. Similarly, the UN Security Council, divided by whether to include references to To the Georgian Government: Georgia’s territorial integrity in either a resolution or statement, has issued nothing on the conflict since it 6. Sign a non-resumption of hostilities agreement began to boil over on 7 August. In an unhappy re- with the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and minder of the Cold War years, the conflict has called Abkhazia. into question the Council’s capacity to address any 7. Pursue and consistently implement without status issue over which P-5 members have significantly dif- preconditions measures to gradually build confi- ferent interests. And in the process of seeking justifi- dence with South Ossetians and Abkhaz, includ- cation for its actions, Russia has also misstated and ing by providing full protection to South Ossetian distorted the UN-approved principle of “responsibility and Abkhaz minorities throughout Georgia. to protect”.

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To the Member States of the an investigation documenting August events in UN Security Council: South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as other parts of Georgia in which Russian forces established 8. Negotiate rapidly a resolution that: temporary presence. The purpose of the investiga- a) acknowledges and welcomes the ceasefire signed tion should be to provide an accurate and com- 15-16 August 2008 and addresses the territo- plete accounting of what occurred in order to rial integrity issues by confirming that it does promote reconciliation and make it possible to en- not affect the legal situation that existed in the sure future accountability for any atrocity crimes. concerned area on 7 August 2008; To the European Union and its Member States: b) welcomes the dispatch of observers to serve as 10. Organise an emergency donors conference, in co- interim monitors of the ceasefire; ordination with the international financial institu- c) authorises for an initial period of one year the tions (IFIs) and bilateral donors, for the purpose formation and operation of a peacekeeping of obtaining funds to assist the repair of war dam- mission, which may be, as appears most prac- age in the affected areas and support economic tical and expeditious, either a traditional UN stability. mission or the mission of another appropriate 11. Rapidly send interim observers to monitor the international institution such as the OSCE, and ceasefire as part of the OSCE mission, reinforce is commanded on the military side by a senior the office of the European Union Special Repre- soldier from outside the region and on the sentative (EUSR) and the Border Support Team political side by a senior diplomat from outside (BST) and take the necessary measures to dis- the region. Russian participation in such a mis- patch a European Security and Defence Policy sion should be fully integrated into the inter- (ESDP) team to assist in a peacekeeping mission national command structure and not form a authorised by the UN Security Council. separate force within the main force. This force should be mandated to: To NATO and its Member States:

i. ensure respect for the ceasefire signed on 12. Do not seek to resolve Georgia’s MAP or mem- 15-16 August 2008; bership status until the present crisis has cooled. ii. offer such assistance as may be deemed Consider other appropriate means of satisfying useful by the de facto South Ossetian and Georgia’s legitimate security concerns pending Abkhazian authorities to develop their insti- any progress on its NATO application. tutions; and iii. encourage contacts between the Georgian To European Union and NATO Member States: government, Georgian institutions and in- dividuals and the de facto authorities of 13. Advise Russia at the most senior level that if it South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their institu- cooperates in implementing and maintaining the tions and individuals; and ceasefire signed on 15-16 August 2008 and nego- tiating and implementing the UN Security Council d) establishes a forum in which the concerned resolution described above, they are prepared to parties, facilitated by the UN, as well as inter- explore common security interests on a wide ested neighbouring states and international or- range of global issues, including possible ways to ganisations such as the OSCE and EU, can bridge differences with respect to Georgia’s rela- urgently explore practical measures to improve tionship to NATO, the expressed Russian interest the humanitarian and economic situation, as well to consider whether there might be some utility in as the possibility of more far-reaching political a forum to draft a new instrument on aspects of measures to achieve, ultimately, a resolution of European security and otherwise generally to the underlying problems that have produced deepen dialogue and cooperation. conflict between Georgians, South Ossetians 14. Advise Russia at the most senior level that if it and Abkhazians, including regarding status. does not cooperate in implementing and maintain- ing the ceasefire signed on 15-16 August 2008 9. Request that the Secretary-General, after consulta- and negotiating and implementing the Security tions with all parties to the conflict and with Council resolution described above, they are pre- relevant international organisations such as the pared to adjust relations accordingly, including to: OSCE, appoint an independent panel to conduct

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a) suspend further consideration of Russia’s 15. Advise Georgia at the most senior level that if it membership in the World Trade Organization cooperates in implementing and maintaining the (WTO) and its participation in the activities of ceasefire signed on 15-16 August 2008 and works the G8; and constructively with regard to the processes to be set in motion by the Security Council resolution b) request through national committees the Inter- described above, every effort will be made to in- national Olympic Committee (IOC) to seek crease aid appropriate to the needs for reconstruc- assurances from Russia that appropriate inter- tion of the economy and infrastructure and to national cooperation is in place with respect to facilitate its EU integration. Abkhazia by 1 January 2009, so that there can be confidence the 2014 Winter Games will be Tbilisi/Brussels, 22 August 2008 prepared adequately and conducted safely and there is no need to review the decision to award those Games to Sochi.

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I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE VIOLENCE South Ossetian de facto authorities.4 They were re- leased after an ultimatum by Georgian President Mik- heil Saakashvili, but shortly thereafter, Russian Close to midnight on 7 August 2008, a senior Georgian warplanes flew over Georgian territory in an open military official announced that Tbilisi had decided to warning to Tbilisi.5 The South Ossetians and Georgi- restore “constitutional order” in South Ossetia.1 The ans reinforced their forces and weaponry in the zone Georgians had declared a unilateral ceasefire several of conflict, in violation of ceasefire agreements.6 hours earlier, after another day of fighting between Georgian and Ossetian forces in and around the region’s In the past months, Russia also had been bolstering its 7 capital, Tskhinvali. But Georgia’s defence ministry position in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Starting said South Ossetian militias had nevertheless contin- in March, talk of war – an attack on the southern part ued into the evening to heavily shell Georgian villages of Abkhazia – had been rife in Tbilisi. A senior Euro- and positions. By 1:00am on 8 August, Georgian pean diplomat said that U.S., German and European troops had launched a large-scale military offensive on Tskhinvali, supported by artillery, and advanced quickly. under the command of a North Ossetian officer, but most troops as well as officers are from the South Ossetian militia. At approximately 1:30am, tank columns of the Rus- For detailed background on the history of the South Ossetia sian 58th Army started crossing into Georgia from the conflict, including the JPKF and JCC, see Crisis Group Roki tunnel separating North and South Ossetia.2 Europe Reports N°183, Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Apparently, the Russians had anticipated, if they did Make Haste Slowly, 7 June 2007; and N°159, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, 26 November 2004. not actually entice, the Georgian move. 4 “Tbilisi confirms four soldiers held in S.Ossetia”, Civil Georgia, 8 July 2008, available at http://civil.ge/eng/article. Prior to these opening events of 7-8 August, the secu- php?id=18721&search. rity situation in South Ossetia had deteriorated sharply. 5 As early as April 2008, there were increasingly frequent In July, four Georgian soldiers serving in the Joint shootouts, mortar attacks, car bombings and other violent Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) 3 were detained by the incidents between the Georgian and South Ossetian forces. Amid reports Georgia had planned an operation to rescue the detained peacekeepers, Russian fighter jets (four in total, ac- cording to the Georgian defence ministry) briefly flew over 1 “‘Georgia decided to restore constitutional order in S.Ossetia’ sovereign Georgian airspace in South Ossetia on the evening – MoD official”, Civil Georgia, 8 August 2008, available at of 8 July, in what appeared to be an attempt to test both http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18941&search. Georgian and, more importantly, Western reaction, but 2 “Russian military hardware is moving towards Roki tunnel”, which Moscow said was an effort to “cool hot heads in Tbi- Ossetian Radio and TV website, 8 August 2008, 1:27am, lisi and to prevent a military scenario from unfolding”. “Rus- available at www.osradio.ru; and “‘Hundreds’ of fighters sian MFA information and press department commentary infiltrate into S.Ossetia from Russia – Georgia says”, Civil concerning the situation in South Ossetia”, 10 July 2008, Georgia, 8 August 2008, available at http://civil.ge/eng/article. available at www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/ php?id=18943&search. 100708/newen3.htm. 3 The June 1992 “Agreement on the Principles of the Settle- 6 In addition to its 500 peacekeepers in the region, Georgia ment of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict between Georgia also had military police there, and irregular forces were pre- and Russia” (also “Sochi agreement”) produced a ceasefire sent in the approximately 30 per cent of South Ossetia that and created the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) and a Georgia controlled. Both the Georgian and South Ossetian Joint Control Commission (JCC). The trilateral JPKF, with sides also had covert forces in the region. Georgian, Russian and Ossetian units, was mandated to re- 7 South Ossetia and Abkhazia are both internationally recog- store peace and maintain law and order in the zone of con- nised as part of the Republic of Georgia. They fought bloody flict and security corridor, as well as in districts and villages wars with Georgia in 1990-1992 and 1992-1993. With the not in the zone of conflict. A common misperception is that signing of the Sochi and Moscow peace agreements, peace- the JPKF is quadrilateral, including both South and North keeping and negotiations formats were established which Ossetian sides, but there is only one Ossetian battalion. It is maintained stability but did not resolve the conflicts.

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Union (EU) leaders had on repeated occasions talked Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Saakashvili out of launching an attack. Each conver- Fried, accused South Ossetia of instigating the crisis, sation worked for “about two weeks”, the official urged Russia to restrain Tskhinvali and spoke optimis- said.8 tically about a new U.S.-Russian effort to encourage political dialogue.11 Georgia announced a unilateral A South Ossetian told Crisis Group in late July that ceasefire, but at 10:15pm local time reported bom- Russian advisers and military officers had recently bardments against all its positions near Tskhinvali. arrived in the town of Java. They hired local Os- Soon thereafter, Fried received a call from the Geor- setians at salaries of €1,000 a month – huge by local gian foreign minister, who told him her country was standards – to help construct military buildings. Rus- under attack and would have to respond.12 sia also sent extra “peacekeepers” into Abkhazia in April and army railway workers on 30 May. Georgia From 11:30pm on 7 August until mid-morning 8 August, denounced these moves as illegal occupation. But in Georgian artillery shelled Tskhinvali, eventually two months the railway crew repaired the rail link taking control of most of the city and several ethnic from Sukhumi to the city of Ochamchire which had Ossetian villages. Georgia’s small air force bombed been broken for years. Moscow insisted that was for Russian tank columns advancing through the Roki “humanitarian” purposes, but only a few weeks later, tunnel in an effort to slow their advance, but by the at least a portion of the 9,000 Russian troops who morning of 8 August, the tanks were engaging the went into Georgia via Abkhazia travelled with their Georgians in and around Tskhinvali. According to a hardware via the railway.9 Western military observer who visited the area on the afternoon of 8 August the Georgians withdrew On 1 August, five Georgian police were injured in car their forces from inside Tskhinvali before a ceasefire bombings in South Ossetia. That night, heavy fighting between 3:00pm and 6:00pm. Clashes between Geor- between Georgians and South Ossetians left six gians, Russians and Ossetians continued, with the Ossetians dead and fifteen wounded in Tskhinvali, as Georgians using artillery to shell Tskhinvali, where well as seven casualties in ethnic Georgian villages. Russian and South Ossetian forces had taken up posi- In the increasingly insecure environment, South tions.13 The Georgian military says it withdrew its last Ossetian officials evacuated more than 800 people to troops from all of South Ossetia at 5:00am on 11 Au- North Ossetia, the Russian region across the border. gust.14 International representatives expressed increasing concern about the violence.10 On 6 August new hos- To justify the Russian operation, Prime Minister tilities left eighteen South Ossetians and two Geor- Vladimir Putin accused Georgia of a “genocide” gian peacekeepers wounded. against Ossetians, and the Russians spoke of 1,500- 2,000 dead in Tskhinvali.15 Human Rights Watch sub- More fighting broke out the following afternoon, 7 August, and President Saakashvili made an appeal for urgent negotiations. A senior U.S. diplomat, Assistant 11 Fried also said, “there’s no evidence that the Russians are pushing them”. “U.S., Russia making S.Ossetia peace ef- 8 Crisis Group interview, senior European official, July 2008. fort”, Reuters, 7 August 2008. The risks of any Georgian overreaction to Russian or local 12 “After mixed U.S. messages, a war erupted in Georgia”, provocation were also emphasised in a nearly hour-long The New York Times, 12 August 2008. Fried reportedly meeting between Crisis Group President Gareth Evans and warned her that this was a mistake, and Georgia should not President Saakashvili in Yalta on 11 July 2008. fall for a “provocation”. But the minister said her country 9 “Nine thousand Russian paratroopers and 350 units of had no choice but to protect its people. armoured hardware entered Abkhazia”, Echo Moskvi radio 13 Crisis Group telephone interview, international observer, station website, 11 August 2008, available at www.echo. August 2008. msk.ru/news/533166-echo.html. 14 Crisis Group telephone interview, official, Georgian minis- 10 “OSCE Chairman-in-Office condemns Georgian-Ossetian try of interior, August 2008. conflict zone violence, reiterates invitation for dialogue”, 15 “Путин: происходящее в Южной Осетии- – это гено- OSCE press release, 2 August 2008; “Statement on South цид осетинского народа” [“Putin: what’s happening in Ossetia”, Estonian foreign ministry, 4 August 2008, avail- South Ossetia is a genocide of the Ossetian people”], Inter- able at www.vm.ee/eng/kat_138/9978.html?arhiiv_kuup= fax, 9 August 2008, available at www.interfax.ru/news.asp?id kuup_2008; and “Statement by the Presidency of the Council =26152. Russian media later reported officials saying that 10 of the European Union following recent events in South per cent of Tskhinvali’s buildings had been totally destroyed Ossetia (Georgia)”, 5 August 2008, available at www.ue2008. and a further 30 per cent had suffered damage “of varying fr/PFUE/cache/offonce/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-08_2008/PFUE- severity”. See “Масштаб разрушений в Цхинвали: 10% 05.08.2008/PESC_Ossetie_Sud;jsessionid=D2D68B9CD5D домов разрушено, еще 20% – повреждено” [“The extent 9CC3146C091D6692149C2. of destruction in Tskhivali: 10 per cent of homes destroyed,

116 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 3 sequently reported that on the basis of its research on Russian units sank several Georgian naval vessels in the ground in South Ossetia, it was able to document the port of Poti in the following days and, perhaps fewer than 100 civilian deaths.16 On 20 August, the most crucially, blew up a vital railway bridge linking Russian prosecutor general’s investigators reported Tbilisi and the west of the country, in effect cutting only 133 civilian deaths in South Ossetia, while the Georgia in two and potentially severely disrupting its de facto authorities still maintained a total of 1,492.17 economy. European diplomats have expressed fears of Human Rights Watch confirmed that many areas of a humanitarian crisis caused by the attacks on civilian Tskhinvali had been badly damaged, most probably in infrastructure. There have been many reports of loot- bombardments by the Georgian forces before they en- ing by Russian troops, as well as cases of similar be- tered the city. Georgian officials insist that most of the haviour by South Ossetian militia who marched into damage was caused by Russian shelling, when Mos- some areas behind them.20 cow’s forces engaged the Georgians and drove them out. Civilians interviewed in Tskhinvali claimed Fighting was often intense. On 19 August, a Georgian Georgians in some cases had thrown grenades into government official reported a total of 215 killed on cellars where residents were hiding. A few days later the Georgian side, including 133 defence ministry when South Ossetian militias took control of ethnic personnel, thirteen interior ministry personnel and 69 Georgian villages, they torched several, looted and civilians. He also reported nearly 1,500 wounded, forced Georgians to flee.18 both civilian and military, and 70 soldiers missing. The Russians claim that 64 of their forces were killed Also on 8 August, at 6:00am local time, Abkhaz and 323 injured.21 There is no verifiable figure for forces joined the fighting, heading for the only part of South Ossetian casualties, although initial Ossetian their territory still under Georgian control, the rugged and Russian reports of up to 2,000 civilian deaths Kodori Gorge. Assisted by Russian planes, they have been significantly reduced. bombed it for three days, forcing the flight of some 3,000 ethnic Georgians. Mediation by French President Nicolas Sarkozy pro- duced a six-point ceasefire document on 12 August. It Within days, Tbilisi officials said more than 20,000 was agreed to first by Russia, then by Georgia, and, troops had crossed the border from Russia, not only with U.S. help, was signed on 15-16 August in Tbilisi into South Ossetia, but also by land and sea into and Moscow. It calls for both sides to withdraw their Abkhazia. Thousands of Russians deployed via troops so as to reestablish the status quo ante, but cer- Abkhazia and crossed the administrative border to en- tain elements of the withdrawal are vague, and, as this ter western Georgia. They occupied Georgian military report went to press on 22 August, Russia had not yet bases and systematically destroyed infrastructure. On started a substantial pullback. There is a real concern the first day (8 August) of the Russian incursion it may want to retain newly minted “peacekeepers” alone, the Georgians claim, their airspace was vio- in parts of Georgia outside South Ossetian and lated 22 times; airfields were a frequent target, but Abkhazia. Russian SU-25 planes also struck a police post as well as residential areas in Gori. There is evidence that As of 18 August, the UN High Commissioner for Russian planes dropped cluster bombs on Gori’s cen- Refugees (UNHCR) said, the conflict had displaced tral square.19 30,000 ethnic Ossetians from their homes, almost all to Russia’s North Ossetia republic. A further 85,000 ethnic Georgians were displaced, including 15,000 from South Ossetia and 3,000 from Abkhazia (Upper Kodori).22 Many of the remaining Georgian displaced 20 per cent damaged”], News.ru.com, 17 August 2008, are from the central city of Gori (45,000) and Zugdidi available at www.newsru.com/world/17aug2008/blank.html. 23 16 “Georgia/Russia: update on casualties and displaced civil- (7,000). ians”, Human Rights Watch, 10 August 2008, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/10/georgi19581.htm. 17 “Russia Scales Down Georgia Toll”, BBC, 20 August 2008; and “Следствие недосчиталось трупов” [“The investigation is 20 “Georgian villages in South Ossetia burnt, looted”, op. cit. short on corpses”], Kommersant, 21 August 2008, at www. 21 “Уточненные потери и неучтенные могилы” [“Adjusted kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1013890&ThemesID=301. casualties and unaccounted graves”], Interfax, 20 August 18 “Georgian villages in South Ossetia burnt, looted”, Human 2008, at www.interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=28225. Rights Watch, 13 August 2008, available at http://hrw.org/ 22 Crisis Group telephone interview, UNHCR official, 16 english/docs/2008/08/13/georgi19607.htm. August 2008. 19 “Georgia/Russia: use of rocket systems can harm civilians”, 23 Before the security situation began to deteriorate several Human Rights Watch, 12 August 2008, available at http:// months ago, South Ossetia’s population was estimated as at hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/12/georgi19594.htm. most 60,000-70,000. Crisis Group interview, OSCE head of

117 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 4

In some areas, basic foodstuffs are becoming scarce, II. MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE AND and local governments are struggling to cope. Serious KEEPING PEACE domestic tensions may follow when the economic situation worsens, casualties are fully reported and the extent of the humanitarian disaster and displacement The ceasefire agreement signed on 15-16 August sinks in. Tbilisi’s schools and public buildings are 2008 is terse in the extreme: “(1) no resort to the use crammed with displaced. Prospects for return are un- of force; (2) cessation of military actions for good; (3) certain, even once the ceasefire firms. The Russian free access to humanitarian aid; (4) return of Georgian foreign ministry downplayed a statement by South military forces to their places of permanent deploy- Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity that ethnic Georgians ment; (5) return of Russian military forces to their from South Ossetia would not be allowed to return, pre-conflict positions; awaiting an international but nevertheless said the process was bound to be 24 mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will under- lengthy. While the right of return must be upheld, take additional security measures; and (6) opening of multi-ethnic cohabitation of South Ossetia and international discussion on the modalities of security Abkhazia will now be more difficult. and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.

There are widespread reports of war crimes and other A side-letter from President Sarkozy on 16 August atrocities against civilians by all sides, though most clarified that point 5 means that such “security meas- are as yet unverifiable or unsubstantiated. But the vio- ures” can be taken only in the area around South Os- lence and reports of alleged atrocities that circulate setia and only several kilometres beyond the among both Georgian and Ossetian communities have administrative border between South Ossetia and the brought to the surface deep ethnic hatreds and war rest of Georgia, such that no significant urban centre traumas from the conflicts in the 1990s. The media is included, including Gori; called for steps to guaran- has often spread unsubstantiated rumours of blood- tee the free circulation along all road and rail routes in curdling violence. Sophisticated hackers have infil- Georgia; stated that security measures are to be taken trated many official and media email sites. As de- in the form of patrols and only by Russian peacekeep- scribed below (Section VI), a credible and impartial ing forces at the level authorised by the existing ar- investigation and, where appropriate, prosecution of rangement, with other Russian forces withdrawing to perpetrators are essential for long-term, sustainable their pre-7 August positions; and concluded that all reconciliation. Confidence building will take years. these measures have a temporary character, awaiting Meanwhile, additional security guarantee mechanisms as quickly as possible the international mechanism, will be needed for both zones of conflict. For the the nature of which is already being discussed at the moment, however, the priority is securing the cease- OSCE, EU and UN in particular.25 fire, withdrawal of Russian troops, access to humani- tarian aid and return of the internally displaced Even with the side-letter, this is all about as vague as persons (IDPs) and refugees. it could be on specifics, including on the separation and withdrawal of forces and the monitoring of im- plementation, all loopholes which strengthen Russia’s position. Indeed, it is much vaguer than its Sochi and mission, Tbilisi, May 2007. See Crisis Group Report, Georgia’s Moscow predecessors from earlier fighting, which South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly, op. cit., p. 3. But regulated the Russian peacekeeping presence in the estimates vary widely. In 2007, the JPKF commander said breakaway territories. The agreement provides that there were up to 50,000 Ossetians and approximately 10,000 the Georgian military should withdraw to its usual Georgians; Tskhinvali authorities said there were up to bases, yet does not refer to the pre-7 August Georgian 82,000 Ossetians, many of whom move between Tskhinvali peacekeeping troops and whether they will be able to and Russia; and Dimitri Sanakoev, leader of the Tbilisi- return to South Ossetia. Point 5 potentially gives the supported alternative de facto South Ossetian authority, said Russian military authority to stay in Georgia proper there were 40,000 Ossetians and 35,000 Georgians. Ibid. The until an international verification mechanism has been territory resembled a checkerboard, with ethnic Georgian established, as well as to stay in South Ossetia in un- and Ossetian villages side by side. Georgian forces con- trolled roughly 30 per cent of the region, the Ossetians the determined numbers to implement tasks beyond their rest, though many areas are uninhabited high mountain original peacekeeping mandate. It also omits any ref- ranges. For further information on ethnic Georgian and Os- erence to the Abkhaz forces which have assumed con- setian populations and displacement before and after the 1990-1992 war, see Crisis Group Report, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 24 “Russia rules out immediate return of Georgian IDPs”, 25 The full text of the ceasefire agreement and side-letter in Civil Georgia, 18 August 2008. the French original are at Appendix B below.

118 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 5 trol of the Kodori Valley, the Russian presence in states should press the Russians at the highest levels Abkhazia and Russia’s naval blockade of Georgia’s to accept the common understanding of the ceasefire Black Sea coast. agreement and leave Georgia proper rapidly.

President Medvedev pledged on 16 August that Rus- To monitor the withdrawal until more permanent and sian forces would start withdrawing from Georgia weighty peacekeeping mechanisms can be agreed, proper on 18 August, but only token movement was impartial international observers should be deployed. visible at the time this report went to press on 22 Au- On 13 August the EU decided to strengthen the gust.26 Russia has also said that it will only fully pull OSCE’s capabilities for this purpose.31 On 19 August, back when the security situation is stabilised27 and is the OSCE Permanent Council agreed to send up to signaling that it wants to maintain its presence at least 100 personnel to Georgia to monitor compliance with in the “security zone” – a 14-km band of territory the ceasefire and withdrawal.32 Twenty monitors had divided evenly on both sides of the administrative arrived as of 21 August, and the remaining 80 should border of the former South Ossetian Autonomous be deployed within the next week. Asked about their Oblast.28 How it would do this – for example by con- official duties, the OSCE Chairman in Office, Finnish stant military manoeuvres throughout the areas or Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, noted: “We just with a permanent, forward “peacekeeping” presence – need to get them in right now; then we will worry at a is unclear.29 How or if it envisages this being moni- later stage what the mandate and scope will be”.33 tored is even more uncertain. Russia is insisting on very restricted deployment con- By calling its troops “peacekeepers”, Russia may be ditions reflecting the current reality on the ground and seeking a long-term presence in Georgia proper. This for monitoring to occur in territories immediately ad- would undermine Georgia’s statehood and should be jacent to South Ossetia.34 With this limited mandate, strongly rejected by Western states as guaranteed to the OSCE mission will find it difficult to monitor keep the dispute at boiling point, with negative rami- withdrawal, support return and facilitate the necessary fications for wider East-West relations.30 Western impartial aid assessment and documentation of al- leged human rights violations by Russians, Georgians, Abkhaz and North and South Ossetians. 26 “The pull-out of peacekeeping forces started today”, said Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the The Permanent Council decision should still be seen general staff of the Russian armed forces, during a daily as a step forward, and OSCE member states should briefing on Monday, 18 August. See “Troops show no signs now press for a bigger mission with a wider mandate. of leaving Gori despite Russian promises”, The Guardian, Russia had always rebuffed past attempts to 18 August 2008, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/ strengthen the OSCE monitors incrementally, particu- 2008/aug/18/georgia.russia3?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront. 27 larly to allow them to function outside the limited On 19 August the “Russian military have claimed Georgia was defying its commitments under the ceasefire accord and South Ossetia conflict zone at the strategic Roki tun- 35 was undertaking measures aimed at ‘restoring combat capa- nel. This time Russia acquiesced to provide some bilities’ of its armed forces….Preparations are underway for carrying out subversive actions against the Russian forces”. See reporting on a news conference of Colonel-General Ana- draw”. “West increases pressure on Russia over Georgia toly Nogovitsyn in Moscow, “Russia claims Georgia violates withdrawal”, The Telegraph, 18 August 2008. ceasefire accord”, Civil Georgia, 19 August 2008, at www. 31 See Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Rela- civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19204. tions Council (GAERC), 13 August 2008, available at 28 The security corridor, together with a zone of conflict, was www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData defined in Protocol 3 of the 1992 JCC agreement. The JCC /en/gena/102338.pdf. is a quadrilateral body with Georgian, Russian, North and 32 The mission to Georgia had some 200 staff but less than South Ossetian representatives, plus participation from the ten in South Ossetia. OSCE. For more, see Crisis Group Report, Georgia: Avoid- 33 “OSCE to send 100 monitors to Georgia”, Reuters, 19 Au- ing War in South Ossetia, op. cit. gust 2008. 29 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington DC, 34 Crisis Group telephone interview, OSCE staff, Vienna, 19 August 2008. August 2008. 30 German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 17 August 2008 35 The Roki tunnel is outside the zone of conflict where said, “I expect a very fast, very prompt withdrawal of OSCE has a mandate to monitor. On 29 July 2004, Georgian Russian troops out of Georgia”. On the same day President Foreign Minister Zurabishvili made a special presentation to Sarkozy warned Medvedev of “serious consequences” in the OSCE Permanent Council, calling for a greater monitor- Moscow’s relations with the EU if Russia did not comply ing presence, in particular at Roki. Russia termed the request with the ceasefire. If Russia did not “rapidly and totally” im- for more OSCE observers and their deployment on the bor- plement the deal, he said, he would call an extraordinary der with Russia at the tunnel “deliberately unrealistic”. At a meeting of the EU Council “to decide what consequences to meeting between de facto President Kokoity and Georgian

119 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 6 international legitimacy to the withdrawal process and organisation such as the EU or the OSCE to take up possibly assuage some EU member states. But the the task. The question of which organisation could best OSCE’s room for manoeuvre is likely to be limited. carry out the mission and in what precise format When its monitors sought to enter Gori over the should be based largely on a determination of which weekend of 16-17 August, Russian troops repeatedly could move fastest. But there are many more real denied them access. Russia also has significant over- world hurdles. Russian dominance on the ground sight of the OSCE mission’s reporting, which is gen- in the breakaway territories, militarily, politically erally treated as confidential, for member states only. and economically, is so great that there is limited Even a numerically increased OSCE monitoring mis- incentive for Moscow to accept any oversight of its sion, therefore, will not have the scope much less the activities. enforcement capabilities Georgia hopes for.36 If a peacekeeping mission is to be put in place, it will Russia will be even more averse to accepting a true need Russia’s full agreement. Moscow sees itself as international peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia advancing a number of important strategic interests in and Abkhazia, even one that accords it a significant its Georgia operations, including defending the rights role.37 Until recently and in addition to the OSCE of its citizens, resisting NATO expansion, reaffirming monitors in South Ossetia, the UN Mission in Georgia hegemon status around its sensitive borders and re- (UNOMIG) had 142 monitors for the some 2,000- claiming its place at the high table of great powers. strong Commonwealth of Independent States Peace- keeping Force (CIS PKF) in Abkhazia. In a best case Western states do have some disincentives they could scenario, Russia would pull back its troops com- bring into play if Russia is too uncooperative, such as pletely from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with the reconsideration of its participation in the G8 and likely exception of the peacekeepers it had there WTO, and even, perhaps, the future of the 2014 Win- before 7 August, and allow an international peace- ter Olympics that have been awarded to Sochi, just a keeping mechanism to ensure compliance with the handful of miles from the conflict zone in Abkhazia. ceasefire and replace the JPKF and CIS PKF. Russia believes it is holding all the cards, but it is jealous of its international standing, keen to be in- Any change of the Moscow and Sochi agreements, volved in international bodies – to sit at the top table, which regulate peacekeeping in Abkhazia and South as its officials often say. Warnings that it will be mar- Ossetia respectively, and deployment of a new peace- ginalised and the prospect that every international keeping mission would require a UN Security Council gathering it attends will feature denunciation of its resolution. Georgia formally quit the Moscow-led CIS conduct in Georgia could just possibly influence it to earlier this month, putting in question the presence of moderate its behaviour. It has to be persuaded that its any Russian peacekeepers under a CIS format in long-term interests for security and prosperity lie in Georgia. A UN Security Council resolution could being accepted as a partner for rather than an obstacle mandate a traditional UN mission or authorise another to, resolving regional and global issues.

Despite its actual position as a party to the conflict, Prime Minister Zhvania on 5 November 2004, the Georgian Russia will demand to be accorded a prominent role side proposed a plan consisting of: ceasefire implementation, in all aspects of the exercise; its troops would have to full demilitarisation and increasing monitoring of the Roki continue to wear peacekeeper helmets and be a tunnel. See Crisis Group Report, Avoiding War in South prominent part of the overall force, though every Ossetia, op. cit., pp. 19, 22. effort should be made to keep their numbers to what 36 “Saakashvili described the response by the U.S. and the they were before 7 August and to obtain a senior EU as ‘appeasement’ of Russia and said that the ceasefire third-country general as military commander. The ‘makes no sense’ without verification on the ground. Georgia’s Foreign Minister, Eka Tkeshelashvili, told reporters in Brus- Russian contingent in any such mission should be sels later that she was ‘disappointed’ by the EU’s reaction to completely integrated in the international command the crisis”. “Georgia emergency meeting highlights rifts structure. The peacekeeping mission commander within EU”, European Voice (online), 13 August 2008, at should have the explicit right to assign Russian www.europeanvoice.com/article/georgia-emergency-meeting- peacekeepers to such areas as the command sees fit. highlights-rifts-within-eu/62016.aspx. Russian components should not form a separate force 37 “There are no signs of the Russians letting in anyone else. I within the main force. Moscow would nonetheless don’t really see it happening – at the moment the Russians also have to be part of the political side of the mis- are firmly in control”, said Swedish Foreign Minister Carl sion, though the overall head of that side of the opera- Bildt on 13 August. “EU backs plan to monitor Georgia tion should be a senior third-country diplomat. truce”, Reuters, 13 August 2008, at www.reuters.com/ article/GCA-Georgia/idUSLC20155020080813?pageNumber =2&virtualBrandChannel=0.

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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR GEORGIA prosperous and democratising Georgia, where its people would have special status and privileges, in- stead of being swallowed up by a giant Russia in Since 8 August 2008 the conflict is no longer between which they likely would quickly lose their identity Georgia and the ethnic Ossetians or Abkhaz, but among more than 100 minority groups. Instead of clearly between Georgia and Russia. Since 2004 Sa- reaching out to fellow countrymen, Saakashvili and akashvili has sought to internationalise the two con- his team staged military parades and often used men- flicts and demonstrate that Russia cannot be a neutral acing rhetoric. Worse still, the president frequently peacekeeper or negotiator.38 He has now succeeded in went out of his way to irritate the Russians, and most both these objectives – but has badly miscalculated particularly Vladimir Putin, with bellicose talk that the consequences, overestimating the ability of Geor- turned the dispute with Moscow into one that was bit- gia’s army to establish new facts on the ground and ter and personal. the willingness of the U.S. and EU to confront Russia. With South Ossetia, the result was even more tragic. Reaction to the recent fighting has shown the paucity When Saakashvili came to power, twelve years had of EU and U.S. leverage over Russia, not least as a passed since the Ossetian-Georgian war. The incom- direct consequence of the deterioration of their rela- petent and corrupt Shevardnadze government had vir- tions with Moscow over NATO enlargement, Kosovo tually ignored the territory, but its indifference had the independence and missile defence. Georgia has re- advantage of causing Ossetians and Georgians to be- ceived substantial high-level attention since 8 August, gin to forget the past. Trade flourished between the 39 but the practical responses from the West have been ethnic groups. But the new Georgian government rhetorical and humanitarian. They demonstrate the put the cart before the horse, insisting on resolving limitations of Georgia’s internationalisation strategy thorny political status issues first, rather than building and of Western pledges to defend democracy, stability ties gradually and showing Ossetians life would be and security in the former Soviet Union. better in a relatively democratic Georgia than in an authoritarian Russia. Most damagingly, it provoked an As Crisis Group reporting has argued consistently, armed clash in 2004 that regained no territory and left Saakashvili, by focusing almost exclusively on Rus- twenty of its soldiers dead.40 The situation deterio- sia, lost opportunities to engage with the Abkhaz and rated badly from there. Especially since spring 2007, South Ossetians. Despite his pro-peace rhetoric, the Tbilisi’s assertive push to change the status quo, in president and hawks in his administration torpedoed the negotiations and on the ground, by supporting an real confidence building and often followed confron- alternative Ossetian administration further contributed tational policies towards the conflict regions. This to tensions. limited contacts for the Abkhaz and South Ossetians other than with Moscow and deepened their separa- tion from Tbilisi. The current Georgian government A. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY badly mishandled both situations since it came into office, forfeiting almost from the beginning the op- What started as a war over South Ossetia and portunity to persuade especially the Abkhaz that it Abkhazia, is fast becoming one over Georgia’s sover- was different from the hated predecessor regime of eignty. In the second week since fighting broke out, former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. and despite pledges to pull back, the Russian army – as this report went to press on 22 August – had barely With patience it might have been possible to show begun a meaningful withdrawal and is still deep in Abkhazia that it would be better served enjoying the Georgia. The immediate priority for the shaken highest possible autonomy within an increasingly Saakashvili administration has become to free Geor- gia proper from occupation. Russia seems tempted to retain control over at least two of the largest cities, 38 This has been the main aim of the Georgian administration Gori and Zugdidi, with 70,000 inhabitants each and since 2004. For more on this, see Crisis Group Europe Re- some 25km and 10km from the Ossetian and Abkhaz ports No193, Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, 5 o conflict zones respectively, as well as parts of the June 2008; N 189, Georgia: Sliding towards Authoritarian- main east-west highway and railway and Poti, a major ism?, 19 December 2007; Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly, op. cit.; and No179, Abkhazia: Ways Forward, 18 January 2007. The EU foreign ministers coun- cil (GAERC) on 13 August spoke for the first time in regard 39 In 2004 Georgia closed the Ergneti market, a move that to the South Ossetian or Abkhaz situation of an “open con- Crisis Group criticised heavily. See Crisis Group Report, flict that has broken out between Russia and Georgia”. See Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, op. cit., pp. i, 9-10. GAERC Conclusions, 13 August 2008, op. cit. 40 Ibid.

121 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 8 port and Georgia’s naval headquarters.41 President justifiable response to “ethnic cleansing and geno- Medvedev has not publicly retreated from his 19 cide” perpetrated by the Georgians.44 Asserting paral- August pledge to President Sarkozy that Russian lels to what NATO undertook with respect to Kosovo troops will leave by 22 August, with a limited number and Serbia in 1999, it has rejected accusations that its remaining in the “security zone” of 14km outside actions, regardless of possible initial justification, South Ossetia. were disproportionate.45 Senior officials have said – again in a mirror image to what Western states said An important part of the conflict’s background and about Kosovo in 1999 and subsequently – that with- wider relevance stems from Kosovo’s independence out “prejudging” the future status of South Ossetia declaration on 17 February 2008 and subsequent rec- and Abkhazia, “after what has happened on the night ognition by 45 states, developments substantially en- of 7-8 August, it is difficult to imagine South Ossetia gineered and defended by the U.S. and most EU and Abkhazia as part of Georgia in the future”.46 And member states. At the time of that independence, they have stressed the inevitability of a “future status then-President Putin warned: “The Kosovo precedent process” for the two entities,47 the underlying ration- is a terrifying precedent. It in essence is breaking ale for which – again identical to Kosovo – is that the open the entire system of international relations that populations have suffered too much to make a return has prevailed not just for decades but for centuries. to the status quo ante possible immediately, if at all.48 And it without a doubt will bring on itself an entire chain of unforeseen consequences”.42

Soon after, Russia strengthened its support of the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 44 withdrawing from the sanctions regime originally im- See below, Section IV.A, and multiple statements, includ- ing by Medvedev and Putin, available at www.kremlin.ru/ posed on Abkhazia by the CIS; establishing official eng/events/details/2008/08/08_205064.shtml. links to both entities; and deploying additional troops 45 At the UN Security Council, Russian Ambassador Vitaly 43 in Abkhazia. Significantly, it did not recognise either Churkin said that “when such an operation is conducted, entity as an independent state, as it had threatened to places are targeted not only within the immediate zone of do in the past, presumably because it would be reluc- conflict….If we look at Kosovo, nobody there limited them- tant to enshrine the right of a compact minority to selves by any definitions of what Kosovo was”, Security secession based on gross violations of human rights, Council debate, 10 August 2008, available at www.un.org/ Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2008.htm. a right that could potentially undermine Russia’s own 46 territorial integrity, in Chechnya, other parts of the Statement by Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Council of North Caucasus, Tatarstan and beyond. It is reason- the Federation, 11 August 2008, available at www.council. gov.ru/print/inf_ps/chronicle/2008/08/item7945.html. able to assume that had events not been brought to a 47 Medvedev, 12 August 2008 press conference with Presi- head by the Georgian attack on 7-8 August, the Kos- dent Sarkozy. See “Kremlin Press Statement following ovo example in itself would not have been enough to Negotiations with French President Nicolas Sarkozy”, 12 precipitate Russian military action in South Ossetia August 2008, available at www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/ and Abkhazia. 2008/08/12/2100_type82912type82914type82915_205208.s html. Lavrov said that not talking about future status in cur- Nevertheless, for both domestic and international au- rent situation “is simply impossible”. See “Transcript of diences, Moscow is now making direct parallels be- Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Minister of tween South Ossetia and Kosovo, between Georgia Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov”, and Serbia. It argues that its military actions were a 13 August 2008, available at www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/ e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/6b874c737d1abd87c 32574a6002a2abb?OpenDocument. 48 “What is sovereignty? It is the supremacy of central gov- 41 See deputy head of Russia’s General Staff, Anatoly Nogo- ernment. Does Russia recognise Georgia’s sovereignty? vitsyn, quoted in “Russian general says troops fortifying Without any doubt it does, just as it recognises the Georgian Georgia ‘buffer zone’”, Georgian Daily, 20 August 2008, at government’s independence from any other governments. http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&ta But this does not mean that a sovereign state has the right to sk=view&id=6281&Itemid=65. do whatever it pleases. Even sovereign states have to answer 42 Putin further warned that the decision would “come back for their actions. Regarding the issue of territorial integrity, to knock them on the head”. “Putin warns Kosovo will this is a separate concept. Sovereignty is based on the peo- ‘come back to knock’ the West, as NATO envoy lashes out”, ple’s will and on the constitution, but territorial integrity is Associated Press, in International Herald Tribune, 22 Feb- generally a reflection of the real state of affairs. On paper ruary 2008, available at www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/ everything can look fine but the reality is far more complex. 22/europe/EU-GEN-Russia-Kosovo.php. Territorial integrity is a very complicated issue that cannot 43 For more on this see Crisis Group Report, Georgia and be decided at demonstrations or even in parliament and at Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, op. cit., pp. 2-3. meetings of leaders. It is decided by people’s desire to live

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Most recently, President Medvedev argued that South and Abkhaz territory, and the ethnic Georgian popula- Ossetians and Abkhazians must decide whether they tion of both entities has been forcibly displaced from want to remain part of Georgia49 and said Russia all areas except the Gali district in Abkhazia. would be supportive: “This is something that must take place in strict accordance with international law, A new cycle of hate and vengeance divides Ossetians though over these last years international law has and Abkhaz from ethnic Georgians. Regardless of given us numerous very complicated cases of peoples whether or not there were mass atrocities in South exercising their right to self-determination and the Ossetia, the perception among Ossetians there is that emergence of new states on the map. Just look at the Georgia sought to destroy their nation when its troops example of Kosovo”.50 The logic is decidedly less marched in.54 Wounds, which did not fully heal in the than perfect, since Russia has loudly and consistently fifteen years of frozen conflict, have become much rejected the appropriateness of the Kosovo process. rawer. Any prospect of Georgia restoring its territorial But the point, stripped of the high-sounding refer- integrity militarily has been destroyed (somewhat ences to international law, appears to be that Moscow paradoxically easing Abkhaz and South Ossetian se- reserves the same right to rule on the claims made curity concerns about Tbilisi’s intentions).55 As part of against a small country by an even smaller people that the ceasefire agreement, Georgia has also promised to it believes the U.S., EU and NATO exercised with sign a non-resumption of hostilities agreement, which Kosovo. South Ossetians and Abkhaz had been demanding before the recent outbreak of fighting. Until recently, Russia insisted it supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, but this language is no longer to The immediate priorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia be heard. Prime Minister Putin was the first to state, are to reestablish security, distribute humanitarian and on 9 August, that “a fatal blow has been inflicted on rehabilitation assistance and ensure the rapid return of the territorial integrity of Georgia itself, and … its displaced persons. This is not the time for discussion own sovereignty”.51 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about status, which should be reserved for a broad in- similarly said on 14 August, “one can forget any talk ternational process with a new negotiating format and, about Georgia’s territorial integrity”.52 Meanwhile, inevitably, a long timeline. The de facto separation Georgia has lost control of almost all South Ossetian53 from Georgia of both entities, has, of course, become a stronger fact of life. International agreement to a formal change of status soon, however, would in ef- fect reward Russia for its disproportionate military in one country”. See “Kremlin Press Statement following measures in Georgia and could tempt it to use similar Negotiations”, op. cit. measures in other parts of the former Soviet Union 49 “Meeting with the President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity and President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh”, Krem- where there are dissatisfied ethnic minorities – espe- lin website, 14 August 2008, available at www.kremlin.ru/ cially ethnic Russians in the Baltic States, Ukraine eng/speeches/2008/08/14/1708_type82912type82914_20532 and even Central Asia. 1.shtml. During the meeting Medvedev said: “And finally, what I wanted to say, last but not least. You know about the sixth principle – I just mentioned this – the issue of status. I fighting by South Ossetian militia on 17 August, a day after would like you to know and to convey to the people of South the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Many of the residents Ossetia and Abkhazia that the position of the Russian Fed- have reportedly fled, however no looting or killings were re- eration will not change: we will support any decision taken ported. See “South Ossetian martial law creates a no man’s by the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in accordance land”, The New York Times, 20 August 2008; “Tanks and with the United Nations Charter, international conventions of Katyushas bristle round isolated Tbilisi”, The Guardian, 18 1966, and the Helsinki Act on security and cooperation in August 2008; and “Ossetian rebels seize areas previously Europe. And we will not only support these decisions but held by Georgia”, Dow Jones, 21 August 2008. will guarantee them in the Caucasus and in the world”. 54 “I would like to note that when you talk to Tskhinvali resi- 50 “Kremlin Press Statement following Negotiations”, op. cit. dents today they name the figure published by Russian mass 51 “Путин: Грузия нанесла смертельный удар своей тер- media. They speak about thousands of killed and wounded риториальной целостности” [“Putin: Georgia inflicted on people, they name the figures named by mass media, and itself a fatal blow”], Vesti.ru, 9 August 2008, at 8:17pm, they will always have it in their minds that they were at- available at www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=199795. tacked and that thousands were killed. And this knowledge 52 See “Russia: Forget Georgian territorial integrity”, Associ- will impede resolution of the conflict”, interview with Tat- ated Press, in International Herald Tribune, 14 August 2008, yana Lokshina, director of Human Rights Watch Moscow available at www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/08/14/news/Russia- office, in Caucasus Press, 14 August 2008. Georgia.php. 55 Crisis Group has previously reported about plans of ele- 53 Akhalgori, a predominantly Georgian populated town on the ments in the Georgian administration to take back at least east side of South Ossetia, which was under Georgian control part of Abkhazia belligerently. See Crisis Group Report, ever since the start of the conflict, was captured without Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

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Ideally all parties should agree to an international po- sian economic, infrastructure and political structures litical process which focuses on confidence building, and the lack of any genuine attributes of a state, South security, human rights protection and refugee return Ossetia is likely to strengthen its de facto integration and which only moves to talks on status – and these with Russia’s North Ossetia republic, with which it without deadlines – when significant practical progress enjoys close ethnic ties. has been made, and the situation is fully normalised. Postponing status determination would give Tbilisi Abkhazia is a different case and may have a real in- time to put forward a good-faith, internationally terest in participating fully in an international process backed effort to make a renegotiated unity attractive. that would not only assure its security but also bring in economic aid and investment, help strengthen its Russia’s acquiescence to the process is essential, but institutions and rebuild links to Georgia. It is strategi- extremely difficult to achieve. However, Moscow has cally, economically and politically much more impor- up to now not been in any hurry to countenance South tant than South Ossetia. Abkhazia has made real Ossetian or Abkhaz independence, and “independ- attempts to establish institutions, develop an economy ence” language has been rarely heard in Moscow based on tourism and such crops as hazelnut, citrus since 8 August. South Ossetia will always be a net and tea and can make claim to significant autonomy, drain on the Russian budget, while until the past few based on current capacities and economic potential.57 months the recognition of Abkhazia has seemed to be Between 40,000 and 60,000 ethnic Georgians dis- too controversial a step to take. Time may be running placed during the early 1990s fighting subsequently out for this approach, however. returned to the Gali district and have not been tar- geted in the recent violence. Russian President Medvedev has already assured the South Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders that he would If a deal for such an international process were struck, support whatever decision they would take about their Georgia would gain an opportunity, probably the only status, as long as it is consistent with international one that is feasible, to win back its lost territories by law. They have already called on Russia to recognise patient state and confidence building over a long time. their independence. The Russian parliament will meet To help it withstand the further immediate shocks, to discuss this on 25 August. If the Duma, which is and help it become attractive to South Ossetia and totally subservient to the will of Prime Minister Putin, Abkhazia, its Western friends should be prepared to for any reason temporizes, the international commu- give it major economic and financial assistance, and nity should move fast to persuade Moscow to accept to support substantial confidence-building efforts. new, open-ended international peacekeeping and status determination exercises. Moscow might accept this, provided it is fully involved in the exercises and B. NATO MEMBERSHIP implicitly recognised as first among international equals. It would be an opportunity to reassert regional The question of NATO’s expansion and character is and global political influence in the guise of peace- fundamental to understanding the fighting in Georgia. maker, after the Kosovo experience in which it felt Russia aims to punish one nation for its NATO ambi- that its national interests were blatantly disregarded tions; to warn others, especially Ukraine, not to go by the U.S. and EU. down the same route; and to humiliate NATO by showing it to be indecisive and ineffective. Georgia’s Once set in motion, such an enterprise would be far push into South Ossetia allowed Russia to demon- from guaranteed success. But it would have more po- strate to wavering NATO members Tbilisi’s reckless- tential ultimately both to maintain Georgia’s territorial ness; Russia’s own willingness to use overwhelming integrity and to help resolve the bilateral Tbilisi- force against any perceived threat to its fundamental Moscow problems honourably than verbal insistence interests; and the dangers of a membership route for on territorial integrity without a political strategy any former Soviet republic. for achieving it. An international process can only work, however, if the Abkhaz and South Ossetians also engage.56 Due to the entity’s integration into Rus- their positions strengthened militarily and politically, their motivation for negotiations is now even lower. The Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides have also, over the past years, lost 56 This is a significant part of the challenge. The current con- confidence in the motivations and impartiality of the EU and flict has further reinforced the conviction in Tskhinvali and U.S., whom they rightly view as unconditional supporters of Sukhumi that there is no shared future with Tbilisi. They had Georgia’s territorial integrity. not been hard-pressed to enter into negotiations even before 57 See Crisis Group Europe Report N°176, Abkhazia Today, this confrontation, but with Moscow’s further backing and 15 September 2006, pp. 15 and following.

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Russia has long been deeply opposed to NATO’s conjunction with the most recent presidential election eastward expansion, which it considers a flagrant in 2008, in which 77 per cent of the electorate voted breach of its view that President Bush senior pledged in favour of NATO membership. that NATO would not expand to take in former Soviet countries – a view that the U.S. claims stems from a The U.S. has been Georgia’s principal champion “misunderstanding” by Mikhail Gorbachev.58 Having within NATO. It applied heavy pressure to other been forced, through its weakness at the time, to member states at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 acquiesce in incorporation of the Baltic States and to approve MAP status for both Georgia and Ukraine. one-time Warsaw Pact allies in what it regarded as an Having failed to overcome reservations from France abrogation of that undertaking, an increasingly resur- and Germany in particular, it negotiated an outcome gent and assertive Russia wants to draw a line at document that promised “that these countries will be- Ukraine and Georgia. Its objections are hardened by come members of NATO” at some time in the future those countries’ strategic positions on its borders.59 and that their MAP status applications would be fur- ther considered in December 2008. As Crisis Group Georgia, by contrast, sees NATO membership as one outlined in its June 2008 report,62 Russia stepped up of the few ways to guarantee its security against its manipulation of the South Ossetia and Abkhaz con- assertive giant neighbour. NATO membership has flicts after Bucharest, bringing war with Georgia been a policy priority for Saakashvili since coming to closer. The NATO membership pledge, and the way it power, one to which he has devoted significant re- was made, was considered by then-President Putin as sources60 to upgrade Georgia’s military capabilities to a personal slap in the face. With hindsight, analysts ensure interoperability with alliance forces.61 He has now describe Russia’s detailed planning for its opera- championed Georgia’s credentials as a candidate at tion in Georgia as beginning after the NATO summit.63 every opportunity – even holding a referendum in All parties regard the events of early August as vali- dation of their Bucharest positions. Georgia claims 58 Michael R. Gordon, “The Anatomy of a Misunderstanding” that failure to offer it MAP status at Bucharest invited The New York Times, 25 May 1997, available at http:// Russian aggression. In an emotional press conference query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E3D8113BF with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Tbi- 936A15756C0A961958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2. lisi on 15 August, Saakashvili declared: 59 Putin’s objections to states on Russia’s periphery joining Western alliances is rooted firmly in Russian history and [W]hen in April in Bucharest Georgia was denied strategic thinking. Strategic thinkers at least as far back as the membership action plan by some members of the nineteenth century argued that the Russian Empire was NATO, I warned Western media that it was asking particularly vulnerable to attack because it lacked natural for trouble. Not only [did] they deny us [a] mem- geographical barriers. It needed, therefore, a cordon sanitaire bership action plan, but they specifically told the around its Russian heartland to provide greater protection. This was considered particularly true of its western border, world that they are denying Georgia … because of which is a reason why any threat to Ukraine raises special concern. Some observers argue that Putin, though deeply ir- ritated by Georgia, wishes to use the present conflict in part at least as an example and warning to Ukraine. 60 The 2007 military budget was almost $1 billion. After the 62 Crisis Group Report, Georgia and Russia: Clashing over November 2007 political protest demonstrations, it should Abkhazia, op. cit. have dropped in 2008, but on 24 June the government unex- 63 At the end of July 2008, 8,000 troops, plus aviation and pectedly proposed a $202 million increase. For more on the elements of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in Caucasus 2008 military budget, see Crisis Group Report, Georgia and Rus- exercises, partially in North Ossetia. Billed as a counter- sia: Clashing over Abkhazia, op. cit., p. 9. terror exercise, it involved 700 tanks. Military operations in- 61 In a 15 March 2008 speech at a military base in Gori, Sa- cluded a forced march to the Daryal Pass, the historic gates akashvili gave the following description of the armed forces: to the Caucasus. More practically, they involved operations 33,000 professional servicemen and 100,000 reservists; doz- in Roki district, the key transport route from South Ossetia to ens of NATO-standard state-of-the-art, self-propelled artil- Georgia proper. Source: “это наши горы” [“These are our lery guns; double the number of warplanes; three times the mountains”], Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 July 2008, available at number of helicopters; and a ten-fold increase in tanks. He www.redstar.ru/2008/07/30_07/1_06.html. Col. Gen. Serge did not specify the period of comparison, but he probably Makarov, commander of the North Caucasus Military Dis- was referring to what had been done in his presidency. trict, said that among other things the troops would practice See “Saakashvili Says ‘No’ to Treaty on Non-Use of assistance to Russian peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia Force”, Civil Georgia, 15 March 2008, available at www. and South Ossetia. The Georgians protested. “Georgia pro- civilgeorgia.ge/eng/article.php?id=17362. See also Crisis tests Russian military drills in North Caucasus”, RIA Group Report, Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, Novosti, 16 July 2008, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/ op. cit., p. 9. 20080716/114126411.htmlWorld.

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existing territorial conflicts in Georgia, basically ise Russia itself as a member. At the other extreme it inviting the trouble.64 could be transformed into an organisation with geo- graphically open-ended membership focused essen- Georgia and the U.S. are still arguing that NATO tially on working with the UN Security Council to membership is the only real protection against Rus- provide multilateral and cooperative security and sian aggression. Meanwhile, some Western states op- global military resources. Alternatively, an intermedi- posed to Georgian membership are breathing sighs of ate but still adventurous position, it could become a relief that by not giving MAP to Georgia in April, primarily region-focused inclusive security arrange- they were more plausibly able to stand back from a ment, but one willing as necessary to play a global conflict with Russia four months later. There is sig- role, with membership open to all those committed to nificant anger in many Western capitals over Saakash- its basic values, including potentially Russia itself vili’s recklessness in giving Russia the excuse it should it return to the path of democratic reform and sought to flex its muscles in the Caucasus and a de- responsible international behaviour.66 termination to ensure that they will not be held hos- tage in future to his intemperate actions. Paris, Berlin Significant delay in considering Georgian member- and like-minded capitals are confirmed in their views ship could be accompanied by some consideration by that Georgia cannot join NATO anytime in the fore- NATO of a limited security pledge to Georgia against seeable future.65 The jury is still out on Ukraine. aggression on Georgian territory outside the separatist regions. This could help ensure that the extended At an emergency meeting on 19 August, NATO for- delay in considering Georgia’s membership bid is eign ministers agreed to establish a new forum, the not viewed as appeasement or a reward for Russian NATO-Georgia Commission, to strengthen ties with aggression. Such an arrangement might become part Tbilisi, and send fifteen experts in civil emergency of the informal package suggested above to make planning to Georgia to help the authorities assess possible UN Security Council authorisation of an in- damage to the civil infrastructure. But there was no ternational peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia fundamental reassessment of the Bucharest conclusions. and Abkhazia. By definition such a pledge could not be as robust or binding as that contained in Article 5 Decisions on Georgian membership, or MAP status, of the NATO Treaty, as it would otherwise encounter should not be taken in the heat and anger of the cur- the same Russian objections. But it could ensure rent crisis. It will clearly be difficult to finally resolve enough ambiguity in Russia’s mind to raise decisively the membership issue, in relation to both Georgia and other potential members, without addressing the larger question of NATO’s future role as a security organisa- 66 tion, and on that there are likely to continue to be very More specifically, this third model might involve a struc- ture with three concentric circles: an inner ring, with transat- significant differences of view among NATO mem- lantic members wholly committed to existing standards of bers. There are at least three broad directions in which democracy, human rights, good governance and mutual de- such a rethink of NATO’s future could lead. NATO fence; a second circle of partners – including Russia – with could retreat into full Cold War mode and remain es- whom the inner ring could work on conflict and crisis pre- sentially a transatlantic regional defence alliance con- vention (and who could be admitted into the inner ring if cerned above all about threats from the east, willing to they satisfy the kinds of conditions being demanded of other embrace new members committed to democratic, former Soviet bloc countries); and an outer ring of more dis- market-oriented values but unable to even conceptual- tant partners and allies who share inner-circle values and goals – like Japan and Australia – with whom the inner circle could promote general stability and potential coalitions-of- the-willing and stabilisation operations. In a climate where 64 “Saakashvili lashes out at West’s ‘muted reaction’”, Civil punitive measures are essentially the only steps being put Georgia, 16 August 2008, available at www.civil.ge/eng/ forward to address Russian behaviour, a strategy that would article.php?id=19162. involve welcoming Russia into NATO architecture at some 65 On 17 August 2008 in Tbilisi, Chancellor Merkel stated, point in the future and holding out the possibility of entry “Every free, independent country can together with NATO into the “inner circle” if it satisfied important political and members discuss when it can join NATO. In December we military criteria could perhaps move the process ahead, but will have a first evaluation of the situation, and we are on a there are always those who will regard this kind of approach clear path in the direction of NATO membership”. Some as too accommodating. These approaches are discussed in analysts interpreted this as a shift in the German position on Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass NATO membership, but she did not in essence pledge any- Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institution thing new as confirmation of eventual NATO membership Press, 2008, forthcoming), pp. 192-193; the “concentric cir- and the first assessment of MAP prospects was already cles” model is a refinement of that proposed in Naumann promised in Bucharest. “Russia says it will start pulling and others, Toward a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain troops from Georgia”, Reuters, 17 August 2008. World (Noaber Foundation, 2007).

126 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 13 the risk to it of another military strike on the territory pipeline and railcars to Georgian ports.71 The Baku- of Georgia proper, while not giving Georgia enough Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline takes gas produced in Azer- confidence to pursue reckless or provocative actions.67 baijan to the Turkish city of Erzurum.72 Georgia also imports gas from Russia and transits Russian-sourced To make the bitter pill of delay somewhat more palat- gas to Armenia.73 It imports about 12 per cent of its able to Tbilisi, and regardless of whether NATO is electricity from Russia and Armenia, and much of its prepared to offer a pledge respecting the territory of electricity network is owned by Russian companies. Georgia proper as discussed above, Georgia might be given strengthened forms of cooperation with the EU, Initially the BTC pipeline was shut down because of such as the invitation to begin discussing a stabilisa- an unrelated blast on 5 August in Turkey’s Erzincan tion and association agreement. This would reverse province.74 BP, the operator of the Baku-Supsa and current EU policy and provide a softer and less Baku-Supsa pipelines, shut them down shortly after provocative potential security guarantee than NATO the conflict began as a “precautionary measure”. The membership but one with very tangible ancillary rail route seemed to function until 16 August, when a benefits. The EU and others, including the U.S., blast occurred on the key east-west railway line halt- should give it the increased economic and financial ing traffic.75 In addition, the Georgian port of Poti, aid it will in any event need to recover from the war just 15km north of Supsa and a terminus for some rail and that can be used to help it carry out the essential exports, was blockaded by Russian forces. On 14 Au- reforms to become a closer EU partner.68 gust BP renewed the flow of gas in the Baku-Supsa pipeline, though because of flow already in the pipe- line and sufficient pressure, deliveries at Erzurum had C. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL never been halted.76 IMPLICATIONS The war’s consequences will be most acutely felt by 1. Energy Georgia and Azerbaijan in the short run. Energy tran- sit is an important contributor to Georgia’s economy Georgia is an important transit country for oil and gas69 (fees, facilities, employment) and helps it obtain the and the only significant route for taking Caspian oil to oil and gas that it needs for its own consumption. For world markets that does not pass through Russia.70 Azerbaijan, the shutdown of its three main transit routes Oil produced in Azerbaijan is transported by the simultaneously has severe effects. Its other options – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the Baku-Supsa

71 The Baku-Supsa pipeline has a capacity of about 155,000 bbl/d. Rail transit is variable but recently has been taking as 67 One formulation is that used in the Security Treaty between much as 120,000 bbl/d of oil from Kazakhstan that was Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. (“the ANZUS treaty”), shipped to Azerbaijan and then taken by rail to the Georgian the key provisions of which provide: “Article III – The Par- port of Batumi. Some Azeri oil is also taken by rail to Kulevi ties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of (near Poti). The BTC pipeline is the most important oil pipe- them the territorial integrity, political independence or secu- line, with capacity of about 1 million bbl/d, and flows of rity of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific”. “Arti- about 850,000 bbl/d before the recent interruption. cle IV - Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the 72 The South Caucasus pipeline has a capacity of about 8.4 Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its billion cubic metres (Bcm) per year, with flows of only about own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet half that. the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 73 Armenia imports about 1.7 Bcm per year via Georgia, with processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as Georgia obtaining under 1 Bcm from Russia as a transit fee, a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security and Russia to provide additional gas to Georgia if Azeri- Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be ter- sourced gas is insufficient for all consumption. minated when the Security Council has taken the measures 74 The cause of the blast has been attributed to the Kurdish necessary to restore and maintain international peace and se- insurgent group PKK, which itself claimed responsibility, curity”. though the Turkish government denied that the blast was 68 For discussion of EU-Georgian relations, including the ab- caused by sabotage. sence of EU interest to date in serious consideration of pos- 75 Alex Lawler, “BP says Azeri oil exports by rail to Georgia sible Georgian membership, see Section V.A below. halted”, Reuters, 18 August 2008. Kazakh oil exports via rail 69 About 1.4 per cent of world oil production (1.2 million had already been halted by decision of the operator of the barrels per day (bbl/d)) flows through Georgia. Kazakh field using the route, but Azerbaijani exporters had 70 When the final stage of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline is been using the rail route to make up for lack of available complete in 2009, it will be possible to pump oil from the pipeline transit. Caspian to the Chinese border. Some oil from the Caspian 76 Daniel Fineren and Margarita Antidze, “BP resumes gas can also be shipped to the Iranian port of Neka. flows to Turkey, oil pipeline shut”, Reuters, 14 August 2008.

127 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 14 to use a pipeline through Russia to the Black Sea port Russian interests will benefit if Georgia can no longer of Novorossisk or to ship to the Iranian port of Neka – serve as a key energy transit route.80 Attacks and are politically and financially less palatable and can- blockades on Georgian oil ports far from the conflict not provide enough capacity to make up for what has in South Ossetia suggest that Moscow at least took been lost with BTC and the Georgian ports. As there advantage of the situation. Still, much of the antici- are tight limits on the storage capacity of its terminal, pated energy transport needs are likely to materialise the capacity of domestic refineries and the size of the only after a number years: for example, it is expected Novorossisk pipeline, Azerbaijan has had to substan- to be five years before the large production of tially reduce its oil production.77 This is enormously Kazakhstan’s super-giant Kashagan oil field in the costly for the government and oil producers there. Caspian comes online. This would provide ample time for a restoration of investor confidence if secu- If the ceasefire holds, the BTC pipeline could reopen rity in the region can be assured. and most of Azerbaijan’s production be restored be- fore the end of August, when repairs in the Turkish 2. Economy section are expected to be completed.78 Georgian Railways announced on 17 August that the damaged Assuming no further damage, direct harm to civilian tracks would be repaired within ten days, though it is infrastructure in Georgia (not including South Os- unclear whether exports would resume so quickly. setia) has been estimated at up to $400 million.81 Pre- Some gas transit to Armenia was reduced at one point conflict forecasts of economic growth between 7.5 but already appears to have returned to normal. It is and 9 per cent in 2008 have been sliced by 2.5 to 5 unclear whether electricity imports from Russia have percentage points.82 Georgia is particularly dependent been interrupted, but consumption has likely de- on foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance its large creased, since electricity infrastructure has been dam- current account deficit, and a decline in investor con- aged in places where fighting occurred, such as Gori. fidence is likely to have a sharp impact on the cur- rency (the lari), especially given the government’s The conflict may well have wider ramifications. limited foreign exchange reserves. If depreciation is Georgia is attractive as a transit country to reduce de- severe, it will cause real problems for those who have pendency on Russia for energy coming from Central borrowed in foreign currency-denominated loans, Asia. Russia has now shown that it can affect those including major banks, large businesses and the gov- transit routes, raising perceptions of political risk and ernment. An international aid package by the Interna- potentially chilling further energy investment in tional Monetary Fund (IMF) or foreign governments Georgia and the region. The EU, via the Nabucco pro- (such as a standby loan facility) may avert this. ject that it supports, has looked to Azerbaijan and Clearly, the quicker stability can be restored, and dis- Central Asia as new sources of gas to increase supply 79 placement reversed, the lesser the long-term impact and diversify sources. This gas, according to plans, will be. would transit Georgia, skirting the other options of Russia or Iran. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are expected to increase their oil production in the near future and will need increased transit capacity, which has been expected to be met in part by Georgia. 80 Russia certainly would prefer that energy transit from Cen- tral Asia and Azerbaijan not use the Caucasus as an alterna- tive for several reasons: 1) Russia loses potential transit fees if non-Russian routes are used; 2) the more energy transit Russia controls, the more leverage it has with the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan; 3) if Russia can restrict sup- 77 Precise production levels have not been made public, but ply growth coming from its neighbours, it can keep energy the mainstay of the BTC pipeline, the ACG fields, reportedly prices higher and make more money on its own exports; and reduced production from 850,000 bbl/d to 250,000 bbl/d. 4) Gazprom would like to be able to purchase gas at large 78 Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler stated on 18 August price differentials from European market prices, thus making 2008 that BTC would resume functioning within a few days, a larger profit and reducing its need to invest in Russia’s own though the BTC consortium pointed to 27 August as the stagnant gas output. If Central Asia were to export some of likely date. “Turk minister: no sabotage on BTC, flow due to this gas through non-Russian routes, however, this option resume”, Hurriyet English, 18 August 2008. BP has already could be lessened. decided to restart the South Caucasus pipeline, and BTC’s 81 A senior Georgian official’s preliminary estimate of the value path follows very close to that of the South Caucasus pipe- of civilian infrastructure damage was already $300 million line. BTC started working on a test mode on 20 August. on 12 August 2008. Crisis Group email communication, in- 79 The U.S. has highly favoured this as a way to reduce Rus- ternational organisation representative, August 2008. sian leverage in both Europe and Central Asia. 82 Ibid.

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This economic hit comes against the backdrop of unrest just described – in a strong domestic position, widespread poverty, high unemployment and the vir- benefiting from outrage over Moscow’s attacks and a tual absence of state-run social services. More than 40 rally-round-the-flag atmosphere. Even figures often per cent of Georgians lived on or below the poverty bitterly opposed to the president acknowledge this. line in 2007.83 While prices in Tbilisi have gone up “The society is fully united in repelling the Russian only slightly and all staples are still available,84 some aggression”, said Paata Zakareishvili, an analyst and villages, particularly in the west, are short of basic former opposition parliamentarian. “Campaigning commodities, including bread.85 As usual, the most against Saakashvili at this time would serve to further vulnerable populations will be hardest hit. shake up Georgian statehood”.90

Severe internal strife could develop. Economic con- But hawks inside the ruling elite who were more in- cerns were already high among the grievances that led clined to risk a military confrontation with Russia will to protests and political unrest in autumn 2007. While likely be pushed aside once the feeling of solidarity the Georgian nation is now strongly united against wanes. Though many of them expected Russia to in- Russia, many are asking bitter questions about the tervene, they did not expect the massive scale of its suitability of Saakashvili’s policies towards Moscow incursion. Relative moderates advocated a more care- and the conflict regions, especially as the human costs ful line and will likely benefit, but only if the gov- of the conflict are becoming known. Some say ernment survives, which is far from assured. Saakashvili’s policies were rash and irresponsible.86 Others blame him for triggering a spiral of violence But opposition groups also say that, ultimately, they fear could throw the country back into the pov- Saakashvili’s government will have to explain how it erty and chaos of the early 1990s, just when it was allowed itself to be lured into a direct confrontation starting to achieve stability and prosperity, and for with Russia.91 “I’m afraid it will not be very easy for miscalculating his international support and exagger- the government to answer all these tough questions”, ating the army’s preparedness to defend citizens.87 said the former parliament speaker, Nino Burjanadze. “It was impossible to imagine that Russian tanks Media and civil society should provide forums in would be 20-25 minutes drive from Tbilisi, that we which to debate what has happened and the country’s would have so many refugees and displaced persons future, but these channels have been weakened under and so many casualties among civilians”.92 Saakashvili.88 The authorities must allow the peaceful protests and redress of grievances. In the rebuilding Burjanadze, a former close ally of Saakashvili, quit stage, donors should redouble their support to civil her parliament speaker post in late 2007. Part of a pre- society, institution building, media freedom and the election campaign dispute, this was also seen as an rule of law 89 and their pressure on the government to effort to distance herself from the authorities as their abandon its increasingly authoritarian tenor. popularity was on the wane. She started her own political movement and is widely viewed as a viable replacement should Saakashvili lose power. On 18 3. Politics August, she gave notice of a possible political come- With thousands of Russian troops still occupying his back, stating “I am more than sure that right now I have 93 country, Saakashvili is for now – despite the signs of to play a very active political role in the country”. Saakashvili won re-election to a second five-year term in January 2008 with 53 per cent of the vote, 83 Crisis Group Report, Georgia: Sliding towards Authori- narrowly avoiding a second round. Opposition groups tarianism?, op. cit., p. 14. claimed fraud tainted the results. The International 84 Crisis Group observations, Tbilisi, August 2008. Election Observation Mission said that the election 85 Crisis Group telephone interview, Tbilisi resident hiding in West Georgian villages, August 2008. was largely consistent with democratic standards 86 Crisis Group telephone interview, Georgian civil society but that there were “significant challenges” with the representative, August 2008. 87 Crisis Group email exchange, former Georgian politician, August 2008. 88 See Crisis Group Report, Georgia: Sliding towards Au- 90 Crisis Group interview, Paata Zakareishvili, political ana- thoritarianism?, op. cit., pp. 24-25. lyst, Tbilisi, August 2008. 89 As Crisis Group recommended in Crisis Group Report, 91 Crisis Group interview, political analysts, Tbilisi, 20 August Georgia: Sliding towards Authoritarianism?, op. cit. See also 2008. William Horton Beebe-Center, “Limited leverage: Eurasia 92 “Saakashvili to face ‘tough questions’”, Civil Georgia, 18 and the West”, The International Herald Tribune, 17 August August 2008. 2008. 93 Ibid.

129 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 16 process that needed to be addressed urgently.94 IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA Saakashvili’s ruling National Movement easily won parliamentary polls in May, defeating a loose coali- tion of opposition groups by 59 per cent to 18 per The intervention in Georgia is a turning point for cent. Many opposition deputies refused to take up Russia’s relations with both its neighbours and the their seats in protest over what they said was more broader international community. It has been marked fraud. But the opposition remains highly fragmented. by self-confidence and aggressiveness, a willingness to push confrontation to the limit and disregard for The chances for an openly pro-Russian figure to emerge, international opinion. Buoyed by the rapid oil-driven should the government collapse, are remote. None growth in its national wealth,95 Russia believes that it have any appreciable public support beyond their own should exercise a decisive influence on global proc- clan-based networks. esses.96 For nearly two decades, the Kremlin ex- pressed interest in cooperation and integration with Western institutions largely on their terms, but it is now returning to the more characteristic great power behaviour of insisting on playing by special rules. There is a strong risk that it is prepared to accept a degree of international ostracism and confrontation if it deems these the costs necessary to achieve its goal of re-creating a security zone around its borders, in which its neighbours accept or are forced to accept limitations on their choice of relations with the EU and the U.S.

Officials conversant with the workings of the Russian government say Prime Minister Putin alone is taking “both tactical and strategic” decisions in the current campaign.97 Once Russian forces crossed into Georgia proper, one said, there was an element of “improvisa- tion”, but the destruction of Georgian military and militarily significant infrastructure was almost cer- tainly a “core element” of the whole operation.98 Given Putin’s central involvement, it is unlikely that there will be much flexibility on the question of en- gaging international peacekeepers. In Chechnya, where the Russian army crushed a would-be secessionist en- clave with a loss of life that far exceeded the Georgia campaign, Putin rejected any involvement of foreign peacekeepers, asserting that a state that agreed to in-

95 In 2007 the economy grew by 8.1 per cent, mainly due to high oil prices, and it is set to grow further. “The World Bank in Russia: Russia Economic Report, June 2008”, The World Bank, June 2008, available at http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/rer 16_Eng.pdf. 96 See for example First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov, “Where is Russia heading? New vision of pan-European security”, presentation at the Munich Conference on Security 94 “Statement of Preliminary Findings”, International Election Policy, 10 February 2008, available at www.security Observation Mission (IEOM), 5 January 2008. The IEOM conference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=217. comprised representatives from the OSCE, the Council of 97 Crisis Group telephone interview, 16 August 2008. Europe and the EU Parliament. 98 Crisis Group telephone interview, 16 August 2008.

130 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 17 ternationalise a conflict by accepting such assistance tics was made most evident when Deputy Com- was abdicating part of its own sovereignty.99 mander of the General Staff General Anatoliy Alek- seevich Nogovitsyn virtually contradicted Medvedev, Though he helped negotiate the details of the cease- stating that “Russian forces will continue their recon- fire agreement with French President Sarkozy, Presi- naissance activities following the ceasefire”,104 after dent Medvedev’s distinctly secondary power role has the president had declared the end of the Russian op- been confirmed. Putin took the lead in issuing the first eration on 12 August. strongly worded warning to Tbilisi on 8 August from Beijing,100 while Medvedev was “holding consulta- tions” in Moscow. Putin two days later flew to the North A. RUSSIAN MOTIVATIONS BEYOND Ossetian capital, Vladikavkaz, to express solidarity GEORGIA with the victims of the initial Georgian offensive and assess needs on the ground. His tone has been harsh, Russia’s actions in Georgia have been a warning to all for example accusing the U.S. in particular of a cyni- other former Soviet republics, amounting to pursuit of cal effort to “present the aggressor as the victim of an a doctrine of limited sovereignty with respect to coun- aggression and to place the responsibly for the effects tries it views, because of history and geography, as 101 on the victims”. within its natural sphere of influence. Ukraine, with its Western predilections and NATO ambitions, is po- The domination Putin is displaying over foreign and tentially vulnerable to this doctrine. Russia has con- security policy with respect to Georgia and its charac- siderable leverage, of which it has already made some teristics match the direction of domestic policy, nota- use: the Crimea was for a time Russian; the eastern bly the tough line he has taken against BP and the 102 part of the country has a large ethnic Russian popula- coal and steel giant Mechel. This demonstrates not tion and close cultural ties to Russia; the economy has only the prime minister’s power, but also the influence more than once been targeted by energy blackmail.105 of his close supporters within the security services Putin reportedly told President Bush at NATO’s Bu- (the siloviki), from whose ranks he rose. Senior mem- charest Summit in April 2008: “You understand, bers of the South Ossetia de facto government are 103 George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is also former Russian security officials. That security Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and elements continue to play a key role in Russian poli- another part, a significant one, was donated by us!”106

99 The deployment of peacemakers in Chechnya is “out of the question” (исключено), Putin noted in a book-length series 104 “Российские военные после прекращения огня про- of interviews in early 2000. It would only be possible if должат разведку на территории Грузии” [“Russian mili- Chechnya’s independence was recognised, and that was tary continue reconnaissance on Georgian territory after something he made clear would never happen. Source: ceasefire”], Interfax, 12 August 2008, available at www. www.kremlin.ru/articles/bookchapter9.shtml. interfax.ru/news.asp?id=26723. 100 Putin said on 8 August that Georgia’s “aggressive ac- 105 This does not excuse Ukraine’s provocative statements tions” in South Ossetia might trigger retaliatory measures. vis-à-vis Russia such as the 14 August statement by foreign “Putin Warns Georgia over S.Ossetia”, Civil Georgia, Tbi- ministry official, Victor Semenov, that deploying the Black lisi, 8 August 2008, available at www.civilgeorgia.ge/eng/ Sea Fleet against “third countries” could provoke terrorist article.php?id=18956. acts against Fleet installations and personnel on Ukrainian 101 “Vladmir Putin attacks the West’s ‘cynical support’ for territory. “Ukrainian MFA: participation of the Russian Black Georgia”, Times Online, 11 August 2008, available at www. Sea fleet in Georgian-Ossetian conflict may lead to unforeseen timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4507031.ece. terrorist acts in Crimea”, Echo Moskvy, 14 August 2008, 102 Mechel was accused of improper pricing practices and available at http://echo.msk.ru/news/533939-echo.phtml. forced to lower its prices. The BP-TNK affair pushed the 106 Quoted in the respected Russian paper Kommersant. The firm’s chairman, Robert Dudley, to essentially “flee” Russia, paper also noted that Putin “hinted transparently that if leading Western fund managers to conclude: “The last train Ukraine is accepted all the same into NATO, this state can carrying the optimists out of Russian equities has just left the simply cease to exist”. “Блок НАТО разошелся на блок- station”. “Russia reaches investors’ tipping point after BP пакеты” [“The NATO bloc broke up into blockpackets”], affair sours”, The Telegraph, 31 July 2008, available at Kommersant, 7 April 2008, available at www.kommersant. www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/ ru/doc-rss.aspx?DocsID=877224. There have been abundant 07/27/ccbp127.xml. and explicit Russian threats against Ukraine’s territorial in- 103 Some analysts argue that Russia’s support to South Ossetia tegrity in the past year. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a is part of a large money-laundering scheme benefiting the close Kremlin ally and senior member of the ruling United siloviki. Yulia Latynina, “South Ossetia Crisis Could Be Russia party, has been at the forefront of demands for Cri- Russia’s Chance To Defeat Siloviki”, RFE/RL, 8 August 2008, mea to be returned to Russia. See: “Мэр Москвы, лидер available at www.rferl.org/content/Article/1189525.html. московского списка кандидатов “Единой России” Юрий

131 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 18

The Baltic States have the protection of membership and revisionist policy in the East of Europe”.109 On 14 in the EU and NATO but also the vulnerability of August, Poland and the U.S. signed a deal on the es- large ethnic Russian populations. Moscow’s claim tablishment of an anti-missile base in Poland.110 The that the rights of those populations are abused has quick signature, after eighteen months of negotiations, taken on a more ominous tenor in the wake of its was defended by the Polish foreign minister as the re- post-7 August assertions with regard to its constitu- sult of “a new international situation”.111 Ukraine has tional obligations and interpretation of responsibility- said it is ready to make its missile early warning sys- to-protect (R2P) claims in the Georgia case.107 tems available to European nations following Russia’s conflict with Georgia. In Russian official circles, as well as some of the me- dia and the minds of many ordinary Russians, the But Russia appears willing to respond in kind. Colonel- conflict in Georgia is not so much between Russia General Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the Russian and Georgia as between Russia and the West.108 Simi- General Staff, declared that “by accepting the missile- lar expressions are plentiful in the Western media. It defence battery Poland is exposing itself to a strike…. is very much in the interests of all to contest a slide Such targets are destroyed as a first priority”.112 De- into a new Cold War mentality. If that is to be ployment to South Ossetia in recent days of short- avoided, the first responsibility lies with the Kremlin, range ballistic missiles (SS-21) may be in part a fur- which, now that it has administered a bloody nose to ther symbolic response to the darkening climate.113 its bête noir, Saakashvili, and shown off its new asser- tiveness, must decide between cooperation or further Other former Soviet republics watching the past confrontation over Georgia. week’s developments are unimpressed by the U.S. and EU inability to back up their political support, Within the former Soviet bloc, the Russian-Georgian and rhetoric about peace and democracy values, with conflict is clearly strengthening dividing lines between military actions or tangible sanctions. “Russia is now those countries that want close ties to the U.S. and showing its real face….We will only become really EU, and those that remain within Russia’s sphere of independent when their economy weakens”, a CIS of- influence. In a 9 August joint statement the presidents ficial said days after Russia entered Georgia.114 The of the three Baltic States and Poland called upon the lesson learned is the need to maintain a balanced for- EU and NATO to stand against Russia’s “imperialist

109 “Joint Declaration of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the situation in Georgia”, 9 August 2008, at www.president.ee/en/duties/press_releases.php?gid= Лужков считает необоснованным передачу Крыма 116987. Украине” [“The mayor of Moscow and leader of the Mos- 110 Gabriela Baczynska, “U.S and Poland sign missile shield cow list of United Russia Yuri Luzhkov considers the trans- deal”, Reuters, 14 August 2008, available at http://africa. fer of Crimea to Ukraine to be unfounded”], Censor. reuters.com/world/news/usnWAR007218.html. net.ua, 21 November 2007, available at http://censor.net.ua/ 111 Ten sites are to be opened by 2012, with the aim to inter- go/offer/ResourceID/68553.html; and “Потомки не простят cept long-range missiles. “Poland, U.S. close in on Missile Если Севастополь и Крым не вернутся России, убежден Deal”, Agence France-Presse, 15 August 2008. “Initialing of Юрий Лужов” [“Our descendants will not forgive us if Se- an agreement between the government of the Republic of bastopol and Crimea do not return to Russia, Yuri Luzhkov is Poland and the government of the United States of America convinced”], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 25 July 2008, available at regarding the placement in Poland of anti-ballistic defensive www.rg.ru/2008/07/25/luzhkov.html. interceptor missiles”, Polish foreign ministry, 15 August 107 Referring to Baltic states celebrating the beginning of 2008, available at www.mfa.gov.pl. Following the deal, a World War II, Medvedev said, “and those same states are the Russian official stated: “Seeing the speedy decision, and the ones who have become ultra-nationalist in their policies, conditions in which this deal was signed, it is once again ob- harassing national minorities and denying rights to the so- vious that this project has nothing to do with the Iranian called ‘stateless’ citizens in their countries….in many cases threat but is directed against Russia”. “U.S./Poland missile we are talking about abuses against Russians and Russian- deal seen aimed at Russia”, Reuters, 15 August 2008. speaking populations. And protection and defending those 112 Quoted in Edward Luttwak, “Georgia conflict: Russia has rights is obviously one of our responsibilities”. Medvedev, blown away soft power”, The Telegraph, 16 August 2008, “Speech at the meeting with Russian Ambassadors and available at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ Permanent Representatives to International Organizations”, georgia/2571274/Georgia-conflict-Moscow-has-blown-away- 15 July 2008, available at www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/ soft-power.html. 07/15/1121_type82912type84779_204155.shtml. 113 Michael R. Gordon, “Pledging to leave Georgia, Russia 108 See for example the impressions of the Russian Army and tights its grip”, The New York Times, 17 August 2008. irregulars in South Ossetia. “Georgia: Russian military entrench 114 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, CIS country, Brussels, themselves deeper”, The Telegraph, 17 August 2008. August 2008.

132 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 19 eign policy approach vis-à-vis Russia and the U.S.- Group among the EU and its member states and the EU. Though Azerbaijan is a close Georgian ally and U.S. and other NATO member states, to analyse and has been losing significant energy revenue since 8 develop policies. Again, whether the dominant theme August, its president has failed to make any statement of those deliberations is crisis management or new, about the Georgian-Russian conflict. In Central Asia cooperative impulses, will depend primarily on there is very likely to be a new amenability on the choices in the Kremlin about how Russia should part of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to doing deals views its true interests. For the West, however, the with Gazprom, possibly even a willingness by preference for engagement with Russia rather than at- Kyrgyzstan to close the U.S. airbase in Manas and by tempts at its isolation should be clear. Uzbekistan to end the American use of the Termez base, as well a general strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in which Russia has B. POINTS OF LEVERAGE WITH RUSSIA a major role. The EU and the U.S. are now openly criticising Russia But Russia is also interested in revising the wider for disproportionate response. “We will have to de- framework of European security.115 President Medve- termine if the Russian intervention against its Geor- dev called in two major speeches in July 2008 for ne- gian neighbour was a brutal and excessive response”, gotiation of a new Treaty on European Security to President Sarkozy wrote in Le Figaro. “In which case, create a “truly open and collective security system”.116 if this demonstrates Moscow’s new hard-line against This was needed, he said, because “Atlanticism as a its neighbours and the entire international community, single basis for security has exhausted itself. We must there will be inevitable consequences for its relations at the present time discuss [the concept of] a single with the European Union”.120 Members of the Bush Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivo- administration have gone much further in urging stok”.117 The Russian ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Russia to withdraw and stating: “Russia’s international Rogozin, has said that Russia would like to convene reputation and what role Russia can play in the inter- an international forum including the OSCE, NATO, national community is very much at stake here”.121 the EU, the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty President Bush claimed its actions “substantially Organization118 to discuss the proposal.119 It is a damaged Russia’s standing in the world” and vague concept and one that should be approached “jeopardised its relations” with the United States with corresponding caution, but if Moscow moves and Europe.122 away from confrontation, there is no reason why this and other broad security themes and issues cannot be The EU and U.S. have few levers with which to com- discussed and if necessary reworked to the general pel the Kremlin to change course on Georgia against good, just as the old Soviet idea of a European Secu- its will, but there remains hope that Russia still wants rity Conference was transformed into the Helsinki to be seen as a mature, constructive contributor to the process. resolution of global challenges and to work, albeit more on its terms than in recent years, with key West- All these matters – from response to the Georgia case ern institutions. If Russia fails to implement the and possible threats to other former Soviet republics ceasefire, accept international monitoring or other- through dialogue on wider aspects of security – need wise not assist in resolving the current crisis, some of extensive preparatory discussion among the like- its current forms of association with the EU, NATO minded before they can be taken up with Moscow. A and their member states might be suspended – al- good way to start would be to convene a Contact though it would be a mistake to close channels of communication, as opposed to specific areas of coop-

115 See, for example, First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov, “Where is Russia Heading?”, op. cit. 120 President Sarkozy, “La Russie doit se retirer sans délai 116 Medvedev’s speech, meeting with Russian ambassadors, de Géorgie”, Le Figaro, 18 August 2008, available at op. cit. www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2008/08/17/01002- 117 Medvedev, “Speech at meeting with German political, 20080817ARTFIG00202-la-russie-doit-se-retirer-sans-delai- parliamentary and civic leaders”, 5 June 2008, available at de-georgie-.php. www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912t 121 Condoleezza Rice, quoted in “US cancels joint military ype82914type84779_202153.shtml. exercise with Russia”, The Financial Times, 13 August 118 The Collective Security Treaty Organization consists of 2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft? Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and news_id=fto081320080434125318. Tajikistan. 122 ”U.S. may seek to punish Russia for Georgia conflict”, 119 Judy Dempsey, “Russian proposal calls for broader secu- CNN News, 12 August 2008, available at http://edition. rity pact,” The New York Times, 28 July 2008. cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/12/georgia.us/.

133 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 20 eration. Russia’s candidacy to become a member of The 2014 Winter Olympic Games might also be util- the World Trade Organization (WTO) is already ised as leverage to encourage Russia to accept inter- blocked, because Georgia suspended bilateral talks national cooperation to resolve the Georgia crisis. that are an essential part of that process.123 In the cur- Those Games are a major source of pride and prestige rent situation it is inconceivable that Georgia will re- for the Kremlin. Putin worked hard and personally to verse that step, or that the U.S. Congress will waive win them for Sochi. That city, however, is only some application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.124 40km from the Georgian border.130 Access, including access over the intervening years to do the extensive Some pressure to mute Putin’s assertive policies may preparatory work necessary to bring the site up to eventually emerge from within. However much the Olympic standards, is dependent on stability in Abkhazia. Russian prime minister may argue that his nation is forging its own identity and following its own logic, it A threat to the success of those Games would be taken is intimately linked with the outside world in terms of seriously by the Russians, but Olympic boycotts have trade and economic relations. The Russian business a mixed and mostly unhappy history. The Interna- sector does not share the siloviki enthusiasm for for- tional Olympic Committee can be faulted for award- eign muscle-flexing. The Russian market and the ing the games to a site so vulnerable to an unsettled economy in general reacted with considerable anxiety conflict, but its record indicates it would not be will- to the war with Georgia. ing to reverse that decision on the basis of what has happened to date in Georgia. On the other hand, hav- The stock market fell abruptly at the start of the inter- ing witnessed the return to hot war in the region, vention, only partly recovered the following week, its members may now be more sympathetic to the ar- and then plummeted again after the NATO emergency gument that Russia needs to do more and do it meeting on 19 August, and as of 21 August had fallen quickly to assure it that the Games will not fall victim 6.5 per cent since 7 August.125 Finance Minister Alek- to the conflict. sei Kudrin noted that on 8 August, $6 billion left the country; another $1 billion left within the next A cautionary shot across the bow would be for con- week.126 Overall, foreign investors have withdrawn cerned governments to urge their national committees their money from Russia at the fastest rate since the to press the IOC to express unease to the Russian 1998 ruble crisis.127 Foreign currency reserves fell by Olympic Committee at the present instability and its over $16.4 billion for the week starting 8 August.128 potential implications for preparation of the Sochi Domestic ruble bond yields have increased by up to Games. The message conveyed should be that the 150 basis points in August.129 IOC will require a status report by a certain date, say 1 January 2009, and that if it then finds cause for con- cern regarding preparations, including concern that there remains a serious conflict risk in the neighbour- hood – failure of the Security Council to agree on in- 123 Russia has finalised bilateral agreements with the U.S. ternational cooperation to cope with the present crisis, and EU. The EU, as its biggest trade partner, has an interest for example – it may need to reconsider its decision to in Russian membership. Other than the Georgia agreement, award the Games to Sochi. Russia needs only a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia to enter the multilateral negotiations which can finalise its Russia also needs to be conscious of the potential membership. economic fallout from its actions – both in terms of 124 Part of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act, the Jackson-Vanik amend- making it a less attractive investment destination due ment denies most favoured nation (MFN) status to certain countries that have non-market economies and restrict emigration. Until it is waived or deemed inapplicable to the Russian case by the U.S., it stands in the way of Moscow’s 130 An agreement was signed in May 2008 by de facto Presi- acceptance into the WTO. dent Bagapsh and the governor of Krasnodar region, 125 The Russian RTS stock market index is now down about Tkachov, on the use of Abkhaz construction materials for 25 per cent for the year. Sochi development. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov said in 126 “Отток капитала из России из-за войны в Южной 2007 that it was difficult to imagine holding the Olympics in Осетии составил 7 млрд долларов” [“The outflow of capi- Sochi without the participation of “such a kind neighbour as tal from Russia because of the South Ossetia war amounted Abkhazia”. “Georgia: Sochi Winter Olympics Could Impact to $7 billion”], News.Ru.Com, 17 August 2008, available at Frozen Conflicts”, Eurasia Insight, 7 November 2007, avail- www.newsru.com/finance/17aug2008/war_price.html. able at www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav 127 Charles Clover, “Investors quit Russia after Georgia war”, 071107.shtml. An international organisation operating in Financial Times, 21 August 2008. Abkhazia is, according to its head, starting to lose human 128 Ibid. resources to the Olympic preparations. Crisis Group inter- 129 Ibid. view, Tbilisi, May 2008.

134 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 21 to its increasingly tense relationships with the West, V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE and as a result of any measures the West may take to EU AND U.S. slow or reverse its integration into the world econ- omy. A. THE EU APPROACH Despite real GDP growth that has averaged 7 per cent in the years 2000-2007, Russia’s is still a small econ- The European Union, and most particularly its Presi- omy compared to those of the U.S., EU, Japan or dency, acted quickly and decisively to broker the China, and dependent on those much larger ones to 131 ceasefire. While there is ample scope for questioning buy its primary export products, oil and natural gas. the vague and loose language in the ceasefire, the It is overly dependent on oil and gas production, shuttle diplomacy of French President Sarkozy and which in 2007 made up two thirds of export revenues Foreign Minister Kouchner showed that when it has and over 15 per cent of GDP. Oil alone provided 132 dynamic leadership, it can play an important interna- about 29 per cent of government revenue. tional political role. Chancellor Merkel’s follow-up

visits to Russia and Georgia on 15-17 August demon- The drop in the stock market, foreign currency re- strated close Franco-German cooperation on the issue. serves, foreign investment, and the increase in the Cooperation between the EU Presidency and the domestic bond yield all show that Russia’s economy OSCE Chairman in Office, Finnish Foreign Minister is vulnerable to global market sentiment in reaction to Stubb, has also been tight.135 Moscow’s decisions. In particular, the reduction in investor confidence makes it more difficult for Rus- Member states are thoroughly behind the six-point sian companies to raise debt and equity finance, as ceasefire, which they approved in an emergency Russian companies are dependent on foreign sources 133 council session of foreign ministers (GAERC) on 13 of long-term capital. August. They affirmed that any peaceful and lasting solution to the Georgian conflict should respect the In the medium term, if physical volumes of energy principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial production and exports stagnate as expected and oil integrity (implicitly of Georgia) and obtain UN Secu- prices stabilise, energy exports will not be able to sus- rity Council backing.136 They agreed to rapidly rein- tain high levels of economic growth. Other sectors force the OSCE’s capabilities to monitor the ceasefire must improve their competitiveness, which will re- 134 and pledged political support to move the process quire substantial foreign investment. Prerequisites forward within that organisation. While not indicating for that investment include not only a more secure whether they would deploy a new European Security environment for foreign investors from predatory and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, they also agreed actions of the Russian government, but also from the to “commit … including on the ground, to support political risk associated with conflict with its neigh- every effort, including those of the UN and OSCE”. bours and subsequent political and economic isolation. But despite this rapid reaction, subsequent develop- ments have shown the limitations of EU “soft power”, especially in the context of the lack of a clear, unified policy on relations with eastern neighbours – Russia and Georgia alike.

