L Ifting the Veil, Part 2

SPACE CHRONICLE A BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY PUBLICATION

Vol. 71 No.2 2018

Further declassification disclosures LIFTING THE VEIL, PART 2: on what US intelligence knew about the Soviet space programme Also: CHEVALINE MEMOIRS Fun and games at AWRE Foulness

DECLASSIFIED US INTELLIGENCE ISSUE

ISBN 978-0-9567382-2-6 JUNE 201841 Submitting papers to From the editor

SPACE CHRONICLE THIS IS THE SECOND publication of Space Chronicle in its new layout – I hope you all approve. It is also my sixth year as its editor. Space Chronicle first appeared Space Chronicle welcomes the submission in 1980 under the control of Andrew Wilson. It was then relaunched in 2002 with for publication of technical articles of general the overall aim of publishing survey and historical articles of worldwide interest interest, historical contributions and reviews with a more general bias than the academic papers that appear in JBIS. in space science and technology, astronautics and related fields. Looking to the future we would like to include, as well as the traditional longer submissions, some shorter papers to give each issue a wider interest content. GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS Such papers could consist of as little as 2,000 – 3,000 words plus illustrations. For example I know that there are at the National Archive at Kew in London ■ As concise as the content allows – files relating to an approach made by the British in 1935 to Eugen Sänger for typically 5,000 to 6,000 words. Shorter information on his rocket work. There are also claims made by Yves Le Prieur papers will also be considered. Longer to the British Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors concerning his work papers will only be considered in on WW1 airborne rockets. The contents of both of these files would make exceptional circumstances and, at the excellent short papers – so if there are any interested authors out there, this is an discretion of the Editor, may be split into opportunity. I am sure there are similar snippets of information in other National parts. Archive and similar sources. ■ Source references should be inserted in the text in square brackets [X] and then For future editions of Space Chronicle, papers in the pipeline include ones on listed at the end of the paper. the production and use of Hale type rockets in the USA during the second half of the 19th century, and a paper by the son of Valentin Glushko on the life of M ■ Illustration references should be cited in Tukhachevsky. numerical order in the text as ‘Fig.X’; those not cited in the text risk omission. 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Editor John Becklake Production MP3 Media Promotion Gill Norman Office BIS, Arthur C. We respectfully ask authors to adhere Clarke House, 27-29 South Lambeth Road, London, SW8 1SZ, UK to these guidelines. Failure to do so will Telephone +44 (0)20 7735 3160 Email [email protected] Website www.bis-space.com result in the delay of acceptable papers for Distribution Space Chronicle is distributed worldwide by mail and may be received by annual publication. subscription or purchase of single copies. It is available through membership of the British Interplanetary Society at much reduced rates. Subscription details for members, non-members Our full Guidelines for Authors can be and libraries are available from the above address. downloaded from www.bis-space.com Space Chronicle is a publication that promotes the mission of the British Interplanetary Society. Opinions expressed in signed articles are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editor or the Council of the British Interplanetary Society. Security clearance, where necessary, is the responsibility of the author. FRONT COVER (1) Enhanced CORONA photograph Published by the British Interplanetary Society. Registered Company No: 402498. Registered of the N1 launch site at Tyuratam, February-March Charity No: 250556. Printed by Latimer Trend, Estover Road, Plymouth, PL6 7PY, England. 1966; (2) photograph of an N1 rocket approaching © 2018 British Interplanetary Society. No part of this publication may be reproduced or the launch pad from the scrapbook of N1 engineer transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or valentin Lieberman; and (3) Project Chevaline recording by any information storage or retrieval system without prior permission from the improved front end. Publishers.

42 SPACE CHRONICLE A BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY PUBLICATION

Vol. 71 No.1 2018 Contents

45 CHEVALINE MEMOIRS Fun and games at AWRE Foulness John Harlow

50 LIFTING THE VEIL, PART 2: Further declassification disclosures reveal what US Intelligence knew about the Soviet space program during the Space Race – part 3* Peter Pesavento

OUR MISSION STATEMENT The British Interplanetary Society promotes the exploration and use of space for the benefit of humanity, connecting people to create, educate and inspire, and advance knowledge in all aspects of astronautics.

43 Contributors

John Harlow MBE qualified in Chemistry, Aeronautical Engineering and Astronomy and Astronautics before pursuing a career centred on rocket propulsion. After joining Hunting Engineering, he was posted to the Rocket Propulsion Establishment at Westcott to work on Polaris Improvement (Chevaline) for 6 months. Thirteen years later(!) he joined the MoD, soon after which the R&D Establishments were privitised and eventually sold to British Aerospace. The later years at Westcott were spent in many consultative roles supporting RAE, MoD, BT (for IntelSat), the FCO and the UN/ IAEA, after which he became a Chief Inspector for UNSCOM. He received an MBE for services to the Defence Industry for this work. On leaving British Aerospace more consultations were taken up with FCO, the UN and many UK organizations (Atlantic Research Corporation UK, QinetiQ, Roxel, etc.). For the past 20 years he has been an independent consultant to Aerojet (now Aerojet Rocketdyne). He is now retired.

Peter Pesavento is an independent scholar and researcher in the field of aerospace, specializing in Cold War history of the Space Race. He has had seminal papers and articles appear in all three major BIS flagship publications over the last thirty years. Such benchmark articles first appeared inJBIS (1990), SpaceFlight (1993) and more recently, Space Chronicle (2007). The topics cover a wide spectrum: Soviet manned lunar projects; Russian space shuttle and spaceplane efforts; disclosing a previously unknown US Navy program that successfully had the first aircraft-launched satellites in the late 1950s, as well as the first operational anti-satellite system; the first comprehensive reportage about the Soyuz 1 mission; as well as what Western intelligence units contemporaneously knew about Soviet space and rocketry activities from before Sputnik through the Vostok and more contemporaneous Russian crewed programs. Including correspondence, Pesavento’s work has appeared in BIS periodicals over 35 times. “Lifting the Veil Part 2” is characteristic of his path-finding publications, comprising of both newly declassified documentation and previously unpublished illustrations from both Western and Russian sources.

44 Space Chronicle, Vol. 71, pp.45-49, 2018

Chevaline Memoirs Fun and Games at AWRE Foulness

JOHN HARLOW MBE

With the withdrawal from service of Chevaline on 31 October 1996, an edict was issued that cancelled all classification on all ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS aspects of the associated documentation and hardware [1], [2], ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile the exception of course being items that were nuclear related. A-Frame Triangular structure atop Polaris 2nd stage. Being unclassified, many of the interesting facets of the project Attachment for the C-Body & PAC could now be discussed in open forum (BROHP conferences at Charterhouse being a particularly good example, as reported AWRE Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (A - in Prospero [3], [4]. Without this security relaxation, even anec- Aldermaston, F - Foulness) dotes such as those related below could not be published. BAJ Bristol Aerojet (Banwell, Somerset) BROHP British Rocket Oral History Project (annual 1. Preamble on Chevaline meetings at Charterhouse school) C-Body One of two REBs of the Chevaline system (the other being the P-Body) The first that many knew of a Polaris Improvement Programme CPA Critical Path Analysis (a key part of PERT) (PIP - HR169. [5]) was in early 1969 after attendance at Coul- DA Design Authority port/Faslane for what was an early version of the Polaris Acquaint FSU Former Soviet Union Course. This was a one-way delivery managed by the Royal Navy (RN) and none of the attendees were expected to tell of their in- HEL Hunting Engineering Ltd (Ampthill, Bedfordshire) volvement or interest. By that time intelligence sources had shown OISC Officer In Scientific Charge (the on-site trials that the defence which the Former Soviet Union (FSU) had been boss) developing against ballistic attack was considered to be effective Payload Aid Carrier (the Chevaline ‘bus’) enough to degrade the offensive capabilities then in existence. In PERT Programme Evaluation and Review Technique addition, the effects of exo-atmospheric nuclear warhead detona- PIP Polaris Improvement Programme (HR 69, later tion could prejudice the existing design of re-entry vehicles (i.e. named Chevaline) the so-called ‘exchange ratio’ was becoming less favourable). [5] RAE Royal Aircraft Establishment (F - Farnborough) REB Re-Entry Body In addition, the FSU’s missile defence system was built to the RN Royal Navy letter of the agreaements regarding the number of launchers each side was permitted (the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – ABM Trea- STSG Separation Trials Steering Group (one of a ty) However, there was nothing in the ABM Treaty regarding myriad of Chevaline meetings) whether these launchers (in fact they were silos) had a reload ca- TCPU Twin Chamber Propulsion Unit (a liquid pability. Thus, given time, one ‘launcher’ could fire many missiles. propellant motor) These silos had a clever design that enabled a rapid reload. UKDC UK Data Centre (at AWRE (A)) Depository of all KH 793 trials data. These were the issues facing the effectiveness of Polaris. In order, US United States then, to ensure successful attack, it was clear that there was a need WES Ward Engineering Services (Poole, Dorset) to confuse the defence sufficiently until it was too late for the full weight of the defence’s ABMs to be brought to bear. Many schemes were studied in depth that eventually coalesced into changing the existing Polaris payload of three Re-Entry Bodies (REBs – called Poseidon), each of which carried a live weapon. A, B and C-bodies) to a system that retained the C-body but also carried a Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC) and another REB, now For the UK to maintain system accuracy meant that a consider- termed the P-body, to be released from the PAC later in the mis- able understanding was demanded from all energetic events during sion profile. Upon reaching the correct state vector, the C-body and the flight. Thus the rocket motors were required not only to be reli- PAC would separate from the Polaris second stage and the PAC able but have a very, very close tolerance on reproducibility (thrust, deploy sub-missiles and the P-body along the Null Range Vector thrust build-up rate, thrust line, mass characteristics, etc.). In addi- around the C-body to effect confusion of the enemy radars. tion, the plume created by a rocket motor efflux reacts differently in a vacuum than in an atmosphere, so gas dynamic effects had also to The United States (US) had the same issues but after doing be fully understood, accurately modelled and be highly reproduc- their own studies (Antelope etc.) decided on a different strategy. ible. Such was the novelty and complexity of the problem that one Their solution was to proceed with payloads consisting of Multiple of the HEL Systems staff, Peter Marriot, set up his own company, Re-entry Vehicles (MRV – the Pave Pepper programme fitted to Fluid Gravity Engineering (FGE), specifically for codifying plume

45 John Harlow

Fig. 1 Chevaline improved front end. modelling and rarefied gas dynamics. An example of the Chevaline – within the above systems minor refinements occurred – payload can be seen at the RAF Museum at Cosford (Fig. 1). hence the scale types C8/A became C8/B, C8/C, etc., while the full scale motors D2/A became D2/B then D2/C 2. Propulsion Background – finally came the 7 Tactical (In-Service) types called ‘T’ motors – the frozen design. During the development of Chevaline, a large number of scale and full-scale solid and liquid rocket propulsion hardware was All scale motors used the same propellant type as in the full- designed, manufactured, built and rigorously tested to enable the scale equivalent. This was to ensure commonality in exhaust gas in-service system to work safely, reliably and repeatedly be very properties. accurate. Whilst detailed design of the 1/3 scale REB Eject motor hardware was undertaken by Ward Engineering Services (WES), As can be imagined, even by the time trials motors were being the full scale hardware design was undertaken by Bristol Aerojet delivered to the test sites, there existed a risk of much confusion. at Banwell (BAJ – now of course long since closed), who were ef- One of my first jobs at Westcott was to write a Chevaline Rocket fectively the ‘empty motor’ Design Authorities (DA). BAJ were Motor Index detailing all these various types, how they differed responsible for both the 1/3 scale and full scale PAC Separation from each other, and their use in trials. It was not a small volume! motors. Westcott both filled and fired the motors and had overall Thus it fell to me to pull together the first issues of two important responsibility (filled motor DA). As motor designs evolved during documents: development, the designation of the next generation would follow – an index of all Chevaline Rocket Motors - research, scale, full- a standard form: scale and Tactical [6]. – an index of all Energetic Compounds (Propellants, Igniters – the earliest ‘A’ series motors (Feasibility and Early Research and Initiators) employed in the IFE [7]. Motors), of which there were only 3 designs: A-1 to A-3. A-3 was unusual in that it was effectively a ‘hybrid’ motor that em- A not inconsiderable task! ployed a solid motor case as a combustion chamber for a liquid propellant burn after the solid propellant had burnt out. In 1975, with the setting up of the Chevaline Motor Project Office (under Stan Green) as a separate entity from both ‘Solids’ –then came ‘B’ series motors (Preliminary and Scale Trials and ‘Liquids’ Divisions at Westcott, the team working Chevaline Motors) of which there were 13 types: B-1 to B-13. became much more engaged with other aspects of the project. Indeed, we were often out at the trials sites and I began setting – later still came the ‘C’ series (Ground Trials Motors) and up motor performance databases derived from both static tests at there were 25 of these: C-1 to C-25. Some of these motors were Westcott and from the various trials. 1/3 scale, some were full scale. Chevaline project management was run by HEL using PERT – the first complete full scale designs were called ‘D’ series and Critical Path Analysis – very powerful tools but at the same (In-Service Development Standard). There were 12 of these, of time vital because the project was so large and complex. For the which one was the liquid propellant PAC Repositioning motor, trials aspect alone there were a huge number of Trial Line Num- the Twin Chamber propulsion Unit (TCPU). bers. At Westcott we always had one person full time, sometimes

46 Chevaline Memoirs: Fun and Games at AWRE Foulness two, just on rocket motor supplies and supply chain issues. and so on. These were the so-called quasi-static trials. HEL ran these trials (and appointed the OISC) and the RAE lead was 3. Foulness Steve Metcalf (who was later to head up Aero 4 Department).

There’s something about being posted to the nether regions. I don’t – there was a dynamic equivalent at AWRE (F) where the scale know what it is, but it takes some people in funny ways. Perhaps models were released into a vacuum vessel for more realistic they go a bit native. free-flying separation tests. AWRE personnel ran these trials with Godfrey Hunt heading up the team (I was to meet Goff These memoirs relate to times when AWRE (F) were undertak- often again many years later in the old War Office – small ing tests that included their ‘bits’ of Chevaline to which our motors world!). All these trials were run under the auspices of the were attached. Foulness Island is a wonderful place – in summer! Separation Trials Steering Group (STSG) that met at AWRE It is a birdwatcher’s paradise and full of Roman ruins. Indeed, at (F), RAE (F) or HEL on a quarterly basis. lunchtime some of the personnel would go and join the ‘dig’ rather than accompany us ‘trials types’ down to the local. Some digs, 5. Third-Scale Dynamic Separation Trials on the Roman rubbish dumps, were apparently quite archeolog- ically rewarding. An oft-frequented pub in Great Wakering had as its claim to fame, apart from the beer, the only surviving item The solid propellant C8 motor was the third-scale equivalent of of HMS Hood – a stag’s head that was mounted over the bar. The the C-Body eject/spin motor and prior to the start of the all-up story goes that as a prank, the stag’s head from the Wardroom Bar separation trials, the AWRE project officer just could not under- of that great ship was ‘stolen’ by landlubbers during a party when stand that such a heavyweight steel motor (i.e. the C8/A design) she called in nearby before World War II. I have never been able to could loft itself, let alone a (small) payload. After much discussion, confirm this, but it is a good story. George Lawson, the Westcott project Officer for C8, had to agree to sacrifice one motor on a ‘proving mission’. The C8/A was duly One of the interesting issues faced by AWRE (F) was that trials integrated into a mock-up of a 1/3 scale C-Body model (the OISC had sometimes to be delayed because of the presence of a near- did not want to waste a ‘real’ model) and the mock-up with C8/A by Soviet trawler covered in antennae, or Polish freighter carry- motor attached to the model A-Frame of the Polaris 2nd stage sep- ing huge stacks of timber (one was left to imagine quite what was aration area. The firing command was sent and subsequent track- underneath those!) These ships would come by travelling slowly, ing by a host of Mk 1 eyeballs saw motor and mock-up disappear of course. In addition, classified information would be released high over the sea wall and on into the mud (it was never found). to the site to ensure that no activities occurred during expected Thus was he convinced and the trials proper could proceed. Oh ye over-passes of Soviet photo-reconnaissance satellites. Heady stuff of little faith! in those days. The later and more realistic trials with both later C8 and C24 The test areas on the AWRE (F) site were run by Neil Thump- (the equivalent 1/3 scale PAC separation motors) designs were all ston and as the KH793 trials really got going in about 1972, Pe- successful in providing much-needed data on forces and moments ter Fuller was drafted in to manage these. John Uppard ran the that enabled accurate modelling of the separation event by HEL. day-to-day trials and Keith Mead was the Firing Officer. Peter later These trials were carried out in a vertical vacuum chamber that became the Superintendent of P&EE Shoeburyness – where we at was located just outside building I4 at AWRE (F). Westcott would often send our larger, unfired/damaged solid propellant rocket motors for explosive destruction if required. Peter would chair STSG whenever it was held at Foulness, as would Roy Dommett if it was held at RAE Farnborough. They both had a realistic and refreshing approach to trials and were always open to any ideas that would move the project forward.