To avoid divisions and retain a focus on the ceasefire, the French Presidency postponed discussion on the 131 Russia’s 2007 nominal GDP in billions of purchasing power effect of recent developments on EU-Russia relations parity U.S. dollars was 2,096, compared with 13,807.6 for to an informal meeting of foreign ministers, 5-6 Sep- the U.S., 7,181.2 for China, 14,827.2 for the EU, and 4,289.2 tember.137 In the middle of summer holidays, EU for Japan. Source: Global Insight. 132 International Monetary Fund, 2007 Article IV Consulta- tion, 23 October 2007. If mining is added to export revenues, and gas and mining to government revenue, the economy’s 135 Finland, partly due to historical and geographic experience, and government’s dependence on the commodities sector is has many excellent specialists on Russia and other parts of yet more apparent. the former Soviet Union. 133 Charles Clover, “Investors quit Russia after Georgia war”, 136 “Council Conclusions on the situation in Georgia”, 13 Financial Times, 21 August 2008. August 2008, Brussels, op. cit. 134 In 2007, about 50 per cent of foreign investment went to 137 As suggested by UK Foreign Secretary Miliband. See “EU the energy sector, reflecting the need for high returns to backs plan to monitor Georgia truce”, Reuters, 13 August match the high risk of the Russian business environment. 2008. The informal meeting (“Gymnich” in EU parlance),

135 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 22 leaders were not prepared to address the difficult is- Tbilisi is interested in EU membership, but Brussels sues which they had been skirting for some time: has hitherto stated that it has no membership perspec- enlargement to new parts of the former Soviet Union, tive in the near term. Georgia is implementing a relations with Georgia (and by extension Ukraine), European Neighbourhood Action Plan (ENAP) under ties with Russia, and how to increase influence and Brussels’ European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). leverage in their own backyard. Whether it will eventually be offered the chance to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement Beyond the immediate crisis, EU member states are (SAA) like its Balkans neighbours is far from cer- divided over how to respond to Georgia and interact tain.142 In the meantime, Georgia has done its best to with Russia. While some policymakers may have tailor the ENAP to meet its conflict resolution goals in expected a Georgian incursion into South Ossetia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The ENP has supported few would have predicted the extent of the Russian confidence building in the two conflict zones but backlash. The EU is ever more split138 between sharp never had the political dimension Georgia has sought.143 critics of Russia – the Baltic States, Poland and Swe- den – and those advocating a “middle of the road ap- In the post-Cold War period, membership and the proach” – France, Germany, but also Greece and other prospect of membership have repeatedly proved to be southern countries.139 A day after the visit of five the EU’s most effective foreign policy tools for ad- presidents and prime ministers from member states vancing toward what was often called the goal of a that formerly were Soviet republics or allies to Tbilisi Europe whole and free. The prospect of membership, on 11 August to express solidarity with Georgia,140 the large-scale EU financial and political engagement, EU foreign ministers’ conclusions criticised neither and robust ESDP missions, has helped bring peace Georgia nor Russia.141 and stability over the past decade to the Western Bal- kans.144 For an EU sceptical of further expansion,145 The EU lacks a clear policy on Georgia. Over the past new thinking among member states is required to pre- several months, it made stronger and more frequent common statements in support of Georgia and critical of Russia, and Javier Solana, its High Representative 142 A new comprehensive agreement with Georgia might in- for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, demon- stead be an “Association” agreement, as with Israel or Egypt, strated interest in supporting conflict resolution in also ENP countries. EU foreign ministers agreed on 22 July Abkhazia and South Ossetia by making his first trip to that Ukraine will get an “Association” agreement, the details Tbilisi and Sukhumi in June 2008. of which are set to be discussed at the 9 September EU- Ukraine Summit in Evian. See “EU to offer Ukraine ‘asso- ciation’ agreement”, European Voice, 23 July 2008, avail- able at www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/07/2127/eu- to-offer-ukraine-”association”-agreement/61811.aspx. 143 For more on Georgia and the ENP see Crisis Group held twice a year – once in each presidency – will also dis- Europe Report N°173, Conflict Resolution in the South Cau- cuss proposals of the EU High Representative Solana for fur- casus: The EU’s Role, 20 March 2006. ther EU engagement on the ground to support the 144 Balkans integration began in 1997 with the definition of a international conflict settlement. See “Council Conclusions EU Regional Approach for the Western Balkans, in which on the situation in Georgia”, 13 August 2008, Brussels, op. cit. the EU set out to help with the implementation of the Dayton 138 See Crisis Group Report, Georgia and Russia: Clashing Peace Accords and Erdut agreements and bring basic stabil- over Abkhazia, op. cit., pp. 16-17. ity and prosperity to the region. Today, all the countries of 139 Crisis Group interview, EU ambassador, Brussels, 13 Au- the Western Balkans have the prospect of future EU mem- gust 2008. bership as explicitly endorsed by the European Council in 140 From Poland, the three Baltic republics. See also “Statement Feira in June 2000 and confirmed by the European Council by the Presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and the in Thessaloniki in June 2003. Prime Minister of Latvia on the further conflict resolution in 145 After the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish elec- Georgia”, 13 August 2008, available at www.president.lt/ torate on 9 June, President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel en/news.full/9500. President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko said that there will be no further enlargement without new travelled to Tbilisi on 12 August to show his support for institutional basis. “Merkel Remains Confident EU Will Georgia. See “President of Ukraine urgently leaves for Tbi- Implement Lisbon Treaty”, Deutsche Welle (online), 24 July lisi”, Ukrainian News Agency, 12 August 2008, available at 2008 at www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3508701,00. www.unian.net/eng/news/news-266659.html. html. The enlargement report adopted by a large majority in 141 Statements of the foreign ministers arriving at the GAERC the European Parliament on 10 July states that for future meeting indicated strong diverging opinions. See “EU backs enlargements “the EU must make efforts to strengthen its plan to monitor Georgia truce”, Reuters, 13 August 2008; integration capacity and that this capacity should be fully and “EU wants peacekeepers ‘on the ground’ in Georgia”, taken into account”. “MEPs move to make EU enlargement EUobserver, 14 August 2008, available at http://euobserver. harder”, EUobserver, 25 June 2008, available at http:// com/9/26606. euobserver.com/15/26387/

136 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 23 vent and resolve conflict in the South Caucasus where Representative (EUSR) presence in Georgia,150 with instability can have a direct effect on EU states’ inter- up to ten new political, military, refugee and police ests. Responding to Georgia’s expressed interest in specialists. eventual membership with economic and financial assistance and political encouragement can only be They should go a step further and modify the mandate a start. The EU, like NATO, needs to rethink its of the Border Support Team (BST), which has been enlargement process and the union’s future role in its monitoring the Georgian-Russian border (except in immediate neighbourhood. Abkhazia and South Ossetia) since 2005, to allow it to work more comprehensively with Georgian au- A common policy towards Russia is difficult to estab- thorities on monitoring, provision of humanitarian lish because member states have clearly divergent in- assistance and IDP return.151 A new ESDP monitoring terests. Big countries like France and Germany have or humanitarian mission, based on a Georgian invita- tended to prioritise their bilateral relations with Mos- tion and Brussels joint action decision, could be cow, rather then subordinate them to a comprehensive another step forward, but there is reluctance to do this EU approach. Russia, they suggest, is just too impor- until military withdrawal is complete. tant to hand over the policy lead to the Council Secre- tariat or the European Commission. Moscow plays If member states eventually agree on an ESDP mis- member states off against each other, applying what sion, it is extremely doubtful that it would be given an two analysts of the European Council on Foreign Re- enforcement mandate, and they would almost cer- lations (ECFR) call an “asymmetric interdependence” tainly insist that deployment be made dependent on an strategy.146 Several EU states are highly dependent on appropriate Security Council resolution. Experience Russia for their energy supplies, to the point where with its rule-of-law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) also they may be susceptible to Moscow’s political influ- demonstrates that unless the EU obtains full Russian ence.147 Greece, for example, receives 75 per cent of backing, mission deployment is likely to be time con- its gas needs from Russia, is an active member of the suming. Again as in Kosovo, EU member states South Stream gas pipeline project, and prior to the re- would probably not be willing to deploy a large ESDP cent fighting blocked the appointment of EU border mission in Georgia without having access to South liaison officers to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.148 Ossetia and Abkhazia, because this would increase the perception of Georgia’s partition and reduce the If member states could agree on common policies, mission’s effectiveness. Another problem is that the they could more rapidly strengthen instruments they capacity of member states to find the several thousand already have in Georgia and devise new ones. Discus- monitors a robust ESDP mission would need is sions regarding deployment of a new ESDP mission severely limited by existing commitments in Kosovo, or use of the new incident assessment mechanism Chad, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. (IAM) in Georgia have been ongoing for several months.149 But at the 13 August emergency council, Unable to define its political role and to put boots ministers were able only to request Solana to prepare quickly on the ground, the EU has focused on provid- proposals for their informal (Gymnich) meeting on 5- ing humanitarian assistance, though the European 6 September. Member states subsequently agreed on Commission’s pledge of a maximum of €11 million in 19 August to reinforce the European: Union Special such aid for Georgia’s post-war rehabilitation152 is

150 “Council Joint Action for amending and extending the 146 See Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, “A Power Audit of mandate of the European Union Special Representative for EU-Russia Relations”, European Council on Foreign Rela- the South Caucuses” 2008/132/CSFP, 18 February 2008, tions, 2008, p. 23. available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 147 Germany is Russia’s leading trading partner; Italy is its do?uri=OJ:L:2008:043:0030:0033:EN:PDF. third. “Russia”, Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2008. 151 See Crisis Group Report, Conflict Resolution in the South 148 Leonard and Popescu, op. cit., pp. 28-29. Caucasus, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 149 For more details, see Crisis Group Report, Georgia and 152 There will be more funds for proper post-war reconstruc- Russia, op. cit., p. 17. On 5 June 2008, the European Parlia- tion. This figure does not take into account member states’ ment called on foreign ministers to consider deployment of contributions. Enlargement Commissioner Rehn said at the an ESDP border mission and suggested that member states post GAERC press conference: “Further funds could be re- take a more active role in a revised UNOMIG. See European leased. First up to €3 million, if needed, up to €10 million.” Parliament resolution of 5 June 2008 on the situation in See video footage of the press conference on 13 August Georgia, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. 2008, available at http://ceuweb.belbone.be/archivevideo.php? do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0253+0+DOC+ sessionno=1864&lang=EN#; and European Commission XML+V0//EN&language=EN. press release, 10 August 2008, available at http://europa.eu/

137 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 24 dwarfed by Russia’s promise of $420 million for document, while the EU wants a legally binding South Ossetia.153 Eleven member states – Austria, the treaty that includes trade and energy.158 It could also Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, consider halting long-term discussions on visa- free Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden – are travel or suspending, partially or fully, the reciprocal also providing assistance through the EU’s Civil Pro- visa facilitation agreement that entered into force in tection Mechanism,154 which was activated on 12 Au- June 2007.159 On 27 June, the EU-Russia Summit gust 2008. The EU is now sending an assessment agreed on seven joint cross-border cooperation programs, mission to calculate more substantial reconstruction worth at least €429 million, which could also be sus- and economic support needs. Italian Foreign Minister pended or delayed.160 However, the co-funding as well Frattini has recommended that a stabilisation confer- as the cooperation between Russia and some of the ence for the South Caucasus be held in Rome on 13 EU’s more sceptical members such as Estonia and Po- November155 but an earlier donors conference is land that these programs involve is seen as a political needed well before the difficult winter months. success that Brussels would be loathe to sacrifice.

The EU even more clearly lacks the leverage and in- The 15-16 September foreign ministers council and struments to affect Russia’s policies toward its the European Council (heads of state and govern- neighbours. It could suspend the negotiations launched ment) a month later are opportunities at least to issue in June156 for a new comprehensive bilateral agree- clear and unified messages about EU relations with ment to replace the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Russia and Georgia. But ultimately the EU needs a Agreement (PCA),157 but Russia seeks only a vague coherent energy policy that would allow it to stand up to Moscow when necessary without fear of energy blackmail. The Lisbon Treaty that is blocked by Ire- rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1256&format= land’s recent negative referendum vote could provide HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr. a legal basis (Article 194) for developing common 153 “Putin announces $420 million in aid for war torn energy security. However, such a policy would also be S.Ossetia”, RIA Novosti, 10 August 2008. 154 “The main role of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection is to facilitate co-operation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies which may require urgent response actions”. http://ec.europa.eu/ mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. environment/civil/prote/mechanism.htm. See also 21 August The 1994 PCA is automatically and annually extended, 2008 European Commission press release, “Georgia: EU unless either party withdraws. See “Agreement on partner- continues to deploy assistance to the conflict-stricken area”, ship and cooperation establishing a partnership between the at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= European Communities and their Member States, of one IP/08/1269&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part”, available Language=en. at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 155 See “This is how we convinced the Russians and damp- CELEX:21997A1128(01):EN:HTML. The Baltic republics, ened Washington’s wrath”, interview with Foreign Minister Poland, Sweden and the UK are already calling for a suspen- Frattini, Il Messaggero, 14 August 2008, available at www. sion of talks. esteri.it/MAE/EN/Stampa/Sala_Stampa/Interviste/2008/08/ 157 See Crisis Group Report, Conflict Resolution in the South 20080814_frattini_messaggero.htm. Caucasus, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 156 The start of negotiations was already delayed in part be- 158 The EU hopes that the new agreement will translate into cause of Lithuania’s requirement that a point on the “frozen “a ‘grand bargain’ in which Russia agrees to open up its en- conflicts” emphasising Georgian territorial integrity be in- ergy market (at least a bit) and in return [for the EU offering] cluded. For more, see Crisis Group Report, Georgia and deeper economic integration through a free trade agreement”, Russia, op. cit., p. 16. while “Russia wants a broad, basic agreement, primarily 157 The new agreement is intended to provide a legally bind- aimed at creating ‘real equality’ between the partners.… ing framework for EU-Russia relations covering political Details on energy, transport, visas and so forth should be left cooperation; the perspective of deep economic integration; a to sectoral agreements, to be concluded at a later stage”. level playing field for energy relations based on the princi- K. Barysch, “The EU’s new Russia policy starts at home”, ples of the Energy Charter Treaty; and closer relations in the CER Briefing Note, June 2008, available at www.cer.org. fields of freedom, security and justice as well as the mutual uk/pdf/russia_bn_kb_24june08.pdf. opening of the educational and scientific systems. See “Joint 159 See “EU-Russia visa facilitation and readmission agree- statement of the EU-Russia summit on the launch of negotia- ments enter into force today”, press release of the EC Dele- tions for a new EU-Russia agreement”, 27 June 2008, avail- gation to the Russian Federation,1 June 2007, available at able at www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/news_914.htm pressData/en/er/101524.pdf; and “EU-Russia: first round of 160 See “Joint statement of the EU-Russia Summit on cross negotiations for the new Agreement”, European Commission border cooperation”, 27 June 2008, available at www. press release, 3 July 2008, available at http://europa. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/ eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1099&for 101525.pdf.

138 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 25 possible in the existing legal framework if there was effort, a position often adopted in similar situations sufficient political will. around the world.164

Further, U.S. officials privately acknowledge that a B. THE U.S. POLICY OPTIONS series of perceived and real slights over the past dec- ade – from the way the anti-missile shield was put U.S. policy toward Georgia now has three objectives: forward, to Central Asian military bases, NATO ex- first, Russia’s compliance with the ceasefire so as to pansion and Kosovo independence – undoubtedly restore the status quo ante, with its forces out of helped those in the Kremlin who argue that Russia Georgia proper and reverting to their former South had to show the West “we’re not taking it any Ossetia and Abkhazia peacekeeping status; secondly, more”.165 Still, they profess surprise over the “ex- to reassure Ukraine and other states bordering a more traordinary nature of what Russia has done in open assertive Russia that they are not being abandoned; defiance of international norms” and stress that the finally, to design a policy with its European allies global response to its current occupation of major that convinces the Kremlin its excessive response to parts of Georgia proper must be strong enough to re- Saakashvili’s own rashness was a serious mistake in assure Ukraine and others. They claim that they have terms of its own long-term strategic interests.161 Ulti- limited instruments with which to achieve their objec- mately, Washington believes that its interests are best tives, especially if Russia does not care about being served by U.S./European engagement with Russia on considered a responsible and cooperative international global issues, but not at the cost of accepting unilat- actor. Their hope is that many Russians – though eral military actions to change borders or intimidate many of these may not be closely aligned to Prime neighbours. Minister Putin – do not believe their country’s inter- ests would be well served by isolation.166 U.S. officials acknowledge that their own embrace of Saakashvili, despite the tarnish accumulating on his Since a military response is not in the cards, the U.S. democratic credentials and his increasingly aggressive is examining diplomatic actions that would show it is behaviour toward South Ossetia and Abkhazia, likely not business as usual. Secretary Rice’s decision not to encouraged him to believe that he would receive sup- visit Moscow as the fighting was still going on was port if he engaged in military adventures. They insist one reflection of this, although officials also say they that they have consistently opposed any military at- do not know what she could have discussed beyond tempt to regain either South Ossetia or Abkhazia and Russian compliance with the ceasefire. They note, for communicated this message both during Secretary of example, that the question of the status of the break- State Rice’s 7-10 July visit to Tbilisi, which focused away territories is in effect postponed well beyond the particularly on Abkhazia,162 and in the days leading up term of the Bush administration. In other arenas, even to the Georgian attack on 7 August.163 Nevertheless, if there is not a formal suspension of Russia’s partici- the U.S. apparently never insisted on explicit com- pation in the G-8, at least for a while it is likely to be mitments that the extensive military equipment it was the G-7 organising meetings, thus sidelining Russia. supplying to Georgia would not be used in such an Similarly while there are no plans to immediately shut down the NATO-Russia Council, it is doubtful that it will meet until after Russian troops have left Georgia proper. Again, much depends on Russian actions over the next days and weeks, but Washington considers it 161 Crisis Group discussions, U.S. diplomats, Washington DC, likely that Ukraine will move faster toward MAP as a 13-19 August 2008. 167 162 “We have had very good discussions here. I want to again result of the events of the past two weeks. affirm that the United States remains committed to the terri- torial integrity of Georgia, to its democratic development. It Two other actions are also likely. First is an extensive is extremely important that the conflicts in Abkhazia and European/U.S. effort to help Georgia reconstruct its South Ossetia be resolved on the basics – basis of principles infrastructure and to support it in reasserting citizen that respect that territorial integrity, that respect the need for security in the towns and villages damaged by the them to be resolved peacefully. We have noted concerns that violence should be – should not be carried out by any party. And we, through the Friends process, will do everything that we can to help resolve those conflicts”. Condoleezza Rice, 164 Ibid. See also “After mixed U.S. messages, a war erupted “Remarks with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvilli”, 10 in Georgia”, The New York Times, 12 August 2008. July 2008, available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/07/ 165 Crisis Group discussions, U.S. diplomats, Washington 106912.htm. DC, 13-19 August 2008. 163 Crisis Group discussions, U.S. diplomats, Washington DC, 166 Ibid. 13-19 August 2008. 167 Ibid.

139 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 26 fighting. Second is a determination to support Georgia VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN in rebuilding its security forces, not least since it ap- AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND pears that much of its capacity to deal with criminal PRACTICE violence, including smuggling and contraband on its coasts, has been devastated by the physical destruc- 168 tion of its naval and coast guard forces. A. THE UNITED NATIONS Russia clearly wants to pose a stark choice to the U.S. Foreign Minister Lavrov asserted on 13 August The Georgian-Russian conflict has exposed how ill- that Washington had to chose between an “illusory equipped the UN, and in particular the Security project [with Georgia] or a real partnership” with Council is to respond effectively to crises that divide Russia.169 But U.S.-Russian relations are now signifi- the “permanent five” (China, France, Russia, UK, cantly damaged and are likely to remain that way U.S.), especially when one of them is directly en- well into the first year of the next administration. If gaged. As noted above, Russia came to the Council on Russia does not withdraw from Georgia proper, the the evening of 7 August, seizing the initiative to re- U.S. will urge its allies to review all ties. Meanwhile spond to the Georgian entry into South Ossetia and the question of what do about Russia has become part prior to its own massive movement of forces. Mos- of the U.S. presidential campaign, although both cow urged a Council press statement criticising the Senators McCain and Obama are treading carefully. Georgian action and calling for an agreement to be Neither wants to be seen as undermining rapidly mov- signed on non-resumption of hostilities. It was re- ing diplomatic initiatives, but each is trying to com- buffed by the U.S., UK and others, who insisted on a municate an image of strength and determination in country’s right to defend itself against aggression and the face of Russia’s disproportionate response to sought to include language that reaffirmed Georgian Georgia’s blunder.170 sovereignty and territorial integrity. There has still been no presidential statement or resolution from the Council on the post 7 August conflict.

Within the Council, the dispute is now reminiscent of bad Cold War days, with meetings, especially on 8 August and 10 August, degenerating into name-calling and mutual charges of ethnic cleansing and other abuse of civilians. Low points included Russia’s per- manent representative, Vitaly Churkin, accusing “a number of Security Council members of conniv- ance”171 in blocking Council action in response to Georgia’s “treacherous attack on South Ossetia”,172 and the U.S. permanent representative, Zalmay Khalilzad, revealing the contents of a confidential phone call between Lavrov and Rice, in which the Russian foreign minister reportedly insisted to his American counterpart that Saakashvili “must go”.173

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has been issuing 168 Ibid. statements to no effect calling for ceasefires, with- 169 See “Georgia-Russia shaky cease fire”, ABC News, 13 drawal of forces, respect for territorial integrity and August 2008. Condoleezza Rice responded: “Georgia is a return to negotiations. The sense of Security Council democratic government in the Caucasus that has elected its leaders. To call it a project of any place, of anybody, perhaps belies more about the way Russia thinks about its neighbors than the way it thinks about U.S. policy”. Condoleezza Rice 171 “Security Council hears conflicting Russian, Georgian “Recent Events in Georgia”, press conference, 13 August views of worsening crisis as members seek end to violence 2008, available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/ in day’s second meeting on South Ossetia”, Security Council 108194.htm. SC/9418, 8 August 2008, available at www.un.org/News/ 170 See Barack Obama, “Obama’s Statement on Georgia”, 11 Press/docs/2008/sc9418.doc.htm. August 2008, available at www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/ 172 Ibid. 2008/08/obamas_statement_on_georgia.html; and John 173 “Security Council holds third emergency meeting as South McCain, “John McCain’s Weekly Radio Address”, 16 Ossetia conflict intensifies, expands to other parts of Georgia”, August 2008, available at www.standardnewswire.com/ Security Council SC/9419, 10 August 2008, available at news/526033209.html. www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9419.doc.htm.

140 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 27 impotence and even irrelevance recalls the debates that Georgia’s territorial integrity “must be affirmed” over Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2002-2003), both occa- and that the Russian text “is intended to rubberstamp sions when a P-5 member or members took military a Russian interpretation [of the plan] that we do not action in the absence of a resolution. At one point, agree with”.179 On 21 August, the Russians put their Churkin declared the Council unable to deal with the draft in “blue”, meaning that as of the afternoon of 22 crisis, stating “I am not sure we are now at the point August, they can call for a vote on it. If forced to a when the Security Council can pass a document or vote, an American veto is extremely likely. Intensive even a press statement which would be meaningful”.174 informal consultations among the most invested UN Security Council members were taking place, as On 19 August, the U.S. and EU member states on the Western powers were scrambling to avoid the embar- Council, with France in the lead, introduced a short rassment of declining to support the Russian draft – a text to translate the ceasefire into a resolution. The potential move likely to be interpreted by Russia and draft175 demanded “full and immediate compliance others as backing away from the Sarkozy plan. with the cease-fire agreement” and “the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces to the lines held prior to The Security Council should endorse the Sarkozy the outbreak of hostilities”. It also reaffirmed Geor- agreement, which contains no mention of Georgia’s gia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, though not territorial integrity, only if the latter is specifically re- in the operative paragraphs.176 Russia said it would affirmed. If Russia threatens to veto such a draft, not support the draft, insisting that all six principles of Western members of the Council should then strive the accord have been endorsed in their entirety and for a minimalist text to secure the ceasefire through restating its position that Georgia’s territorial integrity authorisation of greater international participation in would need to be reconsidered, subject to the outcome peacekeeping efforts. The West must be careful that of a “future status” process for both Abkhazia and any text which fails to reaffirm Georgia’s territorial South Ossetia. integrity does not at the same time specify a prospect of “future status” talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia tabled its own short draft the following morn- ing, which “recalled” all previous UN Security The EU considers that a new resolution is also needed Council resolutions, thus skirting the issue of Geor- to provide legitimacy for the greater role it is willing gia’s territorial integrity, and endorsed in full the to play – including possibly the deployment of an Sarkozy plan.177 It conspicuously omitted mention of ESDP mission. Russia is signalling, however, that it Sarkozy’s letter of clarification and portrayed Russia does not think a resolution is necessary,180 in effect as a facilitator, rather than as an active party to the putting pressure on the EU and U.S. to trade off the conflict.178 The U.S. immediately objected, stating point on territorial integrity for acquiescence to some

174 “UN Security Council Deadlocked over South Ossetia Truce call”, The People’s Daily (Online), 10 August 2008, verbatim record of the 19 August UN Security Council meet- available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/ ing on Georgia, available at www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/ 90856/6471093.html. scact2008.htm. 175 See “Text-Draft U.N. Security Council resolution on 179 Comments to the UN press corps by Alejandro Daniel Georgia”, Reuters, 19 August 2008, available at www.alertnet. Wolff, Deputy Permanent U.S. Representative to the UN, 20 org/thenews/newsdesk/N19314365.htm. August 2008, viewable at http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ 176 Territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia is only ondemand/stakeout/2008/so080820am3.rm. mentioned in the introductory, preambulatory paragraphs. If 180 Medvedev allegedly told Sarkozy that “the most impor- such a text is adopted, it would be the first time the Council tant thing now for ensuring the success of efforts to restore has failed to reaffirm Georgia’s territorial integrity and sov- the region to normalcy is not a UN resolution or some sort ereignty in the operative paragraphs of a relevant resolution. of declaration, but rather an agreement signed by the South The most recent example of such a reaffirmation is Resolu- Ossetian and Georgian sides, based on the principles already tion 1808 (15 April 2008), “Security Council extends man- outlined. Russia, the EU and OSCE will guarantee the date of Georgia observer mission until 15 October, agreement’s implementation”. See “Dmitry Medvedev had a unanimously adopting Resolution 1808 (2008)”, available at telephone conversation with President of France Nicolas www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9299.doc.htm. Sarkozy”, Kremlin press release, 13 August 2008, available 177 See “Text-Russian draft Security Council resolution on at www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/news/2008/08/205291.shtml. Georgia”, Reuters, 20 August 2008, available at www.alertnet. See also remarks to press by Russian Ambassador to UN org/thenews/newsdesk/N20409517.htm. Vitaly Churkin on 19 August, at http://webcast.un.org/ 178 During the 19 August UN Security Council debate, UK ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2008/so080819pm4.rm. Churkin ambassador John Sawyers had rightly argued that Russia, said Russia is “not desperate” to have a resolution, though having formally invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, can- “we believe this is the right thing for the UNSC to do; this is not be considered as anything but a party to the conflict. See what the UNSC is about”.

141 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 28 kind of international peacekeeping or monitoring assist it to do so, but also to take appropriate action if mechanism. it is manifestly failing to do so; it does not address the question of an individual country taking direct action to protect its nationals located outside its own borders. B. RUSSIA’S R2P JUSTIFICATION When such action has been taken in the past – as it The Russian government has argued that its military often has been – the justification has been almost in- operations in Georgia were justified by the principle variably advanced in terms of “self-defence” (since of “responsibility to protect” (R2P); that is, that the 1945, under Article 51 of the UN Charter). How perpetration or imminent threat of atrocity crimes credible such a justification is will depend on a num- against South Ossetians compelled it to step in mili- ber of factors: when a country first confers its citizen- tarily. President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and ship on a large number of people outside its borders, UN Ambassador Churkin have described Georgia’s and then claims that it is entitled to intervene coer- actions against populations in South Ossetia as “geno- cively to protect them, there has usually been some cide”. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly skepticism. argued that Russia’s use of force was an exercise of its responsibility to protect. Secondly, even if the R2P norm were applicable here, no compelling case has been made by Russia that the [U]nder the Constitution [the President] is obliged threat to the South Ossetian population was of a na- to protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens, ture and scale as to make necessary or legitimate the especially when they find themselves in the armed use by it of military force. A number of criteria are conflict. And today he reiterated that the peace en- relevant here, and it is not clear that any of them were forcement operation enforcing peace on one of the satisfied: parties which violated its own obligations would continue until we achieve the results. According to  Seriousness of threat. It is not at all clear whether our Constitution there is also responsibility to pro- “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes tect – the term which is very widely used in the against humanity” were being committed, or im- UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in minently about to be, by Georgia against South any remote part of other regions. But this is not Ossetians. Claims and counter-claims abound, and Africa to us, this is next door. This is the area, – while Georgia’s actions in attacking Tshkinvali where Russian citizens live. So the Constitution of might well be thought to be an unjustified over- the Russian Federation, the laws of the Russian reaction to the provocations it cites – the available Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to evidence is not of the weight or clarity that is 181 exercise responsibility to protect. needed to justify a conclusion that it was “mani- festly failing” to protect its population from these However, the responsibility to protect norm, as em- atrocity crimes, in a way that would prima facie braced by the UN General Assembly in the 2005 justify the use of coercive military action by others World Summit, does not provide a legitimate basis for in response. Early evidence in these situations is Russia’s military actions in Georgia, for a number of often fragmentary, and there will not always be the reasons. time or opportunity to mount any kind of proper impartial investigation, but there has to be some- In the first place, the primary ground stated for inter- thing more than the bald assertions made here by vention – “to protect Russian citizens” – was not in Russia. fact an R2P rationale. The statement by Foreign Min- ister Lavrov blurs the distinction between the respon-  Primary purpose. While one purpose of the Rus- sibilities of a state to protect its populations inside its sian military intervention may have been to protect borders, and the responsibilities that a state maintains South Ossetian civilians under attack, it is highly for populations outside its borders. R2P is about the questionable whether that was the primary motive: responsibility of a sovereign state to protect popula- others appear to have been to establish full Rus- tions within its own borders, and of other states to sian control over both South Ossetia and Abkhazia (in the latter of which there was not even claimed to be a threat of mass atrocity crimes); to disman- 181 “Interview by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian tle Georgia’s entire military capability; to scuttle Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC”, Moscow, 9 August its NATO ambitions; and to send a clear signal to 2008, available at www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a other former parts of the Soviet Union as to what 7b43256999005bcbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574a100262597 would and would not be tolerated by Moscow. ?OpenDocument.

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 Last Resort. While there is not always time in fast- military action without UN Security Council authori- moving situations to fully work through alternative sation. The sense of moral outrage at reports of civil- strategies – as distinct from making a reasonable ians being killed and ethnically cleansed can have the judgment as to whether they would or would not unintended effect of clouding judgment on the best likely be effective – an immediate Security Coun- response, which is another reason to channel action cil call for Georgia to cease its military action does collectively through the United Nations. The Russian not seem to have been out of reach and would references to similar action by other P5 members in have placed Tbilisi under great pressure to comply. other theatres may reinforce doubts about those other Russia did urge the Security Council on the eve- instances but does not justify the Russian actions in ning of 7 August to call for a ceasefire, but dis- Georgia. Indeed they reinforce the dangers of vigi- agreement over whether the statement should refer lante justice across borders. to Georgia’s territorial integrity led to Council in- action: with a little more flexibility on all sides, this issue could probably have been finessed, C. ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY given the concern with which Georgia’s military action was regarded by U.S. and other Council There is an immediate requirement for an independent members. Russia’s position on the “last resort” investigation to document precisely what has hap- issue is weakened by its later attack on Georgian pened since the beginning of August and for efforts to territory outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after make it possible to hold those responsible for any Georgia had already signed a ceasefire agreement atrocity crimes to account.182 These are separate but presented to it by the OSCE mediators. complementary tasks. They serve multiple purposes, not the least of which is to correct misinformation on  Proportionality. The introduction of some 20,000 the scale and nature of atrocities, when appropriate, so troops and 100 tanks not only into South Ossetia as to reduced the likelihood of revenge violence and but also into Abkhazia and Georgia proper appears to promote longer-term reconciliation. manifestly excessive. The Russian naval blockade in the Black Sea as well as aerial bombings of For the independent investigation, the scope should Gori, Poti, the Zugdidi region and an aviation extend beyond the extremely serious alleged crimes to plant in Tbilisi went well beyond the necessary encompass the political and military actions of all minimum. sides. An accurate and complete accounting of what occurred is necessary to help design the way forward.  Balance of Consequences. This is very difficult to argue here on the present state of the evidence To make sure any such investigation is neutral and au- about refugee outflows and unrestrained reprisal thoritative, it should be conducted by a panel of ex- actions by South Ossetian separatists against perts appointed – after consultation with all parties – Georgians, quite apart from concerns about wider by the UN, or the UN working in conjunction with the implications for regional and global stability. OSCE or another intergovernmental organisation such as the Council of Europe.183 The findings should be made public and information shared with authorities Thirdly, in the absence of UN Security Council ap- proval, there is no legal authority for an R2P-based military intervention. The 2005 General Assembly Outcome Document makes it clear beyond argument that any country or group of countries seeking to 182 Crisis Group uses the term “atrocity crimes” advisedly, to apply forceful means to address an R2P situation – refer to serious war crimes, crimes against humanity and where another country is manifestly failing to protect genocide. The type of crime that mass atrocities amount to in its people and peaceful means are inadequate – must any particular case is best left to prosecutors and judges. See take that action through the Security Council. Very Gareth Evans, “Genocide or crime? Actions speak louder than words in Darfur”, European Voice, 18 February 2005; difficult situations can arise in practice where action also David Scheffer, “How to bring atrocity criminals to jus- widely thought appropriate or necessary in the fact of tice”, The Financial Times, 2 February 2005. actual or threatened mass atrocity crimes is blocked 183 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by one or more vetoes in the Council. But this was (PACE), for instance, has already expressed its interest in not the case here: no effort was made by Russia to establishing the responsibilities of each of the parties in- seek Security Council approval. volved in the conflict and made requests to them for detailed information about what happened. See “PACE President The Russia-Georgia case highlights the dangers and welcomes the peace agreement, but declares that human risks of states, whether individually or in a coalition, rights violations must not go unpunished” PACE press re- lease, 13 August 2008, available at http://assembly.coe.int/ interpreting global norms unilaterally and launching ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=2066.

143 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page 30 investigating alleged crimes and human rights abuses, If the prosecutor does proceed further, it is incumbent with appropriate measures for witness security. on Georgia and Russia to cooperate, Georgia because of its legal obligation under the Rome Statute and The basic responsibility for ensuring accountability Russia because it has called on the Court to address for atrocity crimes, and addressing broader issues of South Ossetians’ grievances and should respect the community reconciliation, lies with both Moscow and legal process it submitted its troops to by sending Tbilisi – especially to stop a new spiral of hate from them across the border. To start, both sides should dividing Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhaz and Russians provide, or continue to provide, any evidence they for generations to come – but the International Crimi- collect to the ICC prosecutor. This should occur nal Court (ICC) may also play a useful role. Georgia alongside robust domestic investigations and prosecu- is a state party to the Court’s Rome Statute, giving the tions. If an investigation by the ICC eventually leads ICC jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those to the indictment of specific Georgian or Russian most responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes nationals (including Ossetians or Abkhaz), continued against humanity committed by Georgians or anyone cooperation by both sides within the framework of the else on its territory. Russia is not a party, but its na- Rome Statute is essential. tionals could be prosecuted for crimes in Georgia. Tbilisi/Brussels, 22 August 2008 The ICC prosecutor’s office has already confirmed that it is carefully “monitoring all information on the situation in Georgia since the outbreak of violence in South Ossetia in early August” and specifically re- viewing “information alleging attacks on civilians”.184 It also stated it had met with a Georgian official and that Russia has been formally providing the office with information.185 The prosecutor’s office can open a formal investigation on its own initiative, with ap- proval by the trial judges, but could also do so at Georgia’s request.186

184 “ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Georgia under analysis”, press release, 20 August 2008. The prosecutor is also conducting such analyses in at least Colombia, Afghani- stan, Chad, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. 185 Ibid. Russia had earlier confirmed that it was collecting evidence of alleged crimes and stated that it will assist South Ossetians and Abkhaz to prepare statements to submit to the ICC. See “Генпрокурор Чайка поможет жертвам войны добиться правосудия” [“Prosecutor General Chayka will help the victims to get justice”], Interfax, 12 August 2008, available at www.interfax.ru/txt.asp?id=26795&sec=1484; and “Russia launches genocide probe over S.Ossetia events”, RIA Novosti, 14 August 2008, available at http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20080814/116026568.html, reporting that the Russian prosecutor general’s investigation committee “initiated a genocide probe based on reports of actions committed by Georgian troops aimed at murdering Russian citizens – eth- nic Ossetians – living in South Ossetia” based on an order by President Medvedev on 10 August 2008. 186 Georgia may choose not to make such a referral to the ICC, especially because there is no way to limit the investi- South Ossetian and Abkhaz forces, between 1993 and August gation to particular allegations – the prosecutor has the au- 2008. See “Georgia institutes proceedings against Russia for thority and indeed the duty to pursue those most responsible violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms for all crimes that fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. But of Racial Discrimination [CERD]”, ICJ press release, no. Tbilisi already filed an application before the International 2008/23, 12 August 2008. As a basis for the ICJ’s jurisdiction, Court of Justice (ICJ), which hears suits between states as Georgia invoked Article 22 of the CERD, and it reserved its opposed to criminal prosecutions of individuals, seeking to right to invoke as an additional basis for jurisdiction the Geno- hold Russia responsible for ethnic cleansing, including by cide Convention. Georgia and Russia are parties to both.

144 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 31

APPENDIX A

MAP OF GEORGIA

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APPENDIX B

MAP OF SOUTH OSSETIA SHOWING VILLAGES UNDER GEORGIAN AND OSSETIAN CONTROL PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008

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APPENDIX C

JPKF AND TBILISI MAPS OF GEORGIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS IN SOUTH OSSETIA PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008

147 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 34

APPENDIX D

MAP OF GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT ZONE PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008

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APPENDIX E

15-16 AUGUST CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND SIDE-LETTER

Council Conclusions on the situation in Georgia

GENERAL AFFAIRS and EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting

Brussels, 13 August 2008

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The Council recalls that the Union had expressed its grave concern at recent developments in Georgia, and the open conflict that has broken out between Russia and Georgia. Military action of this kind is not a solution. This war has caused the loss of many human lives, inflicted suffering on the population, resulted in substantial material damage and further increased the number of displaced persons and refugees.

A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Geor gia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions.

2. In this context, the absolute priority is to stop the suffering and bring the fighting to an end. In this respect the Council welcomes the agreement subscribed to by the parties yesterday on the basis of the mediation efforts carried out by the Union.

The principles to which the parties have subscribed are as follows:

(1) Not to resort to force;

(2) To end hostilities definitively;

(3) To provide fr ee access for humanitarian aid;

(4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;

(5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pend- ing an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security meas- ures;

(6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Council calls on the parties to honour all these commitments, beginning with an effective ceasefire, and to ensure that they are implemented effectively and in good f aith both on the ground and in the relevant fora. The international mechanism should be set up rapidly.

3. The Council emphasises the Union's commitment to contribute actively to effective implementation of these principles. They will be embodied in a UN Security Council resolution as soon as possible.

Rapid reinforcement of the OSCE's observer capabilities on the ground is crucial. The Union will take action along to this effect at the OSCE. The Council urges the parties not to obstruct the observers' activities.

The Council also considers that the European Union must be prepared to commit itself, including on the ground, to support every effort, including those of the UN and the OSCE, with a view to a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. It asks the SG/HR, in liaison with the Commission, to prepare proposals on the matter with a view to the informal meeting in Avignon on 5 and 6 September.

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4. The Council stresses the humanitarian emergency and the Union's resolve to provide vital assistance to the population. An outline has been given of initial measures undertaken, both by the Commission and by the Member States. The Council requests the Commission, in liaison with the Presidency, to continue to coordi- nate European assistance and to encourage pooling arrangements designed to enhance its effectiveness and relevance.

It is essential that all parties undertake to respect international humanitarian law and to facilitate the unim- peded deliver y of humanitarian assistance to all the population groups affected, without discrimination.

In addition, in view of the destruction caused by the conflict, the Council emphasises the need to identif y re- construction requirements as of now and to prepare to make a significant contribution to meeting those re- quirements at Union level. It invites the Commission to report back to it on this matter before its next meeting.”

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Paris, le 16 août 2008

COMMUNIQUÉ

La Présidence de la République, dans un souci de transparence, souhaite rendre publique la lettre qui établit précisément les modalités de mise en œuvre du point 5 de l’accord de cessez-le-feu en six points, telles qu’elles ressortent de l’entretien du Président de la République Nicolas SARKOZY avec le Président Dimitri MEDVEDEV le 12 août. Cette lettre a été adressée le 14 août au Président Mikhaïl SAAKACHVILI.

== début de citation ==

Monsieur le Président,

S’agissant du point 5 de l’accord en six points auquel vous avez –après le Président Medvedev- donné votre accord le 12 août dernier lors de notre rencontre à Tbilissi, et qui prévoit que « les forces militaires russes devront se retirer sur les lignes antérieures au déclenchement des hostilités » et que « dans l’attente d’un mécanisme inter- national, les forces de maintien de la paix russes mettront en œuvre des mesures additionnelles de sécurité », je souhaite vous faire part des précisions suivantes :

– Ainsi que je l’ai précisé lors de notre conférence de presse conjointe à Tbilissi, ces « mesures additionnel- les de sécurité » ne pourront être mises en œuvre que dans l’immédiate proximité de l’Ossétie du Sud, à l’exclusion de toute autre partie du territoire géorgien ;

– Plus précisément, ces « mesures » ne pourront être mises en œuvre qu’à l’intérieur d’une zone d’une pro- fondeur de quelques kilomètres depuis la limite administrative entre l’Ossétie du Sud et le reste de la Géorgie, de façon à ce qu’aucun centre urbain significatif n’y soit inclus –je pense en particulier à la ville de Gori- ; des arrangements particuliers devront être définis pour garantir la liberté de mouvement et de circulation le long des axes routiers et ferroviaires de la Géorgie ;

– Ces « mesures additionnelles de sécurité » prendront la forme de patrouilles effectuées par les seules for- ces de maintien de la paix russes aux niveaux autorisés par les arrangements existants, les autres forces russes se retirant sur leurs positions antérieures au 7 août conformément au protocole d’accord ;

– Ces « mesures » auront un caractère provisoire, en attendant l’établissement dans les meilleurs délais du « mécanisme international » dont la nature et le mandat sont d’ores et déjà en cours de discussion dans différentes enceintes internationales, en particulier l’OSCE , l’Union européenne et les Nations Unies.

Fort de ces précisions, je vous demande de bien vouloir confirmer l’accord que vous m’avez donné et que vous avez annoncé publiquement à Tbilissi, en apposant votre signature au bas du protocole d’accord en six points que j’ai moi-même signé en tant que témoin et garant au nom de l’Union européenne. Le Président Medvedev m’a assuré hier que votre signature conduirait au retrait des forces russes conformément à l’accord conclu.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l’assurance de ma très haute considération.

Signé : Nicolas SARKOZY

== fin de citation ==

151 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 38

La Présidence de la République souhaite ajouter les 3 précisions suivantes :

– Dans la lettre accompagnant le document relatif au cessez-le-feu, le territoire mentionné se comprend comme l’immédiate proximité de la zone de conflit, telle qu’elle est définie par les arrangements antérieurs, à l’exclusion de toute autre partie du territoire géorgien. Les mesures définies par ce document ne pourront être mises en œuvre qu’à l’intérieur d’une zone d’une profondeur de quelques kilomètres, autour Tskhinvali dans la zone de conflit.

– En aucune manière les mesures mentionnées dans la lettre ne pourront limiter ou mettre en danger la liberté de mouvement et de circulation le long des axes routiers et ferroviaires de la Géorgie.

– D’autres aspects du processus de résolution du conflit seront discutés ultérieurement.

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APPENDIX F

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, some 135 staff members on five continents, working Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/ through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbe- kistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herze- Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. govina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey; in Teams of political analysts are located within or close by the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest of the violent conflict. Based on information and assessments Andean region and Haiti. from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol- a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg- lowing governmental departments and agencies currently ular update on the state of play in all the most significant provide funding: Australian Agency for International De- situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign min- Agency, Canadian International Development and Re- istries and international organisations and made available search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan- Group works closely with governments and those who in- ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For- fluence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxem- The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent bourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business for International Development, Royal Norwegian Minis- and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring try of Foreign Affairs, Qatar, Swedish Ministry for For- the reports and recommendations to the attention of eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af- senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is fairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Department for International Development, United Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. Executive since January 2000 has been former Austral- Agency for International Development. ian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based the Future Fund, include Carnegie Corporation of New as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The York, Fundación DARA Internacional, Iara Lee and George organisation currently operates eleven regional offices Gund III Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Founda- (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, tion, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Founda- field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, tion, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society In- Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, stitute, Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Tehran). Crisis Group current- Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust and VIVA ly covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict Trust. across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Demo- August 2008 cratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea,

Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org

153 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 40

APPENDIX G

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2005

EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, Europe Report N°160, Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility, Europe 17 January 2005 Report N°185, 21 August 2007 (also available in Albanian, France and its Muslims: Riots, Jihadism and Depoliticisation, Russian and Serbian) Europe Report N°172, 9 March 2006 (only available in French) Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley, Europe Report Islam and Identity in Germany, Europe Report N°181, 14 March N°186, 16 October 2007 (also available in Russian) 2007 Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition, Europe Report N°188, 6 December 2007 (also available in Russian) BALKANS Kosovo’s First Month, Europe Briefing N°47, 18 March 2008 (also available in Russian) Kosovo: Toward Final Status, Europe Report N°161, 24 January 2005 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Will the Real Serbia Please Stand Up?, Europe Briefing N°49, 23 April 2008 (also available in Russian) Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet, Europe Briefing N°37, 25 February 2005 (also available in Macedonian) CAUCASUS Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Europe Report N°162, 7 April 2005 (also available in Serbian) Georgia-South Ossetia: Refugee Return the Path to Peace, Serbia: Spinning its Wheels, Europe Briefing N°39, 23 May Europe Briefing N°38, 19 April 2005 (also available in Russian) 2005 (also available in Serbian) Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground, Kosovo after Haradinaj, Europe Report N°163, 26 May 2005 Europe Report N°166, 14 September 2005 (also available in (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Armenian, Azeri and Russian) Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, Europe Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Europe Report N°167, Report N°164, 6 September 2005 10 October 2005 (also available in Armenian, Azeri and Russian) Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, Europe Report N°165, 13 Azerbaijan’s 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity, Europe Briefing September 2005 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) N°40, 21 November 2005 (also available in Russian) EU Visas and the Western Balkans, Europe Report N°168, 29 Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, November 2005 Europe Report N°173, 20 March 2006 Montenegro’s Independence Drive, Europe Report N°169, 7 Abkhazia Today, Europe Report N°176, 15 September 2006 December 2005 (also available in Russian and Serbian) (also available in Russian) Macedonia: Wobbling toward Europe, Europe Briefing N°41, Georgia’s Armenian and Azeri Minorities, Europe Report 12 January 2006 (also available in Albanian and Macedonian) N°178, 22 November 2006 (also available in Russian) Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, Europe Report N°170, 17 Abkhazia: Ways Forward, Europe Report N°179, 18 January February 2006 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) 2007 (also available in Russian) Montenegro’s Referendum, Europe Briefing N°42, 29 May Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Movement at Last?, Europe 2006 (also available in Russian) Report N°183, 7 June 2007 (also available in Russian) Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s Shadow, Europe Briefing N°43, Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, Europe Report N°187, 14 27 June 2006 (also available in Russian) November 2007 (also available in Russian) An Army for Kosovo?, Europe Report N°174, 28 July 2006 (also Georgia: Sliding towards Authoritarianism?, Europe Report available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) N°189, 19 December 2007 (also available in Russian) Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards, Europe Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State, Europe Report Briefing N°44, 8 November 2006 (also available in Russian) N°191, 25 March 2008 (also available in Russian) Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky, Europe Report N°177, 10 No- Armenia: Picking up the Pieces, Europe Briefing N°48, 8 vember 2006 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) April 2008 Kosovo’s Status: Difficult Months Ahead, Europe Briefing Russia’s Dagestan: Conflict Causes, Europe Report N°192, 3 N°45, 20 December 2006 (also available in Albanian, Russian June 2008 and Serbian) Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, Europe Report Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International Engagement N°193, 5 June 2008 Strategy, Europe Report N°180, 15 February 2007 (also avail- able in Russian) CYPRUS Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan, Europe The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?, Europe Report N°171, 8 Report N°182, 14 May 2007 (also available in Albanian, Rus- March 2006 (also available in Greek and Turkish) sian and Serbian) Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition, Europe Report Serbia’s New Government: Turning from Europe, Europe N°190, 10 January 2008 (also available in Greek and in Turkish) Briefing N°46, 31 May 2007 Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet, Europe Report N°194, 23 June 2008

154 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 41

MOLDOVA OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS Moldova’s Uncertain Future, Europe Report N°175, 17 August 2006 (also available in Russian) For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:  Africa TURKEY  Asia Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead, Europe Report N°184,  Europe 17 August 2007 (also available in Turkish)  Latin America and Caribbean  Middle East and North Africa  Thematic Issues  CrisisWatch please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org

155 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 42

APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Carla Hills Christopher Patten Former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Former European Commissioner for Ex- Saudi Arabia to the U.S.; Chairman, King Trade Representative ternal Relations, Governor of Hong Kong Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Lena Hjelm-Wallén Studies and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Former Deputy Prime Minister and For- Oxford University Kofi Annan eign Affairs Minister, Sweden Thomas Pickering Former Secretary-General of the United Swanee Hunt Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Rus- Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001) Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; sia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Louise Arbour President, Hunt Alternatives Fund; former Nigeria Former UN High Commissioner for Hu- Ambassador U.S. to Austria man Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the Anwar Ibrahim President & CEO International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Deputy Prime Minister of Gareth Evans former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda Malaysia Former Foreign Minister of Australia Richard Armitage Asma Jahangir Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Executive Committee Lord (Paddy) Ashdown Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Morton Abramowitz Former High Representative for Bosnia Rights Commission of Pakistan Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Herzegovina and Leader of the Liberal James V. Kimsey and Ambassador to Turkey Democrats, UK Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL) Emma Bonino* Shlomo Ben-Ami Former Minister of International Trade Former Foreign Minister of Israel Wim Kok and European Affairs of Italy and European Lakhdar Brahimi Former Prime Minister of Netherlands Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Former Special Adviser to the UN Secre- Aleksander Kwaśniewski Cheryl Carolus tary-General and Algerian Foreign Minister Former President of Poland Former South African High Commissioner Zbigniew Brzezinski Ricardo Lagos to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC Former U.S. National Security Advisor Former President of Chile; President, Maria Livanos Cattaui to the President Club of Madrid Former Secretary-General, International Kim Campbell Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Chamber of Commerce Former Prime Minister of Canada Novelist and journalist, U.S. Yoichi Funabashi Naresh Chandra Jessica Tuchman Mathews Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and President, Carnegie Endowment for Inter- Shimbun, Japan Ambassador of India to the U.S. national Peace Frank Giustra Joaquim Alberto Chissano Moisés Naím Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Former President of Mozambique Editor-in-chief, Foreign Policy; former Stephen Solarz Wesley Clark Minister of Trade and Industry of Vene- zuela Former U.S. Congressman Former NATO Supreme Allied Com- George Soros mander, Europe Ayo Obe Chair of Steering Committee of World Chairman, Open Society Institute Pat Cox Movement for Democracy, Nigeria Pär Stenbäck Former President of European Parliament Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Christine Ockrent Former Foreign Minister of Finland Journalist and author, France *Vice-Chair Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Mark Eyskens Victor Pinchuk Adnan Abu-Odeh Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Former Prime Minister of Belgium Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah Industrial Production Group II and to King Hussein and Jordan Perma- Joschka Fischer Samantha Power nent Representative to the UN Former Foreign Minister of Germany Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Kenneth Adelman Yegor Gaidar Government, Harvard University Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of Former Prime Minister of Russia Fidel V. Ramos the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Leslie H. Gelb Former President of Philippines Ali Alatas President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Güler Sabancı Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia Relations, U.S. Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey

156 Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report 195, 22 August 2008 Page 43

Ghassan Salamé Thorvald Stoltenberg Ernesto Zedillo Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of Former Foreign Minister of Norway Former President of Mexico; Director, International Relations, Paris Lawrence Summers Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Former President, Harvard University; Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. Khalid Alireza Iara Lee & George Gund III Ian Telfer BHP Billiton Foundation Guy Ullens de Schooten Canaccord Adams Limited Frank Holmes Neil Woodyer Equinox Partners George Landegger Don Xia Alan Griffiths Ford Nicholson

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser Harry Bookey & Khaled Juffali Michael Riordan (Co-Chair) Pamela Bass-Bookey George Kellner StatoilHydro ASA Elliott Kulick John Chapman Chester Amed Khan Tilleke & Gibbins (Co-Chair) Chevron Vale Marc Abramowitz Shiv Vikram Khemka Richard Cooper VIVATrust Hamza al Kholi Scott Lawlor Neil & Sandy DeFeo Yasuyo Yamazaki Anglo American PLC Jean Manas John Ehara McKinsey & Company Yapı Merkezi APCO Worldwide Inc. Construction and Frontier Strategy Group Ed Bachrach Najib Mikati Industry Inc. Seth Ginns Patrick Benzie Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Shinji Yazaki Alan Griffiths Stanley Bergman & Donald Pels Edward Bergman Charlotte & Fred Anna Luisa Ponti & Hubbell Geoffrey Hoguet

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time. Martti Ahtisaari Malcolm Fraser Surin Pitsuwan Leo Tindemans (Chairman Emeritus) I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Ed van Thijn Diego Arria Max Jakobson George Robertson Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Alain Destexhe Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim Marika Fahlén George J. Mitchell William Taylor Stanley Fischer (Chairman Emeritus)

157

158 Order Code RL34618

Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

August 13, 2008

Jim Nichol Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

159 Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

Summary

In the early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire agreement that provided for Russian “peacekeepers” to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians and supported the regional economy. Simmering long-time tensions erupted on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, “forcing” Georgia to send troops into South Ossetia that reportedly soon controlled the capital, Tskhinvali, and other areas.

On August 8, Russia launched large-scale air attacks across Georgia and dispatched seasoned troops to South Ossetia that engaged Georgian forces in Tskhinvali later in the day. Reportedly, Russian troops had retaken Tskhinvali, occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border by the morning of August 10. Russian warplanes bombed the Georgian town of Gori and the outskirts of the capital, Tbilisi, as well as other sites. Russian ships landed troops in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast.

On August 12, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev declared that “the aim of Russia’s operation for coercing the Georgian side to peace had been achieved and it had been decided to conclude the operation.... The aggressor has been punished.” Medvedev endorsed some elements of a European Union (EU) peace plan presented by visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The plan calls for both sides to pull troops back, allow humanitarian aid into the conflict zone, and facilitate the return of displaced persons. After Russia and Georgia sign a binding text, the plan reportedly will be endorsed at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council. On August 13, the Russian military was reported to be pulling back from some areas of Georgia but also reportedly continued “mopping up” operations.

President Bush stated on August 9 that “Georgia is a sovereign nation, and its territorial integrity must be respected. We have urged an immediate halt to the violence [and] the end of the Russian bombings.” On August 13, he announced that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would travel to France “to rally the free world in the defense of a free Georgia,” and to Georgia, where the United States was launching a major humanitarian aid effort. Congress had begun its August 2008 recess when the conflict began, but many members spoke out on the issue. Senators John McCain and Barack Obama condemned the Russian military incursion and urged NATO to soon extend a Membership Action Plan to Georgia. On August 12, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden warned Russia that its aggression in Georgia jeopardized Congressional support for legislation to collaborate with Russia on nuclear energy production and to repeal the Jackson-Vanik conditions on U.S. trade with Russia.

160 Contents

Background and Recent Developments ...... 1 Renewed Conflict in South Ossetia...... 3 Actions in Abkhazia and Western Georgia ...... 5 Russia Announces a Ceasefire ...... 6 Implications for Georgia and Russia...... 8 Casualties and Displaced Persons ...... 8 U.S. Response ...... 9 International Response ...... 12 International Humanitarian Assistance ...... 15 Georgia and the NATO Membership Action Plan...... 15 Congressional Response ...... 16

List of Figures

Figure 1. Map of South Ossetia ...... 1

161 Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

Background and Recent Developments

Tensions in Georgia date back at least to the 1920s, when South Ossetia made abortive attempts to declare its independence but ended up as an autonomous region within Soviet Georgia after the Red Army conquered Georgia. In 1989, South Ossetia lobbied for joining its territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for independence. Georgia’s own declaration of independence from the former Soviet Union and subsequent repressive efforts by former Georgian President Gamsakhurdia triggered conflict in 1990. In January 1991, hostilities broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia, reportedly contributing to an estimated 2,000-4,000 deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands of people.

Figure 1. Map of South Ossetia

Source: Central Intelligence Agency via the University of Texas at Austin. Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection. On the Internet: [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/georgia_republic.html]

In June 1992, Russia brokered a cease-fire, and Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian “peacekeeping” units set up base camps in a security zone around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The units usually totalled around 1,100 troops, including about 530 Russians, a 300-member North Ossetian brigade (which was actually composed of South Ossetians and headed by a North Ossetian), and about 300 Georgians. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did most of the patrolling. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) composed of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries ostensibly promoted a settlement of the conflict, with the OSCE as facilitator. According to some 162 CRS-2 estimates, some 20,000 ethnic Georgians resided in one-third to one-half of the region and 25,000 ethnic Ossetians in the other portion. Many fled during the fighting in the early 1990s or migrated.

Some observers have argued that Russia’s increasing influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the years has transformed the separatist conflicts into essentially Russia-Georgia disputes. Most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reportedly have been granted Russian citizenship and passports and most appear to want their regions to be part of Russia.1

In late 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili came to power during the so-called “rose revolution” (he was elected president in January 2004). He pledged to institute democratic and economic reforms, and to re-gain central government authority over the separatist regions. In 2004, he began to increase pressure on South Ossetia by tightening border controls and breaking up a large-scale smuggling operation in the region that allegedly involved Russian organized crime and corrupt Georgian officials. He also reportedly sent several hundred police, military, and intelligence personnel into South Ossetia. Georgia maintained that it was only bolstering its peacekeeping contingent up to the limit of 500 troops, as permitted by the cease-fire agreement. Georgian guerrilla forces also reportedly entered the region. Allegedly, Russian officials likewise assisted several hundred paramilitary elements from Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Russia to enter. Following inconclusive clashes, both sides by late 2004 ostensibly had pulled back most of the guerrillas and paramilitary forces.

In July 2005, President Saakashvili announced a new peace plan for South Ossetia that offered substantial autonomy and a three-stage settlement, consisting of demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement. South Ossetian “president” Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan, asserting in October 2005 that “we [South Ossetians] are citizens of Russia.”2 The Georgian peace plan received backing by the OSCE Ministerial Council in early December 2005. Perhaps faced with this international support, in mid-December 2005, Kokoiti proffered a South Ossetian peace proposal that also envisaged benchmarks. The JCC in May 2006 agreed on economic reconstruction projects estimated to cost $10 million, and the next month, the OSCE sponsored a donor’s conference that raised these funds. A Steering Committee composed of the parties to the conflict and donors met in October 2006 to discuss project implementation. In February 2007, the pro-Georgian alternative leadership (see below) called for participating in projects. In April 2007, Kokoiti praised Russia’s unilateral aid efforts and accused the Steering Committee of dallying (see also below).

1 Vladimir Socor, Eurasia Insight, November 20, 2006. 2 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), October 7, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-15001. CEDR, December 12, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27204. South Ossetians who were citizens of Russia voted in the 2004 Russian presidential election, and a poster in South Ossetia afterward proclaimed that “Putin is our president.” Many South Ossetians voted in the 2007 Russian Duma election and the 2008 Russian presidential election. CEDR, December 3, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950289; February 28, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-4015. 163 CRS-3

In November 2006, a popular referendum was held in South Ossetia to reaffirm its “independence” from Georgia. The separatists reported that 95% of 55,000 registered voters turned out and that 99% approved the referendum. In a separate vote, 96% reelected Kokoiti. The OSCE and U.S. State Department declined to recognize these votes. In “alternative” voting among ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia (and those displaced from South Ossetia) and other South Ossetians, the pro- Georgian Dmitriy Sanakoyev was elected governor of South Ossetia, and a referendum was approved supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity.

In March 2007, President Saakashvili proposed another peace plan for South Ossetia that involved creating “transitional” administrative districts throughout the region — ostensibly under Sanakoyev’s authority — which would be represented by an emissary at JCC or alternative peace talks. Each side accused the other in mid- 2007 of blockading water supplies in South Ossetia and other “provocations,” including failure to hold JCC meetings. In July 2007, President Saakashvili decreed the establishment of a commission to work out South Ossetia’s “status” as a part of Georgia. The JCC finally held a meeting (with Georgia’s emissaries in attendance) in Tbilisi, Georgia, in October 2007, but the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the Georgian emissaries made unacceptable demands in order to deliberately sabotage the results of the meeting.3 No further meetings have been held.

During the latter half of July 2008, Russia conducted a military exercise that proved to be a rehearsal for Russian actions in Georgia a few weeks later. Code- named Caucasus 2008, the exercise involved more than 8,000 troops and was conducted near Russia’s border with Georgia. One scenario was a hypothetical attack by unnamed (but undoubtedly Georgian) forces on Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian forces practiced a counterattack by land, sea, and air to buttress Russia’s “peacekeepers” stationed in the regions, protect “Russian citizens,” and offer humanitarian aid. The Georgian Foreign Ministry protested that the scenario constituted a threat of invasion. Simultaneously with the Russian military exercise, about 1,000 U.S. troops, 600 Georgian troops, and token forces from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine conducted an exercise in Georgia, code-named Immediate Response 2008, aimed at increasing troop interoperability for NATO operations and coalition actions in Iraq. Most if not all of these troops had left Georgia by the time of the outbreak of conflict.4

Renewed Conflict in South Ossetia

Tensions escalated in South Ossetia on July 3, 2008, when an Ossetian village police chief was killed by a bomb and the head of the pro-Georgian “government”

3 CEDR, November 1, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950449. 4 CEDR, July 18, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-548001; July 28, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-358017; Georgia National Guard, “‘Immediate Response’ Underway in Republic of Georgia,” Army.Mil News, July 15, 2008; Capt. Bryan Woods, “Security Cooperation Exercise Immediate Response 2008 Begins with Official Ceremony in Republic of Georgia,” Army.Mil News, July 17, 2008.

164 CRS-4 in South Ossetia, Dmitriy Sanakoyev, escaped injury by a roadside mine. That night, both the Georgians and South Ossetians launched artillery attacks on each other’s villages and checkpoints, reportedly resulting in about a dozen killed or wounded. The European Union, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe issued urgent calls for both sides to show restraint and to resume peace talks.

On July 8, 2008, four Russian military planes flew over South Ossetian airspace. The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the incursion had helped discourage Georgia from launching an imminent attack on South Ossetia. The Georgian government denounced the incursion as violating its territorial integrity, and on July 11 recalled its ambassador to Russia for “consultations.” The U.N. Security Council discussed the overflights at a closed meeting on July 21, 2008. Although no decision was reached, Georgian diplomats reportedly stated that the session was successful, while Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin denounced the “pro-Georgian bias” of some Security Council members.5

The day after the Russian aerial incursion, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Georgia for two days of discussions on ways to defuse the rising tensions between Georgia and Russia. She stated that “some of the things the Russians did over the last couple of months added to tension in the region,” called for Russia to respect Georgia’s independence, and stressed the “strong commitment” of the United States to Georgia’s territorial integrity.6

On July 25, 2008, a bomb blast in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, killed one person. On July 30, both sides again exchanged artillery fire, with the South Ossetians allegedly shelling a Georgian-built road on a hill outside Tskhinvali, and the Georgians allegedly shelling two Ossetian villages. Two days later, five Georgian police were injured on this road by a bomb blast. This incident appeared to trigger serious fighting on August 2-4, which resulted in over two dozen killed and wounded. Kokoity threatened to attack Georgian cities and to call for paramilitary volunteers from the North Caucasus, and announced that women and children would be evacuated to North Ossetia. Georgia claimed that these paramilitary volunteers were already arriving in South Ossetia.

On the evening of August 7, 2008, South Ossetia accused Georgia of launching a “massive” artillery barrage against Tskhinvali that damaged much of the town, while Georgia reported intense bombing of some Georgian villages in the conflict zone. Saakashvili that evening announced a unilateral ceasefire and called for South Ossetia to follow suit. He also called for reopening peace talks and reiterated that Georgia would provide the region with maximum autonomy within Georgia as part of a peace settlement. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not end their shelling of Georgian villages but intensified their actions, “forcing” Georgia to declare an end to its ceasefire and begin sending ground forces into South Ossetia. Georgian troops reportedly soon controlled much of South Ossetia, including Tskhinvali.

5 CEDR, July 22, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950329; July 22, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950042. 6 U.S. Department of State. Press Release. Secretary’s Remarks: Remarks En Route Prague, Czech Republic, July 8, 2008. 165 CRS-5

Russian President Medvedev addressed an emergency session of the Russian Security Council on August 8. He denounced Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, asserting that “women, children and the elderly are now dying in South Ossetia, and most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation.” He stated that “we shall not allow our compatriots to be killed with impunity. Those who are responsible for that will be duly punished.” He appeared to assert perpetual Russian control in stating that “historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.”7 On August 11, he reiterated this principle that Russia is the permanent guarantor of Caucasian security and that “we have never been just passive observers in this region and never will be.”8

In response to the Georgian incursion into South Ossetia, Russia launched large- scale air attacks in the region and across Georgia. Russia quickly dispatched seasoned professional (serving under contract) troops to South Ossetia that engaged Georgian forces in Tskhinvali on August 8. Saakashvili responded by ordering that reservists be mobilized and declaring a 15-day “state of war.” Reportedly, up to 6,000 Russian troops had retaken Tskhinvali, occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border by early in the morning on August 10 (Sunday). These troops were allegedly augmented by thousands of volunteer militiamen from the North Caucasus.9

On August 10, Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia reported that Georgia had requested that Secretary Rice act as a mediator with Russia in the crisis over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, including by transmitting a diplomatic note that Georgia’s armed forces had ceased fire and had withdrawn from nearly all of South Ossetia.10 Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili also phoned Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to report that all Georgian forces had been withdrawn from South Ossetia and to request a ceasefire, but Lavrov countered that Georgian forces remained in Tskhinvali.11

Russian warplanes bombed the Kojori special forces battalion military base and a radar installation on Mt. Makhata in the suburbs of the Georgian capital Tbilisi early on August 11, according to Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Utiashvili. Russian warplanes also bombed residential areas in Gori. Georgian troops were pulled back to defend nearby Tbilisi from possible attack.

Actions in Abkhazia and Western Georgia. On August 10, the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet, reported to the U.N. Security Council that the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG; about 100

7 CEDR, August 8, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950325. 8 CEDR, August 12, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950226. 9 Anne Barnard, Andrew Kramer, C.J. Chivers and Ellen Barry, “Clashes in Georgia Move Another Step Closer to All-Out War: Russian Bombers Strike Capital’s Airport,” The New York Times, August 11, 2008; Dario Thuburn, “Russia’s Ragtag Volunteers Enrol for Combat,” Agence France Presse, August 10, 2008. 10 Agence France Presse, August 10, 2008. 11 Interfax, August 10, 2008. 166 CRS-6 observers in all) had witnessed “ongoing aerial bombardments of Georgian villages in the Upper Kodori Valley” the previous day.12 They also had observed “the movement by the Abkhaz side of substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.” Mulet also warned that Abkhaz separatist leader Sergei Bagapsh had threatened to push the Georgian armed forces out of the Upper Kodori Valley. In violation of their mandate, the Russian “peacekeepers” “did not attempt to stop such deployments” of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen UNOMIG observers were withdrawn from the Kodori Valley because the Abkhaz rebels announced that their safety could not be guaranteed, Mulet stated.13

Russian peacekeepers also permitted Abkhaz forces to deploy in the Gali region and along the Inguri River bordering Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. Russian military and Abkhaz militia forces then moved across the river into the Zugdidi district, southwest of Abkhazia and indisputedly in Georgian territory (although some part is within the peacekeeping zone). Bombs fell on the town of Zugdidi on August 10. As the local population fled, Russian troops reportedly occupied the town and its police stations on August 11. Reportedly, the Russian military stated that it would not permit the Abkhaz forces to occupy the town of Zugdidi. The next day, the Russian military reported that it had disarmed Georgian police forces in the Kodori Valley and the Georgian police had pulled out.14

On August 10, Russia sent ships from the Black Sea Fleet to deliver troops to Abkhazia and take up positions along Georgia’s coastline. Russian military officials reported that up to 9,000 troops had been deployed by sea or air. Russian television reported that Igor Dygalo, Russian naval spokesman and aide to the Russian navy commander-in-chief, claimed that Russian ships had sunk a Georgian vessel in a short battle off the coast of Georgia.15 Georgian officials reported that the Russian ships were preventing ships from entering or leaving the port at Poti. The Russians reportedly also sank Georgia’s coast guard vessels at Poti. Three of the Russian warships reportedly left the area on August 13 and returned to their Black Sea base in the Crimea.

Russian troops occupied a Georgian military base in the town of Senaki, near Poti, on August 11, and reportedly destroyed it before pulling out. Russia claimed that the operation was to prevent Georgia from using the base to support its troops on the other side of the country in South Ossetia.

Russia Announces a Ceasefire. On August 12, the Russian government announced at mid-day that Medvedev had called Javier Solana, the European Union’s

12 In July 2006, a warlord in the Kodori Valley area of northern Abkhazia, where many ethnic Svans reside, foreswore his nominal allegiance to the Georgian government. The Georgian government quickly sent forces to the area, defeated the warlord’s militia, and bolstered central authority. 13 “Security Council Holds Third Emergency Meeting as South Ossetia Conflict Intensifies, Expands to Other Parts of Georgia,” States News Service, August 10, 2008. 14 CEDR, August 10, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950192 and Doc. No. CEP-950191. 15 CEDR, August 10, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950216. 167 CRS-7

High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to report that “the aim of Russia’s operation for coercing the Georgian side to peace had been achieved and it had been decided to conclude the operation.”16 In a subsequent meeting with Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and chief of Armed Forces General Staff Nikolai Makarov, Medvedev stated that “based on your report I have ordered an end to the operations to oblige Georgia to restore peace.... The security of our peacekeeping brigade and civilian population has been restored. The aggressor has been punished and suffered very heavy losses.” He announced that military awards would be given to the troops. Seemingly in contradiction to his order for a halt in operations, he also ordered his generals to continue “mopping up” actions.17

Later that day, Medvedev met with visiting French President Sarkozy, who presented a ceasefire plan on behalf of the EU. President Medvedev reportedly backed some elements of the plan. French Foreign Minister Koucher then flew to Tbilisi to present the proposals to the Georgian government. Medvedev and Saakashvili consulted by phone the night of August 12-13 and they reportedly agreed to a six-point draft peace plan, according to a press conference by Sarkozy. The draft calls for both sides to cease hostilities and pull troops back to positions they had occupied before the conflict began. Other elements of the draft peace plan include allowing humanitarian aid into the conflict zone and facilitating the return of displaced persons. Sarkozy offered to send EU monitors to the conflict zone, a proposal endorsed by Saakashvili. The possibility of such monitors as well as an international format for follow-on peace talks is suggested by draft language calling for “the opening of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”18 An emergency meeting of EU foreign ministers on August 13 endorsed the peace plan and the possible participation of EU monitors (also see below, International Response). After Russia and Georgia sign a binding text, the plan reportedly will be endorsed at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council.

On August 13, the Russian military was reported to be pulling back from some areas of Georgia but also reportedly continued “mopping up” operations after the putative ceasefire, although major offensive actions may have ended. These “mopping up” operations may indicate a strategy of degrading Georgia’s remaining military assets and occupying extensive “buffer zones” of Georgian territory near the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This latter strategy appears somewhat like that taken by Armenia during the early 1990s conflict over Azerbaijan’s breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region. Lomaia alleged on August 13 that Russian troops and paramilitary forces were looting Gori, similar to what often took place during Russian operations in its breakaway Chechnya region early in the decade.

16 ITAR-TASS, August 12, 2008. 17 CEDR, August 12, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950208. 18 EDR, August 13, 2008, Doc. No. EUP-950018. 168 CRS-8

Implications for Georgia and Russia

According to some observers, the recent Russia-Georgia conflict harms both countries. In the case of Georgia and South Ossetia, the fighting reportedly has resulted in hundreds of military and civilian casualties and large-scale infrastructure damage that may well set back economic growth and contribute to urgent humanitarian needs. Tens of thousands of displaced persons also add to humanitarian concerns. The fighting appears to have hardened anti-Georgian attitudes in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, making the possibility of re-integration with Georgia more remote. Georgia also may face more difficulty in persuading some NATO members that it is ready for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), usually considered as a prelude to membership. In the case of Russia, its seemingly disproportionate military campaign appears to have harmed its image as a reliable and peaceable member of the international community.

President Medvedev’s vow on August 8 to “punish” Georgia denoted Russian intentions beyond restoring control over South Ossetia. When he announced on August 12 that Russian troops were ending their offensive against Georgia, he stated that Russia’s aims had been accomplished and the aggressor punished. Various observers have suggested several possible Russian reasons for the “punishment” beyond inflicting casualties and damage. These include coercing Georgia to accept Russian conditions on the status of the separatist regions, to relinquish its aspirations to join NATO,19 and to reverse democratization.20 In addition, Russia may have wanted to “punish” the West for recognizing Kosovo’s independence, for seeking to integrate Soviet successor states (which are viewed by Russia as part of its sphere of influence) into Western institutions such as the EU and NATO, and for developing oil and gas pipeline routes that bypass Russia.

Putin left the Beijing Olympics early and flew to Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia. State-controlled media showed Putin meeting with military officers and seemingly in charge of military operations. Later government-issued reports and telecasts of meetings between Medvedev and Putin during the crisis appeared to show Putin as the dominant authority. One Russian commentator assessed the meeting as showing that Medvedev would follow Putin’s hard line in foreign policy instead of his own more liberal proclivities.21 Another Russian commentator raised concerns that the hard line followed by Putin and Medvedev strengthened the influence of the so-called siloviki — the representatives and veterans of the military, security, and police agencies — over foreign and defense policy.22

Casualties and Displaced Persons. Claims of dead and injured were impossible to verify independently, since both Russia and Georgia limited media access in South Ossetia. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reported on August 11 that more than 2,000 people had been killed in South Ossetia, most of

19 “Russia ‘Punishing’ Georgia for NATO Aspirations,” RFE/RL, August 10, 2008. 20 Robert Kagan, “Putin Makes His Move,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008. 21 Open Source Center. OSC Analysis, August 11, 2008, Doc. No. FEA-749753. 22 CEDR, August 11, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-25028. 169 CRS-9 them Russian citizens. Russian military sources reported that four of its warplanes had been shot down, 13 soldiers killed, and 70 wounded. Saakashvili claimed on August 10 that Russia had killed more than 300 civilians in bombing attacks around Georgia.

According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), up to 100,000 persons were displaced by the fighting, including 56,000 living in Gori (the bulk of the city’s population). There are reports that 30,000 South Ossetians living in Tskhinvali were displaced, with most fleeing to North Ossetia, and that 12,000 Georgians fled from southern South Ossetia to other parts of Georgia.23

Some observers in Soviet successor states voiced concerns that Russia’s actions in Georgia did not bode well for their own sovereignty and independence. Russia’s Moscow Times newspaper termed Russia’s actions in Georgia “the strongest possible signal of how far [Russia] is ready to go to retain influence” in other Soviet successor states, and warned that these states are likely to “seek protection from the West,” because of fears that they one day might be invaded.24

U.S. Response

For years, the United States had urged Georgia to work within existing peace settlement frameworks for Abkhazia and South Ossetia — which allowed for Russian “peacekeeping” — while criticizing some Russian actions in the regions. This stance appeared to change during 2008, when the United States and other governments increasingly came to support Georgia’s calls for the creation of alternative negotiating mechanisms to address these “frozen” conflicts, particularly since talks under existing formats had broken down.

This U.S. policy shift was spurred by increasing Russian actions that appeared to threaten Georgia’s territorial integrity. Among these, the Russian government in March 2008 formally withdrew from economic sanctions on Abkhazia imposed by the Commonwealth of Independent States, permitting open Russian trade and investment.25 Of greater concern, President Putin issued a directive in April 2008 to step up government-to-government ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He also ordered stepped up consular services for the many “Russian citizens” in the two regions. He proclaimed that many documents issued by the separatist governments and businesses which had been established in the regions would be recognized as legitimate by the Russian government. Georgian officials and other observers raised concerns that this directive tightened and flaunted Russia’s jurisdiction over the regions and appeared to be moving toward official Russian recognition of their independence.

23 Laurence Peter, “Civilian emergency hits Georgia,” BBC News, August 12, 2008. 24 Moscow Times, August 11, 2008. 25 The economic sanctions had been approved by the Commonwealth of Independent States in January 1996 at Georgia’s behest as an inducement to Abkhazia to engage in peace negotiations with Georgia. 170 CRS-10

A meeting of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on April 23, 2008, discussed these Russian moves. Although the Security Council issued no public decision, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany stated that same day that they “are highly concerned about the latest Russian initiative to establish official ties with ... Abkhazia and South Ossetia without the consent of the Government of Georgia. We call on the Russian Federation to revoke or not to implement its decision.”26 The Russian foreign ministry claimed that Russia’s actions had been taken to boost the basic human rights of residents in the regions.

According to one U.S. media report, Bush Administration officials “were taken by surprise” by Georgia’s attempt to occupy South Ossetia in early August 2008, since the Administration had cautioned Georgia against actions that might result in a Russian military response. At the same time, a “senior U.S. official” on August 9 reportedly described the fighting in South Ossetia as localized and unlikely to escalate.27

President Bush was at the Beijing Olympics when large-scale fighting began. Although he did not cut short his trip (unlike Putin), President Bush stated on August 9 in Beijing that “Georgia is a sovereign nation, and its territorial integrity must be respected. We have urged an immediate halt to the violence and a stand-down by all troops. We call for the end of the Russian bombings.” A similar statement was issued by Secretary Rice. On August 10, Deputy National Security Adviser James Jeffrey warned Russia of a “significant long-term impact” on US-Russian relations if Moscow continued “disproportionate actions” in Georgia and urged Russia to respond favorably to Georgia’s withdrawal of forces from South Ossetia.28 Late on August 10, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza flew to Tbilisi to assist with Koucher’s EU peace plan.

On August 10, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Secretary Rice in a phone conversation that “given the continuing direct threat to the lives of Russian citizens in South Ossetia, Russian peacekeeping forces... are continuing operations to force peace on the Georgian side.” The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Zalmay Khalilzad, revealed that Lavrov had told Rice that Saakashvili “must go” as a condition for a ceasefire.29

Vice President Cheney issued a statement on August 10 after a phone conversation with Saakashvili that “Russian aggression must not go unanswered,” and that the continuation of aggression “would have serious consequences for [Russia’s] relations with the United States, as well as the broader international

26 “Germany, Great Britain, France, U.S.A. and Germany Passed Communique,” Black Sea Press, April 24, 2008. 27 Associated Press, August 11, 2008; Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2008. 28 The White House. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Dana Perino and Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder and Deputy National Security Advisor Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, August 10, 2008. 29 John Heilprin, “U.S., Russian Ambassadors Spar at UN over Georgia,” Associated Press, August 10, 2008. 171 CRS-11 community.”30 Also appearing to take a stronger stance, President Bush on August 11 referred to his conversation with Putin on August 8, stating that he had told Putin that “this violence [in Georgia] is unacceptable,” and that he had “expressed my grave concern about the disproportionate response of Russia and that we strongly condemn bombing outside of South Ossetia.”31 On August 12, Secretary Rice stated that she was encouraged by reports from French Foreign Minister Koucher in Moscow that there was progress in talks with President Medvedev about the EU peace plan, and reiterated that the United States supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and “its democratically elected government.”32

On August 10, the U.S. military began flying 2,000 Georgian troops home from Iraq after Georgia recalled them. A U.S. military spokesman stated that “we want to thank them for the great support they have given the coalition and we wish them well.” Another military spokesman stated that “we are supporting the Georgian military units that are in Iraq in their redeployment to Georgia so that they can support requirements there during the current security situation.33 On August 11, Putin criticized these U.S. flights as aiding Georgia in the conflict.

In a strong statement on August 13, President Bush called for Russia “to begin to repair the damage to its relations with the United States, Europe, and other nations, and to begin restoring its place in the world [by meeting] its commitment to cease all military activities in Georgia [and withdrawing] all Russian forces that entered Georgia in recent days.” He raised concerns that some Russian troops remained in the vicinity of Gori and Poti. He announced that he was sending Secretary Rice to France to “confer with President Sarkozy” on the EU peace plan and to Georgia, “where she will personally convey America’s unwavering support for Georgia’s democratic government [and] continue our efforts to rally the free world in the defense of a free Georgia.” He also announced that Defense Secretary Robert Gates would direct a humanitarian aid mission, which already had begun with an airlift of medical supplies to Tbilisi.34

Georgia’s relations with Euro-Atlantic countries, particularly the United States, may be set back as a result of disappointment among some in Georgia that the West did not do more to defend it from Russia. Some Georgians complained that President Bush made no public offers of assistance during the height of the fighting. In Tbilisi, however, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza on August 12 reportedly stated that the United States was developing an aid package.

30 Stephanie Gaskell, “Cheney Warns Russia: Veep Says Attack on Georgia ‘Must Not Go Unanswered’ as War Expands,” Daily News (New York), August 11, 2008. 31 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia, August 11, 2008. 32 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Situation in Georgia, August 12, 2008. 33 Kim Gamel, “U.S. Military Begins Flying Georgian Troops Home,” Associated Press, August 10, 2008. 34 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia, Urges Russia to Cease Military Operations, August 13, 2008. 172 CRS-12

International Response

Myriad world leaders and organizations have rushed to mediate the Georgia- Russia conflict. Many governments have appeared to consider that both Russia and Georgia may share blame for the recent conflict, but that the most important concern at present is implementation of a ceasefire regime and urgent humanitarian relief. These governments have criticized Russia for excessive use of force and Georgia for attempting to reintegrate South Ossetia by force.35

Immediately after the events of August 7-8, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) met daily to attempt to agree on a resolution, but Russia and China refused to agree to various texts proffered by the United States, France, and Great Britain. The latter states reportedly were working on a resolution based on an EU peace plan (see below).36 At the UNSC meeting on August 10, Russian Ambassador Vitaliy Churkin demanded that Georgia remove its troops, sign an agreement not to use force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and return to the status quo ante of early August as conditions for further talks. U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad denounced the “Russian attack on sovereign Georgia and targeting of civilians and a campaign of terror,” and warned that “Russia's relations with the United States and others would be affected by its continued assault on Georgia and its refusal to contribute to a peaceful conclusion of the crisis.” Churkin countered that it was “completely unacceptable” for Khalilzad to accuse Russia of a campaign of terror, “especially from the lips of a representative of a country whose action we are aware of in Iraq, Afghanistan and Serbia.”37

On August 10, Lavrov claimed that Rice had "incorrectly interpreted" remarks he made to her in a phone conversation earlier about Saakashvili. Lavrov emphasized that Russia “cannot consider as a partner a person [referring to Saakashvili] who gave an order to carry out war crimes,” but he rejected the inference that Moscow was demanding Saakashvili’s ouster as a condition for ending military operations.38

French President Nicolas Sarkozy — whose country had taken the rotating leadership of the EU in July 2008 — had extensive phone consultations on August 10 with Saakashvili, Medvedev, Bush, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and other European leaders to work out an EU peace proposal. Provisions included the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian armed forces to their positions prior to the start of hostilities, full respect for the sovereignty

35 Alexei Malashenko, quoted in Moscow Times, August 11, 2008. 36 Some observers pointed out that Russia and China dismissed arguments that Georgia was dealing with its own internal affairs in South Ossetia, while Moscow and Beijing reject international “interference” in how they deal with separatist problems in Chechnya, Tibet, and Xinjiang. 37 John Helprin, “Russia Says it Is Ready to Negotiate with Georgia,” Associated Press, August 10, 2008. 38 Agence France Presse, August 10, 2008. 173 CRS-13 and territorial integrity of Georgia, and international assistance.39 French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner flew to Georgia on August 10 to discuss this EU peace plan, arriving a few hours after Russian aircraft allegedly bombed near Tbilisi’s international airport. He met with Saakashvili, who agreed to the EU peace plan, and then flew to Moscow to present the plan along with Sarkozy. After Medvedev and Sarkozy worked out elements of a plan, Koucher flew back to Tbilisi to meet with Saakashvili. Saakashvili and Medvedev reportedly consulted further by phone and further agreed on ceasefire moves early on August 13.

The presidents of the three Baltic states and Poland called on August 9 for the EU and NATO to oppose the “imperialist policy” of Russia. The next day, Polish President Lech Kaczynski unveiled a plan worked out by the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine, for an international stabilization force for the South Caucasus, and recommended the plan to French President Nicolas Sarkozy for consideration by the EU. Commenting on the plan, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski stated that an EU stabilization force was needed, since “it is no longer possible for Russian soldiers alone to assure the peace in South Ossetia.” In apparent contrast to the Polish position, Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi warned against the EU adopting an “anti-Russian” stance regarding the Russia-Georgia conflict.40 EU foreign ministers met in Brussels in emergency session on August 13. They emphasized support for the EU peace proposals, called for bolstering OSCE monitoring in South Ossetia, and suggested that EU or U.N. observers might be necessary.41

Some observers have suggested that sanctions the West might take against Russia might include no longer inviting Russia to participate in the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized democracies, withdrawing support for Russia as the host of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, and re-examining Russia’s suitability for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S. analyst Ariel Cohen urged the West “to send a strong signal to Moscow that creating 19th century-style spheres of influence and redrawing the borders of the former Soviet Union is a danger to world peace.”42 EU analyst Nicu Popescu has called for the EU to sanction Russia, including by suspending talks on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.43

Several Western diplomats and analysts drew parallels between Russia’s activities in Georgia and the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia (Yugoslavia), which was aimed at forcing Serb President Slobodan Milosevic to end Serbian attacks in the Kosovo region. Moscow opposed the NATO operation. According to former Greek

39 Agence France Presse, August 10, 2008. 40 EDR, August 11, 2008, Doc. No. EUP-58004 and Doc. No. EUP-100019; August 12, 2008, Doc. No. EUP-58002. 41 Council of the European Union. Council Conclusions on the Situation in Georgia, August 13, 2008. 42 Ariel Cohen, “The Russian-Georgian War: A Challenge for the U.S. and the World,” Heritage Foundation Web Memo, August 11, 2008. 43 EUObserver, August 13, 2008. 174 CRS-14 diplomat Alex Rondos, “Russia wants to serve up to the West a textbook copy of what the West did to Serbia, but of course it’s a ghastly parody.”44 These observers criticize Russia’s disproportionate response in Georgia and stress that NATO’s military aircraft and artillery did not target civilians in Serbia, as Russian forces allegedly targeted ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and across the border. They also stress that NATO halted operations after Serbia pulled its forces out of Kosovo and accepted international peacekeeping, while Russia continued operations after Georgia’s withdrawal of troops from South Ossetia and its calls for a ceasefire.

While some commentators objected to Georgia’s military incursion into South Ossetia as unjustifiable, others argued that Georgia had been provoked by Russia and South Ossetia and had been forced to counter-attack. Taking the former view, London’s Independent argued on August 10 that “U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ... should, while defending Georgia's sovereignty, also point out to President Saakashvili that the US cannot underwrite a bellicose approach towards its separatist regions.45 Taking the latter view, British analyst David Clark argued on August 11 that Georgia’s “resort to offensive operations came at the end of a long period of rising tension in which Russia had done everything it could to stir up trouble and provoke a reaction.”46 Similarly, U.S. analyst Robert Kagan argued that Russia “precipitated a war against Georgia by encouraging South Ossetian rebels,” and that Saakashvili “[fell] into Putin’s trap.”47

Observers who took this view also tended to view Russia’s large-scale military operations against Georgia as disproportionate. Great Britain’s The Guardian argued on August 10 that Russia “lost no time in shedding whatever moral advantage it felt it had,” because of Georgia’s apparent attack on South Ossetia, “by bombing Georgian targets — civilian as well as military, — far removed from the zone of conflict.48

Taking a seemingly dimmer view of Russian intentions, U.S. analyst Ronald Asmus has stated that “despite everything we may have hoped for we are in a new geopolitical competition in the old Soviet spheres of influence. We may lose Georgia. We may lose the ... best chance for a democratic future in the Caucasus. The next target for Moscow will be Ukraine.”49 One Italian commentator asserted that Russia’s actions in Georgia represented the beginning of Russia’s efforts to roll back the Euro-Atlantic integration of Eastern European and Soviet successor states.50

44 Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2008. 45 It conditioned this by adding that “the Russians should not be allowed to get away with supporting breakaway regions within Georgia.” 46 David Clark, The Guardian, August 11, 2008. 47 Robert Kagan, “Putin Makes His Move,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008. 48 “South Ossetia: Much Ventured, Little Gained,” The Guardian, August 11, 2008. 49 Ronald Asmus, Christian Science Monitor, August 11, 2008; Ronald Asmus, “Black Sea Watershed,” GMF News, August 11, 2008. 50 Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), August 12, 2008, Doc. No. (continued...) 175 CRS-15

Some observers have raised concerns that Russia’s alleged attempts to bomb the Georgian sections of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus [gas] Pipeline (SCP) were Russian attempts to disrupt Caspian energy pipelines that it does not control. The BTC pipeline provides oil to Europe and the United States. The SCP provides gas to Turkey and to EU-member Greece, and may be further extended to other EU members. Azerbaijan’s pledge to provide gas through a prospective Nabucco pipeline that would run through Georgia and Turkey to Europe also might face greater Russian opposition, as might the proposed trans- Caspian oil and gas pipelines, which would provide Central Asian countries with non-Russian export routes to the West.

International Humanitarian Assistance. Many countries and international organizations have launched humanitarian assistance efforts. Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, announced a grant of one million euros (1.5 million dollars) for civilians affected by the conflict in South Ossetia. A plane loaded with humanitarian cargo planned to leave for Georgia on August 11. Russia has dispatched two convoys of humanitarian supplies to Tskhinvali, and UNHCR sent a first planeload of such aid to Tbilisi on August 12. The International Committee of the Red Cross has appealed for $7.4 million for the emergency medical needs of displaced people.51

Georgia and the NATO Membership Action Plan. Some observers in Georgia and the West have argued that NATO’s failure to offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the April 2008 NATO summit emboldened Russia’s aggressiveness toward Georgia. Others consider that NATO’s pledge that Georgia eventually would become a member, as well as Georgia’s ongoing movement toward integration with the West, spurred Russian aggression.52 Saakashvili argued on August 10 that Russia wanted to crush Georgia’s independence and end its bid to join NATO. British analyst David Clark on August 11 endorsed the view that NATO should now quickly provide Georgia with a MAP.53 Conversely, London’s Independent on August 10 stated that “thinking hard” about giving NATO membership to countries with separatist conflicts had turned out to be a good policy, and suggested that the conflict is “a setback to Georgia's NATO ambitions.”