4. Separation Trials

There was a requirement for a series of trials to check the physical and aerothermodynamic effects of separating the Chevaline system from the A-Frame atop the Polaris 2nd stage booster. It was found that the design of Chevaline necessitated the separation of the C-Body immediately before that of the PAC. This requirement was determined in two ways:

– at RAE (F) in Aero Department (AE4) there were a range of excellent wind tunnel facilities including large vacuum vessels (GDF 1 & 2). One of these was configured to take one-third scale models of the A-Frame along with the Chevaline system atop the booster second stage. The scale Chevaline components were then physically locked into positions that the HEL’s modelling predicted they should be at various times during the separation event and forces, moments and environments measured by firing C8 and C24 motors at each position. Once the measurements were successfully recorded, the scale mod- Fig. 2 C8/C – 1/3 scale REB Solid Propellant els were moved to a new position and another firing took place, Eject Rocket Motor.

47 John Harlow

tion was apparent amongst project managers as this was a critical item. In these early tests, the C-Body was attached to an open frustum that would normally attach the body to the A-frame and at the instant of firing a line-cutting charge would separate the body from the frustum at the same time as the ignition of the motor. It all seemed very odd as the motor nozzles had a built-in cant angle and an offset thrust line to impart the correct motion to the C-Body. Phil Moore (Westcott D2/A Project Officer) and I went down to UKDC to check out the data. The film, shot at very high speed, appeared to show correct separation but little attitude motion of the separated C-Body. But close attention to the film data proved that the motor did indeed impart the correct motion. (I think a degrees to radians conversion had something to do with it!) Regarding thrust and impulse, it was decided that the cost of the full-scale C-Body model warranted recovery and re-use if at all possible, and therefore a free-standing, above-surface circular swimming pool was obtained in order to soft-catch the payload. It was agreed that the pool could be filled with wet peat and covered by a tarpaulin. Phil and I said that the thrust and impulse of this motor, like that for all the other Chevaline motors, was very tightly controlled, so consistency in flight was to be expected. So arose the bet. A surveyor’s pole was placed where the first of the C-Body models landed and bets were placed as to how close the next round would land to it. Phil and I predicted that given zero wind, the impact point would be identical. Other disbelievers bet on various distances from ground zero. So it was all set up again Fig. 3 C24/C – 1/3 scale PAC Separation – countdown, fire! flight and bingo. Believe it or not, the C-Body Solid Propellant Rocket Motors. model hit and bent the surveyors’ pole. Needless to say, we bought no beer that day! Subsequent rounds, and there were dozens of them, all landed in the same quadrant of the pool. 5. Note on scale factors However, Phil and I were a little taken aback when the AWRE Some factors (e.g. propellant type) do not need to be scaled but project officer bemoaned the fact that not only was the pole now others needed care. Initially forces and moments were assessed unusable but as the C-Body replica model had been damaged, it against the most obvious factors. Chief amongst these for the pro- was also no longer of use. He had to explain the loss of a valuable posed motors was thrust level. Whilst using normal scaling factors full-size replica of the C-Body, and they were expensive! gave representative geometry and mass could be ballasted to suit, in rocket motor terms it was the thrust level that would seeming- In later full-scale separation trials, the C-Body and frustum ly offer the correct dynamics. However, volume filling by exhaust were attached to an A-frame. The motor exhaust was seen to again gas generated from motor efflux into the void underneath both change in gas dynamics and therefore forces and moments of the the C-Body and the PAC is not scalable by thrust. I discussed this departing C-Body. These trials, I understand, used a polyurethane at length with Bob Painter (HEL’s chief gas dynamics modeller) foam catch bed to mitigate damage to the C-Body model. Once and although it would require a new model of both C8 and C24 again, the variability in forces due to atmospheric effects was not- motors to achieve, we agreed that the data requirements warranted. These tests were repeated at the high tower (N62) at AWRE ed the extra work. It is only by scaling mass flow as well that the (A) and high repeatability of the effects of integrated forces and correct forces and moments can be determined. In the case of the moments were found. ‘quasi-static’ trials under vacuum at RAE Aero Department, this was less of a problem; but for dynamic trials at AWRE (F), it was As an aside, there was an issue with mission event timing be- critical. Thus C8/C became C8/D and C24/C became C24/D. tween the missile, the C-Body and the PAC once they had parted For the AWRE (F) dynamic trials, whilst the thrust could be company. It was first thought that a separate timer would be re- scaled, the thrust rise time needed to be shortened to improve the quired to mark the time of IFE separation, Tzero (Tz) to be set gas dynamic effects during the early part of the separation. This from the missile guidance. However, it proved impossible for the proved problematic to achieve. Polaris Missile Modifications Committee (PMMC) to agree to this – they did not want any further modifications to the missile. 6. Full-Scale C-Body Separation Trials (Looking back, I have to ask what was their purpose in life then?) It was subsequently found that the C-Body eject motor ignition delay was so reproducible that the system used the time of the mo- A call from Richard Gordon (HEL contractor at AWRE (A) at tor ignition pulse as the Tz. the UK Data Centre UKDC there) alerted me to the fact that film analysis derived from the first flight on an initial full-scale mod- Acknowledgements el C-Body fitted with a solid propellant D2/A spin/eject motor showed that not only was attitude motion being imparted to the Godfrey (Goff) Hunt for checking my memory of events at C-Body but that the variability of impulse (and therefore range Foulness. and loft height) was in excess of the requirement. The UKDC was the focus of all data from both UK and US trials, right through to English Heritage for their excellent work and publication on full-up submarine launched Polaris/Chevaline. Some consterna- AWRE Establishment, Foulness

48 Chevaline Memoirs: Fun and Games at AWRE Foulness

References

1. The ‘Red Book’ was an overall classification guide for all classified 6. Harlow J, ‘Index of Chevaline Rocket Motors’ (RPE/CH/0063 projects. multiple issues) 2. Jones M. The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent (2 7. Harlow J, Data on Propellants, Igniter Compositions and Fuzeheads Volumes. Government Official History Series) for Chevaline Motors (RPE/CH/0074, Issue 1, February 1976) 3. Panton F.H. ‘Polaris Improvements and the Chevaline System’ 1967- 8. Cocroft W. and Newsome S. ‘Atomic Weapons Research 1975/6. Prospero Number 1, pp 109-128. Spring 2004 Establishment, Foulness, Essex. Cold-War Research and 4. Jones P. Chevaline Technical Programme 1966-1976. Prospero Development Site.’ Survey Report. Research Department Series Number 2, pp 179-191. Spring 2005 Report no. 13-2009 5. Dommett RL. Briefing to DERA. Unpublished.

49 US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/LBJ PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/LBJ US CENTRAL

FRONTISPIECE Declassified page from the August 22, 1968 President’s Daily Brief about Area J activities at Tyuratam, read by Lyndon Johnson. It is believed that both photos were imaged via the high-resolution GAMBIT-3 overhead photoreconnaissance system. Of special note is that the upper picture has the appearance of being taken from a low-flying aircraft or helicopter. The lower picture, somewhat diffuse in clarity due to being taken through cloud cover, shows the two-tone paint scheme of the rocket. Most close-look photoreconnaissance satellites orbited nominally at 110 nautical miles altitude.

50 Space Chronicle, Vol. 71, pp.50-90, 2018

Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures reveal what US Intelligence knew about the Soviet space program during the Space Race – part 3

PETER PESAVENTO, 87 Plum Street, Greenville, PA 16125, USA.

3.0 The “President’s Daily Brief”: ted in ways that held his attention on issues the CIA believed What PDBs told President Lyndon B. Johnson were vitally important” [139]. about Soviet space activities As it turns out, President Lyndon B. Johnson was keenly interested in all events associated with the Soviet space program, and Since the publication of this researcher’s monograph in 2007, one especially in those elements dealing with its manned space oper- of several new document families became disclosed through his ations and the preparations by the Soviets to send cosmonauts to efforts. One key document family was a daily report provided to selenocentric space. the President of the United States on events occurring around the world – the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). The PDB was the equiv- 3.1 W hat the President’s eyes saw: Area J – overhead satellite alent of a “Top Secret” newspaper, providing some reportage that photography of great clarity from both the CORONA would not be found in the newspapers of record at the time. This and GAMBIT-3 programs, hitherto unseen reportage would include photographs, diagrams and maps as was necessary. The news items ranged from one paragraph to several, One of the key elements of the PDBs that provide new insights with special topics requiring the President’s additional attention and indicators as to what US IC analysts had access to informa- being given special treatment in an “annex” at the end of the issue. tion-gathering-wise about the Soviet space program are graphic In PDBs released by ISCAP to this author, the security classified materials (photographs, diagrams, maps and tabular presenta- level labeling was “Top Secret – Contains SIGINT and Keyhole tions) contained in the PDBs that were published most-times Material.” alongside the text. These materials were provided to aid the Presi- dent in ascertaining and understanding the significance of the re- The MDR processing began in 2000 for the very first PDB portage that he was reading. request that this author had, and in 2011 the very first PDB was released publicly, although in heavily redacted form [136]. Sub- Interestingly, the highlights and main focus of graphic materials sequently, ISCAP processed a batch of PDBs with Soviet space on the 1960s Soviet space program in the PDBs is of the construc- program entries in them at this researcher’s request. In September tion of launch pads and support facilities at the Tyuratam Cosmo- 2015 at a symposium at the LBJ library in Texas, the CIA released drome in support of the USSR’s manned lunar landing program, as all such briefings from 1961 through January 1969, albeit with ex- well as of the program’s rocket booster itself. Area J and its associ- tensive redactions in the substantial majority of the publication’s ated rocket were of greatest political interest, as can be derived by issues. A stand-alone publication on PDBs and their precursors the number of PDB entries dealing with the USSR’s manned lunar was also released at this time [137]. Indeed, in August 2016, PDBs landing aspirations, from 1963 up through early 1969 (as currently of the Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations were chrono- released for materials from the LBJ administration). logically released [138]. (For some highlights from this particular trove, please see Appendix A “The Nixon and Ford PDBs: Uncov- What is most striking about the overhead satellite reconnais- ering Further Surprise Pieces of the Space Race Mosaic”). sance photography is the “three dimensional effect” that the pictures possess in the PDBs. When colleagues have looked at the One of the key characteristics of the PDBs is that they reflected original CORONA film imagery strips of either these same or sim- the interests of the administration that was receiving the daily re- ilar images, the pictures do not demonstrate this effect – indicating ports. As a CIA history on the PDB explained, that the photographs were enhanced or manipulated by US analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center prior to “These exclusive products were the Agency’s means of com- publication in the PDBs. Two fine examples of this appear in Figs. municating its intelligence concerns to the President; in turn, 16 and 17 overleaf, which are from the February 28, and March the Agency was made aware of the President’s requirements 1, 1966 PDBs respectively. [140, 141] Infrastructure keenly stands by the written or verbal discussions that followed. The length out in these images as if the observer was hovering at low altitude of the format of the PDB… changed from one presidential ad- above the targeted region. ministration to another, as well as through the course of a single administration, to accommodate the specific requirements Indeed, high-fidelity diagrams were often derived from over- of that President. Those administrations with less intelligence head satellite photography, and from time-to-time examples of or foreign policy background required more historical context, these appeared in the PDBs. Figure 17 (from the March 1, 1966 and the content may have been more detailed… It was, and PDB) is a low-angle depiction of one of the Area J launch pads un- still is, the most influential on a daily basis because the content der construction pointing out key salient features and dimension is derived from the most up-to-the-minute inputs based on measurements. highly sensitive sources… The PDB was routinely adjusted to focus on issues that mattered to that President, and reformat- Besides CORONA photography, GAMBIT-3 close-look imagery

51 Peter Pesavento

Figs 16 and 17 Enhanced CORONA photographs of Tyuratam, February-March 1966. US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/LBJ PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/LBJ US CENTRAL

52 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3 also makes an appearance in the PDBs in relation to Tyuratam and Area J. For the first time in an open publication, the clarity of such imagery has been declassified (without “fuzzing” by declassification analysts) and appears here as the Frontispiece – two images of pad J1 at Tyuratam that were published in the August 22, 1968 PDB [142]. The upper image appears as if it had been taken from a very low-flying aircraft, and the ground-resolved-distance on display is on the order of not more than a few inches; the lower photograph, taken through cloud cover which makes the photograph appear COLLECTION PETER PESAVENTO diffuse, is of the USSR’s manned lunar landing rocket on the launch pad – showing how well-resolved the two-tone color scheme could be from approximately 75 to 100 nautical miles altitude.

3.2 Contemporaneous reportage as manned space events happened

As released, the PDBs showcase classified facts, trends, scoops, Fig. 18 Atheist Museum scrapbook page commemorating the flight of as well as other secret information (even mentions of rumors) Voskhod 2. that would keep America’s top policy maker accurately informed – and those disclosures were provided by the USA’s far-flung in- was trouble with the descent. The Soviet agency has given the telligence-gathering network around the world. It can be consid- impression that the two men are well, but has been chary of ered that the PDBs were something akin to the New York Times post-impact detail.” [144] newspaper on steroids. For the purposes of this discussion, three space events will be highlighted: Voskhod 2, Soyuz 1, and detected The one-page SITROOM document, dated March 20, 1965 preparations for a potential crewed circumlunar mission by the with a time stamp of 2140 Zulu (9:40 PM Washington, DC time) Russians for the tail end of 1968. provides the update that “Press information including TASS releases which has become available early in the afternoon Wash- 3.2.1 Efforts at forewarning, as well as concern for Voskhod 2 ington time suggests that the Soviet cosmonauts Belyayev and Le- crew’s safety highlighted onov have been rescued. TASS has reported that ‘They are resting among friends’ but ‘that they are under the supervision of doc- One of the key trends in Soviet space coverage as exemplified in tors.’…” [145] the PDBs was the effort to acquire early indications that such missions were about to occur. The March 17, 1965 coverage for Vosk- While accurate depictions of the Voskhod 2 spacecraft were hod 2 delineates some of the aspects of this: not publicly disseminated by the Soviets until 1971, evidence is in hand that some parties did have access to accurate diagrams “The Soviets may attempt a manned launch in the next day or outside of the engineering collectives. At the Atheist Museum of so. A large number of instrumentation and support ships are Soviet Achievement in Kiev, Ukraine (now defunct), a scrapbook on station, [details of exactly where redacted]… The Moscow of Russian space exploits was kept. A poster signed by both mis- rumor mill is active as it was before the three-man shot [of sion cosmonauts appeared in this record. Fig. 18 is the scrapbook the first Voskhod]… The ships have been deployed for nearly page that shows both the Voskhod 2 spacecraft in its deployed a month, and the failure of what we believe was a trial run – configuration, as well as an additional picture of the rocket prior Cosmos 57 – on 22 February probably set back Soviet plans to launch. The poster is also signed by Yuri Gagarin. for an earlier manned flight. The pattern of ship deployment, however, is somewhat different from that on 22 February. The While Voskhod 2 had a “happy ending,” not all PDB coverage of Soviets may be trying to beat the well-publicized US Gemini Soviet manned space missions during the 1960s had such positive flight scheduled next week.” [143] conclusions. A case in point was the ill-fated Soyuz 1.