France and Germany, which had voiced reservations at the April 2008 NATO summit about extending a MAP to Georgia, may argue even more forcefully against admitting Georgia, citing both the higher level of tensions over the separatist regions, Georgia’s military incursion into South Ossetia, and the danger of war with Russia. Although the United States strongly supported a MAP for Georgia at the April 2008 NATO summit, recent events may have dimmed this prospect. A

50 (...continued) EUP-25002. 51 Laurence Peter, “Civilian emergency hits Georgia,” BBC News, August 12, 2008. 52 For background, see CRS Report RL34415, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, by Paul Gallis, Paul Belkin, Carl Ek, Julie Kim, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel. 53 David Clark, The Guardian, August 11, 2008. 176 CRS-16

Slovakia commentator argued that “it is difficult to get around the impression that Georgian President Saakashvili took leave of his senses when he ordered his army to ‘liberate’ South Ossetia.... now there is danger that they have blocked their path to the Alliance for a long time, if not definitively. Moreover, the West will think twice whether it will become engaged on their side at all. This is precisely what Moscow wanted the most.”54

An emergency meeting of NATO ambassadors on August 12, 2008 reiterated “in very strong terms” support for a sovereign, independent Georgia, and “condemned and deplored [Russia’s] excessive, disproportionate use of force,” according to a report by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. He termed Georgia “a highly respected partner of NATO,” and stated that the question of a MAP for Georgia remains “very much alive” and may be decided in December 2008. At the same time, there was evidence of hesitancy among some NATO members about moving forward with a MAP for Georgia at the December 2008 session.55

Congressional Response. Congress has long been at the forefront in U.S. support for Georgia, including humanitarian, security, and democratization assistance as well as support for conflict resolution. Among recent actions, the Senate approved S.Res. 550 (Biden) on June 3, 2008, calling on Russia to disavow the establishment of direct government-to-government ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Congress had begun its August 2008 recess when the Russia-Georgia conflict began, but many members spoke out on the issue. On August 8, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman urged all parties to cease fighting and for Russia to withdraw its troops and respect Georgia’s territorial integrity.56 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden called for U.S. officials and the U.N. Security Council to facilitate negotiations between the conflicting parties and stated that “Moscow has a particular obligation to avoid further escalation of the situation.”57 Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen stated that Russia’s invasion of Georgia caused little surprise, given Russia’s other increasingly aggressive foreign policy actions, and called for an international peacekeeping force for South Ossetia.58 Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin on August 10 averred that the United States does “not have much impact, I believe, in terms of [Administration]

54 EDR, August 10, 2008, Doc. No. EUP-59002. 55 Robert Wielaard, NATO Extends Warm Support for Georgia,” Associated Press, August 12, 2008; “Georgia Still on Track to Join NATO, Alliance Chief Says,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 12, 2008. Russia’s NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin denounced Scheffer’s comments and demanded that NATO colleagues condemn Saakashvili. 56 “Statement by Congressman Howard Berman, Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on Escalating Violence in South Ossetia,” States News Service, August 8, 2008. 57 “Biden Issues Statement on Continued Violence in South Ossetia,” States News Service, August 8, 2008. 58 “Ros-Lehtinen Comments on Outbreak of Violence in Georgia,” States News Service, August 8, 2008. She stated that Russian aggression against Georgia was “another reason for the Administration to withdraw the nuclear cooperation agreement from consideration by Congress.” 177 CRS-17 declarations anymore,” but should work with Europe to make clear to Russia that its action “is way out of line” and to convince it to halt aggression in Georgia.59 On August 12, Senator Biden warned Russia that its aggression in Georgia jeopardized congressional support for legislation to collaborate with Russia on nuclear energy production and to repeal the Jackson-Vanik conditions on U.S. trade with Russia.60

Senator John McCain, the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who had previously visited South Ossetia, condemned the Russian military incursion on August 8 and warned Russia that there could be severe, long-term negative consequences to its relations with the United States and Europe. He also stated on August 12 that he had phoned Saakashvili to offer support. Senator Barack Obama, Chairman of the Senate Europe Subcommittee, condemned the Russian military incursion into Georgia on August 8 and called for Georgia to refrain from using force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and for all sides to pursue a political settlement that addresses the status of the regions. Both Senators McCain and Obama have urged NATO to soon extend a MAP to Georgia.61

59 Ben Feller, “Bush Seeks to Contain Violent Conflict in Georgia,” Associated Press, August 10, 2008. 60 “Op-Ed: Russia Must Stand Down,” States News Service, August 12, 2008. 61 Steven Hurst, “McCain: Today We're All Georgians,” Associated Press Worldstream, August 12, 2008; Steven Hurst, “Obama Notes Georgian Role in Crisis,” Associated Press Worldstream, August 12, 2008. 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199

200 AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

Sviluppi recenti

Il processo di stabilizzazione del quadro di sicurezza e di ricostruzione dell’Afghanistan sta attraversando una fase di instabilità legata all’accresciuta pressione dell’insorgenza; sul piano militare essa si sta concentrando sulle principali vie di comunicazione e sulle infrastrutture logistiche, soprattutto nelle zone a sud e ad est. Nella capitale cresce l’allarme a seguito di alcuni gravi recenti episodi (dall’attentato all’Ambasciata indiana all’attacco alle truppe francesi a Surobi).

Nella regione est nel periodo gennaio-luglio 2008 si è registrato un incremento degli attacchi di oltre il 67% rispetto allo stesso periodo del 2007. Nella regione ovest, in un contesto relativamente meno pericoloso, si è registrata tuttavia una maggiore capacità di penetrazione degli elementi anti-governativi, in particolare nella Provincia di Farah e recentemente in alcune aree della Provincia di Herat (da ultimo il 7 settembre un convoglio italiano è stato colpito - senza danni ai soldati - da un attentatore suicida fattosi esplodere al passaggio di un veicolo civile della componente militare italiana di ritorno da una cerimonia di posa della prima pietra di un centro di accoglienza per le donne finanziato dal PRT di Herat e situato a pochi chilometri ad ovest di Herat). L’attacco a guida USA sotto il cappello dell’Operazione Enduring Freedom condotto contro obiettivi dell’insorgenza il 22 agosto scorso a Shindand (Herat), che ha causato 90 vittime, ha riaperto il dibattito sulle vittime civili.

Nel quadro del deterioramento della cornice di sicurezza e nel più ampio contesto della graduale afghanizzazione della sicurezza, è stato approvato dal JCMB del 10 settembre a Kabul l’aumento a 132.000 unità dell’organico dell’esercito afghano - che partecipa oramai al 70% delle operazioni di ISAF. Tale decisione rileva ai fini della sostenibilità finanziaria per la comunità internazionale, chiamata a fornire il proprio sostegno. Anche la polizia afghana, portata ad un organico obiettivo di 82.000 unità, svolge in questo ambito un ruolo critico ed in tal senso occorre puntare ad un suo adeguato livello di sviluppo e preparazione.

Situazione interna

Il quadro interno afgano, a fronte degli obiettivi progressi compiuti, continua a presentare elementi di fragilità (debolezza delle istituzioni, crescente diffusione della corruzione, mancata affermazione dello stato di diritto, potenziale dell’insorgenza) sui quali deve indirizzarsi l’impegno congiunto della comunità internazionale e del Governo di Kabul. Il prossimo ciclo elettorale che si aprirà nel giugno 2009 con le elezioni presidenziali, seguite nel 2010 dalle elezioni per il 203 rinnovo dell’Assemblea parlamentare, rappresenta una sfida cruciale per la giovane democrazia afghana. L’assenza di controllo su alcune aree del Paese incide sul processo elettorale. I ritardi rischiano di pregiudicare il complesso lavoro organizzativo cui la comunità è pronta a fornire un contributo.

Quadro internazionale

La stabilizzazione afghana ha assunto una dimensione regionale ed in un’ottica di lungo periodo richiede una strategia complessiva estesa ai Paesi della Regione, a cominciare dal Pakistan, con il coinvolgimento di Islamabad nel dialogo con Kabul e con la comunità internazionale nel contrasto alle attività dell’insorgenza. Il deterioramento del quadro di sicurezza in Afghanistan è legato anche alla crescente instabilità nelle aree di confine con il Pakistan, dove nelle ultime settimane sono state condotte delle operazioni antiterrorismo sotto il cappello di Enduring Freedom. Sono continuate in Pakistan le operazioni dell’esercito pakistano nelle aree tribali a ridosso della frontiera afghana: costituisce un segnale positivo anche la messa fuori legge in Pakistan del TTB, la principale organizzazione talebana del Paese.

La ripresa degli incontri della Commissione Triparta coordinata da ISAF con la partecipazione degli Stati Maggiori della Difesa di Afghanistan e Pakistan costituisce un recente significativo sviluppo. Ma soprattutto il gesto di Karzai che ha voluto incontrare il neo eletto Zardari è particolarmente incoraggiante per i rapporti fra Kabul e Islamabad. E’ stata invece nuovamente rinviata la riunione d’area RECC (Regional Economic Cooperation Forum) già prevista lo scorso agosto, il cui svolgimento ad Islamabad con l’attivo coinvolgimento afghano costituirebbe un positivo segnale. I più recenti sviluppi in Pakistan, con le dimissioni dell’ex Presidente Musharraf e l’elezione di Zardari potrebbero ora favorire l’avvio di una nuova fase nei rapporti tra Kabul e Islamabad.

In materia di contrasto ai narcotici, problematica intimamente legata a quella dell’insorgenza, il rapporto 2008 dell’UNODC sulla produzione di droga in Afghanistan fornisce elementi per un cauto ottimismo: la coltivazione di oppio è diminuita del 19% rispetto all’anno precedente; tuttavia a causa dell’intensificazione delle colture, la produzione complessiva è scesa solamente del 6%. E’ inoltre aumentato il numero delle province opium-free, passate da 13 a 18. Significativo per l’Italia il dato concernente la Provincia di Herat, dove la superficie coltivata a papavero è diminuita dell’83% nel 2007/2008. Il 98% della produzione di oppio proviene da sette province del sud-ovest del Paese, le stesse province dove la situazione di sicurezza presenta maggiori problemi per l’intensità delle attività di insorgenza e per la presenza di nuclei di criminalità organizzata. I successi sin qui ottenuti sono ascrivibili alla maggiore sensibilità e all’azione degli amministratori locali, che hanno condotto una campagna di sensibilizzazione degli agricoltori. Si tratta di risultati incoraggianti che assumono un rilievo 204 significativo per gli stretti legami con il problema dell’insorgenza e della stabilizzazione del quadro di sicurezza.

Sul piano internazionale la Conferenza di Parigi dello scorso 12 giugno ha consentito di rilanciare l’impegno politico reciproco del Governo afghano e della comunità internazionale per la stabilizzazione e la ricostruzione del Paese. La Conferenza ha confermato le priorità dell’azione congiunta sotto i tre pilastri della sicurezza, della governance e rule of law e dello sviluppo economico e sociale. L’atteso sforzo di razionalizzazione dell’impegno internazionale e di riconduzione ad unità delle molteplici forme di intervento ha beneficiato della nomina del nuovo Rappresentante Speciale del Segretario Generale, il norvegese Kai Eide, che dove ora concretizzarsi in una migliore articolazione di UNAMA.

Ruolo dell’Italia

L’Afghanistan è il Paese nel quale l’intervento dell’Italia è cresciuto e si è articolato maggiormente nel più breve arco di tempo. Oggi la nostra azione politico-diplomatica, l’impiego di forze militari e di polizia, l’attività di cooperazione per la ricostruzione materiale e istituzionale vedono presenti una pluralità di attori. Il livello e la natura dello sforzo e delle risorse impiegate ci portano ad impegnare gli interlocutori afghani in un dialogo serrato volto a sensibilizzarli sull’esigenza di operare per il conseguimento graduale ma tangibile di progressi politici sul piano della governance e della capacità istituzionale.

L’Italia continua ad essere uno dei maggiori contributori di truppe ad ISAF con circa 2400 soldati (il quarto Paese dopo USA, Regno Unito e Germania al pari di Canada e prima di Paesi Bassi, Francia e Polonia). Le Forze italiane esercitano il comando della Regione Ovest una delle cinque in cui è suddiviso il territorio afghano. L’Italia è lead nation a Herat con il Provincial Reconstraction Team che svolge attività di addestramento, ricostruzione e assistenza umanitaria.

L’Italia partecipa inoltre con ufficiali dei Carabinieri e della Guardia di Finanza alla missione PESD EUPOL, con compiti di formazione di agenti afgani nella provincia di Herat e di addestramento della polizia di frontiera. Siamo il secondo contributore ad EUPOL dopo la Germania.

Continua ad essere rilevante anche l’impegno italiano per la ricostruzione e il sostegno alle istituzioni. Più recentemente sono stati approvati alcuni nuovi significativi interventi a sostegno del processo elettorale in fase di avvio, un nuovo contributo all’Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, il fondo fiduciario multi- donatori co-gestito dal Governo afgano e dalla Banca Mondiale, con il quale intendiamo sottolineare il suo ruolo di strumento di supporto al bilancio afgano, di coordinamento degli aiuti e di raggiungimento di una maggiore ownership afgana. Ulteriori interventi saranno inoltre rivolti ad iniziative di sminamento umanitario e contrasto al narcotraffico.

205 Negli ultimi mesi l’Italia ha ulteriormente innalzato il profilo della sua presenza in Afghanistan grazie alla nomina di due funzionari in posizioni di altissimo rilievo. L’Ambasciatore Gentilini ha assunto l’incarico di Rappresentante Civile della NATO e dal 1° settembre l’Ambasciatore Sequi è subentrato allo spagnolo Vendrell come Rappresentante Speciale dell’Unione Europea per l’Afghanistan. Tali incarichi di prestigio e responsabilità consentiranno di conferire ulteriore visibilità al nostro ruolo a sostegno del processo di stabilizzazione del Paese e di fornire un contributo fattivo all’azione di coordinamento dell’impegno internazionale.

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Affari esteri – Note di politica internazionale n. 3 29 maggio 2008 La situazione in Afghanistan

Nonostante i progressi compiuti in Afghanistan nel • Va inoltre tenuto presente che con la ripresa processo di ricostruzione civile e istituzionale – di iniziativa dei taleban le azioni di stampo visibili, tra l’altro, nella rinnovata partecipazione prettamente terroristico decrescono femminile alla vita sociale e politica e nell’ampia percentualmente rispetto a forme varie di scolarizzazione – il processo di stabilizzazione e di guerriglia, che possono evidentemente rafforzamento delle istituzioni democraticamente contare sull’appoggio crescente di settori della elette registra ancora elementi di criticità. popolazione, per ragioni etniche, di comunanza di costumi, religiose, o anche Il profilo di maggiore preoccupazione concerne in solo per la profonda delusione rispetto al particolare la precaria situazione della sicurezza, nuovo corso del Paese, incapace di garantire soprattutto nella parte meridionale del Paese e un livello sufficiente di sicurezza e di nelle zone al confine con il Pakistan, nelle quali progresso economico. Tali nuovi caratteri si è assistito a una progressiva ripresa di influenza dell’opposizione armata al governo di Kabul e degli stessi talebani. Fra le cause delle rinnovate alle forze occidentali riflettono probabilmente difficoltà: una differenziazione anche nel fronte della • gli appoggi che i taleban e gli altri combattenti guerriglia, nel quale l’elemento contro il governo di Kabul ricevono lungo la prevalentemente “internazionalista” islamico, porosa frontiera nord-occidentale del rappresentato dal mosaico di forze facenti Pakistan riferimento ad Al Qaeda, è affiancato dai • la tradizionale struttura tribale della società risorgenti taleban, più radicati nel territorio e afghana che non permette il raggiungimento di per i quali proprio la vittoria in Afghanistan una vittoria militare risolutiva, che costituisce l’obiettivo ultimo. necessariamente – stante la vastità del Paese La necessità di fronteggiare un nuovo livello del – dovrebbe investire pochi punti nevralgici conflitto afghano ha creato tensioni in seno alle • la presenza militare internazionale, articolata forze militari internazionali e ripetute esortazioni nella missione Enduring Freedom a guida dei Paesi i cui contingenti sono impegnati nelle USA, e nella missione ISAF a guida NATO, aree più “calde”: a un maggiore impegno degli altri apparsa fin qui non priva di contraddizioni, non contingenti nello sforzo bellico, sia con l’aumento riuscendo l’amalgama tra il carattere di degli effettivi che mediante una ridislocazione e combattimento diretto della prima e quello di una ridefinizione delle regole di ingaggio dei peace keeping della seconda. L’estensione di contingenti medesimi.. ISAF a buona parte del territorio meridionale Non mancano inoltre altri contrasti tra le forze (luglio 2006) e orientale (ottobre 2006) multinazionali e tra queste e il governo di afghano, resa possibile dall’aumento degli Kabul, in ordine anzitutto alla strategia di effettivi, che hanno superato le 40.000 unità, contrasto alla guerriglia: l’approccio britannico, più ha ulteriormente acuito il contrasto, soprattutto portato alla trattativa con elementi locali, è stato laddove ISAF è subentrata a Enduring criticato dagli americani. Le modalità per Freedom, con una drastica caduta delle combattere le colture oppiacee registrano operazioni di contrasto diretto alla guerriglia; parimenti un disaccordo di fondo tra USA e britannici, con gli americani più favorevoli a un

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approccio di sradicamento tramite irrorazione avvalersi di scudi umani; inoltre, sono state aperte dall’alto, senza le mediazioni indispensabili per inchieste per la verifica dei fatti. una distruzione sistematica e concordata. Anche i Intanto la situazione sul campo ha fatto registrare rapporti fra il presidente Karzai e Londra non sono numerose situazioni critiche per il contingente attualmente facili: agli inglesi è stato contestato di italiano, con la morte di alcuni militari in diversi voler trattare sotto banco con elementi taleban episodi terroristici, che hanno fatto salire a dodici il moderati – cosa che peraltro anche Karzai non contributo di vite umane dei nostri soldati, a cui pare voler escludere – mentre il governo afgano ha hanno sempre corrisposto dibattiti parlamentari rifiutato di accettare il britannico Paddy Ashdown alla presenza dei rappresentanti del Governo: nel quale nuovo inviato dell’ONU nel Paese, con poteri contesto di una crescita esponenziale degli di coordinamento accresciuti. attentati anche nella capitale, il 6 dicembre l'Italia Va infine ricordato che il recente fenomeno della ha assunto la guida anche del comando crescita dei prezzi mondiali di alcune derrate di regionale ISAF della capitale, per un periodo di base, come il frumento, rischia di costituire per otto mesi. l’Afghanistan un ulteriore fattore di tensioni e Tra gennaio e febbraio 2008 si è manifestato il instabilità, poiché nel paese il prezzo del grano è disappunto statunitense per l’insufficiente quasi raddoppiato nell’ultimo anno, e ciò impegno degli alleati NATO nella lotta alla evidentemente colpisce anzitutto le fasce più guerriglia. In proposito il Segretario alla Difesa povere della popolazione. D’altra parte, la naturale Robert Gates ha assunto l’iniziativa di inviare una tendenza di mercato a incrementare la produzione lettera a tutti paesi alleati con una esplicita nazionale di frumento trova un limite nelle richiesta di invio di forze e risorse ulteriori in distorsioni causate dalle condizioni complessive Afghanistan. del paese, in cui le bande criminali, i taleban e i signori della guerra impongono la coltivazione Il 7-8 febbraio 2008 si è svolta a Vilnius (Lituania) dell’oppio – anche se i prezzi di esso hanno la riunione dei ministri della difesa dei paesi registrato un decremento –, ovvero rendono assai della NATO nel corso della quale sono emerse oneroso iniziare a coltivare il grano, poiché opinioni diverse rispetto alle posizioni statunitensi detengono il controllo del credito, esercitato in e soltanto la Francia ha preannunciato la modo usurario. disponibilità ad inviare propri uomini anche nelle regioni “calde” dell’Afghanistan.

Alla metà di febbraio un attentatore suicida ha Gli sviluppi più recenti provocato, a Kandahar, una strage che ha contato Nonostante gli sforzi della coalizione ottanta morti e decine di feriti. internazionale in Afghanistan, negli ultimi dodici Il 20 marzo 2008 il Consiglio di sicurezza delle mesi si è assistito ad una escalation degli Nazioni Unite ha approvato all'unanimità una attacchi terroristici: pur sottoposti a una forte risoluzione predisposta dall'Italia, con la quale pressione della NATO nella parte meridionale del si proroga di 12 mesi il mandato della missione Paese, i taleban si sono mostrati in grado di ONU in Afghanistan (UNAMA). La risoluzione portare attacchi micidiali ovunque. Nella provincia amplia i poteri del nuovo inviato delle Nazioni occidentale di Herat (relativamente tranquilla e, Unite, designato il 6 marzo dal Segretario come si è ricordato, sotto controllo italiano) generale nella persona del diplomatico norvegese un’ampia offensiva condotta all’inizio di maggio da Kai Eide, consentendogli di poter coordinare in via truppe USA, ha causato la morte di numerosi civili. diretta gli aiuti internazionali all'Afghanistan. La questione del coinvolgimento di vittime civili nelle azioni militari contro i taleban ha assunto Dal 2 al 4 aprile 2008 si è svolto a Bucarest un contorni sempre più preoccupanti, provocando vive importante vertice della NATO, che in ordine proteste del presidente Karzai – che ha altresì alla situazione afghana e alla missione ISAF ha disposto la creazione di un’apposita commissione approvato un piano strategico in quattro punti che d’inchiesta - e durissime reazioni del Parlamento di ribadisce “l’impegno di lungo periodo” in Kabul. La NATO ha più volte attribuito la Afghanistan. Anche a Bucarest si sono riprodotte responsabilità ai taleban e alla loro tattica di le linee di divisione già registrate a Vilnius fra

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paesi più impegnati (e soprattutto più coinvolti sui ISAF, pur senza aumenti del contingente o fronti pericolosi) e paesi che non ritengono cambiamenti nella natura di fondo dell’intervento. possibile aumentare il loro livello di impegno. Una Cinque giorni dopo, un analogo orientamento è importante conferma è stata rappresentata dalla stato espresso dal Ministro degli Esteri Franco posizione della Francia che ha ribadito la propria Frattini che – secondo quanto riportato dalla disponibilità verso le richieste di un maggiore stampa - si sarebbe pronunciato in senso impegno, provenienti principalmente dagli USA, favorevole a una revisione delle regole di ingaggio assicurando l’invio di un nuovo contingente di 700 e delle dislocazioni dei reparti italiani in uomini. Oltre alla Francia, altri undici paesi hanno Afghanistan. Frattini ha peraltro posto l’accento dichiarato di essere pronti ad aumentare il numero sulla necessità di rimettere a punto la direzione degli uomini impegnati sul territorio. strategica di marcia della missione ISAF in occasione della Conferenza che si aprirà a Parigi Il 27 aprile lo stesso Presidente afghano Karzai è il prossimo 12 giugno. Sulle nuove prospettive sfuggito all’ennesimo attentato, stavolta perpetrato della posizione del Governo italiano si è espresso nel cuore della capitale con lancio di razzi e positivamente il Segretario Generale della NATO, successiva sparatoria, mentre era in corso una Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. manifestazione pubblica, alla quale peraltro presenziava anche l’Ambasciatore italiano Sequi. I Le posizioni dei due Ministri italiani sono state taleban hanno rivendicato l’attentato. ulteriormente precisate il 26 maggio a Bruxelles, in occasione della loro partecipazione al Consiglio Il 7 maggio il Consigliere Fernando Gentilini è dei Ministri UE congiunto Esteri/Difesa, e a stato nominato Alto rappresentante NATO a seguito di incontri bilaterali con i vertici della Kabul: in tal modo l’Italia ha ottenuto un ulteriore NATO e della politica estera europea: ribadita la riconoscimento del proprio impegno, e il disponibilità a una ridiscussione dei caveat posti Presidente della Camera On. Gianfranco Fini ha dalle autorità italiane all’impiego del nostro inviato a Gentilini un messaggio di congratulazioni, contingente, è stato escluso che le truppe italiane nel quale si sottolinea tra l’altro la delicatezza possano essere spostate in via definitiva, e dell’incarico. Va infatti precisato che la funzione soprattutto che la destinazione di spostamenti conferita a Gentilini implica da un lato il provvisori debba essere necessariamente la zona coordinamento delle iniziative dell’Alleanza “calda” meridionale dell’Afghanistan. La flessibilità Atlantica con quelle intraprese nel paese dalle altre dovrà consistere anzitutto nell’accorciamento da organizzazioni internazionali; e dall’altro la 72 a 6 ore dei tempi a disposizione dell’Esecutivo costante comunicazione delle autorità di Kabul con per autorizzare ad hoc interventi fuori area di il Quartier Generale della NATO. nostri contingenti, che avverranno laddove gli A fronte dei motivi di soddisfazione, l’Italia ha alleati lo richiedano. Inoltre, anche gli italiani dovuto purtroppo registrare anche l’ennesimo potranno reciprocamente beneficiare nelle loro attentato nella rischiosa area di Mushai, 30 km. zone dell’appoggio di militari di altri paesi, qualora a sud della capitale. Sull’episodio, che ritenuto necessario. Il Ministro Frattini ha più volte fortunatamente non ha provocato morti, il governo espresso l’impegno del Governo a informare il ha riferito il 20 maggio con un’informativa Parlamento in merito alle nuove regole di impiego all’Assemblea della Camera dei Deputati. del contingente italiano in Afghanistan. Il neo Ministro della Difesa Ignazio La Russa, in visita il 16 maggio al contingente italiano operante in Libano nell’ambito della missione UNIFIL, si è intrattenuto con la stampa anche in merito alla situazione afghana, rispetto alla quale si è detto Fonti: ANSA; ISPI; www.equilibri.net disponibile a una maggiore flessibilità nell’impiego delle truppe italiane che partecipano alla missione

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Difesa – Missioni militari n. 2 29 maggio 2008

LE MISSIONI MILITARI IN AFGHANISTAN

Dopo gli attentati terroristici dell’11 settembre L’Italia ha partecipato all’operazione dal 18 2001 che hanno colpito gli Stati Uniti d’America, il novembre 2001 con compiti di sorveglianza, Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, il giorno interdizione marittima, nonché di monitoraggio di successivo agli eventi, ha adottato la risoluzione n. eventuali traffici illeciti. Tali attività sono state svolte 1368, nel cui preambolo si riconosceva il diritto di inizialmente da un Gruppo navale d'altura guidato legittima difesa individuale e collettiva degli Stati dalla portaeromobili Garibaldi. Successivamente la Uniti. Va aggiunto che il paragrafo 1 definiva gli partecipazione è stata limitata all’impiego di una attacchi terroristici “una minaccia alla pace” e nel fregata. Dal 15 marzo al 15 settembre 2003 è stata paragrafo 5 si affermava che il Consiglio era “pronto operativa in Afghanistan la Task Force "Nibbio", ad adottare tutte le misure necessarie per rispondere costituita dal circa 1.000 unità dell'Esercito, con il agli attacchi terroristici”. compito di effettuare attività di interdizione d'area Lo stesso 12 settembre 2001, il Consiglio atlantico nella zona di Khowst, al confine tra Afghanistan e ha adottato una determinazione in cui si affermava Pakistan, impedendo infiltrazioni di talebani e di che, qualora fosse stato accertata l’origine esterna terroristi. degli attacchi terroristici, avrebbe trovato La partecipazione italiana alla missione si è applicazione l’articolo 5 del Trattato NATO, ai conclusa il 3 dicembre 2006. sensi del quale un attacco armato contro un ISAF membro dell’Alleanza deve essere considerato come un attacco contro tutti i membri L'ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) è dell’Alleanza stessa. stata costituita a seguito della risoluzione del A breve, è risultato chiaro che la grande Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU n. 1386 del 20 maggioranza della comunità internazionale dicembre 2001 che, come previsto dall'Accordo di concordava, o non nutriva in ogni caso obiezioni, Bonn, ha autorizzato la predisposizione di una forza all’equiparazione dell’azione terroristica dell’11 di intervento internazionale con il compito di settembre con un attacco armato idoneo a garantire, nell'area di Kabul, un ambiente sicuro giustificare una conseguente reazione ai sensi a tutela dell'Autorità provvisoria afghana, guidata dell’articolo 51 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite. Una da Hamid Karzai, che si è insediata il 22 dicembre coalizione di Stati a guida statunitense ha quindi 2001 e del personale delle Nazioni Unite presente autonomamente avviato il 7 ottobre l’operazione nel Paese. Enduring Freedom con l’obiettivo di colpire le La missione è iniziata nel gennaio 2002 ed è stata cellule dell’organizzazione terroristica Al Qaeda inizialmente svolta dai contingenti di 19 Paesi sotto presenti in Afghanistan, nonché il regime talebano. la guida inglese. Le operazioni militari, iniziate il 7 ottobre con una Il 13 giugno 2002 la Loya Jirga (l'Assemblea serie di attacchi aerei contro obiettivi militari e basi tradizionale) ha eletto il premier Hamid Karzai alla terroristiche in territorio afgano, sono proseguite nei guida del governo per un periodo di due anni, fino due mesi successivi provocando la caduta del allo svolgimento delle elezioni generali, che si sono regime talebano e la costituzione, a seguito della tenute il 9 ottobre 2004 e che hanno confermato Conferenza di Bonn del 5 dicembre, svoltasi sotto presidente Karzai. il patrocinio dell'ONU, di un governo ad interim, con il Successivamente il vertice NATO di Praga del compito di governare il paese per i primi sei mesi del novembre 2002, ha approvato un nuovo concetto 2002. militare che stabilisce un approccio globale per la L’operazione ha progressivamente sviluppato una difesa contro il terrorismo e consente alle forze diversa configurazione e si è proposta di realizzare dell’Alleanza di intervenire ovunque i suoi interessi lo la definitiva pacificazione e stabilizzazione del richiedano (quindi anche fuori dall’area dei Paesi Paese, oltre che con lo svolgimento di attività militari membri). Anche a seguito di tali determinazioni, il 16 di contrasto degli insorti e delle formazioni terroriste, aprile 2003 il Consiglio Nord Atlantico (NAC) ha anche attraverso un supporto alle operazioni deciso l'assunzione, da parte della NATO, del umanitarie. comando, del coordinamento e della

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pianificazione dell’operazione ISAF, senza mentre le “Coalition Forces, sono quegli elementi modificarne nome, bandiera e compiti. La decisione militari nazionali della Coalizione guidati dagli Stati è stata resa operativa l'11 agosto 2003, con Uniti che conducono la guerra al terrorismo in l'assunzione della guida della prima missione Afghanistan […] ISAF non è parte delle Forze della militare extraeuropea dell'Alleanza Atlantica. Coalizione" e rimane pertanto distinta da Enduring La risoluzione ONU n. 1510 del 13 ottobre 2003, Freedom, mantenendo le due missioni differenti oltre a prevedere l’ulteriore proroga del mandato di mandati e rispondendo a catene di Comando ISAF, ha, altresì, autorizzato l'espansione delle differenti, l'una facente capo al Comando Supremo attività della missione anche al di fuori dell'area Alleato della NATO ed al Consiglio Atlantico, l'altra al di Kabul. Central Command statunitense di Tampa (Florida). La guida politica dell’operazione è esercitata dal Le due missioni rimangono però in costante NAC, in stretto coordinamento con i Paesi non coordinamento operativo, attraverso il Deputy Chief NATO che contribuiscono all’operazione. Secondo il of Staff Operations di ISAF, statunitense, memorandum sottoscritto fra i Paesi partecipanti e responsabile del raccordo con le Forze di Enduring l'Autorità provvisoria afghana il 4 gennaio 2002, Freedom.

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Lo svolgimento della missione ISAF è articolato in 450 unità, di cui 400 militari dell’Esercito a Kabul e cinque fasi: 50 unità dell’Aeronautica, con compiti di supporto, di ¾ la prima fase ha riguardato l’attività di analisi e stanza ad Abu Dhabi (negli Emirati Arabi). preparazione; L’Italia ha assunto, dal giugno 2005, il compito di ¾ la seconda fase ha avuto l’obiettivo di realizzare coordinare la FSB di Herat ed i PRT della regione l’espansione sull’intero territorio afgano, in 4 ovest del Paese (che comprende le province di distinti stages che hanno riguardato in senso Farah, Badghis e Ghor, oltre a quella omonima di antiorario le aree Nord, Ovest, Sud e d Est; Herat). L’impegno italiano, accresciuto in questa ¾ la terza fase è volta a realizzare la fase da 600 a 2.000 unità, è stato ulteriormente stabilizzazione del Paese; rafforzato anche in vista dell'assunzione del ¾ la quarta fase riguarda il periodo di transizione; comando ISAF, che è stato ricoperto dall’Italia dal 4 ¾ la quinta fase prevede il rischieramento dei agosto 2005 al 4 maggio 2006. Attualmente la contingenti. presenza italiana è articolata in: I quattro stages della seconda fase sono stati ¾ un contingente, la cui componente principale è realizzati progressivamente con la sostituzione degli costituita dalla Brigata alpina "Taurinense", Stati Uniti, da parte della NATO, nella guida delle presente a Kabul, in quanto il Comando operazioni di stabilizzazione nelle diverse aree del regionale della capitale afgana è posto sotto Paese. La fase di espansione è stata completata il comando italiano dal dicembre 2007; nell’ottobre 2006 con l’assunzione del controllo ISAF ¾ un contingente di stanza nella regione di Herat anche sulla regione orientale del paese. (anche questa posta sotto il comando italiano La fase dell’espansione è stata realizzata attraverso dal giugno 2005) che coordina le attività del la costituzione in ogni area di una FSB (Forward FSB e dei PRT della regione. Support Base), ovvero una installazione militare Il 2 aprile 2007 il Consiglio supremo di difesa, aeroportuale avanzata necessaria innanzitutto per presieduto dal Presidente della Repubblica fornire supporto operativo e logistico ai PRT Napolitano, ha fornito concrete indicazioni per un (Provincial Reconstruction Team) presenti nella rafforzamento in uomini e mezzi del contingente stessa regione. In alcune regioni (tra le quali Herat) i militare italiano in Afghanistan, quale attuazione PRT erano già stati istituiti nell’ambito dell’impegno assunto dall’Esecutivo in Parlamento, dell’operazione Enduring Freedom. senza mutamenti nel carattere della missione, ma in Il PRT è una struttura mista composta da unità previsione di una sua durata non breve e di maggiori militari e civili con il compito di assicurare il supporto pericoli potenziali. L’operazione è stata completata alle attività di ricostruzione condotte dalle nel giugno successivo, con l’arrivo di due velivoli organizzazioni nazionali ed internazionali operanti UAV Predator, di cinque elicotteri da combattimento nella regione. Ogni PRT é strutturato in base al A-129 Mangusta e due plotoni di bersaglieri con otto rischio, alla posizione geografica ed alle condizioni cingolati Dardo. socio economiche della regione in cui opera. Il Ministro della difesa Parisi ha precisato, riferendo L’attività di stabilizzazione sta incontrando crescenti al Parlamento il 13 novembre 2007, che “tali nuovi difficoltà, in particolare nell’area meridionale del mezzi non sono […] la risposta ad un cambiamento Paese, per la resistenza talebana che sembra nel profilo della nostra missione, né ad un aumento essersi rafforzata, anche in ragione di una del nostro profilo di impegno politico di fronte alla preoccupante alleanza tra i Talebani e alcuni dei comunità internazionale. Sono invece la doverosa cosiddetti “signori della guerra” che detengono il risposta tecnico-militare all’evolversi delle condizioni controllo politico ed economico – in particolare sulla sul terreno”. coltivazione di oppio – di numerose aree del paese. Durante la missione ISAF hanno perso la vita Accanto alle attività militari, ISAF continua a undici militari italiani, di cui 6 in seguito ad svolgere il compito di assicurare la fornitura di beni attentati. di necessità alla popolazione e promuovere la EUPOL Afghanistan ricostruzione delle principali infrastrutture economiche; a tal fine, la missione intrattiene Nel quadro del processo di riforma della polizia relazioni con numerose organizzazioni internazionali afgana, il Consiglio dell’Unione Europea ha e non-governative e collabora in modo stretto con predisposto, con l’azione comune 2007/369/PESC l’Assistance Mission delle Nazioni Unite in del 30 maggio 2007, un’attività di pianificazione Afghanistan (UNAMA).ISAF comprende connessa alla iniziativa PESD denominata European attualmente circa 47.000 militari appartenenti a Police Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN). contingenti di 40 Paesi. Il contributo maggiore è La missione ha il compito di favorire lo sviluppo di fornito dagli Stati Uniti (19.000 unità), seguiti dal una struttura di sicurezza afgana sostenibile ed Regno Unito (7.750), dalla Germania (3.490), dal efficace, in conformità agli standard internazionali. Canada (2.500) dall’Italia (2.360), dall’Olanda Tale iniziativa è finalizzata allo svolgimento delle (1.730) e dalla Francia (con 1.430 unità). attività di monitoring, training, advising e mentoring a La partecipazione italiana, iniziata il 10 gennaio favore del personale afgano destinato alle unità 2002, è inizialmente consistita in un contingente di dell’Afghan National Police (ANP), e dell’Afghan

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Border Police (ABP). Essa prevede, per l’Italia, lo segretario della Difesa Usa, Robert Gates, ha schieramento di uomini dell’Arma dei Carabinieri e insistito per l'invio di rinforzi perché intravede della Guardia di Finanza. Attualmente sono presenti “l'opportunità di ottenere più rapidamente ulteriori 12 carabinieri e 4 unità della Guardia di finanza. miglioramenti se ci fossero più forze sul posto”. La missione ha sede a Kabul (organismo di Successivamente, nel corso del vertice NATO direzione) ed è previsto che operi a livello sia tenutosi a Bucarest dal 2 al 4 aprile 2008, la regionale (presso i 5 Comandi regionali della Polizia delegazione statunitense ha rinnovato agli alleati nazionale afgana) sia provinciale (presso i PRT). europei l’invito ad inviare più truppe in Afghanistan, Nel corso della riunione del Consiglio UE affari che possano soprattutto essere impiegate nelle aree generali e relazioni esterne, tenutasi a Bruxelles il 26 più “calde” del Paese e a ridurre i caveat pendenti maggio 2008, i ministri degli Esteri dei ventisette sui mandati delle loro forze in teatro. Da parte sua, il Paesi hanno deciso di raddoppiare da 200 a 400 il Presidente Bush ha assicurato che gli USA numero degli effettivi della missione. schiereranno in Afghanistan, nel 2009, un numero consistente di truppe. Conclusione Durante il Vertice di Bucarest, il dialogo Nonostante lo sforzo della comunità internazionale sull’Afghanistan si è concluso con l’adozione della per assicurare la ricostruzione, la pacificazione e il “ISAF’s Strategic Vision”, un documento firmato progresso democratico in Afghanistan, nel corso da tutti i Paesi membri, strutturato in quattro punti, dell’ultimo anno sono aumentati gli attentati suicidi e che pone le basi per una nuova strategia per il le operazioni terroristiche in questo Paese. Paese asiatico. Nel giro di quattro anni l’Operazione ISAF si è Il documento, in particolare, rinnova l’impegno ad estesa a tutte le regioni afgane ed ha assunto i aiutare le istituzioni afgane, a rafforzare la propria caratteri di un’operazione di contro insurrezione, autorità, sottolinea la necessità di un più efficace soprattutto nelle province orientali e meridionali. coordinamento delle attività, sia militari che civili, di Tuttavia, come evidenziato nell’ultimo rapporto tutti gli attori nazionali e internazionali semestrale sull’Afghanistan presentato dal (“comprehensive approach”) e, da ultimo ribadisce Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite Ban Ki Moon l’opportunità di coinvolgere maggiormente i Paesi all’Assemblea Generale e al Consiglio di Sicurezza, confinanti. almeno 78 distretti su 398 sono stati classificati Per quanto riguarda la posizione dell’Italia, in dall’ONU come estremamente pericolosi e il tasso occasione del Consiglio UE Affari generali e relazioni di violenza perpetrata dai talebani e da gruppi di esterne, il ministro degli Esteri Frattini, e quello della insorgenti a loro affiliati è superiore di almeno il 20% Difesa La Russa, hanno manifestato la disponibilità rispetto all’anno precedente. italiana a rivedere alcuni dei caveat che si applicano A fronte di tale situazione e, in particolare, a fronte alle truppe italiane impegnate in Afghanistan e ciò al degli attentati del gennaio scorso, il governo fine di "allineare la flessibilità dell'impiego del americano ha richiesto a tutti i paesi alleati della contingente italiano a quello degli altri partner NATO un maggior impegno in Afghanistan essendo presenti in quel Paese”. le forze attualmente impiegate insufficienti a tenere In particolare, i Ministri, nel precisare che il Governo sotto controllo tutto il territorio, con particolare informerà il Parlamento in merito alle decisioni da riferimento alle aree rurali del sud e del sud-est assumere su questa materia, hanno manifestato dell’Afghanistan dove l’accesso da parte dei l’opportunità di un impiego operativo più rapido dei funzionari e dei civili è ulteriormente diminuito. militari italiani riducendo da 72 a 6 ore i tempi a Nel consiglio dei ministri della Difesa della Nato, disposizione dell’Esecutivo per autorizzare ad hoc tenutosi a Vilnius il 7-8 febbraio 2008, l' Alleanza è interventi fuori area. rimasta divisa sull'opportunità di potenziare l' Da ultimo, come risulta dal comunicato della impegno militare nel Sud dell' Afghanistan, dove i Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri del 28-5-2008, duri combattimenti con i Talebani hanno provocato il Presidente Berlusconi, nel corso di una un difficile scenario di guerra. In particolare Stati conversazione telefonica con il Primo Ministro Uniti e Gran Bretagna hanno manifestato la canadese Harper ha “confermato che l’Italia, in uno necessità che gli altri Paesi membri, in particolare spirito di solidarietà politica alleata, ha avviato una Germania, Francia, Italia, Spagna, inviino truppe riflessione in vista di una possibile revisione delle nella zona di Kandahar, dove il contingente Nato modalità operative di impiego dei propri militari (formato anche da militari canadesi, olandesi e impegnati nella missione ISAF e che una decisione danesi) da tempo paga un alto prezzo di vite al dovrebbe essere adottata entro il mese di giugno”. tentativo di normalizzare la regione. In particolare, il

Fonti:Ministero della difesa, Informazioni della difesa, RID, Rivista militare, ANSA

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DOCUMENTI

COUNCIL OF Brussels, 16 June 2008 THE EUROPEAN UNION (OR. en)

10143/08

PESC 687 COASI 111

LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS Subject: COUNCIL JOINT ACTION amending Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan

10143/08 AF/mce DGE217 Coord EN

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/…/CFSP

of … June 2008

amending Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 14, 18(5) and 23(2) thereof,

10143/08 AF/mce 1 DGE218 Coord EN

Whereas:

(1) On 18 February 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP1 extending the mandate of Mr Francesc Vendrell as the Special Representative of the European Union for Afghanistan until 31 May 2008, and on 26 May 2008 it adopted Joint Action 2008/391/CFSP2 extending his mandate until 30 June 2008.

(2) Mr Francesc Vendrell has informed the Secretary General/High Representative that he is available to continue serving as European Union Special Representative (EUSR) until 31 August 2008. His mandate as EUSR should be further extended until that date. The Council intends to appoint a new EUSR for the following period until 28 February 2009.

(3) Article 5(1) of Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP, as amended by Joint Action 2008/391/CFSP, provided a financial reference amount of EUR 975 000 to cover expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR until 30 June 2008. This financial reference amount should be increased by EUR 678 000 in order to cover expenditure related to the remaining period of the EUSR's mandate,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

1 OJ L 43, 19.2.2008, p. 26. 2 OJ L 137, 27.5.2008, p. 52.

10143/08 AF/mce 2 DGE219 Coord EN

Article 1 Amendment

Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1) Article 1 shall be replaced by the following:

"Article 1

European Union Special Representative

The mandate of Mr Francesc Vendrell as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Afghanistan is hereby extended until 31 August 2008.";

2) Article 5(1) shall be replaced by the following:

"(1) The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR in the period from 1 March 2008 to 31 August 2008 shall be EUR 1 653 000.".

Article 2 Entry into force

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

10143/08 AF/mce 3 DGE220 Coord EN

Article 3 Publication

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at

For the Council The President

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222 COUCILOF Brussels,18July2008(22.07) THEEUROPEAUIO (OR.en,fr)

12010/08 PESC956 COASI153

"I/A"ITEMOTE from: General Secretariat of the Council to: Permanent Representatives Committee/Council Subject: Draft Council Joint Action concerning the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan

1. On 18 December 2007 the Political and Security Committee approved the recommendation by the Asia Working Party to extend the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan until 28 February 2009.

2. On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP 1 extending the mandate of Mr Francesc Vendrell as the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan until 31 May 2008; on 26 May 2008 it adopted Joint Action 2008/391/CFSP 2 extending his mandate until 30 June 2008; on 23 June 2008 it adopted Joint Action 2008/481/CFSP 3 extending his mandate until 31 August 2008. A new Special Representative needs to be appointed for the remainder of the mandate, i.e. from 1 September 2008 until 28 February 2009.

1 OJ L 43, 19.2.2008, p. 26. 2 OJ L 137, 27.5.2008, p. 52. 3 OJ L 163, 24.6.2008, p. 51.

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3. On 7 July 2008 the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors approved the text of a draft Council Joint Action concerning the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan, subject to the choice of candidate, whose name at that time was not yet known. On 9 July 2008 the Working Party also approved the related financial statement.

4 On 22 July 2008 the Political and Security Committee endorsed the Secretary General/High Representative's recommendation regarding the appointment of the new European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan.

5. The Permanent Representatives Committee is accordingly requested to: - confirm the agreement to the draft Council Joint Action and to the related financial statement, which is attached hereto; - advise the Council to adopt the Joint Action concerning the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan, as set out, after legal/linguistic editing, in 9981/08 PESC 663 COASI 101.

______

12010/08 ani/CY/ep 2 DG 224E Coord E AEX LEGISLATIVEFIACIALSTATEMET

Policyarea(s):ExternalRelations

Activity(ies):CFSPCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy

TITLEOFACTIO: Council Joint Action 2008/…/CFSP of …/…/2008 concerning the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan

1. BUDGETLIE(S)+HEADIG(S)

190306 “European Union Special Representatives”

2. OVERALLFIGURES

2.1. Totalallocationforaction:€2,300,000for2008commitment

2.2. Periodofapplication:

The Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. The mandate shall be implemented and expenditure is eligible from 1 September 2008 to 28 February 2009. 2.3. Overallmultiannualestimateonexpenditure:

(a) Schedule of commitment appropriations/payment appropriations (financial intervention) (see point 6.1.1) million € (to 3rd decimal place) Year N + 1 2008 2009 Total

Commitments 2.300 2.300

Payments 2.070 0.230 2.300

(b)Technical and administrative assistance and support expenditure (see point 6.1.2) N/A

(c)Overall financial impact of human resources and other administrative expenditure (see points 7.2 and 7.3)

12010/08 FF/aa 3 ANNEX DG 225E Coord E N/A

TOTAL a+b+c 2008 2009 Total

Commitments 2.300 2.300

Payments 2.070 0.230 2.300

2.4. Compatibilitywiththefinancialprogrammingandthefinancialperspective

Proposal compatible with the existing financial programming  This proposal will entail reprogramming of the relevant heading in the financial perspective  This may entail application of the provisions of the Interinstitutional Agreement 2.5. Financialimpactonrevenue:

No financial implications (involves technical aspects regarding implementation of a measure)

3. BUDGETCHARACTERISTICS

Typeofexpenditure ew EFTA Participation Heading participation applicant Financial countries Perspective

DO CD O O O o4

4. LEGALBASIS

Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 14 and 18(5) thereof Treaty establishing the European Community Council Regulation (EC) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, in particular Article 75(2) thereof

5. DESCRIPTIOADGROUDS

5.1. eedforCommunityintervention

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5.1.1.Objectivespursued In accordance with Article 2 of Joint Action 2008/…/CFSP, the objective of the EU Special Representative shall be to contribute to the implementation of the Union's policy in Afghanistan. In particular the Special Representative shall:

1) contribute to the implementation of the EU- Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact as well as the relevant United Nations ("UN") Security Council Resolutions and other relevant UN Resolutions; 2) encourage positive contributions from regional actors in Afghanistan and from neighbouring countries to the peace process in Afghanistan and thereby contribute to the consolidation of the Afghan state; 3) support the pivotal role played by the UN, notably the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; and 4) support work of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) in the region.

5.1.2.Measurestakeninconnectionwithexanteevaluation The first mandate of the EUSR in Afghanistan was adopted in 2001 and has been renewed 11 times. Each renewal/appointment is preceded by a political assessment by the Council. 5.1.3.Measurestakenfollowingexpostevaluation The Council undertakes reviews at the end of each EUSR mandate on the basis of document Review of Mandates of EUSRs (doc. 6436/03 of 14 February 2003). The most recent review was conducted by the Council Working Group for Asia and Oceania and endorsed by the Political and Security Committee.

5.2. Actionsenvisagedandarrangementsforbudgetintervention

The mandate of the EUSR, as specified in Article 3 of the Joint Action 2008/…/CFSP, shall be to: (a) convey the EU's views on the political process while drawing on the key principles agreed between Afghanistan and the international community, in particular the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact; (b) establish and maintain close contact with and give support to the Afghan representative institutions, in particular the government and Parliament. Contact should also be maintained with other Afghan political figures and other relevant actors inside as well as outside the country;

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(c) maintain close contact with relevant international and regional organisations, notably with the local representatives of the UN; (d) stay in close contact with neighbouring and other interested countries in the region, so that their views on the situation in Afghanistan and the development of cooperation between these countries and Afghanistan are taken into account in EU policy; (e) advise on the progress achieved in meeting the objectives of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact, in particular in the following areas: – good governance and the establishment of rule of law institutions, – security sector reforms, including establishment of judicial institutions, a national army and police force, – respect for human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion, – respect of democratic principles, the rule of law, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, the rights of women and children and the principles of international law, – fostering participation by women in public administration and civil society, – respect for Afghanistan's international obligations, including cooperation in international efforts to combat terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings, – facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons. (f) in consultation with representatives of Member States and the Commission, assist in ensuring that the Union's political approach is reflected in its action for the development of Afghanistan, (g) jointly with the Commission, actively participate in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board established under the Afghanistan Compact, (h) advise on the participation and the positions of the EU in international conferences on Afghanistan.

The main beneficiaries are the people of Afghanistan.

5.3. Methodsofimplementation

The EU Special Representative will sign a Special Adviser contract with the Commission. He will be responsible to the Commission for the management of expenditure related to the mandate.

12010/08 FF/aa 6 ANNEX DG 228E Coord E The EUSR will sign employment contracts with his staff on his own behalf. The terms of reference of any new employment contracts will be submitted to the Commission for prior approval in ways to be specified in the contract.

6. FIACIALIMPACT

6.1. Totalfinancialimpact–(overtheentireperiod)

6.1.1.Financialintervention Project funded by EC contribution and contributions in kind by Member States:

Commitments in € million Year N N + 1 N + 2 N + 3 N + 4 N + 5 Total Breakdown 2008 and subs. Years ContributionEC: 2.300 2.300 BilateralcontributionsbyMember none one States:

Bilateralcontributionsbynon memberstates: none

TOTAL 2.300 2.300

COTRIBUTIOSIKID

EUMemberStatesandInstitutions

DK: secondment of Political Adviser (1) FI: secondment of Human Rights Adviser (1) onMemberStates

None

12010/08 FF/aa 7 ANNEX DG 229E Coord E 6.1.2.Technical and administrative assistance, support expenditure and IT expenditure (Commitmentappropriations) N/A

6.2. Calculationofcostsbymeasureenvisaged(overtheentireprogrammingperiod)

6.2.1 Personnelcosts(€850,126)

FS1/3/2008– FS1/9/2008– Currently Type/numberofpositions 31/8/2008 28/2/2009 filled

EUSR 1 1 1

Seconded Staff 2 2 2

International contracted staff 6 6 6

Local staff (Brussels) 0 0 0

Local staff 38 38 32

Salaries & allowances

• EU Special Representative salary, 6 months * 28,350 €/month = €170,100

The remuneration of the EUSR corresponds to the basic salary of the grade AD 16, 1st level, as fixed at Article 66 of the EC Staff Regulations. The salary is determined on the basis of document “Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special Representatives” (doc. 11328/1/07 Rev 1. of 24 July 2007). The provision includes expatriation allowance of 16 %, a hardship allowance of 40 % and other applicable allowances as per the EC Staff Regulations, as follows (indicative amounts):

- Basic salary: € 15,824 - Expatriation allowance (16%) € 2,715 - Complementary allowance (10%) € 1,523 - Hardship allowance (40 %) € 6,090 - Other allowances € 2,091 - Margin for indexation € 107 TOTAL € 28,350

+ removal allowance 2x 50% of basic salary = €15,824

Seconded Staff

The salaries of the seconded staff are covered by the seconding state and institution, respectively. Daily allowances for seconded personnel are based on Commission Communication C(2007)1746 of 21 December 2007 referring to Council Guidelines 14239/06 of 19 October 2006.

Two secondments (two political advisers) are envisaged.

12010/08 FF/aa 8 ANNEX DG 230E Coord E Daily allowances consisting of per diems, hardship and risk allowances amounting to €44,392 are calculated as follows: - Per diem: UN $142 (no accommodation provided MSA UN rate)*75% / USD exchange rate July 2008 (1.5748) = €67.63

- Hardship: EC: 40% -> €25

- Risk: €30

The risk situation in Kabul is currently assessed as high. The level of risk allowance will be updated according to the actual risk situation and it will be paid for each day spent in the area, excluding regular leave.

Total: € (67.63 + 25 + 30) * 2 seconded * 181 days = € 44,392

International Staff

The salaries of all non-seconded staff are covered by the budget of the mandate. Salaries, daily allowances and travel allowances for international (contracted) staff are based on Commission Communication on Specific Rules for Special Advisers of the Commission entrusted with the Implementation of Operational CFSP Actions (C(2007)1746 of 21 December 2007).

A number of the internationally contracted staff remains the same. 6 experts/officers posts are budgeted for (four political advisers incl. one senior political adviser, one financial/administrative officer and one security officer).

The salaries amounting to €222,600 are based on monthly salary levels ranging from €5,050 to €7,125 in line with Annex 3 of Commission Communication C(2007)1746.

Months N° € € Senior Expert 6 1 7.125 42.750 Expert 6 3 6.375 114.750 Mission Security Officer 6 1 5.800 34.800 Financial officer 6 1 5.050 30.300 Two removal allowances (50% of basic salary) are included for the internationally contracted staff in the total amount of €37,100. The budget for the home travel cost upon taking up and termination of service amounts to €27,000. The allowances for the international staff are calculated in a same way as for the seconded staff.

€ (67.63 + 25 + 30) * 6 internationals * 181 days = €133,176

12010/08 FF/aa 9 ANNEX DG 231E Coord E

Local Staff The salaries of the local staff are budgeted for according to the salary grid for the local staff of the EC Delegation in Kabul. In total thirty-eight local posts are included in the budget with salary levels ranging from a salary of €358 to €1,962 per month. The budget for the local staff salaries amounts to €168,954.

Months N° € € Admin/Finance Assistant 6 1 1.234 7.404 Assistant to EUSR 6 1 1.962 11.772 Assistant 6 2 894 10.728 Assistant for MSO 6 1 873 5.238 National Pol. Assistant /Translator 6 3 1.208 21.744 Driver 6 5 915 27.450 Cook 6 1 915 5.490 Assistant cook 6 4 705 16.920 Maintenance 6 6 615 22.140 Guard 6 7 596 25.032 Policemen 6 7 358 15.036 Insurances

The budget covers a high-risk insurance for the EUSR (€850 per month) and his eight international team members (€300 per month per person), whether these are paid from the budget or seconded by Member States. Cost of medical evacuation insurance amounting to €6,480 is included in the budget.

Months N° € € EUSR 6 1 850 5.100 Team 6 8 300 14.400 Medevac 6 9 120 6.480 The budget also includes a provision of €5,000 € for insurance against financial risks. The total budget for insurance cost amounts to €30,980. Severance payments No provision for severance payments for local employees is included due to improbability of the legal obligation to cover such costs. The budget line is kept in case of change of the legal situation.

6.2.2.Missions(€218,395) All mission expenditure directly related to the implementation of the mandate is covered by the budget of the mandate. The mission expenditure includes transportation, per diems and accommodation. The rates are based on the Guide to Missions for Officials and Other Servants of the European Commission (Article 71 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 11 to 13 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations). The place of employment of the EUSR is Kabul, Afghanistan.

12010/08 FF/aa 10 ANNEX DG 232E Coord E Travel Accommodation Allowance Units N° € € € € € € Europe, EUSR 4 1 4.500 18.000 140 3.360 85 2.380 Region, EUSR 2 1 2.000 4.000 130 1.300 50 600 Other countries, EUSR 2 1 6.500 13.000 230 2.300 90 1.080 Europe, Team 2 6 4.500 54.000 140 10.080 85 7.140 Region, Team 2 4 500 4.000 130 6.240 50 2.800 Other countries, Team 2 2 6.500 26.000 230 5.520 90 2.520 Afghanistan, EUSR/Team 5 9 500 22.500 75 16.875 50 13.500 Rent a car in provinces 6 - 200 1.200 142.700 45.675 30.020 For the EUSR there are four six-day missions budgeted to Europe, two five-day mission to the Region and two five-day mission to other countries (USA-UN, Japan, etc.). The budgeted flight costs take into account the additional cost relating to specific arrangements needed for travelling from and to Afghanistan (UN flights). The budget for the missions of the EUSR amounts to €46,020.

For the team two six-day missions are budgeted to Europe, two six-day missions to the Region and two six-day missions to other countries. The budget for the missions of the team (including car rental in provinces) amounts to €119,500.

Five five-day missions with a total cost amounting to €52,875 are envisaged for the EUSR and the team in Afghanistan.

The allowances calculation takes into account the estimated travel time to and from the different destinations.

6.2.3Runningexpenditure (€932,450)

The running expenditure includes:

Vehicles related expenditure amounting to €72,000:  rent of a soft skin vehicle for the office (€500 per month) and one armoured vehicle for the Mission Security Officer (€11,000 per month) for 3 months when the new three armoured vehicles are expected to be delivered at the latest;  fuel and maintenance for an amount of €36,000. The cost of a close protection team is budgeted in the amount of €720,000 (€120,000 per month). Office expenditure in the amount of €85,200:  Rent/maintenance (€7,000 per month)  Supplies (€3,000 per month)  Electricity, heating (€4,200 per month) IT/Communication expenditure budgeted for in the amount of €22,500;

12010/08 FF/aa 11 ANNEX DG 233E Coord E Other running expenditure in the amount of €32,750.

Workshops 2 5.000 10.000 HEST security training 1 10.000 10.000 Financial Services 1 6.750 6.750

6.2.4.Capitalexpenditure(€220,500) Cost of security equipment (€186,000 budgeted for two ECMs and tracking system for vehicles), IT equipment (€29,500 covering new PCs and secure network/server) and furniture (€5,000) are budgeted for.

6.2.5.Representation Representation costs of up to €9,000 are covered by the budget.

6.2.6.Contingencies The contingency reserve shall be used only with prior written approval of the Commission.

6.3. Itemisedbreakdownofcost(indicative)

BUDGETHEADIG Budgetfrom1/3/2008– Budgetfrom1/9/2008– 31/8/2008(6months) 28/2/2009(6months)

1.PersonnelCosts 702,665 € 850,126 € 2.Missions 123,585 € 218,395 € 3.Runningexpenditure 206,175 € 932,450 € 4.Capitalexpenditure 606,500 € 220,500 € 5.Representation 9,500 € 9,000 € SubTotal(1to5) 1,648,425 € 2,230,471 € Contingencies1 4,575 € 69,529 € TOTAL 1,653,000 € 2,300,000 €

The authorising officer responsible is hereby authorised to vary each of the above amounts related to the EUSR’s budget according to exact operational requirements and possibilities and in keeping with sound financial management, while not exceeding the overall amount of the financing decision.

1 Contingencies shall be used only with prior written approval of the Commission.

12010/08 FF/aa 12 ANNEX DG 234E Coord E 6.4. Financialprecedents

JointAction Budget Allocationof Commitments year appropriations Council Joint Action 2001/875/CFSP of 10/12/2001 2001 None, financed by None concerning the appointment of a Special Representative Council Administrative of the European Union in Afghanistan (Mr. Klaus Peter Budget Klaiber) Council Joint Action 2002/496/CFSP of 25 June 2002 2002 None, financed by None amending and extending Joint Action 2001/875/CFSP Council Administrative concerning the appointment of the Special Budget Representative of the European Union in Afghanistan (Mr. Francesc Vendrell) Council Joint Action 2002/961/CFSP of 10/12/2002 2002 None, financed by None amending and extending the mandate of the EUSR in Council Administrative Afghanistan Budget Council Joint Action 2003/448/CFSP of 16/6/2003 2003 None, financed by None extending the mandate of the EUSR in Afghanistan Council Administrative Budget Council Joint Action 2003/871/CFSP of 8/12/2003 2003 496,000 € 496,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR in Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2004/533/CFSP of 28/06/2004 2004 794,000 € 794,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2005/95/CFSP of 02/02/2005 2005 635,000 € 635,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2005/585/CFSP of 28/07/2005 2005 620,000 € 620,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2006/124/CFSP of 20/2/2006 2006 1,330,000 € 1,330,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2007/106/CFSP of 15/2/2007 2007 2,450,000 € 2,450,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP of 18/2/2008 2008 975,000 € 975,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan Council Joint Action 2008/481/CFSP of 23/6/2008 2008 678,000 € 678,000 € extending and amending the mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan

12010/08 FF/aa 13 ANNEX DG 235E Coord E 7. IMPACTOSTAFFADADMIISTRATIVEEXPEDITURE

7.1 Impactonhumanresources p.m.

7.2 Overallfinancialimpactofhumanresources p.m.

7.3 Otheradministrativeexpenditurederivingfromtheaction p.m.

8. FOLLOWUPADEVALUATIO

8.1 Followuparrangements The Presidency is responsible for the implementation of the decisions made according to title V of the TEU (Joint Action).

According to Article 4.1 of Joint Action 2008/.../CFSP of XXX 2008, the EUSR shall be responsible for implementing his mandate acting under the authority and operational direction of the Secretary General/High Representative. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for expenditure incurred in respect of his activities.

According to Article 4.2 of the said Joint Action, the PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate.

According to Article 11 of the said Joint Action, the EUSR shall regularly provide the SG/HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report as necessary to working groups. Regular written reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. Upon recommendation of the SG/HR or the PSC, the EUSR may provide General Affairs and External Relations Council with reports.

According to Article 12 of the said Joint Action, the EUSR shall promote overall EU political coordination. He shall help to ensure that all EU instruments in the field are engaged coherently to attain the EU's policy objectives. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Presidency and the Commission, as well as those of other EUSRs active in the region as appropriate. The EUSR shall provide Member States' missions and Commission's delegations with regular briefings.

12010/08 FF/aa 14 ANNEX DG 236E Coord E In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with Presidency, Commission and Member States' Heads of Mission who shall make best efforts to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall provide the Head of the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission with local political guidance. The EUSR and the Civilian Operation Commander shall consult each other as required. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

According to Article 13 of the said Joint Action, the EUSR shall present the SG/HR, the Council and the Commission with a comprehensive mandate implementation report by mid- November 2008. The report shall form a basis for evaluation of the Joint Action in the relevant Working Groups and by the PSC.

8.2 Arrangementsandschedulefortheplannedevaluation The Commission may conduct an evaluation of this action in the framework of its budget implementation competence. The Council will conduct a review at the end of the mandate, on the basis of Guidelines in the document “Review of Mandates of EUSRs” (doc. 6436/03 of 14 February 2003).

9. ATIFRAUDMEASURES Controls may be undertaken by the Commission services, including OLAF, as well as by the European Court of Auditors.

______

12010/08 FF/aa 15 ANNEX DG 237E Coord E

238

COUCILOF Brussels,23July2008 THEEUROPEAUIO (OR.fr)

9981/08 PESC663 COASI101

LEGISLATIVEACTSADOTHERISTRUMETS Subject: COUNCIL JOINT ACTION concerning the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan

9981/08 DOS/fc DG 239E Coord E

COUCILJOITACTIO2008/…/CFSP

of

concerningtheappointmentof theEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeforAfghanistan

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular, Articles 14, 18(5) and 23(2) thereof,

9981/08 DOS/fc 1 DG 240E Coord E

Whereas:

(1) On 23 June 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/481/CFSP1 amending Joint Action 2008/131/CFSP extending until 31 August 2008 the mandate of Mr Francesc Vendrell as the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan.

(2) Mr Francesc Vendrell has informed the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) that he is not available to serve as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) beyond 31 August 2008.

(3) The SG/HR has recommended that Mr Ettore F. Sequi be appointed as the new EUSR for Afghanistan until 28 February 2009.

(4) The EUSR will implement his mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

1 OJ L 163, 24.6.2008, p. 51.

9981/08 DOS/fc 2 DG 241E Coord E

Article 1 Appointment

Mr Ettore F. Sequi is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Afghanistan for the period from 1 September 2008 to 28 February 2009.

Article 2 Policy objectives

The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the policy objectives of the European Union in Afghanistan. More specifically, the EUSR shall:

1) contribute to the implementation of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact as well as the relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions and other relevant UN Resolutions;

2) encourage positive contributions from regional actors in Afghanistan and from neighbouring countries to the peace process in Afghanistan and thereby contribute to the consolidation of the Afghan State;

3) support the pivotal role played by the UN, notably the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; and

4) support work of the SG/HR in the region.

9981/08 DOS/fc 3 DG 242E Coord E

Article 3 Mandate

In order to achieve the policy objectives, the mandate of the EUSR shall be to:

(a) convey the European Union's views on the political process while drawing on the key principles agreed between Afghanistan and the international community, in particular the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact;

(b) establish and maintain close contact with, and give support to, the Afghan representative institutions, in particular the government and Parliament. Contact should also be maintained with other Afghan political figures and other relevant actors inside as well as outside the country;

(c) maintain close contact with relevant international and regional organisations, notably with the local representatives of the UN;

(d) stay in close contact with neighbouring and other interested countries in the region, so that their views on the situation in Afghanistan and the development of cooperation between these countries and Afghanistan are taken into account in European Union policy;

9981/08 DOS/fc 4 DG 243E Coord E

(e) advise on the progress achieved in meeting the objectives of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact, in particular in the following areas:

– good governance and the establishment of institutions of the rule of law,

– security sector reforms, including establishment of judicial institutions, a national army and police force,

– respect for human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion,

– respect of democratic principles, the rule of law, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, the rights of women and children and the principles of international law,

– fostering participation by women in public administration and civil society,

– respect for Afghanistan's international obligations, including cooperation in international efforts to combat terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings,

– facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

9981/08 DOS/fc 5 DG 244E Coord E

(f) in consultation with representatives of Member States and of the Commission, assist in ensuring that the European Union's political approach is reflected in its action for the development of Afghanistan;

(g) jointly with the Commission, actively participate in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board established under the Afghanistan Compact;

(h) advise on the participation and the positions of the European Union in international conferences on Afghanistan.

Article 4 Implementation of the mandate

1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate acting under the authority and operational direction of the SG/HR.

2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate.

9981/08 DOS/fc 6 DG 245E Coord E

Article 5 Financing

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR in the period from 1 September 2008 to 28 February 2009 shall be EUR 2 300 000.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be eligible as from 1 September 2008. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.

3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Article 6 Constitution and composition of the team

1. Within the limits of his mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting his team in consultation with the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, and in full association with the Commission. The team must include the expertise on certain specific policy issues, as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall notify the SG/HR, the Presidency and the Commission of the final composition of his team.

9981/08 DOS/fc 7 DG 246E Coord E

2. Member States and institutions of the European Union may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of personnel who are seconded by a Member State or an institution of the EU to the EUSR shall be covered by the Member State or the institution of the EU concerned respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the General Secretariat of the Council may also be posted to the EUSR. International contracted staff must have the nationality of an EU Member State.

3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State or EU institution and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mandate of the EUSR.

Article 7 Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and his staff

The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the mission of the EUSR and the members of his staff shall be agreed with the host party/parties as appropriate. Member States and the Commission shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

9981/08 DOS/fc 8 DG 247E Coord E

Article 8 Security of EU classified information

The EUSR and the members of his team shall respect security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations1, in particular when managing EU classified information.

Article 9 Access to information and logistical support

1. Member States, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.

2. The Presidency, the Commission and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Article 10 Security

The EUSR shall, in accordance with the policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity with his mandate and the security situation in his geographical area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under his direct authority, notably by:

1 OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/438/EC (OJ L 164, 26.6.2007, p. 24).

9981/08 DOS/fc 9 DG 248E Coord E

(a) establishing a mission-specific security plan based on guidance from the General Secretariat of the Council, including mission-specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the mission area, as well as management of security incidents and including a mission contingency and evacuation plan;

(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the EU are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the mission area;

(c) ensuring that all members of his team to be deployed outside the EU, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the mission area, based on the risk ratings assigned to the mission area by the General Secretariat of the Council;

(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the SG/HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the mandate implementation reports.

9981/08 DOS/fc 10 DG 249E Coord E

Article 11 Reporting

The EUSR shall regularly provide oral and written reports to the SG/HR and the PSC. The EUSR shall also report as necessary to working groups. Regular written reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. Upon recommendation of the SG/HR or the PSC, the EUSR may provide reports to the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).

Article 12 Coordination

1. The EUSR shall promote overall EU political coordination. He shall help to ensure that all EU instruments in the field are engaged coherently to attain the EU's policy objectives. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Presidency and the Commission, as well as those of the EUSR for Central Asia. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States' missions and Commission's delegations.

2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with Presidency, Commission and Member States' Heads of Mission, who shall make best efforts to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall provide the Head of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) with local political guidance. The EUSR and the Civilian Operation Commander shall consult each other as required. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

9981/08 DOS/fc 11 DG 250E Coord E

Article 13 Review

The implementation of this Joint Action and its consistency with other contributions from the European Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the SG/HR, the Council and the Commission with a comprehensive mandate implementation report by mid-November 2008. That report shall form a basis for the evaluation of the mandate in the relevant working groups and by the PSC. In the context of overall priorities for deployment, the SG/HR shall make recommendations to the PSC concerning the Council's decision on renewal, amendment or termination of the mandate

Article 14 Entry into force

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Article 15 Publication

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels,

For the Council The President

9981/08 DOS/fc 12 DG 251E Coord E

252 United Nations S/RES/1746 (2007)

Security Council Distr.: General 23 March 2007

Resolution 1746 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5645th meeting on 23 March 2007

The Security Council, Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 1662 (2006) extending through 23 March 2007 the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as laid out in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 March 2006 (S/2006/145), and its resolution 1659 (2006) endorsing the Afghanistan Compact, and recalling also the report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 2006 (S/2006/935), Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, Reaffirming its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations, Reaffirming in this context its support for the implementation, under the ownership of the Afghan people, of the Afghanistan Compact, of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and noting that sustained efforts by all relevant actors are required to consolidate progress made towards their implementation and to overcome current challenges, Recalling that the Afghanistan Compact is based on a partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community, with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations, Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges in a coherent manner through the comprehensive framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact, Noting, in the context of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),

07-28047 (E) *0728047* 253 S/RES/1746 (2007)

and stressing the need for continued cooperation and coordination, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities, Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel, and stressing the importance of the security and safety of the United Nations and associated personnel, Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of the insurgency on the capacity of the Afghan Government to provide security and basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, Recalling the importance of the Kabul Declaration of 22 December 2002 on Good-Neighbourly Relations (Kabul Declaration) (S/2002/1416), welcoming the New Delhi Declaration adopted at the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan on 19 November 2006, looking forward to the Third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan in 2007, and stressing the crucial importance to all parties of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan, Recalling its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and its resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community, including, jointly with the Government of Afghanistan, the coordination and monitoring of efforts in implementing the Afghanistan Compact, and expressing its appreciation and strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Afghanistan and the women and men of UNAMA, 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 15 March 2007 (S/2007/152); 2. Expresses its appreciation for the United Nations long-term commitment to work with the Government and the people of Afghanistan; 3. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMA, as established by resolution 1662 (2006), until 23 March 2008; 4. Stresses the role of UNAMA to promote a more coherent international engagement in support of Afghanistan, to extend its good offices through outreach in Afghanistan, to support regional cooperation in the context of the Afghanistan Compact, to promote humanitarian coordination and to continue to contribute to human rights protection and promotion, including monitoring of the situation of civilians in armed conflict; 5. Welcomes UNAMA’s expanded presence in the provinces, through regional and provincial offices, which support efforts at the central level to

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coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and assist the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners in improving the delivery of services to Afghan citizens throughout the country, and encourages further progress in this regard, including in the southern and eastern provinces, security circumstances permitting; 6. Reiterates its call on the Afghan Government, and on all members of the international community and international organizations, to implement the Afghanistan Compact and its annexes in full; 7. Emphasizes the importance of meeting the benchmarks and timelines of the Compact for the progress on security, governance and development as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics and of increasing the effectiveness and coordination of the assistance to Afghanistan; 8. Acknowledges the central role played by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board in facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the Compact, stresses the role of the JCMB to support Afghanistan by, inter alia, coordinating international assistance and reconstruction programmes, encourages efforts to strengthen the JCMB Secretariat, welcomes the results of the JCMB meeting at senior officials level held in Berlin on 30 and 31 January 2007, and encourages further efforts to provide appropriate high level political guidance and promote a more coherent international engagement; 9. Calls on all Afghan parties and groups to engage constructively in an inclusive political dialogue, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and Afghan-led reconciliation programmes, and in the social development of the country, and stresses the importance of these factors to enhance security and stability; 10. Stresses the need for further progress on security sector reform, inter alia in order to advance towards the goal of ethnically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country, welcomes in this regard the ongoing efforts to increase functionality, professionalism and accountability of the security sector, including the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, including the recent proposed contributions by the United States and other partners, and calls for proper monitoring of the deployment of the Auxiliary Police to ensure its accountability to central authorities; 11. Welcomes the decision by the European Union to establish a mission in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law and counter narcotics, to assist and enhance current efforts in the area of police reform at central and provincial levels, and looks forward to the early launch of the mission; 12. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process started in October 2003, as well as the launch of the programme of disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG) and the commitments made in this regard at the Second Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan on 5 July 2006, calls for determined efforts by the Afghan Government to pursue at all levels the timely implementation of the programme throughout the country, including through the implementation of the newly adopted Action Plan, and requests the international community to extend further assistance to these efforts, taking fully into account the guidance by UNAMA;

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13. Stresses the need for accelerated progress in the implementation of the 10-year strategy for justice reform in the framework of the Afghanistan Compact, including through definition of responsibilities and provision of adequate resources, invites the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to continue to work towards the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, including the reconstruction and reform of the correctional system, in order to strengthen the rule of law throughout the country and eliminate impunity, and takes note with interest of the initiative to organize in Rome a Conference on Rule of Law in Afghanistan to enhance Afghan and international commitment to justice sector reform; 14. Welcomes the continued efforts by the Afghan authorities to promote legislative reform, and stresses the importance of international support for capacity- building in such reform and its implementation; 15. Welcomes the establishment of the provincial councils in accordance with the Afghan Constitution, encourages all institutions to work in a spirit of cooperation, calls on the Afghan Government to pursue continued public administrative reform in order to ensure good governance, full representation and accountability at both national and local levels, and stresses the need for further international efforts to provide technical assistance in this regard, particularly at the local level; 16. Calls upon the Afghan Government, with support from the international community, to begin planning and preparation for Afghanistan’s next election cycle, including the establishment of a permanent Civil Voter Registry (CVR) as called for in the Afghanistan Compact, the passage and implementation of an updated Election Law, and financial and political support for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to ensure that it possesses the resources needed, and to ensure that Afghanistan is set on the path to the creation of affordable and sustainable systems that will contribute to free, fair and transparent elections; 17. Notes with concern the effects of widespread corruption on security, good governance and counter-narcotics efforts, and calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to vigorously lead the fight against corruption and to sustain its efforts to establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration, and welcomes recent steps by the Afghan Government in this regard; 18. Calls for full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law throughout Afghanistan; requests UNAMA, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to continue to assist in the full implementation of the human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a state party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights; commends the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission for its courageous efforts to monitor respect for human rights in Afghanistan as well as to foster and protect these rights; 19. Stresses the importance of the ongoing process of national reconciliation undertaken by the Government of Afghanistan and encourages the full and timely implementation, with international support, of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact, without prejudice to the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution

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1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and other relevant resolutions of the Security Council; 20. Welcomes the cooperation of the Afghan Government and UNAMA with the Security Council’s Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) with the implementation of resolution 1735 (2006), and encourages the continuation of such cooperation; 21. Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the ANDS, stresses the need for continued leadership by the Afghan Government in its implementation, and encourages the participants at the London Conference to continue to fulfil and consider increasing their pledges, including financial assistance for the implementation of the Strategy; 22. Expresses its concern at the serious harm that increasing opium cultivation, production and trafficking causes to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally; calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to pursue effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy; and encourages additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy, including through contributions to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund and continued regional cooperation for the fight against the illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors and against money-laundering linked to such trafficking; 23. Welcomes the outcome of the Second Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan organized by the Government of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime held in Moscow from 26 to 28 June 2006 (S/2006/598), within the framework of the Paris Pact initiative, and calls upon States to strengthen international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the illicit production and trafficking of drugs originated in Afghanistan; 24. Calls upon all Afghan and international parties to continue to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and in efforts to promote the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country; 25. Calls upon the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist groups and criminal activities, welcomes the completion of ISAF’s expansion throughout Afghanistan and calls upon all parties to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and to ensure the protection of civilian life; 26. Welcomes the ongoing efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and its neighbouring and regional partners to foster trust and cooperation with each other, stresses the importance of increasing cooperation between Afghanistan and the partners against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, in promoting peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and in fostering cooperation in the economic and development sectors as a means to achieve the full integration of Afghanistan into regional dynamics and the global economy, and further welcomes progress in this regard;

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27. Recognizes the importance of voluntary, safe, orderly return and sustainable reintegration of the remaining Afghan refugees for the stability of the country and the region, and calls for continued and enhanced international assistance in this regard; 28. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every six months on developments in Afghanistan; 29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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258 United Nations S/RES/1776 (2007)

Security Council Distr.: General 19 September 2007

Resolution 1776 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5744th meeting, on 19 September 2007

The Security Council, Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003), 1707 (2006) and 1746 (2007), Reaffirming also its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and reiterating its support for international efforts to root out terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006) and 1738 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and its resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghan Authorities and welcoming the cooperation of the Afghan Government with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Recognizing the multifaceted and interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges in a coherent manner through the comprehensive framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact, Stressing the central role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan, noting, in the context of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and of ISAF, and stressing the need for further sustained cooperation, coordination and mutual support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities, Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between

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terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel, Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and other extremist groups on the capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of law, to provide basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, Reiterating its support for the continuing endeavours by the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition, to improve the security situation and to continue to address the threat posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, and stressing in this context the need for sustained international efforts, including those of ISAF and the OEF coalition, Condemning in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, and condemning further the use by the Taliban and other extremist groups of civilians as human shields, Expressing its concern about all civilian casualties, and reiterating its call for all feasible steps to be taken to ensure the protection of civilian life and for international humanitarian and human rights law to be upheld, Recognizing the robust efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimize the risk of civilian casualties, notably the continuous review of tactics and procedures and the conduct of after-action reviews in cooperation with the Afghan Government in cases where civilian casualties have reportedly occurred, Stressing the need for further progress in security sector reform, including further strengthening of the Afghan National Army and Police, disbandment of illegal armed groups, justice sector reform and counter-narcotics, Stressing in this context the importance of further progress in the reconstruction and reform of the Afghan prison sector, in order to improve the respect for the rule of law and human rights therein, Reiterating its call on all Afghan parties and groups to engage constructively in peaceful political dialogue within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and in the socio-economic development of the country, and to avoid resorting to violence including through the use of illegal armed groups, Recognizing the importance of the contribution of neighbouring and regional partners for the stabilization of Afghanistan, and stressing the crucial importance of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan, Welcoming the completion of ISAF’s expansion throughout Afghanistan, the continued coordination between ISAF and the OEF coalition, and the cooperation established between ISAF and the European Union presence in Afghanistan, in particular its police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan),

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Expressing its appreciation for the leadership provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and for the contributions of many nations to ISAF and to the OEF coalition, including its maritime interdiction component, Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Government, Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force, as defined in resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 2007; 2. Authorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate; 3. Recognizes the need to further strengthen ISAF to meet all its operational requirements, and in this regard calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to ISAF, and to make contributions to the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 1386 (2001); 4. Stresses the importance of increasing the effective functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector in order to provide long-term solutions to security in Afghanistan, and encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police; 5. Calls upon ISAF to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Government and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the OEF coalition in the implementation of the force mandate; 6. Requests the leadership of ISAF to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its mandate, including through the provision of quarterly reports; 7. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.

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262 United Nations S/RES/1806 (2008)

Security Council Distr.: General 20 March 2008

Original: English

Resolution 1806 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5857th meeting, on 20 March 2008

The Security Council, Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 1746 (2007) extending through 23 March 2008 the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as established by resolution 1662 (2006), and recalling also its resolution 1659 (2006) endorsing the Afghanistan Compact, Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, Reaffirming its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations, Reaffirming in this context its support for the implementation, under the ownership of the Afghan people, of the Afghanistan Compact, of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and noting that sustained and coordinated efforts by all relevant actors are required to consolidate progress made towards their implementation and to overcome continuing challenges, Recalling that the Afghanistan Compact is based on a partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community, based on the desire of the parties for Afghanistan to progressively assume responsibility for its own development and security, and with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations, Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community, including, jointly with the Government of Afghanistan, the coordination and monitoring of efforts in implementing the Afghanistan Compact, and expressing its appreciation and strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Afghanistan and the women and men of UNAMA, Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and

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development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges through a comprehensive approach, Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach in addressing the challenges in Afghanistan and noting, in this context, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and stressing the need for strengthened cooperation, coordination and mutual support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities, Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the increasingly strong links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, including children, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel, Stressing the importance of ensuring safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers, including United Nations staff and associated personnel, Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups on the capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of law, to provide security and basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the improvement and protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, Recalling the importance of the Kabul Declaration of 22 December 2002 on Good-Neighbourly Relations (Kabul Declaration) (S/2002/1416), looking forward to the Third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Islamabad, and stressing the crucial importance of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan, Welcoming the holding of the Afghan-Pakistani Peace Jirga in Kabul on August 2007 and the collective determination expressed at the Jirga to bring sustainable peace to the region, including by addressing the terrorist threat, and expressing its support for the relevant follow-up processes, Recalling its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, and its resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict, and taking note with appreciation of the 7th report of the Secretary-General (S/2007/757) on Children and Armed Conflict of 21 December 2007, 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 6 March 2008 (S/2008/159); 2. Expresses its appreciation for the United Nations long-term commitment to work with the Government and the people of Afghanistan; 3. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMA, as defined in its resolutions 1662 (2006) and 1746 (2007), until 23 March 2009; 4. Decides further that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, within their mandate and guided by the principle of reinforcing

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Afghan ownership and leadership, will lead the international civilian efforts to, inter alia: (a) promote, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government and the adherence to the principles of aid effectiveness enumerated in the Afghanistan Compact, including through mobilization of resources, coordination of the assistance provided by international donors and organizations, and direction of the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in particular for counter-narcotics, reconstruction and development activities; (b) strengthen the cooperation with ISAF at all levels and throughout the country, in accordance with their existing mandates, in order to improve civil- military coordination, to facilitate the timely exchange of information and to ensure coherence between the activities of national and international security forces and of civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations; (c) through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country, provide political outreach, promote at the local level the implementation of the Compact, of the ANDS and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and facilitate inclusion in and understanding of the Government’s policies; (d) provide good offices to support, if requested by the Afghan Government, the implementation of Afghan-led reconciliation programmes, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and with full respect of the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1267 (1999) and other relevant resolutions of the Council; (e) support efforts, including through the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption, in particular at subnational level, and to promote development initiatives at the local level with a view to helping bring the benefits of peace and deliver services in a timely and sustainable manner; (f) play a central coordinating role to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and with a view to building the capacity of the Afghan Government, including by providing effective support to national and local authorities in assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and to creating conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons; (g) continue, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to cooperate with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to cooperate also with relevant international and local non-governmental organizations, to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a state party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights; (h) support, at the request of the Afghan authorities, the electoral process, in particular through the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (AIEC), by

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providing technical assistance, coordinating other international donors, agencies and organizations providing assistance and channelling existing and additional funds earmarked to support the process; (i) support regional cooperation to work towards a stable and prosperous Afghanistan; 5. Calls upon all Afghan and international parties to coordinate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and in efforts to promote the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country; 6. Stresses the importance of strengthening and expanding the presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the provinces, and encourages the Secretary-General to pursue current efforts to finalize the necessary arrangements to address the security issues associated with such strengthening and expansion; 7. Calls on the Afghan Government, and the international community and international organizations, to implement the Afghanistan Compact and its annexes in full, and stresses in this context the importance of meeting the benchmarks and timelines of the Compact for progress on security, governance, rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics; 8. Reaffirms the central role played by the JCMB in coordinating, facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the Compact, stresses the need to strengthen its authority and capacity to, inter alia, measure progress towards the benchmarks outlined in the Afghanistan Compact and facilitate the coordination of international assistance in support of the ANDS, and calls upon all relevant actors to cooperate with the JCMB in this regard, including by reporting assistance programmes to the Afghan Government’s aid coordination unit and to the JCMB; 9. Welcomes the progress made by the Afghan Government in the finalization of the ANDS, looks forward to its launch, and stresses the importance, in this context, of adequate resource mobilization, including through the fulfilment of the pledges made at the London Conference, possible new pledges and increased assistance to the core budget; 10. Notes with interest the intention, expressed by JCMB members at the Political Directors Meeting on Afghanistan held in Tokyo on 5 February 2008, to prepare an international conference to review progress on the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, welcomes the offer of France to host such conference in Paris in June 2008, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on its outcome and to include in this report, if necessary, further recommendations concerning UNAMA’s mandate; 11. Calls upon the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade;

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12. Condemns in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, and condemns further the use by the Taliban and other extremist groups of civilians as human shields; 13. Reiterates its concern about all civilian casualties, calls for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law and for all appropriate steps to be taken to ensure the protection of civilians, and recognizes in this context the robust efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimize the risk of civilian casualties, notably the continuous review of tactics and procedures and the conduct of after-action reviews in cooperation with the Afghan Government in cases where civilian casualties have reportedly occurred; 14. Expresses its strong concern about the recruitment and use of children by Taliban forces in Afghanistan as well as the killing and maiming of children as a result of the conflict, reiterates its strong condemnation of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and all other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict, and stresses the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1612 (2005); in this context, requests the Secretary-General to strengthen the child protection component of UNAMA, in particular through the appointment of child protection advisers; 15. Stresses the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector through training, mentoring and empowerment efforts, in order to accelerate progress towards the goal of self-sufficient and ethnically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country; 16. Welcomes in this context the continued progress in the development of the Afghan National Army and its improved ability to plan and undertake operations, and encourages sustained training efforts, including through the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), and advise in developing a sustainable defence planning process as well as assistance in defence reform initiatives; 17. Calls for further efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Afghan National Police in order to reinforce the authority of the Afghan Government throughout the country, welcomes the increasing role played by the International Police Coordination Board in policy setting and coordination, and stresses the importance, in this context, of the contribution of the European Union through its police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan); 18. Calls for further progress in the implementation by the Afghan Government, with support from the international community, of the programme of disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG); 19. Expresses its concern at the serious harm that increasing opium cultivation, production and trafficking causes to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally; calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to accelerate the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy as discussed at the JCMB meeting held in Tokyo in February 2008, in particular at the local level, and to mainstream counter-narcotics throughout national programmes; encourages

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additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy, including through contributions to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund; 20. Calls upon States to strengthen international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the illicit production and trafficking of drugs originated in Afghanistan, including through border management cooperation in drug control and cooperation for the fight against the illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors and against money-laundering linked to such trafficking, taking into account the outcome of the Second Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan organized by the Government of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime held in Moscow from 26 to 28 June 2006 (S/2006/598), within the framework of the Paris Pact initiative; 21. Welcomes the adoption by the Afghan authorities, in accordance with the outcome of the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, of the National Justice Programme launched at the JCMB meeting held in Tokyo in February 2008, and stresses the importance of its full and timely implementation by all the relevant actors in order to accelerate the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, strengthen the rule of law throughout the country and eliminate impunity; 22. Stresses in this context the importance of further progress in the reconstruction and reform of the prison sector in Afghanistan, in order to improve the respect for the rule of law and human rights therein; 23. Notes with concern the effects of widespread corruption on security, good governance, counter-narcotics efforts and economic development, and calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to vigorously lead the fight against corruption and to enhance its efforts to establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration; 24. Encourages all Afghan institutions, including the executive and legislative branches, to work in a spirit of cooperation, calls on the Afghan Government to pursue continued legislative and public administration reform in order to ensure good governance, full representation and accountability at both national and subnational levels, stresses the need for further international efforts to provide technical assistance in this area, and recalls the role of the Senior Appointments Panel in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact; 25. Encourages the international community to assist the Government of Afghanistan in making capacity-building and human resources development a cross- cutting priority; 26. Notes the leading role that the Afghan institutions will play in the organization of the next elections, encourages the Afghan Government, with support from the international community, to accelerate the planning and preparation of such elections, stresses the need to establish a permanent Civil Voter Registry (CVR) in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact, and emphasizes the importance of free, fair, inclusive and transparent elections in order to sustain the democratic progress of the country; 27. Calls for full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law throughout Afghanistan, notes with concern the

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increasing restrictions on freedom of media, commends the AIHRC for its courageous efforts to monitor respect for human rights in Afghanistan as well as to foster and protect these rights and to promote the emergence of a pluralistic civil society, and stresses the importance of full cooperation with the AIHRC by all relevant actors; 28. Recognizes the significant progress achieved on gender equality in Afghanistan in recent years, strongly condemns continuing forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls, stresses the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and requests the Secretary-General to continue to include in its reports to the Security Council relevant information on the process of integration of women into the political, economic and social life of Afghanistan; 29. Calls for enhanced efforts to ensure the full implementation of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact, without prejudice to the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and other relevant resolutions of the Security Council; 30. Welcomes the cooperation of the Afghan Government and UNAMA with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) with the implementation of resolution 1735 (2006), including by identifying individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaida and the Taliban using proceeds derived from illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors, and encourages the continuation of such cooperation; 31. Welcomes ongoing efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and its neighbouring and regional partners to foster trust and cooperation with each other, including recent cooperation initiatives developed by regional organizations, and stresses the importance of increasing cooperation between Afghanistan and the partners against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, in promoting peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and in fostering cooperation in the economic and development sectors as a means to achieve the full integration of Afghanistan into regional dynamics and the global economy; 32. Calls for strengthening the process of regional economic cooperation, including measures to facilitate regional trade, to increase foreign investments and to develop infrastructure, noting Afghanistan’s historic role as a land bridge in Asia; 33. Recognizes the importance of voluntary, safe, orderly return and sustainable reintegration of the remaining Afghan refugees for the stability of the country and the region, and calls for continued and enhanced international assistance in this regard; 34. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every six months on developments in Afghanistan, in addition to the report requested in paragraph 10 of this resolution; 35. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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270 United Nations S/RES/1817 (2008)

Security Council Distr.: General 11 June 2008

Resolution 1817 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5907th meeting, on 11 June 2008

The Security Council, Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1659 (2006), 1776 (2007) and 1806 (2008), and the statement of its President on 17 June 2003 (S/PRST/2003/7), Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1735 (2006), and reiterating its support for international efforts to combat terrorism in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, Reaffirming its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations, Noting with concern the existing links between international security, terrorism and transnational organized crime, money-laundering, trafficking in illicit drugs and illegal arms, and in this regard emphasizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge, Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the continued violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between illicit drugs trafficking and terrorism, and Calling upon the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan in the fight against narcotic drugs and also welcoming the efforts of neighbouring countries to

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address the impact on the region of the production of illicit drugs in Afghanistan, including through interdiction activities, and encouraging the international and regional organizations to enhance their role in the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotics and precursors, Paying homage to the sacrifice of members of the security forces of Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries in the fight against drug traffickers, Reiterating its support for the fight against illicit production and trafficking of drugs from and chemical precursors to Afghanistan, in neighbouring countries, countries on trafficking routes, drug destination countries and precursors producing countries, encouraging increased cooperation between those countries to strengthen anti-narcotics controls to curb the drug flow, including through border management cooperation, and expressing its support for the Paris Pact Initiative, for the outcome of the Second Ministerial Conference organized in Moscow in June 2006, and for the meeting organized in Kabul in October 2007 in the framework of the Paris Pact Initiative; Stressing the need for Member States to take measures, with the support of relevant international actors to combat the laundering of proceeds of criminal activity, corruption and illicit trafficking in narcotics and precursors in line with the outcome of the Moscow Conference, Recalling that achieving a sustained and significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to eliminating the narcotics industry has been identified as a cross-cutting priority by the “Afghanistan Compact” adopted in London in 2006, which provides the framework for the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community, as well as the Government of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy, Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach to address the drug problem of Afghanistan, which, to be effective has to be integrated into the wider context of efforts carried out in the three areas of Security, Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Economic and Social Development, stressing that the development of alternative livelihood programmes is of key importance in the success of the efforts in counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, and reiterating that extensive efforts have also to be made to reduce the demand of drugs globally in order to contribute to the sustainability of the elimination of illicit cultivation in Afghanistan, Expressing utmost concern at the increase of illegal smuggling, for illicit use, to and within Afghanistan of chemical precursors needed to produce heroin, in particular acetic anhydride, and also hydrochloric acid and acetone, linked to the high level of opium cultivation, production and trafficking, and noting that most of the opium produced in Afghanistan is now processed in the country, Recalling the Political Declaration adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session, in which Member States decided to establish the year 2008 as a target date for States to eliminate or significantly reduce, inter alia, the diversion of precursors, and recognizing that action against the world drug problem is a common and shared responsibility requiring an integrated and balanced approach in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, Acknowledging the role of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council as the central policymaking and coordinating body

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within the United Nations system on international drug control issues, and welcoming its intention to consider the issue of precursors control as one of the central questions to be discussed during the high-level segment of the fifty-second session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Acknowledging the mandate and the leading role played by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), as an independent treaty body, in the implementation of the United Nations international drug control conventions and the international control of precursors, Stressing the central role played by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in assisting Member States, notably by providing technical assistance, in the fight against illicit drugs, 1. Expresses utmost concern at the high level of opium cultivation, production and trafficking, which involves in particular the diversion of chemical precursors, and stresses once again the serious harm that it causes to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, and to the success of the international efforts; 2. Calls upon all Member States to increase international and regional cooperation in order to counter the illicit production and trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan, including by strengthening the monitoring of the international trade in chemical precursors, notably but not limited to acetic anhydride, and to prevent attempts to divert the substances from licit international trade for illicit use in Afghanistan; 3. Invites all Member States, in particular chemical precursors producing countries, Afghanistan, neighbouring countries, and all countries on the trafficking routes to increase their cooperation with the INCB, notably by fully complying with the provisions of article 12 of United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, in order to eliminate loopholes utilized by criminal organizations to divert chemical precursors from licit international trade; 4. Urges exporting States to ensure the systematic notification of all exports of relevant chemical precursors, upon request from importing States, in accordance with provisions of the 1988 Convention, and encourages importing States to request the systematic notification of such exports; also urges the Governments that have not yet done so to register with and utilize the online system for the exchange of pre-export notifications (PEN Online); 5. Calls upon States that have not done so to consider ratifying or acceding to, and State parties to implement fully the multilateral treaties whose aim is to fight against the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, notably the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol of 25 March 1972 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, underlines the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully, and stresses that nothing in this resolution will impose on State parties new obligations with regard to these treaties; 6. Expresses its continued support to the commitment and efforts of Afghanistan to achieve a sustained and significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to complete elimination, Expresses also its

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support to the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to accelerate its implementation, as discussed at the seventh meeting of the Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board (JCMB) held in Tokyo in February 2008, and Calls for additional international support for the priorities identified in that Strategy; 7. Calls upon all Member States, in particular chemical precursors producing countries, Afghanistan, neighbouring countries and all countries on the trafficking routes to adopt adequate national legislation, consistent with the requirements of relevant international conventions to which they are parties, where it has not yet been done, and to strengthen their national capacities in the areas of (i) regulation and monitoring of manufacture and trade of chemical precursors, with a view to controlling the final destination of such chemicals and (ii) specialized enforcement operations against the diversion of precursors, including for their detection and disposal in Afghanistan and the region, and for strengthening border controls; 8. Invites the international community to provide financial and technical assistance and support, in building national capacity in the fields referred to in paragraph 7, to Afghanistan and, where appropriate and upon request, neighbouring countries, including through voluntary contributions to UNODC; stresses in particular the importance of training and equipping law enforcement agencies, including border police and customs officers, so as to allow them to deal efficiently with such tasks as detection, scanning, stockpiling, transportation and destruction of chemical precursors; and encourages Afghanistan and its neighbours to make full use of such assistance; 9. Reiterates its support for the Paris Pact Initiative aimed at facilitating counter-narcotics cooperation and coordination among countries seriously affected by the trafficking of narcotic drugs produced in Afghanistan, for the outcome of the Second Ministerial Conference organized in Moscow in June 2006 (S/2006/598), in cooperation with UNODC, and for other international and/or regional relevant initiatives, such as Project Cohesion, and calls upon Paris Pact partners to further promote international and regional initiatives; 10. Welcomes the launch, under the guidance of UNODC and the Project Cohesion Task Force, of the Targeted Anti-Trafficking Regional Communication, Expertise and Training (TARCET) initiative, targeting precursors used in the manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan, and urges the Paris Pact partners to cooperate closely in a view to achieve its successful implementation; 11. Recognizes the legitimate need of industry to have access to precursors and its important role in preventing the diversion of precursors, and encourages all Member States, in particular producing countries, Afghanistan and its neighbours to develop partnerships with the private sector so as to prevent the diversion of precursors; 12. Looks forward to the outcome of the international conference in support of Afghanistan, which will be held in Paris on 12 June 2008, and encourages the participants to the Conference to make concrete proposals on the ways to address the problem of diversion of chemical precursors for illicit use, in the wider framework of the discussions on the strengthening of counter-narcotics activities in

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the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and National Drug Control Strategy; 13. Encourages Member States to submit to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) for inclusion on the Consolidated List names of individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, using proceeds derived from the illicit cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotic drugs produced in Afghanistan and their precursors, in order to give full effect to the relevant provisions of resolution 1735 (2006); 14. Requests the Secretary-General to include, as appropriate, in his regular reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation in Afghanistan, in close consultation with UNODC and INCB, observations and recommendations on the fight against drug production and trafficking, notably on the issue of the illicit traffic of chemical precursors to and within Afghanistan; 15. Invites the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to consider, in accordance with its mandate, ways to strengthen regional and international cooperation to prevent the diversion and smuggling of chemical precursors to and within Afghanistan, and further opportunities for Member States to support the Afghan Government in developing capacities to tackle precursors and trafficking; 16. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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276 CONTRIBUTI DI ANALISI E DOTTRINA

XVI legislatura

AFGHANISTAN: PUNTO DI SITUAZIONE

Contributi di Istituti di ricerca specializzati

n. 94 Giugno 2008

279 XVI legislatura

AFGHANISTAN: PUNTO DI SITUAZIONE

A cura di Luca La Bella, del Centro Studi Internazionali (Ce.S.I)

n. 94 Giugno 2008

280 Servizio Studi Servizio affari internazionali

Direttore Direttore Daniele Ravenna tel. 06 6706_2451 Maria Valeria Agostini tel. 06 6706_2405

Segreteria _2451 Segreteria _2989 _2629 _3666 Fax 06 6706_3588 Fax 06 6706_4336

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AFGHANISTAN - PUNTO DI SITUAZIONE

di Luca La Bella

GIUGNO 2008

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La posizione geografica dell’Afghanistan, collocata tra il Medio Oriente, l’Asia Centrale e il Subcontinente indiano, è sempre stata strategicamente significativa, sia al giorno d’oggi che all’epoca della “Via della Seta”. Questo ha fatto sì che il Paese fosse fin dall’antichità teatro di scontri e dispute tra gli imperi e i potentati confinanti. Privo di sbocchi al mare e caratterizzato da un territorio aspro e montuoso, l’Afghanistan è stato segnato da conflitti e instabilità politica anche per la maggior parte della sua storia moderna. Le infrastrutture e l’economia sono in rovina e centinai di migliaia di afghani sono ancora rifugiati nei Paesi vicini. Dopo la caduta del regime talebano nel 2001, i combattenti del movimento islamico radicale si sono riorganizzati e rappresentano oggi una forza “risorta”, specialmente a sud e a est. Il presente contesto analitico è caratterizzato dalla sfida che il debole governo di Kabul, sostenuto dalla comunità internazionale, si trova ad affrontare nell’estendere il controllo a tutto il territorio nazionale e nell’infondere alla popolazione un senso di unità nazionale. Nel corso del 2007 si sono registrati alti livelli di violenza nel Paese che hanno portato all’uccisione di circa 8.000 afghani, di cui 1.500 civili, secondo stime ONU. Le perdite della NATO nello stesso anno, 232 caduti, sono state le più alte dall’inizio del coinvolgimento dell’Alleanza nel Paese e il 2008, con 67 caduti, sembra mantenere invariata la pressione sui contingenti stranieri, specie quelli schierati nelle province più turbolente del Paese. Volendo tracciare una mappa del Paese in base ai dati disponibili sulla sicurezza, emerge l’immagine di un Afghanistan “diviso in due”, con una situazione di relativa calma e stabilità a nord e a ovest, ed una di grande rischio e ostilità a sud e a est. Mentre l’area sud è sotto la responsabilità della missione ISAF della NATO, le province orientali del Paese sono il teatro di OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), la missione a guida USA che ha il compito di neutralizzare la minaccia qaedista. L’area dove l’insurrezione è più intensa, abitata dall’etnia pashtun che fornisce la maggior parte dei combattenti talebani, è considerata “off limits” per gli operatori umanitari ed è pertanto maggiormente bisognosa di assistenza e ricostruzione. Per questa ragione, i contingenti schierati in queste aree hanno la cruciale funzione di sopperire all’assenza del governo centrale e delle organizzazioni internazionali mediante la distribuzione di aiuti e fondi per la ricostruzione.