Due to the fact that Voskhod 2 was the earliest Soviet crewed 3.2.2 The Drama of Soyuz 1 mission to have official admission of something going awry as it was happening, the March 20, 1965 PDB focuses special attention Perhaps the most dramatic Soviet space PDB reportage declassi- on the fates of the two cosmonauts. Of all the current PDB releas- fied so far is about the Soyuz 1 tragedy, which ended in the death of es now in the public domain, this particular brief uniquely has a cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Currently, several PDBs have been White House “SITROOM” (Situation Room) update attached that released that contain extensive coverage about this mission and its provides at-the-time the most current information on the wellbe- consequences – including preparations in the days before launch, ing of Alexei Leonov and Pavel Belyayev. events during, as well Soviet activities that took place following the aftermath of the crash. The April 8, 1968 PDB provides an unre- “As of noon EST (Eastern Standard Time) it cannot be estab- dacted glimpse into some of the sources and methods of how the lished that the two Voskhod-2 cosmonauts have been found… US IC analysts were “tipped off” that a new manned space mission [large section redacted, but it may include details of the com- was in the offing (12 days before Soyuz 1 was actually launched), munications intercepts of the search and rescue teams as well that echo the Voskhod 2 reportage: as RADINT (radar intelligence) tracking of what regions that the aircraft and helicopters were congregating around] and we “An unusually large number of flights into Tyuratam over may not be getting all reflections of the rescue operation… The the last week suggests that the Soviets are preparing a ma- weather in the area (nearly 60 [degrees] north – see map) is jor space launch. It is difficult, however, to be sure about the poor again today with a low ceiling and poor visibility. It was nature or timing of an event solely from flight activity. We snowing this morning… TASS has acknowledged that there expect to pick up other indications, such as deployment of

53 Peter Pesavento

space support ships.” [146]

Indeed, the April 20, 1967 PDB amplifies on its predecessor reportage that “All our usual indicators point to a major space launch – probably another test in the Soviet manned space program – within the next few days. It could be a third test of the new capsule, possibly with cosmonauts on board, or a further test of a new upper-stage propulsion system for boosting a spacecraft into a much higher orbit… An unmanned flight around the Moon (with COLLECTION PETER PESAVENTO return to Earth) is also a possibility. The best opportunity for such a flight during April will come up next week.” [147]

Furthermore, in one of the rare cases of PDBs reflecting an in-progress manned mission that had become an international incident, the April 24, 1967 entry (which was provided to President Johnson while the mission was still in space) is among the longest PDB space-connected excerpts so far released for public reading (it covers three paragraphs), and shows the confluence of SIGINT, Fig. 19 Limited-edition poster marking the loss of Soyuz-1 and cosmonaut communications intercepts, and RADINT data in completely un- Vladimir Komorov, April 1968, signed by some of Komorov’s friends. redacted format: ty arriving at the airport located inside the TTMTC (Tyura Tam “Soyuz-1, the new Soviet manned spacecraft launched on Sat- Missile Test Center) that gave indications of a space shot being urday, has been having serious difficulties. The cosmonaut imminent. tried to bring the spacecraft down at 8:00 PM EST on Sunday, but failed. He tried on the next orbit, and may have succeeded. From the disclosed PDBs unmanned circumlunar mission If not, he will have two or possibly three more chances, at nine- events – whether successful, unsuccessful, or postponed – were ty-minute intervals, to come down in the USSR Sunday night. given special mention as well, and included description details. Failing these, he must wait until Monday night… The diffi- For example, the July 24, 1968 entry mentions that “The Soviets culty in deorbiting may be a result of the troubles the space- apparently are postponing their latest attempt to get off an un- craft has been having with stabilization, communications, manned circumlunar flight. It had looked as if the launch would and power supplies. These are more serious than the Soviet come this week, but several of the support ships are now moving have experienced with any of their previous manned craft… off their stations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The ships are Soyuz-1 carried only one man, but had room for three. It was not headed home, however. We do not know just what caused the the first manned test of a new spacecraft the Soviets have been delay. The Russians may try again in August.” [150] developing, most likely for a circumlunar flight. The Soviets may have originally intended a more complex mission for this This reportage dovetails into the on-the-pad accident where the spacecraft, such as orbiting a second spacecraft and transfer- upper stage (Block D) of the Proton ruptured, which forced the ring crew members, but scrapped these plans when troubles cancellation of the planned circumlunar mission. developed.” [148] 3.2.3 Preparations for a crewed circumlunar mission in Readers should note the difference in the amount of details that December 1968: the possible Soviet active plan to “Go President Johnson read about concerning the event, versus the for Broke”/“Shoot the Works” more comprehensive records found in the NSA SIGINT Summa- ry reports (detailed in Section 2.4.3). While the President of the As time progresses, declassified US IC documents (as well as other United States was being kept informed by the US IC analysts as to linked materials) are providing an increasing number of revelato- what was taking place in the aftermath of the Soyuz 1 crash, the ry glimpses into the issue of whether the Russians were concrete- Russians were grappling with the tragedy, including a national fu- ly contemplating on beating the Americans to sending a crewed neral for the cosmonaut. A limited-distribution space event poster space mission around the Moon in late 1968. The data is increas- issued by the Soviets soon after the event appears in Fig. 19. The ingly pointing to the concept that the USSR was actively preparing poster was signed by close friends of Komarov. That the Russians to beat the Americans to the Moon in December, 1968. This in- would commemorate this ill-fated mission is uncharacteristic, and cludes recollections of US IC participants, CORONA photography remarkable. and lunar elongation angle range examinations, as well as declassified agency telegrams and reports on the topic – including US The April 25, 1967 PDB mentions that “The ill-fated flight of State Department documentation [151-154]. With the wholesale Soyuz 1 is a serious setback to the Soviet manned space program. release of PDBs from the LBJ administration, researchers now The Russians are not likely to risk another cosmonaut fatality until have new additional insights into what US IC analysts knew about they have made a detailed investigation of the disaster… Damage Soviet space plans for late 1968, and what they were telling the to the capsule will hamper such investigations.” [149] President about them.

Interestingly, the PDBs demonstrate that the encompassing Interestingly, in regards to the manned circumlunar plans topic, Soyuz 1 coverage was apparently standard for key missions of se- a special annex was attached to the November 2, 1968 issue of the lected interest for the President’s notice, as well as applied to many PDB. [155] PDB annexes were usually reserved for topics of sig- major manned-related missions. Such elements include discus- nificant political gravity and interest for the President, and would sions of launch windows, the deployment of space tracking and describe whether any impacts to US policy were likely as a result of support ships in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans (for spe- the expected forthcoming foreign event. The US IC analysts noted cific launches), as well as noting increasing aircraft traffic activi- that the Russians were taking the necessary steps to keep their op-

54 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3 tions open to allow for the Soviet leadership to make the decision drome, and resume their training there), the information certainly to approve a crewed lunar mission. The title of the Annex is “The bolsters the view that concrete plans were directly in hand for a Soviet Lunar Program: To Gamble or Not to Gamble?”: crewed circumlunar mission in December 1968.

“The announcement that NASA is considering flying Apollo However, the claims of the date of a December 9th launch- 8 around the Moon in December has probably created a di- ing are not supported by other currently available evidence. In- lemma for Soviet leaders… We believe that they realized some deed, these additional hints actually support the notion that the time ago they could not beat the US to a manned lunar landing USSR was actively building up to a potentially crewed circumlu- and hoped instead to upstage the US effort by making the first nar launch for late December 1968, and not earlier in the month. manned flight around the Moon. A successful Moon flight by Among them is a report in an American space business publica- Apollo 8 would deny the Soviets this propaganda victory and tion from mid-November 1968, and another is an entry in Mishin’s could cause them to regard their entire manned circumlunar technical notations dated a mere ten days later. Both are linked by program as a failure… They might, therefore, go for broke and the explicit recorded timing of the launch plans. attempt a manned circumlunar mission ahead of Apollo 8. This would be extremely risky, however, since it would mean The top news story in the November 14, 1968 issue of the US accelerating greatly the pace of their program, which has been periodical Space Business Daily has the title “Soviets said to be plagued by serious technical problems that resulted in the fail- planning December manned circumlunar.” [160] While the Soviet ure of two, and probably three, of their four flights to date… official was not identified, it is likely it may have been an attaché The success of Zond 5 in September might encourage them at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC (the location where the to gamble on a manned flight. Last week’s urgent Soviet de- newsletter was published): marches asking for immediate permission to station recovery aircraft in India and Ceylon suggests that they are at least keep- “Hours before Zond 6 was disclosed to be on its way toward ing open the option of gambling on a manned circumlunar a lunar mission, Space Daily learned from a ranking Soviet flight before Apollo 8. Aircraft in India and Ceylon would be official that the Soviet Union has programmed an attempt to within easy reach of the area of the Indian Ocean where Zond launch a manned circumlunar flight to the Moon in advance 5 was recovered. We need more information, however, before of the United States’ Apollo 8 mission on December 21… The we can say with certainty that the Soviets plan to shoot the official stated that ‘the Soviet Union will make its manned cir- works.” [155] cumlunar launch just a few days before the Apollo 8 launch.’ The optimum circumlunar launch window opens around De- Were the US IC’s suspicions well founded? Current disclosure cember 13 for a mission that would circumnavigate the Moon trends lend increasing support to the notion that the USSR built on December 16… The Soviet spokesman said the Soviet Un- up to a concrete circumlunar mission targeted to fly in December ion is not pressed by this mission schedule. Further, he said 1968. There are even tantalizing hints that this plan for December the USSR is prepared to continue its manned flight program 1968 was to have been a crewed mission. The following section ex- through the winter since Zond 5 has demonstrated the water amines some of this undergirding documentation – both US and splashdown as an alternate recovery capability.” [160] Russian – in detail. Corroboratory data for a late December 1968 timetable for the 3.2.3.1 Soviet-connected, validatory materials further support launching of a Soviet circumlunar mission is confirmed from three notion of December 1968 circumlunar shot separate lines of evidence. The first is Vasiliy Mishin’s technical -no tations, for which the extant notebooks were publicly released in In 1993, two revelatory articles authored by space history research- 2015 on the World Wide Web. [161] The November 29, 1968 en- ers Sergei Shamsutdinov and Igor Marinin appeared. These two try in Mishin’s “Diary XIX” provides the following information: “ publications discussed events connected to the USSR’s manned [‘Work’] Schedule for Object 13 [circumlunar spacecraft] (for [or, circumlunar program that took place in December 1968. [156, ‘to ensure the’] launch 21.XII -24.XII).” This is proof that the USSR 157] The disclosures included that cosmonauts were indeed at the appears to have scheduled a planned launching to selenocentric Tyuratam Cosmodrome in December 1968 for the express pur- space in December 1968. Whether Mishin’s diary entry meant that pose of a manned circumlunar mission attempt. “Object 13” was to have been a crewed or uncrewed mission cannot be interpereted from the text. However, it is interesting to note “At the end of 1968 it became clear that the USA might beat that the Soviet official’s comments to Space Business Daily less than the Soviets in the first manned flight to the Moon. It was then a fortnight earlier on scheduling were already modified from “just that the cosmonauts of the three ‘lunar’ teams wrote a letter to a few days before” to contemporaneously (or slightly after) Apollo the Politburo, asking that the Moon flight be approved imme- 8’s scheduled lift-off date – which might indicate some fluidity on diately, despite the failures. They argued that the presence of the Russian decision-to-launch process. the cosmonauts on board the ship would improve flight safety… In the early days of December, they flew to Baikonur and According to recent calculations by space analyst Phil Clark, stayed there one week, in case orders were received to launch a the launch times for this hitherto unrecognized launch window manned vehicle. The cosmonauts trained vigorously, and were for a potential manned circumlunar would have the following pre- ready to leave at any moment… But no decision came.” [158] cessing launch times (GMT) from Tyuratam: December 21st, 4:50 GMT; December 22nd, 5:40 GMT; December 23rd, 6:30 GMT; Further details that were provided in the second piece included and December 24th, 7:20 GMT. [162] (Meaning the launch Mos- such details as the launch was aimed for the ninth of December, cow time would take place between 8:50 AM on December 21st that the Proton rocket and its spacecraft stood ready in the assem- and 11:20 AM on December 24th at the Cosmodrome.) bly building, and that the cosmonauts were there “for more than one week.” [159] While not ironclad (and questions arise from Secondly, contemporaneous news reportage provides addition- this narrative, among them a major one about whom gave the al significant indications that an actual circumlunar mission was permission for the cosmonauts to actually fly down to the cosmo- planned by the USSR in December 1968. In the final issue of 1968

55 Peter Pesavento

of TIME magazine, there are details that the space tracking ship Vladimir Komarov was in Cuban waters. [163]

“In October, some space officials, apprehensive about Russian Moonshot plans, were hoping that Apollo 8 could be launched as early as Dec. 6. When it was decided that preparation of Saturn 5 and trajectory calculations could not be completed in time, the flight was scheduled for the next moonshot ‘win- LIBRARY LBJ PRESIDENTIAL dow,’ the period between Dec. 21 and 27… Some of the same considerations affected the plans of Russian space scientists, who had an opportunity to launch a Moonshot… [earlier] in December. Despite hints in the Soviet press, widespread rumors in Moscow, and the conviction of some Western experts that the Russians would attempt to upstage Apollo 8, the cosmonauts remained Earthbound. Why no shot was made, only the Russians know. But U.S. specialists note that the Soviet tracking ships that were strung out… [earlier] in December in Fig. 20 President Johnson presents Apollo 8 crewmember Jim Lovell with a apparent preparation for a manned shot are now returning to framed version of his “Earthrise” photograph taken during the mission. port. Even the tracking ship Komarov, usually in the Caribbe- an, is sailing all the way back to Russia.” [164] lunar flight, Apollo 8, in December 1968.” [166] With the application of the previously-discussed revelatory disclosures about Soviet tracking ship placement (mentioned in sec- As the NIE-related document states unequivocally, the main tion 2.7), the appearance of the space-event support ship Vladimir purpose of the Soviet circumlunar program “…as it turned out, Komarov is strong evidence that, at the very least, a circumlunar [was] to upstage the Apollo program.” Currently, the available mission was planned by the Russians in December 1968. And declassified documentation does not address this issue in any de- since the Komarov was also used for manned space missions in tailed form, but in time it may. the same geographical location, a case can be made that a manned circumlunar mission is also an equally valid conclusion. A case in point is that potential further information on Sovi- et manned circumlunar aspirations in December 1968 may be Moreover, a third set of evidentiary substantiation is that, in awaiting declassification among the materials within the extensive a previous publication co-authored by this researcher, the exam- archive at the White House’s National Security Council. Thirteen ination of CORONA satellite photoreconnaissance photography LBJ-era documents on monitoring Soviet space activities are cur- (from mission 1049-2) indicates that there was both a Soyuz rock- rently under FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) appeal by this et being lowered from its erected position (imaged originally at its author from this archive. [167] pad on December 15 in the upright-to-launch position, with associated Proton pads empty) as well as a Proton rocket ensconced at Furthermore, only the PDBs in the PDB files have been pro- its launch pad when imaged on December 22. [165] This may be cessed for declassification release. Other materials, including var- an indication of a build-up to an either an aspired manned (or un- ious intelligence agencies reports and other adjunct briefing ma- manned) circumlunar mission that ultimately was not launched. terials interspersed among the PDBs, are only now starting to be catalogued by archivists at the LBJ library. In the end, the Soviet gambit faltered, and the American Apollo 8 was successful. Fig. 20 is a photo taken during a gala presentation 3.3 PDBs and the Ed Cameron Connection event at the White House in early January 1969 when the Apollo 8 crew presented President Johnson a signed picture of the famed As it turns out, good friend and colleague Ed Cameron (1947- “Earth Rise” photograph. In the years following this White House 2014) played a central role in the US IC reporting to top US policy celebration, US IC analysts continued to evaluate the acquired in- makers about activities happening at Tyuratam’s Area J complexes. Launch of Lomonosov from Vostochny. telligence information, and it seems that the US IC concluded that He had been, from circa 1968 through the early 1990s, NSA’s top the Russians had only faltered very near the finish line. analyst on foreign rocketry and missile activities, with an additional specialization in Soviet-era space activities. As part of his According to commentary found in a 1973 National Intelli- bailiwick, he provided expert testimony in US Congressional in- gence Estimate adjunct report (original classification: “Top Secret quiries “behind closed doors” in regards to Soviet technological All Source, Restricted Data”) on Soviet space projects, issues. [168] As Cameron noted in a draft of his unpublished au- tobiography [169], “…The lunar Zond program, using the SL-12 booster, apparently had as its ultimate objective a circumlunar flight with a “It was the early 1970s and I was working as an ASA 98J Elec- crew of two. We believe that this program was intended to gain tronics Warfare Analyst. Most Electronics Warfare operators experience for manned lunar landings and, as it turned out, and analysts worked with and on radar signals, learning to to upstage the Apollo program. The hardware was first test- jam or blind hostile radars, spoof them, render them useless ed in late 1967, a few days after the beginning of the Apollo or simply make them a target. These were the guys involved in flight test program. The Soviets were apparently hopeful that a classical Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). But, I was one of the speedy man-rating of the SL-12 could be accomplished or that lucky, elite soldiers, sailors and airmen, whose job was called the Apollo program would encounter serious delays…they SpaCol (Space Collection of radio signals); I was an ASA 98J- could have achieved the first manned circumlunar mission J1. I was ASA’s top-rated analyst, and recognized as the best in had their strategy been successful… It was finally postponed my career field (based upon military-wide tests and my ser- indefinitely when the US succeeded with its manned circum- vice record). A budding rocket scientist, I was also known in