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Detto questo è comunque possibile affermare che la situazione al sud sia più ostica di quella incontrata dai soldati americani a est nelle provincie di Kunar, Nooristan e Nangarhar, come dimostra anche il minor numero di caduti registrato in quelle aree. Ad ogni modo, la radicata ostilità dimostrata dalla popolazione del sud nei confronti delle truppe straniere ha origine nella geografia umana di quelle aree. Le province meridionali sono più lontane da Kabul e dalle principali rotte commerciali del Paese e sono abitate da una popolazione caratterizzata da un livello di alfabetizzazione estremamente ridotto e da un sentimento xenofobico che affonda le radici nel “Grande Gioco” tra Russia zarista e Impero Britannico alla fine dell’Ottocento. A Helmand e Kandahar soprattutto, le strutture tribali sono state sensibilmente indebolite da trent’anni di guerre ed i giovani sfuggono al controllo dei capi tribali, vanificando i tentativi di approccio dei comandanti NATO che spesso ricorrono agli ulema per rapportarsi alla popolazione. La mancanza di sicurezza del sud dell’Afghanistan rende il tessuto sociale locale ancora più pericoloso perché porta all’atomizzazione dell’autorità in molteplici centri di potere, con banditi locali, milizie tribali, autorità governative e talebani in competizione per il controllo del territorio e della popolazione. In alcune aree diventa perfino difficile distinguere tra attacchi dei talebani e quelli di altre organizzazioni criminali. Esiste poi l’azione di movimenti radicali come Hezb-e-Islami, il gruppo di Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ex mujahidin prediletto dell’ISI pakistano ed ex Primo Ministro. Le citate province meridionali inoltre, sono “l’habitat naturale” del movimento talebano la cui composizione etnica rispecchia fedelmente il dominio pashtun delle aree a cavallo della linea Durand, che marca il confine ufficiale tra Afghanistan e Pakistan. I principali problemi incontrati dalle truppe NATO al sud, nelle province di Helmand, Kandahar e Oruzgan sono relativi all’entità delle risorse messe a disposizione dalle nazioni contribuenti e dalle restrizioni imposte dai Governi di alcune nazioni sull’impiego dei propri contingenti. La NATO e soprattutto il Pentagono guidato dal Segretario Gates hanno chiesto con insistenza nei mesi passati un maggiore coinvolgimento degli alleati tedeschi, francesi, spagnoli e italiani, i cui contingenti, a causa dei caveat imposti dai governi nazionali, sono Stati schierati lontani dalle cosiddette province “calde” del sud. Dall’aprile 2006, quando la NATO ha assunto il controllo delle province afghane di Helmand, Oruzgan e Kandahar, rispettivamente assegnate a inglesi, olandesi e canadesi, i contingenti di questi Paesi si sono trovati a

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fronteggiare un’insurrezione talebana difficilmente isolabile dalla popolazione pashtun locale e con un solido retroterra strategico, oltre la linea Durand, nelle Aree Tribali del Pakistan. La combinazione di un nemico ben radicato sul territorio (Kandahar è la “culla spirituale” del Movimento Talebano), foraggiato dall’intensiva coltivazione del papavero da oppio e “protetto” dalla comunità pashtun a nord e a sud della linea Durand, ha portato i vertici militari britannici a descrivere le operazioni ad Helmand come le più intense dai tempi della guerra di Corea. Simili esternazioni sono giunte anche da olandesi e canadesi. In particolare, nei primi mesi del 2008, questi ultimi hanno richiesto fortemente l’invio di rinforzi avendo sostenuto il numero più alto di perdite in proporzione all’entità del contingente (50 caduti su 2.500 uomini). La questione della carenza di truppe ha evidenziato il consistente squilibrio di risorse e capacità logistiche tra gli Stati Uniti e gli altri alleati NATO in Afghanistan. In particolar modo è emerso un certo disincanto da parte di Washington per le capacità di proiezione di forza militare degli alleati europei (ad eccezione di inglesi e francesi) che, tradizionalmente concentrati sulla difesa del territorio nazionale, raggiungono appena il minimo di spese militari richieste dalla NATO (2% del PIL di ciascuno). Per contrasto, gli USA, che hanno Forze Armate storicamente improntate all’impiego al di fuori dei confini nazionali, spendono ogni anno il 4% del PIL. Alla vigilia del vertice NATO di Bucarest (3-5 aprile 2008), indetto per cercare di dare una risposta alle esigenze espresse dai comandanti NATO in loco, il Segretario alla Difesa Gates aveva perfino paventato l’emergere di un’Alleanza “a due stadi”, dove solo una parte degli alleati è disposta “a combattere e morire”. Proprio il summit di Bucarest può essere considerato un punto di svolta per la strategia NATO in Afghanistan, essendosi concluso con la decisione di inviare un contingente addizionale francese di 800 uomini (schierati a est e a Kabul) ed un corpo di spedizione dei Marines di 3.200 uomini (a fianco di inglesi e canadesi al sud). In quest’ottica sembra che il summit abbia risentito dell’esperienza irachena del “Piano Petraeus”, tendente a dimostrare come nel contesto di un’insurrezione sia indispensabile avere un numero congruo di truppe per il controllo del territorio. Le lezioni del “surge” iracheno sembrano avere un riscontro anche presso il comandante delle forze NATO in Afghanistan. Secondo il Gen. Dan McNeill, infatti, dovendo applicare alla lettera le linee guida della strategia contro-insurrezionale, in Afghanistan la NATO avrebbe bisogno di 400.000 uomini. Nonostante durante gli ultimi 15 mesi di comando il Gen. McNeill (in procinto di lasciare il comando al Gen. David McKiernan)

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abbia visto passare il numero di uomini in forza all’ISAF da 33 mila a 53 mila, l’ufficiale americano ritiene che la missione NATO necessiti ancora di uomini ed equipaggiamento. A riprova di quest’osservazione e nella convinzione che gli alleati NATO manchino di volontà politica o mezzi materiali per spedire maggiori risorse in Afghanistan, lo sforzo bellico della NATO al sud sta dal 2007 subendo una massiccia “americanizzazione”. Il 2007 infatti ha visto l’invio di una brigata addizionale per l’Afghanistan, contemporaneamente alle cinque brigate inviate in Iraq per il ”surge”. Nel corso del 2008, dopo Bucarest, sono giunti a Helmand e Kandahar i Marines americani in supporto alle operazioni britanniche e canadesi in quelle province. È stata anche ventilata la possibilità di inviare due ulteriori brigate nel 2009 (circa 7 mila uomini) e di porre il sud del Paese permanentemente sotto comando americano. Nel contesto della già citata disparità di mezzi a vantaggio degli USA, bisogna inoltre citare che il solo corpo di spedizione di Marines a Helmand (2.400 uomini) ha a sua disposizione più velivoli (elicotteri da trasporto, d’attacco e caccia) che l’intera task- force britannica (7.500 uomini). Proprio questa appare essere la cruciale differenza tra ISAF ed ENDURING FREEDOM, cioè il fatto che gli USA oltre ad essere presenti nel teatro afghano dal 2001 e quindi prima di qualsiasi altro contingente NATO, possano semplicemente fare affidamento su maggiori risorse umane e finanziarie. Mentre le forze britanniche e canadesi non sono sufficienti a coprire capillarmente il territorio (a Helmand il confine con il Pakistan è pattugliato dai Marines americani), nell’est del Paese le forze USA non hanno il medesimo problema. Inoltre, se la rotazione delle unità americane avviene ogni 15 mesi (12 mesi dal 2008), le forze NATO tornano a casa ogni sei mesi, e per giunta i contingenti nazionali sono inquadrati all’interno di Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), ognuno con priorità differenti. Questo significa che il soldato americano medio passa più tempo in Afghanistan rispetto ai suoi omologhi NATO, a beneficio della sua conoscenza del territorio. Il Gen. McNeill ha più volte dichiarato che questi fattori influiscono negativamente sulla coerenza dello sforzo bellico NATO. Un’ulteriore cruciale differenza è rappresentata dalle immense risorse finanziarie a disposizione dei comandanti militari USA, specialmente nel contesto di ricostruzione del Paese. I comandanti USA hanno accesso a fondi denominati “CERP” (Commanders Emergency Response Programme) del valore di centinaia di milioni di dollari, estremamente utili per il rapido e diretto finanziamento di progetti urgenti a beneficio della comunità locale. A differenza dei suoi omologhi NATO, un comandante

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americano può quindi in autonomia decidere quale sia il più pressante bisogno della popolazione e immediatamente provvedere al finanziamento di scuole, strade e cliniche, senza passare per Kabul e con il risultato di “portare la presenza dello Stato” laddove sia il governo afghano sia gli operatori umanitari non possono arrivare. Questa è stata l’esperienza di ENDURING FREEDOM nella provincia di Kunar, una delle aree più letali per le forze americane fino all’anno scorso che, grazie alla costruzione di scuole e strade è divenuta sensibilmente più stabile. Particolarmente utile risulta essere la costruzione di strade, che oltre a consentire alle Forze afghane spostamenti rapidi in caso di necessità, danno la possibilità a un’intera comunità rurale di portare il proprio raccolto al mercato o di raggiungere in tempo una clinica o un ospedale. Dal canto loro, i PRT sotto l’egida dell’ISAF presentano un modello di sviluppo e ricostruzione più a lungo termine, con almeno una parte dei fondi canalizzata verso Kabul, allo scopo di formare l’apparato amministrativo del Paese. La ricostruzione mediante CERP può, in certi casi, rappresentare un mero palliativo, con scarso coordinamento dei progetti finanziati dai singoli comandanti e bassa sostenibilità di alcuni progetti (scuole finanziate senza maestri). Nonostante la “divisione del lavoro” tra ISAF e OEF sia stata duramente criticata per la scarsa comunicazione e la mancanza di coordinamento tra i due assetti militari, vi è almeno sostanziale accordo su quelli che costituiscono i principi basilari della contro- insurrezione. Specialmente OEF è gradualmente passata da un impiego marcatamente offensivo (“search and destroy”) ad un approccio dove la protezione della popolazione e l’estensione dell’autorità del governo centrale, mediante progetti di ricostruzione, sono un importante strumento per indebolire l’insurrezione talebana. Un approccio del tutto simile a quello impiegato dai contingenti nazionali sotto l’egida dell’ISAF, non da ultimi gli italiani del PRT di Herat. In effetti, analizzando l’evoluzione delle rispettive missioni militari si nota una certa convergenza dei modus operandi. Se, come esemplificato dalle recenti richieste di rilassamento dei caveat nazionali e dalla richiesta di rinforzi, l’ISAF va assumendo, specialmente al sud, funzioni di contro-insurrezione classica, avviene l’inverso per OEF. Le forze USA nell’est del Paese hanno infatti dovuto integrare ricostruzione ed aiuti alla lotta contro la guerriglia talebana. Peraltro, l’enfasi sull’assistenza alla popolazione ha portato notevoli benefici alle forze di OEF in termini di intelligence, come dimostrato dal successo dei 3 attacchi compiuti nel 2008 dai droni USA nelle Aree Tribali del Pakistan al confine con l’Afghanistan. In ultima analisi, la compenetrazione delle strategie ISAF e OEF è anche probabilmente la

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conseguenza del fatto che gli USA sono il principale contributore di truppe per ambedue le missioni e che sia quindi immaginabile, nonostante le distinte catene di comando, un’informale collaborazione. È inoltre significativo che il nuovo comandante in capo delle Forze NATO in Afghanistan sia l’americano David McKiernan, veterano della guerra in Iraq del 2003. Ad ogni modo, il comandante uscente McNeill sottolinea come la campagna militare contro i talebani stia proseguendo con buoni risultati, specialmente nell’est del Paese. Anche al sud, dopo la presa (o la ri-presa) del distretto di Musa Qala da parte della Task-Force britannica coadiuvata da elementi dell’Esercito afghano, la guerriglia talebana non esegue più assalti frontali in forze contro la NATO, preferendo la tattica del “mordi e fuggi” e sempre più prediligendo gli attacchi mediante IED. Se nel 2007 il 44% dei caduti NATO poteva attribuirsi a ordigni esplosivi improvvisati, nei primi mesi del 2008 si passa all’80%. Anche grazie ad una serie di successi riportati al sud dall’ISAF, come l’uccisione o l’arresto di oltre 300 guerriglieri talebani fra cui il comandante Mullah Dadullah (12 maggio 2007), si può affermare che nel 2008 è improbabile che l’insurrezione sia in grado di conquistare (e tenere) importanti città o villaggi. Questo nonostante i talebani continuino ad avere l’inestimabile vantaggio di poter riparare nelle aree pashtun in Pakistan, da sempre retroterra strategico oltre che referente culturale di molti talebani che hanno frequentato madrasse in quel Paese. Appare infatti che la rimozione da parte delle forze NATO o USA di una parte consistente della “vecchia guardia”, ossia i veterani della guerriglia talebana, abbia portato l’insurrezione a fare affidamento su reclute sempre più giovani e inesperte, ma anche sempre più radicali. Questo sviluppo ha prodotto, come detto, un cambio di strategia con l’adozione di tecniche terroristiche, come gli shahid e le IED, e contribuisce all’emergere di nuovi comandanti maggiormente orientati verso la rete qaedista di Osama bin Laden, come Qazi Ziaur Rahman, il comandante delle province di Kunar e Nooristan. La guerriglia talebana potrà anche non essere in grado di ingaggiare le soverchianti forze della NATO e conquistare territorio, ma l’adozione di una strategia asimmetrica di fatto elude la necessità di “conquistare e difendere” territorio. L’asimmetria consente ai talebani di mantenere alta la tensione e l’instabilità politica, capitalizzando sulla progressiva insoddisfazione della popolazione nei confronti del governo centrale, tacciato di corruzione, malgoverno e di essere “al soldo degli stranieri.” Il fatto che il reclutamento di guerriglieri proceda a spron battuto e che nonostante i successi militari di ISAF e OEF i primi 3 mesi del 2008 abbiano visto un

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aumento della violenza del 30%, indica che la situazione di sicurezza per il 2008 potrebbe peggiorare. Il fattore “spettacolare” della strategia asimmetrica porterà probabilmente ad un aumento degli attacchi indiscriminati su obiettivi sensibili, come si evince dall’attacco alla parata militare a Kabul del 27 aprile. L’attacco in questione, che ha portato alla morte di 3 persone e al ferimento di 11, ha grande valore simbolico in quanto rappresenta la seconda volta che nel 2008 l’insurrezione giunge nella capitale, dopo l’assalto all’Hotel Serena del 14 gennaio, con l’importante differenza che alla parata era presente Karzai e una nutrita rappresentanza della comunità diplomatica di Kabul. L’assalto inoltre ha inteso colpire la più rispettata tra le deboli istituzioni del nuovo Afghanistan, l’Esercito nazionale che con le sue 50.000 unità rappresenta il fiore all’occhiello del “nation building” occidentale. Minare la fiducia riposta nell’Esercito in un momento in cui la forza armata si appresta ad assumersi la responsabilità per la difesa di Kabul ed entro il 2011 per il resto del Paese con le forze internazionali in ruolo di supporto, rappresenta un attacco al cuore del “Nuovo Afghanistan”. Assalti simili hanno un immenso impatto sull’opinione pubblica, specialmente rispetto a “classici” scontri a fuoco con le forze NATO dove, secondo dati dell’ISAF, i talebani perdono 15 uomini per ogni soldato ucciso. D’altra parte, l’adozione di tecniche affini allo stragismo qaedista potrebbe portare a una riduzione del sostegno popolare alla guerriglia, alienando la popolazione a causa dell’indiscriminatezza degli attacchi. Anche in province “calde” come Helmand l’ottimismo della maggioranza degli afghani dopo il 2001 sta rapidamente svanendo come risultato della brutalità dei talebani e della soverchiante forza militare che la NATO deve impiegare per rimuoverli. Inoltre, se in origine la popolarità dei talebani dipendeva largamente dai loro successi nello sradicare la corruzione e l’illegalità, ad esempio, con effetti positivi per la sicurezza sulle strade, l’adozione di metodi marcatamente terroristici e la crescente dipendenza finanziaria dal contrabbando di oppio sono chiaramente in contraddizione con l’immagine del combattente islamico “duro e puro”, costruita faticosamente durante gli anni delle lotte intestine degli anni Novanta. Per quanto riguarda la coltivazione e il contrabbando dell’oppio -che rappresenta circa il 60% dell’economia nazionale e mette l’Afghanistan al primo posto al mondo con il 93% della produzione totale- si ritiene che porti nelle “casse” dei talebani circa 100 milioni di dollari l’anno. Ritornando al contrasto tra le province meridionali ed orientali del Paese, è proprio sotto il profilo della lotta alla droga che troviamo le differenze più

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marcate. Se le province di Nangarhar e Kunar, sotto controllo USA, spiccano per il colore verde del grano nei campi, nelle province di Helmand e Kandahar campeggia ancora il rosa-viola dell’oppio. Nel contesto della crisi alimentare mondiale infatti, per la prima volta dal 2001, 20 delle 34 province afghane sono “opium-free” secondo dati dell’ONU corroborati dal Ministro afghano per la lotta ai narcotici, Gen. Khodaidad. A incidere sulla produzione di oppio, più che gli effetti delle campagne anti-narcotici del governo e dei donatori, sarebbe stato l’aumento del prezzo del grano e la fine dell’importazione di grano dal Pakistan, che ha spinto molti agricoltori afghani a incrementare la coltivazione del cereale. Questo sviluppo potrebbe danneggiare la campagna militare dei talebani non solo per la perdita di fondi destinati al pagamento dei guerriglieri, ma in quanto i contadini avrebbero la possibilità di alimentarsi con il raccolto e non dipendere dalla vendita dell’oppio ai talebani per il sostentamento delle loro famiglie. È comunque ancora presto per tracciare le implicazioni che questo sviluppo potrà avere per l’insurrezione talebana che può ancora contare sull’estensiva coltivazione del papavero nella provincia di Helmand, la cui instabilità fornisce le condizioni perfette per la coltivazione illegale. In quest’area, la particolare commistione di guerriglia talebana e signori della guerra dediti al traffico di droga rende difficile lo “scollamento” dei coltivatori di oppio dall’insurrezione. A Helmand, anche i piccoli proprietari terrieri sostengono l’insurrezione talebana. Questa, infatti, li protegge dalle campagne di distruzione delle coltivazioni che minacciano la loro unica fonte di sostentamento. In sostanza, il “fermo-immagine” del Paese conferma la crescente polarità tra un nord ed un ovest relativamente stabili e sotto il controllo (per quanto perfettibile) del governo Karzai, e la “fascia pashtun” a sud e a est, in mano ai talebani. Se la presenza militare internazionale scongiura il pericolo che il governo venga travolto dai guerriglieri islamici, esiste tuttavia il rischio che la situazione del Paese si cristallizzi, dividendo l’Afghanistan in due e di fatto vanificando i tentativi di estirpare la presenza qaedista. In quest’ottica non è il numero delle truppe internazionali a determinare l’esito della campagna anti-talebana, ma l’efficacia del governo Karzai e dei suoi alleati nel promuovere politiche che sappiano aiutare la popolazione a non dipendere dai talebani. In sostanza, estendere nel lungo periodo il controllo del governo sulle province periferiche è una questione prettamente politica. I problemi della comunità internazionale in Afghanistan non sono infatti solo di natura militare, ma anche di ordine politico. In particolare, la debolezza del governo, prodotto

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della povertà e dell’arretratezza in cui versa il Paese dopo 30 anni di guerre, rappresenta un serio ostacolo per la pacificazione e la sostenibilità del “nuovo” Afghanistan. Una sicura priorità del Governo Karzai è quella di dimostrarsi onesto ed efficiente nell’assicurare servizi essenziali alla popolazione. Allo stesso tempo, proprio per scongiurare la deriva talebana di una parte del Paese, il governo deve tentare di instaurare un processo di riconciliazione nazionale capace di dare risposta alle istanze della comunità pashtun, la più numerosa in Afghanistan, ma anche “spina dorsale” dell’insurrezione. Una parte dei pashtun, si sente esclusa dal “nuovo corso” preso dall’Afghanistan dopo la caduta del regime talebano nel 2001 e appare quindi necessaria un’apertura diplomatica nei loro confronti, per persuadere settori sempre maggiori della comunità ad abbandonare la guerriglia e ritornare alla legalità sostenendo il Governo. Detto questo, è proprio con la legalità che il “ruolino” personale del Governo diviene controverso, nonostante il fatto che nel 2004 Karzai fosse stato eletto dagli afgani sulla base delle sue forti connotazioni anti-corruzione e contro il traffico di droga. Ad un anno dalle prossime elezioni, noti trafficanti e signori della guerra sono ancora a piede libero e secondo la stampa europea alcuni ricoprirebbero incarichi ufficiali all’interno del gabinetto del Presidente. Il traffico di droga alimenta la corruzione delle amministrazioni locali e va a sovrapporsi al problema della mancanza di amministratori competenti, dopo decenni in cui gli afghani istruiti che ne hanno avuto la possibilità si sono rifugiati all’estero. In quest’ottica, la comunità internazionale, cioè le truppe dei contingenti nazionali, i donatori e le organizzazioni internazionali, si vedono costrette ad incrementare l’assistenza diretta alla popolazione, tramite l’attività dei PRT. Tuttavia gli stessi attori sono consapevoli che questi sforzi non possono semplicemente “sostituire” l’attività del governo e anzi, in un certo senso, ritardano lo sviluppo e la formazione dell’amministrazione pubblica nazionale. Vi sono inoltre questioni riguardanti la percepita “perdita di sovranità” denunciata da Hamid Karzai in relazione all’azione unilaterale di alleati come il Regno Unito. Le sempre tese relazioni anglo-afghane hanno infatti subito un duro colpo quando Karzai ha “punito” gli inglesi per aver contattato elementi della guerriglia talebana a Helmand senza il permesso del Governo, espellendo due diplomatici e ponendo il veto alla nomina di Lord Ashdown, già amministratore ONU in Bosnia, a rappresentante ONU a Kabul. Nonostante gli oltre 7.500 uomini, i 3 miliardi di sterline spesi e i 100 caduti, sembra che le “interferenze” di Londra siano interpretate come nocive in quanto erodono l’immagine di Karzai davanti agli afghani e ai membri del suo stesso governo,

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ad un solo anno dalle elezioni. Venuto al potere con l’Alleanza del Nord nel 2001, oggi Karzai si vede osteggiato da molti tagiki, uzbeki e hazara che hanno combattuto al suo fianco contro i Talebani. In quest’ottica appare difficile che in prossimità delle elezioni il Presidente Karzai si scontri contro poteri occulti quali il narco-traffico e gli amministratori corrotti. È possibile notare anche come il Governo afghano per arginare la perdita di sostegno popolare abbia cominciato a “corteggiare” gli ambienti religiosi più conservatori. Alcuni membri del Parlamento afghano premono addirittura per la promulgazione di leggi che vietino alle donne di uscire di casa se non accompagnate da parenti maschi. Le polemiche sulla nomina di Paddy Ashdown hanno provocato ritardi nella ricerca di un coordinatore ONU per le attività di assistenza e ricostruzione. Questa è una posizione considerata estremamente importante alla luce della co-esistenza di molteplici e indipendenti programmi di assistenza, dai PRT che fanno capo ai contingenti nazionali ai Paesi donatori ufficiali, alle organizzazioni umanitarie. La necessità di adottare un approccio omnicomprensivo che tenga conto delle esigenze militari e di quelle della popolazione civile, capace di innescare, per così dire, un circolo virtuoso di sviluppo e sicurezza, rappresenta la vera sfida per la comunità internazionale in Afghanistan. Infatti, secondo la Banca Mondiale l’efficacia degli aiuti internazionali all’Afghanistan va migliorata, come ha dichiarato il 4 giugno Alastair McKechnie, direttore del dipartimento “Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries”. Secondo la Banca Mondiale, il governo afghano, che si appresta a richiedere 50 miliardi di dollari di aiuti per finanziare la ricostruzione del Paese nei prossimi 5 anni, deve rendere prioritari i programmi per la lotta alla povertà e alla corruzione dove i progressi sono stati esigui. Alla vigilia della conferenza dei donatori a Parigi – che aprirà i lavori il 12 giugno 2008 - appare prioritario anche l’impegno internazionale a favore dello sviluppo agricolo dell’Afghanistan, specie alla luce della crisi alimentare mondiale e dell’effetto positivo che questa ha avuto sulla conversione delle coltivazioni di papavero in grano. Sfruttando la presente congiuntura infatti è possibile simultaneamente dare al Paese l’auto-sufficienza alimentare, neutralizzare o perlomeno marginalizzare l’influenza del traffico di droga sulle istituzioni e assestare un forte colpo alla guerriglia talebana, foraggiata dal narcotraffico. Ad ogni modo, nonostante l’azione del governo Karzai possa risultare inefficace in alcuni settori, rimane il fatto che il panorama politico afghano spicca per la sua carenza di alternative. Hamid Karzai, pashtun durrani della tribù dei popalzay, non risulta forse

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l’individuo più indicato per portare i talebani, pashtun del clan rivale ghilzai, al tavolo dei negoziati, specialmente perché “legato” all’Alleanza del Nord dominata dai tagiki. Karzai rimane ad ognimodo l’unico interlocutore non ideologicamente ostile all’Occidente, con il quale la comunità internazionale può continuare a lavorare per la stabilità del Paese. La predisposizione al dialogo con l’Occidente lo rende sicuramente più ricettivo alle pressioni di molti suoi alleati che richiedono un maggiore impegno del governo a favore della popolazione o della riconciliazione nazionale. Nonostante le polemiche con gli inglesi abbiano avuto l’effetto di bloccare l’azione diplomatica delle cancellerie europee, per il timore di indebolire ulteriormente il Presidente o di innescare una reazione xenofoba nel Paese, risulta necessario quindi continuare a lavorare con Karzai per incrementare l’efficacia del Governo e arginare il malcontento popolare. A maggior ragione quindi, nell’anno che ci separa dalle elezioni presidenziali del 2009, la comunità internazionale dovrà adoperarsi per migliorare la “regia politica” dei programmi di assistenza al Paese asiatico. Nel breve termine infatti, grazie ad un coordinamento politico dei disparati programmi di assistenza, è possibile migliorare la qualità della vita della popolazione afghana, con la costruzione di strade, pozzi, cliniche e scuole. Migliorare la fornitura di servizi essenziali allevia la povertà ed espande l’autorità di Kabul sul territorio nazionale. Tuttavia, nel lungo termine, senza una più efficace azione di governo contro il narcotraffico e la corruzione, e in assenza di un maggiore impegno a favore della riconciliazione con la comunità pashtun, sarà difficile pacificare il Paese.

Sul piano delle relazioni esterne, le ingerenze provenienti da Pakistan e Iran contribuiscono ad alimentare l’instabilità dellìAfghanistan. Il Pakistan è rilevante come non mai per il contesto insurrezionale afghano. Infatti non è solamente il retroterra strategico della guerriglia pashtun, ma anche una fonte indispensabile di combattenti, specialmente in seguito agli accordi di non belligeranza firmati da Islamabad con i militanti delle aree tribali, che hanno causato l’aumento dell’infiltrazione di mujahidin pakistani oltreconfine. Nel contesto della perdita di influenza di Musharraf e della morte della Bhutto, la capacità americana di influenzare le decisioni del governo pakistano è significativamente diminuita. Michael Hayden, direttore della CIA, ha descritto gli accordi come “disastrosi” per gli interessi americani e ha ordinato l’intensificazione delle attività di contrasto di al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Il 14 maggio 2008 un raid aereo compiuto da un drone USA ha ucciso due

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operativi di al-Qaeda nel villaggio di Damadola nel distretto tribale di Bajaur. Il successo del raid conferma la maggiore penetrazione informativa dell’intelligence americana nelle province afghane di Kunar e Nooristan, che confinano proprio con il distretto di Bajaur. Gli accordi, definiti dal Ministro degli Esteri afghano Dadfar Spanta come “appeasement”, sono Stati firmati a maggio da Islamabad con i talebani pakistani di Baitullah Mehsud. Quest’ultimo è considerato uno dei militanti più pericolosi del Paese ed è stato accusato di essere il mandante dell’omicidio di Benazir Bhutto. Nel fragile contesto post-elettorale pakistano, con gli accordi Islamabad intende abbassare la tensione nelle aree tribali (FATA) e minimizzare il proprio coinvolgimento nella guerra al terrorismo voluta da Washington. L’Esercito pakistano, inoltre, teme che un confronto ad oltranza nelle FATA finirà per de-stabilizzare l’intero Paese ed è reduce da umilianti sconfitte subite in Waziristan per mano dei militanti di Mehsud. Il cessate il fuoco tra militanti e Forze Armate pakistane ha per i primi la funzione di disimpegnare risorse “bloccate” in Pakistan a vantaggio della jihad contro la NATO, ma anche quella di neutralizzare il ruolo di polo logistico giocato da Islamabad per lo sforzo bellico NATO. Non è la prima volta che il Pakistan ha adottato la via della tregua per pacificare le turbolenti aree tribali, retaggio dell’eredità coloniale britannica. Tutti i precedenti accordi con i militanti sono presto sfociati nella ripresa delle ostilità contro le Forze Armate pakistane. Anche quest’ultimo esempio di diplomazia “tribale” offre poche speranze di una tregua duratura, soprattutto a causa della crescente radicalizzazione dei militanti che rende questi ancora più inaffidabili. La svolta strategica dell’insurrezione afghana concede ampia libertà di manovra ai talebani pakistani come Mehsud, il cui contributo di armi e uomini è di cruciale importanza per la campagna contro la NATO. La rapida comparsa di una nuova generazione di comandanti talebani come Mehsud, meno legati al territorio e alla storia afghana e più legati al network di bin Laden, mette gradualmente in secondo piano mujahidin “storici” come Hekmatyar o Jalaluddin Haqqani e rende vano ogni tentativo di dialogo. Tehrik-i- Taliban-Pakistan, il gruppo armato di Baitullah Mehsud, è considerato vicino ad al- Qaeda e ai “takfiri” arabi presenti nelle FATA. Proprio in virtù di questi legami, Mehsud non rappresenta un movimento armato meramente locale, ma ha l’ambizione di partecipare attivamente alla jihad globale contro l’Occidente. Ogni accordo negoziato fino ad oggi in Pakistan ha avuto effetti deleteri sulla penetrazione di combattenti in Afghanistan. L’accordo firmato nel 2006 in Nord Waziristan ha portato alla triplicazione delle infiltrazioni oltre la linea Durand.

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In seguito a questi ultimi accordi, è già possibile notare un aumento degli attacchi nell’est del Paese che minaccia di rendere vani i progressi fatti negli ultimi mesi nelle province di Kunar e Nangarhar.

I rapporti bilaterali tra Iran e Afghanistan sono caratterizzati da un buon livello di cooperazione. La repubblica islamica esercita grande influenza in Afghanistan, e non solo presso l’etnia hazara, di religione sciita, che rappresenta circa un quinto della popolazione afghana. Con un lungo e poroso confine di 936 km, è naturale che l’influenza iraniana in Afghanistan si faccia sentire da Herat a Kabul. La cooperazione economica è molto stretta, l’Iran è infatti uno dei principali donatori in Afghanistan ed è specialmente nell’area di Herat che si nota “l’impronta” iraniana. La città del nord-ovest è illuminata grazie all’elettricità proveniente dall’Iran, ed è anche sede di uno stabilimento industriale dove i macchinari sono iraniani ed i prodotti destinati al mercato iraniano. Una delle strade asfaltate migliori del Paese è quella che si estende per 120 km da Herat verso il confine, anch’essa frutto della cooperazione iraniana. Al confine però, come si evince dal numero di punti di osservazione e fortini, la situazione è più tesa. I quattro milioni di tossico-dipendenti iraniani rappresentano un mercato lucroso per i contrabbandieri afghani, ma non è solo con la droga che si spiega la crescente militarizzazione del confine. Le autorità afghane e le forze NATO sono sempre più convinti che dall’Iran entrino quantitativi ingenti di armi e munizioni. In particolare ad allarmare la NATO è il fatto che siano stati rinvenuti depositi pieni di cariche esplosive molto sofisticate e ad alto potenziale simili a quelle usate dai combattenti in Iraq. L’Iran in quanto collegamento terrestre tra Afghanistan e Iraq potrebbe servire da tramite per lo scambio di tecniche ed expertise tra le due insurrezioni. Se così fosse, l’Iran potrebbe presto emergere al fianco del Pakistan come seconda retroguardia della guerriglia, che impiega progressivamente esplosivi e munizioni di origine iraniana nei loro attacchi. Nel contesto delle travagliate relazioni tra USA ed Iran, sembra quindi che l’Afghanistan sia divenuto il teatro di un nuovo e più rischioso “Grande Gioco”. Secondo il Pentagono, Teheran starebbe mettendo in atto una strategia volta al mantenimento di un alto livello di insicurezza e instabilità politica in Afghanistan, sul modello del ruolo destabilizzante giocato in Iraq dalla “Forza al-Qod”, braccio esterno dei Pasdaran. Teheran adotterebbe questo approccio nel tentativo di distogliere

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l’attenzione della comunità internazionale dal programma nucleare iraniano e dalle sue sospette applicazioni militari.

La recente propensione della guerriglia per le tecniche del terrorismo suicida, come per altro sostenuto dall’ISAF, potrebbe essere una dimostrazione del suo indebolimento, a fronte delle offensive condotte dall’Alleanza dal 2006 e della progressiva perdita di sostegno popolare. Il problema del sostegno all’insurrezione da parte degli afghani, come detto, è direttamente proporzionale alla performance del Governo di Kabul. L’influenza del movimento talebano, specie nelle aree meridionali, è tanto più sentita quanto più sentita è la debolezza, l’inefficienza e la corruzione del Governo. Il cambio di tattica è quindi probabilmente sia la naturale evoluzione di un movimento che ha subito pesanti perdite, sia la dimostrazione della grande capacità di adattamento della guerriglia talebana. Essa, infatti, permette di contrastare l’azione delle truppe straniere che per conquistare i ”cuori e le menti” devono inevitabilmente stare a stretto contatto con la popolazione. La comunità internazionale ha inviato contingenti in Afghanistan poco dopo gli eventi dell’11 Settembre 2001. A sette anni di distanza, le truppe sono cresciute di numero e la missione di assistenza ha assunto le caratteristiche di una contro-insurrezione classica, con un Governo che controlla le città e un nemico che tiene le campagne. Ad ogni modo, l’obiettivo dei contingenti multi-nazionali è rimasto lo stesso, la stabilizzazione del Paese e il supporto al Governo democraticamente eletto di Hamid Karzai, un uomo nel quale si è scelto di investire molto. Certamente in termini militari, i talebani non possono sperare di sconfiggere la superiorità convenzionale delle forze NATO, ma intendono fiaccare la volontà dei governi che schierano contingenti, mediante il logorante stillicidio della tattica terroristica. In sostanza giocano d’attesa, ipotizzando che esista un limite di caduti, feriti e finanze, oltre il quale l’Occidente non può spingersi, a fronte dello sgretolamento del sostegno interno per la campagna afghana. In effetti, la parentesi entro la quale i contingenti ISAF devono provvedere alla sicurezza del Governo, dando il tempo a Karzai di stabilire lo stato di diritto nel Paese, è limitata nel tempo. Ma ciò non significa che i talebani abbiano la vittoria in pugno. Come detto in precedenza, lo stragismo che sempre più spesso viene impiegato miete molte più vittime fra gli afghani che tra i ben protetti soldati dell’ISAF. Questo fattore, alla lunga, come abbiamo visto accadere per al-Qaeda in Iraq, potrebbe provocare uno

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scollamento della popolazione dall’insurrezione ed un calo di sostegno, e senza il supporto della popolazione ogni insurrezione è destinata a prosciugarsi. Inoltre, qualora continuasse la conversione in grano di molte piantagioni di oppio, l’insurrezione potrebbe subire pesanti ripercussioni in termini di reclutamento e armamento. Comunque, l’Afghanistan rimane un Paese profondamente segnato da decenni di guerre e da secoli di rivalità interetniche e intertribali, il cui sottosviluppo rappresenta il maggiore ostacolo al conseguimento dell’obiettivo delle forze multinazionali. Anche se progressi sono stati fatti in diversi settori, non da ultimo nella scolarizzazione, la mancanza di sicurezza in ampie parti del Paese rende gli Afghani sempre più scettici sull’azione del Governo, considerata inefficace e corrotta. Specialmente al sud, dove operano i contingenti inglesi, canadesi, olandesi e americani, la popolazione locale non sembra riporre fiducia nel fatto che l’ISAF possa garantire loro elettricità, acqua potabile e assistenza medica. Questo soprattutto in conseguenza dell’aumento, registrato negli ultimi due anni delle vittime civili, coinvolte in offensive NATO o in attacchi suicidi. Per questa ragione, l’impegno a favore della conquista “dei cuori e delle menti” deve continuare ad essere il fulcro della campagna di contro-insurrezione. Solo dimostrando alla popolazione che la presenza delle truppe occidentali è funzionale al miglioramento delle loro condizioni di vita è possibile vincere l’ostilità degli afghani verso le truppe straniere e convincerli a riporre maggiore fiducia nel governo centrale. Un approccio omnicomprensivo che sappia coniugare sicurezza, governance e sviluppo si sta dimostrando più lento del previsto nel produrre risultati sul piano della ricostruzione. L’assenza di operatori umanitari e funzionari governativi, molti dei quali non si avventurano al di fuori della relativa sicurezza di Kabul, porta alla mancanza di tangibili progressi sul campo, specialmente al sud. Motivo anche dell’adozione di un approccio differente da parte degli americani ad est, i quali optano per il finanziamento diretto di progetti minori da parte delle singole unità tattiche in loco. Nel breve termine, non sembra esservi alternativa al proseguimento delle attività di assistenza dei contingenti e delle cancellerie occidentali che attualmente sostengono Karzai e il suo Governo, specie nel 2008, ultimo anno prima delle elezioni. In particolar modo, dovranno essere incrementati gli sforzi per la costruzione di infrastrutture essenziali quali centrali elettriche, strade e impianti idrici. Inoltre, dovrà essere attentamente esaminata la possibilità da parte dei singoli membri NATO di incrementare i contingenti e ridurre i caveat che vincolano il loro impiego sul territorio.

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Nel lungo termine però, l’assistenza esterna non può sostituirsi all’azione del Governo. Cruciali saranno per la sostenibilità del “Nuovo Afghanistan”, lo sdoganamento delle istituzioni e dell’economia afghane dalla corruzione, dal traffico di droga e dall’inefficienza. In questo senso, a livello politico, il Governo afghano dovrà adoperarsi per portare gli elementi meno radicali della guerriglia talebana all’interno di un processo di riconciliazione nazionale, arginando così la deriva di una parte consistente della popolazione. Una sconfitta della comunità internazionale in Afghanistan avrebbe conseguenze devastanti, e non solo per la sicurezza e la stabilità politica dell’Asia Centrale, ma anche per quella dell’Occidente. Un obiettivo primario per la comunità internazionale in Afghanistan è infatti sempre stato quello di assicurarsi che il Paese non tornasse ad essere uno Stato fallito, generatore di instabilità e violenza. Il consolidamento del network di al-Qaeda nelle aree al confine con il Pakistan, fa presagire che, nell’eventualità di un ritiro dei contingenti e in assenza di un consolidato sviluppo in senso istituzionale e socio-economico del Paese, quest’ultimo tornererebbe ad essere un rifugio sicuro per il movimento di Osama bin Laden dal quale lanciare attacchi contro l’Occidente ed i suoi alleati nella regione.

298 TALIBAN PROPAGANDA: WINNING THE WAR OF WORDS?

Asia Report N°158 – 24 July 2008

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. BACKDROP ...... 3 A. RISE OF THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT ...... 3 B. MEDIA UNDER THE TALIBAN...... 4 III. MEDIA AND TALIBAN RESURGENCE...... 7 A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT...... 8 B. TALIBAN SPOKESMEN ...... 9 C. SPREADING THE MESSAGE ...... 12 1. Night letters (Shabnamah)...... 12 2. Publications ...... 13 3. DVDs...... 14 4. Online ...... 15 5. Audio/poetry...... 15 IV. WHAT THEY SAY ...... 17 A. FOREIGN PRESENCE ...... 18 1. Guantanamo Bay and arbitrary detentions ...... 18 2. Civilian casualties...... 19 3. Xenophobic appeals...... 20 B. LEGITIMACY AND POWER ...... 22 1. Corrupt government...... 22 2. Projecting power...... 22 3. Justifications for jihad and suicide attacks ...... 23 V. WHAT THEY DO NOT SAY ...... 25 A. TRIBALISM...... 25 B. WIDER WORLD ...... 26 C. GOVERNANCE ...... 27 VI. COHESION OR COMPETITION? ...... 29 A. ALLIED AND COMPETING VOICES ...... 29 B. WHAT DOES IT WANT?...... 32 VII. CONCLUSION ...... 33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF AFGHANISTAN ...... 35 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 36 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...... 37 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 40

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Taliban has created a sophisticated communica- ‰ a difficult negotiating partner because it lacks a tions apparatus that projects an increasingly confident coherent agenda, includes allies with divergent movement. Using the full range of media, it is suc- agendas and has a leadership that refuses to talk cessfully tapping into strains of Afghan nationalism before the withdrawal of foreign forces and with- and exploiting policy failures by the Kabul govern- out the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law). ment and its international backers. The result is weak- ening public support for nation-building, even though Out of power and lacking control over territory, the few actively support the Taliban. The Karzai govern- Taliban has proved adept at projecting itself as ment and its allies must make greater efforts, through stronger than it is in terms of numbers and resources. word and deed, to address sources of alienation ex- Despite the increasing sophistication of some of its ploited in Taliban propaganda, particularly by ending propaganda, however, it still puts out contradictory arbitrary detentions and curtailing civilian casualties messages that indicate internal rifts and the diffuse from aerial bombing. nature of the insurgency. These reveal a cross-border leadership and support apparatus striving to present a Analysing the Taliban’s public statements has limits, unified front and assert control even as various groups since the insurgent group seeks to underscore suc- maintain their own communications networks. Main- cesses – or imagined successes – and present itself as taining relations with transnational jihadist networks, having the purest of aims, while disguising weak- which have a more global agenda, is a potential prob- nesses and underplaying its brutality. However, the lem for the Taliban, which has always been a largely method still offers a window into what the movement nationalistic movement. considers effective in terms of recruitment and bol- stering its legitimacy among both supporters and po- A website in the name of the former regime – the Islamic tential sympathisers. Emirate of Afghanistan – is used as an international distribution centre for leadership statements and inflated The movement reveals itself in its communications as: tales of battlefield exploits. While fairly rudimentary, this is not a small effort; updates appear several times ‰ the product of the anti-Soviet jihad and the civil war a day in five languages. Magazines put out by the that followed but not representative of indigenous movement or its supporters provide a further source strands of religious thought or traditional pre- of information on leadership structures and issues conflict power structures; considered to be of importance. But for the largely rural and illiterate population, great efforts are also ‰ a largely ethno-nationalist phenomenon, without put into conveying preaching and battle reports via popular grassroots appeal beyond its core of support DVDs, audio cassettes, shabnamah (night letters – in sections of the Pashtun community; pamphlets or leaflets usually containing threats) and traditional nationalist songs and poems. The Taliban ‰ still reliant on sanctuaries in Pakistan, even though local support has grown; also increasingly uses mobile phones to spread its message. ‰ linked with transnational extremist groups for mostly tactical rather than strategic reasons but The vast majority of the material is in Pashtu, and a divided over these links internally; shortage of language skills in the international commu- nity means much of this either passes unnoticed or is ‰ seeking to exploit local tribal disputes for recruit- misunderstood. English-language statements are rela- ment and mainly appealing to the disgruntled and tively crude, but the Taliban is able to put out its story disenfranchised in specific locations, but lacking a rapidly. More effort is devoted to Arabic language wider tribal agenda; and output, aimed at soliciting the support of transnational

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networks and funders. The overriding strategic narra- (b) speaking out strongly and consistently about tive is a quest for legitimacy and the projection of Taliban killings and attacks, while holding the strength. Use of tactics such as suicide bombings – international community and Afghan national previously unknown in Afghanistan – and roadside security agencies proportionately accountable bombs, as well as such audacious actions in 2008 as a for their actions; prison break in Kandahar city, an attack on a military (c) refraining from threatening the media for re- parade attended by President Hamid Karzai and an porting and ensuring that legal definitions of assault on a five-star hotel demonstrate that grabbing incitement in the media are appropriate and attention lies at the core of operations. clear; and Within Afghanistan the Taliban is adept at exploiting (d) holding open trials of captured insurgents and local disenfranchisement and disillusionment. The allowing their victims public redress. Kabul administration needs to ensure it is seen as one 2. Build the morale of the security forces by having worth fighting for, not least by ending the culture of senior officials regularly visit Afghan army and impunity and demanding accountability of its members. police units around the country, and put a human The international community must provide the neces- face on the violence by assisting the wounded and sary support and pressure for improved performance, bereaved families. while also examining its own actions. Whatever the military benefits of arbitrary detentions, they are far 3. End the culture of impunity by ensuring the rule of outweighed by the alienation they cause. The effec- law, including by holding government and security tiveness of aerial bombardment, even if strictly exer- officials accountable for crimes and abuses. cised within the bounds of international law, must be considered against the damage to popular support. To the Governments of Countries Contributing Greater efforts are needed in Western capitals to ex- International Troops: plain to their own populations the necessity of staying for the long haul rather than yielding to the pressure 4. Improve communications with Afghans on the direc- of quick fixes that give only the appearance of action. tions and activities of the international engagement, while ensuring an Afghan lead in appropriate The Taliban is not going to be defeated militarily and areas, through: is impervious to outside criticism. Rather, the legitimacy (a) reaching out to local correspondents for inter- of its ideas and actions must be challenged more national and national media, not just foreign forcefully by the Afghan government and citizens. Its reporters; killings of civilians and targeting of community lead- ers need to be highlighted, including a public account- (b) building language skills among foreign staff and ing for actions by the militants through open trials – properly training sufficient numbers of profes- something that has not yet happened. Strengthening sional translators; the legitimacy of the Afghan government and ensuring (c) streamlining systems and devolving more re- that its actions – and those of its international backers sponsibility to ground-based personnel so they – are similarly bound by the rule of law should be an can respond rapidly to incidents involving in- important complement. Ultimately, winning popular ternational forces; and support is not about telling local communities that (d) directing enquiries on incidents that do not in- they are better off today. It is about proving it. volve foreign troops to the appropriate Afghan institution. RECOMMENDATIONS 5. Emphasise that the foreign presence is in support of the Afghan people and subject to the rule of law To the Government of Afghanistan: by ensuring that international troops are held ac- countable, in particular by conducting thorough 1. Do not block the flow of information, but seek investigations and improving data collection and instead to disclose more, in an open and timely information sharing on incidents of alleged civil- manner, and build morale by: ian casualties. (a) responding more quickly on incidents such as 6. Communicate clearly to the Afghan public that while civilian casualties and other alleged abuses by the troops will stay as long as necessary, there are the government or its international supporters that no longer-term strategic objectives, such as per- are likely to feed into insurgent propaganda; manent bases in the country.

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7. Ensure when using aerial force not only that an To Donors: operation is strictly within the parameters of inter- national law, but also that its potential immediate 9. Emphasise the building and reform of judicial and military gain has been weighed against longer- detention systems in which detainees can be han- term community perceptions. dled safely and legitimately and held to account within a rule-of-law system. 8. Press the Pakistan military to end its appeasement of pro-Taliban militants and Afghan insurgents Kabul/Brussels, 24 July 2008 operating from Pakistani territory, and encourage a dialogue between Kabul and the democratically elected government in Islamabad.

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I. INTRODUCTION every kinetic operation they undertake is specifically designed to influence attitudes or perceptions”.4

The Taliban has proved remarkably successful in pro- However while the Taliban has had its successes, jecting itself as much stronger than it is in terms of sometimes contradictory messages signal internal di- numbers and resources on a battlefield where inde- visions and underscore the diffuse nature of the insur- pendent verification is nearly impossible.1 Increas- gency. As well as increasing alliances with criminals, ingly the Afghan population in conflict-hit areas is there are a number of groups involved in spreading sitting on the fence or weighing options amid a sense the violence, including Jalaluddin Haqqani’s network, of insurgent momentum. The Taliban’s growing con- the remnants of Hizb-e Islami (Khalis), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami and foreign networks, fidence and worsening violence have created a sense 5 in many capitals of an intractable conflict.2 including al-Qaeda. This report focuses on material issued in the name or in support of the Taliban Communications lie at the core of the insurgents’ movement’s leadership, which styles itself the Islamic actions. They use “all available networks – political, Emirate of Afghanistan, but will examine the extent 6 social, economic and military – to convince the en- to which there may be coordination with others. emy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the per- The report studies public communiqués in an attempt ceived benefit”.3 This can be seen in the increasing to learn more about the messenger from the message: use of asymmetric attacks, such as suicide and road to understand how the Taliban seeks to project itself, bombings, which have a major impact on public opin- how words measure up against actions, the coherence ion while requiring little manpower or popular support. and clarity of stated goals and links to broader net- There is also a growing use of “spectacular” events works. Given the insecure environment, it was not which draw headlines around the world. As a U.S. mili- possible to access the networks, such as local mullahs tary officer put it, “unfortunately, we tend to view in- and elders as well as travelling Taliban, which spread these messages further into the countryside to a formation operations as supplementing kinetic [fighting] 7 operations. For the Taliban, however, information ob- largely rural, illiterate population. While such an ap- jectives tend to drive kinetic operations … virtually

4 Crisis Group interview, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) officer, Kabul, 10 June 2008. 5 For details on insurgent groups, see Crisis Group Report, Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency, op. cit. 1 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°123, Countering Afghani- 6 For previous work on Taliban propaganda, see Tim Foxley, stan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, 2 November 2006. Ac- “The Taliban’s propaganda activities: how well is the Afghan cording to UN estimates, there are some 3,000 active and insurgency communicating and what is it saying?”, Stock- 7,000 occasional Taliban fighters, as well as more passive holm International Peace Research Institute, project paper, supporters. “Letter dated 15 November 2007 from the Chair- June 2007; Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency man of the Security Council Committee Established Pursu- and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night letters)”, Small Wars ant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning al-Qaeda and the and Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 2007), pp. 317- Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed 344; and Thomas Elkjer Nissen, “The Taliban’s information to the President of the Security Council”, S/2007/677, p. 9. warfare: A comparative analysis of NATO information In 2006, an analyst estimated that there were 17,000 Taliban, operations and Taliban information activities”, Royal Danish 1,500 Hizb-e Islami and 2,000 al-Qaeda. Antonio Giustozzi, Defence College, December 2007. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo- Taliban Insur- 7 See, for instance, The Globe and Mail (Canada) series, 21 gency in Afghanistan (New York, 2008), p. 132. March 2008, “Talking to the Taliban” in which 42 low- 2 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°145, Afghanistan: The ranking Taliban in five districts of Kandahar were inter- Need for International Resolve, 6 February 2008. viewed in late 2007, at www.theglobeandmail.com. They 3 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in showed remarkable similarities in their responses, indicating the 21st Century (Minnesota, 2006), p. 2. messaging networks. 304 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words? Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 2

proach obviously has limits, it still offers insights into ‰ Arabic, for wider transnational networks. More what the leadership sees as the most effective mes- closely linked with global issues and movements sages to gain recruits, ensure its orders are followed online as well as through a few publications, aimed and obtain legitimacy and support.8 This includes a at building wider support and presumably gaining number of distinct audiences. “The insurgent is send- recruits and financing. Global groups also seek to ing one message to his supporters, another to the mass link the conflict in Afghanistan to their wider nar- of the undecided population and a third to the coali- rative of a battle between the West and Islam. tion decision-makers”.9 A fourth audience should be added: the transnational extremist networks from Material for the report was gathered in Kabul, Jala- which the insurgents aim to draw resources.10 labad, Logar and Kandahar. Interviewees included those who worked under the Taliban regime in the Distinct multilingual efforts, shaped for different au- communications field, including staff of Radio Voice diences, undertaken on behalf of the Taliban include: of Sharia, the foreign ministry, the information and culture ministry and state-run media, as well as some ‰ English language, for international audiences. Dis- former writers for the Taliban’s current publications. seminated primarily through a regularly updated Government and international community efforts are website and almost daily contact with international briefly considered, but the aim is to learn about the media outlets, it aims at gaining global coverage and insurgency from the insurgents – of whom remarka- an international audience through reputable outlets; bly little is known.

‰ local languages, particularly Pashtu (with some Dari and Urdu). Aimed at regional groups, includ- ing on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. This has several objectives: to obtain wider public support through folk imagery and culture (songs/ poems) which appeal to national and religious sen- timents; fear and intimidation through night letters (shabnamah, pamphlets or leaflets usually contain- ing threats) and violent DVDs; and recruitment through morale-boosting martial songs, orations and statements about operations on the website, magazines, DVDs and audio cassettes; and

8 For earlier Crisis Group analysis on post-2001 popular disillusionment which has fuelled – and in turn been fuelled by – Taliban messaging, see Asia Report N°62, Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation, 5 August 2003; and Asia Report N°64, Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, 29 Sep- tember 2003. 9 Hammes, op. cit., p. 209. 10 For work on extremist networks in other contexts, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°147, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, 28 February 2008; and Crisis Group Middle East Report N°50, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, 15 February 2006. See also Daniel Kim- mage, “The al-Qaeda media nexus: The virtual network behind the global messages”, Radio Free Europe, special report, March 2008; and Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al- Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology”, Congressional Research Service, updated 26 January 2006. The al-Qaeda media apparatus and possible sanctions are further consid- ered in the “Letter dated 13 May 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning al-Qaeda and the Tali- ban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council”, S/2008/324, pp. 8-10.

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II. BACKDROP With the Pakistani military’s patronage and foreign funding, extremist madrasas in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt of Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province A. RISE OF THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT (NWFP) also mushroomed, becoming a source of recruitment and influence for the Afghan mujahidin.15 In their bid to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan in As millions of Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan, the 1980s, the U.S. and its Western allies, as well as refugee camps likewise became a source of support Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states, pro- and recruitment for the Afghan Islamists. Ahmed vided military and financial support to seven Sunni Rashid noted: Islamist parties, which had Pakistan’s backing and Prior to the war the Islamicists barely had a base in many of which operated out of Pakistani safe havens.11 Afghan society, but with money and arms from the These Islamist factions were armed and equipped in CIA pipeline and support from Pakistan, they built deliberate preference to tribal, nationalist or royalist one and wielded tremendous clout.16 parties for multiple reasons. Pakistani support was based on fears of irredentist claims by Pashtun nationalists The distorted interpretations of Sunni Deobandism on its Pashtun borderlands; Saudi Arabia was guided taught in these madrasas, superimposed on an equally by its Sunni Wahhabi/Salafi ideological preferences; distorted version of Pashtunwali17 were to form the the U.S. saw the Islamists as the most desirable ally Taliban creed. The Taliban foot soldiers (the talibs, against the Soviets and the Soviet-backed Kabul com- 12 students, from which the movement took its name) munist regime. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, were mainly dispossessed, marginalised Pashtun youth, now a Taliban ally, was the main beneficiary of 13 many from the Pakistani madrasas; other recruits to external support. Another was Jalaluddin Haqqani, the movement were the products of decades of radi- who later also turned his guns on his benefactors but calisation and violence in their homeland. was described during that period as “goodness per- 14 sonified” by a Texan congressman. Having first emerged in 1994 as a local reaction to the post-Soviet chaos in the southern region of Kandahar, the movement’s easy, early victories quickly drew the attention of Pakistan’s security services, whose previ- 11 The seven Sunni mujahidin parties were Burhanuddin ously favoured client, Hekmatyar, had little success Rabbani’s Jamiat-i Islami; Hizb-e Islami (led by Gulbuddin in capturing the capital, Kabul, from largely non- Hekmatyar); Hizb-e Islami (led by Mawlawi Younus Khalis); Pashtun mujahidin factions. With this powerful insti- Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani’s Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi tutional sponsorship, the Taliban rapidly extended its Afghanistan; Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islam; Sebghatullah Mujaddeidi’s Jabha-yi Najat-i Milli-yi Af- rule in a series of dramatic victories, taking Kabul in ghanistan; and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi’s Harakat-i 1996 and overrunning the final major city, the north- Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan. For details of the mujahidin ern centre of Mazar-e Sharif, in 1998. By 2001, only a groups, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°39, Political Par- pocket in the north east eluded its grasp, although but ties in Afghanistan, 2 June 2005; and Barnett Rubin, The three countries – Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates Fragmentation of Afghanistan (Yale, 2002), pp. 201-225. and Saudi Arabia – recognised the Taliban regime in 12 Hizb-e Islami was heavily influenced by the Ikhwan al- Afghanistan. Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood). In 1978 it splintered into two groups, which became Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) and The Taliban’s original leadership, including supreme Hizb-e Islami (Khalis). The latter, led by Mawlawi Younus leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, was largely drawn Khalis, was dominated by tribal ulama (Islamic scholars). from Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi’s Harakat-i In- Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) was the most organised and dis- ciplined of the mujahidin factions, demanding loyalty to the party rather than individual commanders. 13 Part of Hizb-e Islami (Khalis), Haqqani joined the Taliban and became a minister under Taliban rule. Still a Taliban sup- 15 porter, he maintains his own distinct network, discussed below. For detailed analysis of Pakistan’s madrasa sector, see Cri- 14 George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York, 2003), sis Group Asia Report N°130, Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas p. 473. Many of the asymmetrical tactics taught during this and Violent Extremism, 29 March 2007; Crisis Group Asia period are seen today. An analyst observed: “[Pakistani mili- Report N°84, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, 7 tary intelligence’s Afghan operations director Brigadier October 2004; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°36, Pakistan: Mohammad] Yousaf and the Afghan car bombing squads he Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, 29 July 2002. trained regarded Kabul University professors as fair game, 16 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great since they were poisoning young minds with Marxist anti- Game in Central Asia (New York, 2002), p. 19. Islamic dogma”. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York, 2004), 17 Pashtunwali or Pakhtunwali is the tribal and social code of pp. 132-134. the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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qilab-i Islami-yi.18 Success and territorial expansion wrote dismissively of the Afghans. He stressed: “A saw recruitment from other Pashtun-dominated muja- jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like hidin groups, including Hizb-e Islami (Khalis). Even an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it some members of the Khalq faction of the People’s can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) were to join and organisational matters”.22 the Taliban.19 A few leaders of other ethnic groups were co-opted mainly for tactical reasons, such as The intoxicating success of helping to precipitate the Hazara factional powerbroker Mohammad Akbari, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan fuelled interna- but were never part of the core leadership.20 tional networks of jihadis from Morocco to the Phil- ippines.23 When Osama bin Laden sought refuge in The Taliban’s obscurantist brand of Deobandi Islam, Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996, he came at the invi- a product of and reaction to years of war and disloca- tation of old fighting friends and under the protection tion and superimposed on Pashtunwali, was an anom- of the Jalalabad shura (council).24 Following Taliban aly to pre-war Afghan society. Non-Pashtun groups victories, bin Laden befriended Mullah Omar and in were violently suppressed, as the Taliban sought to 1997 moved to Kandahar, the Taliban de facto capital impose its distorted interpretation of Islam and Pash- where the reclusive leader had the previous year taken tun social codes – most vividly seen in attitudes to- the title Amir ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faith- wards women – on others: ful). It was from Afghanistan that in 1998 all the groups associated with al-Qaeda launched a manifesto They first targeted “bad Muslims”, while Western along with a fatwa (religious edict) declaring: “The culture came only second. They had quite good ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians relations with the United States till the autumn of and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim 1997 and did not bother to expel Western NGOs, who can do it in any country in which it is possible to”.25 later turning anti-U.S. for purely political reasons. Instead they took a hard-line on Afghan customs and culture. They banned music, films, dancing B. MEDIA UNDER THE TALIBAN and kite-flying.21 Under the Taliban regime, the media was mainly used During the years of the anti-Soviet jihad, Afghanistan to lecture the population. Mullah Mohammad Ishaq also became a testing and training ground for Nizami, head of Radio Voice of Sharia, declared: Islamists from around the world. During the 1980s, “Afghan people have to be told that we are good for Islamist radicals converged on Peshawar in Pakistan’s them, that is our job and that is what we will continue NWFP, which had become the base camp for the Afghan jihad. It was here that Osama Bin Laden de- veloped his ideas, a world away from his privileged 22 Quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad upbringing in Saudi Arabia. While viewing the con- Went Global (Cambridge, 2005), p. 12. flict in Afghanistan as a breeding ground for radical 23 See Crisis Group Middle East Report N°37, Understand- Islamic movements, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, ing Islamism, 2 March 2005. who went on to become al-Qaeda’s number two, often 24 Following the collapse of Dr Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai’s PDPA regime in 1992, various mujahidin fac- tions controlled regional power centres. The fractious Jala- labad shura of tribal leaders and prominent guerrilla leaders 18 This predominantly Pashtun party was dominated by tradi- in the east – long a centre for foreign fighters – was domi- tional clerics. See William Maley, “Interpreting the Taliban”, nated by Hizb-e Islami (Khalis), including its most promi- in William Maley (ed.), Afghanistan and the Taliban: The nent local leader, Haji Abdul Qadir (later President Hamid Rebirth of Fundamentalism? (Delhi, 2001), p. 15. Karzai’s vice president before his 2002 assassination), while 19 The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), also drawing in members of Ahmad Gailani’s Mahaz-i Milli- which took power through a coup in 1978, was divided into the yi Islami-yi Afghanistan. Rubin, op. cit., p. 277; and Coll, Khalq (People or Masses) and Parcham (Banner) factions. op. cit., p. 327. Haqqani in particular had long ties with bin 20 Afghanistan’s population is ethnically diverse, with four Laden. “When al-Qaeda was formed along the Afghan- distinct groups accounting for the large majority: the Pash- Pakistan border in the summer of 1988, its first camps were tuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. Precise population ratios in Haqqani territory. The first infrastructure of al-Qaeda was are difficult to determine, in large part because of the ab- essentially supervised by Haqqani … so bin Laden and sence of a census, but also because of refugees flows. The Haqqani would have known each other for fifteen years by last (incomplete) census, in 1976, put the Pashtuns at 38 per the time bin Laden came across the border after Tora Bora cent of the population and the largest ethnic group. See Cri- [in 2001]. “Interview with Steve Coll”, “Return of the Tali- sis Group Report, The Problem of Pashtun Alienation, op. cit. ban”, Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 2006, p. 21 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: the Search For a New 8, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ taliban/. Ummah (New Delhi, 2005), p. 260. 25 Quoted in Rashid, op. cit., p. 134.

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to do”.26 Internationally, the Taliban focused on trying a personal assistant to Mullah Omar, sometimes acted to win international legitimacy, particularly by gain- as his spokesman and is also still occasionally heard, ing control of the Afghan seat at the United Nations.27 appearing to speak for the top leadership. With little understanding of the outside world, its efforts were confused, and its treatment of women in The former foreign minister under the Taliban, Maw- particular attracted strong disapproval. lawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, claimed that the “Taliban suspended all TV and cinematographic The ministers of culture and information under the shows but conversely enhanced radio programs and regime were Amir Khan Muttaqi28 and then Qudratul- other state print media”.32 The regime renovated print- lah Jamal,29 who had the near impossible task of justi- ing presses and, like nearly every regime before it, fying to the world such actions as the destruction of created its own organ, Sharia, while continuing more the Buddha statues in Bamiyan. Kabul was prized as established publications. These were, however, slim the traditional seat of power in Afghanistan and home and closely monitored to project positive images of to the official ministries, but the Taliban’s de facto the regime. Afghanistan Radio continued under the capital remained the southern city of Kandahar, and name Radio Voice of Sharia; presenters were punished the head of the department of information and culture if they did not read out Taliban statements in full. there, Abdul Hai Mutmain,30 wielded considerable Music, except for unaccompanied religious chants, power in the communications sector. All three men was banned.33 Television,34 photography and even, appear to have retained media positions in the recon- in the later stages, the internet were also barred, stituted Taliban leadership structure.31 Tayyab Agha, although a number of regime and pro-regime websites were maintained for external use.35

26 Caroline Lees, “Turn on, tune in to Radio Taliban”, The Independent, 26 October 1996. Mullah Nizami initially fled U.S. Alan Finder, “A Taliban past and a cloudy Yale future”, with the Taliban leadership, taking refuge in Peshawar, but The New York Times, 6 July 2006. in 2007 returned to Kabul under a Karzai government recon- 32 Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, “Afghanistan and the ciliation program. Taliban”, published in Pashtu in 1384 (equivalent to 20 27 Although the Taliban had representatives in New York, March 2005-20 March 2006). The quote was taken from p. Afghanistan’s UN seat remained with the Rabbani government. 32 of an unpublished English version, translated and edited 28 The Consolidated List, established and maintained by the by Mohammad Suhail Shaheen. 1267 Committee with respect to al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, 33 Chants by Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens) were popu- and the Taliban and “other individuals, groups, undertakings lar and broadcast nearly every night on the English program. and entities associated with them”, last updated 3 July 2008, Presenters and producers from this time say they received carries Muttaqi as born in approximately 1968 in Helmand. letters from as far away as Scandinavia about their nightly He was later education minister. Created under UN Security English language shortwave transmission. Crisis Group Council Resolution 1267 (1999), the 1267 Committee, also interviews, Kabul, March-April 2008. known as the “Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee”, 34 A television was kept, in great secrecy, at the foreign min- oversees a list of individuals subject to travel bans, assets istry to monitor international broadcasts: “The power of the freezes and arms embargoes. religious police was so great that even powerful ministers 29 According to the Consolidated List, Jamal was born in ap- such as [Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad] Mutawakil feared them. proximately 1963 in Paktia. An interview in Al Somood When he became minister of foreign affairs, he ordered a (Standing Firm) magazine reported that he fought the Soviet satellite dish to be installed on the ministry building’s invasion in Paktia and was an early member of the Taliban, roof….The purpose of it was to receive news on TV espe- serving as a military commander, and created its media cially from the Al Jazeera news agency. He emphasised that committee after the movement lost power in 2001. Ahmad it should not draw attention. Although the TV was placed in Mukhtar, “Interview with Qudratullah Jamal, Minister of the basement of that building, Muttawakil locked the door Information for the government of the Islamic Emirate of while watching it and placed a guard outside at all Afghanistan”, Al Somood, May 2008, p. 9. This Taliban times….Abdul Rahman Zahed, the deputy foreign affairs monthly Arabic-language magazine, discussed in greater minister, never dared to even enter the room unless accom- depth below, carries both Islamic and Gregorian dates, with panied by Mutawakil”. Quote from unpublished English the former based on a solar calendar and the later a lunar. For translation by Sepideh Khalili and Saeed Ganji of Vahid Mo- convenience only the Gregorian dates will be used in this jdeh, Afghanistan under Five Years of Taliban Sovereignty report. The translation from Arabic is by Crisis Group. (Tehran, 2003), p. 18. Mojdeh, now a political analyst in Throughout this report, unless otherwise stated, translations Kabul, had previously edited the Hizb-e Islami paper Shaha- are from Pashtu to English and by Crisis Group. dat in Peshawar and worked in the publications department 30 The Consolidated List carries Mutmain as born in approxi- of the foreign ministry under the Taliban. Ibid, author’s note. mately 1973 in Zabul. 35 See Patrick Di Justo, “Does Official Taliban Site Exist?”, 31 In contrast, another regime representative, Sayed Rah- Wired, 30 October 2001. One Taliban-era communications matullah Hashemi, went on to study at Yale University in the employee said he was later asked to type – on a computer – a

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In Kandahar, the department of information and cul- As relations with the outside world deteriorated, ture produced the Pashtu and Dari-language Khilafat Mullah Omar denounced the foreign broadcasting of Meyashtani (Caliphate Monthly), the “Islamic Emirate “biased and hostile” information. In March 2001, the of Afghanistan’s central publication organ”. An infor- BBC was banned and its correspondent, one of the mation centre in Kandahar produced other publications, few foreign reporters based in Afghanistan, was including an Arabic monthly, Al-Imarat-ul Islamia forced to leave. (The Islamic Emirate) and an English monthly, The Islamic Emirate.36 These were colour productions Unlike the Taliban, al-Qaeda’s leadership revelled in with far more sophistication, as well as interest in the spotlight. Bin Laden had assiduously cultivated international affairs, than their Kabul counterparts. media attention and his jihadi credentials during his They were indeed produced without cooperation from stay in Peshawar.42 The imposition of sanctions made the capital’s media and appeared to have received as- it more difficult to do so, but he continued to give inter- sistance from al-Qaeda; at least one American worked views to a select few from secret locations.43 with the centre.37

The reclusive Taliban chief, Mullah Omar, did not appear on television and gave only limited inter- views.38 Other commanders and ministers occasion- ally appeared on television, mostly Arabic-language channels (often furtively, not wanting colleagues to know), possibly to gain individual recognition and Arab patronage.39 However, those who worked in the Taliban media emphasise that the leadership did care how they were perceived. While it often had little idea how to burnish its international image, particularly the English-language media was often described at weekly meetings between ministers and local editors as being “on the frontline”, that is, a top priority.40 International publications were monitored, as were foreign journalists who were urged to refer to the re- gime as the Islamic Emirate rather than the Taliban.41

decree banning the use of computers, although this was never implemented as the Taliban fell from power soon afterwards. Crisis Group interview, Kabul, 9 April 2008. 36 The centre’s director was Mawlawi Ahmad Jan Ahmadi. These publications appeared largely aimed at an overseas audience, with subscriptions offered in Pakistan, the U.S., UAE and Saudi Arabia. 37 Crisis Group interviews, Kabul and Kandahar, February- March 2008. Several people mentioned “Adam the Ameri- 42 In 1987, “Bin Laden commissioned a 50-minute video that can” working at the information centre, possibly Adam showed him riding horses, talking to Arab volunteers, broad- Gadahn, an American convert, now under U.S. indictment casting on the radio and firing weapons – the same things for treason, who still works for the al-Qaeda media arm and many commanders without video cameras did routinely. He regularly appears in Al Sahab video productions. See Raffi sought out Arab journalists and gave lengthy interviews de- Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American”, The New Yorker, signed to ‘use the media for attracting more Arabs, recruiting 22 January 2007. more Arabs to come to Afghanistan’, as one of the journal- 38 These included a 1998 audio interview with the BBC ists recalled. It was the birth of bin Laden’s media strategy, Pashtu service. See www.bbc.co.uk. aimed primarily at the Arabic-speaking world; in part he 39 Crisis Group interview, former Al Jazeera stringer, Kabul, drew on some of the media tactics pioneered by secular Pal- 17 April 2008. estinians terrorists and nationalists during the 1970s and 40 Crisis Group interview, former Kabul Times staffer under early 1980s”. Coll, op. cit., p. 163. the Taliban regime, Kabul, 3 June 2008. 43 In 1999, for example, Rahimullah Yusufzai, who worked 41 Kate Clark, “The Struggle For Hearts and Minds: The for The News (Pakistan), Time and ABC News, was “sum- Military, Aid and The Media”, in Antonio Donini, Norah moned” to bin Laden’s “tented encampment in Helmand” to Niland and Karin Wermester (eds.), Nation-Building Unrav- hear denials of involvement in the embassy bombings in Af- elled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan (Connecticut, rica which had attracted retaliatory U.S. bombing on camps 2004), p. 85. in Afghanistan. “Wrath of God”, Time, 11 January 1999.

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III. MEDIA AND TALIBAN ouster, many of these discredited leaders were RESURGENCE brought into power by the international community, particularly the U.S. They were allowed to return to their predatory ways, including involvement in the Lacking popular support, the Taliban regime was opium trade, as long as they helped the hunt for al- quickly ousted by the international military interven- Qaeda and mouthed allegiance to Kabul. As U.S. at- tion that took place after it refused to turn over bin tention turned to Iraq, and the peace dividend failed to Laden following the terror attacks of 11 September materialise, disillusionment began. Attacks by ethnic rivals on Taliban foot soldiers, and on Pashtuns in 2001. While the Taliban seemingly melted away, very 47 few of the underlying conditions that had brought it general, particularly in the north, as well as civilian into power were tackled.44 casualties in international military operations in the Pashtun heartland, often the result of poor or deliber- The Taliban had gained power rapidly because of ately misleading information, fuelled alienation and Pakistani support and patronage. Although President anger in the southern and eastern provinces. Musharraf’s military government joined what the U.S. This provided a well of resentment for the Taliban to described as its war on terror, the Taliban was able to 48 retreat across the border, where it regrouped and reor- tap. Highlighting civilian casualties from the start, it ganised in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan and NWFP. sought to frame the international military intervention The Pakistani military government’s reliance on mul- as a wider war against Islam and/or Pashtuns. “This is lahs to neutralise its moderate democratic opposition not an issue of Osama bin Laden”, Mullah Omar told also empowered the Taliban. Benefiting from the rigged the Voice of America as early as September 2001. “It is an issue of Islam. Islam’s prestige is at stake. So is 2002 elections, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), 49 a six-party religious alliance dominated by Fazlur Afghanistan’s tradition”. A November 2002 night Rehman’s Pashtun-dominated Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam letter, distributed in Afghanistan and faxed to Pakistani (JUI-F), the Taliban’s mentor since its inception, journalists, stated that Mullah Omar had declared “jihad” against the foreign forces in Afghanistan and formed the NWFP government and was a coalition 50 partner of Musharraf’s party, the Muslim League – the “proxy government”. It also said that he had appointed two deputies, Mullah Brader51 and Mullah Quaid-i-Azam. The Taliban thus had a safe haven and 52 a base of operations in the two MMA-controlled prov- Obaidullah Akhund, although there was, at this inces, while JUI-F madrasas continued, as in the past, to provide recruits, Afghan and Pakistani, for its cause.45 47 See “Anti-Pashtun Violence in Northern Afghanistan: If Taliban command and control structures, sanctuar- Recent Testimonies”, Human Rights Watch, 6 March 2002. ies and sources of fundraising and recruitment in 48 The number of casualties in the earliest days of the inter- Pakistan were to help it regroup and reorganise,46 vention is still unknown. 49 domestic dynamics also aided it to regain some lost “Mullah Omar – in his own words”, translated transcript of ground in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the Taliban had the twelve-minute Voice of America (VOA) interview in The Guardian, 26 September 2001. gained a modicum of legitimacy and support by oust- 50 Quoted by Asif Farooqi, “Taliban’s new hierarchy un- ing corrupt and brutal commanders. After its own veiled”, 25 June 2003, islamonline.net. 51 Originally from Deh Rawood, Uruzgan, and born in 1962, Brader had held the positions of deputy minister of defence, 44 See Crisis Group Report, The Problem of Pashtun Alien- head of the western region and general military commander ation, op. cit., p. ii. of the northern provinces under the Taliban regime. After its 45 On the military government’s relationship with the Islamist fall, he first fought in the western provinces and in Uruzgan, parties and Taliban presence in Pakistan, see Crisis Group Kandahar and Helmand. “The deputy [leader] of the Islamic Asia Briefing N°69, Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Emirate gives an exclusive interview with Al Somood”, Al Balochistan, 22 October 2007; Crisis Group Asia Report Somood, January 2007. N°125, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, 11 52 According to the Consolidated List, Obaidullah was born December 2006; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°49, in Kandahar in 1968 and was defence minister under the Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, 20 March 2003. Taliban regime. He was apparently arrested in Quetta in Feb- See also “The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to ruary 2007 “‘Taliban Leader’ Held In Pakistan”, BBC News, Destroy The Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in 2 March 2007, although a foreign newspaper claimed to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, United have interviewed him two days later in Quetta. “Swiss Paper States Government Accountability Office, April 2008. Says Former Taliban Defence Minister Free”, Associated 46 For instance, what is commonly referred to as the Quetta Press, 11 March 2007. There have not been statements from Shura, named after Balochistan’s capital, is considered the him since this time, although he was also reported to have main leadership council of the Taliban. Crisis Group Report, been detained in Lahore in February 2008. Shahnawaz Khan, Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency, op. cit., p. 9. “Security agencies arrest Mullah Obaidullah again”, The

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stage, little evidence of any more extensive structure number of invitations for journalists, pledging that or following to command. “the mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will do their best to maintain security for independent With the Taliban’s organisational abilities in tatters, journalists so that the realities can be revealed to the the tone of night letters and publications in the early people”.56 Such meetings have, however, proved years was largely defensive, focusing largely on risky, with a number of journalists kidnapped and/or American “atrocities”. Adopting a pragmatic approach, killed,57 while local officials have detained others be- the Taliban abandoned earlier strictures against pic- cause of their contacts with insurgent groups.58 tures of living images53 – although still blurring those of women – and used graphic pictures of Afghan casu- As a local journalist from an insurgency-hit province alties and the destruction of property allegedly by for- said, “the Taliban exaggerates, [while] the govern- eign forces. Images from the Iraq war also began to ment reduces the number of casualties; so if we say appear. In 2005-2006, as the insurgency grew in the Taliban numbers, the government threatens us; if Afghanistan, the propaganda projected an increasing we say the government numbers, then the Taliban air of confidence and assertiveness, depicting images threatens us”.59 He has moved to the capital due to se- of the bodies of international troops and Afghan se- curity fears, including the Taliban killing two students curity forces, along with their destroyed vehicles and he had interviewed at a new government school be- captured supplies, as well as Taliban weapons caches cause they spoke with the media at such an event. and operations.54 Indeed, the threat of insurgent violence hanging over local journalists is under-reported. The Taliban pays close attention to the coverage it receives and moves A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT quickly to intimidate those it feels report actions or statements in an unfavourable light or do not give The Taliban is militarily overwhelmed by interna- them due prominence. Mullah Dadullah,60 who had tional air power, and it lacks control over territory or emerged as a media star in television interviews and state institutions. As a result, communications and gruesome DVDs before his 2007 death, ordered “re- media coverage assume greater importance. Taliban leaders or spokesmen cannot address large gatherings which would render them vulnerable to attack. Some

Western and local reporters have had access to field commanders,55 and indeed the Taliban has issued a tute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 27 November 2007. Asia Times Online’s Pakistan bureau chief, Syed Saleem Shahzad, travelled in Kandahar and Helmand in De- Daily Times (Pakistan), 25 February 2008. Even more re- cember 2006; see his series “In the Land of the Taliban”, cently it has been reported that Obaidullah may have been Asia Times Online, December 2006. released by Pakistani authorities in exchange for the coun- 56 “Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan about try’s kidnapped ambassador to Afghanistan; see Mushtaq the comments of a human rights organization”, Al Emarah, Yusufzai, “Kidnapped Ambassador Freed”, The News, 18 1 July 2007 (translation: AfghanWire). May 2008. Captured Taliban spokesman Latifullah Hakimi 57 Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo was kidnapped in had spoken of the closeness of Mullah Omar and Obaidullah. March 2007 in Helmand. He was released, but his Afghan Ismail Khan, “Mullah Omar’s Deputy Obaidullah Captured”, fixer, Ajmal Naqshbandi, and driver, Sayed Agha, were Dawn, 2 March 2007. killed. A British journalist and his local assistant were held 53 Orthodox Muslims believe that the depiction of living im- for three months in eastern Afghanistan. “Film-maker Sean ages is haram (forbidden). Langan kidnapped in Afghanistan is set free”, The Times 54 Crisis Group email communication with long-time Taliban (UK), 24 June 2008. The Asia Times Online Pakistan bureau publication observer, 14 March 2008. chief was held for six days in northern Helmand during the 55 Since the Taliban’s fall, the only “press conference” was trip mentioned above. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “A ‘guest’ of held during negotiations for the release of 23 South Korean the Taliban”, Asia Times Online, 30 November 2006. missionaries kidnapped in central Ghazni province in August 58 “Journalist held over Musa Qala visit freed”, IWPR, 9 2007, for which two Taliban representatives were given safe November 2007. passage by the government. “After Taliban news conference, 59 Crisis Group interview, Kabul, 13 July 2008. Afghan government bans media from South Korea talks 60 Born 1967 in Deh Rawood, Uruzgan, Dadullah was a par- site”, Associated Press, 12 August 2007. A BBC correspon- ticularly brutal frontline commander under the Taliban re- dent was “embedded” with some of the fighters in Kandahar gime and after its fall a member of the leadership council and Helmand in 2006; see David Loyn, “Travelling with the and a commander in the south west. “[H]e was both a man of Taliban”, BBC News, 24 October 2006; a small group of lo- fighting and media at the same time”. Mustafa Mahmood, cal reporters was invited into the town of Musa Qala while it “Personal biography of martyr commander Mullah Dadul- was under Taliban control in late 2007, including to view a lah”, Al Somood, June 2007, p. 11. See also William Maley, military parade; see “Special report from Musa Qala”, Insti- “Introduction”, Maley, op. cit., p. xi.

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porters and [media] offices to refrain from publishing ing commented that “the foreign military does not the enemy’s lies. Otherwise we will kill them”.61 care about them [the local media] or their perceptions. The Taliban cares very much about their perceptions”.64 With such impediments to independent verification, reports from the field often become a battle of com- Of course, in Afghanistan less than a quarter of the peting press statements. Facts are hard to come by, adult population is estimated to be literate, with only 2 cross checking is difficult, and rumours can quickly per cent claiming to read newspapers regularly.65 gain currency. The Taliban has proved adept at feed- Around a third of households have a television and 88 ing statements and claims to the flourishing Afghan per cent radios,66 while only a tiny fraction of the media scene. The information minister under the population has access to the internet.67 In such a situa- Taliban regime, Quadratullah Jamal, boasted of a pro- tion the Taliban keeps online resources fairly basic. active approach: The internet is used to allow the leadership to com- municate quickly and broadly – nationally and inter- The most prominent Afghan specialists admit in nationally – with media and other opinion-makers, their interviews that the Taliban media activities replacing faxes, which were more common in 2002 are very quick and reactive when journalists ask us and 2003. for information. The Karzai media … are much weaker and cannot compete with us. Journalists In terms of reaching the average member of the popu- confirm that when they ask the ministry of defence lation, visual and audio mediums such as DVDs and to give information about a particular event, it audio cassettes can make a great impact, and tradi- takes 24 hours to get the answer, while we can tional night letters are still widely used. While such give the information through satellite phones in a methods – and most of all word of mouth – facilitate record time.62 the much wider spread of ideas and help create a con- ducive climate, they are, of course, much harder to Such speed is, of course, much easier when spokes- control. There is some evidence, discussed further be- men do not need to establish facts. Still in its infancy, low, of frustration among the Taliban leadership and the local media too often accepts Taliban statements increasing attempts to exert control over what is said at face value, partly, no doubt, because of the diffi- in its name. culty of verification, as well as the government’s and the international military’s failure to provide timely reactions. Instead of more proactively putting out its B. TALIBAN SPOKESMEN own message, Kabul too often reacts by simply crack- ing down on a critical media, failing to distinguish be- According to the history of the Taliban media in its tween reporting and incitement. In June 2006, for Arabic-language magazine Al Somood (Standing instance, government security agencies issued “guide- Firm), a media commission was formed on 23 Sep- lines” that sought to bar “broadcasting those materials tember 2002 and run first by the Taliban-era minister which weaken the morale of the public, cause security problems and which are against the national inter- est”.63 An international involved in local media train- Afghanistan’s armed forces is weak.” In 2008 the Haj minis- try apparently attempted to ban reporting from Kabul city mosques without its permission. See “Afghan Ministry 61 “Taliban supreme commander demands ‘impartial’ treat- Curbs Media Reporting of Mosque Sermons”, Tolo TV, 29 ment by media”, Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press News January 2008 (translation: BBC Monitoring Service). Agency (AIP), 4 September 2006 (translation: BBC Moni- 64 Crisis Group interview, Kabul, 11 June 2008. toring Service). The spokesman reading the statement con- 65 The adult literacy rate is estimated at 23.5 per cent. tinued: “Many news sources cruelly treat the Taliban. For “United Nations Human Development Report 2007”, con- example they do not air our reports....However they publish ducted by the Centre for Policy and Human Development, whatever the enemy tells them without seeking the Taliban’s p. 19. There is a gross gender disparity, with only 12.6 per view….We will kill anyone who mistreats us like this. What cent of women literate compared to 32.4 per cent of men. we demand is that the media should impartially and inde- Ibid, p. 24. According to the results of a nationwide survey, pendently air our reports”. 74 per cent said they never relied on newspapers for infor- 62 Ahmad Mukhtar, “Interview with Qudratullah Jamal”, op. mation and only 2 per cent said they read a newspaper cit., p. 15. almost every day. “Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the 63 Translation of media guidelines distributed to local broad- Afghan People”, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, 2008, p. 108. casters and agencies in June 2006. These included statements This surveyed 6,263 respondents in all 34 provinces. or interviews with “armed organisations and terrorist 66 “Afghanistan in 2007”, op. cit., p. 97. groups”, reports of terrorist activities used as the lead story 67 One estimate put internet access in Afghanistan at 1.7 per and reports that “aim to represent that the fighting spirit in cent of the population, www.internetworldstats.com.