56 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

some quarters as a top-notch telemetry analyst, doing reverse the West about the N-1 and every resource available… From engineering of both strategic and tactical foreign rocketry, 1971 through 1974, based upon those TELLMAN outputs and foreign spacecraft, in direct support of DoD, learning to and a fresh and newly developed understanding of what it all understand them, how to make use of them if possible, and meant, and through supercomputer simulation programs like how to defeat them when needed. At least, that was our goal. my reprogramming of ROCKET (Rand’s Omnibus Calculator For the most part, we were successful and it all worked.” [170] of Kinematic Earth Traces). I, almost alone, literally rewrote the entire catalog of Department of Defense assessments of A side note is that the acronym “ASA” was for the Army Secu- every known foreign missile and rocket system on the face rity Agency, a major component of the NSA’s Defense Department of our planet. It refuted much of the assessment work done entities-wide diaspora during the 1960s and early 1970s prior to by CIA, FTD [USAF Foreign Technology Division located at its absorption into INSCOM – the US Army’s Intelligence and Se- Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio] and the other intelli- curity Command.) gence agencies who reported to the Department of Defense. I used data from known US systems to verify the validity of my Additionally, public comments made by Cameron nearly a dec- foreign models… In 1976, though at the time working already ade ago have been recently corroborated in an unexpected man- for two years as a civilian contractor for the government on a ner. Some of this NSA’s top analyst’s earliest rocketry analysis work fairly high priority N1 project, I developed a similar full un- reached President Johnson, and was influential (source-wise) on a derstanding of the N1 launch vehicle and its missions. But, my number of high-level intelligence assessments used by US policy lengthy reports, many several inches thick, met with a ‘who- makers at the height of the Space Race and Moon Race. gives-a-damn’ attitude from both the intelligence communi- In late April 2007, on the public discussion listserv group ty and NASA. That silhouette which appeared in the [1971] “friends and partners in space,” Cameron painted in broad brush- CIA-written NIE [on Soviet space], was from one of my ear- strokes about some of his achievements while he was employed lier reports, but the comparative silhouettes of Saturn V and at NSA, and hinted that his analyses of the Area J vehicle actual- N-1 saved one classification compartment stamp by avoiding ly pre-dated his self-disclosure of work that appeared in the 1971 the use of [detailed illustrations based on] the high resolution National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet space programs (issued satellite photograph[s] of the N-1. It was much the same as on July 1, 1971). [171] The boldface italics have been added for Mishin’s sketch when Soviet photographs were still secret in emphasis: Russia.” [172]

“Many have asked just where I fit into the N-1 [Area J vehi- In Fig. 21, the comparative silhouette graphic of the Area J vehicle] story and what made me so sure of what I have said. Well, cle and the US Saturn V that appeared in the 1971 NIE mentioned at first, when I was a new troop with the US Army SPACOL by Cameron can be viewed, which was ranked only at the “Top [acronym for NSA’s SPAce COLlection network of intercept Secret” level – there was no code word markings on this version of sites around the periphery of the USSR] boys, I helped feed the the National Intelligence Estimate (keep in mind that there are in- TELLMAN [NSA-based supercomputer] and earlier telemetry deed different versions of NIEs with some having more and some processing systems as a covert space collector during the years having less detail, depending upon which US policy official was when N-1 was of prime interest (1968-70), later I was key to the recipient of the document [173]). However, any earlier com- developing processing software, ROCKET2 and SixDOF, for parative illustration of the two rockets happened to not be extant it and other intelligence agency supercomputers using telem- (or even known about) until February 2014, when the November etered data to produce extremely accurate and detailed flight, 28, 1968 PDB had excerpts declassified by CIA at the request of trajectory and resulting orbital path reconstructions. In the this researcher. [174] Indeed, the 1968 graphic is quite similar as end, I saw and used everything known in those early days by that depicted in the 1971 NIE on Soviet space – although this time, US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY US CENTRAL

Fig. 21 Intelligence reports on the supposed confuration of the Soviet N1 Moon rocket.

57 Peter Pesavento the rockets in the comparison are not in silhouette, and has more data and illustrative details.

That particular Daily Brief not only included an earlier comparative of the two Moon landing rockets, but also hitherto unknown disclosures appear (as can be seen in Fig. 22). Because the PDB was ranked higher in security classification – “Top Secret: Contains SIGINT and KEYHOLE material” versus merely “Top Secret” for the 1971 NIE publication – shows why that was.

The PDB has coloration scheme hints of the Soviet booster, as well as the evidence of the detection of the fuel line fairings on the first and second stages (indicating the use of GAMBIT-3 imagery in the creation of this rough order-of-magnitude depiction, and explicitly connotes that already in late 1968 that GAMBIT-3 equipment was able to image targets with better-than-four-inches resolution ground-resolved distance – something previously un- LIBRARY PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/LBJ US CENTRAL disclosed).

This preciseness of the data about the Area J vehicle (including a more accurate measurement of the height of the rocket at 335 feet versus the later 1971 NIE data of 317 feet, with its base width at 55 feet, as well as a very excellent estimate on the payload capability of 80,000 to 96,000 pounds for a lunar mission) would require it to be ranked higher than merely “Top Secret.” It is noteworthy that Fig. 22 A briefing comparison of the N1 and Saturn V Moon rockets. this data was in hand in early November 1968. As a result of this new information, it is a reasonable conclusion that Cameron was already working on rocket analyses of the USSR’s manned lunar AF’s National Air & Space Intelligence Center). These accounts are landing program booster at this time that had top-level, US poli- from lesser-known document families that had not been in public cy-maker impact. release prior to this author’s efforts, including: Spot Reports, Rus- sian Guided Missile Reports (RUGMs), daily NSA SIGINT Sum- 4.0 Rendezvous With History: maries, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Digest reports, Space the latest disclosures on Area J and the Soviet Event Reports, Foreign Ballistic Missile and Space Developments annuals, as well as Telemetry Beaconry Analysis Conference re- effort to compete with Apollo ports (TEBACs) that featured symposia with a concentration on Soviet space activities on a regular basis (sometimes twice annu- As mentioned previously, and highlighted in this paper, a signif- ally). icant plurality of the US IC narrative contradicts official Russian histories as pertaining to events. But this accentuation is no more In aggregate, the accumulation of new data from these docu- boldy underscored than in regards to the materials relating to the ment collections allow new perspectives. Additionally, it should be USSR’s manned lunar landing program – and in particular, the noted that the above-named document families contained reports launches of the Area J rocket. Simply put, the US IC “prism” of that were originally security classified ranked at the Top Secret what was interpreted as to have taken place is very much asyn- Codeword level, with some of these at multiple (several) Code- chronous with the Russian canon. Readers should keep in mind words. This will be explained in the following sections. that while it is generally accepted among most space historians that the Soviet manned lunar projects never reached the condition In addition to the new document families from US IC agencies, of a manned space launch, the US IC viewpoint does not agree diligent efforts (by this author and colleagues) have been made to with this assessment. track down the personal papers, work product, and – if still alive – interviews of major participants who were involved in the con- Since it has been a very recent phenomenon that there has sumption, as well as dissemination of information sourced to US been an increasing release of “Top Secret Codeword” documen- IC agencies on the Soviet space program, as well as its manned tation on the Soviet manned lunar program via US IC agencies, lunar projects. This effort was conducted on the premise that new, it remains too early to know what intelligence acquired by these unexpected insights may in all likelihood be acquired that current agencies bolstered this contradicting assessment to what current document disclosures do not address – “bridge some of the gaps” historians accept as the accurate chronology. But in the following in the current chronologies. Some significant progress has been sections, this alternative US “prism” will be detailed. These details made in this regard. What follows in subsequent sections here are will include the highlighting of oral histories to help flesh out the some highlights of this endeavor. overall picture of US perceptions, uncertainties and all. There is one specific item of note that should be highlighted Over time, assiduous efforts on the part of this researcher have in regards to “the art of” intelligence interpretation. One of the opened previously closed avenues for information acquisition most difficult things to detect and accurately capture is the intent on Soviet space activities; in particular a concentrated focus on of specific actions and activities of a targeted subject. The ability materials relating to the USSR’s manned lunar projects recorded to discern specific aims of policy of a foreign government is, at contemporaneously by US IC units as events unfolded. These new best, concluded as an “estimate” – even with a burgeoning accu- materials emanate from both NSA and CIA, but also legacy USAF mulation of data coming from human sources, telemetry captures, FTD “Foreign Technology Division” (released by NASIC – the US- radar returns, acoustic sensors, radio and telephone communica- Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

tions intercepts, as well as media reportage. Hence the frequent It is most likely (although not directly attributed to by name, the usage of this term can be found in all manner of declassified US IC information garnered by Clark points to these individuals as the documentation when analysts are attempting to ascribe concrete most likely candidates) that these further experts and policy mak- timetables for non-publicly disclosed programs. ers made up part of the reporter’s “contact rolodex”: Carl Duckett (Director of CIA’s Science & Technology Directorate) and David 4.1 Providing background: contemporaneous comments by Brandwein (who headed the Guided Missile and Astronautics In- US Intelligence officials on the Moon race telligence Committee, and subsequently the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, also known as FMSAC) of the CIA, as well One of the most pronounced gaps in space historiography has as Melvin Laird (Secretary of Defense) and David Packard (Dep- been the dearth of personal narrative materials made by US IC of- uty Secretary under Laird) of the Pentagon, as well as various oth- ficials contemporaneously during the Moon Race that would pro- er officials from the US Air Force. A CIA official at the National vide some oral history about the subject from their perspective. It Photographic Interpretation Center may have also provided Clark is known that “backgrounders” were provided to journalists, but with comments regarding US overhead photoreconnaissance sys- for the most part any personal commentaries made by interview- tems information. ees or briefers never make it into the final published newspaper reportage. And until recently, there was no access by space his- Journalists typically write and file much more material than torians to any “notes taken” during such proceedings. Due to the ever reaches print. As a consequence, filed (and not used) materi- efforts of this author and fellow-researchers/historians on behalf als by journalists may often contain new, previously unknown in- of this author, previously “un-mined” materials can now begin to formation on historical events. Clark’s personal papers are no ex- fill this gap. [175] ception. For example, in an “advisory on Zond 6” that was issued soon after the spacecraft’s launching (but prior to official Russian It can be considered that this type of material is a necessary fur- announcements that it was aimed at the Moon on November 12, ther enhancement of the declassified literature. In this brief over- 1968), new information about intercepted communications from view, highlights will include files of an aerospace journalist who the Soviet space vehicle is mentioned. The source was the radio as- wrote for nationally distributed publications, as well as a Wash- tronomer Sir Bernard Lovell, then of the Jodrell Bank astrophysics ington, DC insider who had received briefings on the subject of observatory. the Soviet space program via US IC personnel, and then published publicly accessable reports on the topic, initially for Congressional “Another source (fyi [for your information] Sheldon), consumption. Within these files are insightful commentaries on who has been more accurate more often, confirms Lovell’s what US IC agencies and analysts were thinking contemporane- statement that two voices have been monitored from Zond 6. ously as the Moon Race was nearing its zenith and dramatic con- (That’s definitely not for attrib [ution] to Sheldon) Lovell says clusion. the voices appear to be recorded and presumably are being used to check out communications. You will remember that 4.1.1 From the Evert Clark files Sir Bernard also heard voices [from the Soviet circumlunar mission] when Zond 5 flew… My sources say voice cannot Evert B. Clark (1926-1988), a top-rated journalist, wrote for Avi- be used to check other kinds of communications than voice ation Week & Space Technology, the New York Times, and News- circuits. They believe voice recordings would only be used to week (as well as other periodicals) from the mid-1950s up through check communications…Welsh’s line on Zond 6 (nfa) [not for the early 1980s. (Fig. 23 is a photograph of the journalist, circa attribution] is that ‘they always seem to have a backup and they 1966.) His beat evolved into reporting on not only space and mil- always seem to fire it.’ This overlooks the fact that Russia flew itary missile technology developments and national-level policy Zond 4 over exactly the same route, but had big trouble at the decisions on space and missilery, but his efforts also included re- point of Earth re-entry; that it then flew Zond 5, retrieving porting on how, when and what US IC agency analysts knew in some nice pictures but apparently not hitting the preferred regards to space exploration events (and their intent) happening landing area; and that Zond 6 is really the third try… If Zond in the USSR. 6 is a manned precursor, it makes good sense for the Russians to keep the mission as simple as possible and repeat the earlier From what can be confirmed from Clark’s notes in his accumulat- Zond flights as completely as possible (except where they went ed archives (located at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia [176]), wrong, of course). If Zond (or Soyuz) is supposed to use some these are people in Washington, DC that he knew well and used as skip-out capability…perhaps the main purpose of the Zond 6 sources for information: James Webb (NASA Administrator), John flight is to try to fly it all the way home to Russia rather than Foster, Jr. (Department of De- dump it in the Indian Ocean… I find it interesting that Zond fense), Edward Welsh (of the Na- 5 had only one voice recording (as far as my reading indicat- tional Space Council, described as ed) and Zond 6 [has] had two… All this makes me lean more “the conservative [interpretation] and more toward von Braun’s theory (see our first Apollo 7 file source” [177]), Charles S. Sheldon from the Cape [Kennedy] for details) that Zond and Soyuz are II (Chief, Science Policy Division, the same and that the ride back after the circumlunar flight is US Congressional Research Ser- going to be a cramped one. More as it develops.” [177] vice, described as a person “who has been more accurate more In this brief overview, much interesting material from the Evert often” than Welsh [177]), along Clark papers is not being highlighted. A case in point is that Clark with Directors of Central Intel- had access to “For Official Use Only” Soviet broadcast and print ligence Richard Helms and Wil- materials on the Soviet space program (as it was provided by CIA’s liam Colby (there is a photograph Foreign Broadcast and Information Service, the FBIS) in real in the collection of Clark standing time, and his collection includes FBIS documentation from the

JOHN JACKSON/SPECIAL COLLECTIONS, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE POLYTECHNIC VIRGINIA COLLECTIONS, JOHN JACKSON/SPECIAL with c. 1966.Colby), as well as as- 1960s that is accessible from almost no other archival source. The Fig. 23 Evert B. Clark. tronauts. Evert Clark archive holds a trove of surprise materials covering

59 Peter Pesavento the USSR’s civilian, as well as military, space programs – the vast half of the 1960s, ‘But then the story changes rather abruptly to preponderance from the perspective of the US intelligence com- a program that is going to hell in a hand bag,’ one intelligence munity, to the extent it was willing to divulge some of its well-kept official said. (He referred to the years it has taken to get the Pro- secrets to one of America’s foremost aerospace journalists. ton booster man-rated and the failure of the super-booster to even make it into orbit.)… Why the failures? ‘That is one of the Indeed, in hindsight – nearly a half century later with the dis- baffling questions to us,’ the first official said. He believes the- an closures now in hand – decently rigorous evaluations as to the ex- swer may lie not in machines, but people. The space program’s tent that US IC agency directors and analysts were truthful and ac- ‘Chief Designer,’ Sergei Korolev, remained anonymous to the curate in their relating of events to Clark can now be applied. For Russian and other publics until his death in 1966. It was about example, in one filed feature article (from September 1971 [178, that time that the program got into trouble. It also was about 179]), Clark was able to incorporate extensive comments about that time that a considerable amount of money and resources reactions that US IC personnel had in regards to key anticipated shifted from the manned space program to military technology. events in the Soviet space program. Intelligence agencies know this but several years after the fact they do not know why… One analyst…believes that the Soviets “As it turned out, ‘miserable problems with boosters caused are at least five years behind the US in computer technology the Russians not to make the grade,’ either on a manned circum- – ‘they are rather impoverished’ – particularly in the so-called lunar flight or the attempt to grab the first rocks. (An automatic ‘software’ of programming. Computers were essential to the rocket did scoop up rocks [Luna 16], but after Americans had success of Apollo’s design testing and flight. At one time the reached the Moon.)… Photographic satellites, monitoring the Soviet space program had Russia’s highest national priority, and Soviet launching pads at Tyuratam, and electronic ‘ferret’ satel- therefore had demands on its best computers.” [180] lites eavesdropping on unsuccessful rocket tests that the public never learned about, had triggered the decision for one of the It is noteworthy that the CIA sources that were discussing these most moving and spectacular events in Man’s history [Apol- points with Clark assiduously avoided providing accurate “precise- lo 8] … The same spy skies had, for several years, been telling ness” to their declarations – the first photographic detection of the American analysts of Russia’s progressive buildup toward a gi- Area J rocket on the launch pad was in fact in December 1967, not ant rocket to land men on the Moon – despite Kremlin denials the Summer of 1968, and that the actual size of the Soviet manned that Russia was interested in a race. Rocket test stands, rail lines, lunar-landing program booster was definitively known (that the new launching pads all pointed to plans for an immense rocket, N-1 rocket was even shorter than the US Saturn V in height), and far larger than the American Saturn 5. Space chief Webb had this knowledge was in hand at least since November 1968 (as dis- told Congress for several years that such a booster was being cussed in section 3.3), and not the exaggerated claim of it being built but all except those inside the intelligence club believed the size of two Washington Monuments. This deliberate mislead- he was ‘crying wolf.’… Despite their foreknowledge that this ing seems to indicate a hyper-sensitivity about the resolution of US would be the largest Russian booster yet, analysts were stunned photoreconnaissance satellites at the time when Clark was writing in the Summer of 1968 when it finally reached the launch pad his feature article in 1971. In the same vein, a very curious com- and first showed up on photographs… ‘It wouldn’t do to say ment that “no cosmonauts were on board” will be shown to be a they were surprised at the size,’ an intelligence expert said. challenged claim inside the US IC in upcoming section 4.5.4. ‘They were shocked, amazed. Guys were walking around for days with their mouths open. I mean big – like two Washing- 4.1.2 From the Charles S. Sheldon II Files ton Monuments.’… But the world had not yet seen a flight of the super-booster and the Soviet public probably does not even Charles S. Sheldon II’s (1917-1981) name and research expertise is know of its existence. The reason: Failure after failure… ‘This familiar to space historians and scholars alike. He is perhaps best was the Moon-landing booster,’ one intelligence expert said, known as the editor of the US Congressional Research Service se- ‘bigger than the Saturn but with comparable throw-weights ries Soviet Space Programs, which was issued in 1962-1965, 1967, (payloads). And it looked like they were pushing the program. 1966-1970, 1971, 1971-1975, and 1976-1980 editions. [181-190] But they got into deep trouble – there were a number of tests His background includes graduating from Harvard, a lengthy stint with this booster and not one success. It was a gigantic thing, it in the US Navy (reaching the final rank of Captain) during World amazed everybody… It had the same design ideas, same kinds War 2 and the Korean conflict – including working on the staff of of engines as their smaller rockets. Four stages in all, but with General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo. [191] the same old heavy plumbing.’… The long-awaited first flight test came in the Summer of 1969, just before Apollo 11 headed In the mid-1950s, he began working for the US Government in for the first manned lunar landing. (Note: There was [sic] no Washington, DC, and participated in the drafting of the National cosmonauts on board.)… ‘Well, they blew it up not far off the Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as well as the Communica- pad,’ the expert said. ‘It made a nice little hole in the ground. tions Satellite Act of 1962. His membership on the President’s Na- They went right back to it and tried it again and got more of the tional Space Council during most of the 1960s allowed him to have same. That killed their man-on-the-Moon program right there. access to all classified materials regarding Soviet space activities, They had some really tragic failures. It looked like there was no and this classified materials access continued subsequently while quality control… There was a joke at the time about cosmo- he was working at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) as a nauts going out to watch a firing and immediately defecting to policy analyst (this CRS stint lasted until his passing). [191, 192] somewhere.’… Actually the repeated failures have not deterred the Russian rocketeers. A high intelligence official told News- For some time, the location of Sheldon’s papers and work week: ‘Indeed, they are working hard and have worked hard on product was unknown. After a lengthy search, researcher-analyst the big booster. It blows up shot after shot. They’ve had a very, Charles Vick located the archival materials in a storage unit at the very miserable life. But they have not given up. Quite to the Smithsonian’s National Air & Space Museum’s Silver Hill facility. contrary.’ … If the cyclopses of space can make dramatic reve- The incomplete finding aid accompanying the Sheldon materials lations they still cannot see all. It is abundantly clear that the So- added further challenges to identifying the contents. viets had many successes in space in the late 1960s and the first Due to Sheldon’s immersion in the US government bureau-

60 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3 cracy as a policy analyst and advisor, he made unique structural lunar landing aim]. It seems to linkages to US IC personnel directly involved in contemporaneous say that Soviet statements in gathering and interpretation of what was taking place inside the June [1969] predicting a sam- Soviet space program. The Sheldon papers archive show that his ple return are to be believed, contacts included CIA’s David Brandwein (Fig.24) and Carl Duck- that you would suppose that ett. Interestingly, much of the writings/speeches of Sheldon appear this would be achieved by the to have been reviewed by CIA personnel during pre-publication/ big booster, and that therefore public disclosure activities. This apparent CIA review included the Luna 15 had to be something Soviet Space Programs Congressional report series. else, like a Lunakhod rov-

US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY US CENTRAL er. But it seems logical that An example of insights into the thinking and views of CIA’s if there was an attempt to fly space analysts about the Russian program at the height of the the big booster in July [1969], Moon Race is found in a cover letter dated 11 May 1971 that ac- and that it was ultimately to companied corrections and comments that Brandwein provided be used in a manned lunar on a draft of Sheldon’s Soviet Space Programs 1966-1970 edition. landing, it would make more [193] The letter (written on CIA letterhead) has all the hallmarks Fig. 24 David Brandwein. sense not to use it for a com- of collegiality and familiarity, as it is addressed to “Dear Charles” plex sample return mission, and signed “David.” The telling comments are those in regards to but rather to do something simpler… It can also be agreed that the section entitled “Flight Operations.” the Soviets are unable to repeal the laws of physics and would ultimately need two big boosters with a rendezvous to do the “Dear Charles: manned lunar landing, then it would make sense to have the The latest bundle of material you sent has been reviewed, but we first big booster flight do as much of a lunar mission as possible have looked critically at only the amended section titled ‘Flight with the lower velocity capability of a single big booster. This Operations.’ We still have major difficulties with this section, might have been something like a flight into and out of lunar and the enclosed comments identify the particular sections that orbit (no landing) and a low-g recovery on Earth. That would trouble us most… We believe the presentation is such that any remove any impediment to calling Luna-15 a sample return sophisticated reader would decide that you prefer the first hy- attempt… Like you, I find it hard to believe that the Soviets pothesis, particularly because the second hypothesis is presently had lunar sample return payloads built for two different launch without conviction. As you know, we feel very strongly that the vehicles, but to me the evidence favoring Luna-15 as the sample second hypothesis is the right one, and it therefore irks us to see return payload is much more convincing.” [196] it get short shrift. Perhaps the fault is ours, in that we were evi- dently not as persuasive as we might have been… In any event, Considering that this letter at the time of its issuance was not se- what you say is your business and there is little point in further curity classified, it contains a shocking amount of at-the-time clas- argument. However, if you put in a prefatory section alluding sified data in it (albeit coached in hypothetical terms) – that being to your consultation with other specialists in the Government, I that the Soviets attempted to launch their largest rocket booster would appreciate it if you put in a caveat to the effect that there connected with their manned lunar landing program in July 1969, was strong disagreement in at least one quarter with some of that it was to have sent a spacecraft to selenocentric space and re- your judgements. turn to Earth, and that Luna 15 was itself a lunar sample return Best regards, mission. None of these elements were publicly confirmed by US [signed ‘David’] government sources at the time of this letter’s writing. David S. Brandwein” [193] 4.2 M elvin Laird remembers early July, 1969: “I thought the The “hypotheses” mentioned by Brandwein (of which several Soviets would ‘Go Up’” typescript draft pages with marking pen corrections were attached to the cover letter), are identified as “1. First Alternative: Opera- Melvin Laird (1922-2016) was the tenth US Secretary of Defense tions in 1969 Not Intended to Support a Manned Landing” [194] (January 1969 through January 1973) under President Richard M. and “2. Second Alternative: Operations in 1969 Intended to Sup- Nixon (Fig. 25 shows Laird giving Nixon a personal tour of the port an Early Competitive Landing” [195]. Brandwein is explicitly Pentagon in January 1969). His tenure as the top policy maker/ telegraphing that the CIA believed that the USSR was attempting to competitively land cosmonauts upon the lunar surface first, ahead of the planned Apollo 11 mission. And readers should keep in mind that this assessment was made nearly two years after Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin left boot prints in the lunar dust. It is an indication that – although Brandwein is oblique – there was hard data in hand that would bolster this preferred viewpoint of a competitive, contemporaneous Moon-landing race.

To amplify on the theme, further on in the letter Brandwein makes a considerably detailed statement as to what the Area J vehicle launch attempt and the subsequent Luna 15 were intending.

“Page 259, middle paragraph [(underline in original text) meaning the last section of the “Second alternative” section, as well as section E, “Aftermath of 1969 Flights” in the actual published report.] This part does not seem to be an effective argument OF DEFENSE OF THE US SECRETARY BERLAGE/OFFICE NANCY supporting the first hypothesis [of a non-competitive manned Fig. 25 President Nixon and Melvin Laird at the Pentagon, January 1969.

61 Peter Pesavento advisor to Nixon at the Pentagon coincided with some of the most launch attempt was an increase in the communications traffic dramatic events of the Soviet space program. Laird’s unique role at Tyuratam. “Although there was a lot of preparation and a during the Moon Race made him a focus of interest for this re- lot of [communications] traffic, … I never saw an intelligence searcher and for colleague Charles Vick. Due to a set of fortuitous report that said it would be ‘on this particular day’… Once they circumstances, Vick was able to conduct a series of interviews over start firing them [the rockets], then you know.” [197] three sessions with Laird in late 2007. [197] The questions asked during these interviews had substantive input from this research- – the retired Defense Secretary recalls that there was a lunar er, and allowed Vick to acquire as detailed an array of responses as lander on board, but it appears from Laird’s comments on this possible from the former Secretary of Defense. subject that the consensus of the US IC on this point may not have been universal; additionally, besides the expected lunar Laird was attempting to extemporaneously recall events that orbital mission, the lunar lander was also believed part of the took place nearly four decades before at the time of this converse, planned tests in selenocentric space: “They were going to try yet the former highest-level government insider demonstrated a and put something down on the planet [Moon], something detailed command of memory when he fielded the questions dur- there, but I don’t think we thought anyway that a [Soviet] man ing the interview. A further caveat is that Laird revealed what he was going to land [at this time, in July 1969].” [197] felt comfortable with disclosing – that is, all the intelligence collection sources at the US IC’s disposal at the time were not men- – Laird also hinted that it was the Pentagon that first informed tioned by him (an excellent example of such an exclusion was the President Nixon about the launch failure: “The President was SIGINT and satellite constellation orbiting over Tyuratam at that informed as soon after as we were pretty sure. You do not in- time, as well as COMINT intercept stations in Turkey and its envi- form him until you are pretty sure. You know, I always believed rons that contributed to the data accumulation and interpretation that you have got to be careful with these intelligence reports, of the early July launch attempt). Nevertheless, Laird’s comments because I always figured that you have to wait for the third one provide a high quality glimpse into the inner workings of a Feder- at least. The first two are sometimes wrong. You do not like to al bureaucracy that was seeking to keep a top-level policy maker run to the President and I didn’t.” [197] accurately informed. – one key item is the fact that Laird disclosed that the US IC The interviews also revealed what and how Laird knew about expected the July 3, 1969 launching to have a manned com- the July 3, 1969 Area J event at Tyuratam, and what Laird recalled ponent. “It was [to include] an orbital vehicle and they didn’t about US IC expectations regarding the intent of the anticipated expect it to land on the first time [out]… It was one [J vehicle] Soviet launch. The point is that Laird’s comments completely con- and then the Soyuz…, for crew transfer.” [197] tradict the currently accepted Russian historical canon as to the intended mission of the Soviet super booster’s launch attempt that When asked about how certain the US intelligence communi- happened about two weeks before Apollo 11 lifted off. ty was about this pre-Apollo 11 manned mission scenario, Laird commented that “You know, I think they were pretty sure, but they Despite his many responsibilities as one of the top five intel- never put it that way. They never said ‘100% sure’ or anything like ligence consumers in the US government, Laird kept an eye on that. I don’t think the intelligence reports said ‘definitely’ that a the USSR’s manned lunar intentions, even with the administering crew was going up.” Yet Laird confirmed that he personally con- of the Vietnam war: “I had a lot on my plate at that time because cluded from all the intelligence reportage coming across his desk we had a war going on over in Vietnam… It kept me pretty busy, that the July 3, 1969 Area J launch attempt was an actively manned but I did get into this issue [about Soviet manned lunar activities] mission: “Well, I think [that] they were.” Laird explained why he because I felt I had to.” [197] felt this: “I always anticipated the best from those Soviet people that were doing the work. I thought they were quite, quite capa- When asked about how important was it to him about the mon- ble… Well, I really felt, it’s a personal opinion, [but] I thought the itoring of the Area J activities, Laird responded that “Well, all of Soviets would ‘go up’ [with cosmonauts].” [197] that is important at a time when you are trying to exactly figure out what they are doing. They are not announcing it. There is not Indeed, Laird’s recollection of an expected Soviet manned lunar public record of it as there was in the public record of most of our expedition is echoed by Robert Seaman’s delineation (published activities, and so you are interested in all of that material.” He fur- in 2005) of what the former NASA Deputy Administrator (and ther commented about how frequently he received reports on the former Secretary of the Air Force during Laird’s tenure at the Pen- Soviet manned lunar program at the time in 1969: “Oh, I would tagon) felt was the USSR’s manned lunar landing mission scenario. get reports regularly. I met each week with the intelligence people, NRO and in particular NSA and Defense Intelligence” that would Seamans wrote: keep him informed on events as they unfolded. [197] “The N-1 [Area J vehicle] would ferry the Earth-escape rockets, lunar propulsion systems, and lunar lander into orbit, fol- Further salient points from the interview are these: lowed by the cosmonauts aboard the Soyuz, who would rendezvous and dock with their lunar chariot.” [198] – in regards to the July 3, 1969 launch failure from Area J, Laird recalled various interconnected threads regarding the report- Seamans alludes to the fact that he felt that this would have age of the event as it was transmitted to him: “The only reports been the sequencing had the Russians succeeded in fully testing I got [initially] came through NRO and NSA… [the first re- the Area J vehicle; what is different and significant in Laird’s rec- ports came through] in about 24, 36 hours [afterwards to him], ollection, is the claim that this was the exact scenario for the early something like that. It was fairly soon, as soon as they [the July 1969 launch attempt event, had things gone according to the agencies] put the telemetry together… It took a little while you perceived plan. know. We didn’t know what [went] wrong [with the launching] at the start until the telemetry was developed.” [197] The viewpoint of a manned Soviet lunar expedition ahead of – what alerted Pentagon analysts about the onset of the Area J Apollo 11 is amplified by previous public declarations by other US