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of information and culture, Qudratullah Jamal, and main spokesmen on daily military matters, while from May 2004 by Ustad Mohammad Yasir.68 A mu- Taliban regime official Mutmain spoke, though very jahidin-era minister, affiliated to Abd al-Rabb al- rarely, on “political issues”.75 “Dr Hanif” was arrested Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami,69 Yasir is a powerful in January 2007, apparently soon after entering the speaker who likes to portray himself as a thinker and eastern border province of Nangarhar from Pakistan.76 expert on theological and ideological matters. He The presence of so many voices for the Taliban in speaks Arabic and has made appearances on Arabic Pakistan who were able to easily contact journalists television channels. He was arrested in Pakistan’s when U.S. attention was largely consumed by the NWFP province in August 2005 and transferred to hunt for al-Qaeda has long been a matter of conten- Afghan authorities70 but exchanged in March 2007 for tion between Kabul and Islamabad. a kidnapped Italian journalist.71 Upon release he was quoted as saying he was: “grabbing two rifles to begin Particularly in the early years, a number of self-styled jihad again to hunt down invaders and fight non- spokesmen and field commanders would give inter- believers”.72 views, with or without permission. The leadership’s frustration with these competing representatives was While Mullah Omar remains the most important fig- apparent when a fax to various outlets in February urehead for the movement, he is rarely heard from, 2004 refuted comments by a purported spokesman, although statements appear in his name on important Saif al-Adl, and named Hamed Agha (possibly an issues or events. Among successive Taliban spokes- alias for Qudratullah Jamal)77 as the only representa- persons, Latifullah Hakimi was the most prominent in tive authorised to speak for the movement,78 although the early years.73 He was detained in Quetta in Octo- little was subsequently heard from him. A 2005 mes- ber 2005 but was also freed in the March 2007 ex- change, although he has not been heard from since.

Following Hakimi’s arrest, Qari Mohammad Yousuf of the former Taliban regime. “Captured Taliban fuels Ahmadi (subsequently referred to as “Qari Yousuf”) Islamabad-Kabul fire”, Radio Free Europe, 18 January 2007. and Mohammad Hanif (“Dr Hanif”)74 appeared as the Aryn Baker, “A Taliban spokesman’s confession”, Time, 17 January 2007. 75 “Mr Mutmain said Mr Yousuf and Dr Hanif would provide information on militant activities in different parts of 68 “The media activities of the Taliban Islamic movement”, Afghanistan. They would speak on military matters only, he Al Somood, December 2007, pp. 5-6 (translation: Afghan- said, adding that he would be the spokesman on political Wire). issues”. “Taliban ‘appoint new spokesman’”, BBC News 69 Yasir was born in 1953 in Wardak province. “Interview Online, 14 October 2005. with Ustad Mohammad Yasir”, Al Somood, July 2007. 76 Following his arrest, he was shown on television a number 70 It appears that he was able to continue his work even while of times by Afghan authorities, claiming that Mullah Omar in Pul-i-Charkhi, the country’s maximum security prison. A lived in Quetta and criticising attacks on civilians. He was speech on suicide bombings was attributed to him from also filmed condemning a suicide attack in Nangarhar. “The prison on the Taliban website, Al Emarah, dated 11 Decem- incidents in which innocent people were killed should be ber 2006. Borhan Younus and Mudassir Ali Shah, “Kabul condemned. I would like to ask those people who have been confirms Yasir, Hakimi among 14 extradited by Pakistan”, deceived by the enemy and are working against their nation Pajhwak Afghan News Agency, 26 October 2005. to give up their opposition. If they continue to fight, the peo- 71 Mullah Dadullah’s brother, Mansoor Dadullah, was also ple of Afghanistan will undoubtedly prosecute them one among those released and went to lead the fighting in south- day”. Text of a report by Afghan Aina Television, 15 March ern Afghanistan after the former’s death. “Mullah Dadul- 2007 (Dari translation: BBC Monitoring Service). Hizb-e lah’s Replacement Named”, Al Jazeera, 18 May 2007. Islami (Khalis) responded with a night letter: “Whatever 72 Ian Fisher, “Italy swapped five jailed Taliban for a hos- these days is published with the media attributing it to Tali- tage”, The New York Times, 22 March 2007. ban captured spokesman Dr Mohammad Hanif is only con- 73 Ron Synovitz, “Pakistan hails capture of Taliban spokes- spiracy and propaganda of the puppet administration and man as breakthrough”, Radio Free Europe, 5 October 2005, intelligence network who want to cheat the Muslim nation of says Hakimi had been the head of the justice department and Afghanistan and damage the public’s view of the muja- then oversaw the department of information and culture in hidin”. “Statement by the leadership of Hizb-e Islami on the Herat (1999-2000); “Kabul confirms Yasir, Hakimi…”, op. comments of detained Taliban spokesman Dr Mohammad cit. says he had headed the department of information and Hanif”, undated nightletter, attributed to Mawlawi Khalis’s culture in Ghazni. See also “The media activities of the Tali- son, “amir of Hizb-e Islami” Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid, and ban Islamic movement”, op. cit., pp. 5-6. This called him the distributed in the eastern region. official spokesman, even though statements at that time did 77 Graeme Smith, “The Taliban”, Globe and Mail, 27 not recognise him as such. November 2006. 74 Abdul Haq (apparently his real name), in his mid-20s and 78 Amin Tarzi, “Neo-Taliban Free To Communicate With from the Nangarhar area, does not appear to have been part Media”, Radio Free Europe, 9 August 2005.

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sage posted in the name of Mullah Omar on the Tali- under Mawlawi Ahmad Jan;84 and Yasir overseeing ban’s Al Emarah (The Emirate) website demanded: “invitation” (recruitment).85 It is unlikely that all ten groups named in this organisational structure are up The international community and the people of the and running. Titles and charts do not necessarily country should not term each comment to be those translate into the existence of a coherent organisation. of the Islamic Emirate. The comments of the Is- Indeed, the same article admitted as much, saying of lamic Emirate are those which are released by our the training and education commission that “its activi- official spokesmen and our Al Emarah web page.79 ties are currently limited, owing to limited training facilities of the movement”. It also acknowledged that The practice has, however, continued. In 2007, a the commission of prisoners and martyrs families’ statement asking government employees to stop affairs “faces a serious shortfall in facilities and fi- working with the administration was denied by Qari nancial means” in attempting to provide money for Yousuf, who demanded: “This statement was not released by the Taliban, and it is up to [the] media to take confirmation from spokesmen while releasing on events b. Issue jihadi magazines and newspapers c. Oversee behalf of the Taliban”.80 the internet website related to the movement d. Issue and publish jihadi books e. Prepare jihadi films and publish them Today the most prominent spokesmen, with contacts on jihadi websites”. Ahmad Mukhtar, “Administrative Struc- listed on the website, are Zabihullah Mujahid, who ture of the Taliban Islamic Movement”, Al Somood, March appears to take major responsibility for the eastern 2008, p. 17. It is unclear how this relates to a media unit dis- and central regions, and Qari Yousuf, who speaks cussed in the July 2008 issue of Al Somood, which it said is mainly on the south. These are likely noms de guerre overseen by Nasiruddin “Herawi” – a figure discussed below – commonly used by the Taliban – and, particularly in – and works at: “the production and publication of jihadi films; their transmission on jihadi websites; putting in order the case of Qari Yousuf, names that are used by more 81 and publishing the archives of important issues related to the than one person. They maintain regular contact with Afghan cause; the gathering of photos, videos and military journalists through email, SMS and telephone calls reports from within the front by Al Somood correspondents; and provide online reports on incidents. Journalists the setting up of explanatory media sessions on important stressed that Taliban spokesmen responded to queries subjects from reporters and journalists from within the mili- around the clock, in sharp contrast to government and tary frontlines, such as in Musa Qala district in Helmand international officials. A number of Taliban com- province, Panjwayi district in Kandahar province, Tora Bora manders still appear to use their own spokesmen. For in Nangarhar province, Saydabad district in Wardak prov- instance, Shahabuddin Attal spoke on behalf of Mul- ince, Askar Kut as-Sakhina in Ghazni province, Sabari dis- lah Dadullah and, following his May 2007 death, his trict in Khost province and the other regions of Afghanistan if and when the need arises; the publication of the special brother Mullah Mansoor Dadullah.82 announcements of the Emir with regard to urging jihad against the Crusaders, and directives and orders for the mu- In March 2008 Al Somood outlined an alleged new jahidin; the starting up of educational, cultural and Islamic leadership structure, with Muttaqi heading a “cultural courses in the mujahidin’s camps; the preparation of books 83 commission”; a training and education commission on jihadi thought and their distribution to the mujahidin; the accumulation and organisation of data and statistics concern- ing the [mujahidin] martyr-soldiers against foreign forces in 79 “Message of Amir ul-Momineen to the nations of Afghani- Afghanistan; the gathering and organisation of the data and stan and Iraq”, Al Emarah, 12 May 2007 (translation: statistics of martyrs and orphans of martyrs (both civilian AfghanWire). and mujahidin) who died in the battles fought between the 80 “Taliban spokesman denies issuing statement against Afghan mujahidin and the Americans; the accumulation and ordering government workers”, AIP, 17 October 2007 (translation: of data concerning the activities of the Christian evangelical BBC Monitoring Service). organisations operating under the cover of humanitarian aid 81 Journalists interviewed by Crisis Group said that Qari to the Afghan people, research into ways of confronting Yousuf in particular seemed to be a name used by multiple these activities”. “Al Samood begins its third year”, Al people who answered the same telephone. This practice Somood, July 2008, pp. 1-3. allows for 24-hour coverage and also minimises the threat 84 “The commission conducts training and education within posed by the capture of one individual. Crisis Group inter- the mujahidin’s fronts and areas under their control”. “Ad- views, journalists, Kabul and Kandahar, February-March ministrative Structure of the Taliban Islamic Movement”, op. 2008. cit. This could be Mawlawi Ahmad Jan Ahmadi, director of 82 Mansoor Dadullah was reportedly captured in Pakistan in the Kandahar Information Centre under the Taliban. February 2008. Candace Rondeaux, “Top Taliban com- 85 “It carries out invitational (recruitment) activities among mander is captured in Pakistan”, The Washington Post, 12 the mujahidin, forms invitation (recruitment) and education February 2008. circles within the fronts to encourage the employees of Kar- 83 Duties listed include “a. Establish relations with media zai’s administration to leave working for the Americans and channels and agencies to notify them on important military the Crusaders and join the Mujahidin’s lines”. Ibid.

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the families of those killed or imprisoned.86 The im- 7. Those mullahs who perform funerals for those portance of publishing such an organisational schema who are killed in the campaign – national army, was in showing the personalities currently favoured national and border police and intelligence – will and the roles seen as significant to highlight. be killed with torture; and remember: such a mul- lah will never be forgiven.

C. SPREADING THE MESSAGE Schools, often the only government-run institution in many areas of the country, have been the subject of a campaign of intimidation for several years.87 A night 1. Night letters (Shabnamah) letter circulated in the central province of Wardak in Night letters (shabnamah) are a traditional means of May and June 2008, and warning that “non-Muslims communication in Afghanistan. Printed or handwritten and Westerners have not come to bring peace and pages are delivered to individuals, distributed through stability”, said: towns and villages or even blanketed over provinces. It is difficult to establish the true source of night let- Non-Muslims and Westerners are implementing ters, since messages are sent by a large variety of their own laws in order to spread immorality and sources. Criminal groups, including those involved in corruption throughout Afghanistan and other the drugs trade, could, for example, conceivably use Islamic countries. An example is schools con- night letters in the name of the Taliban to generate structed for females and using these to indoctrinate women with immorality and corruption. Interna- fear in an area. tional NGOs are funding these schools, and all pa- The Taliban uses them often to deliver threats, gener- triots are requested to [stop sending] their females ally directed at Afghans who work with the interna- … to those immoral centres; otherwise they will 88 tional forces or the government. For instance, a printed be dealt with under the Sharia. one-page missive distributed in south eastern Afghani- stan in May 2008 in the name of the “Afghanistan The National Solidarity Program, a government- Islamic Emirate Khost Jihadi Military Front” warned initiative with elected councils that oversee grants in their areas, is a more recent target of threats. A night “all residents in Khost” that: letter in Khost in late 2007 told people: 1. Tribal elders should not consider the U.S. stronger Reject all of the assistance coming from the Na- than Allah and not give verdicts against mujahidin; tional Solidarity Program, and don’t accept their otherwise you will soon regret it. solar panels because through this honey they will 2. Those who spy and work for the infidel govern- give you poison….Those from your community ment and military forces should quit their jobs by who participate in this infidel solidarity … if you 20 June; otherwise they will see something which act against Islam or speak against the Taliban … they have never seen in their lives. hell is your place.89 3. Do not get close to the infidel forces at any time or in any place.

4. During attacks on government and infidel forces, you should keep yourselves safe and not provide support for them; if this rule is violated, your death 87 “Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan”, will be the same as the death of the U.S. and their Human Rights Watch, July 2006. The report pointed out that puppets. other groups, including Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami and mili- tias of local warlords, also target schools, teachers and stu- 5. Our mines are live; we do not allow the killing of dents. It further noted, p. 33, that “in other areas, schools are civilians, but you should not show them to the in- attacked not as symbols of government, but rather because fidels and their slaves. We will show our power to they provide modern (that is, not solely religious) education, those who show our land mines to them or inform especially for girls and women”. By 2005 there were five them about us. million students (primary/secondary/higher) of whom over one and a half million were girls and women, nearly all de- 6. When you see infidel forces on the street and nied the right to education under the Taliban regime. “United roads, stop where you are and do not go forward. Nations Human Development Report 2007”, op. cit., p. 161. 88 “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Warning Letter of the Maidan Shah [Wardak] Mujahidin”. 89 Quoted in Anna Husarska, “Doing good is more perilous than ever”, Los Angeles Times, 3 May 2008. Husarska is sen- 86 Ibid. ior policy adviser at the International Rescue Committee.

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Individuals are also targeted through night letters.90 spokespersons for the movement’s media unit on Since 2007, text messages on mobile telephones have account of consideration necessitated by the present been increasingly used to deliver threats. [security] circumstances”.94

Rival groups use night letters to stamp their claim on Such publications, not necessarily Taliban-run but territory. When the Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz (Tora highly supportive, include Tora Bora – which re- Bora Military Front, discussed below) emerged from cently marked its fourth anniversary – published quar- the remnants of Hizb-e Islami (Khalis), a four-page, terly in Pashtu by the Tora Bora Publication Organ, full-colour missive with a full-page photograph of its linked with the Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz. leader, Mawlawi Khalis’ son Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid, was distributed in Nangarhar province around June Several of these publications have an Afghan address 2007 in a clear attempt by the new group to establish on their masthead.95 However, given the difficulty of its turf. printing and distribution in that country, it is likely that production is done in Pakistan, possibly in Peshawar and Quetta. This is borne out by interviews 2. Publications with two former writers for these magazines. Slim pamphlets and magazines supporting Taliban activities and ideas began to appear in 2002, an early The Taliban monthly Arabic-language magazine Al Somood is “issued by the Media Centre of the Taliban example being Azam (Tenacity), in Pashtu and Dari. 96 The magazine contained essays and frontline reports, Islamic Movement”. It is of a higher standard but publication ceased after the editor’s arrest.91 Ac- than other publications, although it is written in very cording to Al Somood, the long-running publications simple Arabic, likely the editors’ second language. Srak92 and Murchal93 are products of the Taliban me- Available in a high-quality PDF format as well as dia unit. Of the rest, discussed in a lengthy article on hard copy, Al Somood seeks to highlight the Taliban’s Taliban media activities, it said, “all the supervisors hierarchy, organisational coherence and depth. It also and those who publish and established these media/ publishes in-depth articles, military statistics and in- informational publications are journalists and follow- terviews with field commanders and leadership fig- ers of the Islamic Emirate, even if they prefer to pub- ures, including Mullah Brader, Mawlawi Aminullah lish these magazine and newspapers not officially as (named as a member of the military council), Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor (named as military commander

90 A religious scholar, accused of being a spy, was killed in Puli Alam, Logar on 3 June 2008. A night letter left on his body warned people to stop working with the government, Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police 94 “The media activities of the Taliban Islamic Movement”, (ANP) or NGOs. Reported by the Afghanistan NGO Safety op. cit. Office (ANSO), 5 June 2008. 95 Srak lists its address as Khair Khana Mina, Area 2, Kabul 91 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The very picture of – unusual given that this is a Tajik-dominated suburb in the propaganda”, Newsweek, 8 March 2004. Al Somood reported capital. It also has a hotmail address. Murchal simply gives that Azam was established on 25 May 2002 by Nasiruddin Kabul as an address, as well as a Yahoo address. Tora Bora al-Nasir and stopped publication on 16 April 2003. It also gives Jalalabad City, District 2, Street 4, House 3 as its ad- listed other short-lived publications, including Pashtu- dress, along with a Yahoo address. language Tawakkal (Trust) established by Mullah 96 The inside page of Al Somood says it aims to provide: “A Mohammad Hussain Mustasad (killed in Zabul on 22 July genuine image of Islamic jihad in Afghanistan. A thorough 2007); Basoun (Revolution) fortnightly, established in Octo- follow-up of events on the Afghan scene. A serious media ber 2002 by Mullah Hussain Khan in Dari and Pashtu, which step to help the Afghan question”. Its chairman is listed as stopped publication after one year; Istiqamat (Uprightness) Nasiruddin “Herawi”, who, it says, “enjoys a special status established by Hamidullah Hamed in November 2005 in and dignity in his relation to the Commander of the Faithful Pashtu and Dari, which lasted only three issues. “The media (May God Protect Him) and, furthermore, undertakes the activities of the Taliban Islamic movement”, op. cit., pp. 5-6. accomplishment of important military and administrative 92 Srak (Beam of Light), a glossy monthly in Pashtu (with activities; he has become famous among the leadership of a little material in Dari), calls itself the publication of the the Taliban and among the mujahidin as the ‘right hand’ of “Afghanistan Islamic Literary Association”. The editor on the Commander of the Faithful (may God Protect the masthead is Lutfullah Momand. Him)….Security circumstances have necessitated that he use 93 Murchal (Trench), a quarterly focusing on military affairs, the name “Herawi” instead of his real name; as he works in says it is published by the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”. more than one sphere, his original name appears at the head The editor on the masthead is Mullah Khabir Ahmad Muja- of the Americans’ list of main wanted persons belonging to hid, also the name of the person who wrote the speech, the Taliban”. “The media activities of the Taliban Islamic “Guantanamo Prison”, delivered by Yasir. movement”, op. cit.

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Kandahar) and Yasir.97 The similarity of many of the recognising that the practice was invoking wider responses suggests a heavy editorial hand. community disgust, the Taliban leadership gave orders to stop it in February 2008, following an eleven- 3. DVDs month period in which more than 100 people had been decapitated on spying charges. A purported Taliban This new media negates the need for the journalist as commander in Helmand told a local news agency: gatekeeper and offers the advantage of speaking di- “In my opinion, the orders are driven by growing pub- rectly to the audience. In an illiterate society, it also lic aversion to beheadings. From now on we will be has obvious advantages over publications. The discs, executing the secret agents by shooting instead of and MP3s in urban areas, which are sold as well as slaughtering them”.100 While no beheadings appear to being distributed to journalists in Pakistan and Afghani- have been filmed since the decree,101 the Taliban has stan, appear to be largely aimed at recruitment and continued distributing images of its summary form of morale. They contain emotive chanting, archival foot- justice. On the evening of 13 July 2008, several na- age from the fight against Soviet forces and the tional broadcasters showed clips – apparently taken Soviet-backed regime, images from Iraq and clips by an Afghan journalist102 – of a large group of Tali- from Western documentaries as well as videos of in- ban kidnapping two women in Ghazni and shooting surgent training, attacks on government and interna- them because of their “immorality”. The incident was tional forces and equipment seized or destroyed. They strongly personally condemned by Karzai.103 also aim at demoralising Afghan forces and disprov- ing the claims of international forces. For instance, a More material now seems to be filmed inside Afghani- DVD interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was stan, and it is improving in quality. Two cameras believed to be dead, was released in 2008.98 Another, mounted on tripods were used to capture a truck apparently showing two of his commanders mocking bombing on a military base in Sabri, Khost province, reports of their deaths, was handed to journalists in on 3 March 2008 which killed two international sol- February 2008, within weeks of announcements that diers and two Afghan civilians; the DVD was distrib- 104 they had been killed.99 uted within a couple of weeks of the attack. It was noticeably different from the shaky camerawork seen Mullah Dadullah used savage images of beheadings, in previous years. apparently modelled on those from Iraq. However,

97 In Al Somood’s 25th issue (July 2008), which also marked its third year of publication, an editorial pledged that the 100 Interview with Mullah Sharafuddin, cited as “a Taliban magazine “will try as much as possible to present an accurate commander in the southern lawless province of Helmand” in picture of political and military developments in Afghani- Janullah Hashimzada and Akram Noorzai, “Omar to Tali- stan; will try to introduce a special section for military re- ban: Stop beheadings”, Pajhwak Afghan News, 3 February ports from within the front; will concentrate, in the rest of its 2008. See also “Taliban chief orders change in mode of exe- articles, on including the most important developments in the cutions”, IRIN, 4 February 2008. Afghan struggle; will publish in forthcoming issues of Al 101 There have been some beheadings reported, including two Somood pages devoted to the history of the Taliban Islamic Afghan nationals accused of spying for the U.S. forces in movement and the founding of the Islamic Emirate of Karangal Valley in the eastern province of Kunar, an area Afghanistan; and will publish, in particular, articles covering where groups linked to foreign influences and under less di- historical developments since the American invasion and rect Taliban control hold sway. See “Taliban behead two for occupation of Afghanistan”. ‘spying’ for U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan”, Tolo Tele- 98 The Haqqani interview was distributed on DVD by “The vision, 16 April 2008 (translation: BBC Monitoring Service). Source of Jihad” (Manba Al Jihad in Arabic) and the Cultural 102 Nahal Toosi, “Afghans free journalist who took execution Affairs Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. pics”, Associated Press, 18 July 2008. 99 No production house is given, but a white Taliban flag is 103 Karzai told the national broadcaster: “The [two] women shown in the background; the two commanders, surrounded of Afghanistan were martyred by terrorists, who have been by armed men, appear to be Mullah Sangeen and Darim trained outside Afghanistan, by spying and intelligence Sedgai. U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan had stated that agencies. They have been trained in places where the issue Mullah Sangeen was killed in a raid on 11 December 2007. of namus (honour) is of no value, and in places where there In January 2008, the Bagram Media Centre claimed that is no respect for women and honour. They have been trained unknown gunmen in Pakistan killed Darim Sedgai, “a pow- in places where people are trained and sent [to Afghanistan] erful Haqqani network commander” on 16 January. See Bill to disgrace humans, to disrespect the human dignity and Roggio, “Siraj Haqqani’s deputy killed in Afghanistan”, The honour”. National Afghanistan TV, 14 July 2008 (translation Long War Journal, 14 December 2007; and “Coalition forces from Dari and Pashtu: BBC Monitoring). confirm Darim Sedgai’s death”, Bagram Media Centre, 26 104 The footage of the attack was included in Haqqani’s January 2008. March 2008 DVD as a means of dating his appearance.

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A number of “studios” have logos “branding” their Urdu, Arabic and English.109 The often poorly trans- DVDs, although their exact role in the process – film- lated English section is the smallest, consisting almost ing, editing and distribution – is unclear. The products solely of updates – now done several times a day – of of the more local studios are still noticeably less pro- inflated accounts of attacks and occasional leadership fessional than those on Afghanistan produced by Al statements on policy or events. The Pashtu section – Sahab (The Clouds), al-Qaeda’s media arm. There is by far the most extensive – also largely focuses on in- also a growing phenomenon of such images – often flated battlefield accounts,110 but includes poetry, in- the most gruesome – being passed round on mobile terviews, extended articles and commentary, as well telephones, often accompanied by ring tones of songs as links to magazines that appear to have some sort of discussed below. official approval. Reaction to events is quick: stories on the June 2008 Kandahar jailbreak were up the 111 4. Online same evening, though the reporting was confused.

Since mid-2005, the Taliban has had an internet pres- Unlike some of its other Islamist counterparts, Al ence through the website Al Emarah (The Emirate),105 Emarah has no discussion forums, although some labelled a product of the Cultural Affairs Commission lively pro-Taliban ones in which members tend to of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Da Afghani- more openly espouse the Pashtun ethnic agenda oper- stan Islami Emarat Da Farhangi Charu Kummisiyun) ate unofficially. Unlike many other jihadist websites, and carrying official leadership statements. It has ex- it also does not include instruction manuals and does isted under a number of addresses, which have been not link with groups in other theatres – although there successively blocked, and now moves between free are several online forums and sites, particularly those service providers.106 A banner at the top of the website focused on Iraq, which report Taliban spokesmen’s proclaims “The Voice of Jihad” (“Da Jihad Ghag” in statements, particularly when Al Emarah is down. Pashtu) – a name also used on a number of DVD pro- ductions.107 “Garmsiry”, named on the website as head of news in the early months of 2008, is also credited 5. Audio/poetry on a few of these productions.108 The Taliban exaggerates when it claims: “With God’s While fairly basic – partly presumably to make it eas- help we were able last year to open mobile radio stations ier to move when taken down – this is no small-time in Paktia and Helmand provinces, and through those operation. It has five language sections: Dari, Pashtu, stations we were able to offer … a good media cover-

109 “Initially in Pashtu and Arabic, only the site’s Pashtu- 105 Interestingly, al-Qaeda’s Yahya al-Libi (famed for his es- language pages were updated regularly. In 2006, materials in cape from Bagram prison) has been quoted saying that his Persian, Urdu and English were added; however only the job before his 2002 arrest in Karachi was “to transmit the Pashtu and Persian pages were updated regularly. In mid- word of the mujahidin to the outside world through the inter- 2006 the website was updated daily and often more than net and the special website (Al-Imarat-ul Islamia)”. Inter- once per day”. Amin Tarzi “The Neo-Taliban”, in Robert D. view with Yahya al-Libi conducted by Mawlawi Hatem Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds.), The Taliban and the Crisis of Tayy for Tora Bora which then appeared in April 2006 on Afghanistan (Massachusetts, 2008), p. 399. Islamist websites (translation: MEMRI, special dispatch se- 110 For instance, on 4 June 2008 Al Emarah reported: “In ries no.1160, 10 May 2006). martyrdom operations 50 enemy officers were killed in 106 It has shifted domains between alemarah.net, ale- Khost”, with the story sourced to Zabihullah Mujahid. Ac- marah.org, alemarah.cjb.net, alemarah.r8.org, alemarah. cording to the interior ministry, nineteen civilians and four i67.org, alemarah.110mb.com and, most recently, ale- police were wounded in the suicide attack. “Security devel- mara.110mb.com. The early ones, where the addresses given opments in Afghanistan”, Reuters, 4 June 2008. by those who had registered them were easier to find, gave 111 The first article, in Pashtu, implied that the driver of the contact details in Peshawar and Lahore, Pakistan. tanker that exploded destroying the prison’s defences had 107 This name has been used for jihadist publications in other fled, and the “mujahidin did not suffer any casualties”. “All countries, most notably an al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia’s online the prisoners of Kandahar Jail Were Released in an Historic magazine, Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad in Arabic). See Attack”, Al Emarah, News Section (Pashtu), 13 June 2008. Stephen Ulph, “The voice of jihad is back”, Terrorism Fo- The account in the English section also explicitly stated that cus, vol. 2, no. 8 (28 April 2005). Links between them – if the driver had abandoned the vehicle before another Talib any – remain unclear. fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) at the tanker. An- 108 DVDs seen by Crisis Group have references to Garmsiry other section, however, subsequentlyemphasised that it was a from 2006; his name appeared on the website with an email suicide attack. “Qari Yousuf: Hundreds of Prisoners of Kan- contact address in 2008. Aliases are often linked to places of dahar Jail Are Safe”, Al Emarah, Hot Events Section origin – in this case, possibly Garmsir. (Pashtu), 14 June 2008.

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age and spread the news as it happens”.112 There have This would be new revolution in which each cruel been some small attempts at broadcasting to different person will suffer/Each criminal will be ashamed provinces in the south and east, but these are geo- and taken to trial/This flood will clear out the dirt graphically sporadic and for only a few hours at a time.113 and will spread in every direction/The oppressed will become happy, and everywhere there will be Audio cassettes114 (and, for city dwellers with com- freedom/Everyone will break their chains and puters, MP3s) are one of the most effective means of every captive’s hand will be freed/In order to gain communication, containing songs and poetry, in par- independence for the nation; the countrymen will ticular religious chants and taranas, emotional, martial, smile”.116 nationalistic songs without musical accompaniment. These are tied closely to Afghan imagery and history, not necessarily produced by the Taliban but aimed at building wider sympathy for the insurgency within the population. While some songs refer directly to Taliban activities, they mainly simply aim to heighten resistance to foreigners and appeal to nationalism. They feed into a long cultural tradition of travelling minstrels carrying news and opinions; indeed, there are examples today of such songs being memorised and passed along.

One cassette, “The convoy of martyrs (volume 1)”, contains songs such as “Let me go to jihad”; “My mother, I am going with your permission”; and “Con- voys going to jihad, I am joining the martyrs”.115 Many people told Crisis Group that they enjoyed such music, even if they did not support the Taliban; others reported carrying the cassettes in their vehicles as “protection” if they were stopped at a Taliban check- post. Popular tunes are available as ring tones for telephones.

The Taliban website also has a section devoted to lit- erature and poetry, appropriating a popular culture based on pride, resistance and anger. One such poem says:

112 “Mullah Brader gives decisive declarations on jihadi de- velopments in Afghanistan”, Al Somood, April 2008, p. 10. 113 Taliban radio was reported to be broadcasting in Kanda- har on 18 and 20 April 2008. Amin Tarzi, “Taliban radio back on air”, Radio Free Europe, 9 May 2005. In the south eastern provinces of Paktika, Paktia, Khost and Ghazni, where a spokesman said that there would be daily broad- casts, the sound quality was poor and the reception faint. Pam O’Toole, “Taliban radio station back on air”, BBC News, 21 June 2007. An organisation with projects in rela- tively remote areas also told Crisis Group that Taliban radio had broadcast to the eastern region. Crisis Group interview, Kabul, 11 May 2008. 114 This is a long-used medium in the region; the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, smuggled proselytising audio cas- settes into Soviet Central Asia. Coll, op. cit., pp. 103-104. 115 This production provided an address on GT Road, Min- 116 “This country will be freed”, Al Emarah, 1 January 2007 gora, Swat district, NWFP. (translation: AfghanWire).

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IV. WHAT THEY SAY stan and appeal to Islamist extremists worldwide.118 In 2008 there were explicit appeals to those who claimed the title of mujahidin during the anti-Soviet jihad but 119 While the medium is important to reach appropriate who had not then joined the Taliban movement. In audiences, it is the message of the group that will de- turn, members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) termine if its ideas turn into actions. The Taliban and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are dismissed seeks to exploit popular sentiment, drawing on local as munafiq (hypocrite), and others in the administra- narratives, understanding that those ideas or griev- tion are called ghulam (slave/servant), ajir (agent) and ances which already have some currency resonate the gawdagai (puppet). most. Although manipulated and exaggerated – often massively – Taliban propaganda usually has at its Mixed messages have appeared in Taliban communi- core real incidents or deeply felt issues. The mis- cations, signalling a diversity of views within the treatment of Taliban prisoners or minority Pashtun insurgent group and the difficulty of communication communities in the north, for example, created an with a leadership in hiding. Taliban participation in early well of resentment that the Taliban could tap. the peace jirgas between Pakistan and Afghanistan was one very public subject of confusion. While a After the Taliban’s ouster, the Karzai administration spokesman hinted that the Taliban could, with pre- 120 and its international backers believed peace would conditions, participate in the talks, Mullah Omar 121 have to come before justice.117 As a result, there was quickly ruled it out. little community reconciliation to heal rifts created and exacerbated by years of conflict and human rights The major themes discussed below are ones in which abuses. Alienation was further fuelled by the often high- a general message is apparent and appears to resonate handed tactics of the U.S.-led coalition forces, focused with sectors of the population. on eliminating Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants and conducting operations mainly in the Pashtun-majority south and eastern provinces. Such was the starting point from which the Taliban began its outreach, feeding on local grievances but increasingly showing 118 “Until 2006, when the use of the Internet by the opposi- confidence and a sense of momentum. Taliban state- tion became more organised and systematic, most violent ments and arguments may often appear contradictory activities were carried out under the ‘Taliban’ name. Begin- and counter-intuitive – for instance highlighting the ning in 2006, the website purporting to represent the ‘Islamic insecurity it does much to create. Emirate of Afghanistan’ began referring to the opposition as ‘mujahidin’. In the course of Islamic history, many groups The language the Taliban uses is also important. It have used the term to identify their struggles to defend Islam. continues to lay claim to being the “Islamic Emirate It gained currency in Afghanistan during the 1979-1989 So- of Afghanistan”. While it has sought to distinguish viet occupation”. Tarzi, op. cit., p. 403. 119 itself from previous mujahidin factions, many of “Some of the [anti-Soviet] jihadi leaders and commanders which are seen as brutal and self-serving, it also uses … are now supporting the Americans in fighting against the the term “mujahidin” for its fighters, aiming to tie people of Afghanistan; they are supporting the invaders, which is in contradiction of Islamic and Afghan val- itself with past conflicts that resound within Afghani- ues....there is no doubt that former jihadi commanders and leaders had given many sacrifices in the path of Islam and independence….if they find the truth, the Islamic Emirate can reconcile with them, and the Islamic Emirate’s heart is open for them”. “Statement by the Political Commission 117 President Karzai told the BBC: “We must first have of the Islamic Emirate regarding certain developments in peace, stabilise peace, make it certain, make it stand on its Afghanistan and the world”, Al Emarah, 5 March 2008. own feet and then go for justice....justice becomes a luxury 120 Spokesman Qari Yousuf was quoted saying they had not for now. We must not lose peace for that”. “Karzai sets out been invited and would set conditions it they were, while Afghanistan vision”, BBC News, 14 June 2002. Similarly, warning: “If any group is ignored, it will be nothing but a asked about investigating mass graves, the then-Special Rep- political meeting”. “Taliban flag joining Afghan peace resentative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) Lakhdar talks”, Reuters, 10 December 2006. Brahimi said: “A very important point to remember here is 121 “Now the aggressor forces in our country want to entangle that I think we have a responsibility, certainly to find out our valiant nation and tribes in their devilish trap by way of what has happened, but I am sure you will agree that our jirgas. But I am sure that no Muslim will participate in some- responsibility to the living has to have precedence as far as thing that is created by aggressors and puppets”, Mullah Omar we, the United Nations, are concerned and we cannot take a in a taped message delivered to the Afghan Islamic Press risk of putting anyone’s life in danger”. Transcript of press Agency for the Eid holiday in December 2006. “Mullah conference, UN News Centre, 27 August 2002. Omar issues Eid message”, Al Jazeera, 31 December 2006.

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A. FOREIGN PRESENCE Taliban attacks. While the vast majority of Afghans are still far more concerned at what would happen if When the Taliban was ousted, Afghans, desperate for foreign forces left Afghanistan, actions and insensi- some respite from violence, welcomed the foreign tivities of international players have created rising re- forces. The international community’s failure to send sentment and alienation that the Taliban seeks to troops in sufficient numbers countrywide as neutral exploit. peacekeepers in those early days lies at the root of many of the problems faced today. In recent years the 1. Guantanamo Bay and arbitrary detentions numbers of foreign troops in the south in particular has risen dramatically. However, they now face a much Extrajudicial detentions at Guantanamo Bay and Ba- 124 tougher job, with popular disillusionment having set gram airbase, along with ham-fisted or ill-informed in as the same discredited local leaders are in power, raids, have undermined the perceived legitimacy of and a peace dividend has failed to materialise. the foreign presence and have become enduring sym- bols of oppression, particularly among Pashtuns. At This international intervention is quite different from least two books by Afghans on experiences in Guan- 125 previous ones, since it is in support of an elected tanamo have been widely circulated, and the image Afghan government. The UN Security Council of being imprisoned on a far-distant island has entered authorises the International Security Assistance Force the folk culture. A tarana framed as a letter from a (ISAF) presence, while the separate U.S.-led coalition prisoner to his mother is popular on audio cassettes force, under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), is and MP3: the subject of a 2005 bilateral agreement.122 Yet, by stressing a long tradition of Pashtun nationalism, I am imprisoned in Cuba jail/I sleep neither during pride and resistance and exploiting suspicions about the day nor during the night, my mother/It’s the motives of the foreign forces, the Taliban is a piece of land amidst the ocean/This is Cuba attempting to gain legitimacy and support. A poem Island/There are detainees in it/It is surrounded by published on Al Emarah pledged: bars/ There are cages/Which are very strong/They are as small/as a human being/These are for horror/ I will never accept a life where I must bow to others/ These are for tragedy/These are for punishing the I will never back the illegitimate for any money … poor nation.126 I will not swear on Washington as my Qiblah [direction to Mecca], nor will I bow to Bush … Yasir delivered an audio homily about Guantanamo, I will not kiss the hand of Laura Bush, nor will I which has also been distributed in a printed pamphlet bow to Rice … My beliefs and my Pashtun pride stating: “This prison is being used as a psychological teach me this/If I am chopped into pieces, I will torture tool and as psychological warfare, to create 127 not beg to others.123 terror amongst Muslims”. Taliban magazines regu-

Undermining the legitimacy of the foreign military presence and demonstrating its ability to attack them are central to the Taliban’s appeals. DVDs nearly 124 In early 2008, Bagram had 630 prisoners, more than twice always show attacks on international forces, although the 275 at Guantanamo, and up from 100 in early 2004. Tim the ANA and ANP are more regularly the targets of Golden, “Foiling U.S. plan, prison expands in Afghanistan”, The New York Times, 7 January 2008. 125 Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef (former Taliban ambassador 122 A fuller explanation of the legal framework is provided in to Pakistan, now reconciled with the Karzai administration “Guidelines for Interaction and Coordination of Humanitar- and living in Kabul) authored A Picture of Guantanamo, ian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan”, developed published in mid-2006, with editions in Afghanistan, Paki- by the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group co- stan, India and Malaysia. He described being shackled, chaired by UNAMA and the Agency Coordinating Body for hooded, deprived of food and water, kicked and beaten, de- Afghan Relief (ACBAR), 20 May 2008, p. 4. While ISAF, prived of sleep and subjected to forced nudity. Two brothers, now roughly 50,000 troops, has expanded to cover the entire Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost and Ustad Badr ul-Zaman, pub- country in five regional commands, a separate U.S.-led coa- lished Broken Shackles the same year. lition force remains under Operation Enduring Freedom. It 126 Extract from a version obtained in Nangarhar in March concentrates on high-value targets and counter-terrorism, is 2008. The song had been circulating for at least a year. also responsible for much of the Afghan National Army and 127 “Guantanamo Prison”, speaker: Ustad Mohammad Yasir; Police training and has been referenced in UN Security writer: Mullah Khabir Mujahid (listed in Murchal magazine Council resolutions on continuation of ISAF since 2003. as its chief editor); publisher: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 123 “Death is a gift”, poem in Al Emarah, 5 January 2007 Cultural Affairs Commission (2,000 copies), 1385 (21 (translation: AfghanWire). March 2006-20 March 2007), p. 10.

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larly carry “letters” allegedly from inmates of Guan- alleged abuses or overreaction by international forces tanamo or Bagram.128 are regularly found in Taliban magazines and online publications. These are usually exaggerated, but inci- DVDs showing examples of raids and cultural misun- dents such as the April 2007 deaths, when marines derstandings are used to depict the international mili- shot civilians in Nangarhar following a suicide attack tary presence as an occupation – some even pirated on their unit, are repeatedly cited, and the lack of pub- from Western news productions. An Australian lic accountability is a subject of local outrage.132 documentary showed the then Uruzgan governor Jan Noting the media interest in civilian casualties, the Mohammed using filthy language and sexual slurs as Taliban has aggressively pushed the issue, attempting he detained a young villager while supported by a group to depict an indiscriminate occupation force: of marines.129 The version circulated by the Taliban was subtitled: “The Americans want to strengthen [O]ur oppressed nation is still under the brutal human rights in Afghanistan? You should judge”. occupation of aggressors, and their homes and har- vest come under the crusader army’s bombardment Detentions and raids by foreign troops are eroding everyday and every minute. They kill children, old local support for the intervention. Agreements which people and women and violate Islamic sanctities outline the responsibilities and obligations of interna- and national customs.133 tional forces and include mechanisms to address alle- gations of abuse are vital. Detention issues are Independent verification is often all but impossible, complex, as the Canadians have found. Like many since most conflict-related deaths take place in remote ISAF nations reluctant to get into detentions them- areas, made too dangerous by militants to check num- selves, they handed prisoners over to Afghan authori- bers and civilian/combatant status. However, in July ties, only to then be accused of turning a blind eye to 2008, after the American military’s media centre had torture.130 There must be a greater focus on the wider said a number of militants were killed in the eastern rule of law in Afghanistan, including public trials, if province of Nangarhar, an international media corre- Taliban propaganda is to be negated. spondent found evidence that members of a wedding party had been bombed, as locals – and the Taliban – 134 2. Civilian casualties had claimed. The UN estimates at least 1,500 civil- ian casualties in 2007 – although the numbers of those International efforts in Afghanistan have relied heavily killed by ISAF or by the Taliban is unclear.135 Civilian on aerial bombardment; 3,572 bombs were dropped 131 by NATO in 2007. Civilian deaths resonate enor- mously in communities, particularly given terrible 132 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission memories of Soviet bombing campaigns. Reports of reported that twelve civilians were killed by a marines spe- cial operations unit following a suicide attack attempt on the main road outside Jalalabad. The marines said that they had come under small arms attack after the bombing. The unit 128 “My young countrymen, I want to share many things with was withdrawn from Afghanistan, and a special tribunal con- you, write many things to you, but I am afraid that those sol- sidered whether charges should be pressed. In May 2008 it diers with big shoes and long hair would come again to me was decided there would be no charges. See Carlotta Gall, and take me to a separate room, torture me and deprive me “Marines actions in Afghanistan called excessive”, The New of sleep for a few nights as punishment”, signed “An Afghan York Times, 15 April 2007; and Rahim Faiez, “Many prisoner, metal cage no. 434, Camp Delta, Guantanamo, Afghans outraged At U.S. decision on Marines”, Associated Cuba”. “Letter of a Prisoner”, Srak, December 2007-January Press, 24 May 2008. 2008. Tora Bora carried a letter allegedly written by a 133 “US, allies ‘are the true terrorists’ – Afghan Taliban woman in Bagram prison. “I don’t want to write in the letter leader’s Eid message”, AIP, 12 October 2008 (translation: about what happens to me in prison – which would break BBC Monitoring). hearts – because of my Afghan pride….They have snatched 134 “Several militants killed with precision airstrikes Nan- my honour in prison”. Tora Bora, March 2008. garhar province”, Bagram Media Center, 6 July 2008. “Bride 129 Carmela Baranowska, “Afghanistan – Taliban Country”, Among 30 martyred in American occupation air strike”, Al Journeyman Pictures, 16 August 2004. Emarah, 6 July 2008. Alastair Leithead, “Afghan survivors 130 Stephanie Levitz, Brian Laghi, Campbell Clark and Paul tell of wedding bombing”, BBC News, 13 July 2008. Some Koring, “Kandahar governor denies torture claim”, Cana- of the complexities and ambiguities of exactly who is a civil- dian Press and Globe and Mail, 2 February 2008. See also ian in a conflict of loose and fluid alliances are examined in Ian Austen, “Canada again transfers Afghan prisoners”, The Leithead’s subsequent “Doubts over US Afghan operation”, New York Times, 1 March 2008. BBC News, 17 July 2008. 131 Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) David W. Barno, “House Foreign Affairs 135 “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Committee Testimony”, U.S. House of Representatives, International Peace and Security”, A/62/722-S/2008/159, 2 April 2008, p. 4. 6 March 2008, p. 4.

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deaths at the hands of foreign forces – whatever the This is not a martyrdom-seeking operation. Sev- reason – are not only tragedies but also feed into per- eral innocent Muslims were killed. The top offi- ceptions of an occupation force – and motivate those cials [of the government] sacrificed some of their seeking revenge to join insurgent ranks.136 own people in order to distort the image of the Muslims and of the Taliban. Our operations do not The Taliban shows far less care about civilian lives kill civilians.143 than foreign forces, who insist that the insurgents actively seek out civilian shields.137 Anti-government Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid blamed youth groups killed over four times more civilians in the and inexperience for civilian deaths in such attacks: first three months of 2008 than international forces “A lot of people are coming to our suicide bombing according to Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) centre to volunteer. We have a problem with making figures.138 Afghanistan has not seen the large-scale sure they attack the right targets, avoiding killing suicide bombings of Iraq in civilian centres; most at- civilians. It takes time to train them properly”.144 tacks have targeted the military and police,139 but in- surgent groups have shown little concern for innocent Karzai has repeatedly and publicly called upon the bystanders. The first twenty suicide attacks of 2008 international forces to exercise more care.145 Those killed six times as many civilians as the first twenty foreign forces indeed must appreciate that it is not just attacks of 2007.140 The July 2008 bombing at the the military requirement or legal justification that has Indian embassy ripped through crowds of Afghans to be considered for each bomb, but also the poten- queuing for visas and entering the nearby school and tially wider psychological and strategic impact. At the shops, killing over 40. The Taliban denied involve- same time, to ensure a true picture of what is happen- ment, as it does in most bombings that kill large num- ing on the ground, much greater attention needs to be bers of bystanders.141 given to the insurgents’ deliberate conduct of opera- tions in areas with civilians, their targeting of civil- This follows experiences in which large-scale civilian ians and the hypocrisy behind their finger-pointing at deaths in suicide attacks have rebounded. Hundreds foreign forces. of protestors chanted “Death to Pakistan, death to al- Qaeda and death to the Taliban” following a 2006 3. Xenophobic appeals explosion in Spin Boldak which killed over twenty people.142 Mullah Dadullah quickly moved to shift the The Taliban aims to exploit suspicions about the for- blame: eigners’ intentions in Afghanistan. A night letter widely distributed in the east, for example, simply repeated what many local rumours already said:

136 Almost a third of the 42 insurgents interviewed by the The colonial forces have once again attacked this Globe and Mail in Kandahar province claimed to have had at country to loot the wealth and kill the people…Do least one relative killed in aerial bombardments by foreign you know why?…Afghanistan is full of valuable forces. Graeme Smith, “Talking to the Taliban: A poll from mines; if a true Islamic and independent Afghan the frontlines”, Globe and Mail, 22 March 2008. 137 See, for instance, Rahim Faiez, “U.S.: Taliban Used Kids as Human Shields”, Associated Press, 19 September 2007. 138 Its figures show the top nine causes of civilian deaths 143 Mullah Dadullah interview aired on Al Jazeera 13 Febru- with around 55 people killed by international military force ary 2006 (transcript and translation: Television Project, Mid- protection shootings, air operations and ground operations dle East Media Research Institution (MEMRI), clip 1036). compared to around 235 in anti-government firing, assassi- 144 “Transcript: BBC Taliban interview”, BBC Online, 21 June nations, roadside bombs and suicide blasts, ANSO Quarterly 2007. This contradicted an earlier statement by the then Data Report, 1 January-31 March 2008, p. 10. spokesman, Dr Hanif: “There is no need for training some- 139 According to UNAMA estimates, 43 per cent of suicide body to carry out a suicide attack. A fidayee [dedicated sol- attacks in 2007 were directed at international forces; 24 per dier] is ready to die for his religion. He just puts bombs cent at government and civilian/political targets; and 33 per around himself, and he is giving up his soul to God. There is cent at ANP and ANA. “Suicide attacks in Afghanistan no need for training”. “In interview, Taliban official defends 2001-2007”, UNAMA, 1 September 2007, p. 45. suicide attacks”, Christian Science Monitor, 3 February 2006. 140 ANSO, op. cit., p. 9. 145 See, for instance: “Our innocent people are becoming vic- 141 “Taliban denies role in Kabul blast”, Agence France-Presse, tims of careless operations of NATO and international 8 July 2008. Zabihullah Mujahid told the news agency: “We forces…we are thankful for [the international community’s] wish we had carried out this attack … since India has been help to Afghanistan, but that does not mean that Afghan the enemy of the Islamic Emirate”. lives have no value. Afghan life is not cheap, and it should 142 “Afghans protest at bomb attacks”, BBC Online, 18 Janu- not be treated as such”. Aryn Baker, “Backlash from Afghan ary 2006. civilian deaths”, Time, 23 June 2007.

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administration is established and the rich mines airplanes to the West and Europe from Bagram, are explored, Afghanistan will compete with the Kandahar, Mazar and Shindand airports.150 developed countries of the world.146 Qudratullah Jamal similarly condemned the “fast” life- Much is made of the Afghans’ historic resistance to style allegedly foisted by foreigners on Afghans today, outside forces, including invocations of the rout of the in particular equating the small gains made by women British in 1880: “We will remind them of [the Battle (such as appearing on television) with immorality: of] Maiwand, and we will reach Washington/We are the soldiers of Islam, and we are happy to be mar- We see today that all media and propaganda tools in tyred”,147 goes the refrain of one nationalist song. Afghanistan, including TV, radio and newspapers, aim at spreading obscenities, alcohol and Western Mullah Omar released a statement on national day habits that are contrary to Islam. The crusaders claiming: built several centres with different names in Kabul and the provinces’ capitals to spread such habits. The 88th anniversary of independence comes at a We can find today a Hollywood branch in Kabul. time when Afghanistan once again has returned These centres try to use Afghan girls to produce back to the colonisation of those occupying forces, those movies, and there are serious efforts to build as a result of which our houses are destroyed, our internet centres and CD shops and bordellos.151 children are orphaned, our brave and courageous combatants either are martyred very ruthlessly or Many Afghans, particularly at a local level, do not are sent to jail.148 understand the different forces in their country. How- ever, stories and statements in Taliban publications The overthrow of the brutal Soviet occupation (with play up the debates in Western capitals to highlight a the role of foreign backers expunged) is highlighted perceived lack of resolve and short-termism, and dis- in a magazine article as yet another episode in the suade Afghans from throwing in their lot with the mighty resistance to outsiders: Karzai government. Articles emphasise contradictory policies and actions, particularly relations with We are the sons of Ahmad Shah and Akbar Khan; neighbouring Pakistan: our fathers knocked down great, great forces in history with the help of God. In this century our Like a dizzy patient they do amazing and strange grandfathers gave a jaw-breaking response to Eng- activities. Sometimes they announce to the whole land and our fathers to the Russians, and God will- nation the end of mujahidin resistance; sometimes ing we will give the Americans a similar response.149 they talk about negotiation and reconciliation; sometimes they start mass killing of innocent pris- Much is also much made of Western decadence, in oners; sometimes they accuse neighbours of inter- particular the “corrupt” lifestyle Westerners have fering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs; and allegedly brought to Afghanistan. This picks up on sometimes they hold joint meetings with them.152 local resentment at the perceived flashy lifestyle of some foreigners but is distorted and exaggerated, such Apart from exaggerating lifestyle changes in Afghani- as in this statement on Al Emarah: stan – and particularly Kabul – the main theme being perpetuated is that the Taliban will outlast the foreign Except videos, movies, TVs, containers of porno- presence and will punish those associated with it or graphic DVDs, CDs, cosmetics, and other corrupt- their “foreign ways”. The response this requires from ing items, nothing else has been imported to foreign leaders is a delicate balance in statements to Afghanistan. Similarly no other things were ex- emphasise to the Afghan people that the troops are ported except narcotics day and night by American present to support the Karzai government and will stay as long as necessary but not forever. But it also demands more than words, including a redoubled effort to build

146 Distributed in the name of the Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz in Nangarhar province in June 2007, op. cit. 150 “U.S., NATO and puppet administration achievements in 147 “We are the soldiers of Islam”, song lyrics published on the past year”, weekly commentary, Al Emarah, 6 January Al Emarah, 1 January 2007 (translation: AfghanWire). 2008. 148 “Message of the Islamic Emirate in honour of the 88th 151 Ahmad Mukhtar, “Interview with Qudratullah Jamal”, op. Anniversary of Independence in Afghanistan”, Al Emarah, cit., p. 11. 18 August 2007 (translation: AfghanWire). 152 “Interview with the deputy and exalted mujahid of the 149 “Sacrifice”, Murchal, September 2006 (translated from Islamic Emirate Mullah Brader”, Al Emarah, 27 September Pashtu). 2007.

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local security forces and putting them at the fore to Another statement sought to strip them of the right to counter perceptions of a “foreign invasion”. claim the title mujahidin:

Those former mujahidin, who at present are serv- B. LEGITIMACY AND POWER ing the infidels in the Kabul administration, should no longer be called mujahidin. On occasions when Insurgents do not need to win militarily; they often they are criticised, then the word jihad should not just need to outwait their opponents. Hence depicting be used to describe them so as, God forbid, not to themselves as unflagging and their ultimate victory as insult the innocent mujahidin and the sacred jihad inevitable is crucial to securing advantage. The Tali- against the communists, and not to put us in the ban seeks to portray itself as steadfast and its violence same category with those wretched people who as legitimate. Growing popular discontent with the consciously are and were against the past sacred corruption of those in power only helps fuel griev- jihad, and who try to tarnish the sacred name of ances, even among those for whom the Taliban holds jihad in the minds of the public.155 no natural appeal. The Karzai administration is also derided as a puppet of the Western powers, with much imagery based on 1. Corrupt government the “green dollars” paid to those who work with the The international community’s decision, after the international community. This picks up on local anger Taliban’s ouster, to co-opt many unpopular com- at the large amounts of money the favoured few manders and warlords into the new administration – receive in contrast to those who earn meagre local and the failure by Karzai and his international backers salaries: to stand up to them today – has had far-reaching im- We will never forgive those people who brought plications for the administration’s legitimacy and its the Americans to our territory and those who en- ability to deliver good governance and services to tered Kabul supported by American warplanes, the population.153 In the 1990s, the Taliban’s original because the nation will never forgive them: they appeal was that of a “purifying force” against abusive have sold their Afghan identity and freedom.156 power-holders who had destroyed much of Kabul in their quest for power. Many of them are back in power today. 2. Projecting power

Taliban propaganda often focuses on the role of these An increasingly assertive insurgency is seeking to pro- mujahidin factional leaders in the fratricidal civil war ject its power to both domestic and international audi- after the Soviet withdrawal. A DVD, referring to war- ences. Statements of casualties, updated online several lords and commanders now back in power, asked: times a day and emailed, telephoned or sent as text messages to journalists, highlight individual incidents. … who is responsible for this tragedy and diffi- There is aggressive hyperbole: “American Christian culty? The ordinary mujahidin or these educated kafir [disbeliever/infidel] terrorist occupation military leaders and professors? And was it these ordinary to send 3,000 more of its terrorists to Afghanistan to mujahidin leaders who issued the decree of jihad be killed by mujahidin”.157 Journalists realise that the against each other or these educated leaders and tolls are exaggerated158 – but there is usually an inci- professors?154 dent at the core of reports to follow up on.

155 “Advice by the Cultural Affairs Commission of the Is- lamic Emirate to poets and singers”, Al Emarah, 5 May 2008 153 For previous Crisis Group analysis on the linkages be- (translation: BBC Monitoring Service). tween co-option, governance and popular disillusionment, 156 “Declaration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the see Asia Briefing N°17, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step parliamentary amnesty of the puppet regime”, 4 February Forward?, 16 May 2002; Asia Report N°56, Afghanistan’s 2007 (translation: AfghanWire). Flawed Constitutional Process, 12 June 2003; Report, The 157 Headline of statement on Al Emarah in response to the Problem of Pashtun Alienation, op. cit.; Asia Briefing N°35, U.S. announcement of sending 3,000 additional soldiers to Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back On Track, 23 Feb- Afghanistan, 11 January 2008 (translation: AfghanWire). ruary 2005; and Report, Countering Afghanistan’s Insur- 158 Apart from inflated daily tolls, Al Somood publishes a gency, op. cit. monthly count that blames all civilian casualties on the inter- 154 “The scale of bravery”, DVD distributed by Ghairat Stu- national and Afghan security forces. In March 2008, when dio, undated, obtained in Jalalabad, March 2008. the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office recorded five suicide

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Roadside and suicide bombings are techniques par- 1. Our military operations will focus on the capital ticularly suited to seizing media attention. Targets cities of the four regions of the country including such as Kabul’s five-star Serena Hotel in January Kabul. 2008 and the military parade attended by the president 2. Most of these operations will be allocated to mar- in April 2008 grab global media headlines and raise tyrdom-seeking attacks and roadside blasts, as these doubts among Afghans about the capacity of local tactics are the most effective at inflicting the most security forces. Increasingly, attempts are made to losses upon the enemy. depict such attacks as strategic, with the announce- ment of “operations” such as “Operation Kamin” 3. The primary target of our attacks are the Crusader (Ambush) in May 2007159 and the 2008 spring offen- invading forces and then secondly the high- sive, “Operation Ibrat” (Lesson) by Mullah Brader. ranking officials of the Karzai administration. Announcing the latter, he declared: 4. In order to keep national and foreign forces sur- We will continue our holy jihad until we topple the rounded in Kabul, the initial stage of surveillance/ slave administration in Kabul and establish an control of roads leading to Kabul from Maidan Islamic system in an independent Afghanistan. All Shar (capital of Maidan Wardak), Kapisa and Char mujahidin should carry out activities in line with Asiab, has begun. This tactic will soon be put to the plan given to them. The enemy has lost its mo- the test in the Maidan Wardak and Sarobi areas. rale and does not have the spirit to fight the muja- 5. Before the implementation of this military strat- hidin face-to-face. Therefore, arbitrary bombing egy, all members of the slave army of the Karzai raids have destroyed people’s homes and crops, administration are notified to leave and join the and they think they can achieve victory by carry- mujahidin.161 ing out such acts.160 The 2008 campaign of targeting mobile cell phone towers In a 2007 interview, Brader laid out Taliban strategy demonstrated an ability to conduct an orchestrated for the coming year, emphasising an increasing use of operation combining communications with military roadside bombs and suicide attacks in Kabul and sur- actions. Announcements calling on mobile phone rounding provinces: companies to switch off telephone towers at night were followed by targeting of those that did not comply.162

3. Justifications for jihad and suicide attacks The Taliban seeks to justify the current fight as a duty operations and the UN six, Al Somood reported thirteen. ANSO records showed eighteen international troops killed in incumbent on each Muslim. While major scholars and March and the UN fifteen, compared to 93 claimed by Al religious figures have not declared that the Taliban is Somood. Al Somood claimed 101 “martyred mujahidin” in the month. Interestingly, the number of operations recorded by Al Somood (171), was much smaller than the UN’s total 161 “Interview … Mullah Brader”, Al Emarah, op. cit. of 345 anti-government initiated actions, suggesting that the 162 “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has decided to give magazine either simply makes up the numbers, or has links three-days’ deadline to all mobile phone companies to stop to only some of those involved. “Table of statistics on opera- their work from five in the evening until seven in the morn- tions for the month of March 2008”, Al Somood, April 2008. ing every day so that by stopping work in that period the The slight difference in the Gregorian and Islamic calendars enemies’ illegal and unethical detection activities [it was would not account for the large differences in numbers for alleged that mobile phones were being exploited to track the month. Taliban commanders] will be stopped and huge numbers of 159 “Based on the decision of the military and jihadi council civilians and mujahidin will be protected from their oppres- of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Kamin military opera- sion”. “The announcement of the Islamic Emirate of Af- tions began today….as part of the Kamin military operations, ghanistan about mobile phone activities in Afghanistan”, Al all enemy forces will be eliminated or a stop will be put to Emarah, 25 February 2008. There were many suspicions that the enemies’ military operations….according to military tactics the Taliban had economic motives behind the demands. A in such operations, guerilla fighting and pitched battles are night letter in the Sayedabad district of Wardak, in the name deemed to be of great importance and, God willing, we will of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, for instance, warned: sabotage all the goals and plans of the enemies”. “Kamin op- “As you continue to operate in the area, we are expecting erations declared against domestic and external operations”, you to provide financial support for the Taliban stationed Al Emarah, 27 May 2007 (translation: AfghanWire). in Saidabad district. If you cannot, then you should stop 160 “Afghan Taleban announced launch of new operation in your work. Otherwise you have no right to complain in the spring”, statement by Mullah Brader emailed on his behalf future (we are warning you of future incidents)”. Reprinted by Zabihullah Mujahid, AIP, 25 March 2008 (translation: in Informed Consent Blog, Barnett Rubin (translation: BBC Monitoring Service). Mohammad Omar Sharifi), 31 March 2008.

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waging a jihad, the movement’s commanders, such as – and recorded tributes to “martyrs”.167 Pages are Mansoor Dadullah, attempt to rouse the population by regularly dedicated to “martyrs” in Taliban publica- declaring: tions, and suicide attacks receive special attention on the website. If cults of martyrdom were not found in I have a message to the Afghan people and to all the past in Afghanistan as in some other conflict Muslims: They must continue to wage jihad, areas, 168 the Taliban certainly seems bent on creating wherever they may be – whether it is jihad of the them.169 pen, of the tongue, of the sword, or of money. What is important is that they continue with the jihad, because it is an individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims.163

Appeals are made to families – particularly mothers – to encourage or even to just allow their sons to fight. In a fiercely delivered oration, Yasir declared: “The mother of jihad and the mother of the Pashtun has not yet become sterile. This mother can give birth to martyrs, youths and people who have guns to sacrifice their lives”.164 He outlined the glories – and military advan- tages – of martyrdom:

By killing them (foreigners), the door of paradise opens to us. When they kill us, the door of para- dise will also open to us. They are the secret of our success in this world and the world hereafter. Our success both in this world and the world hereafter lies in their fight. When both death and life … are success, it is difficult to fight such a nation.165

Yasir claimed a large number of volunteers – includ- ing females – were available for suicide bombings,166 a tactic previously unknown in Afghanistan and one that most Muslims, as in Pakistan, consider a deadly sin. The Taliban has, therefore, devoted much effort to justifying their use. Widely circulated DVDs show 167 A series filmed in June and July 2006 showed males, who Mullah Dadullah personally congratulating young appeared to be teenagers or in their early twenties, seated in male volunteers. There are also DVDs featuring front of a Taliban flag as they spoke, with the makings of alleged final interviews with bombers – usually young suicide bombs displayed before them. They read prepared comments slowly, having trouble with the words – at least two read the same speech. 168 A UNAMA report noted that “in Afghanistan this public culture of suicide attackers as martyrs has not developed, and while videos of assassinations are commonplace, videotaped 163 “New Taliban military commander Mansoor Dadalluh: wills of attackers are very rare. Because these rituals, cere- Bin Laden is alive and well”, interview with Mansoor monies and practices are critical to the founding and mainte- Dadullah, Al-Jazeera TV, 17 June 2007 (translation: Special nance of a culture that venerates and even sustains suicide Dispatch, Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project, no. 1630, 21 attacks and their perpetrators, attention and care is needed June 2007). to retard or preclude the development of such a culture in 164 Yasir speaking on a DVD distributed in February 2008. Afghanistan”. See “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan”, op. cit., It is not branded, but he speaks before a Taliban flag. p. 29. Cults of martyrdom exist from some other periods of 165 Ibid. Afghanistan’s history. Al-Qaeda graves are venerated in 166 “When people saw the acts, the ethics, and the martyrdom Khost, for example. See Nick Meo, “Praying for a miracle at of our fedayi, when our youth saw it, the lists [of suicide the shrines of al-Qaeda”, The Independent (UK), 28 October bombers] reached such an extent that we cannot provide 2004. Taliban graves from the time of the regime’s over- enough [suicide] waistcoats. We have one fedayi for each throw in Kunduz were pointed out to Crisis Group as a site tank; we have one fedayi for … each vehicle of NATO and of local pilgrimage in 2007. American forces….[S]ometime back I went to a girls’ ma- 169 Brian Glyn Williams, “The Taliban Fedayeen: The drassa to give a speech on jihad. The girls [afterwards] sent a World’s Worst Suicide Bombers?”, Terrorism Monitor, 19 list of those ready for sacrifice operations”. Ibid. July 2007.

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V. WHAT THEY DO NOT SAY ditions. Sporadic and regional advances in political participation by women and school attendance by girls have however been offset by a failure to insist This section briefly outlines issues that have a bearing on accountability for those whose forces committed on the present conflict – or that some commentators sexual violence during the years of conflict – and con- argue do – but which do not appear on the Taliban’s tinue such abuse today – but have been given posi- public agenda. Some issues are not highlighted be- tions of power. Further, women suffer broadly from cause they reflect badly on the movement or risk cre- the recent lack of security, corruption, rights abuses ating divisions. Interestingly, although the Taliban was and civilian casualties. Finally, the administration has virulently anti-Shia after taking power, statements to- failed to publicly articulate a vision of women’s day – particularly from the leadership – do not address rights, participation and protection that is both home- this and even seek to emphasise communal harmony. grown and consistent with traditional Afghan Islamic This may be in a deliberate attempt to preclude Shia society. Thus, the debate has been ceded to those opposition at this stage. There is also rarely talk about who erroneously argue that such efforts are an alien narcotics, an obviously sensitive topic, since the haram concept imposed on Afghanistan by foreigners and (religiously forbidden) trade helps provide financing their Afghan “puppets”. for the insurgency.170 When challenged on this point, the Taliban tends to refer to the final year of the A. TRIBALISM regime, when production – although not trafficking – was banned. Mansoor Dadullah argued: Taliban statements do not use tribal vocabulary. The When we were in power we eliminated the opium Taliban is certainly predominantly Pashtun, but Pash- problem with one single command. Since our tun tribal and sub-tribal loyalties and divisions do not country was wrested out of our hands, the farmers shape the movement. Indeed, it emerged during the have begun cultivating opium again. Karzai and 42 anti-Soviet jihad largely as a post-tribal grouping, the coalition countries cannot stop them.171 years of conflict and displacement breaking down previous ties and hierarchies. The Taliban understandably strongly denies criminal activities attributed to the movement. For instance, The Ghilzai and the Durrani are the two largest and stories about an alleged $20 million ransom for historically antagonistic Pashtun tribal confederations. Korean hostages were denounced as “devilish propa- The Durrani dynasty created the modern state of Af- ganda”.172 ghanistan and remained the dominant political actor until the PDPA takeover in 1978. President Karzai Given the Taliban’s abhorrent record on women’s belongs to the Popalzai sub-tribe of the Durranis. rights and access for women and girls to education Although Mullah Omar is a Ghilzai, the Taliban and health services during their tenure in power, there movement originally centred on the Durrani heartland would seem to be a clear case for the Karzai govern- of Kandahar, with the southern city becoming its de ment to highlight its improvements in women’s con- facto capital and remaining of importance to the movement. The Taliban leadership today is largely

Ghilzai but also has Durrani members. It is wrong and

170 See, for instance, Kate Clark, “Taliban’s ‘$100M opium even counterproductive to call the insurgency a Ghil- takings’”, BBC News, 24 June 2008. zai uprising, a designation that appears to be gaining 171 “Transcript: Die Weltwoche interview with Taliban some currency. Such labels risk becoming self- commander Mansoor Dadullah”, 7 June 2007, www. fulfilling and could marginalise and alienate some counterterrorismblog.org. The number of troop-contributing Pashtun groups even more, thus undermining national countries given by NATO-ISAF is actually 40. ISAF Place- reconciliation. mat, last updated 10 June 2008, www.nato.int/ISAF. 172 “[T]here is a devilish propaganda being orchestrated Local dynamics, particularly of district and provincial against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by the main- administrations, better explain why certain tribes have stream media, which is propagating to the world that the joined and others have rejected the Taliban. Recruits Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was paid $20 million in ran- are not attracted because of the insurgents’ overall som money by the South Korean government to win the appeal to a certain tribe or group, rather the very op- freedom of the South Koreans, which is not true. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan released the remaining South Kore- posite: some have joined because of exclusion of their ans as a goodwill gesture”. “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan tribe or community at a local level in the current po- statement concerning the mainstream media propaganda litical set up. Since 2001, for example, the Zirak wing asserting that ransom money was paid for the South of the Durrani, including the Barakzai, Alokozai and Korean[s]”, released 31 August 2008. the Popalzai has dominated local administrations in

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the south. Many of the Noorzais (of the Panjpai wing will reciprocate good relations…The Islamic Emirate of the Durrani) around Panjwayi who saw the militia of Afghanistan considers the ongoing invasion of of rival tribes sent into their area as police in mid- the Israeli usurper regime as against human rights 2006, consider that they are simply fighting back with and any other humane norms, especially their the only ally available – the Taliban. By definition recent barbaric operations in Gaza.176 they become “anti-government”.173 The statement also recognised the importance of good In a system that is largely based on patronage net- relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours and con- works rather than representative and meritocratic demned UN Security Council resolutions on Iran’s institutions, the use of force much too often becomes (Shia) regime, thereby apparently causing quite a stir the only recourse available for excluded and margin- in cyber-space among more global Islamists who re- alised communities and groups. Tribalism is a reaction ject the concept of nation states and condemn many to the lack of democracy and to a system in which regimes in the region as illegitimate.177 Mullah Dadul- the centre provides access to power and resources to a lah was one who sought to widen the Taliban cause, favoured few “trusted” groups, while deliberately telling the U.S. network CBS: “Even if they [Ameri- excluding others. can troops] go back to America we will take re- venge.…America has humiliated our country and our people. We will never negotiate”.178 As yet, however, B. WIDER WORLD there is no evidence of Taliban operations outside the region, and the vast majority of statements are in- When in power the Taliban had little interest in the ward-looking. outside world beyond the quest for legitimacy. Olivier Roy observed: “The Taliban … express a deep rejec- Although the Taliban does not recognise the validity tion of the Western cultural model, but no strategic of the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan opposition to the West”.174 This changed somewhat as and Pakistan drawn by the British in colonial India the leadership grew close to al-Qaeda, and UN sanc- days and an issue that strained relations with Islama- tions were imposed after the regime’s refusal to hand bad when it ruled in Kabul,179 there is little evidence over bin Laden. However, even today the Taliban that it is pursuing irredentist goals. However, while focus is firmly internal. When it has ventured into the the Taliban is unlikely to directly challenge the Paki- wider realm of global politics, it has usually sought to stani military and so put at risk its vital cross-border emphasise respect for other countries’ sovereignty. sanctuaries, the Taliban’s ideological and ethnic ties Mullah Omar has proclaimed: with Pakistan tribal militants, who have pledged alle- giance to Mullah Omar and call themselves the Paki- The Islamic Emirate never interferes in other coun- stani Taliban,180 undermine the stability and security tries’ domestic affairs, nor can it tolerate the inter- ference of other countries in our domestic affairs. We are making efforts to free our beloved Afghani- 176 “Statement by the Political Commission … about certain stan with all our strength from the occupation developments”, op. cit. of the invaders and to prepare free and liberated 177 Ron Synovitz, “Al-Qaeda Bloggers’ Sparring With Tali- conditions for our people to live in.175 ban Could Signal Key Differences”, Radio Free Europe, 12 March 2008. 178 A rare statement on international affairs in the name “Taliban leader vows to force U.S. troops out”, CBS of the Taliban “political commission” asserted: News, 29 December 2006. 179 In May 2000, for instance, Taliban’s ambassador in Is- The Islamic Emirate is eager for good relations with lamabad, Mohammad Haqqani, strongly rejected reports that visiting interior minister Mullah Razzaq had even held talks all foreign countries and neighbours and wants to on recognising the Durand Line with the Pakistan govern- live with them in peace, in the light of the provi- ment. “Taliban deny Mullah Razzaq discussed Durand Line sions of the holy religion of Islam. Similarly the with Pakistan”, Afghanistan News Centre, 23 May 2000. Islamic Emirate expects that all other countries 180 Said a long-time Taliban watcher: “They are Taliban in the sense that they share the same ideology as the Taliban in Afghanistan and see them as their allies. If you ask them, ‘Who is your leader?’ they will say the Afghan Taliban emir 173 See Graeme Smith, “Inspiring tale of triumph over Tali- Mullah Mohammad Omar. They also fight alongside the ban not all it seems”, The Globe and Mail, 23 September 2006. Taliban in Afghanistan”. Quoted in Graham Usher, “The 174 Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?”, Pakistani Taliban”, Middle East Report Online, 13 February in Maley, op. cit., p. 210. 2007. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, when asked 175 “Message of Amir ul-Momineen to the nations of if the Afghans worked with their Pakistani counterparts, re- Afghanistan and Iraq”, op. cit. plied: “No. The mujahidin of Afghanistan do not have any

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of Pakistan’s Pashtun-majority NWFP and FATA as service involvement in the Serena Hotel and military well as its Pashtun belt in Balochistan. Encouraged by parade attacks: “Both the attacks were planned and the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, in which they carried out by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s are active participants, Pakistani Taliban groups are special Al-Hamza martyrdom-seeking battalion … the bent on creating a Taliban-style state in Pakistan’s martyrdom-seeking mujahidin were all Afghans”.185 Pashtun heartland.181

Outsiders have always fuelled Afghanistan’s internal C. GOVERNANCE conflict. The Taliban is, however, quick to deny any such support, emphatically denouncing reports of Ira- The Taliban’s internal workings remain largely opaque. nian assistance: The movement is certainly keen to portray itself as far more organised and internally cohesive than it actually The Iranian road mines which are found in Afghani- is. The “dismissal” of Mansoor Dadullah of the wing stan come from the puppet police and Northern more closely linked to al-Qaeda was one internal 182 Alliance Hazara (Shia kafirs), who have a very squabble which, unusually, became very public. A close relationship with Iran. Iran is and has always statement on the website announced: been a number one enemy of the Taliban, so it is ab- surd to claim that Iran is supporting the Taliban.183 Mullah Mansoor Dadullah is not obedient to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in his actions and Far more obvious – and vital – are the enduring ties has carried out activities which were against the within the Pakistani security organs and the flourish- rules of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, so the ing extremist environment in that country. But this decision [-making] authorities of the Islamic continues to be denied. The reports in May/June 2008 Emirate of Afghanistan have removed Mansoor of a sharp increase in cross-border activity from Paki- Dadullah from his post, and he will no longer be stan, after the military there resumed negotiations on serving the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in any peace deals with pro-Taliban Pashtun militants, were way, and no Taliban will obey his orders any summarily rejected: more.186

Peace in any part of the world is in the interest of Daduallah’s personal spokesman rejected this, telling humans, and the deal in Pakistan has in no way any reporters: “Mullah Mansoor Dadullah is still Taliban effect on the jihad in Afghanistan. Afghanistan commander and has never been sacked”, adding that the is a sovereign country, which is currently being statement was “rather a conspiracy by some elements occupied by invaders.…America and its puppets within the Taliban movement against Mansoor Dadul- linking the increase in mujahidin operations in lah. They want to weaken the Taliban movement”.187 Afghanistan to the peace deal in Pakistan is once again diverting the attention of Afghans and the Widely reported in 2006 was a Taliban Layeha (Code rest of the world from [their] humiliating defeat.184 of Conduct), “from the highest leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” largely focused on mediating The Taliban similarly angrily rejected accusations relations between groups under different command- by the Afghan government of Pakistani intelligence ers188 as well as the behaviour of individual mem-

involvement in the crisis in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban 185 “Islamic Emirates response to the statement by Sayed An- have concentrated on Afghanistan; they do not interfere in sari, spokesman to the intelligence network of the Karzai Pakistan and nor do they need to. We have our enemy in puppet administration”, Al Emarah, 27 June 2008. Afghanistan, so there is no need to interfere in Pakistan, nor 186 “The decision by authorities of the Islamic Emirate of to cooperate with the Pakistani Taliban in fighting against Afghanistan to remove Mansoor Dadullah from his position the military government”. Claudio Franco, “Exclusive inter- as the Commander in Charge of the Taliban”, Al Emarah, 29 view with Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid”, NEFA December 2007 (translation: AfghanWire). Foundation, 25 January 2008. 187 “Taliban member dismisses ‘sack’ claim”, Agence France- 181 See Crisis Group Report, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, op. cit. Presse, 30 December 2007. Mansoor Dadullah was quoted in 182 This is one of the few examples of anti-Shia language in a Pakistani newspaper saying, “I have not been expelled Taliban statements. from the movement. I have served the Taliban, and without 183 “Clarification of statement regarding Iranian support of me the movement would stand nowhere”. Alamgir Bhittani, Taliban”, Al Emarah, 25 December 2007 (translation: “Dadullah says he is indispensable to Taliban”, Dawn, 9 AfghanWire). January 2008. 184 “Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan regard- 188 “9. If a Taliban fighter wants to move to another district, ing peace deal in Pakistan”, 7 June 2008. he is permitted to do so, but he must first acquire permission

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bers.189 It had been circulating since late 2005 and of- Anyone who works as a teacher for the current fered a rare glimpse into the movement’s internal puppet regime must receive a warning. If he never- workings. However the Taliban leadership has never theless refuses to give up his job, he must be had a coherent plan for wider governance and devel- beaten. If the teacher still continues to instruct opment. Just as in the 1990s, when ministers would contrary to the principles of Islam, the district disappear to the frontlines, the Taliban remains commander or a group leader must kill him.192 largely a warrior force, with little in terms of a political structure that is separate from the military. Nearly all While the Taliban might be motivated by the desire to those named as “shadow governors” today are com- destroy educational institutions which, in their view, manders, not ideologues, and their functions are unclear. teach Afghans foreign values, it is still difficult to jus- tify targeting civilian institutions that teach children, It is hardly a government-in-waiting and indeed, dur- and the leadership has made contradictory statements. ing the time it was in power, displayed little interest Dr Hanif has denied such violence: “[T]he Taliban are in providing for the population, rather leaving this to supporters of education. And the people who burn NGOs and the UN. Schooling does appear to be one schools, they are not the Taliban. They are the enemies area where it has felt it necessary to make some pub- of Islam, they are the enemies of the Taliban.... Burn- lic statements. In 2007, Mutmain declared that the ing schools is not allowed under Islam”.193 Taliban had earmarked $1 million to set up schools in southern Afghanistan,190 although there is no evidence this actually happened. In fact, the Taliban has con- ducted a sustained campaign of intimidation, targeting school buildings, teachers and students.191 The Layeha spelled out strict penalties for those working in schools:

of his group leader….12. A group of mujahidin may not take in mujahidin from another group to increase their own power. This is only allowed where there is good reason for it, such as a lack of fighters in one particular group. Then written per- mission must be given and the weapons of the new members must stay with their old group”. “A New Layeha for the Mujahidin”, Sight and Sound, 29 November 2006. 189 “6. Taliban may not use jihad equipment or property for personal ends….17. Mujahidin have no right to confiscate money or personal possessions of civilians….19. Mujahidin are not allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield or into their private quarters”. Ibid. 190 M. Ilyas Khan, “Taliban ‘to build Afghan schools’”, BBC News, 23 January 2007. On Al Emarah it was stated: “The Taliban’s move to improve education undermines the ongo- ing smear campaign against them. Their enemies depict the Taliban as hostile towards education and have even accused them of burning schools and killing teachers….The Taliban garnered wide support with this latest initiative on education. If the Taliban were to issue further reassurances, they would be able to secure support on a national scale. The Taliban need to remove any remaining fears and ambiguities by clearly stating their intentions, and responding to the allega- tions made by the enemies of Islam”. “Taliban issues new school curriculum”, Al Emarah, 16 January 2007 (transla- tion: AfghanWire). 191 Opening the parliament in 2008, Karzai noted that 300,000 children in southern Afghanistan now stay home because of the threat – up from 100,000 the previous year. 192 New Layeha, op. cit. “Afghan strife keeps children home”, BBC News, 21 Janu- 193 “In interview, Taliban official defends suicide attacks”, ary 2008. Christian Science Monitor, 3 February 2006.

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VI. COHESION OR COMPETITION? the Islamic Emirate for their own gain….In addi- tion, the Islamic Emirate expects and asks re- spected poets to write poems which stimulate the A. ALLIED AND COMPETING VOICES jihadi morale of the public and help the oppressed nation, give tribute to thoughts of freedom, reveal The insurgency is not driven by a strong, coherent the devilish plans of the enemies; and instead of admiring tribal, personal and narrow interests, they organisational structure; on the contrary, it is a loose 195 alliance of groups fighting alongside a variety of fel- should appreciate Islamic and national values. low travellers. At the heart of it is the Taliban, but Even more damaging is competition for attention even during its previous regime several of the groups among different groups. There regularly are contra- co-opted into its movement maintained distinct net- dictory claims of credit for attacks, such as the suicide works. Particularly post-2001, broader coalitions are bombing in Kabul’s Wazir Akbar Khan district in often tactical alliances of convenience. Amid these November 2007. The Taliban claimed it had organ- fluid relationships the Taliban has tried to project ised this, as did Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar).196 Asked itself as the rightful rulers, while other, smaller groups whether the Taliban and Hizb-e Islami had cooperated have sought shelter under the Taliban umbrella to in the attack on the Kabul’s Serena hotel in January legitimate their own actions. The Taliban attempts to 2008, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid replied: project a more cohesive structure and coordinated strategy than the reality, in which it has struggled to Contact among the mujahidin does exist. As far as exert authority over its field commanders, as recog- coordination in operations is concerned, that is dif- nised by spokesman Qari Yousuf: ferent. The mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate have their own strategy and tactics. There is no such On fundamental issues, all orders and decrees are coordination among them on operations; however coming from the centre, all mujahidin are bound their aim, too, is to fight the Crusaders.197 by the stance of the leadership, although in some daily, simple affairs and issues the commander of The following anti-government groups are noticeable each area can himself make decisions.…because for maintaining their own propaganda operations in the resistance is step by step being strengthened, the national and international media and thus creating and as our areas of control expand, the leader- distinct “brands”. Smaller local groups tend to com- ship’s watch improves and stances become coher- municate at the more grassroots level, while the more ent, having control over simple issues becomes 194 criminal ones, linked to the drugs trade, understanda- possible too. bly seek anonymity:

Uncoordinated efforts in its name by sympathisers The Haqqani Network. Jalaluddin Haqqani, a for- which have diluted the Taliban “brand” have appar- mer member of Hizb-e Islami (Khalis) faction, long ently caused frustration, as indicated by an April 2008 known for his links to Arab foreign fighters, joined Taliban announcement: the Taliban regime as a minister. Haqqani, however, always maintained his own distinct networks in south- Recently a number of writers, religious scholars eastern Afghanistan, with strong cross-border links, and poets have compiled books, jihadi CDs and particularly to Pakistan’s FATA region. recorded taranas and publicly distributed them. They referred to their personal work in the name For several years, it was believed that Haqqani had of the Islamic Emirate, in particular the Cultural died, and his organisation was now run by his son Affairs Commission, while they had not informed any authorised official of the Islamic Emirate. The Islamic Emirate hails their efforts, however rec- 195 ommends that those who compile books, jihadi “The announcement of the Afghanistan Islamic Emirate Cultural Affairs Commission”, Al Emarah, 8 April 2008. CDs or songs and want them to be released in the 196 name of the Islamic Emirate should get the ap- Qari Mansoor, who introduced himself as the Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) spokesman in the central Kapisa prov- proval of the Islamic Emirate Cultural Commis- ince, claimed Kabul resident Qari Ahmad Jan had carried out sion … otherwise they should not use the name of the attack on the group’s behalf. If true, it would have been the latter’s first suicide attack. Taliban spokesman Zabihul- lah Mansoor rejected this as “baseless”. “Taliban also claim 194 “Detailed Interview with Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, Official responsibility for attack in Afghan capital”, Pajhwok Afghan Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, republished News Agency, 27 November 2007. on Al Emarah, June 2008 (in Pashtu), from East and West 197 Claudio Franco, “Exclusive interview with Taliban website. spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid”, op. cit.

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Sirajuddin, who ranks high on the U.S. list of most Jalaluddin has been introduced by his past deeds wanted terrorists. In March 2008, however, a DVD rather than an explicit current title,201 leaving his posi- showed an elderly Jalaluddin alive, although appar- tion within the movement’s structures unclear. ently unwell, speaking for 30 minutes. He referred to a hotel attack – presumably that on the Serena, which Hizb-e Islami (Khalis) – Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz many Western security officials believe his network (Tora Bora Military Front). Mawlawi Khalis, the facilitated, and a suicide attack on a joint US-Afghan head of the mujahidin faction Hizb-e Islami (Khalis), base in Sabri, Khost. Footage of this large truck bomb centred in eastern Afghanistan around Nangarhar attack, apparently carried out by a German-Turk,198 province, was co-opted into the Taliban when the was spliced into the DVD, which was distributed un- movement was in power. Following the Taliban’s der the Manba al-Jihad (Source of Jihad, in Arabic) ouster, some members joined the Karzai government’s label, which claims to have permission from the Tali- administrative structures. However, he went under- ban cultural commission. During the years of anti- ground and in 2003 released an audio cassette calling Soviet jihad, Haqqani had a glossy monthly maga- for a “jihad” against foreigners in Afghanistan.202 zine, Manba al-Jihad.199 When he died in 2006,203 the Taliban released a condo- lence message in the name of the media commission: A well-known personality from the years of the anti- Soviet jihad, Jalaluddin Haqqani had occasionally ap- We consider the death of the late Mawlawi Khalis peared in Taliban-linked publications prior to this. In as a big loss for the Islamic world, particularly the one such interview, in 2006, the cohesion of the in- Afghan nation; at the same time we hope his suc- surgents was emphasised: cessor and son, Mawlawi Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid, will be helped by Allah to follow the jihadi, aca- After the Russians left Afghanistan, there were fif- demic and religious path of his father and teen very different political parties in the country. strengthen that sacred path.204 Each of these parties had dreams of political power and for different political reasons.…right Following an apparent power struggle, Anwar ul-Haq now in Afghanistan we have the Islamic Emirate Mujahid formed the Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz.205 of Afghanistan instead of fifteen different parties. It uses the same logo as Tora Bora magazine, estab- The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, according to its previous attempt to control the country and ful- fil the wishes of jihad, came out on top.200 201 For instance in the reproduced “Audio Message: Whoever Interestingly, while his name and his son’s name have stands by the Americans under any name will be absolutely treated like them”. Istiqamat, May-June 2006, he is de- appeared over the years in various observers’ ac- scribed as “a well-known victor in Afghanistan’s Islamic ji- counts of Taliban leadership councils, neither was had and a respected jihadi personality”. In “An Interview named in the March 2008 Al Somood organisational with Jalaluddin Haqqani”, he is described as “the strong structure. In his appearances in the Taliban media, commander of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, Al Emarah, 25 December 2006. 202 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Khalis Goes Into Hiding After Calling For Jihad”, The News (Pakistan), 31 October 2003. 198 For more on the DVD and Haqqani, see Carlotta Gall, 203 Khalis was in his 80s. His son Mujahid announced his “Old-Line Taliban Commander Is Face Of Rising Afghan death but without details on how and where he died. Zubair Threat”, The New York Times, 17 June 2008; for more on the Babakarkhail, “Mawlawi Younus Khalis passes way”, possible origins of the suicide bomber, see Matthias Ge- Pajhwak Afghan News, 24 July 2006. bauer, Yassin Musharbash and Holger Stark, “Germany’s 204 Describing the Taliban’s relationship with Khalis, the First Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan?”, Spiegel Online, 15 statement said, “when the Taliban Islamic movement was March 2008. established under the leadership of Amir ul-Momineen, the 199 The founder was listed as Jalaluddin Haqqani, with the late Mawlawi, like some other jihadi leaders, pledged bayat magazine based in Peshawar. Two separate editions regu- [fealty] to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”. Media com- larly appeared one in Pashtu and Dari (founded 1368, 21 mittee of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Al Emarah, 24 March 1989 – 20 March 1990), the other in Arabic (founded July 2006. in 1369, 1990). These contained photo galleries, editorials, 205 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “New Taliban group named after political commentaries, poetry, book reviews and world Tora Bora Setup”, abcnews.com, 26 February 2007. news. There is currently also a largely defunct website, Spokesman Qari Sajjad was quoted as saying that Mujahid www.murchal.8rf.com, bearing the name Manba Al Jihad, was the leader of Hizb-e Islami (Khalis) but had formed the which linked through to Al Emarah. new group because it had become faction-ridden and weak. 200 The interview was originally published in Arabic in Al The new group was formed prior to the announcement. He Somood, November 2006, and appeared the following month added: “We have now decided to step up our operations and on Al Emarah (translation: AfghanWire). approach the media to publicise our cause”.