62 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

IC participants that were reviewed in an article published by this re- The total area of the building encompasses 495,000 square feet, searcher in 2012. [199] So Laird’s claim is consistent with this previ- which is larger than our comparable facility for Saturn but not ous trend of disclosures, despite the fact that these claims clash with as high. A vehicle assembled in such a building would prob- the available evidence (mostly all sourced to Russian materials). ably be about 100 feet high and at least 40 feet in diameter. It would either be coupled with upper stages outside the building The starkness of this clash can be illustrated by the fact that or assembled horizontally inside the building… Most of the the prevailing viewpoint (of many space historians) maintains that estimates for the final configuration of the vehicle envision the from the accumulated evidence the Soviet Moon-landing-rocket SL-9/SL-12 as an upper stage. The complete postulated system program was so far behind in meeting its State-decreed develop- has been called the SL-X… [201] ment benchmarks schedule, that no manned flight can be considered likely; furthermore, only one rocket has been identified so far Interestingly, a USAF FTD document excerpt (released by NA- as being involved with the early July 1969 launch attempt. SIC) and issued 22 December 1972 (original classification of “Se- cret”) – following four launch failures of the Soviet rocket – has a Due to the fact that Laird was cleared to see “all source” data major section entitled “SL-X Launch Vehicle (Not Yet Launched).” in his position as Secretary of Defense, he received the best and [202] The text commentary has emphasis on the process of con- most accurate information available, including “Top Secret” mul- struction and transport of the rocket: tiple-codeword documents. However, not all US government personnel had the security clearances necessary to see such ranked “The next generation launch vehicle will be called the SL-X for documents, and some materials and information that were wholly purposes of discussion. The initial launch of this large vehicle has available at the TS codeword level were not so at lower-ranked lev- been anticipated for some time. The orbital payload capability of els. For a significant swath of materials on the Soviet space pro- this system is assessed in the 250,000 – 300,000 pound category… gram, this makes for some (to the historian is now looking at these The large diameter of the expected SL-X first stage would require it many decades afterwards) compelling instances of cognitive disso- being assembled vertically. Large-diameter tanks probably would nance, as readers will note in upcoming section 4.3. not be fabricated at the launch site because of the complex in- spection, hydrostatic test, and tank cleaning facilities that would 4.3 “Still Highly Classified”: intelligence be necessary. Therefore, the first stage probably would consist of compartmentalization and the dissemination of clustered modules built elsewhere and shipped to the VACB [ver- information about the sensitive “J vehicle” rocket tical assembly building] to be mechanically joined. Large overhead bridge cranes would be used to handle the modules and assem- Until recently, there had been an insufficient accumulation of doc- bled stages. After assembly and checkout, the first stage would be uments about the USSR’s manned lunar landing program rocket placed horizontally on a rail-mounted T/E [transporter/erector]. to grasp how sensitive this launch vehicle was, as considered by The remaining stages would then be mated horizontally. Horizon- US policy makers as well as US IC analysts during the time its de- tal mating and transport would be expected in view of past Soviet velopment was being closely monitored. But now, the comparison practices” [203]. of the two classification groupings’ content – of “Secret” as well as “Top Secret Codeword” – makes for some Kafka-esque forays into Fig. 26 shows the two different configurations of the SL-X what could, and could not, be discussed. sourced to this late 1972 FTD report – one that tapers in its upper stages to the top end of the rocket, while the other depicts a “fat As readers will note, the vast majority of materials about this bullet” type of presentation, quite similar to an early 1970s public rocket and program presented in this article are ranked at the “Top source study published by Charles Vick. [204] Why these unlike Secret/Top Secret Codeword” level. But the recent release of Se- depictions both occupy the same report in conjunction with dis- cret-level documentation provides insight as to how a highly clas- cussions about the same launch vehicle is not known. sified program gets discussed in lower-level materials, and in particular, what aspects of the program can be highlighted. Indeed, it appears that while the existence of the rocket at the TS level is confirmed and a wealth of details are provided, at the Secret level the rocket is only postulated, and discussed only in the most general of terms – despite launches of the rocket system prior to the document’s issuance. Two examples of originally Secret-level classification discussions are presented here.

In the Spring 1969 issue (ranked “Secret No Forn” for “No For- eign nationals”) of the Air University’s (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama) Air Commentary, an article on the USSR’s unmanned space program [200] includes the following examination:

“…They have not, to date, developed a launch vehicle that is competitive with our Saturn 5. Because of this they do not have the capability to conduct an Apollo-type lunar mission. There

have been, however, a number of statements in the open press INTELLIGENCE CENTER AIR AND SPACE NATIONAL US AIR FORCE that the Soviets may be developing a very large launch vehicle… It appears to be well within the Soviet technical ability to do just this… There is a reported buildup of a new rocket complex at the Tyura Tam launch facility that consists primarily of a huge assembly building. The building is 800 feet long and has a bay section about 190 feet high with 120 foot doors. Fig. 26 Two proposed configurations of the imagined Soviet SL-X.

63 Peter Pesavento

Furthermore, the index for all 1969 articles from the second half produced NSA SIGINT Summary series. The newly released in- of that year (from July 1 through December 31) that appeared in formation shows how closely Soviet space-related activities were the NORAD Weekly Intelligence Review (original security classi- monitored. fication ranking: “Secret”) makes neither mention of any activities associated with Area J at all, nor any about the vehicle launch fail- 4.4.1 NSA SIGINT Summaries highlight uncertainty of Area J ure of early July 1969 itself. It is as if the rocket did not exist. [205] event activity interpretation

One can ask the obvious question as to why there is such a dis- The 15 February 1969 edition of the NSA SIGINT Summary men- parateness and dichotomy between presentations of the “Secret-” tions that the estimated launching of a Soviet lunar-related mis- and “Top Secret-” level documents in regards to the Area J vehi- sion had to be pushed back from 17 February due to the “pace cle (the former quite off-the-mark, while the latter highly accu- of the deployment of certain Soviet Range Support ships and the rate and detailed). It may be due to possibly three reasons: Firstly, stations [meaning geographical oceanic locations] being manned the sources and methods employed to garner the accurate data by key support ships suggest that the planned launch date for the were at the Top Secret level (via overhead close-look photorecon- circumlunar operation may be 21 or 22 February.” [209] There is naissance satellites, HUMINT sources, as well as radiotelephone a further report on 19 February, but the content was completely communications and telemetry test intercepts when the rocket excised (and is currently undergoing MDR appeal with NSA), but was on the launch pad) that cannot be mentioned in lower-ranked this is no doubt about the Proton launch failure that happened on documents; secondly, the perceived political sensitivity of the pur- that day, with a Lunakhod rover as payload [210, 211]. pose/meaning of the Soviet rocket – an attempt at a clandestine, under-the-radar effort to beat the American Apollo timetable at The 21 February edition has an article entitled “Major Soviet putting the first humans on the lunar surface. The third reason is space event cancelled.” The entry, with heavy redactions in its cur- perhaps the authors didn’t have the security classification access rent release, says the following: to the compartmented materials, and may have not known about them to begin with. “The major Soviet space event, which had predicted for 21/22 February, has apparently been postponed. [three lines A glimpse into this compartmentalization about the Soviet completely redacted] on 19 February probably resulted in the manned lunar landing program rocket now has an extant example cancellation of a space vehicle launch with an as yet undeter- for space historians to examine. In this particular document, the mined mission. Subsequent redeployment of the SSESS [Soviet issues that it raises for policy makers who had detailed knowledge Space Event Support Ships] Bezhitsa and Kegostrov suggests of the Area J vehicle’s existence (and for whom there was a respon- that the event will not take place this month.” [212] sibility to make an effort to transmit information to the public about Soviet lunar activities) is highlighted in a CIA “Memoran- Interestingly, more hints as to what NSA analysts thought was dum for the Record” concerning a telephone call between David going on in late February 1969 (as well as further details relating to Brandwein (Director of the FMSAC) and Wernher von Braun in ship tracking deployments) are revealed in the NSA SIGINT Sum- late September 1968. [206] mary reports that were issued in June 1969 connected with another lunar-related mission altogether. The 7 June 1969 edition has a As Brandwein writes, “Von Braun then asked if he could refer report entitled “Major space operation planned from Tyuratam” in any way to the large booster now erected at Area ‘J.’ I told him which states that this information was still highly classified. However, I did say that if he chose to quote statements by Mr. Webb [NASA Admin- “Analysis of [lengthy phrase redacted] movements of Soviet istrator] on this subject, I doubted whether any reprisals would be Space Event Support Ships (SSESS), coupled with the [two lines taken by the intelligence community.” [207] The “reprisals” men- redacted] indicates that preparations are underway for a ma- tioned by Brandwein were the undeclared threat of severing access jor space operation, possibly involving the SL-12 multi-stage to intelligence source materials as well as conversations with US space launcher system. The pattern of activity is compatible IC analysts about events going on inside the Soviet space program. with that observed on 19 February when a launch attempt – thought to have involved a trans-lunar flight and return mis- 4.4 Sleuthing in the murk: unclear intelligence and the 19-22 sion – was postponed.” [213] February 1969 Area J firing attempt Strangely, the mention of the 19 February as being the launch Until quite recently, there has been a severe dearth of materials date and the mention of a circumlunar mission may be conflating concerning what the US IC knew about the Area J launch attempt the February 19 Proton launching attempt (of a Luna series mis- of late February, 1969. While the newly available data from both sion) and the follow-up Area J vehicle telemetry captures, as other CIA and NSA document families sheds revelatory new light on the NSA (as well as other IC agency) information puts the super-boost- event, it also poses further questions. Taken in aggregate, the new er launch cancellation in the February 20/21/22 time frame. This information seems to clash with other US intelligence data streams confusion may be due to the fact that so much material has been (including one public leak to a US newsweekly that did state that redacted from the released declassified reports, as the context of the there was a very large rocket on the launch pad at Tyuratam and two rocket launch pad preparations (and what US IC analysts could was expected to be imminently launched [208]). The uncertainty discern about these two separate efforts) has been affected by the that will be described demonstrates what happens when the US IC removal of data. Also, it remains unknown presently why there is (at this time) was confronted by an “unknown,” masked in part by such a wide three-date swath for this event cancellation as recorded another lunar-related mission in the same time frame. Informed in the declassified documentation. This lack of clarity may be found speculation possibilities as to why will also be fielded in this sec- to be clearly explained in the censored content. tion. Furthermore, a report entry in the 11 June 1969 edition (enti- The most detailed insights as to what US IC analyst units were tled “Preparations continue for a major unmanned space opera- seeing in the intelligence intercepts are gleaned from the daily tion”) provides additional details relating to the late February 1969

64 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

Proton and Area J launch attempt: “The…(SSESS) Bezhitsa and of the launch preparations for the Area J vehicle has substantive Kegostrov continue with preparations indicative of a major, un- corroboration via the materials from Boris Chertok’s published manned, space operation from Tyuratam within the next few days. recollections. In his fourth volume, Moon Race, [215] Chertok [seven lines redacted] the probably SL-12 lunar-related launch at- mentions the fact that N-1 3-L had been taken out to the launch tempt on 19 February… The Bezhitsa and Kegostrov are currently pad prior to the State Commission meeting of February 9, 1969, in the South Atlantic almost in the same support stations they held but doesn’t state exactly when that took place (but likely in January in the 19 February operation…” [214] 1969, or perhaps even earlier in 1968).

So what space historians now have in hand is the following in “Only the State Commission could make the decision to roll regards to the Area J February 1969 launch failure from US intelli- out the first N-1 No. 3L flight rocket to the launch site and gence community sources: prepare it for launch. However, long before this decisive meeting, rocket No. 3L had already been at the launch site and had – ship deployment movements to on-station locations for the undergone a cycle of electrical tests there, including a launch operation tipped off US IC analyst personnel that a mission simulation… [This was done] but for the simple reason that a was in the offing, and that it involved a circumlunar mission for full electrical equivalent – an integrated test stand – was not return; this includes specific mention of tracking ships in the yet ready… The assembly of rocket N-1 No. 3L was complet- south Atlantic, and the indications that there were additional ed before integrated electrical developmental testing on the such ships in the Indian Ocean for monitoring the returning stand [was available]. Therefore, a daring decision was made spacecraft from selenocentric distance (allowing that this also to roll out the rocket to the launch site and conduct all the could be that the ship tracking station-keeping was for both the necessary checkout procedure there jointly with all the ground Proton and Area J vehicle launch attempts towards the Moon, equipment, after which the rocket would need to return to the although the ships in the Indian Ocean would directly infer a engineering facility at the [vehicle assembly building] for [ad- circumlunar mission, as mentioned in section 2.7); ditional] electrical developmental testing… The launch was scheduled for 20 February. The day before, the weather service – according to the newly disclosed information, the dates of forecast low cloud cover hampering [the] visual monitoring mission launch activity appear to cover a swath of three days: during the first-stage operation flight segment. The launch was 20 through 22 February; postponed to 21 February.” [216]

– four months onward from the event, US IC analysts believed (According to Mishin’s diary entries, the State Commission meet- that the late February Area J launch attempt was cancelled; ing was on January 9th, and not February 9th as Chertok writes. The final roll out of the first launch-ready N-1 rocket took place on – there seems (based on the partial information releases in February 8, 1969. [217]) hand) to be some confusion and conflation of the interpretation of the Area J vehicle and the coincident Proton rocket that was It may be a reasonable conclusion to state that the Russians undergoing launch preparations simultaneously at Tyuratam were aware of the American monitoring of their launch prepara- through the 19 February (when the Proton failed to reach orbit); tion activities, but the Soviet engineers may not have known that the Americans weren’t able to figure out that an entirely new rock- – information, believed to be sourced to overhead reconnais- et had been taken to the firing area. Fig 27, a photograph of the sance photography, showed a rocket on the launch pad at Area J, and this was leaked to the US media. (Newsweek reported “The Soviets are readying a first test of their super-rocket, which is reported to have 10 million to 14 million pounds of thrust…” [208]) However, the currently released data from the NSA SIGINT Summary reports makes no connection between this other information-gathering stream and its own SIGINT reportage. PETER PESAVENTO COLLECTION PETER PESAVENTO The following reasonable speculations can be proffered as to possibly why US IC analysts may have – in the first quarter of 1969 – conflated the launch attempt with the SL-12, and not completely separated out to a newer, previously unflown rocket. It may be that the telemetry data captures from the J vehicle were exceptionally similar to the telemetry captures of the coincident preparations of the lunar-bound Proton rocket on the launch pad. The telemetry streams for the two rockets may have also been overlapping as apparently the preparatory activities took place simultaneously. Indeed, the tracking ship network had similar “on station” geographical locations as when the Proton-launched Zond circumlunar missions took place, which may have contributed to this “interpretation familiarity.” But due to Russian standard operating procedure, non-circumlunar space events would not have had any tracking ships in the Indian Ocean, and the indications from the NSA SIGINT Summary reportage is that there were.

That the US IC monitoring network targeting the Tyuratam Cosmodrome seems to have captured several starts-and-stops Fig. 27 The N1 on the launch pad at Area J, Tyuratam, February 1969.

65 Peter Pesavento

N-1 3L rocket on its launch pad in mid-February 1969, is from the ing beyond approximately 73,000 feet altitude. [222] However, it activities scrapbook of OKB-1 engineer Valentin Lieberman. seems that the FPS-17 system perhaps experienced a progression of subsystem upgrades throughout the 1960s, but currently acces- Because a great deal of data was being intercepted and in- sible data does not speak to specifics on beam bandwidth/trans- terpreted in real time by US IC analysts in regards to the Area J mitter frequency ranges. [223-225] launch preparations, it could be speculated that the data accumulation influenced the final interpretation by US IC analysts According to comments of a radar technology specialist, if the of a permanently postponed mission. For example: Recording of OTHR (the FPS-17 was acting as an OTHR due to the atmospher- weather forecasting communications about low cloud ceilings on ic ducting phenomena over southwest Asia during specific times February 19; intercepted discussions about postponement of the of the year) was indeed operating in the low single-digit MHz forthcoming launch on the 19 and 20 of February; the Proton lu- range, then: nar launch failure on the 19th; plus (currently undisclosed) potential RADINT (radar intelligence) data showing that the rocket had “When the rocket was on the launch pad, it would act like a vacated the launch pad. monopole reflector [meaning a vertical metal structure with one end tied to a ground on the Earth’s surface, like a radio an- In upcoming section 4.4.2, a discussion about RADINT capa- tenna]. So if the OTHR was on the right frequency, it could see bilities will be detailed, and how it was potentially possible to con- the rocket on the pad. The only obstructing issue would be the clude the rocket had left the launch pad. gantries which are about the same height as the rocket, or the lightning protection towers would also reflect, so they could The additional (tentative) NSA conclusion that the Area J mask whether the rocket was really there or not. Since the launch was cancelled was not a universally accepted consensus. exhaust would be electrically conducting, it would act like a A November 1971 FTD legacy report acquired by this researcher wire or cable, electrically connecting the rocket to the Earth till shows in a tabular graphic entitled “SL-X Test Schedule and Mile- the rocket got to several times its own height, at which point stones” (reproduced in a previous publication [218]) that states it would break the ground connection and turn into a dipole “22 Feb 1969 Probably Cancellation.” So even two-and-a-half years reflector [a type of radio antenna with two bilaterally symmet- subsequent to the event, the US IC analysts still could not defini- rical elements, which is mimicked by an aircraft in flight, or a tively conclude what happened. On a side note, the “22 February” rocket in ascent]… Once it broke about 5000 feet in altitude, date is echoed in a CIA article that appeared in the Directorate it would probably be a dipole reflector. Now you would have of Intelligence’s Weekly Review, issued on 18 July 1969. The CIA to add the visible exhaust plume to the length of the rocket, report (perhaps for the first time) also explicitly demarcates that so maybe double the rocket length for the equivalent electri- two separate Soviet lunar projects were being deployed by the Rus- cal length. Then you would have to know what frequency the sians – one using the Proton, and the other using a Saturn V-class OTHR was operating at and whether it could tune in close to vehicle launched from Area J. [219] the targeted dipole reflector frequency or an even multiple of that fundamental frequency. Assuming that it could, then it Some (further) currently unanswered questions: Why wasn’t should easily be able to see something at 5000 feet [altitude] the overhead photoreconnaissance material seemingly not inte- and 1000 miles [away]. It would all have to be pretty much grated in with the SIGINT data (from time to time, non-SIGINT predetermined (what frequency was best) to get it right, then it data does appear in the reports)? (Was this part of a what is called would just be waiting for the signal return. The Q of the rocket the “intelligence stovepiping” issue where compartmentalization + exhaust plume would make it such that you would have to be prevented data fusions from all the incoming intelligence informa- nearly right on the frequency.” [222] tion streams?) Was there any telemetry capture data that may have indicated a launching? If so, of what quality was it? And based on There is some circumstantial evidence that is suggestive that the new information in these NSA disclosures, what happened on the FPS-17 may possibly have been modified by the mid-1960s to February 19 (besides the obvious Proton failure) that caused the “see” with greater precision and fidelity than its original specifica- interpreted conclusion that the Russians cancelled the upcoming tions from the mid-1950s. In early October 1967, the CIA publica- launch of the Area J vehicle in the following days? And why does tion series Weekly Review had a special report on the Soviet space US IC documentation cite a three-day swath as the date of this program. [225] A section discussing the Proton rocket (which event? stages at 137,000 feet [226]), mentions radar intelligence:

4.4.2 Was RADINT involved? Facts and speculations “Among the most interesting Soviet space flights in the past few years have been those initiated with the orbiting of a According to Russian information releases, N-1 3L reached a 28,000-pound Proton satellite in July 1965. The Proton was height of 14 kilometers (slightly over 45,000 feet) before it “stag- twice as heavy as any payload previously put into orbit by the gered and tumbled down.” [220] This height would be easily re- USSR and signaled the availability of a booster considerably solvable by the over-the-horizon (OTHR) RADINT facilities that larger than the SS-6 [Vostok/Soyuz launcher]. Three more Pro- were in operation at Diyarbakir in Turkey at the time – but only ton launches have been made, one of which failed. Telemetry if the beam bandwidth/transmitter frequency was in the low sin- and radar data indicate that the Proton booster is a two-stage gle-digit Megahertz (MHz) range (of 1.5 to 2.5 MHz), and not in rocket that burns conventional fuel…” [227] the triple digit range (for example, such as 175-219 MHz, which is in the VHF, or very high frequency, range). An unproven speculation (that is, there are no published sources that address this subject) is that the ability to discern from radar According to current disclosures, the FPS-17 radar system was the type of fuel used in a rocket may be a characteristic of sin- operating in the VHF section of the spectrum (198 MHz), which gle-digit transmitter frequency OTHR RADINT. This speculation is believed to have been the original tuning set when it became encompasses the idea that with sufficient beam fidelity, the -com operational in 1955. [221] That means that the original settings for position of propellants expelled via the exhaust plume perhaps this radar system could only completely resolve rockets ascend- have unique backscatter signatures.

66 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

There is further circumstantial evidence that appears to corrob- planned in conjunction with this mission; the precise mission orate the notion of the refined ability of RADINT to detect types objectives of the operation are not [currently] known.” [231] beyond liquid propellant (thus seeming to indicate increased resolution in some form) – in a late March 1966 NORAD Weekly Time awaits further declassification disclosures that may shed Intelligence Review a log of “Missile Range Firings” was published. light on these unresolved issues (including a CIA Space Event Re- [228] The log listing reports that “US radar stations detected the port on the February 1969 “launch cancellation” that is currently following Soviet space/missile launches…,” and for the entries of undergoing declassification processing at ISCAP). But as the evi- 26 February and 15 March 1966, the “Propulsion System” was la- dence will show in upcoming sections, just about one month fol- beled “Unknown (solid propellant)” [228] – meaning that while lowing the 11 June NSA SIGINT Summary edition, US IC analysts the type of rocket used was not identified, the radar data indicated would come to a different conclusion about the specific rocket em- the launch event to be a solid-propellant missile. What is most sig- ployed in the 20-22 February 1969 launch attempt. nificant is that the data was solely from RADINT (and not from any other intelligence-gathering conduit), as well as the fact this 4.5 US pieces of the Soviet puzzle: new insights on the July 3, ability is mentioned almost three years prior to the February 1969 1969 Area J launch attempt Area J launch attempt. Of all launches in the history of the Soviet space program, one However, further insights related via interview with the radar of the most politically consequential was the 3 July 1969 launch technology specialist do state that if the FPS-17 did not operate attempt of the USSR’s manned lunar landing program booster, the in the single-digit MHz range, the system – as current disclosure N-1. While Russian disclosures have provided a lot of information data indicate – “…might have been on the edge of what they could about the event (but with many gaps in the information release pick up at the time, so the reason that they didn’t see the [Area J coverage), there has been up to now rarely any corresponding vehicle] actual ascent [via radar] is because they could not. Also data coming from the US IC side of the equation. What details keep in mind that the atmospheric ducting phenomenon is not American analysts gathered from their intelligence monitoring, constant, it is intermittent – and it could be that on that day there and what was interpreted to be the Russians’ intent for the mission was not a duct.” [222] had remained largely outside of the public domain. However, this situation has now largely changed, due in great part to the declas- In the declassified literature, low-altitude launch failures have sification efforts of this researcher. [232, 233] been disclosed to be detected through means other than RAD- INT: The activation of the Earth satellite tracking network node at This section features the current synthesis of information about Tyuratam (designated by US IC analysts as FLIM FLAM), teleme- the event from a non-Russian perspective. However, new Rus- try emanating from the rocket, COMINT intercepts from person- sian-sourced information will also be highlighted to compare and nel at the Cosmodrome to tracking stations down range, timing contrast those new details from the newly declassified informa- signals activation (once the rocket had ignition), as well as acous- tion. Additionally, readers should keep in mind that the Russian tics intelligence – the roar of the engines produced a very long- nomenclature for the manned lunar landing program rocket – the wave infrasound signature that rippled outwards for hundreds of “N-1” – is synonymous with the US IC identification of the “Area miles. [229] J vehicle.”

Was such data acquired at the time via OTHR techniques (pro- 4.5.1 NSA reportage of tracking ships going on station: space vided the beam bandwidth/transmitter frequency was appropri- vehicle recovery ships in the Pacific? ate)? If not, why was such a key data set missing? And since even Russian disclosures admit to on-the-pad electronic mission sim- One of the main tip-offs of a major forthcoming space mission ulation testing going on prior to the launch attempt, why wasn’t were the transit-to-station of the network of Soviet space tracking at least some of the SIGINT (for example, the computer control ships. What is significant – in the face of the new disclosures via system was unlike that used on the Proton) from that testing indi- the previously discussed Defense Intelligence Digest article – is cating that the telemetry captures were non-Proton in character? the indicators of where the ships were going on station, as well as which specific ships. This is important as it points to one of the 4.4.3 Post-February 1969: evidence of the US IC looking for a main factors of intent. The 27 June 1969 issue of the NSA SIGINT two-rocket countdown Summary has an article entitled “Probably Soviet circumlunar mission planned for early July.” [234] The revelatory nature of this There are the hints that US IC analysts were looking for coinci- report is marred somewhat by the redactions exhibited in the cur- dent launchings of a Proton and another rocket (subsequent to rently released version: the late February 1969 Proton and Area J countdowns) that, for example, appear in the NSA SIGINT Summary report for 16 June “Soviet space support ship movements [six or seven word 1969. Entitled “Soviet Probable Lunar Mission Fails,” it provides phrasing redacted] in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans sug- new details on the (now-recognized [230]) Luna soil-sample re- gest that preparations are again underway for a probably un- turn launch failure, and specifically mentions analysts looking for manned circumlunar mission from Tyuratam during the first a dual-countdown type of scenario: week of July. The Soviet Space Event Support Ship (SSESS) Komarov is scheduled to arrive at its circumlunar support sta- “An unmanned space vehicle with a probable lunar-related tion off Havana within the next few days. SSESS in the south mission was launched from the Tyuratam Missile Test Range Atlantic are near or approaching support stations, and two (TTMTR) at approximately 0400Z on 14 June. [six lines redact- SSESS are en route to the Indian Ocean and can be on station ed] No evidence is presently available to identify the nature of by the first week in July. The Soviet Space Vehicle Recovery the payload, if any, but no recoverable capsule is believed to Ships (SSVRS) in the Indian Ocean probably have begun their have been on board [meaning no telemetry signatures indicat- operational deployment in support of a forthcoming mission. ing a Zond circumlunar spacecraft-type of payload]. [phrasing [Several sentences redacted]… a normal procedure observed redacted] does not reveal whether or not a second launch was prior to a major space operation of this type.” [234]

67 Peter Pesavento

The Soviets were telegraphing a circumlunar space shot. The telligence’s Weekly Review two weeks after the event, provides ad- extended redacted section is interesting to note, as it follows in the ditional information that MASINT (measurement and signature text details about the placement of Soviet space vehicle recovery analysis intelligence – a technique that includes seismographic, ships in the Indian Ocean. One of the key items is if there were infrared, as well as acoustic data acquisition) located in the Aral such ships also possibly stationed in the Pacific Ocean, then that is Sea area helped confirm that an explosion occurred: “The strength a key indicator that a manned space shot is in the offing, and one of an explosion monitored from the area of the Aral Sea on 3 July can speculate that the two sentences may be talking about infor- suggests that a booster larger than the SL-12 blew up at Tyuratam mation about potential SSVRS ships in the Pacific Ocean. If this either on the pad or early in flight.” [219] ultimately proves to be the case, then this is part of the “smoking gun” that the 3 July 1969 event intended to have a manned com- One month following the publication of the Weekly Review re- ponent. Indeed, the previously mentioned Defense Intelligence port, the CIA’s flagship publication Central Intelligence Bulletin Digest article explicitly mentions that when such ships are usually (issued 15 August 1969 [237]) provided some of the first explicit directly under the 52 degree Earth orbital trace, they are there in details highlighting some of the initial indicators that a major So- the event a manned abort takes place after launch from Tyuratam. viet space event took place in early July, 1969. (However, this mystery deepens with a further discussion of ship tracking station points in the next section.) “USSR: Recent satellite photography of Tyuratam shows that the Soviets’ largest space booster exploded during its first The redacted sections are currently under MDR appeal by this launch, resulting in extensive damage to the launch pad… The researcher. explosion probably occurred on 3 July. On that day intercepted communications [extended phrase redacted, but most likely it 4.5.2 CIA documentation reveals new details of what data US says “between the Moscow control center and support ships IC analysts gathered, and their early conclusions in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans”] disclosed that a booster had failed early in flight or on the pad. [phrasing redacted, but In late 2015 this researcher received from ISCAP a set of newly probably says “Acoustint [acoustics intelligence] monitored declassified materials concerning the early July 1969 launch event from the area of the Aral Sea”] strongly suggested that there from Tyuratam. Among these was a document from the CIA se- had been an explosion of a vehicle larger than the SL-12, the ries Soviet Space Event Reports. [235] In this version of “J-Vehicle biggest booster previously used by the Soviets… In addition to Failure – 3 July 1969” (issued 26 August 1969 by CIA’s FMSAC the damage to the launch pad, the surrounding area is dark- division), some of the text survived processing, mainly the “Sum- ened, indicating fire damage. The service tower, which moves mary” and “Implications of the Failure” sections, along with a pho- away from the booster before launch, appears intact, but one tograph of the explosion’s aftermath, believed to be imaged via the of the two 600-foot towers closer to the pad is missing and the CORONA series of photoreconnaissance satellites. The text that other apparently was damaged in the explosion… The recent- has been released, however, is of significant interest, with new de- ly completed second launch pad at Complex J, which is some tails – including dates of two earlier electronic launch simulation 1,600 feet from the damaged pad, looks unharmed, as do the countdowns as well as a further amplification on the unusualness launch control facilities. Complex J may, therefore, still be ca- of the on-station placement of Soviet space tracking ships. Addi- pable of supporting a launch from the second pad… The new tionally, there is mention of the February 1969 Area J launch at- booster is the Soviet counterpart to the US Saturn 5, and will tempt, but again reiterates that it was a cancellation. be used in the Soviet manned lunar landing program.” [238]