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lished in 2004.206 Through its spokesman, Qari he is shot – and hyperlinks through to the Al Emarah Sajjad,207 the group has claimed responsibility for a and Manba al-Jihad websites. number of attacks in the east, including the March 2007 bombing of a U.S. marine unit outside Jala- Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar). The post-2001 relation- labad.208 It maintains allegiance to the Taliban, with ship between the Taliban and its former rival, Gul- Mujahid’s spokesman having described him as “also buddin Hekmatyar – who fled as they marched on head of the Taliban shura for his native Nangarhar. Kabul – has been unclear. The players themselves He is very much part of the Taliban movement”.209 send different signals. Asked in a December 2007 in- The front also appears to maintain links with al-Qaeda. terview about his relationship with the Taliban, Hek- Tora Bora, for instance, interviewed al-Qaeda’s Abu matyar replied: “[We] have neither [a] problem nor Yahya al-Libi after his escape from Bagram prison, coalition with the Taliban…[I] have not met Mullah and he in turn appeared to endorse it: Mohammad Omar Akhund yet. I respect him and all those fighting against the invaders, even if they had Get your information about the mujahidin [from enmity with us in the past”.212 He added: “[We] do not Tora Bora] and support it to the best of your abil- have any relationship with al-Qaeda”.213 An analyst ity with money, articles and reports, and by dis- has suggested that given the previously adversarial tributing it among the people, in order to bring the relationship, the Taliban’s “agreement with Hizb-e voice of the mujahidin to as many Muslims as pos- Islami in 2002 appears to have been more of a matter sible in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of the of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s willingness to emerge countries around the world.210 from obscurity than the result of a genuine interest on the part of the Taliban leadership”.214 The front appears particularly active in the propaganda sphere, with the magazine and a well-maintained Tora Its communication apparatus is certainly separate Bora website (currently toorabora.com), across which from that of the Taliban. While Hekmatyar’s spokes- a banner runs proclaiming: “In the hope of the victory person, Haroun Zarghoon, arrived relatively late on of the Islamic Emirate”.211 It includes video footage – the scene in 2006, the faction’s long-running newspa- one clip apparently shows the trial of a “spy” before per Shahadat (Martyrdom) still appears in Pakistan; its well presented web-version, Shahadatnews.com, is updated regularly and operates apparently uninter- rupted. Evidently created and designed in Pakistan, it posts a Pakistani telephone contact. Its coverage 206 Founded by Ghazi Ajmal and edited by Mawlawi Hatem focuses on exaggerated versions of Hizb-e Islami ac- Tayy, the magazine’s first issue featured a detailed and illustrated article on Guantanamo Prison. Stephen Ulph, tions, with the organisation claiming credit for attacks “New jihadi magazine for Afghanistan”, Terrorism Focus, throughout Afghanistan, and featuring Hekmatyar’s 6 August 2004. interviews with various national and international 207 “Qari Sajjad informs the media about the operations of the media, including most recently the American CBS. Tora Bora Front and gives formal statements on various is- Given the party’s origins among the educated and the sues and military affairs”. “Statement by the leadership of intellectuals, it is less emotive and more analytical Hizb-e Islami on the comments of detained Taliban spokes- than Taliban media. man Dr Mohammad Hanif”, op. cit. 208 “Wounded Afghans say U.S. forces fired on civilians after Al-Qaeda. The relationship between al-Qaeda and suicide bomb”, Associated Press, 3 May 2007. 209 Taliban is also fluid and opaque. Osama bin Laden “New Taliban group named after Tora Bora setup”, op. has reaffirmed his support for Mullah Omar as Amir cit. Later in the year, however, Mujahid lost a large number ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) and like of men in an operation around Tora Bora. In October there were reports that Mawlawi Abdul Kabir had been appointed his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has mentioned Man- military commander of the eastern zone, whether as a re- soor Dadullah and before him his brother, Mullah placement for, or a superior to, Mujahid is unclear. “Taliban Dadullah, several times – although ignoring most other Appoint Mawlawi Kabir as New Zonal Chief”, Pajhwok Taliban leaders. 215 Mansoor Dadullah in turn has not Afghan News, 20 October 2007. 210 Interview with Yahya al-Libi originally conducted by Mawlawi Hatem Tayy for Tora Bora, which then appeared in April 2006 on Islamist websites (translation: MEMRI, 212 “Brother Hekmatyar, Emir of Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan’s special dispatch series no.1160, 10 May 2006). interview with Ariana Television (Afghanistan)”, reproduced on 211 Another banner states: “This Islamic website is being run Shahadatnews.com, 14 December 2007 (translated from Dari). by the mujahidin of Hizb-e Islami Khalis to publish jihadi 213 Ibid. news, issues, statements and interviews with well know jihadi 214 Giustozzi, op. cit., p. 129. personalities. Any writing and reports are welcome from jihadi 215 ”[T]oday they [Afghans] are fighting America and its groups, personalities and writers and will be published”. agents under the leadership of the Commander of the Believ-

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been averse to making his relationship with al-Qaeda version of Sharia. The Taliban is also adamant that public. In one interview, he said, “the most recent foreign troops must leave, an essential precondition if proof that Osama bin Laden is alive and well is that it is to win power. While it does not directly threaten he sent me a letter of condolence after my brother’s the outside world, the Taliban certainly poses a threat martyrdom and advised me to follow in the footsteps by its willingness, as in the past, to enter into alli- of my brother, Mullah Dadullah”.216 Both he and ances of convenience with radical Islamist forces – Yasir have appeared in output of the local al-Qaeda Afghan, regional and transnational. media wing, Al Sahab (The Clouds). The Taliban appears to have no strategy beyond the Al Sahab217 has produced considerable material on use of violence to achieve the dual goals of state cap- Afghanistan. In May 2007 it announced Egyptian and ture and imposition of its version of an Islamic order. original al-Qaeda member Mustafa Abu al-Yazid as Given the autonomy that Taliban commanders and the head of the organisation in Afghanistan in an offi- allied networks enjoy, the leadership might exercise cial video recording which appeared on Al Jazeera.218 little control over everyday military operations, but In several audio and video appearances since then, he there are some broad trends that include: has made special appeals for funding and trained per- sonnel for Afghanistan. Libyan Abu Yahya al-Libi ‰ hindering government outreach and, as a result, has also been a prolific speaker on Al Sahab and other undermining Kabul’s legitimacy, by preventing al-Qaeda outlets since his escape from Bagram prison through violence and intimidation the population – in July 2005, including about Afghanistan. Unsurpris- and in particular women – from utilising the few ingly, al-Qaeda material is far more professional than services that exist, such as schools and health clin- local Afghan productions, although the latter appear ics;219 to be learning from it fast. It also appears al-Qaeda ‰ eroding public support in Western capitals, through has its own Arabic-language magazine Vanguards of attacks on foreign forces and a constant drumbeat Khorasan (a historic name for Afghanistan) circulat- of aggressive rhetoric that emphasises the Tali- ing on jihadi forums which focuses on “affairs of the ban’s staying power; jihad and mujahidin in Afghanistan”. Its existence highlights the importance of the area to the organisa- ‰ undermining the morale of Afghan security forces, tion. The relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda through attacks on them as well as threats which works both ways. The Taliban, or individual members further erode public confidence in the ability of of the movement, seeks resources, support and volun- Kabul to provide security; teers from al-Qaeda; the stateless transnational movement, in turn, seeks to tie Afghanistan into its ‰ demonstrating their reach with complex attacks on wider narrative of a war between the West and Islam. high-profile targets which seize headlines, even in areas where they do not have much popular sup- port; and B. WHAT DOES IT WANT? ‰ targeting pro-government local community leaders who speak against the movement and closely The Taliban aim is simple: to capture the state – a monitoring and responding to the media to try and very secular goal – and then impose, as in the past, its shape coverage.

ers, Mullah Omar, may Allah protect him, and under the command of the knight of the field, Hajji Mansoor Dadullah. 219 According to a spokesman of the public health ministry, I ask Allah, the most high to grant them victory and resolve”, 40 health workers were killed or kidnapped while delivering “Osama bin Laden: Message to the Peoples of Europe”, services in the past two years; and at least 36 health facilities Al Sahab, released 29 November 2007. Transcript NEFA were shut down in the east and south due to the insecurity. Foundation. “Over 360,000 affected by reduced health service”, IRIN, 14 216 “New Taliban military commander Mansoor Dadullah: May 2008. While Afghanistan still has one of the world’s bin Laden is alive and well”, aired on Al-Jazeera TV, 17 highest maternal mortality rates, health is a field where there June 2007 (translation: MEMRI special dispatch series, no. have been noticeable gains, with 15,000 health workers by 1630, 21 June 2007). 2007, 49 per cent of them women. “United Nations Human 217 See Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda’s Growing Online Offen- Development Report 2007”, op. cit., p. 28. The health minis- sive”, The Washington Post, 24 June 2008. This noted that in ter said that coverage by a basic package of health services 2007 As Sahab released 97 original videos – a six-fold in- has increased from 9 per cent of the population in 2003 to 82 crease from 2005 percent in 2007. “An Interview with Dr Sayed Mohammad 218 “Al Qaeda’s Afghan head ‘named’”, Al Jazeera, 24 May Amin Fatimi”, June 2007, International Development Asso- 2007. ciation, World Bank.

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The movement uses communications as a force mul- VII. CONCLUSION tiplier and is quick to claim actions even when the facts are not established in a bid to appear all- powerful and set the agenda. It further understands The Taliban seeks to create the illusion of inevitability that even implied threats and grandiose rhetoric can and invincibility, while trying to defend the legitimacy impact on the population’s perceptions and calcula- of its actions. It has succeeded in conveying an impres- tions. The increasing use of very public attacks has sion of coherence and momentum far greater than had a striking effect on morale far beyond the imme- reality, both within Afghanistan, among a population diate victims. Images, for instance, of (unarmed) sol- that is weary of war, and outside, with those in West- diers fleeing the parade ground in Kabul in the face of ern capitals also weary of commitments to a far- gunfire had profound influence on the population. distant conflict. The insurgents cannot win on the bat- Such strategies do not require huge resources in terms tlefield, but they do not have to. All they need to do is of manpower or military hardware. wear out their opponents – and influencing percep- tions at home and abroad are a vital component of this While there is more and more talk within Kabul and strategy. The Afghan and other governments engaged among some Western capital of dialogue and negotia- in the Afghanistan endeavour have failed to commu- tions with the Taliban, there is little softening in the nicate robustly and honestly with their populations in rhetoric of the movement’s leadership, which still in- a way that would help build and sustain popular will sists that the withdrawal of foreign troops is an essen- for a long-term endeavour. tial precondition for any negotiations. According to Mullah Dadullah: The Taliban has proved adept at fuelling existing grievances, suspicions and perceptions in its attempt Our terms for ending the war are that America to drive a wedge between the Afghan people and the withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan, and that it Karzai government and its international supporters. unconditionally stops harming the Muslims. Then 220 Kabul has not managed in a firm and coherent way to we will consider negotiating with them. undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy through consistently highlighting its violent tactics and links to criminal Karzai’s dismissal has appeared as another precondition: groups. Instead, it has too often simply sought to If Karzai has the power to fulfil the first condition crack down on the local media, which, admittedly, in of the Islamic Emirate, then the Islamic Emirate is its fledgling state and in the absence of other narra- ready to negotiate on other issues, but Karzai is tives, has often portrayed the conflict naively. never in position to fulfil the first condition of the Both Kabul and its international supporters need to Islamic Emirate. Because he was installed after respond in a timely, coordinated manner if they are to foreign forces came to Afghanistan … he must effectively counter Taliban allegations. They must also leave before the foreign forces leave.221 focus, far more than is presently done, on the human Indeed, given the insurgency’s current momentum, costs of insurgent violence. The members of the mul- the Taliban leadership would appear to have little in- tilateral coalition must also realise the importance of communicating exactly what is at stake in Afghani- centive to negotiate. This does not, however, neces- 222 sarily preclude talks with mid-level commanders who stan to their domestic constituents. This should not have not joined the Taliban for ideological reasons. be so difficult; 11 September 2001 demonstrates the Moreover, many foot soldiers just want a fairer deal importance of ensuring that Afghanistan does not under any government. At the same time, Kabul and the once again become a failed state that hosts extremists. international community must also realise that unilat- Above all, there is an urgent need for deeper-rooted eral concessions to those Pashtun commanders who change, not just cosmetic tinkering. The Afghan gov- have benefited by the rule of the gun could fuel another ernment must be truly accountable, bound by the rule round of conflict should their equally well-armed eth- nic adversaries see their interests threatened or the perception be created that violence brings rewards. 222 In the words of a Canadian government-mandated in- quiry, “to put things bluntly, governments from the start of Canada’s Afghan involvement have failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties, 220 Mullah Dadullah’s interview, 2006, op. cit. and expected results of that involvement”. “Independent 221 “Mullah Brader gives decisive declarations on jihadi de- Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan”, January velopments in Afghanistan”, op. cit., p. 18. 2008, p. 20.

336 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words? Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 34

of law, acting in the best interests of the people and accountable, by putting in place more transparent sys- capable of providing services and security. Military tems to investigate and report on civilian casualties means alone will not succeed in countering the insur- and other complaints. Only then will they succeed in gency. Instead, by building institutions and offering neutralising the Taliban’s attempts to paint the foreign the services that give the Afghan people a better life, intervention as an invasion and foreign troops as an the government can gain public support, thus denying occupation force. the insurgents opportunities to exploit local griev- ances and thereby gain a modicum of legitimacy. The Afghan government must seek to improve ties with the democratically elected government in Paki- The insurgents, of course, understand the importance stan. The international community would be best of violently disrupting the government’s capacity to served by encouraging this dialogue process, even as provide security and services. Since the Afghan secu- it pressures the Pakistan military to end a policy of rity forces still lack the ability to counter the insur- appeasing pro-Taliban militants and Afghan insur- gents on their own, the security umbrella provided by gents operating from Pakistani territory. the international community remains vital if Afghani- stan is to stabilise. While it is necessary to emphasise The Taliban is a violent, minority movement which that foreign troops will stay as long as needed, the in- holds out no genuine hope to Afghanistan but is grow- ternational community must prioritise the building of ing through tapping into diverse grievances and re- Afghan security and administrative capabilities and sentments. Countering it requires strategic purpose, not assure the Afghan people that there are no long-term just tactical tinkering, so as to better meet the expecta- designs on the region. Any talk of long-term U.S. tions of the people. Ultimately, if the violence is to be bases would, for instance, feed into nationalistic resis- defeated, the need is for actions and not just words. tance as well as neighbours’ apprehensions. Interna- tional forces must also demonstrate that they are Kabul/Brussels, 24 July 2008

337 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 35

APPENDIX A

MAP OF AFGHANISTAN

338 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 36

APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- cratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, some 135 staff members on five continents, working Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/ prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbe- Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. kistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herze- Teams of political analysts are located within or close by govina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey; in countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to violent conflict. Based on information and assessments Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest of the from the field, it produces analytical reports containing Andean region and Haiti. practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg- foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol- ular update on the state of play in all the most significant lowing governmental departments and agencies currently situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. provide funding: Australian Agency for International De- velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign min- of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development istries and international organisations and made available Agency, Canadian International Development and Re- simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Group works closely with governments and those who in- Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan- fluence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For- analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxem- figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business bourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring for International Development, Royal Norwegian Minis- the reports and recommendations to the attention of try of Foreign Affairs, Qatar, Swedish Ministry for For- senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af- co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for fairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United King- External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. dom Department for International Development, United Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. Executive since January 2000 has been former Austral- Agency for International Development. ian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based the Future Fund, include Carnegie Corporation of New as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The York, Fundación DARA Internacional, Iara Lee and George organisation currently operates eleven regional offices Gund III Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Founda- (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, tion, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Founda- field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, tion, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society In- Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, stitute, Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Tehran). Crisis Group current- Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust and VIVA ly covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict Trust. across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Demo- July 2008

Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org

339 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 37

APPENDIX C

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2005

CENTRAL ASIA After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation?, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007 (also The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture, available in Korean and Russian) Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian) North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship, Asia Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May Briefing N°71, 4 December 2007 (also available in Russian) 2005 (also available in Russian) South Korea’s Election: What to Expect from President Lee, Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May Asia Briefing N°73, 21 December 2007 2005 (also available in Russian) China’s Thirst for Oil, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008 Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December South Korea’s Elections: A Shift to the Right, Asia Briefing 2005 (also available in Russian) N°77, 30 June 2008 Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 February 2006 (also available in Russian) SOUTH ASIA Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report N°113, 10 April 2006 Nepal’s Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005 Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian) Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing N°35, 23 February 2005 Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35, 24 February 2005 Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 (also available in Russian) Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94, 24 March 2005 Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007 The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18 Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 April 2005 (also available in Russian) Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005 Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia Briefing N°67, 22 August 2007 Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005 Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008 Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report N°101, 21 July 2005 Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, Asia Report N°150, 10 April 2008 Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005 Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan¸ NORTH EAST ASIA Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005 Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?, Report N°104, 27 October 2005 (also available in Nepali) Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian) Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing N°43, 22 November 2005 Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report Nº100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean) Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, Asia Report N°106, 28 November 2005 China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 September 2005 Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role, Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005 North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108, 15 December 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian) Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006 China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean) N°46, 15 March 2006 After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in N°49, 19 April 2006 Korean and Russian) Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and May 2006 (also available in Nepali) Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia in Korean and Russian) Report N°116, 15 May 2006 North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia 13 November 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian) Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006 Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report N°119, 14 September 2006

340 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 38

Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006 SOUTH EAST ASIA Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia Report N°123, 2 November 2006 Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005 (also Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report available in Indonesian) N°124, 28 November 2006 Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005 N°125, 11 December 2006 Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126, 18 May 2005 (also available in Thai) 15 December 2006 Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005 Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29 January 2007 Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February available in Indonesian) 2007 (also available in Nepali) Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report N°105, Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia 18 November 2005 (also available in Thai) Report N°130, 29 March 2007 Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005 Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report N°131, 2 (also available in Indonesian) April 2007 Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, Asia Report N°132, Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005 18 May 2007 (also available in Nepali) Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, Asia Report N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian) N°134, 29 May 2007 Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006 Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°135, 14 June 2007 Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006 Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 (also available in Nepali) Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114, 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian) Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, Asia Report N°137, 31 July 2007 Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian) Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report N°138, 30 Au- gust 2007 Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing N°53, 5 September 2006 Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September 2007 (also available in Nepali) Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 2006 (also available in Indonesian) Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Briefing N°69, 22 October 2007 Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006 Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, Asia Report N°141, 7 November 2007 Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing N°58, 8 December 2006 Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°70, 12 November 2007 Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127, 24 January 2007 Nepal: Peace Postponed, Asia Briefing N°72, 18 December 2007 (also available in Nepali) Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report N°129, 15 March 2007 (also available in Thai) After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008 Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 22 March 2007 Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, Asia Report N°145, 6 February 2008 Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing N°63, 3 May 2007 Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage, Asia Report N°146, 20 February 2008 Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in Maluku, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007 Nepal’s Election and Beyond, Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 (also available in Nepali) Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections, Asia Briefing N°65, 12 June 2007 Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, Asia Report N°151, 28 April 2008 Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia Briefing N°66, 19 July 2007 (also available in Indonesian) Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful Revolution?, Asia Report N°155, 3 July 2008 Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, Asia Report N°139, 4 October 2007 (also available in Indonesian) Nepal’s New Political Landscape, Asia Report N°156, 3 July 2008 Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia Reforming Pakistan’s Police, Asia Report N°157, 14 July 2008 Report N°140, 23 October 2007 (also available in Thai) “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report N°142, 19 November 2007 Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report N°143, 17 January 2008 (also available in Tetum)

341 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 39

Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing N°75, OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS 22 January 2008 Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report N°144, For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: 31 January 2008 • Africa Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia • Asia Report N°147, 28 February 2008 • Europe Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, Asia Report N°148, 31 • Latin America and Caribbean March 2008 • Middle East and North Africa The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in • Thematic Issues Mindanao, Asia Report N°152, 14 May 2008 • CrisisWatch Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua, Asia Report N°154, please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org 16 June 2008

Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, Asia Brief- ing N°77, 7 July 2008

342 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 40

APPENDIX D

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Carla Hills Christopher Patten Former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Former European Commissioner for Saudi Arabia to the U.S.; Chairman, King Trade Representative External Relations, Governor of Hong Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Lena Hjelm-Wallén Studies Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Former Deputy Prime Minister and Chancellor of Oxford University Kofi Annan Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden Thomas Pickering Former Secretary-General of the United Swanee Hunt Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001) Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador Louise Arbour President, Hunt Alternatives Fund; former and Nigeria Former UN High Commissioner for Ambassador U.S. to Austria Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for Anwar Ibrahim President & CEO the International Criminal Tribunals for Former Deputy Prime Minister of Gareth Evans the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda Malaysia Former Foreign Minister of Australia Richard Armitage Asma Jahangir Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Executive Committee Lord (Paddy) Ashdown Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Morton Abramowitz Former High Representative for Bosnia Rights Commission of Pakistan Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Herzegovina and Leader of the Liberal James V. Kimsey and Ambassador to Turkey Democrats, UK Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL) Emma Bonino* Shlomo Ben-Ami Former Minister of International Trade Former Foreign Minister of Israel Wim Kok and European Affairs of Italy and European Lakhdar Brahimi Former Prime Minister of Netherlands Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Former Special Adviser to the UN Secre- Aleksander Kwaśniewski Cheryl Carolus tary-General and Algerian Foreign Minister Former President of Poland Former South African High Commissioner Zbigniew Brzezinski Ricardo Lagos to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC Former U.S. National Security Advisor Former President of Chile; President, Maria Livanos Cattaui to the President Club of Madrid Former Secretary-General, International Kim Campbell Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Chamber of Commerce Former Prime Minister of Canada Novelist and journalist, U.S. Yoichi Funabashi Naresh Chandra Jessica Tuchman Mathews Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and President, Carnegie Endowment for Shimbun, Japan Ambassador of India to the U.S. International Peace Frank Giustra Joaquim Alberto Chissano Moisés Naím Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Former President of Mozambique Editor-in-chief, Foreign Policy; former Stephen Solarz Wesley Clark Minister of Trade and Industry of Venezuela Former U.S. Congressman Former NATO Supreme Allied Com- George Soros mander, Europe Ayo Obe Chair of Steering Committee of World Chairman, Open Society Institute Pat Cox Movement for Democracy, Nigeria Pär Stenbäck Former President of European Parliament Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Christine Ockrent Former Foreign Minister of Finland Journalist and author, France *Vice-Chair Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Mark Eyskens Victor Pinchuk Adnan Abu-Odeh Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Former Prime Minister of Belgium Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah Industrial Production Group II and to King Hussein and Jordan Perma- Joschka Fischer Samantha Power nent Representative to the UN Former Foreign Minister of Germany Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Kenneth Adelman Yegor Gaidar Government, Harvard University Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of Former Prime Minister of Russia Fidel V. Ramos the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Leslie H. Gelb Former President of Philippines Ali Alatas President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Güler Sabancı Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia Relations, U.S. Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey

343 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words Crisis Group Asia Report N°158, 24 July 2008 Page 41

Ghassan Salamé Thorvald Stoltenberg Ernesto Zedillo Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of Former Foreign Minister of Norway Former President of Mexico; Director, International Relations, Paris Lawrence Summers Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Former President, Harvard University; Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. Khalid Alireza Frank Holmes Ian Telfer BHP Billiton George Landegger Guy Ullens de Schooten Canaccord Adams Limited Iara Lee & George Gund III Neil Woodyer Bob Cross Foundation Don Xia Equinox Partners Ford Nicholson

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser Harry Bookey and Charlotte & Fred Michael Riordan (Co-Chair) Pamela Bass-Bookey Hubbell StatoilHydro ASA Elliott Kulick John Chapman Chester Khaled Juffali Tilleke & Gibbins (Co-Chair) Chevron George Kellner Vale Marc Abramowitz Citigroup Amed Khan VIVATrust Hamza al Kholi Richard Cooper Shiv Vikram Khemka Yasuyo Yamazaki Anglo American PLC Credit Suisse Scott Lawlor Yapı Merkezi APCO Worldwide Inc. Construction and Neil & Sandy DeFeo Jean Manas Ed Bachrach Industry Inc. John Ehara McKinsey & Company Patrick Benzie Shinji Yazaki Frontier Strategy Group Najib Mikati Stanley Bergman & Sunny Yoon Edward Bergman Seth Ginns Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Alan Griffiths Donald Pels

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time. Martti Ahtisaari Malcolm Fraser Surin Pitsuwan Leo Tindemans (Chairman Emeritus) I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Ed van Thijn Diego Arria Max Jakobson George Robertson Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Alain Destexhe Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim Marika Fahlén George J. Mitchell William Taylor Stanley Fischer (Chairman Emeritus)

344 LIBIA

[Fonte: sito Internet Ministero Affari Esteri]

Libia

Rapporti politici I legami storici, la vicinanza geografica, l’intenso dialogo politico ed il partenariato energetico rendono prioritario e strategico per la nostra politica estera il rapporto bilaterale con la Libia. L’Italia ha costantemente sostenuto Tripoli nel processo di progressiva normalizzazione dei rapporti della Libia con l’Occidente e rappresenta ancora oggi il principale Paese di riferimento, oltre che il primo partner economico-commerciale.

Con la firma a Roma, il 4 luglio 1998, del Comunicato Congiunto italo-libico, si era inteso fissare i termini del superamento dei contenziosi correlati al passato coloniale e porre le basi per una nuova fase di cooperazione. Le intese di principio contenute nel Comunicato Congiunto hanno avuto un seguito attuativo, in particolare per quanto riguarda le iniziative realizzate dall’Italia nel settore sanitario, della formazione post-universitaria e dello sviluppo agricolo. Gli impegni che si era assunta la parte libica non sono stati invece mantenuti. Il contenzioso bilaterale è stato quindi oggetto di un lungo negoziato, che ha portato alla firma di nuove intese, in occasione della visita a Tripoli dell’allora Presidente del Consiglio, il 28 ottobre 2002. Nel quadro di tali intese, tra le altre cose, era stata avviata a soluzione la questione dei crediti vantati dalle imprese italiane nei confronti di Enti libici e, da parte italiana, era stato assunto l’impegno a finanziare gli studi progettuali per la realizzazione di un’importante opera infrastrutturale in Libia, richiesta dal Colonnello Gheddafi a chiusura di tutti i contenziosi del passato.

Da allora, il rapporto con Tripoli è stato caratterizzato da fasi alterne e, in sostanza, nessun risultato concreto è stato registrato sul fronte dei contenziosi storici. Permangono, quindi, le discriminazioni vigenti in Libia a danno dei cittadini italiani (gli Italiani espulsi dalla Libia nel 1970 non possono ottenere un visto, salvo abbiano compiuto 65 anni di età) e delle società italiane. Inoltre, il contenzioso sui crediti vantati dalle società italiane nei confronti di Enti libici è tuttora in una fase di stallo, non avendo le Autorità libiche mantenuto gli impegni assunti nel 2002 ed avanzato, successivamente, proposte ritenute congrue dai creditori.

L’assalto il 17 febbraio 2006 al Consolato Generale d’Italia in Bengasi aveva segnato una fase particolarmente difficile nei rapporti con Tripoli. Nell’estate 2006 il Ministro degli Affari Esteri ha riavviato il dialogo politico con le Autorità libiche, ponendo le basi del lungo e complesso negoziato che dovrebbe auspicabilmente portare alla conclusione di un Trattato di Amicizia e Cooperazione, che segni il definitivo superamento del capitolo del passato e l’inizio di un ampio e bilanciato partenariato.

Numerosi sono i settori di collaborazione bilaterale, tra i quali quello della non proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa. La rinuncia della Libia a tali armi

347 rappresenta il punto di arrivo di un percorso lungo, intrapreso dalla Libia con il sostegno ed il pieno incoraggiamento dell’Italia. L’Italia ha accompagnato tale processo sostenendo l’adesione di Tripoli alla Convenzione per la messa al bando delle Armi Chimiche e la riconversione in industria farmaceutica dell’impianto di Rabta, sospettato di aver prodotto negli anni ’80 armi chimiche. Analoga collaborazione è stata offerta da parte italiana per quanto riguarda il Controllo delle Tecnologie Missilistiche e per adeguare la normativa libica agli standards del regime di non proliferazione missilistica, in particolare nel settore del controllo dell’import-export di tecnologie e materiali sensibili. Nell’ottobre del 2004, la Libia è stata cancellata dall’elenco dei Paesi che l’MTCR considera a rischio di proliferazione.

Altrettanto rilevante è la collaborazione in atto nel settore della lotta all’immigrazione clandestina. Negli ultimi anni la rotta libica si è affermata come la principale direttrice per l’afflusso di clandestini che giungono sulle nostre coste. L’Accordo bilaterale del dicembre 2000 in materia di lotta al terrorismo, alla criminalità organizzata e all’immigrazione clandestina (entrato in vigore nel dicembre 2002) costituisce il quadro giuridico di riferimento che ha consentito di raggiungere con Tripoli specifiche intese in materia di cooperazione nel contrasto all'immigrazione illegale.

Le visite Oltre a frequenti visite in Libia del Ministro dell’Interno, vi sono ricorrenti riunioni dei vertici amministrativi di Polizia e Servizi di Sicurezza dei due Paesi. In termini di assistenza tecnica il Ministero dell’Interno ha impegnato oltre 40 milioni di euro. Il 30 dicembre 2007 il Ministro dell’Interno ha firmato a Tripoli un Protocollo d’intesa che prevede un ulteriore rafforzamento della collaborazione in materia di lotta all’immigrazione clandestina.

Rapporti economici Per quel che concerne l’interscambio commerciale, l’Italia è il primo partner della Libia sia come fornitore (circa 14% del totale) che come cliente (circa 37%). L’interscambio italo- libico ha raggiunto nel 2007 la somma complessiva di 15.643 milioni di Euro, con un saldo negativo della bilancia commerciale italiana di 12.365 milioni di Euro, dovuto alle forti importazioni di idrocarburi. Le principali esportazioni italiane verso la Libia riguardano i prodotti petroliferi raffinati (circa il 44% del totale) e macchinari di varia tipologia (circa il 13%) mentre le importazioni dalla Libia riguardano pressoché esclusivamente gli idrocarburi e i prodotti petroliferi (98% del totale).

348 Scheda Paese: Libia. Aspetti economici. [fonte: sito Internet ambasciata italiana a Tripoli, 11 settembre 2008]

Agro-alimentare L’agricoltura e' un settore che soggetto a forte sviluppo e che potrebbe offrire interessanti opportunità per le nostre aziende. Attualmente, infatti, oltre il 75% dei bisogni alimentari è soddisfatto con le importazioni e solo il 10% del territorio e' coltivabile. Per fare fronte a tale situazione per i prossimi anni è previsto un maggior investimento nel settore della meccanizzazione agricola per consentire uno sviluppo produttivo e di resa per ettaro più consistente. Positiva risulta invece l’esportazione verso la Libia di prodotti alimentari italiani che nel corso del 2007 ha fatto registrare un incremento percentuale pari al 18% passando da 47,4 a 56,1 milioni di euro.

La pesca è un altro settore di particolare importanza sia per il rinnovo della flotta peschereccia che per le attrezzature. Le potenzialità della Libia in questo settore sono enormi, mentre le risorse ittiche sono sfruttate solo al 20%. Con oltre 1.800 km di costa, le possibilità di sviluppare un’industria legata al settore sono reali. Gli Enti preposti prevedono investimenti nel settore e si prefiggono, in particolare, la realizzazione di ben di 24 nuovi porti attrezzati anche per la lavorazione e conservazione del pesce. Attualmente esistono solo due impianti attivi per la lavorazione del tonno a Zanzur e a Zliten, mentre a Zwara e Koms vi sono due piccole unità per l’inscatolamento di sardine. Le attrezzature di refrigerazione attualmente disponibili nel porto di Zliten non sono sufficienti.. Investimenti sono previsti per rinnovare la flotta peschereccia ed alcuni ordini sono stati indirizzati verso i cantieri di Mazara del Vallo. Il Distretto della pesca e la Camera di Commercio di Mazara del Vallo ha sottoscritto accordi di collaborazione con la Camera di Commercio di Misurata e con il Direttore del locale Porto da Pesca.

Turismo Il turismo è uno dei settori su cui la Libia punta per lo sviluppo e la diversificazione della sua economia. Le condizioni ambientali e la presenza di siti archeologici, oltre all'attrattiva rappresentata dal deserto, sono premesse di partenza che hanno già permesso di avviare e far crescere le attività turistiche nel Paese dopo la fine delle sanzioni nel 1999. La creazione di strutture stabili per il turismo e di una fascia di potenziali operatori e lavoratori nel settore turistico è l'obiettivo che ora le Autorità libiche si pongono per incrementare le presenze di visitatori. In ragione di ciò il settore turistico sta attraversando una fase di profondo cambiamento. Infatti, dopo la costruzione del nuovo Hotel di Dar Tellil, sul mare, a ca. 10 km ad ovest di Sabrata (80 km ad Ovest di Tripoli), gestito dalla Soc. italiana Dar Sahara cui è subentrata l'Agenzia "I viaggi del ventaglio", e' prevista la costruzione di altri due complessi immediatamente a ridosso di Sabratah con annesso campo da golf, ed altri complessi turistici (con relativi campi da golf) sono previsti vicino Leptis Magna (90 km ad Est di Tripoli), altri ad est di Bengasi, mentre un imponente progetto per la creazione di un parco naturalistico ed archeologico presso Cirene e' stato presentato alla stampa internazionale direttamente da Saif El Islam. Recentemente si sono fatte avanti società straniere (Svizzere, Maltesi, Tunisine e Belghe, americane ma anche coreane e cinesi) per progetti turistici particolarmente interessanti che prevedono la creazione di zone turistiche di

349 alto livello, con hotel a 5 stelle, campi da golf, porti turistici per barche da diporto, ecc.. Ma anche aziende italiane (Dar Sahara, Viaggi del Ventaglio, Altay ed altre) sono molto attive in questo settore non solo come agenzie di viaggi ma anche per l'ottenimento di concessioni per lo sviluppo turistico. Una specifica menzione particolare merita, infine, il progetto della Valtur relativo alla realizzazione di un resort turistico. Alla fine dello scorso anno queste Autorità hanno, infatti, deliberato l’assegnazione alla Valtur di un’area di 53 ettari, poco distante da Villa Silin (località Garabulli a circa 60 Km da Tripoli) e per la quale è previsto un investimento del valore complessivo di circa 50 milioni di euro, finanziati per il 40% dai soci libici e per la rimanente quota dalla controparte italiana. La formula utilizzata per la concessione dell’area su cui sorgerà il resort è quella dell’affitto del terreno per 75 anni. Essa è stata preferita alla soluzione alternativa che non prevede il pagamento di un affitto ma che contempla il versamento al Governo libico di una quota annuale dei profitti realizzati con la struttura turistica a pieno regime. Il resort – che dovrebbe contare circa 300 camere con una capacità ricettiva di circa 700 persone – disporrà di “facilities” di alto profilo quali, centro congressi, piscine, spa, area dedicata allo “shopping” e strutture sportive. I lavori dovrebbero avere una durata di 18 mesi e, alla loro ultimazione, il resort dovrebbe essere capace di assorbire circa 300 unità di personale locale. Altri progetti turistici sono previsti lungo tutto la costa libica, vicino a Leptis Magna (120 Km ad est di Tripoli), vicino a Villa Silin (10 Km da Leptis Magna), a Cirene, dopo Bengasi, a Tobruk, presso l’isola di Farwa (vicino al confine Tunisino). Mentre è dei primi mesi di questo anno un convegno internazionale organizzato dalle autorità libiche per il risanamento di una vasta zona depressa nel golfo della Sirte dove dovrebbero sorgere vari complessi turistici. Si tratta della prima applicazione del concetto dello “sviluppo sostenibile” realizzato in Libia. La Soc. Hill International, una delle più grandi compagnie di consulenza nelle costruzioni, ha affidato alla Birdi Tourism Investment Co. l'incarico di impresa capofila per la realizzazione del progetto "Bardiyyah Development", un progetto di sviluppo turistico del valore di parecchi miliardi di dollari, sul mare ad est di Tobruk, che avrà un impatto di tutto rilievo sulla economia della zona. Il valore del contratto per la prima fase di 18 mesi è di 56 milioni di $. Il Progetto prevede lo sviluppo un’area di 200 km da Tobruk fino al confine con l'Egitto.

Settore bancario Il processo di privatizzazione e razionalizzazione della presenza dello stato nella economia libica prosegue con la messa sul mercato di alcune banche libiche. Infatti, dopo che la francese BNP Parisbas ha vinto la gara per l’acquisto del 19% della Sahara Bank, uno dei più importanti istituti di credito statali libici, per un importo di circa 146 milioni di euro, si e’ appreso che l'Arab Bank PLC si e’ aggiudicato il 19% del capitale della Banca Libica Al- Wahda per la cifra di 210 milioni di euro. A questa gara aveva partecipato anche Banca Intesa oltre che la francese Società Générale scartata all'ultimo minuto. L'Arab Bank PLC avrà la possibilità di acquistare fino al 51% degli assets della banca in un periodo di medio termine per un totale di 1 miliardo e 700 milioni di euro. Dopo l’avvenuta privatizzazione delle due banche sopra citate, il processo di apertura al mercato interesserà altri tre istituti di credito libici (Gumhouria Bank, Umma Bank e National Commercial Bank of Libya).

Settore industriale. L’economia libica dipende quasi unicamente dalla produzione e vendita di petrolio e gas e per tale motivo la politica del Governo libico è orientata a favorire lo sviluppo del settore

350 non-oil ed alla creazione di un tessuto industriale che possa fare fronte alle necessità della domanda interna. In questo senso l'ICE e l'Ambasciata d'Italia hanno organizzato corsi di formazione a Tripoli sul marketing internazionale, sui processi di trasferimento di tecnologia, di innovazione tecnologica, nonché sulle modalità per la creazione di nuove PMI. Durante questi corsi dove sono stati coinvolti imprenditori privati, Università Centri di Ricerca ed alcune organizzazioni libiche preposte alla creazione ed allo sviluppo di un tessuto di nuove PMI. Nell'ultimo corso, dopo avere prima individuato e selezionato i settori e gli imprenditori libici, si è proceduto alla creazione di 5 nuovi progetti produttivi nei settori delle nuove tecnologie della comunicazione, della informatica, della lavorazione del pesce, della produzione di succhi di frutta e dei fertilizzanti per agricoltura formando i nuovi imprenditori alle tecniche della internazionalizzazione, della gestione e della organizzazione aziendali e mettendoli in contatto con altrettanti imprenditori italiani per poter collaborare anche in futuro. A seguito di questo riuscito esperimento da parte libica è stato manifestato un forte interesse alla cooperazione con l’Italia nel settore industriale e delle piccole e medie imprese. In questo contesto l’Ente Libico per la creazione e lo sviluppo delle PMI ha chiesto di sottoscrivere un protocollo di intesa di collaborazione con l’ICE e con strutture specialistiche per la creazione di nuove imprese produttive, in particolare piccole e medie e proseguire sul progetto dello sviluppo di PMI.

351

352 [Fonte: sito Internet Ambasciata italiana a Tripoli, 11 settembre 2008]

I rapporti bilaterali

Cooperazione politica

L’Italia e la Libia intrattengono intense relazioni sul piano politico, che si estendono a molteplici settori di attività e comportano una consultazione assidua in riferimento a molti Paesi ed aree geografiche, con particolare riferimento alla regione mediterranea e nell’area africana.

L’Italia ha sempre cercato di favorire una piena integrazione della Libia nella comunità internazionale. Da parte italiana si è incoraggiata la Libia a rinunciare alle armi di distruzione di massa, ad impegnarsi, in generale, nelle attività internazionali volte al disarmo e si è sostenuta con tempestività l’aspirazione della Libia ad aderire ad organizzazioni internazionali di carattere globale e regionale. Su queste basi si è sviluppata anche la collaborazione fra i due Paesi nella lotta al terrorismo internazionale.

Da parte dell’Italia si segue con attenzione l’impegno della Libia in seno all’Unione Africana per il progresso economico e politico del continente in un’ottica di progressiva integrazione. Per il ruolo importante assunto dal Colonnello Gheddafi nell’organizzazione panafricana l’Italia segue con frequenti consultazioni anche lo sviluppo della posizione libica sul tema delle riforme delle Nazioni Unite e del Consiglio di Sicurezza.

La Libia è osservatore del Processo di Barcellona, che lega l’Unione Europea ai Paesi della sponda sud del Mediterraneo; da parte italiana si intende favorire un’adesione piena della Libia alla cooperazione euro-mediterranea sulla base del riconoscimento libico dei principi e delle regole che ne costituiscono la sostanza (il cd. acquis di Barcellona).

L’Italia collabora attivamente con la Libia nel quadro del Dialogo 5+5 (Francia, Italia, Spagna, Portogallo, Grecia più Marocco, Tunisia, Libia, Algeria, Mauritania), che prevede riunioni dei Ministri degli Esteri, dell’Interno, del Lavoro , della Difesa, oltre a numerose riunioni tecniche di settore.

Sul piano bilaterale i due Paesi hanno sottoscritto il 4 luglio 1998 un “Comunicato congiunto”, con cui sono stati articolati i punti essenziali per la chiusura del capitolo legato al passato coloniale e per lo sviluppo del rapporto bilaterale. Per l’Italia ha particolare importanza che il trattamento dei cittadini italiani nati in Libia, ai fini della concessione del visto d’ingresso nel Paese, ed il trattamento delle aziende italiane che operano in Libia siano conformi alle regole internazionali e che non abbiano carattere discriminatorio.

L’Italia ha mantenuto rapporti di amicizia con la Libia anche negli anni in cui il Paese ha incontrato le maggiori difficoltà sul fronte internazionale, per l’isolamento a le sanzioni decise nell’ambito delle Nazioni Unite.

353 L’allora Ministro degli Esteri Dini fu il primo esponente di Governo di un Paese occidentale a venire in visita a Tripoli immediatamente dopo la sospensione , nell’aprile 1999, delle sanzioni delle Nazioni Unite. Il Presidente del Consiglio, Silvio Berlusconi, è stato il primo Capo di Governo di un Paese occidentale ad incontrare il Colonnello Gheddafi dopo l’ abolizione formale delle sanzioni. Nel corso del 2004 il Presidente del Consiglio ha effettuato altre due visite in Libia. Il Presidente della Camera dei Deputati, Pier Ferdinando Casini, si è recato in visita a Tripoli nell’Aprile del 2005.

Negli ultimi anni è stata inoltre sviluppata dai due Paesi un’intensa cooperazione per la prevenzione e la lotta all’immigrazione clandestina, al traffico di stupefacenti ed alla criminalità organizzata. Il Ministro dell’Interno, Pisanu, ha incontrato il Colonnello Gheddafi numerose volte nel 2004 e nel 2005.

354 Cooperazione economica Con l’entrata a regime del gasdotto di Mellitah che trasporta gas dalla Libia in Sicilia attraverso un metanodotto sottomarino di oltre 580 km, la Libia e’ passata dal 34° al 7° posto nella graduatoria dei Paesi fornitori dell’Italia, mentre il nostro Paese si e’ confermato in assoluto il primo esportatore con una quota che (secondo i dati del FMI) ad Agosto 2007 si attesta al 20,3% ca. delle importazioni della Libia.

L'Italia, inoltre, risulta essere il terzo Paese investitore tra quelli Europei (escludendo gli investimenti da petrolio) ed il sesto a livello mondiale. L’importanza che questo mercato riveste per l’Italia è dimostrata anche dalla presenza stabile in Libia di oltre 70 imprese, prevalentemente collegate al settore petrolifero ed alle infrastrutture, ai settori della meccanica, dei prodotti e della tecnologia per le costruzioni. In tale contesto di presenza di ditte italiane in Libia, l’Italia conferma la propria posizione di principale partner economico della Libia e rimane saldamente in testa tra tutti gli altri Paesi. Dalla tabella seguente si può evincere il forte distacco che nel rapporto commerciale con questo Paese ancora esiste tra l’Italia ed alcuni dei principali concorrenti europei ed internazionali.

La presenza dei prodotti del “Made in Italy”sul mercato libico e’, nonostante l’aumento della concorrenza, ancora buona. Nel corso degli ultimi anni il mercato libico dei beni di largo consumo e dei beni strumentali si è, tuttavia, caratterizzato per un crescente orientamento verso prodotti a basso costo (anche a scapito della qualita’) in provenienza dalla Cina, India, Turchia, Corea, Indonesia. Tale tendenza comporta la necessita' che le nostre aziende migliorino gli strumenti della concorrenza, prestando, in particolare, una maggiore attenzione alla “politica”dell’assistenza post-vendita, ai corsi di formazione, a tutte quelle accortezze funzionali alla fidelizzazione di un cliente che, con l’apertura del mercato e l’aumento della concorrenza, è divenuto sempre più esigente. Nel corso del 2007, il valore delle esportazioni italiane verso la Libia – passando in termini monetari 1402,5 milioni di euro a 1638,8 milioni di euro ha fatto registrare, rispetto al 2006, un incremento del 16,84%. Un dato, quest’ultimo che consente, tra l’altro, di superare per la prima volta il valore record di 1501,8 milioni di euro raggiunto nel 2004(anno dell’ultimazione dei lavori del gasdotto di Mellitha).

Nell’arco temporale di riferimento, le più significative performance delle nostre esportazioni si sono avute nei settori dei prodotti petroliferi raffinati (+ 53,92%), degli autoveicoli (+ 98,18%), dei mobili (+ 34,28%), dei pezzi di ricambi per aeromobili, dei prodotti e conserve di frutta e verdure (+172,83%,), degli apparecchi medicali (+169,17%). Significativo è anche il recupero nelle esportazioni di prodotti alimentari che mettono a segno un incremento del 18%. Un dato, quest’ultimo, particolarmente significativo se si tiene conto che nel corso del 2006 era stata registrata una preoccupante contrazione di circa il 20%. Viaggiano in territorio ampiamente positivo (+163%) anche le esportazioni di legno e prodotti in legno (esclusi i mobili). Crescono del 69% le esportazioni di prodotti della carta e del 30% quelle di articoli in gomma e prodotti della plastica.Con un incremento del 2% appaiono in graduale recupero le esportazioni di macchine elettriche che lo scorso anno avevano registrato una contrazione del 12%.

355 Appaiono, invece, in calo le esportazioni di prodotti dell’abbigliamento (-10) e dei prodotti in cuoio (comprese le calzature) che lasciano sul terreno un -30%. Con una riduzione del 70,49% risultano, inoltre, in forte calo le esportazioni di tubi e prodotti in metallo (si tratta di beni che vengono generalmente importati in presenza di consistenti lavori per la costruzione di impianti industriali e/o petroliferi). Significativa è anche la contrazione nelle vendite di macchinari. Più nello specifico, calano del 12% le esportazioni di macchine ed apparecchi meccanici, del 34% quelle di macchine per ufficio e di sistemi informatici.

Il valore aggregato delle importazioni (gas e petrolio) si è assestato, in termini monetari, a 14005 milioni di euro, facendo registrare un incremento del 10,6% rispetto l’anno precedente(12655milioni di euro) Il saldo della bilancia commerciale -ampiamente condizionato dalle ingenti importazioni di petrolio e gas - è pari a -12,366 miliardi di euro. Il valore dell’interscambio si assesta invece a 15,643 miliardi di euro, in crescita del 11% rispetto al 2006(14,058 miliardi di euro).

In conclusione, gli ultimi dati ISTAT si presentano indubbiamente positivi per quanto concerne le nostre esportazioni verso la Libia. Ciò non solo per la sostanziale crescita di molte voci della bilancia commerciale ma anche per il graduale recupero nelle vendite di alcune tipologie di beni quali, ad esempio, i prodotti alimentari. Ai buoni dati sull’andamento delle nostre esportazioni si associano quelli sulle commesse per lavori in loco ottenuti da aziende italiane. Un dato quest’ultimo che non deve, comunque, distogliere l’attenzione dalle difficoltà che questo mercato continua comunque a presentare.

356 Cooperazione culturale

Il quadro giuridico della cooperazione culturale tra Italia e Libia è regolamentato dall’Accordo di cooperazione culturale, scientifica e tecnologica tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Grande Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, firmato a Roma il 18.12.1984 ed entrato in vigore il 9.9.86. A tale accordo è subentrato il nuovo Accordo di cooperazione culturale, scientifica e tecnologica, firmato a Tripoli il 5 giugno 2003 ed entrato in vigore il 30 maggio 2007.

La presenza culturale italiana in Libia si concentra essenzialmente sull’insegnamento e la diffusione della lingua italiana e sulla cooperazione nel settore archeologico.

Insegnamento e diffusione della lingua italiana In Libia si registra un crescente interesse per lo studio della lingua italiana, anche in ragione della vicinanza geografica con l’Italia e dell’interscambio commerciale che pone il nostro Paese al primo posto tra i partner economici della Libia, nonché per il sempre maggiore afflusso di turisti italiani che richiedono guide capaci di parlare la nostra lingua. L’insegnamento della lingua italiana si muove lungo due specifiche direttrici: i corsi organizzati dall’ Istituto Italiano di Cultura e l’insegnamento presso le Università locali. Nel realizzare pienamente il quadro europeo di riferimento e puntando su una riqualificazione dei corsi di lingua, nel 2008 il numero di iscritti ai corsi dell’Istituto Italiano di Cultura di Tripoli è stato di circa 600 studenti. A questi vanno aggiunti anche 30 studenti dell’Accademia della Marina Militare di Tripoli. Per quanto attiene, invece, l’insegnamento presso le locali Università disponiamo di un lettorato presso l’Università di Tripoli Al Fatah e di un lettorato presso l’Accademia di Studi Superiori dove, nel Dipartimento di italianistica, vengono impartiti gli insegnamenti per il Master biennale in didattica dell’italiano come lingua straniera, finalizzato alla formazione di insegnanti libici. Si segnala, inoltre, l’apertura - grazie ad un rapporto di collaborazione accademica con l’Università di Palermo - del Dipartimento di Lingua e Letteratura Italiana presso l'Universita' di Garyounis di Bengasi.In tale ambito è stato attivato un corso di laurea quadriennale in lingua e letteratura italiana.

L’insegnamento della lingua italiana è altresì incentivato dalla concessione di borse di studio a favore di studenti libici, da usufruire presso le Università italiane e messe annualmente a disposizione dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Per l’A.A. 2008-9 la Libia è risultata beneficiaria di 56 borse studio messe a disposizione dal Governo italiano.

Istituto Italiano di Cultura L’Istituto Italiano di Cultura ha sede a Tripoli in un’accogliente palazzina nel quartiere residenziale di Ben Ashour. La sede, inaugurata il 6 dicembre 2003, dispone di numerose aule per i corsi, una ricca Biblioteca (circa 9000 titoli) ed un ampio spazio multifunzionale per gli eventi. L’IIC, in stretto coordinamento con questa Ambasciata, ha ampliato ulteriormente le proprie attività di promozione della lingua e della cultura italiane.

357 La Scuola italiana A Tripoli è presente la Scuola italiana paritaria “Al Maziri”, che si articola su 4 livelli di insegnamento: scuola dell’infanzia, primaria, media e liceo scientifico. Gli alunni sono principalmente italiani. La Scuola ha ottenuto il riconoscimento legale con D.I. 3538 del 21.6.1980 per la scuola secondaria inferiore e superiore ed ha ricevuto il conferimento dell’istituto giuridico della parità. Per maggiori informazioni: Complesso Scolastico italiano privato “Al Maziri”Indirizzo: Gargaresh area – Ben Othman Lot – Tripoli. Telefono: 0021821 – 4837240 – 4842333. Email: [email protected]

Cooperazione nel settore Archeologico Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri, attraverso la Direzione Generale per la Promozione e la Cooperazione Culturale, sostiene da molti anni missioni archeologiche, antropologiche, etnologiche italiane all'estero, svolgendo un ruolo fondamentale per la tutela e la conservazione del patrimonio culturale mondiale. Le missioni archeologiche costituiscono uno dei principali strumenti della presenza culturale italiana in Libia. Esse offrono a questo Paese un contributo senza eguali, sia dal punto di vista “qualitativo” che “quantitativo”, rispetto ad altri partner occidentali. In tale contesto, e grazie anche a periodiche consultazioni che hanno luogo nell’ambito del “Comitato Misto per la Collaborazione nel Settore Archeologico”, l’Italia e la Libia hanno convenuto di rafforzare l'impatto socio-economico degli interventi nel campo della preservazione del patrimonio archeologico, con una migliore programmazione dell'attività delle missioni archeologiche e con la definizione di iniziative nel campo della formazione e del restauro, finalizzata a valorizzare le prospettive di investimento nel settore del turismo e di cooperazione in quello dell'artigianato. L'ammontare dei contributi, concessi annualmente in seguito alla pubblicazione di un bando, varia a seconda della disponibilità finanziaria concessa per il settore in questione per quell'anno specifico. Per informazioni sulle modalità di accesso ai finanziamenti erogati del Ministero degli Affari Esteri consultare la pagina web www.esteri.it Politica Estera > Grandi temi > Politica Culturale o contattare l’Ufficio V - settore archeologia - della Direzione Generale per la Promozione e la Cooperazione Culturale -Tel.:06/36912735; 06/36918291; 06/36918289.

Tra le numerose richieste pervenute dalle varie missioni operanti in Libia, nel 2008 il Ministero degli Affari Esteri italiano ha stanziato i propri contributi per le seguenti missioni:

1) Missione diretta dal Prof. Antonino Di Vita - Università degli Studi di Macerata (Dipartimento di Scienze Archeologiche e Storiche dell'Antichità). La missione opera sull’Area Sacro-Funeraria di Sidret El Balik (Sabratha) e si prefigge il restauro degli affreschi.

2) Missione diretta dal dott.Sebastiano Tusa – Regione Sicilia (Assessorato BB.CC.AA.EPI – soprintendenza del mare). Si tratta di un nuovo progetto che ben si inserisce nel quadro della cooperazione mediterranea nel campo della protezione e valorizzazione del patrimonio archeologico subacqueo e che riscuote particolare interesse da parte delle Autorità libiche. Il progetto comprende lo studio topografico degli antichi porti della Cirenaica (strutture

358 portuali di Pycos e Ugla) nonché l’esplorazione del relitto seicentesco nella baia di Ras Al- Hilal.

3) Missione diretta dal Prof. Nicola Bonacasa - Università di Palermo (Dipartimento di Beni Culturali e Storico-Archeologici). Si tratta del proseguimento di un progetto pilota che nel periodo 2002-2004 ha portato a compimento i previsti lavori di studio, restauro e anastilosi del tempio di Zeus a Cirene, mentre nel 2005 si è concentrato sulla parte ovest dello stesso tempio.

4) Missione diretta dal Prof. Mario Luni - Università di Urbino (Istituto di Archeologia). Progetto pilota che prevede ricerche, scavi e restauro del nuovo santuario di Demetra a Cirene con tempio dorico arcaico, altare, portico, teatro ricavato nella roccia e propilei monumentali.

5) Missione diretta dal Prof. Savino Di Lernia – Università di Roma “La Sapienza” (Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Archeologiche e Antropologiche dell’Antichità). La missione opera nella regione del Tadrart Acacus e prevede l’inventario e la conservazione dei siti di arte rupestre dell’Acacus, ricognizioni di superficie, sondaggi di scavo di siti di età preistorica nel tavolato del Messak Settafet e nelle aree adiacenti.

6) Missione diretta dalla Prof.ssa Luisa Musso - Università di Roma Tre (Dipartimento di Studi Storico Artistici, Archeologici e sulla Conservazione). Si tratta di un progetto pilota concentrato nell’area di Leptis Magna e che prevede in via prioritaria la realizzazione del portico esterno del "Museo delle Ville”, l’allestimento e il restauro dei mosaici.

7) Missione diretta dalla Prof.ssa Oliva Menozzi – Università di Chieti “G.D’Annunzio” (Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Antichità). Progetto consistente in ricognizioni e scavi a Uadi Ain Hofra ed indagini archeomatiche a Lamluda, con corsi di formazione per tecnici locali.

8) Missione diretta dalla Prof.ssa Barbara E.Barich – Università di Roma “La Sapienza” (Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Archeologiche, Antropologiche dell’Antichità). Si tratta di una missione congiunta italo-libica nel Jebel Garbi, con l’obiettivo di effettuare un’indagine sulla diffusione dell’homo sapiens in Nord Africa e nel terriotorio di Josh e wadi Jahn.

9) Missione diretta dall’Architetto Khalil Abdel Hadi – Centro Internazionale Studi di Architettura e Storia del Mediterraneo. Il progetto prevede il recupero delle città carovaniere (Ghat, Murzuq e Zwyla), la fine dei lavori di restauro del museo di Ghat, la realizzazione dei progetti di restauro delle antiche moschee di Al Amin ed Al Atiq a Ghat, il rilievo ed il restauto del castello di Murzuq, analisi e rilievi di edifici di epoca italiana ad Al Homs (Leptis).

10) Missione diretta dal Prof. Salvatore Garraffo – CNR di Roma (Istituto per le Tecnologie Applicate ai Beni Culturali). Si prefigge lo studio, il restauro, la catalogazione e l’informatizzazione del tesoro monetale di Misurata a Leptis Magna, nel quadro della storia della circolazione monetaria della Tripolitania antica.

359 11) Missione diretta dalla Prof.ssa Anna Maria Dolciotti – Centro Internazionale Ricerche Archeologiche, Antropologiche e Storiche di Roma. La missione si concentra sul “Tempio Flavio” a Leptis Magna e mira a riprendere gli scavi per ricostruire l’articolazione del tessuto urbano di Leptis, schedare e restaurare materiali. Il Progetto prevede anche corsi di formazione e restauro per il personale del Dipartimento.

Accanto alle undici missioni che per il 2008 hanno ottenuto i contributi MAE, appare doveroso segnalare la presenza di ulteriori importanti missioni: la missione diretta dalla Prof.ssa Serenella Ensoli dell’Università di Napoli, per il restauro e l’anastilosi dell’Anfiteatro di Cirene; la missione diretta dal Prof. Francesco Tomasello dell’Università di Catania, per l’anastilosi di alcune emergenze architettoniche dell’isolato adiacente al cd.tempio Anonimo di Leptis Magna ecc. Alcune di esse hanno ricevuto finanziamenti durante gli scorsi anni e stanno operando grazie a finanziamenti accademici, regionali o privati.

360 Cooperazione allo sviluppo

QUADRO DI RIFERIMENTO

La Libia dal punto di vista della situazione socioeconomica vieneannoverata dall'OCSE tra i Paesi in via di sviluppo, e nell'ambito di questi, tra quelli. piu' avanzati. (Il Rapporto sullo sviluppo umano delle Nazioni Unite colloca il paese al 58mo posto).

Allo scopo di rafforzare e sviluppare le relazioni tra l'Italia e la Libia, i Ministri degli Esteri dei due Paesi hanno sottoscritto il 4 luglio 1998 un Comunicato Congiunto.

In tale Comunicato è stato, tra l'altro, previsto un sostegno daparte italiana per la bonifica e la valorizzazione dei terreni agricoli disseminati da mine durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale, la costruzione di un centro medico in Libia per la cura dei lesionati dalle mine, la formazione di personale libico, ecc.

Il "Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE)" nella seduta del 4 agosto 2000 ha adottato una delibera con la quale ha deciso che "i fondi di cui alla legge 26 febbraio1987, n. 49, possono essere utilizzati per finanziare attività di cooperazione con la Libia, limitatamente ai settori della sanità, dell'agricoltura, della formazione, dello sminamento umanitario e degli interventi umanitari d'emergenza"..

PROGRAMMI La Cooperazione italiana in Libia

La cooperazione allo sviluppo con la Libia è iniziata a seguito del Comunicato Congiunto sottoscritto a Roma il 4.07.1998. La delibera CIPE del 4.08.2000 ha autorizzato l'uso dei fondi della legge 49/87 limitatamente ai settori della sanità, dell'agricoltura, della formazione, dello sminamento umanitario e degli interventi umanitari d'emergenza.

Titolo: Riqualificazione del Centro di Riabilitazione di Bengasi. Settore: sociosanitario Organismi di esecuzione: UNDP

Finanziamento a dono del Governo Italiano per un importo totale di 6.879.219,00 Dollari di cui - per Centro Ortopedico Bengasi 6.495.000,00 Dollari - per Centro Residenziale di El Marji 384.219,00 Dollari

L'iniziativa è stata realizzata in emergenza per il tramite dello UNDP che ha utilizzato un finanziamento interamente italiano per la riqualificazione del Centro, sia nella struttura che e' stata rammodernata, ma soprattutto nella fornitura di apparecchiature medicali e fisioterapiche d'avanguardia, quando alla Libia era stato appena tolto l'embargo dell'ONU. Il finanziamento iniziale e' stato poi esteso per un contributo al riammodernamento dell'Ospedale del Marji. E' iniziato nel 2001 e sostanzialmente concluso ad aprile del 2002. 361 Il 10 novembre 2005 e' stato sottoscritto un addendum per l'utilizzo di una somma residua di 342.588 USD e di ulteriori 261.588 USD per completare le dotazioni del Centro di Bengasi

Titolo: Supporto allo sviluppo organizzativo del Centro di Riabilitazione di Bengasi. Settore: sociosanitario Organismi di esecuzione: Assistenza tecnica e coordinamento in Gestione direttadella DGCS e parte In convenzione con L'Istituto Superiore di Sanità Italiano(ISS)

Durata: 24 mesi

Finanziamento a dono del Governo Italiano per un importo totale di 1.752.100,00 Euro di cui - fondo in loco a Gestione Diretta 1.091.000,00 Euro - in Convenzione con l'ISS 331.100,00 Euro

L'iniziativa è la seconda fase di un intervento iniziato nel 2001 e completato nel 2002, realizzato dallo UNDP, interamente finanziato dal Governo Italiano per un importo di circa 7,7 milioni di Euro. Con la seconda fase ci si propone di innalzare le capacità manageriali per la gestione ottimale del Centro in modo che Esso possa rappresentare un punto di riferimento certo per la cura delle lesioni fisiche e nervose e più in generale per affrontare le disabilità e le difficoltà dei portatori di handicap.

Programma di Valorizzazione Agricola Terreni bonificati dai residuati bellici.

Titolo: Centro di ricerca e sperimentazione applicata alla zootecnia ed alla foraggicoltura nella Shabia di Sirte; Settore: sviluppo rurale Organismi di esecuzione: Assistenza tecnica e coordinamento a curadell'Istituto Agronomico dell'Oltremare di Firenze (IAO)(www.iao.florence.it) Opere civili a cura dell'United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) Durata: 30 mesi Finanziamento a dono del Governo Italiano per un importo totale di 4.210.039,90 Euro di cui - Allo IAO 3.278.449,90 Euro - Allo UNDP 931.590,00 Euro scopo della iniziativa è quello di coadiuvare il Paese a conseguire la sicurezza alimentare attraverso la creazione di un moderno Centro di ricerca e sperimentazione dotato di stalla per l'allevamento bovino, laboratorio lattiero caseario ed annessi. La formazione del personale locale è un punto chiave del programma. Il centro si occuperà anche della valorizzazione delle specie zootecniche "minori" come pecore , cammelli ed altro.

362 Nell'ambito del Progetto e' previsto uno studio per il rimboschimento della zona di Wadi El-loud.

Programma di Valorizzazione Agricola Terreni bonificati dai residuati bellici.

Titolo: Realizzazione di un Centro di ricerca e sperimentazione agricola nella Shabia di El Batnan - Tobruk; Settore: sviluppo rurale Organismi di esecuzione: Assistenza tecnica e coordinamento a cura dell'Istituto Agronomico dell'Oltremare di Firenze (IAO) Opere civili a cura dell'United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) Durata: 30 mesi Finanziamento a dono del Governo Italiano per un importo totale di 3.547.118,28 Euro di cui - Allo IAO 2.630.622,48 Euro - Allo UNDP 916.495,80 Euro scopo della iniziativa è quello di aiutare il Paese beneficiario nel conseguirela sicurezza alimentare attraverso la costituzione di un Centro di Ricerca volto a valorizzare i terreni aridi e le colture più idonee in tali ambienti. Verranno realizzati dei laboratori di analisi chimico fisiche, di analisi dei mangimi e di analisi delle patologie, laboratori per i Sistemi Informativi Territoriali (GIS), laboratori di tecnologia agricola appropriata e laboratorio orto frutticolo. I Tecnici del Centro di Ricerca saranno formati in Libia ed in Italia per essere all'avanguardia nei rispettivi settori di azione.

Titolo: ART - GOLD Maghreb (Appoggio Alle Reti Tematiche - Governance and Local Development) Settore: buon governo e sviluppo sociale Organismi di esecuzione: UNDP Durata: 36 mesi Finanziamento a dono del Governo Italiano per un importo totale di 1,5 milioni di Euro

L'iniziativa realizzata dallo UNDP e' interamente finanziata dal governo italiano e riguarda i 4 paesi del Maghreb: Marocco, Tunisia, Algeria e Libia. Si propone la creazione di un partenariato tra le istituzioni locali decentrate con altrettante istituzioni italiane ed europee finalizzato allo sviluppo socioeconomico. La struttura operante in Libia e' gia entrata in contatto con lacooperazione decentrata di regioni e province italiane.

Titolo: Assistenza allo studio a favore di cittadini libici Settore: formazione Organismi di esecuzione: in convenzione con l'Università di Ancona Durata: annuale rinnovabile sino al conseguimento della specializzazione Finanziamento a dono del Governo Italiano per un importo totale di

Importo I annualità : 978.786,00 € anno accademico 2002/2003 Importo II annualità : 987.047,68 € anno accademico 2003/2004

363 Importo III annualità : 988.069,20 € anno accademico 2004/2005 Importo IV annualità : 900.000,00 € anno accademico 2005/2006

L'iniziativa prevede la specializzazione post-universitaria inizialmente di 62 laureati poi ridottisi a 56, in varie discipline (soprattutto in Medicina e Chirurgia, ma anche in Agraria ed Ingegneria), partendo dai corsi di lingua sino al conseguimento della specializzazione.

Borse di studio della DGCS.

L'ufficio di Cooperazione dell'Ambasciata segue infine l'iter istruttorio delle borse di studio a carattere scientifico finanziate dalla DGCS, dal momento della pubblicizzazione con la comunicazione alle autorità libiche, sino alla conclusione delle stesse. Dall'inizio del 2003 ad oggi sono stati attivati i corsi riepilogati nella seguente tavola.

Altre iniziative assimilabili a quelle di cooperazione, ma non finanziate con la legge 49, sono: Assistenza al governo libico per la costituzione di un libro genealogico delle vacche da latte (Progetto ANAFI); valore 1 milione di Euro; Assistenza al governo libico nel settore della pesca, (Progetto FEDERCOPESCA)Valore 1 milione di Euro; Programma di assistenza alle cure mediche di cittadini libici, in Italia. Impegno del governo italiano a curare 62 pazienti libici non curabili in loco. Valore 2,2 milioni di Euro. Programma congiunto ISIAO-Centro Jihad per la ricerca sui cittadini libici allontanati dalla Libia in epoca coloniale. Valore 500 mila Euro Programma di sminamento. Il programma doveva essere finanziato dalla legge 180/92 per un valore di 3,4 milioni di Euro ma non e' mai decollato per la mancata fornitura di indicazioni del governo libico.

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Berlusconi in Libia: firmato Trattato amicizia e cooperazione 29 Agosto 2008

Il Presidente del Consiglio, Silvio Berlusconi, ha incontrato il Colonnello Muammar Gheddafi, Leader della Rivoluzione del Grande Fatha a Bengasi dove è stato firmato il Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra l'Italia e la Libia. Il Presidente Berlusconi ha inoltre consegnato a Gheddafi la statua della Venere di Cirene.

Al suo arrivo all'aeroporto di Bengasi, il Presidente del Consiglio e' stato accolto dal primo ministro libico, Baghdadi Mahmoudi, e dal ministro degli Esteri, Abdel Rahman Chalgham.

L'Italia pagherà nei prossimi 20 anni 5 miliardi di dollari di risarcimenti alla Libia per il passato coloniale. Lo ha dichiarato Silvio Berlusconi al suo arrivo. L'accordo di amicizia, partenariato cooperazione prevede uno stanziamento da destinare a progetti infrastrutturali in Libia. L'intesa, ha sottolineato ancora il Presidene del Consiglio, "metterà fine a 40 anni di incomprensioni. E' un riconoscimento completo e morale dei danni inflitti alla Libia dall'Italia durante l'epoca coloniale". L'accordo, ha confermato il Presidente, prevede la realizzazione di un'autostrada costiera che attraverserà la Libia dal confine con l'Egitto a quello con la Tunisia. L'Italia si è impegnata anche a costruire 200 abitazioni, a mettere a disposizione borse di studio per giovani libici che vogliano studiare in Italia e a versare pensioni ai mutilati dalle mine piazzate dagli italiani in epoca coloniale.

Il trattato garantirà anche la possibilità di realizzare investimenti in modo da creare un ampio partenariato economico e industriale. Il nuovo partenariato bilaterale prevederà, inoltre, un rafforzamento della collaborazione in materia scientifica, culturale, energetica, nella lotta al terrorismo, alla criminalità ed alle organizzazioni che sfruttano l’immigrazione clandestina, nel settore della difesa, in quello del disarmo e della cooperazione parlamentare tra enti locali.

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Ti trovi in: Home : Presidente : Interviste e interventi Sintesi dell’ intervento del Presidente del Consiglio, Silvio Berlusconi, alla firma del Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra Italia e Libia 30 Agosto 2008

Un ringraziamento affettuoso e cordiale al vostro Leader che ha voluto fortissimamente arrivare a firmare questo accordo. Accordo che giunge dopo quei momenti tragici e drammatici dell’occupazione italiana del vostro Paese.

A nome del popolo italiano, come capo del governo, mi sento in dovere di porgere le scuse e manifestare il nostro dolore per quello che è accaduto tanti anni fa e che ha segnato molte delle vostre famiglie.

Il vostro Leader ha voluto mettere fine a questo periodo, a questi lunghi anni in cui i nostri due Paesi hanno sì collaborato, ma sono stati divisi nel ricordo di quello che è successo in quegli anni. Il vostro Leader ha voluto che guardassimo avanti e costruissimo per tutti, ma soprattutto per i nostri giovani, un'amicizia che potesse rendere i nostri popoli più felici.

Perciò abbiamo avuto la felicità di poter preparare e firmare qui, davanti a voi, questo Atto, che denuncia la nostra volontà di lasciare alle spalle tutto il passato e il suo dolore, e di guardare al futuro con una collaborazione concreta in tutti i campi, anche in campo internazionale, dove saremo fianco a fianco per diffondere la pace nel mondo.

Colgo questa occasione per dare un pubblico riconoscimento al vostro Leader per l’opera che ha saputo svolgere in questi anni portando il vostro popolo alla piena dignità e facendo del vostro Paese un protagonista della politica internazionale e, con la sua moderazione, incitare alla moderazione tutti i popoli.

367 Ho approfittato di questa occasione per ripetere a lui la preghiera che continui ad essere promotore di una unione più forte tra tutti i Paesi dell’Africa. Oggi tutti i popoli dell’Africa guardano alla Libia, guardano al vostro Leader, e sanno bene che soltanto uniti potranno migliorare nel benessere e contare nel mondo alla pari con l’Europa e con gli altri continenti.

Lascio a voi in questa giornata il mio cuore, felice, veramente felice di essere riuscito a mettere da parte tutto ciò che non era amore e guardare verso il futuro con quei sentimenti che soli p ortano la felicità e il benessere all’uomo, che sono l’amicizia, la fratellanza e l’amore.

368 COMUNICATO CONGIUNTO 4 luglio 1998

Tenendo in considerazione quanto caratterizza le relazioni tra i due popoli di Italia e di Libia, i profondi e forti legami, le cui radici risalgono a secoli di contatti, di attività commerciali, di storia comune ma che la colonizzazione italiana ha cagionato delle ferite ancora ricordate da molti libici. Nel desiderio di rafforzare e sviluppare tali relazioni, nell'interesse dei due popoli amici, I'Italia invita la Libia a superare il passato, un passato che la Libia invita l'Italia a non ripetere in futuro. In uno spirito di buon vicinato, non si verificheranno atti ostili di qualsiasi origine dall'Italia verso la Libia e dalla Libia verso l'Italia. Le due parti esprimono la loro volontà e determinazione a sviluppare le relazioni bilaterali su nuove basi fondate sull'eguaglianza, il mutuo rispetto e la reciproca collaborazione nei vari campi, per promuovere gli interessi ed il benessere dei due popoli e contribuire al sostegno della pace ed alla stabilità nella regione del Mediterraneo, al suo sviluppo economico ed al benessere dei suoi popoli. Il Governo italiano esprime il proprio rammarico per le sofferenze arrecate al popolo libico a seguito della colonizzazione italiana e si adopererà per rimuoverne per quanto possibile gli effetti, per superare e dimenticare il passato, avviare una nuova era di amichevoli e costruttive relazioni tra i due popoli. Il Governo italiano, pertanto, si impegna a: 1 continuare a ricercare, con tutti i mezzi disponibili, i cittadini libici allontanati coercitivamente, all'epoca, dalla loro Patria e dai propri familiari; 2 adoperarsi, in forma diretta e tramite la collaborazione bilaterale ed internazionale, per la rimozione e bonifica dei campi minati disseminati in Libia durante la guerra. Per la realizzazione di tal fine, il Governo italiano offrirà la propria assistenza tramite l'istituzione di corsi di formazione per unità speciali per la rimozione delle mine in Libia; offrirà le cure, alle persone danneggiate dalle mine terrestri, in centri specializzati in Italia; provvederà alla costruzione in Libia di un centro medico specialistico per l'applicazione di protesi in collaborazione tra la Mezzaluna Rossa libica e la Croce Rossa italiana; 3 offrire risarcimenti ed assistenza alle persone danneggiate per effetto dello scoppio di dette mine; contribuire alla realizzazione di progetti umanitari atti ad aiutare le famiglie dei disabili e dei danneggiati; collaborare con lo Stato libico nell'operazione di sviluppo delle regioni disseminate e danneggiate dalle mine: accordi specifici tra i due Stati stabiliranno i relativi dettagli; 4 Al raggiungimento di tali obiettivi si provvederà attraverso la costituzione di una Società italo-libica, in cui partecipano imprese italiane pubbliche e private, ed il Presidente della quale viene designato dalla Parte libica. Il suo scopo sarà di contribuire al sostegno dell'economia libica tramite l'esecuzione di progetti di infrastrutture di base e di progetti di sviluppo in genere. Tale Società costituirà un Fondo Speciale (con contributi di società italiane, il settore pubblico italiano ed enti libici) per i seguenti scopi: - la bonifica ed urbanizzazione delle zone disseminate di mine durante la Il guerra mondiale; - la formazione di specialisti nel campo dello sminamento; la cura dei cittadini libici danneggiati dallo scoppio delle mine; la costruzione di un centro medico in Libia per la cura dei lesionati dalle mine; - la ricerca dei cittadini libici che furono allontanati dal loro Paese e dei loro discendenti, figli e nipoti, per restituire riconoscimento, materiale e morale, ai loro familiari ed al popolo libico; - altre iniziative atte ad alleviare gli esiti negativi causati dal passato. L'Italia fornirà un sostegno speciale alla Libia, sul versante culturale e nel campo dello sviluppo economico e degli aiuti tecnici. Accordi particolari tra le parti competenti nei

369 due Stati ne stabiliranno condizioni e dettagli. L'Italia si impegna a restituire alla Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, tutti i manoscritti, reperti, documenti, monumenti e oggetti archeologici trafugati in Italia, durante e dopo la colonizzazione italiana della Libia, secondo la Convenzione dell'UNESCO del 14 novembre 1970 su importazione, esportazione e trasferimenti illeciti di beni culturali. I due Paesi collaboreranno per individuare tali manoscritti, reperti, documenti, monumenti, pezzi archeologici ed oggetti ed indicarne l'ubicazione. Le due Parti concedono, I'una all'altra, un rapporto preferenziale di reciproca collaborazione. Il Governo italiano concede ai cittadini libici il diritto di godere dei privilegi riconosciuti dalla legislazione italiana all'epoca della colonizzazione, nella misura in cui le Autorità competenti, in Libia ed in Italia, definiscano tali privilegi, compatibilmente con gli obblighi derivanti all'Italia dall'appartenenza all'Unione Europea. Lo Stato libico, a sua volta, permetterà ai cittadini italiani interdetti dall'ingresso nel proprio territorio, per delle precedenti disposizioni, di entrare nel territorio libico per motivi di turismo, visita o lavoro. In conclusione, le due Parti prendono atto che la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista conferma che con l'applicazione del presente Comunicato, non vi saranno più motivi di contesa o di polemica, con I'Italia, circa il passato. Il presente Comunicato è stato redatto e firmato nella città di Roma in data 4 luglio 1998. per la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista Omar Mustafa El Muntasser Segretario del Comitato Popolare Generale per il Collegamento Estero e la Cooperazione Internazionale per la Repubblica Italiana Lamberto Dini Ministro degli Affari Esteri

[Fonte: sito Internet Associazione Italiani Rimpatriati dalla Libia]

370 ATTO CAMERA

INTERROGAZIONE A RISPOSTA SCRITTA 4/00411

Dati di presentazione dell'atto

Legislatura: 15 Seduta di annuncio: 17 del 03/07/2006

Firmatari

Primo firmatario: PEDRIZZI RICCARDO Gruppo: ALLEANZA NAZIONALE Data firma: 03/07/2006

Destinatari

Ministero destinatario:

• PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI • MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

Ministero/i delegato/i a rispondere e data delega Delegato a rispondere Data delega PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 03/07/2006 Attuale delegato a rispondere: MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI delegato in data 13/07/2006

Stato iter:

CONCLUSO il 17/01/2007 Partecipanti allo svolgimento/discussione RISPOSTA GOVERNO 17/01/2007 INTINI UGO VICE MINISTRO AFFARI ESTERI

Fasi iter:

MODIFICATO PER MINISTRO DELEGATO IL 13/07/2006 SOLLECITO IL 28/11/2006 RISPOSTA PUBBLICATA IL 17/01/2007 CONCLUSO IL 17/01/2007

Atto Camera

Interrogazione a risposta scritta 4-00411 presentata da RICCARDO PEDRIZZI lunedì 3 luglio 2006 nella seduta n.017

PEDRIZZI. - Al Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al Ministro degli affari esteri. - Per sapere - premesso che:

371 al fine di dare seguito alle convergenti indicazioni emerse dalla riunione congiunta delle Commissioni Esteri e Difesa di Senato e Camera nella XIV legislatura, il Consiglio dei Ministri n. 46 del 23 febbraio 2006 ha deciso di adottare tutte le iniziative opportune a dare respiro strategico e forte valenza operativa alla partnership Italia-Libia;

è stata assegnata priorità a chiudere definitivamente il capitolo storico del passato coloniale, anche con misure significative, oltre a quelle già eseguite ed in corso di esecuzione, da concordare con la parte libica, che diano segno di amicizia tra i due popoli, in particolare quella della concessione senza discriminazione dei visti ai profughi italiani; si continua a ricercare con la parte libica una soluzione accettabile del contenzioso economico sui crediti che vantano le aziende italiane espulse dal territorio libico; i componenti dell'AIRL (Associazione Italiana Rimpatriati dalla Libia) erano proprietari in Libia di beni mobili ed immobili ed hanno ivi esercitato le proprie attività, contribuendo allo sviluppo delle relazioni industriali e commerciali del paese stesso; nell'anno 1970, a seguito del mutamento del regime di governo, i nostri connazionali residenti in Libia ed i loro danti causa, subivano, in quanto cittadini italiani, l'espulsione dal territorio libico e la confisca di tutti i loro beni da parte del Governo della Libia, in violazione del Trattato Italo-Libico del 1956, nonché delle Risoluzioni dell'ONU relative alla proclamazione di indipendenza della Libia, che garantivano diritti ed interessi della comunità italiana; in quella occasione, probabilmente per ragioni di opportunità politica ed economica, il Governo italiano ritenne di dover accettare il fatto compiuto, senza denunciare la violazione del Trattato del 1956 e senza avvalersi della clausola arbitrale espressamente prevista dall'articolo 17 del Trattato medesimo; il Parlamento italiano ha approvato, dapprima, la legge del 6 dicembre 1971, n. 1066, con la quale si riconosceva un acconto sugli indennizzi spettanti ai cittadini italiani per i beni perduti, e successivamente la legge del 28 novembre 1980 n. 16, legge del 5 aprile 1985 n. 135 e legge del 29 gennaio 1994 n. 98 che sono ancora in via di applicazione; la misura degli indennizzi normativamente riconosciuti non può considerarsi certamente congrua, sia per ciò che concerne la valutazione dei beni confiscati, sia per la difficoltà o, addirittura l'impossibilità di reperire la documentazione richiesta a supporto delle domande di indennizzo; nel luglio 1998, interveniva tra Italia e Libia un accordo, che pur affrontando e risolvendo diverse «questioni aperte» tra i due Paesi, non faceva alcun cenno alla questione del risarcimento per i beni confiscati dalla Libia ai cittadini italiani; il Governo italiano è stato più volte interpellato e sollecitato ad operarsi in ambito internazionale per conseguire una risoluzione della questione, ma nessuna reale ed efficace azione è stata intrapresa in tal senso, nei trentasei anni che sono trascorsi dalla rivoluzione libica;

372 alcuni componenti dell'AIRL, hanno avviato un azione legale innanzi alla Corte Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo (CEDU) per censurare la presenza di una prassi amministrativa di tolleranza da parte dell'Italia di un comportamento lesivo dei diritti riconosciuti dalla stessa CEDU -: se non ritengano di fornire chiarimenti in merito a quanto esposto, in particolare per quel che concerne la concessione dei visti di ingresso in Libia ai profughi italiani; quali concrete ed urgenti iniziative intendano assumere per fronteggiare e chiudere questo capitolo storico risalente al secolo scorso; quali provvedimenti intendano prendere per l'integrale soddisfazione dei danni patiti dai nostri connazionali espulsi dalla Libia a seguito delle confische operate dal Governo Libico a partire dal 1970 ed allo stato rimasti ancora sostanzialmente privi di adeguati indennizzi. (4-00411)

Atto Camera

Risposta scritta pubblicata mercoledì 17 gennaio 2007 nell'allegato B della seduta n. 093 All'Interrogazione 4-00411 presentata da PEDRIZZI

Risposta. - In relazione a quanto rappresentato dall'interrogante nel presente atto parlamentare, si sottolinea che la questione dei visti agli esuli italiani di Libia rappresenta già da tempo una priorità per il Governo italiano, nell'ambito del rilancio dei rapporti bilaterali con la Libia. Infatti, fin dal 1998, nel Comunicato congiunto italo-libico, la parte libica aveva assunto un formale impegno a consentire l'ingresso in Libia dei cittadini italiani nati in loco, impegno poi confermato anche in successivi incontri al più alto livello (da ultimo in quello dell'allora Presidente del Consiglio Berlusconi con il Colonnello Gheddafi il 7 ottobre 2004). Nonostante questo, però, Tripoli ha reso nota, nell'aprile 2005, una disposizione per la quale possono ottenere un visto d'ingresso in Libia solo quei cittadini italiani nati nel Paese, che abbiano compiuto sessantacinque anni di età. Il Governo italiano ha immediatamente richiesto alle Autorità libiche, in svariate occasioni, di annullare tale disposizione - ritenuta un'ulteriore discriminazione - e di sostituirla con una di carattere generale, che consenta senza limitazioni a tutti i profughi di Libia di poter ottenere un visto di ingresso. Da ultimo, nel corso degli incontri avuti a Rama con il Vice Ministro libico per i Paesi dell'Europa, Al Obeidi, il 4 luglio e il 3 agosto 2006, il Ministro degli Affari Esteri ha ribadito la nostra viva aspettativa che la questione dei visti a favore dei cittadini italiani nati in Libia possa trovare al più presto una positiva e definitiva soluzione. Con riferimento, infine, al quesito riguardante gli indennizzi a favore dei cittadini italiani espulsi dalla Libia nel 1970, si segnala che la normativa vigente prevede «indennizzi» che

373 sono stati concessi nei limiti e con l'osservanza delle condizioni e modalità previste dalle leggi stesse. Tale normativa è stata ormai integralmente applicata, non senza difficoltà, considerata la mancanza di collaborazione da parte del Governo libico, che non ha mai consentito accertamenti o più semplicemente l'accesso alla documentazione. Da ultimo, la legge 98/94 ha addirittura previsto la massima possibile garanzia consentendo, da un lato il ricorso all'atto notorio per provare la proprietà dei beni perduti e dall'altro il ricorso al giudice ordinario avverso le determinazioni dell'Amministrazione ove ciò si rendesse necessario. Il Governo condivide pienamente il sentimento di solidarietà e di riconoscenza per i connazionali all'estero vittime di danni ed affronti ingiusti e continuerà ad adoperarsi, nei limiti consentiti dalle risorse disponibili, affinché ad essi venga riconosciuta adeguata soddisfazione.

Il Viceministro degli affari esteri: Ugo Intini.

374 CONTRIBUTI DI ANALISI E DOTTRINA

Arturo Varvelli N. 97 - LUGLIO 2008 L’Italia, la Libia e l’indebolimento del rapporto privilegiato Sintesi Nel corso dei 39 anni di tica nel Mediterraneo, di cui La completa normalizzazione delle relazioni tra l’Italia e la Libia di l’anti-imperialismo di Gheddafi relazioni internazionali della Libia ha Gheddafi la storia sembra es- fu tutto sommato baluardo avuto inevitabilmente come contraltare l’indebolimento del sersi ripresentata più volte. negli anni Settanta, poi in rapporto privilegiato con l’Italia. Problemi vecchi e nuovi sem- relazione al rischio costituito Quel nesso di reciproca brano trascinarsi nel corso dal fondamentalismo islamico indispensabilità del passato, basato degli anni senza che ad essi di cui il laicismo del regime su una evidente complementarietà si riesca a trovare una solu- libico è un naturale strenuo economica, sembra essersi zione definitiva. Tuttavia, Italia oppositore. affievolito. Infatti, la crescita della domanda mondiale di petrolio rende, e Libia hanno avuto relazioni Tuttavia proprio in relazione al a differenza degli scorsi decenni in privilegiate per gran parte del- passato storico si sono cui l’isolamento libico giocava un la loro recente storia. A legare ruolo fondamentale, più facilmente registrate le maggiori difficol- i due paesi non è solo un sostituibile il ruolo di primo tà. Il rimpatrio forzato degli passato storico comune, che importatore dell’Italia, grazie al fatto italiani tra il luglio e l’ottobre pure è motivo di divisione, ma che la Libia dispone ora di nuovi e del 1970 fece chiaramente in- numerosi partner. anche relazioni commerciali tendere che il nuovo regime costanti che hanno saputo La differenziazione dell’economia e del Colonnello era propria- resistere ai momenti in cui il la creazione di un sistema mente costituito su sentimenti produttivo sostenibile appare una tono della contrapposizione anti-colonialisti e che neces- strada inevitabile, e parzialmente già politica si è fatto più aspro. La sitava di compattarsi per mo- intrapresa da Tripoli. La riforma Libia svolge un ruolo diffi- tivi interni contro il vecchio economica che Gheddafi sembra cilmente sostituibile nella po- voler imboccare, si prospetta come oppressore. Nonostante que- litica energetica italiana non una transizione difficile e sto inizio difficile, e le prime solo per l’entità delle impor- potenzialmente destabilizzante. contemporanee richieste di L’Italia potrebbe essere rilevante nel tazioni di petrolio, ma anche risarcimento per danni, le delicato passaggio delle riforme per la qualità non comune del relazioni tra i due paesi sono svolgendo ancora una volta una greggio libico e per la pros- proseguite piuttosto positi- funzione stabilizzante della società simità geografica che con- libica, permettendo al governo di vamente per buona parte de- sente un più facile accesso Tripoli di individuare nell’Italia un gli anni Settanta1. In quel alle risorse. Una funzione che partner determinante nel processo periodo la convenienza a un di trasformazione economica, grazie nell’ultimo decennio è dive- alle caratteristiche della propria nuta ancora più importante in economia legata alla piccola e media seguito all’interesse italiano 1 Nel giro di qualche anno, dalla impresa. allo sfruttamento delle risorse partenza forzata degli italiani, l’Eni di gas naturali. A queste ra- evitò la nazionalizzazione, che man gioni, si aggiunge il ruolo rile- mano toccava invece in sorte alle altre società petrolifere straniere, vante della Libia nella sicu- mentre più tardi, nell’ottobre del rezza del Mediterraneo, un’a- 1972, firmò un accordo di compar- rea fondamentale per l’Italia. tecipazione paritaria con l’ente Arturo Varvelli è Dottore di ricerca Per i governi italiani la Libia di petrolifero libico (Lnoc), per lo in Storia delle relazioni Gheddafi ha giocato sempre sfruttamento del ricco giacimento di internazionali. un ruolo stabilizzante nella re- Bu Attifel. Due anni dopo un accor- do di cooperazione economica, gione, prima in relazione al ri- scientifica e tecnica sanciva il ruolo schio di un’espansione sovie- italiano di “partner privilegiato” del- la Libia. 377 rapporto stretto era reciproca. positiva per parecchi anni. Ottanta e continuata nei primi Se l’Italia aveva bisogno del Tuttavia alcuni fattori politici anni Novanta – causa di una petrolio libico, anche il regime influirono negativamente nelle crisi fiscale in Libia –, l’Italia di Tripoli necessitava dell’Ita- relazioni bilaterali. L’aperta lavorò per un progressivo lia, innanzitutto come fonda- ostilità americana dei primi reinserimento libico nella co- mentale contribuente alla sta- anni Ottanta, l’opposizione li- munità internazionale, cosa bilità del rentier state. Roma bica ad ogni risoluzione che avrebbe garantito alle era la prima importatrice di pacifica del conflitto medio- relazioni italiane con Tripoli petrolio libico, i cui introiti per- rientale e il sostegno e finan- uno sviluppo più sereno in un mettevano a Gheddafi di di- ziamento a gruppi terroristici nuovo contesto internazio- stribuire la rendita alla popo- internazionali incisero nega- nale. lazione attraverso la crea- tivamente sulle relazioni tra i zione di posti di lavoro pub- due paesi. Il conseguente blici, una politica dei prezzi avvicinamento libico-sovietico Le relazioni attuali controllata dallo stato e un cominciò a preoccupare l’Italia sistema di sussidi ai beni di anche sotto il punto di vista Oggi l’elevato prezzo inter- prima necessità. Ma l’Italia, politico. In questo periodo la nazionale del greggio sta attraverso il proprio know Libia fece più pressanti le facendo vivere alla Libia una how, era necessaria anche proprie richieste di indennizzo nuova fase economica assai per il mantenimento della ca- e strappò all’Italia, il primo a favorevole, paragonabile per pacità libica sia di estrarre il concederle fu Andreotti, alcu- certi versi a quella degli anni petrolio che forniva la rendita, ne parziali promesse sul risar- settanta. Tuttavia il contesto sia nell’attuare il processo di cimento (all’inizio si trattò del- politico internazionale è molto distribuzione della stessa, che la costruzione di un ospe- diverso e differenti sono an- avveniva grazie alla realizza- dale)2. Ciononostante le rela- che i rapporti economici della zione italiana di molte opere zioni economiche e la loro Libia. civili e alla importazione di “necessità” per entrambe le La completa normalizzazione beni primari e prodotti finiti. La parti rimasero un caposaldo delle relazioni internazionali crescita dei prezzi del greggio delle relazioni italo-libiche. I della Libia, a cui l’Italia ha che si verificava in quel perio- due paesi superarono anche contribuito giocando da sem- do e che sarebbe durata per la crisi del 1986, con il lancio pre un ruolo d’avanguardia, tutti gli anni Settanta favorì un dei missili libici su Lampe- ha avuto inevitabilmente co- notevole aumento delle entra- dusa, una crisi che non aveva me contraltare l’indebolimento te libiche. Dopo il raffred- origini interne alle relazioni tra del rapporto privilegiato con damento dei rapporti con gli i due paesi ma, piuttosto, era l’Italia. Dal punto di vista altri paesi occidentali, dagli stata indotta dall’atteggiamen- economico, nonostante l’Italia Stati Uniti alla Gran Bretagna, to degli Stati Uniti. Anche si sia giovata in termini as- alla Francia, per varie moti- successivamente all’accadu- soluti dell’apertura e della vazioni politiche, l’Italia rimase to, pur nel rispetto delle san- ripresa mercato libico, il ruolo l’unico vero referente occi- zioni internazionali da parte italiano appare eroso rispetto dentale della Libia, raffor- italiana, la Libia restò un agli altri partner. Le impor- zando la propria funzione di partner ideale, un mercato dal tazioni dell’Italia dalla Libia complementarietà nell’econo- quale l’Italia poteva, da una sono passate, in termini per- mia libica. In breve periodo, parte, comprare petrolio e, centuali dal 42,8 del totale nel grazie alla disponibilità finan- dall’altra, vendere i propri 2002 al 37,4 nel 2006, mentre ziaria libica le imprese italiane prodotti, riequilibrando parzial- le esportazioni sono an- si aggiudicarono importanti mente la bilancia commer- ch’esse diminuite passando commesse e il ruolo italiano ciale. In questo periodo critico 3 dal 25% al 14% . Quel nesso nel paese fu straordinaria- per la Libia, nel quale alle di reciproca indispensabilità mente rafforzato. sanzioni si sommò la caduta sembra apparentemente es- del prezzo del petrolio iniziata La collaborazione tra i due sersi indebolito, perché la cre- nella seconda metà degli anni paesi, basata su questa scita della domanda mondiale relazione economica di “reci- proca utilità”, rimase stabile e 2 Intervista dell’autore al sen. Giulio 3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Libya Andreotti, 24 ottobre 2006. Country Profile, 2007. 378 di petrolio rende, a differenza fu chiuso rapidamente con la queste controversie politiche degli scorsi decenni in cui donazione del complesso e le difficoltà dovute ad una l’isolamento libico giocava un ospedaliero promesso. Il risul- accresciuta concorrenza eco- ruolo fondamentale, più facil- tato di questa situazione è nomica internazionale costrin- mente sostituibile il ruolo di stato il trascinarsi del conten- gono quindi ad un riesame primo importatore dell’Italia, zioso stesso nel corso di un delle attuali relazioni italo- grazie al fatto che la Libia decennio e l’esasperazione libiche. dispone ora di nuovi e nume- attuale delle pretese libiche. La recente visita del presi- rosi partner. Oggi il petrolio e Viaggiando in un mare peri- dente del Consiglio Silvio Ber- il gas della Libia sono oggetto glioso di ambiguità, il “dono” è lusconi sembra aver nuova- di grande attenzione da parte finito per naufragare e Ghed- mente rasserenato i rapporti, di altri paesi, quasi totalmente dafi ha alzato la posta chie- ma la questione va valutata nuovi al mercato libico come dendo la costruzione di un’au- alla luce di due interrogativi la Cina, o nuovamente coin- tostrada di ben 1.900 chilo- correlati: può l’Italia oggi con- volti dopo un lungo periodo metri dal confine con la Tu- tinuare a giocare un ruolo come la Russia, la Francia, la nisia alla frontiera libico- d’avanguardia nelle relazioni Gran Bretagna, la Spagna e egiziana. con Tripoli, che le permetta di gli Stati Uniti4. Queste rela- Ma ai vecchi problemi se ne garantire i propri fondamentali zioni economiche sono natu- sono aggiunti di nuovi. Per- interessi politici ed economici, ralmente frutto delle nuove durano gli insoluti di paga- o si deve invece rassegnare relazioni politiche della Libia. mento sofferti da circa 100 ad un ruolo meno signifi- Relativamente alle relazioni imprese italiane per com- cativo? Potrebbe un nuovo con l’Italia sembrano invece plessivi 600 milioni di dollari. accordo politico ed econo- ancora pesare le questioni Vi sono poi questioni relative mico, che includesse esplici- rimaste insolute. Le richieste ai visti di ingresso richiesti tamente un riconoscimento libiche di risarcimenti, a cui dagli italiani costretti dal del risarcimento, risolvere il Gheddafi ricorre sovente, regime di Gheddafi a fare contenzioso ed avviare i due sono sempre state interpre- ritorno in Italia nel 1970 paesi verso una nuova fase di tate dai vari governi italiani più abbandonando in Libia beni collaborazione? come un’arma negoziale adot- immobili e imprese solo par- tata nelle relazioni economi- zialmente risarciti secondo che che la dimostrazione di l’Associazione degli italiani La trasformazione eco- un’irrinunciabile, e motivata, rimpatriati dalla Libia. Ma di nomica libica rivendicazione. Tuttavia, no- ancor più difficile soluzione nostante le offerte e le pro- risulta essere il problema Innanzitutto vanno tenuti in messe dell’Italia sancite nel relativo all’immigrazione. Il considerazione la congiuntura 1998 con il comunicato con- flusso di immigrazione clan- economica internazionale, lo giunto firmato dall'allora mini- destina proveniente dalle co- sviluppo politico-economico li- stro degli Esteri Lamberto Dini ste libiche è infatti emerso bico e, ancora una volta, le con il suo omologo dell'epoca, come numericamente sempre caratteristiche di rentier state Omar Mustafa El Muntasser – più rilevante negli ultimi anni. del regime libico. La diffe- con il quale l'Italia, per la Ciò ha costretto l’Italia a chie- renziazione dell’economia e la prima volta, si impegnava a dere la collaborazione della creazione di un sistema pro- correggere gli errori del Libia nel controllo dei traffici duttivo sostenibile appare una passato – il contenzioso non marittimi. Il colonnello Ghed- strada inevitabile, e parzial- dafi si è generalmente reso mente già intrapresa da Tri- 4 La russa Gazprom negli ultimi disponibile a patto di un con- mesi si è dimostrata partico- tributo italiano in termini fi- larmente interessata alle forniture nanziari e di mezzi5. Tutte d’attuazione – che prevede la ces- libiche, prima attraverso la richiesta sione temporanea alla Libia di sei all’Eni della cessione/scambio di unità navali della Guardia di finan- alcuni giacimenti di petrolio e di 5 Il 29 dicembre scorso il ministro za per operazioni di controllo, ri- gas di sua proprietà, poi attraverso degli Interni Giuliano Amato e il mi- cerca e salvataggio nei luoghi di l’inizio di trattative dirette con i libici nistro degli Esteri libico Abdur- partenza delle “carrette del mare” per l'acquisto di gas, proponendosi raham Mohamed Shalgam hanno sia in acque italiane che libiche e anche come distributore. siglato un accordo – ora in via con equipaggi misti. 379 poli. Tuttavia, la politica eco- presente congiuntura petro- concorrenti, è costituito dalla nomica libica rimane disar- lifera e il reintegro nella comu- natura stessa del sistema ticolata e solo negli ultimi anni nità internazionale. economico italiano, costituito ha dimostrato una preoc- di piccole e medie imprese. L’economia libica gode infatti cupazione per lo sviluppo Proprio questa tipologia di di buona salute grazie agli post-petrolifero. “I mercati, co- impresa è infatti la maggior- attuali prezzi petroliferi, men- me indica il caso libico, non mente richiesta nel processo tre dal punto di vista politico la esistono in un vuoto ammi- di trasformazione dell’econo- svolta moderata della Libia ha nistrativo, sociale e isti- mia libica nel quale i di- offerto le garanzie necessarie tuzionale. Per creare mercati pendenti statali sono in- ai paesi e alle imprese stra- interni competitivi non è suf- centivati a dimettersi e ad niere per operare con maggior ficiente eliminare quelle parti avviare un’attività produttiva. convinzione nel paese. Tripoli, della burocrazia che con- Alle aziende straniere è infatti pur nelle incoerenze del regi- trollano e regolano il flusso di sempre di più chiesto di for- me, è dunque avviata sulla beni e servizi, come si intende mare joint-venture a capitale strada di una graduale e spesso in letteratura. Lo stato misto con imprenditori libici. prudente riforma economica, deve attivamente dispiegare e L’Italia quindi, al di là delle che, minimizzando i rischi di creare gli strumenti a sua grandi commesse civili ed destabilizzazione, possa atti- disposizione per portare a edili per i quali sembra fatale rare gli investimenti esteri termine i difficili compiti di l’ascesa di nuovi referenti7, fuori dal settore degli idro- amministrazione e di come la Cina che vanta bassi carburi, diversificare l’econo- regolazione indiretta per costi di manodopera, potreb- mia, sviluppare la piccola e definire i diritti di proprietà, per be ancora giocare un ruolo media impresa e creare posti fare osservare i contratti, importante nella costituzione di lavoro. tagliare i costi di transazione della piccola e media impresa e, infine, promuovere una Naturalmente questa trasfor- locale. Questo presuppone concorrenza reale”6. Intra- mazione non può prescindere però una nuova strategia eco- prendere quindi il percorso da un forte legame con i paesi nomica nei confronti del della riforma economica si- più sviluppati. E questa è pro- paese di Gheddafi. Nono- gnifica, seppur progressiva- babilmente, insieme al peri- stante una costante presenza, mente, mettere in discussione colo islamico interno, la moti- infatti, sono proprio le PMI il contratto sociale tra il re- vazione principale che ha quelle che storicamente han- gime e i cittadini basato sulla spinto Gheddafi nell’ultimo de- no trovato i maggiori ostacoli distribuzione della rendita pro- cennio alla svolta moderata, e hanno avuto strumenti prio perché questa viene no- alle parziali ammissioni di col- minori per superarli, a co- tevolmente riorientata. pa sugli attentati terroristici ed minciare dalla conoscenza alle aperture agli Stati Uniti. delle complesse regole per gli La riforma economica che Perché questo passaggio ab- investimenti in Libia, alla dif- Gheddafi sembra voler intra- bia pieno successo la Libia ha ficile protezione dei propri cre- prendere, con il ruolo di guida bisogno della comunità inter- diti, alle frequenti controver- della Fondazione diretta dal nazionale, dell’Europa, e an- sie. Spesso appoggiate in figlio Saif Al-Islam, si pro- che dell’Italia. parallelo da azioni politiche, le spetta quindi come un pas- grandi imprese italiane in saggio difficile e potenzial- Dal punto di vista italiano, Libia, l’Eni prima fra tutte, mente destabilizzante. Le titu- infatti, se appare inevitabile hanno sempre ottenuto buoni banze del regime nei confronti un certo ridimensionamento successi economici nelle rela- di un cambiamento simile so- del ruolo di guida nelle rela- zioni con i libici, che si sono no dettate proprio da questo zioni con Tripoli, rimane uno dimostrati partner affidabili. timore. Due condizioni sem- straordinario interesse ad es- Ne è testimonianza la recente brano però poter aiutare la sere uno dei principali prota- firma dei sei contratti di Libia in questo passaggio: la gonisti dello sviluppo interno Exploration and Production libico. Il vantaggio competitivo 6 D. VANDEWALLE, Libya Since dell’Italia, oltre che dalla lunga Indipendence. Oil and State- familiarità con la Libia degli 7 F. ZALLIO, La Libia tra op- Building, I.B. Tauris Pubblishers, operatori italiani rispetto ai portunità e competizione, «ISPI London 1998. Med Brief», n. 4, 5 maggio 2008. 380 Sharing (Epsa IV) che con- gramma di cooperazione sta- disposto a rispettare i patti vertono gli accordi siglati a bile tra i due paesi. sottoscritti con il paese che ha ottobre scorso sull'attività di violato irrimediabilmente la di-

Eni in Libia e prolungano la gnità della Libia. A queste fornitura di petrolio fino al I problemi politici ricorrenti obiezioni la miglior 2042 e quella di gas fino al risposta verrebbe proprio dal- 2047, nonostante le tempo- Relativamente alla richiesta di la firma di un accordo che sia ranee tensioni suscitate a fine risarcimento e ad un possibile capace di comprendere e diri- aprile dalla nomina di Cal- accordo politico, va con- mere tutte le controversie tra i deroli a ministro. siderato innanzitutto che le due paesi e che quindi limiti la più importanti decisioni eco- possibilità di revanscismo fu- L’ipotesi da percorrere è nomiche della Libia sono turo della Libia. Come ricor- quella di un accordo eco- guidate da scelte politiche. dato in precedenza, nelle nomico che coinvolga ed in- Poi si deve valutare che, occasioni in cui i due paesi centivi anche le piccole e giunti a questo punto delle hanno stipulato accordi basati medie imprese italiane ad trattative tra i due paesi, sulla reciproca convenienza, operare sul mercato libico. sarebbe controproducente tor- la Libia si è rivelata un partner Per dare maggiore incisività nare sui propri passi. Quindi sostanzialmente affidabile. alla propria azione l’Italia do- la definizione di un accordo vrebbe, innanzitutto, richiede- La retorica anti-italiana potrà che dia attuazione al proto- re alla Libia la revisione di rimanere comunque una co- collo di intesa siglato nel 1998 alcuni degli strumenti che stante di Gheddafi, ma sarà e insieme costituisca un dovevano facilitare i rapporti solamente strumentale al pia- “accordo di carattere globale, economici, come l’Associa- no interno perché la vena an- vantaggioso per entrambe le zione Libico Italiana (Ali), ti-colonialista resterà intrinse- parti”, come augurato più vol- creata dall’accordo del 1998, ca alla “rivoluzione” degli uffi- te dalla Farnesina, pare au- nel tempo trasformatasi in ciali libici e continuerà a costi- spicabile. “uno strumento che molte tuire una chiave di volta della aziende italiane percepiscono Senza entrare nella questione sopravvivenza stessa del regi- come vessatorio. Infatti l’Ali, se sia doveroso o meno un ri- me. Tuttavia sarà svuotata di offrendo di fatto il solo servizio sarcimento per i fatti storici, richieste specifiche e difficil- di facilitare l’ottenimento dei seppur ora, diversamente da mente potrà essere riproposta visti, chiede alle aziende ita- qualche decennio fa, siano qualche rivendicazione come liane che fanno affari in Libia molto più chiare le responsa- condizione al mantenimento di pagare una percentuale bilità italiane9, nel breve e me- di buone relazioni. che varia dall'0,5 al 2,5% sui dio periodo l’accordo schiu- La nuova Unione per il Medi- loro contratti rendendo più derebbe la strada a una col- terraneo, varata nei giorni difficile la competizione con gli laborazione più stabile tra i scorsi con il vertice di Parigi, altri concorrenti esteri”8. Il due paesi anche nei settori di avrebbe potuto teoricamente tentativo libico di proporsi agli più recente interesse, come garantire alla realizzazione occhi degli investitori inter- quello dell’immigrazione. del progetto autostradale un nazionali come grande hub I rilievi che oggi vengono quadro europeo adeguato, in- dell’area mediterranea, an- mossi al possibile accordo serendo il progetto in quello drebbe assecondato con ini- fanno leva sull’inaffidabilità di più generale della costruzione ziative – come quella da più Gheddafi: il leader libico, in di collegamenti stradali dal parti ventilata della creazione questa visione, sarebbe poco Marocco all’Egitto. Ma la man- di un “incubatore” italo-libico cata partecipazione di Ghed- per le piccole e medie im- dafi al vertice mette forte- prese – che possano costi- 9 Si vedano per esempio due mente in dubbio anche un fu- tuire un vero e visibile pro- recenti lavori dello storico del colonialismo italiano A. DEL BO- turo coinvolgimento libico nel- CA, Italiani, brava gente?, Milano la realizzazione di quei pro- 2005, e A un passo dalla forca. getti, soprattutto nei settori 8 A. CATARCI, Nota del direttore Atrocità e infamie dell'occupazione dell’energia, dei trasporti e ufficio Ice di Tripoli, novembre italiana della Libia nelle memorie delle infrastrutture, e nello svi- 2007. del patriota Moha-med Fekini, Milano 2007. luppo delle piccole e medie 381 imprese, che sono al centro Conclusioni to, impone alle imprese ita- della nuova cooperazione tra liane di ampliare le offerte la due sponde. Denunciando il Esiste ancora un importante superando il tradizionale ap- progetto come una “forma di ruolo che l’Italia potrebbe gio- proccio legato alla pura e nuovo colonialismo”, Gheddafi care, grazie alle proprie carat- semplice esportazione di pro- cerca di spingere altri leader teristiche economiche. L’Italia dotti. Viene infatti richiesta la ad allinearsi sulla medesima potrebbe essere rilevante nel disponibilità a formare società opinione, prendendo in questo delicato passaggio delle rifor- miste, trasferendo il know- modo la leadership della po- me svolgendo ancora una how della piccola e media sizione critica verso l’Unione volta una funzione stabiliz- impresa. Lo scopo è quello di per il Mediterraneo. Ciò non zante della società libica, per- “arricchire l’economia libica implica certo la fine del mettendo al governo di Tripoli con un tessuto imprenditoriale dialogo economico e commer- di individuare nell’Italia un idoneo a soddisfare le richie- ciale, destinato a continuare, partner determinante nel ste del mercato interno libico, ma svincola, come in passato, processo di trasformazione ma, possibilmente, anche Gheddafi dalle regole del rap- economica. quelle dei paesi confinanti”11. porto stabile con l’Europa. L’interesse italiano quindi è La dirigenza libica pare poter, Il compito della diplomazia quello di favorire una cre- nei prossimi anni, cambiare le italiana non si presenta facile. scente interdipendenza tra i prospettive di sviluppo della L’Italia dovrebbe essere in due paesi. Secondo il Rap- Libia, che, a lungo termine, prima fila nell’accompagnare il porto del Gruppo di Ri- non possono essere vincolate rinnovato interesse libico, co- flessione Strategica del unicamente al settore petro- munque manifestato, verso ministero degli Affari Esteri lifero, anche se, ovviamente, una maggiore integrazione (Rapporto 2020), con i paesi questa risorsa è destinata a economica con le istituzioni con i quali l’Italia è mag- rimanere l’asse portante, europee ed internazionali in giormente legata dal punto di specialmente in una fase di prospettiva di un ingresso libi- vista energetico – la Libia prezzi elevati. In prospettiva di co nel Wto per il quale dal insieme a Russia, Algeria e lungo periodo, se la crescita 2004 sono in corso le proce- Norvegia copre all’incirca economica libica, accompa- dure di adesione. Anche l’U- l’80% delle importazioni ita- gnata dal contemporaneo svi- nione europea che, secondo liane – vanno costruiti, o rin- luppo degli altri paesi litoranei, le dichiarazioni del marzo saldati, rapporti politici, eco- fosse efficace e durevole, scorso del commissario per le nomici e commerciali “che favorirebbe anche la creazio- Relazioni Esterne Benita Fer- favoriscano una maggiore in- ne di una fascia di con- rero-Waldner, era decisa a terdipendenza, sviluppando tenimento dei flussi migratori colmare la lacuna dell’as- investimenti in tali paesi an- provenienti dai paesi africani senza di un quadro che disci- che in aree strategiche quali il confinanti a sud, contribuendo plini le relazioni della Libia sistema finanziario, l’industria a risolvere indirettamente un con l'Ue, dovrà continuare a di alta tecnologia e le in- altro dei problemi attualmente rivolgere l’attenzione a Tripoli. frastrutture”10. più importanti. Elemento u- Un accordo di libero scambio gualmente necessario è la for- La recente evoluzione del- ambizioso servirebbe a inten- mazione di una classe im- l’economia della Jamahiriya, sificare la cooperazione fra prenditoriale capace di impie- maggiormente orientata a so- l'Ue e la Libia sulle questioni gare le disponibilità finanziarie stenere le strutture private e economiche e commerciali e, del paese per creare una incentivarne la nascita, anche parallelamente al sostegno struttura produttiva che possa attraverso sostanziosi prestiti, europeo alla richiesta libica di assicurare il soddisfacimento sostituendole all’inefficiente aderire al Wto, questi nego- dei bisogni primari e secon- apparato produttivo dello sta- ziati darebbero un fonda- dari. Se l’Italia sarà capace di mentale impulso al rein- giocare un ruolo determinante serimento della Libia nel 10 Rapporto 2020, le scelte di sistema commerciale mon- politica estera, Unità di analisi e di 11 M. ACHILLI, prefazione a Il diale. programmazione, Gruppo di Diritto commerciale in Libia, di F. riflessione strategica, ministero GRECO, Camera italo-libica edi- Affari Esteri, 2008. zioni, 2007. 382 in questo processo di trasformazione, accompa- gnandolo con una parallela La ricerca ISPI analizza le azione politica, il risultato sarà dinamiche politiche, quello di tornare ad essere strategiche ed economiche del “indispensabile” allo sviluppo sistema internazionale con il dell’economia libica, con con- duplice obiettivo di informare e seguenti risvolti positivi per le di orientare le scelte di policy. relazioni bilaterali. I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare interesse per l’Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali e articolati in:

9 Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale 9 Programma Europa 9 Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente 9 Programma Russia e Vicini Orientali 9 Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici

9 Progetto Argentina 9 Progetto Asia Meridionale 9 Progetto Diritti Umani 9 Progetto Disarmo 9 Progetto Emergenze e Affari Umanitari 9 Progetto Internazionaliz- zazione della Pubblica Amministrazione

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384 [Fonte: sito Internet Associazione Italiani Rimpatriati dalla Libia]

La "normalizzazione" dei rapporti Italo libici e i diritti dei rimpatriati di A. Sinagra*

1. L'ultimo evento in senso cronologico nella evoluzione dei rapporti italo - libici è costituito dalle intese raggiunte il 4 luglio 1998 in sede di Commissione mista italo - arabolibica, istituita con l'Accordo bilaterale di cooperazione economica scientifica e tecnica firmato a Roma il 19 gennaio 1974. Tali intese si segnalano specificamente per il fatto che esse vanno anche oltre la attuazione di quanto convenuto con il citato Accordo del 19 gennaio 1974, e dunque per molti aspetti si pongono come nuovi accordi tra il Governo italiano e quello libico. Sotto tale prospettiva le intese raggiunte il 4 luglio 1998, per quel che esse innovano rispetto all'Accordo bilaterale del 19 gennaio 1974, e per quanto esse sotto diversi aspetti appaiano riconducibili alla previsione dell'art. 80 della Costituzione, sembrano giustificare consistenti perplessità in ordine al fatto che le medesime siano state sottratte a qualsiasi procedura di ratifica. Ancor più consistenti perplessità nel senso indicato suscita il "Comunicato congiunto" diffuso nello stesso giorno del 4 luglio 1998 all'esito della riunione della Commissione mista. Al di là del "nomen" dato al documento, esso si pone nella sua natura intrinseca come un vero e proprio Accordo internazionale con forte caratterizzazione e contenuto politico dal quale derivano ben precisi obblighi per la parte italiana. Va detto subito, in realtà, che dalla lettura di tale ultimo documento colpiscono due circostanze: la prima è il carattere assolutamente squilibrato del contenuto dell'atto che, lungi dalla sinallagmaticità di un accordo vero e proprio , vede solo la parte italiana assumere delle obbligazioni; non la parte libica. La seconda circostanza, che solo apparentemente può essere qualificata come formale ma che viceversa nella sostanza è indicativa di una ben precisa scelta politica di unilaterale assunzione di obbligazioni da parte italiana, è che mentre il Governo italiano assume le sue obbligazioni confermandole nella loro immediata operatività e nella altrui pretesa di loro immediata esigibilità con la forma indicativa delle espressioni verbali ("il Governo italiano si impegna", "il Governo italiano concede"), le solo apparenti obbligazioni assunte dalla parte libica vengono ancor più sfumate nei loro contenuti e nella loro percettività dalla forma futura delle espressioni verbali ("lo Stato libico permetterà").

Rinviando ad un momento successivo qualche rilievo in ordine ai contenuti dei documenti fin'ora citati - contenuti che per molti aspetti non sfuggono ad un giudizio anche di comicità ancorchÈ, si spera, involontaria - per valutare se con le intese da ultimo raggiunte possa seriamente parlarsi di "normalizzazione" nei rapporti italo - libici così come in modo tanto trionfale quanto ingiustificato si pretende da parte dei responsabili della nostra politica estera, occorre ripercorrere - seppur molto sinteticamente e sulla base degli atti internazionali - l'evoluzione dei rapporti italo - libici dal momento della occupazione militare britannica, all'esito dell'ultimo conflitto, della Cirenaica e della Tripolitania, fino ad oggi. Tale esame retrospettivo appare assolutamente necessario per verificare quanto di squilibrato vi fosse da una parte o dall'altra, in senso positivo o negativo, nei rapporti italo -

385 libici, e che avesse giustificato una "normalizzazione" così come vengono oggi presentate le intese raggiunte lo scorso anno. Tali intese, per il loro contenuto quasi esclusivamente concessorio da parte dello Stato italiano allo Stato libico, lascerebbero supporre che la precedente sistemazione dei rapporti fosse sbilanciata a favore e vantaggio dello Stato italiano.

2. Questo è il punto centrale che va verificato anche per quel che specificamente riguarda le rivendicazioni patrimoniali e non patrimoniali dei cittadini italiani espulsi dalla Libia nel 1970, previa confisca dei loro beni. L'atto fondamentale nella sistemazione post - bellica dei rapporti italo - libici è costituito dall'Accordo tra il governo della Repubblica Italiana e il governo del Regno Unito di Libia (con relativi scambi di note) concluso a Roma il 2 ottobre 1956. Si è detto da più parti, e ancora oggi da parte di qualcuno, che tale Accordo era troppo favorevole agli interessi italiani. Al di là delle incongruenze di un tale giudizio nei riguardi di un accordo liberamente concluso e accettato dalle due parti, deve dirsi che, a tutto ammettere, non risulta esistente nel diritto internazionale una simile ragione o motivazione per disattendere e violare i patti liberamente e regolarmente conclusi. NÈ può dirsi seriamente che gli eventi verificatisi a seguito del colpo di Stato del 1° settembre 1969, che pose fine alla monarchia senussita, possono essere intesi come denuncia degli accordi conclusi da quello Stato durante il precedente regime. Ne farebbe difetto la forma poichè non vi è mai stato un atto ufficiale in tal senso da parte libica, e ne farebbe difetto la sostanza poichè in larghissima misura le previsioni contenute nell'Accordo italo - libico del 1956 avevano avuto attuazione e dunque si erano esaurite nei loro effetti, con la conseguenza che ben poco o niente poteva costituire oggetto di denuncia da parte delle nuove autorità rivoluzionarie libiche. In secondo luogo deve ricordarsi che l'Accordo italo - libico del 1956 si poneva, come risulta dal suo preambolo e dalla legge italiana di autorizzazione alla ratifica, in rapporto di stretta esecuzione di quanto stabilito con la Risoluzione A/1758 del 19 dicembre 1950 dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite che recava ben precise disposizioni economiche e finanziarie relative al costituendo Stato indipendente di Libia; dunque, quanto di pretesamente sbilanciato a favore dello Stato italiano si volesse rinvenire nell'Accordo italo - libico del 1956, altro non è che la esatta esecuzione di quanto stabilito con la citata Risoluzione dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite. Infine, e da ultimo, deve pur dirsi che il contenuto di detta Risoluzione delle Nazioni Unite muoveva da una considerazione ben precisa dello stato di fatto esistente al momento in Libia e di quanto in Libia aveva fatto il Governo italiano fin dal 1912 in termini di sviluppo economico e di promozione sociale, oltre a quanto era stato fatto in termini di organizzazione amministrativa e istituzionale anche con riguardo ai rapporti tra la Libia e l'Italia: rapporti che potevano a giusto titolo essere qualificati non già in termini di colonizzazione, bensì più esattamente in termini di integrazione tra lo Stato italiano e la Libia. Si pensi, a tacere d'altro, ai provvedimenti in materia di cittadinanza rappresentati dal D.L. luogotenenziale del 1° giugno 1919, n. 931, relativo all'ordinamento della Tripolitania; dal RD legge 31 ottobre 1919 n. 2401 relativo all'ordinamento della Cirenaica; dalla legge 26 giugno 1927, n. 1013, e dalla successiva legge di modifica del 3 dicembre 1934, n. 2012. Conseguentemente, l'Accordo italo - libico del 1956, dando puntuale esecuzione alla Risoluzione del 19 dicembre del 1950 dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, non

386 può in alcun modo ritenersi, quanto al suo contenuto, sbilanciato a favore degli interessi italiani poiché esso, come anche la più volte citata Risoluzione, teneva giustamente conto (su ciò convenendo anche la parte libica) di quanto in termini finanziari, organizzativi e di promozione sociale ed economica era stato fatto in precedenza dal Governo italiano in favore delle popolazioni della Cirenaica e della Tripolitania. E di tale consistente sviluppo della Libia promosso dai governi italiani, pre - fascisti e fascisti tenne ben conto la Risoluzione dell'ONU nel disporre, nel suo terzo considerato, che la formale costituzione dello Stato libico indipendente doveva e poteva avvenire al più tardi il 1° gennaio 1952. Nella storia controversa delle colonizzazioni non sembra rinvenibile una situazione corrispondente che vede una ex colonia potersi costituire nella forma autonoma indipendente dello Stato a così poco tempo dalla cessazione del cosiddetto regime coloniale.

3. Da quanto finora esposto deve trarsi allora la conclusione che nulla da "normalizzare" vi era nei rapporti italo - libici a fronte di quanto già concordato con il Trattato del 2 ottobre 1956, sotto la pretesa motivazione di uno sbilanciamento di quelle intese a beneficio dello Stato e dei cittadini italiani che avevano profuso e profondevano il loro lavoro e il loro impegno nelle regioni della Cirenaica e della Tripolitania. Lo Stato libico si era inequivocabilmente impegnato al riconoscimento e al rispetto dei diritti civili, e segnatamente dei diritti di proprietà, dei cittadini italiani presenti sul territorio. Già la citata Risoluzione dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, all'art. VI, inequivocabilmente disponeva che "i beni, i diritti e gli interessi dei cittadini italiani, comprese le persone giuridiche italiane in Libia, saranno rispettati", e questo è il contenuto essenziale, per quanto ora interessa, dell'Accordo italo - libico del 2 ottobre 1956. L'espropriazione illegale e selvaggia di questi beni, diritti ed interessi che seguì da lì a poco agli eventi del 1° settembre 1969, con la successiva espulsione dei cittadini italiani titolari di quei beni, diritti e interessi nella sua illegalità può essere valutata sotto un differente punto di vista: come violazione flagrante e violenta della citata Risoluzione delle Nazioni Unite e degli accordi italo - libici del 2 ottobre 1956 ovvero come generalizzata ed illegale espropriazione da parte dello Stato libico dei beni, diritti ed interessi degli stranieri. Tale espropriazione è dal diritto internazionale qualificata come illecita e per essa, a tutto ammettere, il governo espropriante avrebbe dovuto corrispondere un indennizzo pari al valore attuale e potenziale dei beni, diritti ed interessi in questione. Premesso che non risulta che mai da parte delle autorità libiche sia stata formulata una pretesa di originaria illegale acquisizione da parte dei cittadini italiani di quei beni, diritti ed interessi (come in via eccettuativa rispetto alla generale garanzia e riconoscimento di tutela di quei beni, diritti ed interessi, prevedeva il citato art. VI della Risoluzione dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite) che nell'Accordo italo - libico del 1956 vennero accertati sulla base di una ben precisa e meticolosa documentazione, deve ancora ribadirsi che da parte del Governo italiano non si ritenne per ragioni politiche, differentemente valutabili, di sottoporre ad arbitrato la situazione determinatasi con i provvedimenti adottati dalle autorità rivoluzionarie libiche a seguito degli eventi del settembre 1969, così come prevedeva l'art. 17 dell'Accordo italo - libico del 1956. Nè il Governo italiano ritenne, per le medesime valutazioni politiche che ora si omette di commentare, di denunciare nella sede delle Nazioni Unite quei provvedimenti delle autorità libiche così palesemente violativi della Risoluzione dell'Assemblea Generale del 19 dicembre 1950.

387 Neppure ritenne il Governo italiano, e nè ha fino ad ora ritenuto, di far valere presso le autorità libiche, e a tutela dei suoi cittadini, l'obbligo di quelle autorità di risarcire quei beni, diritti ed interessi così illegalmente e indiscriminatamente confiscati con la legge libica del 21 luglio 1970 sulla base - se non degli Accordi del 2 ottobre 1956 - di una ben precisa previsione del diritto internazionale generale. Al di là di ogni valutazione sulle azioni o sulle omissioni di politica estera italiana nei confronti della Libia, da quanto finora esposto possono trarsi due conclusioni. La prima è l'obbligo sostitutivo, pieno e ineludibile, del Governo italiano di risarcire in misura integrale e comprensiva del valore degli avviamenti commerciali, degli interessi e della svalutazione monetaria, quei beni, diritti e interessi perduti dalla Comunità italiana presente in Libia e poi da lì espulsa con la forza.

4. Al riguardo, e per quel che specificamente attiene alla ormai trentennale ed ancora insoluta vicenda dei nostri connazionali forzosamente rimpatriati dalla Libia, nelle sue connessioni di diritto internazionale, deve dirsi che il problema complessivo si pone sotto il titolo, ben conosciuto agli internazionalisti, della protezione diplomatica dello Stato nei confronti dei propri cittadini e dei loro interessi all'estero. Certo, in linea generale l'istituto giuridico della "protezione diplomatica" riflette, come anche hanno avuto modo di precisare le Sezioni Unite Civili della Corte di Cassazione nel famoso caso Neroni, non già un diritto del cittadino, bensì una potestà e cioè una facoltà dello Stato di appartenenza della persona in ragione del rapporto di cittadinanza. Ma, tutte le volte in cui i diritti e gli interessi del cittadino all'estero vengono riconosciuti e garantiti dallo Stato con un Accordo internazionale - e, per quel che ora interessa, e al di là della Risoluzione dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite del 19 dicembre 1950, con l'Accordo italo - libico del 2 ottobre 1956 - lo Stato ha un obbligo nei confronti dei propri cittadini di proteggere le loro persone e i loro diritti e interessi (e questi ne hanno un corrispondente diritto) nei confronti dello Stato estero, specialmente quando nella definizione dei rapporti con quest'ultimo si prevede la possibilità di ricorrere allo strumento arbitrale. Nulla di tutto questo e nulla ha fatto lo Stato italiano in difesa dei suoi cittadini illegalmente espropriati e forzosamente rimpatriati dalla Libia. Da qui la seconda conclusione e cioè l'obbligo pieno e indiscutibile dello Stato italiano di risarcire esso, in via sostitutiva e in misura intera, i beni, i diritti e gli interessi dei nostri connazionali. In questa direzione si sono avuti, come è noto, diversi provvedimenti normativi italiani a beneficio dei cittadini rimpatriati dalla Libia, e ciò conferma il punto di vista fino ad ora esposto. Si tratta, tuttavia, di provvedimenti del tutto insufficienti poichè la cifra globale corrisposta fino ad oggi agli aventi diritto, a circa trent'anni dalla confisca, ammonta a circa 288 miliardi (mi riferisco ai provvedimenti n. 1066 del 1971 e n. 135 del 1985) e cioè non raggiunge nemmeno il valore delle perdite subite e stimate al 1970 in circa 400 miliardi di lire italiane.

5. L'Accordo italo - libico del 2 ottobre 1956, per sua espressa statuizione, dichiarava che con esso era concluso e definito ogni aspetto contenzioso e rivendicativo nei rapporti tra l'Italia e la Libia.

388 Per altro verso, in nessun modo puÚ ricavarsi - se non facendo ricorso ad un tragico umorismo - alcun profilo di legittimità al generalizzato provvedimento libico di confisca del 21 luglio 1970 nella parte in cui questo fonda la sua pretesa di legalità sulla necessità di "restituire al popolo libico le ricchezze dei suoi figli e dei suoi avi usurpate dagli oppressori", e cioè da quei coloni che con il loro lavoro e il loro sacrificio, già prima dell'avvento del fascismo, promossero lo sviluppo economico e sociale di quelle regioni recandovi il segno della civiltà e dando ai suoi stessi abitanti dignità di popolo. In tale situazione è ben curioso ed amaro constatare come il Governo italiano così generosamente prodigo verso chi, spinto da destini avversi, cerca e ottiene in Italia dignità umana e protezione, sia talmente sordo nei confronti di chi, con il proprio lavoro e i propri sacrifici, in Libia e altrove ha onorato il proprio Stato di appartenenza e il suo governo nelle sue successioni storiche. Si spendono miliardi per l'assistenza ai profughi di ogni più differente provenienza geografica, ma a distanza ancora di trent'anni non vengono appieno risarciti ai nostri concittadini rimpatriati dalla Libia quei beni, diritti ed interessi che il Governo italiano, nella consapevole omissione di ogni pur dovuta azione internazionale di tutela e nella indiscussa vigenza di Accordi internazionali, ha ritenuto di sacrificare a beneficio di una politica estera le cui finalità sono difficilmente comprensibili, e a beneficio di più rilevanti interessi economici. Da quanto da ultimo esposto emerge il problema di fondo: con gli Accordi del 1998 sarebbero stati "normalizzati" i rapporti italo - libici. Ma cosa vi era da "normalizzare" se con il Trattato del 1956 ogni questione era stata definita ed in modo in verità molto generoso nei confronti della Libia alla quale l'Italia trasferiva, tra l'altro, tutti i suoi beni del demanio e del patrimonio indisponibile e disponibile e anche delle sue aziende ed enti autonomi? Forse vi era da "normalizzare" il risarcimento dovuto ai nostri profughi dalla Libia e non a caso la citata legge n. 1066 del 1971, nel disporre un acconto sugli indennizzi per i beni perduti, soprassedeva a corrispondere la rimanente parte, "in attesa di accordi internazionali". I sopraggiunti accordi internazionali non affrontano minimamente il problema del pieno risarcimento dei nostri concittadini rimpatriati dalla Libia.

6. Dunque ci troviamo di fronte ad un Governo inadempiente e ad un Parlamento che promette ma non onora le sue promesse. Al di là delle ancora insoddisfatte e legittime aspettative dei nostri concittadini, le intese italo - libiche di recente intervenute lo scorso anno sono addivenute sul piano propriamente politico ad una "normalizzazione" che francamente giustifica ogni dubbio ed ogni perplessità. In particolare, e senza addentrarci in un'analisi dettagliata di quanto convenuto all'esito della riunione del 4 luglio 1998 della Commissione mista italo - libica che, tra le altre cose, fa stato di progressi nel settore turistico del tutto ignoti alla esperienza corrente, e che annuncia la conclusione in materia di un Accordo del cui testo peraltro non si dispone, quel che sorprende è il richiamo ai diritti dell'uomo che anche la parte libica dichiara di voler rispettare. Premesso che non risulta nessuna particolare attitudine e disponibilità da parte delle autorità libiche al rispetto dei primordiali diritti e libertà fondamentali della persona umana (a cominciare dalle libertà politiche e religiose), è appena il caso di rammentare a tale proposito che le autorità libiche ancora oggi precludono l'ingresso sul loro territorio, e anche solo per finalità meramente turistiche, ai cittadini italiani espulsi nel 1970; e ciò nonostante

389 che nel richiamato "Comunicato congiunto" del 4 luglio 1998, si legge che "lo Stato libico, a sua volta, permetterà ai cittadini italiani interdetti dall'ingresso nel proprio territorio, per delle precedenti disposizioni, di entrare nel territorio libico per motivi di turismo, visita o lavoro": le autorità libiche, dunque, non fanno in tempo a concludere un accordo che già lo violano e come esempio di "normalizzazione" dei rapporti bisogna dire che non è male. E non è certo sufficiente la lettera di postume e vuote assicurazioni del Ministro Dini inviata in un caldo sabato d'agosto alla Presidente della Associazione dei Rimpatriati dalla Libia, a far sperare nella futura "normalizzazione" di tale aspetto dei rapporti italo - libici che cosÏ direttamente attiene al rispetto della persona umana e ad un reale spirito collaborativo da parte della nostra ex "quarta sponda". La verità è che nei negoziati per la "normalizzazione" dei rapporti italo - libici può rinvenirsi soltanto una elencazione di impegni unilateralmente gravanti sullo Stato italiano e la lettera del Ministro Dini curiosamente appare il giorno successivo a quello in cui sull'"Italy Daily" dell'"Herald Tribune" compariva un articolo di Cristopher Emsden non certo elogiativo della "politica estera" italiana nei confronti della Libia e ancora meno elogiativo delle omissioni del Governo italiano nei confronti dei rimpatriati dalla Libia. Bisogna pur dire che non solo questa non è politica estera, ma non è neppure un modo accettabile di considerare e proteggere le umanissime aspirazioni di chi chiede solo di poter rivedere per pochi giorni i luoghi dove è nato, dove ha vissuto e dove ha lavorato. E' solo il metodo di un deplorevole inganno e di una ancor più deplorevole ipocrisia da parte di chi finge di credere al dichiarato proposito di rispetto dei diritti dell'uomo da parte libica e nella realtà crede di acquietare la coscienza con una tardiva missiva ferragostana. Nonostante tutto, se questo è il prezzo che si ritiene di dover pagare per conservare o conseguire risultati economici di particolare grandezza (e basterebbe pensare alle concessioni petrolifere dell'Agip o agli enormi interessi economici che ruotano intorno al gigantesco costruendo gasdotto che unirà la costa libica a quella siciliana, ovvero pensare all'eventuale commessa all'Italia per la costruzione di 2.187 chilometri di ferrovia lungo la costa libica) con tutti gli indubbi vantaggi che ciò comporta e comporterà per lo sviluppo della nostra economia nazionale e per il pieno utilizzo delle nostre tecnologie e della nostra forza - lavoro, allora è giusto che di quei vantaggi beneficino non soltanto questa o quell'altra impresa italiana e, in conclusione, la collettività nazionale, ma prima di ogni altri i nostri concittadini profughi dalla Libia che ancora attendono il soddisfacimento dei loro indiscussi diritti. Al contrario, come ricorda Emsden nel suo articolo su "Italy Daily" dell'"Herald Tribune" dell'8 agosto 1999, sembra che il Ministro Dini abbia dichiarato che la questione delle proprietà dei rimpatriati non era di massima priorità.

7. La verità è che la tanto decantata "normalizzazione" non è altro che una resa incondizionata, morale e politica, dell'Italia nei confronti di un paese al quale l'Italia dette non solamente ordine e benessere ma, nel 1934, il suo stesso nome di Libia. A parte la amara constatazione che il verbale della riunione della Commissione mista italo - libica del 4 luglio 1998 evidenzia gli infruttuosi tentativi di parte italiana di intessere utili ed effettivi rapporti con le autorità libiche, come si ricava dai diversi accordi proposti da parte italiana con riguardo a differenti settori e per i quali la controparte libica si è semplicemente riservata di far conoscere il suo punto di vista senza neppure indicare un termine, è dal "Comunicato congiunto" dello stesso giorno 4 luglio 1998 che si può avere una misura precisa del tipo di "normalizzazione" dei rapporti che è stato conseguito.

390 Si rammentano le "ferite ancora ricordate da molti libici" a causa della "colonizzazione italiana". Non si precisa di quali ferite si tratta e non si ricorda che l'Italia in quelle regioni, prima sottoposte al dominio ottomano, portò la civiltà delle sue leggi, il sacrificio del proprio lavoro, i suoi ordinamenti amministrativi, l'istruzione generalizzata , l'assistenza sanitaria e trasformò in larga misura, con l'opera dei suoi coloni, lande desertiche in campi rigogliosi. E come l'antico console resse con l'imperio il popolo e nella pace introdusse il costume e le regole affratellando nella comune cittadinanza e in un comune destino un popolo che mai fu ritenuto sottomesso, ma fu ritenuto fratello; di esso ne fu rispettata la lingua, gli usi e la religione nel gesto simbolico della spada impugnata in difesa dell'Islam. Nonostante ciò l'Italia di oggi invita la Libia "a superare il passato". Attingendo anche a profili di indubbia comicità di tale spessore da far dubitare che essa sia stata involontaria, "la Libia invita l'Italia a non ripetere in futuro" il deprecato passato e l'Italia promette che "non si verificheranno atti ostili di qualsiasi origine dall'Italia verso la Libia". E ancora: "il Governo italiano esprime il proprio rammarico per le sofferenze arrecate al popolo libico a seguito della colonizzazione italiana". Il passo qui si presta a una dubbia interpretazione nel senso che nel prevedere di seguito che l'Italia "si adopererà per rimuoverne per quanto possibile gli effetti", è lecito pensare che si alluda alla demolizione delle strade, dei porti, degli ospedali, delle scuole, dei poderi, delle opere di irrigazione e di quant'altro fu realizzato "a seguito della colonizzazione italiana" per provocare le lamentate "sofferenze arrecate al popolo libico".

8. Nello specifico, raggiungendo un insolito mix tra l'ironia e la tragedia, l'Italia si impegna "a ricercare, con tutti i mezzi disponibili, i cittadini libici allontanati coercitivamente, all'epoca" dalla Tripolitania e dalla Cirenaica: siamo nel 1912 e calcolando un'età media degli "allontanati coercitivamente" di 25 anni, questi dovrebbero avere oggi mediamente 112 anni di età. Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri italiano ci farà sapere quanti ne sono stati rintracciati. Ma vi è la questione poi della ricerca in Italia dei discendenti di costoro i quali evidentemente si accasarono in Italia o altrove e questi eventuali discendenti evidentemente o si sono perfettamente integrati in Italia o non vogliono ritornare in Libia per intuibili motivi, ovvero - per meno intuibili motivi - si nasconderebbero e non si vogliono far trovare. Tuttavia, questa Italia, questa deplorevole Italia, ne ritiene necessaria la ricerca "per restituire riconoscimento, materiale e morale, ai loro familiari - (che dovendo essere ragionevolmente gli ascendenti dovrebbero avere mediamente oggi 140 anni di età ed essere in vita per ricevere il promesso riconoscimento materiale) - e al popolo libico." Poi vi è il problema dello sminamento dei campi minati, e questo è un problema serio e in parte reale ma che riguarda anche e in pari misura il Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna la cui opera di minamento in Libia durante la guerra fu ben più consistente di quella italiana. NÈ le autorità libiche hanno fino ad ora indicato e documentato quando, quanti e chi dei cittadini libici abbiano subito lesioni a seguito dell'esplosione di mine. Nonostante ciò, l'impegno finanziario che assume il Governo italiano con le intese di cui ora si discute è gigantesco e si prevede anche la costituzione in forma societaria e con capitali italiani di un "Fondo sociale" finanziato dall'Italia ma presieduto da un cittadino libico. In finale, come nel crescendo dei fuochi pirotecnici, vi è l'aspetto storico - culturale e dunque "L'Italia si impegna a restituire alla Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, tutti i manoscritti, reperti, documenti, monumenti e oggetti archeologici trafugati

391 in Italia durante e dopo la colonizzazione italiana della Libia". Al riguardo, deve dirsi con molta franchezza che non può consentirsi una così deliberata offesa non tanto al prestigio nazionale italiano del quale nessuno ormai più si occupa, quanto all'intelligenza media dei cittadini: non esistono "manoscritti, reperti, documenti" riconducibili o meno ad una pretesa, e allora certo inesistente, cultura libica. E quanto poi ai "monumenti e agli oggetti archeologici" essi sono quelli che hanno segnato l'espandersi della civiltà di Roma ed essi sono in Libia e là essi devono rimanere, come a Leptis Magna e in tanti altri luoghi della Cirenaica e della Tripolitania, a testimonianza di quella prima grandiosa opera di colonizzazione condotta da Roma in lande desertiche e allora pressocchè disabitate.

9. In conclusione, il Governo italiano si impegna anche a concedere, nella misura compatibile con gli obblighi derivanti dalla sua appartenenza all'Unione Europea, "ai cittadini libici il diritto di godere dei privilegi riconosciuti dalla legislazione italiana all'epoca della colonizzazione". Dunque, l'infame colonizzazione italiana elargiva privilegi e benefici alle popolazioni libiche e tra questi, e per prima, come pure si è ricordato, la pari cittadinanza italiana. A fronte di questo si disconoscono ancora ai profughi i loro sacrosanti diritti e ad essi si preclude ancora oggi, nonostante l'"impegno" libico contenuto nel ricordato "Comunicato congiunto", la possibilità di recarsi in Libia con il solo visto turistico. Questa è la "normalizzazione" dei rapporti italo - libici come è stata voluta dal Governo italiano. La verità triste è che non c'è più governo e non c'è più Italia.

Il Professor Avv. Augusto Sinagra è Ordinario di Diritto Internazionale presso l'Università di Roma "La Sapienza"

392 RASSEGNA STAMPA RELATIVA ALL’ACCORDO ITALIA-LIBIA

395 396 397 398 399 400 Data: Autore: Categoria: 2008-9-2 TG POLITICA

++ LIBIA: P CHIGI,ACCORDO FA SALVI IMPEGNI INTERNAZIONALI ++ 20080902 03876 ZCZC0455/SXA B POL S0A QBXB ++ LIBIA: P CHIGI,ACCORDO FA SALVI IMPEGNI INTERNAZIONALI ++ (V. 'LIBIA: GHEDDAFI, ROMA NON DARA'...' DELLE 18:30) (ANSA) - ROMA, 2 SET - ''In relazione a quanto riportato oggi dall'agenzia di stampa libica Jana, circa il trattato firmato sabato scorso tra l'Italia e la Libia, si precisa che l'accordo fa, come e' ovvio, salvi tutti gli impegni assunti precedentemente dal nostro Paese, secondo i principi della legalita' internazionale''. E' quanto scritto in una nota diffusa da Palazzo Chigi. (ANSA). TG 02-SET-08 19:16 NNNN

401

[Fonte: sito Internet agenzia di stampa Reuters]

Gheddafi: Italia non darà basi in caso attacco a Libia martedì 2 settembre 2008 22:29

ROMA (Reuters) - L'Italia si è impegnata con la Libia a non concedere le basi Nato dislocate sul proprio territorio nella eventualità di una aggressione nei confronti di Tripoli da parte degli Stati Uniti o della Nato.

Sarebbe questo il contenuto dell'articolo 4 del Trattato di Amicizia siglato fra Italia e Libia lo scorso sabato a Bengasi, secondo le parole del leader libico Muammar Gheddafi, riportate dalla agenzia di stampa ufficiale Jana e disponibili sul sito web.

Palazzo Chigi ha replicato che il Trattato siglato la scorsa settimana fra il colonnello e il presidente del Consiglio, Silvio Berlusconi, lascia invariati i precedenti accordi internazionali sottoscritti dall'Italia.

Fermo restando il quadro dei trattati già esistenti, il ministro degli Esteri Franco Frattini ha confermato l'impegno preso da Roma per evitare azioni aggressive nei confronti della Libia.

"Abbiamo specificato con grande chiarezza che ci sono trattati internazionali multilaterali che ovviamente restano", ha detto Frattini parlando in serata a margine di un dibattito alla Festa democratica di Firenze.

"C'è l'accordo con la Libia che prevede un reciproco impegno a non esercitare azioni di aggressione, cosa che l'Italia esclude categoricamente di poter fare", ha aggiunto il responsabile della Farnesina, annunciando che il governo riferirà sulla questione davanti al Parlamento, come richiesto dall'opposizione.

In un discorso tenuto domenica scorsa a Bengasi, Gheddafi ha detto che l'articolo 4 del Trattato sancisce che: "Nel rispetto dei principi di legittimità internazionale l'Italia non userà o non consentirà l'uso dei propri territori nella eventualità di una aggressione contro la Libia". La Libia si impegna a fare altrettanto nei confronti dell'Italia.

Nel suo discorso, Gheddafi ha precisato che quello che Tripoli ha chiesto all'Italia è l'assicurazione che "né l'America né la Nato usino i territori italiani contro la Libia".

402 In una nota, il governo ha spiegato: "In relazione a quanto riportato oggi dall'agenzia di stampa libica Jana, circa il trattato firmato sabato scorso tra l'Italia e la Libia, si precisa che l'accordo fa, come è ovvio, salvi tutti gli impegni assunti precedentemente dal nostro Paese, secondo i principi della legalità internazionale".

Il "Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione" siglato domenica scorsa mira a migliorare i rapporti tra Italia e Libia, importante produttore di energia, e fissa i risarcimenti richiesti dal Paese africano per i tre decenni di regime coloniale italiano.

L' accordo di partenariato prevede che l'Italia paghi 5 miliardi di dollari alla Libia nei prossimi 25 anni da destinare a progetti infrastrutturali in Libia.

L'accordo prevede inoltre la realizzazione di un'autostrada costiera che attraverserà la Libia dal confine con l'Egitto a quello con la Tunisia.

Gli aerei Usa bombardarono Tripoli, Bengasi e la casa di Gheddafi nell'aprile 1986, attacchi che, secondo la Libia, uccisero più di 40 persone inclusa la figlia adottiva del leader libico.

La Nato prevede la difesa reciproca tra gli Stati membri in caso di attacco da parte di uno Stato esterno all'alleanza.

403 404 405 Arabnews - http://www.arabnews.it -

Italia-Libia: la strada è aperta? Inserito da Mustapha Hammouche Il 3 Settembre 2008 @

03/09/2008

L’accordo siglato fra Italia e Libia per il risarcimento dei danni legati al periodo coloniale costituisce un importante precedente che non è passato inosservato nel mondo arabo, soprattutto in Algeria, il cui contenzioso con l’ex potenza coloniale francese è tuttora aperto

Quello che in realtà è un accordo tra la Libia e l’Italia viene presentato come “il gesto dell’Italia”. Non è il pagamento di 5 miliardi di dollari distribuiti in venticinque anni che rovinerà l’Italia o che ricostruirà la Libia, ma il gesto pone un precedente che non mancherà di lasciare la sua impronta nel seguito del dibattito sulla fase post-coloniale.

È forse per questo che l’accordo non dovrebbe essere ridotto al suo aspetto finanziario, e che ci si dovrebbe invece concentrare sul fatto che tale accordo stabilisce il principio di ‘riparazione’ e, dunque, quello del carattere dannoso della colonizzazione.

La Gran Bretagna, il Portogallo, la Francia e la Spagna, in particolare, che hanno a lungo occupato territori in Africa ed in Oriente, non potranno ignorare il precedente italo-libico quando le questioni del ‘pentimento’ e della ‘riparazione’ torneranno nuovamente ad essere poste.

Silvio Berlusconi, firmando con Muammar Gheddafi “un accordo d’amicizia, di partenariato e di cooperazione”, ha inaugurato il primo atto di riconciliazione tra una colonia ed una ex potenza coloniale; e, proclamando che “come capo del governo (…) il mio dovere era di esprimervi in nome del popolo italiano il nostro rammarico e le nostre scuse per le ferite profonde che vi abbiamo causato”, esprime la prima dichiarazione di pentimento da parte di un dirigente dell’antica ‘madrepatria’ coloniale.

Se da un lato le relazioni tra i due stati hanno attraversato momenti di crisi acuta prima di arrivare a questo risultato, dall’altro sembra che l’accordo abbia permesso di aprire nuove prospettive di cooperazione tra i due paesi.

Da parte del dirigente libico è stata necessaria una certa costanza nel rivendicare una riparazione ai crimini della colonizzazione italiana, per far sì che essa si realizzasse. Ha concorso a ciò, da parte italiana, la volontà profonda di garantirsi una cooperazione energetica consolidata e duratura. Ha contribuito soprattutto la pressione della marea migratoria, e la necessità di garantirsi la collaborazione del paese d’imbarco nella lotta contro i network dell’immigrazione clandestina.

Il tema della riparazione è una costante della diplomazia libica, anche quando Gheddafi riceveva il suo “amico Silvio”. Nulla a che vedere con il percorso caotico che lo stesso tema ha seguito tra l’Algeria e la Francia, un percorso che va dall’omissione compiacente in circostanze di euforia ‘mediatico-sentimentale’ alla crisi polemica nei momenti di dissenso aperto.

Tra il 2003 ed il 2007, avevamo pazientemente atteso un “trattato d’amicizia” solennemente annunciato, che stava assumendo misteriosamente forma all’interno dei consigli presidenziali, prima di apprendere che ad esso mancava la condizione preliminare del ‘pentimento’. Sul fronte francese, si è atteso che la rifondazione delle relazioni franco-algerine fosse all’ordine del giorno per promuovere una legge che prescrive l’insegnamento degli “effetti positivi della colonizzazione” (a tale proposito si può consultare l’articolo [1] “Establishment”, apparso sul quotidiano algerino Liberte dell’8 maggio 2007 a firma di Salim Tamani (N.d.T.) ).

L’incostanza algerina ha reso indecifrabile il ruolo della questione del ‘pentimento’ all’interno del suo rapporto con la vecchia potenza coloniale, mentre l’incoerenza francese riduceva a semplice aneddoto gli sforzi encomiabili di due ambasciatori accreditati ad Algeri.

La Libia e l’Italia hanno appena mostrato qual è la strada da percorrere?

Mustapha Hammouche è un editorialista algerino

406 Titolo originale:

[2] Libye-Italie : la bonne voie ?

Articolo stampato dal sito Arabnews: http://www.arabnews.it

URLs in this post: [1] “Establishment”, apparso sul quotidiano algerino Liberte: http://www.arabnews.it/2007/05/23/establishment/ [2] Libye-Italie : la bonne voie ?: http://www.liberte-algerie.com/edit.php?id=99061

407 Data: Autore: Categoria: 2008-9-3 ZU ESTERO

LIBIA: PARLA ESPERTO, SU TRATTATO POLEMICHE STRUMENTALI/ANSA 20080903 01895 ZCZC0501/SXA R EST S0A S91 SA1 QBXB LIBIA: PARLA ESPERTO, SU TRATTATO POLEMICHE STRUMENTALI/ANSA PER IL PROF. UMBERTO LEANZA NESSUNA INCOMPATIBILITA' CON NATO (di Augusto Zucconi) (ANSA) - ROMA, 3 SET - Solo prese di posizione strumentali. Umberto Leanza, professore di diritto internazionale all'Universita' Tor Vergata di Roma e consulente presso l'Ufficio contenziosi diplomatici della Farnesina, liquida cosi' le critiche mosse al Trattato di amicizia e cooperazione firmato sabato scorso con la Libia. E in dichiarazioni all'ANSA precisa: con i nostri impegni Nato non c'e' nessuna incompatibilita'. I dubbi e le perplessita' sono sorti quando, ieri, l'agenzia libica Jana ha diffuso il testo di un discorso in cui il colonnello Muammar Gheddafi ha spiegato al paese che l'Italia, nell'articolo 4 del Trattato, si e' impegnata ''a non usare e soprattutto a non concedere l'uso delle basi sul suo territorio alla Nato e agli Stati Uniti per aggressioni contro la Libia''. Palazzo Chigi e il ministro degli esteri Franco Frattini hanno subito precisato che questo non rimettera' in discussione i precedenti accordi internazionali ma cio' non e' bastato a scongiurare le polemiche. In un'intervista pubblicata oggi dalla Stampa, il presidente della Commissione esteri del Senato, Lamberto Dini, ha parlato ad esempio di ''contraddizione evidente'' tra Patto Atlantico e accordo italo-libico. ''Non c'e' nessuna incompatibilita' - ha invece puntualizzato il professor Leanza - l'articolo 4 parla esclusivamente di ipotesi di aggressione, il trattato Nato contempla l'ipotesi difensiva nella sua origine del 1949, mentre nelle successive modifiche prevede azioni poste in essere dall'Alleanza su richiesta del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite''. ''Si tratta quindi di due ipotesi che non sono in conflitto tra di loro, si tratta di due cose diverse'', ha sottolineato. Le osservazioni del professor Leanza sembrano trovare una piena rispondenza anche tra i partner internazionali dell'Italia. Il portavoce della Nato James Appathurai ha detto oggi che l'Alleanza ha la massima fiducia nelle assicurazioni venute da Frattini. E gli Usa gia' ieri hanno definito l'accordo italo-libico ''uno sviluppo positivo''. ''Da noi c'e' l'abitudine, per ragioni politiche, di creare strumentalmente un 'casus belli' od ogni momento - ha commentato Leanza - ma su questa intesa non c'e' nessuna contraddizione, basta prendere i due testi, confrontarli e vedere che parlano di due cose diverse''.

(ANSA). ZU 03-SET-08 19:07 NNNN

408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 IRAQ

Camera dei deputati - XV Legislatura - Dossier di documentazione (Versione per stampa) Autore: Servizio Rapporti Internazionali Titolo: IRAQ Serie: Schede Paese Numero: 27 Data: 25/09/2007

REPUBBLICA DELL’IRAQ

DATI GENERALI Superficie 473.072 KMQ (CIRCA UNA VOLTA E MEZZO LA SUPERFICIE DELL’ITALIA

Capitale BAGHDAD (5.000.000)

Abitanti 26.074.000

Composizione etnica ARABI (75%), CURDI (20%), TURCOMANNI ED ALTRI (3%)

Religioni praticate MUSULMANI 97% (SUNNITI 35%, SCIITI 65%), CRISTIANI, E ALTRI 3%

421

CARICHE DELLO STATO

Presidente JALAL TALABANI (DALL’APRILE 2005 UNIONE PATRIOTTICA DEL KURDISTAN, PUK)

Primo Ministro NURI AL_MALIKI (DALL’APRILE 2006. ALLEANZA IRACHENA UNITA, SCIITA)

Presidente dell’Assemblea Nazionale MAHOMOUD AL-MASHHADANI (DALL’APRILE 2006, IRAQI TAWAFIQ FRONT, SUNNITA) Ministro degli Esteri HOSHYAR ZEBARI

Ministro dell’Interno JAWAD AL BULANI

ƒ RESPONSABILE DELLE FORZE USA IN IRAQ (168.000 UOMINI)[1]: DAVID PETRAEUS ƒ PROVINCE SOTTO IL CONTROLLO IRACHENO: 8 ƒ PROVINCE SOTTO IL CONTROLLO USA: 10 (RICONSEGNA PREVISTA AL GOVERNO IRACHENO, LUGLIO 2008)

PROSSIME SCADENZE ELETTORALI ELEZIONI POLITICHE 2009

IL PROCESSO DI DEMOCRATIZZAZIONE IN IRAQ

Il Processo di normalizzazione in Iraq sta seguendo le indicazioni date dalla Risoluzione n. 1546 del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite. Dal 2004 sono state realizzate le seguenti tappe:

28 giugno 2004 Entra in carica il Governo ad interim iracheno

30 gennaio 2005 Si tengono le elezioni per i 275 membri dell’Assemblea Nazionale Costituente incaricata di redigere una bozza di costituzione (la precedente, provvisoria, era stata approvata l’8 marzo 2004 ed era osteggiata particolarmente dall’etnia musulmana sciita, in maggioranza nel Paese) da sottoporre a referendum popolare in vista di un assetto istituzionale definitivo del Paese. I 275 membri dell’Assemblea Nazionale Costituente sono inoltre incaricati di formare un Governo ad interim. La consultazione elettorale del 30 gennaio è boicottata dai musulmani sunniti.

3 maggio 2005 Entra in carica il primo Governo democratico dopo più di 50 anni. 15 agosto 2005 Presentazione della bozza della Costituzione all’Assemblea Nazionale di Transizione. 422

15 ottobre 2005 Viene approvata, con referendum, la bozza della Costituzione. I voti favorevoli sono stati il 78% ed i contrari il 21%. Per bloccare la costituzione sarebbe stato necessario che tre province avessero bocciato il testo con una maggioranza di due terzi. In due province a maggioranza sunnita i no sono stati superiori al 66%, ma in quella di Ninive i no hanno ottenuto solo il 55% dei voti. I risultati definitivi sono stati diffusi dalla Commissione elettorale irachena il 25 ottobre.

15 dicembre 2005 Si tengono le prime elezioni politiche dalla caduta del regime di Saddam Hussein.

20 maggio 2006 Il Primo Ministro al-Maliki presenta il suo governo

Questi i punti principali della Costituzione[2] approvata:

ƒ L’Iraq è uno Stato indipendente e sovrano, con un sistema di governo repubblicano, parlamentare e federale. ƒ L’Islam è la religione ufficiale dello Stato e una principale fonte per la legislazione. Nessuna legge può essere approvata se contraddice l’Islam, i principi della democrazia e la Costituzione. ƒ Viene garantita l’identità islamica della maggioranza del popolo islamico. Ogni individuo ha libertà di culto. ƒ L’arabo ed il curdo sono le due lingue ufficiali dello Stato. ƒ Lo Stato federale è composto da una capitale, da regioni, da province decentralizzate e da amministrazioni locali. ƒ La Regione del Kurdistan viene riconosciuta come una delle regioni della Federazione. Spetta all’Assemblea Nazionale di votare una legge che fissi le procedure per stabilire le regioni. ƒ Il petrolio ed il gas sono di proprietà di tutto il popolo iracheno e le risorse derivanti saranno divise equamente ed in modo appropriato rispetto alla demografia dell’intero Paese. ƒ Il Governo dell’Iraq rispetta ed applica tutti i trattati internazionali per prevenire lo sviluppo di armi nucleari, chimiche e biologiche. ƒ Le forze armate irachene sono formate da tutte le componenti della popolazione irachena, senza discriminazioni o emarginazioni. ƒ Il Parlamento resterà in carica 4 anni. Il Presidente della Repubblica può essere convocato a rispondere al Parlamento se sarà richiesto dalla maggioranza assoluta dei deputati. La stessa maggioranza può sfiduciare un Ministro ed il Primo Ministro. ƒ Tutti i gruppi o i movimenti che propongano, incitino o giustifichino il razzismo ed il terrorismo sono interdetti. Fra questi, in particolare il Partito Baath.

La Carta costituzionale appare complessivamente un testo moderato, in cui la presenza della legge islamica come una delle fonti del diritto è temperata dal richiamo al rispetto dei diritti umani fondamentali. Gli altri nodi di più difficile risoluzione (federalismo, ripartizione delle risorse naturali fra centro ed amministrazioni locali, status di Kirkuk, ruolo delle milizie) sembrano essere stati risolti attraverso formule che, di fatto, hanno rinviato a normazioni future. In particolare, la questione di Kirkuk, città curda ricca di giacimenti petroliferi, sottoposta ad una “arabizzazione” forzata ai tempi di Saddam Hussein, non è stata ancora risolta[3].

423 Per quanto attiene alla questione del federalismo[4], si segnala che, il 26 settembre 2006, il Parlamento iracheno ha avviato il dibattito sul progetto di uno stato federalista. Il disegno di legge costituzionale stabilisce le competenze delle 18 province in cui è diviso l’Iraq ed i meccanismi per il loro eventuale raggruppamento in regioni autonome. Il progetto, proposto dalla coalizione sciita, maggioritaria, era osteggiato dai sunniti. Sunniti e sciiti hanno comunque raggiunto un compromesso in base al quale il progetto federalista non potrà entrare in vigore per almeno 18 mesi dopo l’eventuale approvazione. Il parlamento iracheno ha approvato l’11 ottobre 2006 il disegno di legge per la costituzione dello Stato federale come previsto dalla nuova Costituzione nazionale. Al termine di una terza lettura del testo, i deputati presenti - 140 su 275 - hanno votato il progetto, approvandolo a maggioranza. I parlamentari che si opponevano al disegno federale come previsto nella nuova legge hanno boicottato la seduta. Si tratta in particolare di molti deputati sunniti, di quelli che fanno riferimento al giovane leader radicale sciita Moqtada Sadr, di alcuni componenti sciiti della maggioranza di governo che fanno capo al partito Fadila e alcuni deputati della lista dell'ex premier sciita Iyad Allawi. Il rapporto Baker-Hamilton sulla situazione in Iraq, diffuso alla fine del 2006, si è espresso sfavorevolmente – allo stato attuale – per un assetto federalista dell’Iraq, ed ha anzi raccomandato il rafforzamento del potere centrale dello Stato.

Le elezioni politiche del 15 dicembre 2005

Più di 6.500 candidati, 307 partiti e 19 coalizioni si sono registrati per partecipare alle elezioni. I principali contendenti si sono organizzati secondo criteri etnici e religiosi: la Coalizione Unita dell’Iraq (comunità sciita), il Raggruppamento curdo (Alleanza), mentre gli arabi sunniti (che avevano boicottato le elezioni del gennaio 2005) erano rappresentati dal Tawafoq Iraqi Front ed il Fronte Nazionale Iracheno Hewar. La violenza, che caratterizza la vita irachena dalla fine del regime di Saddam Hussein, non è cessata neppure durante le elezioni. Oltre agli scontri verbali e fisici, si è registrata l’uccisione di un leader sunnita, Mizhar al Dulaimi. Circa il 79% dei 15,5 milioni di iracheni registrati ha partecipato al voto (con un netto progresso rispetto al 58,32% registrato nelle elezioni del gennaio 2005) Nella capitale, Baghdad, i risultati preliminari hanno segnato la vittoria della Coalizione Unita per l’Iraq (59%) Il Tawafoq Iraqi Front, piazzatosi secondo con il 19% delle preferenze, ha chiesto una ripetizione delle elezioni affermando che si erano avute numerose irregolarità e frodi. A più di un mese di distanza dalle elezioni, i risultati definitivi non erano stati ancora diffusi a causa dei molti reclami presentati alla Commissione Elettorale Indipendente (circa 1.800). I risultati definitivi sono stati diffusi il 10 febbraio 2006. Il parlamento iracheno ha tenuto la sua prima sessione il 16 marzo 2006. Il 22 aprile Mahmoud al-Mashhadani è stato eletto speaker. Nello stesso giorno è stato confermato Presidente della Repubblica Jalal Talabani il quale ha nominato Jawad al-Maliki, precedente Speaker dell’Assemblea Nazionale di Transizione, Primo Ministro.

424

GOVERNO IN IRAQ

A SEGUITO DEGLI ULTIMI AVVENIMENTI POLITICI (CFR. INFRA) IL GOVERNO AL-MALIKI E’ APPOGGIATO DAI CURDI E DAGLI SCIITI DEL PARTITO DAWA.

Composizione del Parlamento iracheno:

PARTITI SEGGI Coalizione irachena unita (Sciita, composta da Dawa e 128 Consiglio Supremo Islamico iracheno) Raggruppamento del Kurdistan 53 Tawafiq Iraqi Front (sunnita) 44 Lista irachena di Iyad Allawi (laico) 25 Fronte Nazionale Iracheno Hewar (sunnita) 11 Unione Islamica del Kurdistan 5 Raggruppamento per la liberazione e la riconciliazione 3 Altri 6 TOTALE 275 Le donne sono 70 (il 25,45%).

ATTUALITA’ POLITICA In collaborazione con il Servizi Studi

La mozione contro il Presidente del Parlamento Mahmud Al-Mashhadani (11 giugno 2007) e gli sviluppi successivi

Il Parlamento iracheno ha approvato nel giugno 2007 una risoluzione che ha costretto alle dimissioni il Presidente del Parlamento, al-Mashhadani (113 voti a favore su 168). La decisione di chiedere le dimissioni del Presidente del Parlamento è maturata in seguito a diversi episodi di violenza commessa da guardie del corpo di al-Mashhadani contro membri del Parlamento. Immediatamente dopo la votazione della mozione, il blocco sunnita ha iniziato un boicottaggio dei lavori parlamentari in segno di protesta. Questo, insieme al boicottaggio del gruppo sciita facente a Moqtada Sadr (32 deputati) ha impedito l’approvazione della legge sulla ripartizione dei proventi del petrolio che – secondo la visione USA – potrebbe contribuire in modo decisivo alla stabilizzazione del Paese. Nel mese di giugno sciiti, sunniti e curdi avevano trovato un accordo di massima sulla ripartizione dei proventi petroliferi: il nord curdo avrebbe avuto il 17% dei ricavi netti ogni mesi (detratte le spese per il Governo federale). Il resto dovrebbe andare diviso tra le altre province, in base alla popolazione. I deputati sciiti, che avevano scelto il boicottaggio per protestare contro la distruzione di due minareti del mausoleo di Al-Askari (Samara) uno dei luoghi santi più cari agli sciiti, hanno accettato di riprendere i lavori il 17 luglio in cambio della promessa da parte dell’autorità dell’adozione di nuovi misure di sicurezza e l’apertura di un’inchiesta. Due giorni dopo (19 luglio 2007) anche i sunniti hanno deciso di mettere fine al boicottaggio, dopo aver trovato un

425 accordo con le altre forze politiche sulla restituzione a Mashhadani dell’incarico di Presidente. L’accordo non ha comunque messo fine all’instabilità politica. A dispetto delle dichiarazione del Presidente USA, che ha riscontrato miglioramenti nel campo della sicurezza e della “riconciliazione politica”, i sei ministri del blocco sunnita hanno il 1° agosto le dimissioni dal Governo di unità nazionale[5]. Gli analisti si stanno chiedendo se la realizzazione di uno stato democratico e coeso si sta allora trasformando in un’utopia. All’indomani della caduta di Saddam Hussein vi era l’inevitabile consapevolezza che l’Iraq sarebbe rimasto un paese debole con una fragile società per ancora molto tempo: gli anni di Saddam infatti sono stati caratterizzati da guerre (prima con l’Iran e poi con l’Occidente), dall’embargo e da una dittatura brutale che hanno completamente distrutto non solo le infrastrutture fisiche del paese (fabbriche, scuole, ospedali, etc…) ma anche e soprattutto il potenziale umano. Nonostante tutto molti analisti sostennero che, come l’esperienza empirica dimostra in altre società deboli e fragili, anche in Iraq sarebbe stato possibile educare e formare una classe media capace di attuare una sorta di tecnocrazia, indispensabile per la costruzione del governo post-Saddam. Si sarebbe trattato di un processo lungo e faticoso. La debolezza della società sarebbe rimasta una costante ancora per molti anni, ma il governo avrebbe avuto la capacità di essere ragionevolmente stabile in modo da provvedere ad una adeguata sicurezza e da essere abile ad arginare il fenomeno della guerriglia interna. Poiché l’area geografica maggiormente colpita dalla violenza era il triangolo sunnita, situato al centro dell’Iraq, le forze di sicurezza avrebbero avuto successo solo se avessero convinto i sunniti ad abbandonare le loro simpatie per gli insorti iracheni. In questo caso il ruolo delle forze di coalizione guidate dagli Usa doveva essere decisivo nell’appoggiare il governo iracheno rendendolo più forte e maggiormente credibile agli occhi degli insorti, i quali prendendo atto della realtà si sarebbero convinti ad abbandonare le armi per raggiungere il potere. Simultaneamente, con una migliore situazione relativa alla sicurezza, ci sarebbe stata una generale partecipazione alla nuova organizzazione politica, alla luce dei modesti successi del governo. Sul piano pratico il governo, protagonista di questa ottimistica visione, doveva essere abile nel designare nuove strategie nazionali, implementare efficacemente un programma di ricostruzione, proteggere le risorse non rinnovabili, di cui il paese ne è ricchissimo, e soprattutto promuovere la nascita e lo sviluppo di un essenziale ed indigeno settore privato, indispensabile per la crescita economica irachena. Si sarebbe trattato di progetti proposti dal governo federale e dai singoli governatorati, e messi in pratica dal settore privato. In uno scenario contraddistinto da miglioramenti riguardanti la sicurezza, modesti successi nel campo delle nuove istituzioni, nonché la nascita di un settore privato integrato con quello pubblico, la fase successiva sarebbe stata caratterizzata dalle riforme democratiche. La chiave del successo di una simile visione era nelle mani della presunta classe media capace di dare al paese una piattaforma politica consapevole, responsabile e matura. Il problema però è che tanti anni di dittatura non hanno permesso alla società irachena di dotarsi di una classe politica autonoma, capace di non cadere nella trappola della corruzione e del lassismo politico, e seppur con tutto l’aiuto ed il sostegno delle forze di coalizione, la classe media del paese non ha avuto quel lungo periodo indispensabile per arrivare alla maturità necessaria per guidare un paese devastato dalla guerra. La fase di transizione indispensabile all’Iraq per ammortizzare gli anni della dittatura e la destabilizzazione della guerra, in realtà ha condotto al collasso degli apparati di governo e al fallimento della costruzione di legittime istituzioni. Nonostante tutto, almeno fino a qualche mese fa, la Casa Bianca continuava ad essere ottimista, sostenendo che i presunti miglioramenti e progressi registrati dal governo iracheno e dalle forze di coalizione concernenti la sicurezza del paese, avrebbero posto le fondamenta per future misure atte alla riconciliazione politica e alla messa in opera di indispensabili riforme. In realtà la violenza settaria nel paese non si placa ed inoltre è la stessa violenza che negli ultimi mesi ha innescato una serie di boicottaggi che hanno reso non- operativo il parlamento. I boicottaggi, insieme all’assenteismo cronico di cui soffre il parlamento,

426 ne hanno paralizzato i lavori. E’ indicativo notare come questi avvenimenti, legati soprattutto a questioni non vitali per il benessere del paese ma intrecciati piuttosto con interessi dei gruppi se non dei singoli attori, hanno privato l’Iraq di un governo stabile e funzionale. Il problema è che un governo democratico e solido è una vera e propria sfida per il paese dal momento che la cultura politica irachena non incoraggia liberalismo e democrazia nonché non vi è la concezione di una leale opposizione e di una tradizione di alternanza al potere. Il limbo politico alimentato dalle divisioni etnico-settarie tra sciiti, sunniti e curdi, incoraggia inoltre i gruppi terroristici, avvantaggiati da un aleatorio ambiente di sicurezza, a lanciare attacchi all’interno del paese. Inevitabilmente il piano economico risente completamente della critica situazione politica: le rendite petrolifere potrebbero risollevare rapidamente l’economia irachena ma senza una legge che gestisca l’utilizzo delle risorse energetiche, queste ultime non portano alcun beneficio. Infatti i tagli all’elettricità e la mancanza di reti di distribuzione dell’energia sono problemi quotidiani, sommati tra l’altro anche ai precari servizi nel campo idrico e sanitario. Queste carenze sono lo specchio di una profonda crisi umanitaria in atto nel paese: l’organizzazione umanitaria britannica Oxfam ha pubblicato recentemente un rapporto in cui riferisce che il 28% dei bambini iracheni è malnutrito, il 15% degli iracheni non può permettersi di mangiare regolarmente e il 70% non ha accesso all’acqua potabile, tutti fattori in brusco aumento dal 2003. Inoltre i combattimenti e le deboli istituzioni irachene limitano lo stesso lavoro umanitario. Tra le cause del malgoverno oltre alla grave emergenza umanitaria, vi è lo stretto legame tra ricostruzione e corruzione. Il governo infatti sta fallendo nell’importante responsabilità relativa alla distribuzione di miliardi di dollari per la realizzazione di progetti indispensabili alla ricostruzione del paese. Basti pensare che lo scorso anno il Primo Ministro al- Maliki ha allocato solamente il 22% del budget disponibile per progetti di vitale importanza, spendendo invece il 99% dell’ammontare per salari statali. Sul piano politico, le aspettative degli Usa riguardanti ad esempio l’adozione, da parte del parlamento, del testo di legge sulle elezioni, sull’equa distribuzione delle rendite petrolifere e sulle misure da prendere per permettere ai vecchi membri del partito Baath di reintegrarsi tra la popolazione attiva, sono state vanificate.

RECENTI SVILUPPI DELLA CRISI IRACHENA

Il Rapporto Baker Nel marzo 2006 il Congresso USA ha deciso di affrontare le persistenti difficoltà presenti sul fronte iracheno con un’iniziativa complessiva che analizzasse in modo ampio e libero da condizionamenti politici le cause di tali difficoltà e ne indicasse i possibili rimedi. Tale iniziativa fu affidata ad una commissione consultiva parlamentare, a composizione bipartisan incaricata di procedere ad un riesame dell’intera strategia americana in Iraq. Il 6 dicembre 2006 è stato presentato il Rapporto elaborato dalla commissione, co-presieduta dall’ex segretario di Stato, il repubblicano James Baker, e dal democratico Lee Hamilton, gia’ membro del Senato. Il Rapporto (160 pagine contenenti 79 proposte puntuali) ha proposto sostanzialmente un cambiamento di rotta chiedendo al presidente Bush di trasformare la missione militare in una missione di appoggio alle forze irachene, per consentire alle truppe combattenti Usa di ritirarsi entro il primo trimestre 2008; di porre al governo di Baghdad traguardi da raggiungere a breve e medio termine, inclusa la riconciliazione nazionale; di promuovere prima del 31 dicembre un Gruppo d'appoggio internazionale dell'Iraq con i Paesi vicini, la Siria e l'Iran compresi, oltre all'Onu e alla Ue; e di riavviare il negoziato di pace israelo-palestinese, valutato come passaggio indispensabile per la stabilita' della regione. Il Rapporto ricordava i dati di un bilancio pesante: 400 miliardi di dollari,quasi 3 mila vittime e oltre 22.000 feriti tra i soldati Usa (al dicembre 2006)e suggeriva che gli istruttori americani venissero portati da 4 mila a 20 mila e “incastonati”

427 nell'esercito iracheno, parallelamente riducendo le forze impegnate in Iraq a forze logistiche, di intelligence, di reazione rapida, di corpi speciali, numericamente portati alla metà circa dei 140 mila effettivi presenti nel dicembre 2006 in Iraq. Il Rapporto, tuttavia, escludeva (valutandola irresponsabile e foriera di caos) l’ipotesi di un ritiro precipitoso delle truppe statunitensi. Sul piano politico, l’elemento più rilevante del rapporto era rappresentato dall’apertura alla Siria e all'Iran, fondata sulla valutazione che soprattutto la prima sarebbe disposta alla collaborazione. Contemporaneamente all’uscita del Rapporto, il Presidente Bush dichiarava di voler annunciare - entro la fine dell’anno - un cambio della strategia americana in Iraq. Nei giorni immediatamente successivi, le reazioni al Rapporto sono state in genere positive in Europa (vedi le dichiarazioni immediatamente successive alla presentazione del Rapoorto di Romano Prodi e Angela Merkel); anche da parte iraniana sono immediatamente pervenuti commenti positivi. Scetticismo è stato invece subito espresso dal Segretario di Stato Rice, mentre - nei giorni successivi - si registravano reazioni molto negative del Governo iracheno e del Presidente della Regione Autonoma Curda, Massud Barzani. Nel mese di dicembre 2006 si è svolta l’analisi politica del rapporto all’interno dell’amministrazione Bush. Tale analisi ha messo capo ad un cambio di strategia - come preannunciato - ma non nella direzione indicata dal Rapporto Baker. La nuova strategia, annunciata il 10 gennaio 2007 in un discorso in diretta televisiva del Presidente americano, è basata infatti non sul ritiro graduale, ma sull’invio di nuove truppe americane in Iraq.

Valutazioni sulla nuova strategia americana Estremamente complesso appare oggi il compito di valutare in che misura - e se - la nuova strategia americana in Iraq, annunciata il 10 gennaio e concretamente attuata a partire dal 23 gennaio, con l’arrivo in Iraq della avanguardia delle nuove truppe americane, stia conseguendo risultati concreti. La nuova strategia prevede l'invio graduale di 21.500 soldati Usa in piu' in Iraq: 17.500 a Baghdad, altri 4.000 nella provincia di Anbar. La decisione è stata accompagnata da un avvertimento al Governo iracheno sulla necessità di ridurre la violenza, sviluppando in particolare un’azione repressiva verso le squadre armate sciite di Moqtada al Sadr, verso le quali il governo iracheno aveva dimostrato eccessiva condiscendenza. Altre componenti della nuova strategia sono l’offensiva per impedire a Siria e Iran di sostenere gli insorti, e l'invio di sistemi di difesa missilistici Patriot nella regione. Nel quadro di questa strategia orientata a colpire le roccaforti dell’estremismo sciita e i relativi appoggi iraniani si inquadrano le accuse alla Repubblica islamica dell’Iran di fornire ai fondamentalisti sciiti armi, rifugi, addestramento, fondi, ma soprattutto bombe - i famigerati ordigni Ied, sensori o detonatori passivi agli infrarossi (non rilevabili dai normali sistemi di interferenza in dotazione agli eserciti) collegati a materiale esplosivo - alle quali sarebbe stata addebitabile l’escalation di attentati dei primi mesi del 2007. Ancora in questo quadro va collocata la vicenda del rapimento del diplomatico iraniano Jalal Sharafi, effettuato il 4 febbraio a Baghdad da un gruppo di rapitori che indossavano divise dell’esercito iracheno, del quale l’Iran ha accusato immediatamente gli Stati Uniti (Sharafi è stato successivamente liberato il 3 aprile).

428 I successi sul campo, in termini di sicurezza e di sradicamento del terrorismo, sembrano ancora lontani. Tuttavia una valutazione complessiva appare non facile, in quanto vi è un versante politico di questa strategia che probabilmente non è stato pubblicizzato al momento del suo lancio. Secondo alcuni analisti, infatti, la nuova strategia di Bush prevedeva sin dall’inizio di affiancare alla nuova offensiva sul campo volta a neutralizzare l’offensiva terroristica e a colpire duramente ogni appoggio (Siria e Iran) di cui questa si avvale, anche un nuovo attivismo diplomatico in tutte le direzioni, senza preclusioni nei confronti dei due paesi confinanti, anzi proprio indirizzato particolarmente verso Siria e Iran. In tal senso - nonostante l’apparente opposizione - il piano lanciato da Bush il 10 gennaio non sarebbe in contraddizione con l’indirizzo generale del Piano Baker. Gli sviluppi successivi sembrerebbero confermare questa tesi (vedi infra).

La ripresa dell’iniziativa multilaterale Il 10 marzo si è svolta la Conferenza di Baghdad che ha rappresentato un evento storico in quanto ha raccolto - attorno allo stesso tavolo - rappresentanti di Stati Uniti, Siria e Iran per uno scambio di vedute che è andato oltre la stessa situazione irachena per toccare punti di particolare tensione internazionale quali la questione libanese e il nucleare iraniano. Il 3 e 4 maggio si è svolta - a Sharm el Sheik - una nuova Conferenza internazionale sulla sicurezza dell’Iraq e la stabilizzazione dell’area. Alla Conferenza, che per Baghdad rappresenta una svolta nella cooperazione regionale contro la violenza e il terrorismo, hanno partecipato i Paesi confinanti con l’Iraq, così come il Bahrein, l'Egitto, i rappresentanti della Lega Araba, dell’Organizzazione della Conferenza Islamica, dellONU, dell’Unione Europea, i cinque Paesi membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza e quelli membri del G8. Particolare interesse ha destato l’incontro, a margine della Conferenza, tra il Segretario di Stato USA Condoleeza Rice e il ministro degli Esteri della Siria: tra i due Paesi non avvenivano contatti ad alto livello dall’assassinio in Libano di Rafik Hariri (2005). Vi era attesa anche per un possibile incontro della Rice con il ministro degli Esteri iraniano Mottaki, pure presente alla Conferenza, ma l’incontro non si è svolto. La Conferenza ha approvato un piano quinquennale (International Compact with Iraq), in base al quale si prospetta un raddoppio del ritmo di crescita e del PIL pro-capite del Paese, nel quadro di un Iraq sicuro, libero e prospero, che al presente appare però piuttosto distante. In ogni modo, nel documento in 19 punti gli Stati e le Organizzazioni internazionali partecipanti si sono impegnati a combattere il terrorismo, a fronte dell’impegno del governo di Baghdad a porre fine alla situazione di guerra civile strisciante; in particolare, gli attori della Conferenza hanno assicurato la propria collaborazione nel controllo delle frontiere irachene, attraverso le quali passano armi e combattenti stranieri. E’ stato inoltre ribadito il principio di non ingerenza negli affari interni dell’Iraq, che sarà aiutato ad accelerare la preparazione delle forze armate nazionali, presupposto per la fine della presenza militare multinazionale nel Paese. Infine, è stato richiesto alla Lega Araba di organizzare una Conferenza per la riconciliazione nazionale in Iraq. E’ stata inoltre annunciata dal Segretario generale dell’ONU un’ulteriore cancellazione del debito iracheno dell’ordine di 30 miliardi di dollari USA. Ma - al di là delle deliberazioni concrete - il vero significato politico della Conferenza sembra risiedere nel ritorno a una dimensione multilaterale nell’approccio al problema iracheno e nella sostanziale accettazione di tale svolta da parte degli Stati Uniti.

429 Intanto, anche sul piano interno si è registrato un primo segnale politico positivo: il principale partito (sciita) di governo iracheno, il Consiglio supremo della rivoluzione islamica in Iraq, ha deciso di togliere il riferimento rivoluzionario dal proprio nome, in quanto considera il passaggio di potere nel Paese ormai compiuto; ma, soprattutto, rileva che il partito abbia deciso di porre come proprio riferimento spirituale non più la guida suprema della rivoluzione iraniana, Alì Kamenei - che è tradizionalmente il capo spirituale di tutti gli sciiti -, bensì il Grande Ayatollah di Najaf Alì Al Sistani, espressione di un islamismo sciita poco incline alle suggestioni teocratiche introdotte in modo travolgente negli anni ’70-’80 dalla predicazione di Khomeini. Nel mese di agosto 2007 si sono accentuate le difficoltà del governo iracheno, che, costituito nel giugno 2006, ha subito dapprima le dimissioni di sei ministri fedeli al leader radicale sciita Moqtada Sadr, con la motivazione che il governo si era rifiutato di fissare un calendario per il ritiro delle forze straniere dal paese. Successivamente, cinque ministri e il vice premier, tutti facenti riferimento al Fronte della concordia, ossia il maggiore gruppo parlamentare sunnita, si sono a loro volta dimessi perché insoddisfatti delle risposte del governo alle proprie richieste (che si incentravano soprattutto sul problema della sicurezza e sulle misure che regolano arresti e detenzione dei cittadini). All'inizio del 2007 è stata la volta del ministro della giustizia, mentre ai primi di agosto 2007 altri quattro ministri hanno preannunciato il boicottaggio delle riunioni dell'esecutivo, pur senza presentare dimissioni ufficiali. Il 10 agosto 2007 il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha approvato la risoluzione 1770, di iniziativa statunitense e britannica, con voto all'unanimità: la risoluzione, nel prorogare di un anno la durata della missione civile delle Nazioni Unite a Bagdad, la UNAMI, ne ha altresì ampliato compiti e mandato, segnando in qualche modo il momento del ritorno delle Nazioni Unite sulla scena irachena, dopo che la UNAMI era stata ridotta ai minimi termini in seguito all'attentato del 2003 nel quale perse il rappresentante speciale del Segretario generale dell'ONU, il diplomatico brasiliano Sergio decademelo. L'unico elemento su cui non si è raggiunto un consenso è stato quello della nomina del capo missione, di modo che è stato prorogato per ulteriori tre mesi il precedente capo dell'UNAMI, il pakistano a Ashraf Qazi. Successivamente è stato nominato a capo dell'UNAMI il diplomatico svedese Staffan De Mistura, che ha tra l'altro a lungo operato anche in Italia.

La situazione interna americana Mentre sul versante diplomatico e politico si registrano - nella fase più recente - questi risultati significativi, la situazione sul terreno non dà segni chiari di miglioramento: la violenza terroristica non è stata infatti neutralizzata. Attentati anche molto gravi, si sono susseguiti senza soluzione di continuità anche nei mesi di febbraio-maggio: in particolare, si ricordano le due sanguinose stragi effettuate nello stesso luogo (il mercato di Sadriya, quartiere centrale a maggioranza sciita di Baghdad) il 3 febbraio e il 18 aprile e che hanno causato oltre cento morti ciascuna, la strage di Nadir (cittadina a sud di Baghdad del 6 marzo (117 morti fra i partecipanti ad una processione di fedeli sciiti), nonché il gravissimo attentato al Parlamento iracheno del 12 aprile che ha dimostrato la vulnerabilità anche delle aree più protette della città di Baghdad (zona verde). Il 28 aprile un’autobomba guidata da un attentatore suicida ha provocato non meno di 55 vittime a Kerbala, città santa degli sciiti.

430 Particolare preoccupazione ha destato poi il 12 maggio l’agguato a una pattuglia USA che transitava a sud-ovest di Baghdad, che ha provocato 5 morti e il rapimento di tre militari da parte di un gruppo sunnita: il giorno dopo l’agguato è stato rivendicato dallo “Stato islamico in Iraq”, braccio armato di Al Qaeda nel Paese, mentre due gravi attentati colpivano la città di Erbil (nel Kurdistan iracheno) e la capitale, provocando oltre 60 morti. Un secondo elemento di difficoltà della posizione dell’amministrazione americana è rappresentato dalla situazione politica interna, dove una solida maggioranza dell’opinione pubblica appare stabilmente favorevole al ritiro totale delle truppe USA dall’Iraq entro il 2008 e dove i principali candidati alle presidenziali (di entrambe gli schieramenti) sono ormai su una linea di opposizione alla strategia del Presidente. Occorre inoltre ricordare che il Congresso degli Stati Uniti - nel quale dopo le elezioni di mid-term i democratici hanno raggiunto il controllo di entrambi i rami - è entrato dalla metà di febbraio in una serrata dialettica con le posizioni del presidente Bush, e con la nuova strategia per l’Iraq enunciata agli inizi del nuovo anno. Si ricorda che il 16 febbraio la Camera dei Rappresentanti ha approvato una risoluzione - non vincolante per l’esecutivo - la quale si oppone all’invio in Iraq di nuove truppe: l’atto è passato con una maggioranza di 246 voti a favore (quindi superiore alla forza del partito democratico), mentre 182 sono stati i deputati contrari. Un analogo strumento non è stato posto in votazione al Senato solo perché i democratici, il giorno successivo, non hanno raggiunto la necessaria maggioranza per la convocazione dell’Assemblea. In ogni caso, alla metà di febbraio ha iniziato a profilarsi lo scontro sulla vera questione decisiva, quella della concessione dei fondi necessari alla nuova configurazione della presenza USA in Iraq: sui finanziamenti, infatti, il Congresso esprime un voto vincolante per l’esecutivo. I successivi snodi della complessa dialettica parlamento-governo hanno visto il 15 marzo il rigetto in Senato di una mozione dei democratici che chiedeva l’inizio del ritiro dall’Iraq entro 4 mesi, per completarlo nel settembre dell’anno prossimo. D’altra parte, però, una Commissione della Camera dei Rappresentanti ha approvato, sempre il 15 marzo, una mozione di analogo contenuto. Il 28 marzo i democratici, seppure con un risicato 50 a 48, sono riusciti a far approvare dal Senato una modifica alla legge - in discussione - sul rifinanziamento delle missioni in Iraq e Afghanistan: l’emendamento introduce come scadenza degli effetti del provvedimento, - e quindi della presenza militare americana - la data del 31 marzo 2008 (anche se il termine non va inteso come perentorio, ma piuttosto come obiettivo di lavoro per l’Amministrazione USA), più restrittiva ancora del 1° settembre 2008 già fissato alcuni giorni prima dalla Camera dei Rappresentanti. Nelle more dell’armonizzazione dei due testi, prima della trasmissione al presidente Bush, questi ha duramente criticato la posizione del Congresso, accusando i democratici di irresponsabilità, in quanto la fissazione di scadenze con una crisi in corso non farebbe che aumentare i rischi di insuccesso, subordinando ad interessi propagandistici le esigenze delle truppe al fronte. Lo scontro tra la Casa Bianca e il Congresso è stato rilanciato il 24 aprile dallo shock della strage di nove militari USA per mezzo di un camion-bomba, rivendicata da Al Qaeda: tra i democratici cresce il riferimento a funesti precedenti, come quello del Vietnam, sotto la cui cattiva stella ormai si sarebbe irreversibilmente posta l’impresa americana in Iraq. Tra il 25 e il 26 aprile il Congresso ha approvato in via definitiva la legge sul rifinanziamento delle missioni in Iraq e Afghanistan, confermando per il mese di aprile 2008 la scadenza della

431 missione delle truppe americane in Iraq. Il Presidente Bush ha tuttavia confermato senza esitazioni le sue precedenti esternazioni in merito, ponendo il veto sul provvedimento (2 maggio), per superare il quale i due rami del Congresso dovrebbero riapprovare la legge a maggioranza dei due terzi, circostanza questa che appare impossibile per la maggioranza democratica. L’effetto del veto si estende comunque all’intero provvedimento, e quindi anche i finanziamenti per la presenza militare USA in Iraq e Afghanistan sono al momento congelati: è probabile tuttavia che sulla questione si giunga infine ad un compromesso mediante trattative fra il Congresso e la Casa Bianca. Proprio tali trattative sono però ostacolate dall’accentuazione delle posizioni dei vari candidati democratici alla nomination, i quali hanno interesse, in questa fase della campagna per la nomination a spingere per un rientro accelerato delle truppe USA dall’Iraq: in tale contesto diviene più difficile per la maggioranza democratica del Congresso ricercare soluzioni “morbide”. Anche la possibilità che una nuova legge in discussione al Congresso frazioni in due tranches gli stanziamenti, subordinando l’erogazione della seconda - che dovrebbe coprire il periodo successivo al 30 settembre 2007 - a un rendiconto della Casa Bianca sul raggiungimento degli obiettivi posti alle autorità irachene in merito alla riconciliazione nazionale e all’aumento della sicurezza, è stata rigettata dal Pentagono, per il quale un bilancio di soli due mesi è di fatto ingestibile, e metterebbe in serie difficoltà le truppe sul terreno operativo. Gli stessi vertici militari USA in Iraq hanno fatto presente che il contingente militare americano, una volta completato il suo rafforzamento, non potrà lasciare il Paese prima della primavera del 2008. Il 16 maggio, tuttavia, il Senato ha respinto una mozione democratica volta a mettere fine ai finanziamenti entro il 31 marzo 2008. Il New York Times, con un lungo editoriale pubblicato l'8 luglio 2007, ha preso nettamente posizione per un ritiro delle truppe americane dall'Iraq: si è trattato indubbiamente di una ulteriore seria difficoltà per il presidente Bush, già alle prese con un progressivo sfilacciamento della stessa maggioranza repubblicana nel Congresso, in presenza dell'apparente stallo, se non peggioramento, della situazione irachena. La risposta della Casa Bianca si è articolata su un duplice piano, negando, da un lato, che il dibattito sul ritiro delle truppe americane fosse già in corso, e chiedendo d'altro canto al Congresso e alla nazione di attendere fino a settembre, quando, con il secondo dei due rapporti previsti dalla legge approvata qualche settimana prima dal Congresso, si sarebbe potuto fare un bilancio meno frettoloso dei risultati della nuova strategia americana. Il 12 luglio è stato presentato al Congresso degli Stati Uniti il “Progress Report” dell’amministrazione Bush sulla situazione in Iraq. Il Rapporto definisce il quadro della sicurezza ''complesso ed estremamente difficile'' e da' una pagella con luci e ombre al governo del premier Nuri al Maliki. Sulla base di indicatori chiaramente definiti, il Rapporto - voluto dal senatore repubblicano John Warner - valuta i progressi nei 18 «passi avanti» chiesti in aprile dal Congresso a Bush e al premier iracheno Maliki. Di questi, 8 risulterebbero soddisfacenti (progressi sarebbero stati raggiunti in sostanza, nella messa in sicurezza della regione di Baghdad e nella riduzione delle violenze fra gruppi etnico-religiosi), 8 insoddisfacenti (aspetti istituzionali quali l’approvazione di leggi sulla de-baathificazione, sulla distribuzione dei proventi petroliferi, sulla istituzione di una commissione elettorale, nonché disarmo delle milizie e rafforzamento delle forze di sicurezza irachene) e 2 difficilmente giudicabili (in sostanza, relativi al varo di una amnistia). Il Presidente americano - anche contraddicendo i segnali interni negativi che si erano intensificati nelle ultime settimane e il clima di crescente critica all’interno stesso del partito repubblicano - ha espresso una posizione non pessimista. Intanto, nella giornata del 14 si è registrata un reazione aspra di al Maliki alle critiche espresse all’indirizzo del suo governo nel “Progress Report”. Il leader sciita ha infatti dichiarato polemicamente che il governo iracheno è in grado di fronteggiare da solo la

432 situazione sul territorio e che il governo USA può quindi procedere in qualunque momento al ritiro completo delle truppe. Non si sono registrate reazioni ufficiali americane a queste dichiarazioni, successivamente ritrattate da al Maliki, ma ritenute - comunque - il segno di una difficoltà di rapporti fra le due parti. Non hanno certo contribuito a migliorare i rapporti tra il premier iracheno e gli Stati Uniti le visite compiute nel mese di agosto 2007 da al Maliki in Turchia, Iran e Siria, viste le accuse americane agli ultimi due paesi di essere semmai un aspetto del problema iracheno, in quanto fomenterebbero l'instabilità interna del paese. Intanto, la fronda parlamentare contro l'amministrazione statunitense è proseguita, ma senza troppo successo: nella notte fra il 12 il 13 luglio la Camera dei rappresentanti ha approvato una misura per la quale l'inizio del ritiro delle truppe americane avrebbe dovuto avvenire entro 120 giorni, e in ogni caso concludersi entro l'aprile 2008. La votazione tuttavia ha visto passare solo di stretta misura il provvedimento, con una maggioranza ben lontana da quella dei due terzi che permetterebbe di superare il veto presidenziale, peraltro più volte minacciato da Bush. Non diversamente sono andate le cose in Senato, dove, nonostante una seduta notturna non stop,u provvedimento di analoga portata ha ricevuto il 18 luglio solo una risicata maggioranza. Il 10 settembre 2007 il comandante in capo delle forze americane in Iraq, generale David Petraeus, ha dichiarato al Congresso che gli obiettivi militari della nuova strategia statunitense sono stati in gran parte raggiunti: ciò dovrebbe consentire di ridurre a 130.000 unità entro l'estate del 2008 la presenza militare USA, mediante un processo di ritiro progressivo da iniziare immediatamente con il rimpatrio di circa 2000 marines. D'altra parte, il generale Petraeus non ha nascosto che un ritiro precipitoso e prematuro delle truppe potrebbe avere ancora effetti catastrofici, poiché i progressi non sono stati omogenei in tutto il paese, e in quanto, mentre è stato conseguito l'obiettivo della riduzione della pericolosità dei militanti di al Qaeda presenti in Iraq, è altrettanto chiaro come l'Iran stia cercando di rendere le milizie sciite autoctone dell'Iraq una sorta di partito libanese Hezbollah, per combattere una guerra per procura sul suolo iracheno. Il 13 settembre il presidente Bush ha dato seguito a quanto dichiarato dal generale Petraeus quando, in un discorso alla nazione pronunciato dallo Studio Ovale della Casa Bianca, ha confermato un primo ritiro di circa 30.000 soldati americani entro l'estate del 2008, a condizione di un proseguimento dei progressi nella sicurezza dell'Iraq. Il discorso di Bush è stato tuttavia duramente contestato dall'ala democratica del Congresso, che ha constatato come il ritiro annunciato non faccia altro che riportare le truppe americane alla consistenza precedente alla nuova strategia, configurando un proseguimento sine die della presenza Usa in Iraq.

La ripresa dei rapporti fra USA e Iran Ma fra gli sviluppi più recenti della situazione irachena assume un particolare rilievo la ripresa delle relazioni diplomatiche fra Stati Uniti e Iran. Dopo 27 anni di congelamento delle relazioni fra i due paesi, lo scorso 28 maggio Iran e USA hanno tenuto a Baghdad un incontro ufficiale bilaterale ad alto livello - che dovrebbe rappresentare il primo di una serie. Oggetto limitato dell’incontro è stata la stabilizzazione dell’Iraq, mentre rimangono - ufficialmente - fuori dal negoziato altre questioni (questione nucleare, Libano, conflitto israelo-palestinese, ecc.). In realtà l’incontro è il primo che i due paesi hanno deciso di rendere pubblico. Infatti, oltre ai due brevi scambi avvenuti a margine delle due conferenze internazionali in marzo a Baghdad e in

433 maggio a Sharm el-Sheikh, è noto che negoziati non pubblici sono in corso da tempo (addirittura da prima dell’invasione americana dell’Iraq) e che se ora il negoziato viene allo scoperto ciò accade perché - almeno sulla stabilizzazione dell’Iraq - sono già state consolidate le linee di un’intesa. Un momento decisivo di svolta sembra essere stato rappresentato dalla proposta iraniana presentata da Kazemi-Qomi a Crocker durante il brevissimo scambio avvenuto a Sharm el-Sheikh, il 4 maggio scorso. L’incontro di Baghdad del 28 maggio è stato condotto dai due ambasciatori in Iraq, Ryan Crocker e Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, ma un innalzamento del livello delle rappresentanze è possibile nel prossimo futuro. Al termine dei colloqui di Baghdad lo stesso rappresentante iraniano ha preannunciato come molto probabile un prossimo incontro di follow-up da tenersi entro un mese. In effetti, numerosi osservatori concordano nel ritenere le posizioni di USA e Iran sull’Iraq ormai molto vicine e nel far risalire tale nuova situazione ad almeno quattro fattori decisivi: interesse a stabilizzare una situazione che ha♣ portato alla liquidazione di un regime sunnita e ostile sia a USA che a Iran; presa d’atto da parte di ciascuno dei due♣ governi della impossibilità - senza l’altro interlocutore - di arrivare a tale stabilizzazione; presa d’atto della impossibilità (ormai) di♣ realizzare i due migliori scenari (per gli USA, un Iraq unito e filo americano; per l’Iran, un Iraq unito e filo iraniano); interesse a evitare i due scenari peggiori (lo♣ scenario peggiore per gli USA è quello di un Iraq diviso con la parte meridionale controllata dall’Iran; per l’Iran lo scenario peggiore è quello di un Iraq governato di nuovo dai sunniti e armato dagli USA, ma anche per l’Iran la rottura dell’unità nazionale e la stessa soluzione federale sono ipotesi non auspicabili). Manifestazioni di ostilità e minacce reciproche fra i due paesi (verificatesi anche nei giorni successivi all’incontro) non contraddirebbero questo processo di avvicinamento, ma andrebbero lette semplicemente come espressioni tattiche collaterali alla traiettoria principale. La proposta iraniana consegnata all’ambasciatore americano un mese fa è stata pubblicizzata ufficiosamente sul quotidiano Al-Hayat. Essa si basa sui seguenti punti: ritiro non precipitoso delle truppe USA e loro♣ reinsediamento all’interno di basi in territorio iracheno;

rifiuto di ogni ipotesi di smembramento del♣ paese;

impegno del blocco sunnita a sradicare e♣ tagliare ogni aiuto al terrorismo qaedista; impegno americano ad aprire un negoziato anche♣ sulla questione del nucleare iraniano. Nonostante le precisazioni delle due parti circa la attuale limitazione degli incontri diplomatici alla sola questione irachena, sembra assodato che l’Iran abbia interesse a ottenere in cambio della disponibilità a negoziare anche un ammorbidimento delle posizioni americane sul nucleare;

In cambio l’Iran assumerebbe l’impegno di:

riportare sotto il proprio controllo le milizie♣ sciite armate; permettere la revisione della legge per la♣ de-baathificazione in favore della minoranza sunnita; permettere la revisione della Costituzione♣ irachena in modo da raddoppiare la rappresentanza dei sunniti nel Parlamento di Baghdad; 434 favorire - sul piano interno iracheno - una♣ definizione equa della distribuzione dei redditi derivanti dal petrolio (si ricorda che i sunniti sono maggioritari nella aree centrali dell’Iraq, povere di petrolio) e sul piano internazionale la composizione dei conflitti in Libano e Palestina. L’interesse dell’amministrazione americana a questo negoziato appare evidente: se l’operazione avesse successo, gli USA potrebbero imboccare una via d’uscita dal vicolo cieco iracheno e quindi un recupero di quella libertà di azione su altri scacchieri (a partire da quello afgano-pakistano) progressivamente e ormai fortemente ridotta negli ultimi 4 anni. In questo senso, si dimostrerebbe la fondatezza delle analisi che avevano visto nella nuova strategia lanciata da Bush a gennaio - e nell’apparente rifiuto del Rapporto Baker (imperniato sul riavvicinamento diplomatico all’Iran) - proprio il preludio alla attuazione del disegno politico preconizzato dal Rapporto Baker. Il 24 luglio vi è stato a Baghdad un secondo incontro tra gli ambasciatori degli USA e dell'Iran in Iraq, Ryan Crocker e Hassan Kazemi-Qomi.

Prospettive di stabilizzazione dell’Iraq Le prospettive di una stabilizzazione della situazione irachena sembrano oggi dipendere in gran parte dal futuro del negoziato fra USA e Iran. Tuttavia, la stessa volontà convergente delle parti non è elemento sufficiente a un suo successo finale. Gli analisti, sia pure con diversa enfasi, richiamano infatti un numero consistente di residui elementi indipendenti dalla volontà delle due parti: Il successo del negoziato dipende da un♣ controllo almeno sui movimenti sciiti in Iraq, ma l’egemonia iraniana sugli sciiti iracheni non è un dato acquisito. Esistono in primo luogo le divisioni politiche: oggi dei tre maggiori gruppi sciiti: Consiglio Supremo Islamico dell’Iraq, Hizb al-Dawah e Blocco al-Sadrita - solo i primi due hanno legami stretti (il ché non significa, comunque subordinazione) con Teheran; restano fuori da questa orbita, oltre al Blocco al-Sadrita, una miriade di gruppuscoli non controllabili e - più in generale - è sempre presente il rischio di una diffusa reazione di tipo nazionalistico-arabo - fra gli sciiti iracheni - all’eccessivo attivismo di Teheran. Un secondo elemento di incertezza è dato♣ ovviamente dalla azione dei gruppi del fondamentalismo qaedista che sarebbero i principali perdenti. Essi, fra l’altro, operano in una dimensione internazionale e sarebbero danneggiati da un accordo in Iraq da cui discenderebbe automaticamente una ripresa della libertà d’azione degli USA in altri teatri come quello afgano- pakistano, dove ha trovato riparo lo stato maggiore qaedista. L’impennata di attentati della fase più recente sarebbe una diretta conseguenza (già ampiamente prevista dagli osservatori) delle nuove relazioni diplomatiche USA-Iran. Quanto alla♣ componente sunnita irachena (per quanto sia possibile parlare in termini unitari di una galassia in cui sono identificabili almeno 5 aree: blocco politico di tendenza islamista del Fronte dell’Accordo Islamista, blocco politico secolare del Fronte Nazionale del Dialogo, gruppi tribali, establishment religioso, insorgenza nazionalista sunnita) essa non sembra ostile in linea di principio ad ogni ipotesi di accordo, ma è certamente sospettosa delle reali intenzioni degli sciiti iracheni e preoccupata degli spazi che saranno ad essa garantiti in un paese che vede i sunniti comunque in minoranza. Vittime predestinate di un riavvicinamento♣ USA-Iran sembrano essere i curdi iracheni che - proprio grazie alla forte tensione fra sciiti e sunniti - hanno potuto realizzare condizioni ampie di autonomia e che verrebbero invece sacrificati sia da riforme costituzionali più favorevoli ai sunniti,

435 sia da un accordo sulla distribuzione “equa” dei proventi petroliferi. Non è certo un caso che i curdi siano stati, a suo tempo, i più forti critici del Rapporto Baker. Non vanno dimenticati i forti sospetti di♣ Arabia Saudita e Stati del Golfo verso un cambiamento che vedrebbe crescere l’influenza iraniana in tutta la regione e che produrrebbe il ritorno nei paesi d’origine di migliaia di terroristi ottimamente addestrati. Infine, l’elemento di incertezza forse♣ principale è dato dalla freddezza della Russia e dai forti strumenti di pressione su Teheran (almeno finchè la costruzione del reattore di Bushehr non sarà ultimata).

I temi politici di maggior rilievo sul tappeto sono oggi:

quello del sistema per un’equa⎫ distribuzione dei ricavi petroliferi

e quello della ripartizione dei poteri fra⎫ governo federale e regioni. Un accordo fra le maggiori forze politiche - favorito da un’azione comune di USA e Iran - potrebbe rappresentare un elemento di svolta rilevante. Rimane comunque incombente il rischio di un collasso del paese, evidenziato dagli osservatori più pessimisti

Il G8 di Heiligendamm e l’Iraq Infine, si ricorda che la questione irachena è stata affrontata anche dal Vertice dei Capi di Stato e di Governo dei paesi del G8 che si è svolto dal 6 all’8 giugno 2007 ad Heiligendamm, in Germania. In tale ambito, i paesi presenti hanno ribadito il loro impegno per l’indipendenza, la sovranità e l'integrità territoriale del Paese, condannando ancora una volta con forza tutti gli atti di terrorismo e di violenza. E’ stato quindi accolto con favore il lancio, durante la Conferenza internazionale per la sicurezza e la stabilizzazione dell’Iraq svoltasi i primi di maggio a Sharm el Sheikh, del piano quinquennale per lo sviluppo del Paese, l'International Compact with Iraq (ICI), ravvisando nell’iniziativa di Sharm una tappa fondamentale verso l'obiettivo della riconciliazione nazionale.

QUADRO ECONOMICO

A causa del conflitto che ha interessato l’Iraq, il quadro economico del Paese appare notevolmente mutato e il reperimento di dati aggiornati di fonte ufficiale è estremamente difficile. Poiché oggi l’assetto definitivo della nazione resta sotto molteplici aspetti ancora da definire, la presente scheda fa riferimento in alcune parti alla disciplina e alle normative del periodo pre- bellico e formalmente ancora in vigore. Alcune informazioni riportate nella presente scheda potrebbero, tuttavia, risultare incomplete o parziali.

PRINCIPALI INDICATORI ECONOMICI 436

PIL a prezzi correnti (miliardi di 19,0 12,7 25,5 30,6 US$) Tasso di crescita reale (%) -14,2 -35,3 46,5 1,5 Reddito pro capite (US$) Inflazione (%) 26,3 36,3 31,7 31,6 Bilancia Commerciale (milioni di US$) Esportazioni 12.218,8 9.711,1 16.863,0 23.032,0 Importazioni 9.817,3 9.933,5 19.731,3 20.154,0 Saldo 2.401,5 -222,4 -2.868,3 2.878 Debito estero (miliardi di US$) 112,5 111,1 109,1 96,4 Fonte: EIU, Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Report novembre 2006

Main destinations % of total Main origins of % of total of exports 2005(a) imports 2005(a) US 49.4 Jordan 12.0 Canada 13.5 Vietnam 5.1 Italy 12.6 US 20.9 Jordan 19.7 Turkey 22.3 (a) Derived from partners' trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error. Fonte: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Rischio paese NELLA CLASSIFICA RISCHIO-PAESE, AGGIORNATA AD OTTOBRE 2006, LA SACE COLLOCA L’IRAQ NELLA 7A CATEGORIA OCSE SU 7. Si tratta della categoria assegnata dall’OCSE ai paesi, che indica il grado di rischiosità (da 0 a 7, ove 0 rappresenta il rischio minore e 7 il rischio massimo).

Prospettive future

A causa dei problemi di sicurezza, la produzione petrolifera è cresciuta di poco nel 2006. Inoltre, la spesa per lo sviluppo è stata ostacolata dai costi per la sicurezza e dalla corruzione; mentre il settore non oil è stato danneggiato dalla mancanza di sicurezza e dalla lentezza della ricostruzione. Di conseguenza, gli esperti del settore, stimano una crescita del Pil reale di circa il 3% per il 2006. Per il 2007-08 si prevede un incremento modesto, al 3,5% circa, poiché gli aumenti della produzione petrolifera saranno scarsi e continueranno i problemi per il settore non oil. Tuttavia, se la situazione della sicurezza dovesse peggiorare, non si verificherà nessun aumento della produzione petrolifera. Per quanto riguarda l’inflazione, si stima un tasso medio del 60% per il 2006. Secondo l'opinione di esperti, presume che i prezzi medi saranno marcatamente più alti rispetto allo scorso anno. Ciò, in parte, riflette la diminuzione dei sussidi per i carburanti. I sussidi, sia per i carburanti che per numerosi altri prodotti, rimarranno in vigore, anche se saranno limitati, contribuendo a limitare l’aumento dell’inflazione durante il periodo di previsione. I costi dei prodotti importati sono aumentati notevolmente nel 2006, tuttavia dovrebbero diminuire a partire dal 2007, aiutando così l’inflazione a scendere al 45% nel periodo di previsione. La banca centrale è impegnata a mantenere quello che è diventato un legame di fatto con il dollaro. La Banca Centrale sembra riluttante ad utilizzare le sue cospicue riserve di valuta estera (circa 12,2 miliardi di dollari alla fine del 2005) per soddisfare la domanda di dollari. Gli esperti del 437 settore si aspettano che la pressione sulla valuta rimanga elevata, a causa della situazione della sicurezza, tuttavia, la banca centrale dovrebbe riuscire a mantenere relativamente stabili i tassi di cambio. Nel 2006 le entrate derivanti dal petrolio sono aumentate, in linea con gli aumenti dei prezzi medi. Gli analisti stimano un aumento di circa il 40%, a circa 32 miliardi di dollari. Le entrate da esportazioni aumenteranno di circa il 2,5% nel 2007, a circa 33 miliardi di dollari, grazie a un aumento atteso del 4% nella produzione petrolifera. Le entrate saranno quasi invariate nel 2008, poiché la diminuzione dei prezzi medi del petrolio sarà più o meno compensata da un modesto aumento della produzione. La spesa per le importazioni continuerà a crescere, in linea con la necessità di ricostruzione e il rafforzamento della domanda interna, ma il ritmo di crescita dovrebbe diminuire a una media annua del 4% nel 2007-08. La spesa complessiva per le importazioni dovrebbe arrivare a 21,5 miliardi di dollari nel 2007 e a 22,3 miliardi di dollari nel 2008. Quindi, il surplus commerciale passerà da una stima di 11,4 miliardi di dollari per il 2006 a circa 11,5 miliardi di dollari per il 2007, prima di diminuire a 10,9 miliardi di dollari nel 2008. Per le partite correnti, invece, si stima un surplus di 8 miliardi di dollari (23% del Pil) nel 2006, che dovrebbe rimanere più o meno uguale nel 2007, prima di scendere a quasi 5 miliardi di dollari nel 2008. Questi movimenti sui conti esteri dipende fortemente dai prezzi e dalla produzione del petrolio, poiché le entrate da petrolio incidono per circa il 98% delle esportazioni.

2007 2008 PIL (var. %) 3,4 3,5 Inflazione (%) 45,0 40,0 Produzione petrolifera 2.017 2.097 (milioni di barili/giorno) Bilancia commerciale (miliardi di US$) Esportazioni 33,0 33,2 Importazioni 21,5 22,3 Saldo 11,5 10,9

Settori produttivi

L’embargo decretato dalle Nazioni Unite, avendo determinato l’isolamento economico dell’Iraq per lungo tempo, non ha permesso di tracciare un quadro significativo dell’economia del Paese. Gli effetti dell’ultima guerra hanno peraltro aggravato tale situazione. Tutta l'economia del Paese resta comunque legata agli andamenti del settore petrolifero, suscettibili di influenzare la produzione industriale e lo sviluppo dei servizi. Un ruolo marginale è rivestito dall’agricoltura, pur in presenza di buone potenzialità del settore, poiché non è stata mai destinataria di efficaci politiche di sviluppo.

Interscambio commerciale tra l’Italia e l’Iraq

L’interscambio commerciale tra l’Italia e l’Iraq ha cominciato a svilupparsi grazie alle aperture offerte dalle disposizioni dell’ONU. Le importazioni italiane dall’Iraq mostrano un certo dinamismo, mentre le esportazioni italiane verso l’Iraq, pur avendo registrato qualche crescita, sono infatti decisamente inferiori rispetto alle 438 nostre importazioni. Questa vitalità dei rapporti commerciali tra i due paesi, ha messo in evidenza la necessità di avere rappresentanze ufficiali italiane nel paese iracheno: a ottobre 1996 l’Italia aveva pertanto a Baghdad una sezione di interessi presso l’Ambasciata Ungherese. Dai dati relativi al primo quadrimestre del 2006 emerge una notevole diminuzione delle esportazioni (-53,95%), giunte a 64.4 milioni di euro, rispetto agli oltre 139 milioni di euro registrati nello stesso periodo del 2005. Le importazioni, invece, sono passate da 530.5 milioni di euro del primo quadrimestre dello scorso anno, agli oltre 939.5 milioni di euro relativi al primo quadrimestre del 2005, con un aumento del 77,11%. Di conseguenza, il saldo commerciale negativo si è incrementato del 124,04%. I dati riportati di seguito, relativi ai principali gruppi merceologici oggetto dell’interscambio tra Italia e Iraq, sono solo indicativi degli scambi commerciali degli ultimi anni tra i due Paesi, a causa delle restrizioni cui è stato soggetto il paese arabo. Le opportunità di penetrazione delle imprese italiane nel mercato iracheno sarebbero infatti più significative, una volta stabilizzata la vita civile del Paese. Le importazioni italiane dall’Iraq sono dominate dal petrolio greggio e gas naturale. Negli anni 2003-2004, si sono registrate nuove voci dell'import, quali: cuoi e pelli di vario tipo; "Apparecchi riceventi per la radiodiffuzione e la televisione, apparecchi per la riproduzione e registrazione del suono e dell'immagine"; "Stampi, portastampi, sagome e forme in metallo"; "Oggetti di cancelleria e altri articoli n.c.a."; "Prodotti chimici vari"; Contatori per acqua, gas e di altri liquidi, di apparecchi di misura, controllo e regolazione, comprese parti accessori"; ed infine "Altra frutta, anche a guscio; piante utilizzate per la preparazione di bevande e spezie". Nettamente in calo invece, le importazioni di cereali, "Apparecchi trasmittenti radiotelevisivi"; e "Telecamere e apparecchi elettroacustici"; voci che al 2005 hanno raggiunto quota 0. I principali prodotti esportati dall’Italia verso il paese mediorientale restano, invece, tradizionalmente concentrati nelle voci relative alle macchine e apparecchi e agli autoveicoli (motori, genertori e trasformatori elettrici; Turbine idrauliche e termiche; ecc). Diminuiti invece i comparti: "Macchine da miniera, cava, cantiere"; Tubi senza saldatura"; "Attrezzature industriali per la refrigerazione e la ventilazione (per uso non domestico); "Altre macchine per l'agricoltura, la silvicoltura e la zootecnica".

Interscambio commerciale Interscambio Italia - Iraq 2005 2004 2003 Trend 2005-2004-2003 valore in € valore in € valore in € Esportazioni 291.283.060 201.059.572 143.662.573 Importazioni 1.644.021.680 807.919.969 713.254.168 Saldo -1.352.738.620 -606.860.397 -569.591.595 Fonte dati Istat Gen-Dic 2005 (agg. 01/06/2006)

[1] Secondo quanto affermato dal generale Petraeus, le prime truppe USA dovrebbero essere rimpatriate a metà dicembre. Nei primi mesi del 2008, il contingente americano dovrebbe scendere a 130.000 uomini. [2] La Costituzione ha ottenuto il consenso massiccio della popolazione sciita e curda, mentre i leader sunniti – che hanno invitato i propri elettori a votare no – hanno incassato una sconfitta di misura, fallendo per poco la maggioranza di due terzi in tre province che avrebbe rimesso tutto in gioco. Il Governo USA ha sottolineato la decisione irreversibile da parte della popolazione irachena di voltare le spalle alla violenza in favore della democrazia.

[3] La provincia di Kirkuk, che storicamente fa parte del Kurdistan, vede arabi, curdi e turkmeni rivendicare il proprio diritto a vivere in questa zona. I curdi, in particolare, vorrebbero che la città facesse parte della loro regione autonoma, eventualità osteggiata naturalmente dalla componente araba.

439 [4] L’Iraq è dominato da tre gruppi etnico-religiosi: Sciiti, Curdi e Sunniti. I tre gruppi presentano differenze molto rilevanti tanto da far pensare che il progetto del Governo americano di creare uno stato libero e democratico in cui le tre popolazioni possano vivere congiuntamente sia pura utopia. I gruppi etnici più importanti sono rappresentati da Curdi e Sciiti, seguiti da una minoranza di Sunniti (soltanto il 20% della popolazione). Secondo il piano degli Sciiti, con a capo Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, sarebbe opportuno creare uno stato autonomo, nel sud della regione e seguire quindi il modello del Kurdistan. I Curdi pretendono un'autonomia per permettere l’avverarsi di quel sogno di creare una patria per tutte le popolazioni Curde disseminate in maggioranza tra Turchia, Siria e Iran. L’unico gruppo veramente interessato alla creazione di uno stato unitario sono i Sunniti, che vivono nella regione a nord ovest di Baghdad, un territorio però quasi completamente desertico e privo di petrolio, a differenza delle altre zone dell’Iraq.

[5] I Ministri avevano presentato una lista di richieste, tra cui l’amnistia per alcuni detenuti sunniti arrestati per ragioni di sicurezza, all’approvazione della quale avevano affidato il loro rientro o meno al governo. I dicasteri affidati ai membri sunniti sono quelli della pianificazione e cooperazione allo sviluppo, dell’istruzione superiore, della cultura, della difesa, oltre alla carica di ministro di Stato per gli affari femminili e a quella di vice Primo Ministro con delega alla sicurezza.

440 XV legislatura

IL CONFLITTO IN IRAQ Prospettive da Washington

Contributi di Istituti di ricerca specializzati

n. 83 Dicembre 2007

441 XV legislatura

IL CONFLITTO IN IRAQ Prospettive da Washington

A cura di Riccardo Alcaro, Alessandro Marrone e Alessia Messina dell’Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

n. 83 Dicembre 2007

442 Servizio Studi Servizio affari internazionali

Direttore Direttore Daniele Ravenna tel. 06 6706_2451 Maria Valeria Agostini tel. 06 6706_2405

Segreteria _2451 Segreteria _2989 _2629 _3666 Fax 06 6706_3588 Fax 06 6706_4336

443 Il conflitto in Iraq Prospettive da Washington

di Riccardo Alcaro, Alessandro Marrone, Alessia Messina*

Lo scorso gennaio il presidente Usa, Bush, ha deciso l’invio di quasi trentamila truppe aggiuntive in Iraq (il cosiddetto surge, termine che indica un aumento improvviso, ma di breve durata) con il duplice obiettivo di migliorare le condizioni di sicurezza e favorire il processo di riconciliazione nazionale. Il Congresso a maggioranza democratica ha duramente criticato la decisione di Bush e tentato di costringere il presidente a definire un calendario certo per il rientro delle truppe americane dall’Iraq. Bush si è rifiutato di fissare limiti temporali, ma ha acconsentito a che, dopo un certo lasso di tempo, i risultati della sua nuova strategia fossero presentati al Congresso. Il 10 e l’11 settembre scorsi il generale David Petraeus, comandante delle forze americane in Iraq, e l’ambasciatore Usa a Baghdad Ryan Crocker hanno reso note le loro valutazioni sulle condizioni di sicurezza e politiche in Iraq. Più o meno nello stesso periodo, altre fonti ufficiali americane (l’organo investigativo del Congresso, una commissione indipendente, e le agenzie di intelligence) hanno pubblicato le proprie valutazioni. Questi diversi rapporti offrono un quadro della situazione variegato e non sempre concordante. Il rapporto Petraeus è decisamente il più positivo. Su alcuni elementi di fondo, comunque, i rapporti sembrano concordare: gli Usa sono apparentemente riusciti a contenere l’escalation di violenze che aveva contrassegnato gli ultimi mesi del 2006, ed alcuni significativi progressi sono stati compiuti in aree, come la provincia di Anbar, che in precedenza erano state teatro di azioni di guerriglia antiamericane ad alta intensità; nello stesso tempo però altre regioni hanno fatto registrare un peggioramento, e in generale il numero di attacchi contro le forze americane ed irachene resta molto alto. Un altro elemento di grave preoccupazione è l’elevato livello delle violenze tra i diversi gruppi etno-settari dell’Iraq (curdi, arabi sunniti e arabi sciiti). Le violenze intersettarie riflettono l’incapacità dei partiti iracheni di avviare un effettivo processo di riconciliazione nazionale, che soddisfi le esigenze dei diversi gruppi (per esempio con un’equa legge sulla distribuzione dei proventi del petrolio) e restituisca al governo un minimo di efficienza e una maggiore capacità di controllo del territorio. La valutazione sostanzialmente positiva, anche se molto cauta, del generale Petraeus ha contribuito significativamente ad alleggerire la pressione sull’attuale amministrazione perché cambi strategia. È probabile, dunque, che la presenza militare americana in Iraq si aggirerà ancora tra le 100 e le 140 mila unità quando, a gennaio 2009, si insedierà il nuovo presidente Usa. A lui o lei spetterà il difficile compito di dare una direzione strategica chiara ad un’operazione politico-militare sempre più dispendiosa, il cui successo sembra compromesso (almeno rispetto agli obiettivi iniziali), e di cui l’opinione pubblica americana, stando ai sondaggi, è sempre più stanca.

* Riccardo Alcaro è ricercatore, Alessandro Marrone è assistente alla ricerca e Alessia Messina è tirocinante presso lo IAI. 444 Indice

Introduzione

1. La situazione sul terreno: problemi aperti e valutazioni divergenti

2. Le politiche dell’amministrazione e l’azione del Congresso 2.1. Le politiche dell’amministrazione 2.2. L’azione del Congresso

3. La posizione sull’Iraq dei principali candidati alla presidenza 3.1. I candidati repubblicani 3.2. I candidati democratici

Conclusioni

Schede A. Esame prospettico delle valutazioni sulla situazione in Iraq fornito dal New York Times

B. L’opinione pubblica americana e la guerra in Iraq

4452 Il conflitto in Iraq Prospettive da Washington

di Riccardo Alcaro, Alessandro Marrone, Alessia Messina

Introduzione Il presente lavoro offre una panoramica delle posizioni espresse dall’establishment militare e politico americano sulla situazione in Iraq. Nella prima sezione viene svolta un’analisi comparata delle diverse valutazioni fornite da fonti militari, politiche e di intelligence degli Stati Uniti sui più recenti sviluppi in Iraq. Nella seconda sezione vengono esaminate la politica dell’attuale amministrazione repubblicana e l’azione del Congresso a maggioranza democratica. Nella terza sezione vengono passate in rassegna le posizioni dei principali candidati presidenziali sul futuro dell’impegno politico e militare americano in Iraq per capire cosa ci si possa realisticamente aspettare qualora le elezioni fossero vinte da un repubblicano oppure da un democratico.

1. La situazione sul terreno: problemi aperti e valutazioni divergenti Le grandi difficoltà sul terreno, l’incertezza degli scenari futuri, il sempre più gravoso dispendio di risorse umane e finanziarie hanno eroso il sostegno dell’opinione pubblica americana alla presenza militare in Iraq. Non vi è però una maggioranza netta a favore di un ritiro immediato e totale. Gli americani restano in generale favorevoli ad un ritiro graduale, ma molto diffusi restano i dubbi circa l’opportunità di un disimpegno completo. Più che una misura drastica – come appunto il ritiro integrale – l’opinione pubblica chiede una direzione strategica chiara e l’indicazione di credibili limiti temporali per il rientro delle truppe (cfr. i risultati dei diversi sondaggi sull’opinione pubblica americana in merito alla guerra in Iraq riportati più sotto, scheda B).

Dallo scorso autunno, quando si sono tenute le elezioni congressuali, l’Iraq ha stabilmente occupato il primo posto nell’agenda politica degli Stati Uniti. La conquista della maggioranza al Congresso da parte dei democratici, nonché l’approssimarsi della campagna presidenziale del prossimo anno, hanno contribuito ad accendere, e a volte incendiare, i toni del dibattito. Governo, gruppi politici e candidati presidenziali sono stati chiamati a presentare strategie e piani d’azione per la pacificazione e progressiva stabilizzazione dell’Iraq. La decisione del presidente Bush di inviare nuove forze nella speranza di rendere più sicura Baghdad (epicentro delle violenze) e facilitare così il processo politico in Iraq – la strategia del cosiddetto surge – è stata duramente attaccata dai democratici. Anche qualche repubblicano, in particolare tra quelli che si presenteranno per la rielezione il prossimo anno, ha preso le distanze. Il presidente Bush ha difeso con forza la sua scelta, e in primavera ha posto il veto ad una risoluzione del Congresso che fissava un calendario per il ritiro delle truppe. Bush ha però dovuto acconsentire a che i risultati della sua nuova strategia fossero sottoposti all’esame del Congresso.

Il 10 e l’11 settembre scorsi il comandante della forza multinazionale in Iraq, generale David Petraeus, e l’ambasciatore americano a Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, hanno riferito al Congresso sui progressi compiuti sul doppio fronte della sicurezza e del

4463 processo politico. Più o meno nello stesso periodo altre fonti di stato americane hanno pubblicato le loro valutazioni complessive della situazione in Iraq. In totale, dunque, la scorsa estate sono state rese pubbliche quattro diverse valutazioni: a) il rapporto Petraeus/Crocker1; b) il rapporto del Government Accountability Office (Gao), l’organo di supervisione e inchiesta del Congresso2; c) il rapporto della commissione indipendente nominata dal Congresso e guidata dal generale in pensione James J. Jones3; d) la National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (Nie), ovvero la sintesi delle analisi delle agenzie di intelligence americane4.

Dall’esame comparato delle principali conclusioni dei diversi rapporti (una comparazione prospettica, ripresa dal New York Times, segue più sotto, scheda A) emerge in primo luogo l’assenza di consenso generale sia sulla valutazione degli sviluppi più recenti sia sull’interpretazione delle tendenze più significative. In parte ciò dipende dal metodo impiegato: dai dati scelti, dal periodo di tempo preso in considerazione, dalle fonti utilizzate e così via5. In parte dipende dalla volatilità delle condizioni politiche e di sicurezza in Iraq: a un miglioramento in una data area fa spesso da contraltare il deterioramento o lo stallo in altre (l’eccezione è stato finora il Curdistan iracheno, che ha goduto di relativa stabilità fin dal 2003; le recenti tensioni con la Turchia, tuttavia, mostrano come anche la situazione nel nord dell’Iraq sia esposta a rischi di destabilizzazione; cfr. § 3.1). Infine, non si può escludere che le diverse valutazioni siano influenzate dalle percezioni e convinzioni individuali o di appartenenza politica degli analisti. Alcuni commentatori, per esempio, hanno osservato che difficilmente il generale Petraeus, la cui nomina è stata votata dal Senato all’unanimità, avrebbe potuto dichiarare al Congresso il fallimento di una strategia da lui stesso ispirata (va però ricordato che Petraeus gode di ampio rispetto e credibilità nell’establishment politico e militare degli Stati Uniti)6.

I rapporti valutano la situazione in Iraq alla luce di tre parametri generali: le condizioni di sicurezza nel paese, le violenze intersettarie, e il processo politico. Si tratta di questioni strettamente correlate tra loro.

1 Gen. David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, 10-11 settembre 2007, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf; Amb. Ryan C. Crocker, Report to U.S. House of Representatives on the Situation in Iraq, 10-11 settembre 2007, www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2007/91941.htm. 2 United States Government Accountability Office, Securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq, settembre 2007, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20070911_POLICY_GRAPHIC/GAO.pdf. 3 James J. Jones (presidente), The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 6 settembre 2007, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20070911_POLICY_GRAPHIC/isf.pdf. 4 Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive, agosto 2007, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20070911_POLICY_GRAPHIC/August_2007_Iraq_NI E.pdf. 5 Per la differenze metodologiche e d’approccio, cfr. Karen DeYoung, “Experts Doubt Drop In Violence in Iraq”, The Washington Post, 6 settembre 2007, p. A16; per una valutazione critica (largamente positiva) della metodologia impiegata nel rapporto Petraeus, cfr. la serie di articoli di Michael O’Hanlon, specialista presso la Brookings Institution, disponibili sul sitoweb www.brookings.edu/experts/ohanlonm.aspx?more=rc. 6 Sia la Camera dei rappresentanti che il Senato hanno votato risoluzioni di condanna nei confronti di un’inserzione aspramente polemica verso Petraeus firmata dal movimento progressista e anti-guerra Moveon.org. L’inserzione, apparsa sul New York Times, stigmatizzava la supposta parzialità del generale con un gioco di parole sul suo nome, chiamandolo General Betray-Us (come dire ‘il generale Ingannatore’). 4474 La dimensione della sicurezza comprende le azioni di guerriglia contro la coalizione multinazionale (al 95% circa composta da truppe americane) e contro le forze di sicurezza irachene (polizia ed esercito), nonché le violenze tra i diversi gruppi settari iracheni. Le divisioni etniche e settarie alimentano la violenza, impediscono il consolidamento del governo centrale e il controllo del territorio e provocano lo spostamento forzato di masse ingenti di persone sia all’interno del paese sia oltre i suoi confini. Il numero dei rifugiati iracheni oscilla attorno ai due milioni, la stragrande maggioranza dei quali è ospitata in Siria (circa 1,5 milioni) e Giordania. A questi si aggiungono 2,4 milioni di sfollati interni. La questione dei rifugiati e degli sfollati, sebbene non figuri tra le massime priorità dell’agenda americana, è direttamente legata alla sicurezza del paese e alle sue prospettive di stabilizzazione7. L’azione combinata di questi fattori ostacola gli sforzi di riconciliazione nazionale tra i diversi gruppi e fazioni e pregiudica la costruzione di un apparato statale funzionante.

Per quanto attiene alle condizioni di sicurezza, il rapporto Petraeus offre qualche motivo d’incoraggiamento. Gli obiettivi militari del surge – rendere Baghdad più sicura e ridurre le violenze intersettarie – sarebbero stati raggiunti (il numero di vittime civili nella capitale irachena sarebbe diminuito del 70% rispetto a dicembre 2006). Sebbene le valutazioni offerte da altri rapporti non siano in linea con il cauto ottimismo del generale Petraeus, anch’esse rilevano un lieve miglioramento. Oltre che a Baghdad, il progresso più importante si è registrato nella provincia di Anbar, fino a pochi mesi fa principale fucina dell’insurrezione sunnita e delle attività anti-coalizione dei gruppi legati ad al-Qaeda. Il considerevole calo nel numero delle vittime nella regione sarebbe una conseguenza della rottura tra le tribù sunnite locali e i gruppi di matrice ‘qaedista’, certamente la più significativa novità occorsa nella prima parte del 2007 (cfr. § 3.1). In altre zone del paese, in particolare quelle sciite del sud, gli attacchi contro le forze della coalizione sono però aumentati. Questo sembra suggerire che la nuova strategia americana ha avuto una certa efficacia in aree circoscritte, ma che non ha dato un contributo decisivo al recupero del controllo del territorio, almeno finora. Le forze di sicurezza irachene, pur aumentate in numero, non sono in grado di condurre operazioni di combattimento senza la direzione o il supporto delle forze della coalizione. In molte zone, inoltre, le milizie organizzate su base settaria continuano ad esercitare un’influenza preponderante sulle forze di sicurezza irachene.

Dalle diverse analisi sul campo emerge dunque che gli sforzi della coalizione e delle forze di sicurezza irachene hanno contenuto l’escalation di violenze che ha contrassegnato gli ultimi mesi del 2006 (tra i più sanguinosi dall’inizio della guerra) 8. I progressi raggiunti (su cui non c’è unanime consenso) poggiano però su basi precarie e nuovi focolai di violenza sono apparsi in province in precedenza più stabili. Anche il rapporto Petraeus riconosce come la violenza, nonostante i progressi compiuti a

7 Cfr. Elizabeth Ferris, Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination, The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 27 agosto 2007, http://www3.brookings.edu/views/papers/ferris/20070827.pdf. 8 Il numero dei soldati americani uccisi a settembre, 43, è inferiore del 43% rispetto al mese precedente (cfr “Better Numbers”, Washington Post, 14 ottobre 2007). Ad ottobre il numero di vittime militari americane è diminuito ulteriormente, scendendo al livello più basso dal marzo del 2006 (cfr. “Could U.S. military gains in Iraq outlast Bush?”, Yahoo News, 17 novembre 2007). A novembre il numero complessivo di attacchi alle forze americane è diminuito per tre settimane consecutive, scendendo al livello più basso dal febbraio 2006: nella terza settimana di novembre sommando gli attacchi avvenuti con autobombe, ordigni ad orologeria, mine, colpi di mortaio, razzi, missili terra aria, armi leggere, sono stati registrati 575 attacchi contro le forze americane rispetto ai 1.600 di giugno 2007 (cfr “US says attacks in Iraq fell to feb. 2006 level”, New York Times, 19 novembre 2007). 4485 Baghdad e nell’Anbar, resti endemica e ad alta intensità. Basti pensare che il dato più ottimistico sul numero di auto-bombe (quello del rapporto Petraeus) è di novanta al giorno (si tratta, tra l’altro, di uno dei dati su cui si registrano maggiori discrepanze tra il rapporto Petraeus e gli altri: le valutazioni del Government Accountability Office oscillano attorno ai 170; l’Iraq Index della Brookings Institution, che raccoglie e sintetizza i dati da fonti come le Nazioni Unite e il Pentagono, stima la media degli attacchi giornalieri intorno a 120).

Sul fronte delle violenze intersettarie, il quadro offerto dalle diverse valutazioni è più fosco. Attentati e violenze tra i diversi gruppi etno-settari dell’Iraq, in particolare tra sunniti e sciiti, hanno subito una brusca impennata da quando un ordigno esplosivo ha semi-distrutto la Moschea d’Oro sciita di Samarra nel febbraio 2006. Nel corso del 2007 la situazione non è cambiata in modo sostanziale. Lo stesso rapporto Petraeus, che pure riferisce di una diminuzione del 70% delle violenze intersettarie a Baghdad, riconosce che il numero di vittime dovute all’odio e alle rivalità etnico-settarie è ancora “inquietante”. Gli altri rapporti parlano di riduzioni marginali del livello di violenza, preferendo porre l’accento su altri, più preoccupanti elementi, come l’aumento degli scontri intra-sciiti. Diversi analisti hanno sottolineato inoltre come il calo delle vittime sia anche da attribuire alla pulizia etnica che in molte aree sia a Baghdad che altrove ha costretto alla fuga la popolazione appartenente alla confessione minoritaria o meno organizzata sul piano militare. Inoltre, misurare le violenze intersettarie pone seri problemi, perché non è sempre possibile avere la certezza del carattere ‘intersettario’ dell’atto preso in esame (come ammette il rapporto del Gao)9.

Più sconfortante ancora è quanto emerge dai diversi rapporti in merito al processo politico. Nelle intenzioni, il surge avrebbe dovuto facilitare la riconciliazione nazionale garantendo maggiore sicurezza e riducendo gli attriti intersettari. I diversi rapporti concordano però nel giudicare l’azione del governo iracheno inefficace e le prospettive per un compromesso sulle questioni centrali ancora distanti (il rapporto del Gao segnala come il governo iracheno abbia realizzato solo tre dei diciotto obiettivi legislativi, economici e relativi alla sicurezza fissati dal Congresso americano). In particolare, il governo iracheno non ha ancora proceduto alla promessa revisione costituzionale che dovrebbe dare più garanzie ai sunniti, non ha varato la legge sulla distribuzione dei proventi della vendita del petrolio e non ha affrontato la questione della de-baathificazione e del disarmo delle milizie. Il dibattito politico resta ostaggio delle divisioni settarie. L’avvicinamento tra le tribù sunnite dell’Anbar e le forze della coalizione – come detto il maggiore progresso registrato dall’inizio dell’anno – è motivato dagli attriti sempre più forti tra la popolazione locale e i gruppi radicali legati ad al-Qaeda, non da uno specifico piano di cooptazione dei sunniti nel governo. La mediazione con i capi sunniti locali è servita agli americani per ridurre il numero di attacchi contro la coalizione, ma non ha avuto riflessi a livello nazionale. Alcuni temono anzi che replicare il ‘modello-Anbar’ in altre zone del paese, in assenza di un chiaro disegno di conciliazione nazionale, sia rischioso. Gli americani infatti non farebbero che prendere le parti di una fazione in una serie di scontri locali, alimentando e non soffocando le violenze intersettarie10.

9 Un alto ufficiale dell’intelligence americana ha riassunto questa difficoltà in modo brutale, ma efficace: “Se il proiettile penetra nella nuca, è [un omicidio] settario. Se dalla fronte, è [un’esecuzione] criminale” (cfr. Karen DeYoung, Experts Doubt Drop In Violence In Iraq, cit.). 10 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Iraq surge assessed. Testimony buys time for Bush”, Strategic Comments, vol 13, n. 7, settembre 2007. 4496

In conclusione, ogni valutazione della situazione sul terreno in Iraq deve fare i conti con molteplici elementi di incertezza. I limitati progressi sul fronte della sicurezza – rivendicati da Petraeus, ma messi in dubbio da altri – non autorizzano a parlare di un processo di pacificazione in corso. Questioni centrali come la violenza intersettaria – dal 2006 stampa ed esperti hanno cominciato ad usare più diffusamente l’espressione “guerra civile” (o “guerre civili”)11 – o l’inefficienza del governo centrale restano irrisolte. La complessità e gravità della situazione richiedono apparentemente un impegno sostenuto sul piano politico, economico e militare di medio-lungo periodo da parte degli Stati Uniti. Il ritiro delle truppe, parziale o integrale che sia, non è un’opzione presa in considerazione dai diversi rapporti summenzionati. Il generale Petraeus si è espresso a favore del mantenimento dell’attuale numero di truppe (168 mila) almeno fino alla prossima estate, a parte una riduzione modesta prevista per Natale. Gli altri rapporti non si esprimono direttamente, anche se la Nie fa notare come la percezione di un prossimo sganciamento da parte Usa possa spingere le diverse fazioni irachene ad organizzarsi per occupare il vuoto di potere lasciato dagli americani. D’altra parte, lo stesso Petraeus riconosce che la strategia del surge non offre garanzie certe di successo. È inevitabile che, soprattutto con l’approssimarsi dell’appuntamento elettorale del prossimo anno, negli Usa verranno discusse altre opzioni – per esempio quella proposta dalla Commissione Baker-Hamilton di ridurre il numero di truppe da combattimento e riconfigurare la missione su compiti di addestramento e anti- terrorismo. Per avere un’idea più chiara su come si articolerà il dibattito sull’Iraq in America, sarà necessario guardare alle scelte dell’attuale amministrazione, all’operato del Congresso a maggioranza democratica, e naturalmente alle posizioni espresse dai più importanti candidati presidenziali.

Scheda A – Esame prospettico delle valutazioni sulla situazione in Iraq fornito dal «New York Times»12

RAPPORTI Petraeus/Crocker Government Commissione National Accountability Jones Intelligence Office Estimate Sicurezza Gli obiettivi La violenza Mentre la Ci sono stati militari del surge rimane elevata. Il sicurezza in moderati ma sono stati in numero medio di alcune parti discontinui larga misura attacchi giornalieri dell’Iraq è miglioramenti raggiunti. Negli contro i civili è sembrata nella situazione ultimi mesi le rimasto quasi migliorare, il della sicurezza dal forze irachene e invariato negli paese continua gennaio del 2007. della coalizione ultimi sei mesi. Il ad essere afflitto La forte spirale di hanno fatto numero di attacchi dalla violenza violenza per adesso progressi nel complessivi è interna. La è stata arrestata, e il campo della diminuito a luglio violenza è livello complessivo sicurezza. rispetto a giugno nettamente di attacchi in Iraq è Sebbene i in gran parte a diminuita nella diminuito durante

11 Le fonti ufficiali americane rifiutano però di utilizzare quest’espressione. 12 Farhana Hossain, “Assessments of the War”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/world/20070910_REPORTS_GRAPHIC.html. 4507 miglioramenti causa della provincia sunnita sette delle ultime siano stati diminuzione di di Anbar, in nove settimane. In discontinui nel attacchi alle forze precedenza ogni caso il livello paese, il numero della coalizione. roccaforte della complessivo di complessivo degli Gli attacchi sono guerriglia. Ma gli violenza, incluso il attacchi è aumentati in attacchi sono numero di attacchi e diminuito per 8 concomitanza con aumentati a di vittime, rimane delle ultime 12 i maggiori eventi Diyala, Balad, alto. settimane, politici o religiosi. Bassora e Amra. scendendo nelle La violenza resta ultime due al endemica a livello più basso Baghdad, dal giugno del nonostante i 2006. moderati successi ottenuti da febbraio. Violenza settaria Le operazioni Non si può Nelle zone con I livelli di violenza della coalizione e determinare se la una popolazione settaria e delle forze violenza settaria etnicamente e insurrezionale irachene hanno sia diminuita religiosamente rimarranno alti, contributo a dall’inizio del mista, come anche se con il ridurre la piano per la Baghdad e le proseguimento delle violenza etnico- sicurezza di città circostanti, attività di contro- settaria, Baghdad. La continuano a guerriglia e di riducendo misurazione della registrarsi supporto e notevolmente il violenza settaria è violenze e addestramento delle numero delle difficile poiché intense attività forze irachene vittime a Baghdad non è sempre settarie. Anche condotte dalla e nel paese chiaro l’intento alcune aree sciite coalizione la rispetto al picco di dell’atto di etnicamente sicurezza violenza del violenza. Il omogenee del sud continuerà a dicembre 2006. Il numero medio di vedono migliorare numero attacchi giornalieri aumentare il modestamente nei complessivo di contro i civili è livello di violenza prossimi 6-12 mesi. vittime civili è rimasto quasi tra le milizie diminuito, invariato negli sciite. sebbene sia ancora ultimi sei mesi. ad un livello inquietante. Forze di Le forze di Il numero delle Le forze di Le forze di sicurezza sicurezza unità dell’esercito sicurezza sicurezza irachene irachene irachene hanno iracheno operanti irachene hanno non sono continuato a in modo compiuto migliorate crescere e a autonomo è progressi abbastanza da sostenere diminuito tra discontinui, ma condurre le maggiormente il marzo e luglio dovrebbe esserci operazioni peso della 2007, sebbene le un miglioramento principali sicurezza, forze di sicurezza crescente delle indipendentemente sebbene siano aumentate loro capacità per dalla coalizione, in lentamente e tra di numero e provvedere alla modo sostenibile continue stiano guidando sicurezza interna ed in più località, e preoccupazioni in misura dell’Iraq. Si restano dipendenti per le tendenze maggiore le registrano dalla coalizione per settarie di alcuni operazioni di progressi importanti aspetti di elementi tra i contro-guerriglia. maggiori supporto logistico loro ranghi. La fedeltà tribale nell’esercito e nel ed in In generale ed etnico-settaria ministero della combattimento. comunque i rimane forte in difesa rispetto al L’interferenza soldati iracheni molte unità ministero politica nelle hanno combattuto dell’esercito, dell’interno, dove operazioni di e sostenuto ostacolando corruzione e sicurezza continua a perdite, prendendo l’azione contro le disfunzioni hanno minare gli sforzi 4518 la guida delle milizie. Continua ostacolato le delle forze irachene operazioni in l’interferenza forze di polizia. e della coalizione. molte aree. politica sulla La polizia Attualmente sono conduzione delle irachena sta in azione circa operazioni militari migliorando 140 battaglioni tra e sull’applicazione prevalentemente a esercito, polizia e della legge. Le livello locale, ma forze speciali, il autorità politiche è vulnerabile alle 95% dei quali irachene infiltrazioni, e capaci di prendere continuano a spesso inferiore ai la guida delle rivolgere false terroristi e alle operazioni, accuse al personale milizie quanto ad sebbene con un delle forze di addestramento ed parziale sostegno sicurezza. equipaggiamento. della coalizione. Controllo delle Il controllo delle Le milizie L’influenza delle milizie sulla milizie sulle forze continuano ad milizie e dei sicurezza locale di sicurezza locali avere un ruolo guerriglieri non è stato preminente nella continua a minare eliminato. sicurezza locale, l’affidabilità di Numerosi rapporti e pongono una alcune unità delle americani e minaccia alla forze di sicurezza dell’Onu sicurezza e alla irachene. affermano che le stabilità dell’Iraq milizie importante quanto mantengono quella di al- ancora un Qaeda. controllo Nonostante la significativo o forte un’influenza sulla concentrazione di sicurezza locale in truppe nella parti di Baghdad e capitale, il in altre aree del governo centrale paese. Tale non ha ancora il influenza colpisce pieno controllo ogni settore del della sicurezza a ministero Baghdad e nelle dell’interno, in città circostanti. particolare a Baghdad e in altre grandi città. Riconciliazione Alcuni degli Il governo Il rapporto si I leader politici politica sviluppi politici iracheno non ha concentra sulla iracheni più promettenti a realizzato situazione della rimangono livello nazionale l’impegno preso sicurezza. incapaci di non sono nel giugno 2006 Tuttavia aggiunge governare. Le misurabili da di adottare che il fattore più divisioni tra il modelli né visibili misure legislative, importante che primo ministro al- lontano da economiche e sul potrebbe Maliki e la fazione Baghdad. Noi fronte della influenzare di al-Sadr sono associamo i sicurezza che immediatamente aumentate. Le progressi nella promuoverebbero e favorevolmente tensioni derivanti riconciliazione la riconciliazione l’evoluzione della dalla situazione nazionale nazionale tra le sicurezza in Iraq è della sicurezza e all’adozione di fazioni in lotta. la riconciliazione l’assenza di leader leggi chiave, ma il Nonostante i politica, al fine, in forti hanno bloccato problema di tali leader iracheni particolare, di il dibattito politico, leggi è che abbiano porre fine alla rallentato il costituiscono un recentemente violenza settaria. processo altro passo verso siglato un accordo, decisionale, e un assetto federale la polarizzazione aumentato la dell’Iraq che non tra i maggiori vulnerabilità di al- 4529 tutti gli iracheni gruppi etnici e la Maliki. La hanno ancora lotta tra le fazioni percezione di un accettato. A sciite ritiro americano livello provinciale diminuiscono la probabilmente i successi politici stabilità della incoraggerà le sono stati più coalizione di fazioni a cercare pronunciati, governo, e la sua delle soluzioni particolarmente capacità di locali sulla nel nord e adottare la sicurezza che nell’ovest del legislazione potrebbero paese. La necessaria per la intensificare la questione chiave riconciliazione competizione e la adesso è settaria. violenza settaria. connettere tali successi provinciali al governo centrale.

2. Le politiche dell’amministrazione e l’azione del Congresso

2.1 Le politiche dell’amministrazione Lo scorso gennaio, come detto, il presidente Usa George W. Bush ha adottatouna nuova strategia per l’Iraq. Con il doppio obiettivo di migliorare le condizioni di sicurezza – soprattutto a Baghdad – e di favorire il processo di riconciliazione nazionale, Bush ha ordinato l’invio in Iraq di 28 mila nuove truppe da combattimento – il cosiddetto surge (‘incremento rapido ma temporaneo’). A giugno, le truppe americane in Iraq hanno toccato le 168 mila unità, il tetto massimo del periodo successivo all’invasione.

Gli ultimi mesi del 2006 erano stati particolarmente sanguinosi in Iraq, e il dibattito sembrava essersi spostato sulle opzioni alternative ad un esteso e prolungato impiego delle forze americane in operazioni di combattimento. Nel dicembre 2006 una commissione d’inchiesta bipartisan nominata dal Congresso – la commissione Baker-Hamilton – aveva raccomandato di ridurre il numero delle truppe da combattimento, concentrare la missione su addestramento e attività di antiterrorismo (cioè contro le cellule di al-Qaeda e simili formatesi in Iraq), e coinvolgere i vicini dell’Iraq, inclusi Siria ed Iran, in un processo regionale di stabilizzazione del paese13. La decisione di Bush di aumentare le truppe ha suscitato dunque una certa sorpresa. Così facendo, Bush ha riaffermato con determinazione di non considerare plausibile l’opzione del ritiro – per quanto graduale e parziale – in mancanza di effettivi miglioramenti delle condizioni di sicurezza. La Casa Bianca ha conseguentemente adottato un criterio generale per determinare il graduale ritiro di parte delle truppe presenti in Iraq, il cosiddetto return on success, in base al quale i soldati americani potranno tornare in patria man mano che migliorerà la sicurezza, e a condizione che ciò non metta a repentaglio i progressi compiuti nel frattempo14.

In applicazione di tale principio, e in accordo con le raccomandazioni di

13 James A. Baker III e Lee H. Hamilton, Iraq Study Group report. The way forward – A new approach, 6 dicembre 2006, http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html. 14 The White House, Fact Sheet: “Return on success” guiding principle for troop levels in Iraq, 13 settembre 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070913.html. 45310 Petraeus, l’amministrazione ha programmato una modesta riduzione degli effettivi. Ad ottobre sono ritornati negli Stati Uniti senza essere sostituiti 2.200 marines schierati nella provincia di Anbar. È inoltre previsto il ritiro di una brigata dell’esercito (circa 5.700 soldati) entro la fine di dicembre, e la riduzione entro luglio del 2008 del numero delle brigate in Iraq da 20 a 15. Gli esperti stimano che nei prossimi nove mesi potrebbero venire richiamati in patria tra i 21.700 e i 30.000 effettivi, riportando quindi il numero di soldati in Iraq ai livelli precedenti il surge. Prima di ulteriori decisioni sui passi successivi, a marzo 2008 Petraeus e Crocker dovranno comunque di nuovo riferire al Congresso sulla situazione irachena.

La Casa Bianca prevede che, quando le condizioni di sicurezza lo permetteranno, le truppe americane lasceranno la guida delle operazioni di combattimento alle forze di sicurezza irachene, assumendo così un ruolo prima di supporto e poi di semplice supervisione. Ciò dovrebbe in futuro consentire agli Stati Uniti di concentrarsi sull’addestramento delle forze di sicurezza irachene e sulle operazioni antiterrorismo. I comandi militari in Iraq stanno preparando i piani necessari allo scopo di trasferire la responsabilità della sicurezza alle forze irachene senza compromettere i progressi compiuti nelle aree dove era più forte la guerriglia sunnita. L’idea è che alcune delle brigate operative in Iraq riducano gli effettivi impiegati in combattimento per aumentare quelli impegnati nell’addestramento delle forze irachene. Data l’incertezza della situazione, tale processo sarà graduale e in ogni caso le forze americane resteranno pronte ad intervenire nelle aree più a rischio. L’attuazione del piano, dunque, non potrà che avvenire in maniera graduale e in accordo con le valutazioni dei comandanti di brigata impegnati sul campo. Una componente essenziale del piano è che il governo di Baghdad incrementi gli effettivi delle forze di sicurezza irachene, aumentando in particolare il reclutamento nelle zone sunnite (che sono generalmente sottorappresentate, specialmente nella polizia) 15.

L’attenzione alle aree sunnite dell’Iraq è una delle novità più importanti introdotte dal surge. Infatti, un elemento cruciale nella valutazione dell’amministrazione sono i progressi compiuti nella provincia di Anbar, che costituisce un terzo del territorio iracheno, è popolata prevalentemente da sunniti, ed è stata a lungo l’epicentro dell’insurrezione antiamericana. Petraeus ha riferito che la situazione nell’Anbar è migliorata più che nel resto del paese, poiché le tribù sunnite locali hanno rotto l’alleanza con le cellule di al-Qaeda ed hanno iniziato a collaborare con le forze americane. Secondo il generale gli attacchi contro la coalizione sono diminuiti dell’85% (dai 1.350 dell’ottobre del 2006 ai circa 200 dell’agosto 2007), e 20.000 reclute sunnite sono state arruolate nelle forze di polizia locali. Gli americani puntano a replicare il successo ottenuto nell’Anbar anche in altre province critiche, come quella di Diyala e quelle sciite nel sud del paese. Tuttavia, come fatto notare in precedenza, alcuni dubitano dell’opportunità di replicare il ‘modello-Anbar’, perché sostenere una delle parti del conflitto settario rischierebbe di indebolire il governo nazionale e la sua capacità di interagire con la popolazione. Il problema è stato riconosciuto dalle autorità irachene, che hanno tentato di farvi fronte creando organizzazioni locali di ‘controllo del vicinato’ coordinate da un comitato centrale per la riconciliazione nazionale16.

La stragrande maggioranza degli esperti, inclusa la commissione Baker- Hamilton, ritiene essenziale per la stabilizzazione dell’Iraq la cooperazione dei paesi

15 Cfr. Michael Gordon, “US plans big effort to train Iraqi forces”, International Herald Tribune, 23 novembre 2007, p. 1-7. 16 Cfr. IISS, Iraq surge assessed. Testimony buys time for Bush, cit. 45411 vicini. Di questi, nessuno sembra avere obiettivi pienamente coincidenti con quelli degli Stati Uniti. I paesi arabi della regione, tra i quali la sola Siria ha criticato pubblicamente gli Usa, non sono andati molto oltre l’assicurazione di un sostegno formale al processo politico in atto. Nelle principali capitali arabe è diffuso e in crescita il timore che l’ascesa al potere in Iraq di gruppi e partiti sciiti abbia favorito una pericolosa espansione dell’influenza dell’Iran (con l’eccezione dell’Iraq, tutti gli stati arabi sono a maggioranza sunnita, anche se rilevanti minoranze sciite esistono in Arabia Saudita e Bahrein). Il governo di Teheran intrattiene stretti rapporti con alcune delle principali formazioni sciite irachene, come per es. lo Sciri (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), sebbene il grado di influenza esercitato dagli iraniani sia oggetto di dibattito.

È sull’Iran, dunque, che sono puntate le attenzioni di Washington. In Iraq si gioca una parte importante della partita regionale tra Iran e Stati Uniti (che comprende anche questioni come il controverso programma nucleare iraniano e il sostegno iraniano ad altre forze antiamericane in Medio Oriente, come Hezbollah in Libano)17. Sia Washington sia Teheran sono interessate alla stabilizzazione dell’Iraq, sebbene su basi apparentemente opposte: se gli americani puntavano (e in parte puntano ancora) ad un Iraq alleato che funga anche da argine all’influenza iraniana nell’area del Golfo, l’Iran vede nella predominanza dei gruppi sciiti nel nuovo Iraq un’opportunità per accrescere il suo ruolo regionale. La logica che ha portato molti esperti a ritenere possibile, per quanto difficile, un punto d’incontro è che né l’obiettivo originario degli Usa né quello preferito da Teheran sono effettivamente conseguibili, perché entrambi i contendenti avrebbero le capacità di frustrare i disegni dell’altro. Ciò detto, la costruzione di un’intesa irano-americana sull’Iraq resta un’impresa di difficile realizzazione per l’estrema diffidenza che caratterizza i rapporti tra i due Stati. Negli Stati Uniti, in particolare, l’amministrazione sembra ancora divisa tra chi ritiene un’intesa con l’Iran un passo necessario e chi ritiene essenziale invece escludere l’Iran da ogni soluzione di stabilizzazione regionale e, anzi, lavorare per isolarlo ulteriormente a livello internazionale. La componente ‘Iran’ della politica americana verso l’Iraq sembra riflettere questa tensione tra priorità discordanti.

L’amministrazione Bush accusa da tempo l’Iran di ostacolare la stabilizzazione dell’Iraq. Già un anno fa lo stesso rapporto dell’Iraq Study Group aveva sottolineato che l’Iran, oltre a sostenere i partiti sciiti, forniva armi, aiuti finanziari ed addestramento alle milizie sciite. Il rapporto Petraeus sostiene che le milizie al-Qud delle Guardie rivoluzionarie dell’Iran – una potente organizzazione armata – assistono i ribelli sciiti con armi, finanziamenti, addestramento, e che vi sono prove che i componenti più sofisticati degli esplosivi usati da questi gruppi provengono dall’Iran. Sulla solidità delle prove che testimonierebbero il coinvolgimento delle milizie al-Qud nelle attività di guerriglia antiamericana in Iraq si è molto dibattuto (e si dibatte ancora). Il Congresso Usa, però, le ha considerate sufficienti a giustificare l’inserimento delle milizie al-Qud nella lista delle organizzazioni terroristiche degli Stati Uniti.

Allo stesso tempo l’amministrazione ha tentato di avviare un dialogo con l’Iran circoscritto alla questione irachena, accogliendo così almeno in parte la raccomandazione dell’Iraq Study Group di intraprendere un negoziato regionale. Gli

17 Gli Stati Uniti sostengono l’adozione di misure punitive da parte dell’Onu contro l’Iran fino a quando quest’ultimo non avrà fornito garanzie oggettive sulla destinazione solo pacifica del suo programma nucleare. Washington sostiene anche il disarmo di Hezbollah, che considera un’organizzazione terroristica. 45512 Stati Uniti hanno organizzato all’inizio di maggio in Egitto, a Sharm el-Sheikh, la prima Conferenza internazionale sull’Iraq, cui hanno preso parte gli stati membri del G8 e della Lega araba, una rappresentanza delle Nazioni Unite, e tutti i paesi confinanti con l’Iraq, compreso quindi l’Iran. Nel suo intervento alla conferenza, il ministro degli esteri iraniano, Manucher Mottaki, ha collegato le violenze in Iraq all’occupazione americana e ne ha chiesto la fine. A margine della conferenza, la delegazione iraniana ha disdetto il previsto incontro bilaterale tra il segretario di stato Rice e Mottaki. La conferenza si è chiusa con la cancellazione di trenta miliardi di dollari di debito estero iracheno, e con l’impegno ufficiale dei paesi partecipanti a sostenere la transizione in Iraq. Il 28 maggio l’ambasciatore Crocker ed il suo omologo iraniano a Baghdad Hassam Kazemi-Quomi hanno avuto un colloquio di quattro ore, alla presenza del primo ministro iracheno al- Maliki. Si è trattato del primo incontro tra ambasciatori dei due paesi dal 1979. Alla seconda Conferenza internazionale sull’Iraq, svoltasi il 3 novembre ad Istanbul, Mottaki ha ribadito la richiesta iraniana di fissare un calendario per il ritiro delle truppe straniere, suggerendo la loro sostituzione con una forza militare formata da contingenti dei paesi confinanti con l’Iraq. L’Iran ha inoltre chiesto l’immediato trasferimento di tutti i poteri statali al governo iracheno, l’espulsione dei gruppi di guerriglieri curdi ostili all’Iran, l’amnistia per i responsabili degli attacchi contro le truppe occupanti ed il loro parziale reintegro nelle forze di sicurezza irachene. Gli Stati Uniti e l’Arabia Saudita hanno respinto il pacchetto di proposte, che non ha trovato forti consensi neppure tra gli altri partecipanti alla conferenza. Non sono stati avviati, ma nemmeno esclusi, ulteriori colloqui bilaterali tra Iran e Stati Uniti.

Ad esacerbare le tensioni contribuisce anche la questione della detenzione di cittadini iraniani da parte degli Stati Uniti e di cittadini americani da parte dell’Iran. Nel gennaio 2007 le forze americane hanno arrestato cinque iraniani nel consolato di Teheran ad Irbil, nel Curdistan iracheno, accusandoli di prestare assistenza ad attività antiamericane. L’Iran ne ha richiesto l’immediata scarcerazione, sostenendo si tratti di diplomatici e non di agenti dei servizi di sicurezza o delle milizie al-Qud. Ad agosto altri otto iraniani sono stati arrestati a Baghdad dall’esercito americano, che li ha poi rilasciati con tanto di scuse ufficiali. Infine il 30 settembre le forze americane hanno arrestato nel nord dell’Iraq un altro iraniano accusato di contrabbando di materiale esplosivo, che secondo i governi di Teheran e Baghdad è invece membro di una delegazione commerciale e va rilasciato. Dal canto loro le autorità di Teheran hanno arrestato nel maggio 2007 due cittadini irano-americani, e un anno fa un cittadino irano- canadese, accusandoli di essere cospiratori al servizio degli Stati Uniti.

Mentre i rapporti con l’Iran restano tesi e non sembrano aver portato ad un’intesa generale su come gestire la stabilizzazione dell’Iraq, gli Stati Uniti sono costretti a far fronte ad un grave problema con un altro dei vicini dell’Iraq, la Turchia. Negli ultimi mesi la Turchia ha mostrato crescente irritazione verso il governo iracheno e quello americano, accusandoli di non aver preso adeguati provvedimenti contro i guerriglieri del Partito dei lavoratori del Curdistan (Pkk, il gruppo armato che lotta per l'indipendenza del Curdistan turco), che hanno intensificato gli attacchi in territorio turco operando dalle loro basi nel nord dell’Iraq. Il malumore e le preoccupazioni dei turchi sono cresciute al punto che il governo ha minacciato di intervenire militarmente. Ad ottobre il parlamento di Ankara ha autorizzato l’adozione di ogni misura, incluse operazioni militari oltre confine, per porre fine all’esistenza di organizzazioni terroristiche nei paesi vicini, mentre l’esercito turco ha schierato oltre sessantamila soldati al confine con l’Iraq ed ha preparato piani per l’incursione. A fine ottobre l’ennesimo attacco del Pkk ha provocato la reazione dell’aviazione turca, che è

45613 intervenuta oltre confine.

Gli Stati Uniti sono riusciti a dissuadere la Turchia dall’intraprendere operazioni militari su larga scala nel Curdistan iracheno. I colloqui tra i ministri degli esteri turco, iracheno ed americano, tenutisi durante la seconda Conferenza internazionale sull’Iraq, e soprattutto il vertice tra Bush e il primo ministro turco Reccep Tayyip Erdogan del 5 novembre, hanno allontanato per il momento lo spettro di un’invasione turca del nord dell’Iraq. L’amministrazione americana ha promesso alla Turchia una maggiore azione di contrasto alle attività del Pkk, e una più stretta cooperazione a livello politico, militare e d’intelligence. Un analogo impegno è stato preso anche dal governo di Baghdad.

2.2 L’azione del Congresso Il rapporto Petraeus, anche grazie all’alta reputazione di public servant del generale, ha contribuito in maniera decisiva ad allentare le pressioni sulla Casa Bianca perché cambiasse strategia ed indicasse limiti certi per il ritiro delle truppe. Il giudizio sostanzialmente positivo sul surge ha spinto diversi parlamentari repubblicani inizialmente critici verso il piano della Casa Bianca a riconsiderare le proprie posizioni. L'amministrazione, in questo modo, è riuscita ad evitare che i repubblicani appoggiassero le richieste di ritiro da parte dei democratici in numero sufficiente a rendere inefficace il veto presidenziale. I democratici hanno contestato le valutazioni di Petraeus e Crocker, sostenendo da un lato che i dati sono troppo confusi perché se ne possano trarre conclusioni attendibili, e sottolineando dall’altro come il surge non abbia favorito il processo di riconciliazione nazionale, che pure era una delle due priorità fissate da Bush a gennaio. I democratici hanno criticato duramente l’amministrazione per il rifiuto di fissare limiti certi, esprimendo la preoccupazione che in tal modo l’impegno militare americano in Iraq potrebbe protrarsi per molti anni a venire. Tali critiche sono condivise dalla maggioranza degli americani, ma i democratici non sono riusciti a trasformare l’appoggio dell’opinione pubblica in un risultato politico. In Senato i democratici hanno una maggioranza risicata e non sembrano in grado di raccogliere i voti repubblicani sufficienti a superare un veto presidenziale ed imporre la propria posizione all’amministrazione18.

La tensione tra amministrazione e Congresso si è acuita di nuovo a metà novembre in occasione della discussione della legge di rifinanziamento delle missioni militari in Iraq e Afghanistan. Di fronte alla richiesta della Casa Bianca di duecento miliardi di dollari, la maggioranza democratica in Congresso ne ha concessi solo cinquanta. Ha inoltre inserito nella legge che stanziava i fondi una disposizione che ordinava al presidente di iniziare il ritiro delle truppe entro 30 giorni dalla sua approvazione e indicava l’obiettivo non vincolante di ritirare la maggior parte delle truppe entro il 15 dicembre del 200819. Alla Camera dei rappresentanti, dove la maggioranza democratica è più consistente, la legge è stata approvata con 218 voti contro 203, attraendo però solo 4 voti repubblicani mentre 15 deputati democratici hanno votato con l’opposizione contro la proposta del proprio gruppo parlamentare. Al Senato la legge ha ottenuto 53 voti favorevoli, mentre ne servivano 60 per superare l’ostruzionismo repubblicano. Il provvedimento non è stato dunque approvato. Secondo le stime del Congresso e del Pentagono, in mancanza di una legge di finanziamento i

18 Peter Baker, Jonathan Weisman, “Accord on Iraq war slips further away”, Washington Post, 16 settembre 2007. 19 Noam N. Levey “House democrats renew antiwar push”, Los Angeles Times, 15 novembre 2007. 45714 fondi attualmente a disposizione sono sufficienti per continuare le operazioni solo fino a marzo 2008. I democratici hanno affermato che non approveranno altri stanziamenti per la guerra in Iraq finché non sarà stabilito un calendario preciso per il ritiro.

Alcuni commentatori ritengono che i democratici continueranno con tale strategia fino alle prossime elezioni presidenziali, nella speranza che l’elettorato premi gli sforzi compiuti per ottenere il ritiro. Tuttavia alcuni senatori democratici, come il candidato alle primarie Christopher Dodd del Connecticut, sottolineano come il partito corra così il rischio di aumentare la delusione dei suoi sostenitori dando la sensazione di non incidere sulla politica presidenziale. I repubblicani dal canto loro utilizzano i segnali di un miglioramento della situazione della sicurezza in Iraq per giustificare l’opposizione al ritiro delle truppe. Inoltre, accusano i democratici di perdere tempo prezioso trascurando altre importanti questioni, e di volere andare oltre i limiti dell’autorità del Congresso, quando cercano di imporre limitazioni e condizioni alla conduzione della guerra, che è invece, sottolineano i repubblicani, una prerogativa del presidente.

La maggior parte degli analisti concorda sul fatto che il rapporto Petraeus, pur prefigurando un graduale ritiro delle truppe nel medio termine, abbia posto le basi per il mantenimento di una forte presenza americana in Iraq nel prossimo futuro. Le audizioni di Petraeus e Crocker hanno infatti conseguito il risultato politico di allentare le pressioni sull’attuale amministrazione, ed il dibattito politico si sta ora concentrando su come il prossimo presidente americano gestirà la situazione ereditata da Bush, e cioè una presenza militare americana in Iraq compresa tra le 140 e le 100 mila unità. Diventa quindi importante capire le posizioni che i principali candidati democratici e repubblicani stanno assumendo in merito alla questione irachena.

Scheda B - L’opinione pubblica americana e l’Iraq

Approva la decisione di aver iniziato la guerra in Iraq?

Approva Disapprova Non risponde ABC News/Washington 35% 63% 2% Post 29 ott. – 1 nov. Pew Research Center 39% 54% 7% 17-23 ott. CBS News 12-16 ott. 45% 51% 4% Cnn 12-14 ott. 34% 65% 2% ABC News/Washington 38% 59% 3% Post 27-30 sett.

Ritiene che sia ancora possibile per gli Stati Uniti ottenere una vittoria in Iraq?

Fonte Sì è ancora possibile No non è più possibile Non risponde NBC News/Wall Street 40% 54% 6% Journal, 1-5 nov.

45815 Ritiene che le truppe debbano restare in Iraq finché la situazione non sarà stabilizzata o debbano essere ritirate il prima possibile?

Fonte Restare finché la Ritirare il prima Non risponde situazione non sarà possibile le truppe stabilizzata Pew Research Center 42% 54% 4% 17-23 ott. ABC News/Washington 43% 54% 3% Post 27-30 set.

Per quanto tempo è disposto a mantenere le truppe in Iraq?

Fonte Meno di 1 1-2 anni 2-5 anni Più di 5 anni Non risponde anno CBS News 12- 45% 27% 12% 5% 11% 16 ott.

Approva l’operato del presidente Bush riguardo all’Iraq?

Fonte Approvazione Disapprovazione Non risponde NBC News/Wall Street 27% 68% 5% Journal, 1-5 nov. CBS News 12-16 ott. 26% 67% 7% ABC News/Washington 30% 68% 2% Post 27-30 set.

Approva l’operato dei democratici in Congresso riguardo all’Iraq?

Fonte Approvazione Disapprovazione Non risponde CBS News 14-16 sett. 31% 57% 12%

Quale partito ritiene agirà meglio riguardo all’Iraq?

Fonte Democratici Repubblicani Entrambi Nessuno Non risponde ABC 50% 34% 2% 10% 4% News/Washington Post 29 ott. – 1 nov. ABC 49% 34% 3% 11% 3% News/Washington Post 27-30 set.

3. La posizione sull’Iraq dei principali candidati alla presidenza Il conflitto in Iraq sarà certamente al centro della campagna per le prossime presidenziali americane ed è probabile che una parte consistente degli elettori farà la sua scelta basandosi sulla posizione dei candidati al riguardo. . È praticamente certo che nel 2008 gli americani saranno chiamati a scegliere tra un candidato repubblicano che, in linea con l’attuale strategia dell’amministrazione Bush, s’impegnerà a mantenere la presenza militare americana in Iraq, e un candidato democratico che prometterà invece di porre termine al conflitto al più presto. Da un’analisi più approfondita dei programmi

45916 elettorali dei principali candidati emerge tuttavia che le posizioni sono piuttosto articolate.

3.1 I candidati repubblicani In campo repubblicano, i principali candidati non solo hanno appoggiato la guerra in Iraq fin dall’inizio e la strategia del surge avviata nel gennaio scorso, ma concordano sulla necessità di mantenere le truppe sul terreno, ritenendo che un disimpegno dalla regione non sia nell’interesse né dell’Iraq né degli Usa.

Rudolph Giuliani, uno dei favoriti delle primarie repubblicane, ha sottolineato come “fissare una data ufficiale per il ritiro delle truppe adesso sarebbe un terribile errore, perché non farebbe altro che incoraggiare [..] i nemici [degli Stati Uniti]”20. Giuliani, che ha spesso evocato la minaccia di un nuovo attentato terroristico in America, sostiene con forza che gli Usa non hanno altra scelta che continuare la guerra contro i terroristi. Collocando la guerra in Iraq nel più ampio contesto della “guerra globale al terrore”, Giuliani sembra preparare il terreno per giustificare un’eventuale presenza militare Usa nel Golfo per molti anni ancora21.

Su posizioni simili a quelle di Giuliani (e di Bush) è John McCain che ritiene che non si possa procedere al ritiro delle truppe prima che il governo iracheno sia in grado di garantire una certa stabilità politica al paese. Nonostante non abbia mai risparmiato critiche sul modo in cui l’amministrazione Bush ha condotto la guerra, il senatore dell’Arizona ha dichiarato esplicitamente di non avere a disposizione alcun ‘piano B’ se l’attuale strategia dovesse fallire22. Ogni alternativa che fissasse una data certa per il ritiro, ha sottolineato McCain in un’intervista, non farebbe altro che far precipitare gli eventi23. Infatti, se gli Stati Uniti abbandonassero l’Iraq, non farebbero che “cedere terreno ad al-Qaeda”, rafforzare l’Iran e creare le condizioni per una più ampia guerra regionale24. Nessun politico di primo piano negli Stati Uniti è stato più in linea con la strategia del surge di McCain. Il senatore dell’Arizona, infatti, è stato non solo uno dei più convinti sostenitori del piano di Bush, ma anche tra coloro che avevano chiesto un aumento degli effettivi dispiegati in Iraq ben prima che il presidente si decidesse in tal senso25.

A differenza di McCain che non ritiene saggio avviare un dialogo con Siria e Iran per la pacificazione dell’Iraq, almeno fino a quando questi due paesi non si mostreranno più inclini a venire incontro alle richieste americane, l’altro candidato repubblicano di spicco, Mitt Romney, sostiene invece gli sforzi per coinvolgere i paesi vicini nei negoziati sul futuro dell’Iraq26. Per quanto riguarda la strategia

20 Rudy Giuliani, Rudy’s 12 Commitments to America, 6 agosto 2007, http://www.joinrudy2008.com/issues/. 21 Richard Perez-Pena, “Giuliani’s Iraq Views May Provide Cover”, The New York Times, 14 febbraio 2007. 22 Michael R. Gordon , “McCain Sees ‘No Plan B’ for Iraq War”, The New York Times, 15 aprile 2007. 23 Michael Gordon, “An Interview With Senator John McCain on Iraq”, The New York Times, 14 aprile 2007. 24 John McCain, John McCain's Address to the Hudson Institute, 27 settembre 2007, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/e59e471a-5c46-4682-9f28-e6e40e6dc1c0.htm. 25 Tom Curry, McCain calls for substantial, sustained surge, MSNBC, 5 gennaio 2007; Dan Balz and Shailagh Murray, “The War Within Sen. McCain”, The Washington Post, 13 gennaio 2007. 26John McCain, Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 11aprile 2007, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/fdeb03a7-30b0-4ece-8e34-4c7ea83f11d8.htm; Mitt Romney, Governor Mitt Romney's Remarks at Yeshiva University, 26 aprile 2007, http://www.mittromney.com/News/Speeches/Yeshiva_University_Speech. 46017 dell’incremento di truppe e la necessità di mantenerle sul terreno, la sua posizione non si discosta da quella degli altri candidati repubblicani. Romney si oppone anche all’ipotesi di spartizione del paese in tre regioni (una curda, una sunnita e una sciita), che di fatto consentirebbe “all’Iran di impossessarsi del sud sciita, ad al-Qaeda di dominare l’ovest sunnita e al nazionalismo curdo di destabilizzare il confine con la Turchia”27. L’ex governatore del Massachussetts suggerisce invece un “piano in tre fasi”: mantenimento del livello di truppe, “ruolo di supporto” di queste ultime nei confronti delle forze armate irachene, ed infine un periodo in cui le forze americane, stanziate fuori dall’Iraq, sarebbero “pronte ad intervenire” se necessario28.

3.2 I candidati democratici Sul versante democratico, anche se i principali candidati si dicono pronti a porre termine alla guerra e a ritirare le truppe, un esame più approfondito di quanto da loro sostenuto induce a ritenere che gli Stati Uniti potrebbero restare in Iraq per diversi anni ancora anche con un presidente democratico29.

Nella rosa dei candidati democratici, Hillary Clinton si è distinta sin dall’inizio del conflitto per aver assunto posizioni moderate (nel 2002 ha votato a favore della guerra e, resistendo alle pressioni di parte dell’elettorato democratico, si è rifiutata di rinnegare quel voto)30. Clinton deve far fronte, da un lato, alla necessità di blandire l’elettorato pacifista e, dall’altro, a quella di evitare l’accusa di essere arrendevole sul fronte della sicurezza e della difesa degli interessi americani. Pertanto, come è stato osservato, “la [sua] promessa di uscire dall’Iraq è lungi dall’essere qualcosa di immodificabile”31. In una delle sue dichiarazioni più esplicite Hillary ha affermato che “se il Congresso non terminerà questa guerra prima di gennaio 2009, sarò io come presidente a farlo”32. Tuttavia, avendo anche dichiarato che “il ritiro richiederà mesi per essere realizzato nel modo giusto”, l’ex first lady ha intenzionalmente evitato di specificare una data certa. Per Clinton, infatti, esistono “interessi vitali di sicurezza nazionale” che rendono necessario il mantenimento in Iraq di un certo numero di truppe33. La senatrice di New York ha fatto capire di voler mantenere una ridotta ma significativa forza militare nel paese per combattere al-Qaeda, contrastare l’influenza iraniana ed evitare derive destabilizzanti da parte del Curdistan iracheno34.

A differenza della sua principale rivale, Barack Obama, l’altro candidato per le primarie del partito democratico, ha espressamente dichiarato modalità e tempi del ritiro. Per il senatore dell’Illinois, uno dei pochi candidati presidenziali ad essersi opposto fin dall’inizio all’invasione americana, “non c’è soluzione militare all’Iraq e mai c’è stata”. Il piano di Obama è cominciare a ritirare le truppe immediatamente, con

27 Mitt Romney, Rising to a New Generation of Global Challenges, «Foreign Affairs», luglio/agosto 2007. 28 Jonathan Martin, Romney concedes Iraq "a mess”, describes three-step plan, «The Politico», 3 settembre 2007. 29 Jeff Zeleny, “Democrats Say Leaving Iraq May Take Years”, The New York Times, 12 agosto 2007. 30 Dan Balz , “Hillary Clinton Crafts Centrist Stance on War”, The Washington Post, 12 dicembre 2005 31 Micheal Dobbs, The Fine Print in Hillary's Promise to 'End the War’, 10 ottobre 2007 32 Alexander Mooney, Clinton: I will end Iraq war, CNN, 2 febbraio 2007; Hillary Clinton, Ending the War in Iraq, http://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/iraq/ 33 Michael Gordon, “Transcript of Interview With Senator Clinton”, The New York Times, 14 marzo 2007 34 Michael Gordon, “Clinton Sees Some Troops Staying in Iraq if She Is Elected”, The New York Times, 14 marzo 2007. 46118 l’obiettivo di completarne il rientro entro la fine dell’anno. Tuttavia, lo stesso piano prevede il mantenimento “fuori o dentro l’Iraq” di “una forza residuale” americana35.

John Edwards, che ha fatto del ritiro uno degli elementi chiave della sua campagna, sostiene la necessità di “ritirare immediatamente 40-50 mila truppe” per poi rimuovere “tutte le unità combattenti entro un anno”. Tuttavia anche lo stesso Edwards non nasconde la necessità, una volta data esecuzione al ritiro, di “mantenere sufficienti forze fuori dall’Iraq, in paesi amici, come il Kuwait, per prevenire un possibile genocidio o il rafforzamento di al-Qaeda in Medio Oriente”36.

Pertanto, pur mostrandosi intenzionati a porre termine al conflitto e ad assecondare così il sentimento contrario alla guerra del loro elettorato, i principali candidati democratici, con i loro piani per un graduale ridispiegamento e le proposte per mantenere una forza residuale americana fuori o dentro l’Iraq, tendono a lasciarsi un certo margine di manovra. Sono consapevoli infatti che, una volta alla Casa Bianca, procedere ad un disimpegno totale senza aver prima garantito la riduzione della violenza e la stabilità politica del paese potrebbe non essere un’opzione immediatamente praticabile.

Conclusioni A quasi cinque anni dalla deposizione di Saddam Hussein, la complicata gestione della guerra in Iraq continua ad occupare il primo posto nell’agenda di politica estera degli Usa. La nuova strategia voluta dal presidente Bush ad inizio anno – il cosiddetto surge – sembra aver arrestato l’escalation di violenze che sul finire del 2006 aveva portato molti a considerare preferibile l’opzione di un ritiro graduale e parziale delle truppe americane. Nonostante la diversità delle valutazioni sul campo, a Washington si guarda oggi all’Iraq con meno pessimismo che in passato. La situazione sul terreno, però, resta quella di un paese politicamente instabile, insicuro e martoriato dalle violenze intersettarie. È improbabile che il prossimo presidente si decida per un ritiro integrale e immediato. L’impegno politico-militare degli Stati Uniti in Iraq non sembra quindi destinato a cessare presto. La valutazione sostanzialmente positiva della strategia del surge da parte del comando militare, per quanto dibattuta e criticata, ha certamente dato respiro all’attuale amministrazione. In assenza di eventi straordinari, dunque, non sembra verosimile che il presidente Bush ordini un ritiro sostanziale di truppe entro la fine del suo secondo e ultimo mandato. La gestione dell’impegno americano in Iraq, compreso il destino di un contingente militare che difficilmente scenderà sotto le centomila unità nei prossimi dodici mesi, sarà responsabilità del prossimo presidente.

I candidati repubblicani, pur avendo espresso alcune critiche all’operato di Bush, ne condividono la visione di fondo: lasciare l’Iraq senza aver stabilizzato il paese è in contrasto con gli interessi americani, perché favorirebbe la diffusione di al-Qaeda in

35 Barack Obama, Obama’s Plan to Responsably end the War in Iraq, 12 settembre 2007 http://my.barackobama.com/page/-/pdf/Fact%20Sheet%20Iraq%20Final.pdf. 36 John Edwards, Edwards Statement On Congressional Testimony By General Petraeus And Ambassador Crocker, 10 settembre 2007, http://johnedwards.com/news/press-releases/20070910-petraeus-crocker/; John Edwards, Edwards Campaign Statement on Clinton's Response to Question on Iraq, http://johnedwards.com/issues/iraq/20071030-debate-question-iraq/; John Edwards, John Edwards' Plan To End The War In Iraq, http://johnedwards.com/issues/iraq.

46219 Iraq, rafforzerebbe l’Iran e rischierebbe di creare le condizioni per un conflitto allargato peggiore di quello attuale. Anche i candidati democratici sono sensibili a questi argomenti, ed è pertanto improbabile che, qualora fosse eletto uno di loro, gli Usa procedano ad un ritiro integrale prima di essersi assicurati qualche forma di garanzia su come continuare ad influenzare gli eventi nel Golfo. È probabile che un eventuale presidente democratico si impegni maggiormente nel tentativo di coinvolgere gli stati vicini dell’Iraq, compresi i ‘nemici’ Iran e Siria, in un processo regionale di stabilizzazione. Le probabilità di successo di un approccio del genere, così come della semplice e pura continuazione della strategia di Bush, sono molto incerte. La cooperazione regionale sembra un elemento essenziale per migliorare le condizioni di sicurezza e favorire il processo politico, ma non è certo sufficiente, da sola, a pacificare l’Iraq. Le violenze intersettarie tra i vari gruppi iracheni hanno una dinamica loro propria, e il processo di riconciliazione nazionale necessario per farle cessare o almeno contenerle non ha fatto finora alcun progresso sostanziale.

Ad un anno dalle prossime presidenziali americane, dunque, e nonostante le posizioni espressamente sostenute dai principali candidati, le condizioni in Iraq sono talmente volatili e precarie che è difficile prevedere, se non per approssimazione, cosa farà il prossimo inquilino della Casa Bianca. Su di lui – o su di lei – ricadrà il difficile compito di rendere più credibili gli obiettivi e la strategia di un’operazione politico- militare che è stata finora fallimentare. Nel far ciò dovrà tener conto da un lato della crescente sfiducia di un elettorato stanco dei costi umani e finanziari della guerra, dall’altro degli interessi americani di lungo termine – petrolio e influenza regionale – che sono in gioco in Iraq e nella regione.

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Ultimi dossier del Servizio Studi

30 Dossier Energia nucleare: ritorno al futuro? Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 903 "Disposizioni in materia di sospensione del 31 processo penale nei confronti delle alte cariche dello Stato"

Schede di lettura Disegni di legge AA.SS. nn. 413, 465, 508 “Garanzia sovrana dello Stato italiano 32 per i soggetti creditori della Libia”

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 692-B “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 33 decreto-legge 23 maggio 2008, n. 92, recante misure urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica”

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Dossier Disegno di legge A.S. n. ... "Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 35 decreto-legge 25 giugno 2008, n. 112, recante disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo economico, la semplificazione, la competitività, la stabilizzazione della finanza pubblica e la perequazione tributaria" Tabella delle corrispondenze Indice per materia Ed. provvisoria

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. ... "Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 36/I decreto-legge 25 giugno 2008, n. 112, recante disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo economico, la semplificazione, la competitività, la stabilizzazione della finanza pubblica e la perequazione tributaria" Vol. I (artt. 1-59) Ed. provvisoria

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. ... "Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 36/II decreto-legge 25 giugno 2008, n. 112, recante disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo economico, la semplificazione, la competitività, la stabilizzazione della finanza pubblica e la perequazione tributaria" Vol. II (artt. 60-84) Ed. provvisoria

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge AA. SS. nn. 586 e 905 “Adesione della Repubblica italiana al 37 Trattato concluso il 27 maggio 2005 tra il Regno del Belgio, la Repubblica federale di Germania, il Regno di Spagna, la Repubblica francese, il Granducato di Lussemburgo, il Regno dei Paesi Bassi e la Repubblica d'Austria, relativo all'approfondimento della cooperazione transfrontaliera, in particolare allo scopo di contrastare il terrorismo, la criminalità ransfrontaliera e la migrazione illegale (Trattato di Prum). Istituzione della banca dati nazionale del DNA e del laboratorio centrale per la banca dati nazionale del DNA. Delega al Governo per l'istituzione dei ruoli tecnici del Corpo di polizia penitenziaria”

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 999 "Conversione in legge del decreto-legge 28 agosto 38 2008, n. 134, recante disposizioni urgenti in materia di ristrutturazione di grandi imprese in crisi"

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