“An attempt to launch the Soviet’s giant new space booster Accompanying the report was a two-photo graphic of Area J from Complex J at Tyuratam at approximately 2015Z on 3 July showing a “before” and “after” set of pictures. The initial picture resulted in a major disaster when the vehicle exploded on the was taken in June 1969, the other in August 1969. The former pad soon after first-stage ignition. The intended mission of the shows both launch pads of Area J that appear to be taken via operation was to send an unmanned payload to the Moon. Re- high-resolution optics, while the latter shows a close-up of the covery of the vehicle in the USSR after a low-G re-entry over shattered remains of the firing area following the failed launch the Indian Ocean apparently was also included in the mission attempt, also likely via a close-look satellite imaging system. The profile. A similar operation had culminated in a cancellation to current released version of the pair of photographs is of poor re- launch on 22 February 1969… Support ship deployments and production, and so is not included here. However, the graphic was communications activity, including practices on 27 June and 1 reproduced in a previous publication. [239] July, had indicated that a major space operation was under way in the Soviet Union. The nature of the activity indicated that a Two months afterward, a follow-on FMSAC report entitled lunar mission and subsequent recovery was involved. Howev- “J-Vehicle Failure – 3 July 1969” appeared in the October 1969 er, certain aspects – primarily SSESS deployment in the Atlan- issue of CIA’s Scientific Intelligence Digest. [240] While much of tic under a 49-degree Earth trace [in the Defense Intelligence the currently released version is heavily redacted (and those re- Digest article on ship deployments, this specific Earth trace is dactions are now under declassification processing by ISCAP), the also used for the USSR’s Fractional Orbital Bombardment Sys- disclosed content augments the August 1969 Central Intelligence tem tests] (vice the usual 52-degree positioning) and the lack Bulletin description: of a SMRIS [Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ship] under the parking orbit insertion point in the Pacific – suggest- “An attempt to launch the Soviet’s giant new space booster ed strongly that the operation would involve the Soviet’s new from Complex J at Tyuratam at approximately 2015Z on 3 space booster rather than the SL-12 [Proton] launch vehicle… July resulted in a major disaster when the vehicle exploded Identification of the event as a possible early in-flight failure on the pad soon after first-stage ignition. The intended -mis was based initially on communications activity and the failure sion of the operation was to send an unmanned payload to of US collection sensors to acquire the vehicle…” [236] the Moon. Recovery of the vehicle in the USSR after a low-G reentry over the Indian Ocean apparently was also included A separate CIA report that appeared in the Directorate of In- in the mission profile… [extensive redactions for five para-

68 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

graphs]…the 3 July event had indeed involved a catastrophic survivals. failure on Launch Pad J-1. Extensive damage indicated that a As Melvin Laird’s recollections mentioned in section 4.2, he vehicle had exploded within a few seconds after ignition of the learned that one had to wait for at least the third report to appear first stage. It appears that at least 6 months to a year will be re- on an evolving event before the data contained in it could be con- quired to bring the pad back to operational status. Launch Pad sidered well on its way to being “settled in.” And this can be readily J-2, just recently completed, appears to be unharmed, as do the applied to both NSA documents under discussion here. The Spot launch control facilities… It is the only Soviet launch vehicle Report is entitled “Possible Cancellation of a Soviet Lunar Mis- capable of supporting a manned lunar landing operation, al- sion from Tyuratam, 03 July 1969.” [243] This one-page bulletin though since high-energy propellants probably are not used – which may be among the earliest reports on the Area J launch (as in the case with the US Saturn V), two launches with sub- failure event – states the following: sequent Earth-orbit rendezvous and docking will be required to accomplish such a mission… The loss of the booster during “Communications activity between [three lines redacted] cou- its first launch attempt is expected to delay the Soviet manned pled with the activation of Tyuratam rangehead in a compati- lunar landing by upwards of a year. Pad J-2, however, probably ble time frame, suggest that the anticipated Soviet lunar launch can be used for launchings when problems with the system are may have been planned to occur [phrase redacted, probably “at corrected.” [241] approx.” Zulu time recording] on 03 July, but if so was possibly cancelled shortly before launch. Although the possibility As readers will note, the October 1969 CIA report reflects the exists that the mission suffered a very early in-flight failure, agency view (at this juncture of 90 days after the actual event) that: there were no sensor reflections to support this… Since the operation late on 03 July, no information has been received re- – this launch attempt was the first; garding future intentions of the Soviet support ships, hence, it is not presently known if another attempt will be made to – its analysts’ interpretation of the initial data pointed to an launch during the current lunar cycle.” [243] explosion soon after ignition; The mention of “sensor reflections” possibly indicates that – (as reported previously in the August 1969 Central Intelli- RADINT may have been included in the sensor network for this gence Bulletin report) apparently photoreconnaissance data event, and – perhaps on this evening of the launch – there was no indicated that the second launch pad at Area J escaped un- atmospheric “transmission duct” phenomena operating to have scathed, and radar signals bounce back to Diyarbakir.

– the Agency estimated two rockets would be needed to fulfill The follow-on adjunct report (no title or date extant) has some the actual Soviet landing plan. very fragmentary mentions of Soviet ship tracking positions in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, including one phrasing stating “to the Readers should note that there is always some duplication in north of Kerguelen Island [a French-administered island in the information from one report to the next in time progression, as far-southern Indian Ocean].” [244] Both of these documents are there is significant overlap between the July, August and October now currently undergoing declassification processing with ISCAP. CIA reports. Furthermore, the significance of these early conclusions would be eventually augmented – as well as in key aspects, The July 5, 1969 NSA SIGINT Summary article (entitled “Pos- superceded – by better information as a result of more in-depth sible cancellation or early in-flight failure of Soviet lunar mission analysis of the acquired data intercepts. In many cases, this type of from Tyuratam on 3 July 1969”) provides some of the same word effort can take years to obtain correct conclusions. phrasings as the earlier July 3 Spot Report, as well as hitherto unreleased details about what types of communications were inter- Ultimately, it would take until September 1971 for a more thor- cepted between the control center at Tyuratam and the tracking ough (and accurate) SIGINT analysis report of the 3 July 1969 ships on station in the various oceans. [245] Interestingly, the NSA event to appear to tell US policy makers as to what exactly hap- analyst writing this bulletin admits to the fact that the rocket could pened. (This particular 1971 analysis report, heavily redacted in not be positively identified, and additionally mentions the Proton its current released version, is undergoing further declassification rocket perhaps being involved (again, a potential indication that processing by the US Air Force at the request of this author.) [242] the telemetry characteristics between the J vehicle and the Proton may have been very similar): An upcoming section will examine information that appeared in the press soon after the 3 July 1969 event happened will be ex- “Extensive communications activity [three lines redacted] and amined, including further highlights about MASINT. activation of the Tyuratam Rangehead in a compatible time frame, indicates that a Soviet lunar launch may have been 4.5.3 Initial NSA reports on the Area J launch failure planned to occur [phrase redacted, most likely the time Zulu] on 3 July, but was either cancelled or failed early in flight. Prior to 2015, no materials dealing with preliminary reports on Positive identification of the launch system cannot be made; what the US IC thought was taking place in relation to the 3 July however, this activity possibly involved the SL-12 multi-stage 1969 event existed in public release. This all changed through the launch configuration. There were no sensor reflections which efforts of this researcher, who was able to garner two NSA reports would confirm that a launch did occur. High precedence op- issued from the day of, as well as two days after, the event in 2016. erational messages were sent… [five lines redacted] a possible One is a preliminary Spot Report on the day of the event (plus operation termination message sent [phrase redacted]. This a follow-on adjunct report), and also an NSA SIGINT Summary communications activity is similar to that noted for previous document from 5 July 1969. Examining what these bulletins tell is cancellations/failures… [six more lines redacted].” [245] hampered by the fact that the former is nearly completely redacted, while the latter has substantive removals of text. Be that as it The released NSA materials indicate that all communications may, some insights can still be garnered from these two historical activity between authorities in the launch area and monitors

69 Peter Pesavento aboard the ocean patrols was intercepted and interpreted in real time. Additionally, the mention of the SL-12 Proton rocket (an initial guess until the data was examined closely to tell US IC analysts a new rocket was involved) begs the question of whether ultimately an additional rocket was thought to be “in play” during this launching attempt.

While the declassification of NSA materials continues, an additional information source with in-depth knowledge of the events COLLECTION PETER PESAVENTO of 1969 had been retired NSA analyst Edwin Neal Cameron. What his recollections have been able to provide include the necessary provision of analysis context of the documents’ content, as well as filling in a number of the gaps that US IC redactions have punc- tured in the historiographic chronologies.

4.5.4 The ecollectionsr of Ed Cameron: an eyewitness to Moon race history, and its subsequent US IC analyses

As previously highlighted in section 3.3, Ed Cameron worked for the ASA adjunct of the NSA, and had a singular, unique perspective on Soviet space activities during the height of the Moon Race, from 1967 through 1971 (with his analyses strictly oriented towards non-US space operations for the US IC from 1967 through 1974) as a top-tier, “front line” analyst. He had stints in a number of NSA-administered SPACOL network stations, including longer term continuances (with intermittent temporary duty stations elsewhere) in Sinop, Turkey (1967-1969), and Chitose, Japan (1969-1971). Subsequently, Cameron was employed at NSA head- quarters at Fort George Meade, Maryland for more than two decades, conducting analysis work on both foreign space operations as well as missile/rocketry testing [246]. Figure 28 is a photograph of Cameron during his tour visit to the Tyuratam Cosmodrome in 1992. Fig. 28 Ed Cameron during a visit to Tyuratam Cosmodrome, 1992.

During his time with NSA, Cameron had access to nearly the was already on “alert status” for the super rocket launching in complete pantheon of classified materials regarding the subject early July, 1969. He saw the bulletins that Chitose was to be of his expertise. He once commented that ultimately much of the “on watch” for the event, but this alert and its associated phys- documentation he used in his work was classified at the TS mul- ical monitoring was cancelled within minutes of the launch ti-codeword level, and the number of codewords could, from time attempt failing to materialize over the horizon in its ascent to to time, total over a dozen on specific reports [246]. space. Cameron was not a direct participant in the monitoring proceedings of the event as it happened, as he was “in the It could be said that Cameron’s favorite analyses he conduct- Day Room” attendance at Chitose when the launch failure oc- ed concerned the USSR’s manned lunar projects, and especially curred. [168] those regarding landing cosmonauts upon the lunar surface. Due to this affinity, conversations that Cameron had with this research- – there was more than 24 hour prior notice to make ready for er showed his ability to recall in great detail and facility the in- the early July 1969 launching, as this alert came from Head- formation that he had seen and used decades before during his quarters at Fort Meade via secured teletype. Significantly, work. (However, readers should keep in mind that recollections linguists were also on standby along with the usual SIGINT such as this are based on the incompleteness and errors of memo- personnel at Chitose; according to Cameron, this was the “best ry, and are not the equivalent of declassified documentation. And external indicator” that the launching was expected to have a like with many oral histories, extant declassified documentation manned component, without referring to telemetry or other cannot currently verify what is recalled. Furthermore, Cameron reference points. Linguists were only put on task stations if it is expressing views that he recalled were held solely by analysts was known that cosmonauts were involved, and would be on within the NSA at the time, and not what was the eventual overall the mission itself. [168] US IC consensus.) What follows are some highlights from those remembrances, related to this researcher in 2004 and 2005. [168] – Cameron recalled that a “considerable COMINT component” in reports he reviewed on the July 1969 event indicated There is no doubt that much of what Cameron recounts clashes that a “significant number” of the cosmonaut cadre attended severely with accepted historical canon – but at the same time, is this particular launching. [168] consistent with other US IC-linked disclosures as to what was perceived as the intended plan of the July 1969 Area J launch attempt. – all signals from the Soviet super booster as it sat on the pad [193, 197-199] undergoing checkout and test were picked up by a US “low flying” orbiter, that Cameron described as being of the SAVANT – having come to Chitose in early July, Cameron was aware of series, perhaps SAVANT 34. This particular vehicle recorded the SPACOL site’s involvement in the monitoring of the early the entire flight manifest sequence during the electronic sim- July Area J launch attempt. When Cameron arrived, Chitose ulation mission tests conducted on the launch pad from mid-

70 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

June into early July 1969. (Cameron also alluded to the idea the early July 1969 launch failure revealed by Cameron were that earlier training efforts at Area J also included “high fidel- that the mission would be manned, with cosmonauts em- ity sequences” that included telemetry sequences of intended placed on the super booster itself. As Cameron remembered, Moon flight with an apparently non-flight test rocket article.) “Much effort was made to find out if a Soyuz rocket was on its The satellite took about 15 to 20 minutes for each of its daily launch pad during these proceedings, and no data was defini- passes to complete over Tyuratam. As Cameron recalls, SA- tively broken out telemetry-wise to bolster this CIA-supported VANT had two passes “on the northern node” and two passes scenario of Earth-orbit rendezvous.” [168] “on the southern node” each day over the Cosmodrome. [168] – additionally, it was considered that the spaceflight ultimately – notably, SAVANT carried the first ELINT (ELectronic INTel- would have been an “all up try” to put cosmonauts into sele- ligence: telemetry intercepts) package that was programmed nocentric space, and either be the equivalent of an Apollo 10- “to look for specific things…that looked for signals that we like mission (out-of-plane activities between the orbiter and were interested in.” The electronic simulation mission tests lander, involving tests of lunar orbit rendezvous), but with the performed by Russian engineers with the Area J rocket were lander being for most of its tasking operating in an uncrewed unlike any others previously monitored, as these additionally mode; or an Apollo 8-like mission (where the independent ac- involved intensive check-out and electronic activation of the tivities of the orbiter and lander would be much more limited, payload that was recorded by US IC sensors in the region. conducted together in plane, as some estimates concluded that (Most other uncrewed lunar-related missions only had such the Soviet lunar lander was not at full operational status), as simulation tests up through Earth orbital insertion of the rock- these two spacecraft would orbit the Moon together. [168] et itself, with no testing of the payload at the firing area, and apparently only Zond circumlunar payloads had some on-pad Cameron further recalled arguments between various US in- testing previously.) The full mission simulation included sele- telligence community factions about what was termed the “Crazy nocentric space events of the various components. The data set Ivan” scenario of putting cosmonauts on (what the US IC consid- for the entire mission was accumulated “via overpasses in the ered) the very first launch attempt of the vehicle. [168] The CIA four weeks prior” to the actual launch, along with telemetry analysts felt that the USSR would never put crew on an untested intercepts via Sinop. [168] flight vehicle (hence the intensive search for subsequent evidence of a second rocket countdown in early July 1969); NSA analysts – Cameron mentioned that when the data was later broken held an opposing view that the Soviets were, when necessary, out, the lunar lander was determined to be on board, and it high-risk takers – provided that the political prestige pay-off was was not inert. There was detection of an active radar system of sufficient gain, and that the risk presented a decent likelihood (for rendezvous and docking) within the payload separate of preemption of other nations’ efforts. (Indeed, Charles S. Shel- from the circumlunar spacecraft, an operable propulsion unit, don II commented on such a scenario in late June 1969 in a US as well as the apparent detection of other electronically active military newspaper interview. [233]) Cameron recalls substan- lander subsystems. [168] tiating content from the NSA materials citing the following as examples: – the N-1 explosion was picked up via acoustic sensors in the – all three Voskhod missions, including biosatellite Cosmos southwest Asian area (many are situated around the world), and 110, exhibited very low safety margins (including a precursor may have been the first indication an actual explosion had oc- that exploded on orbit during a key critical procedure, yet a curred, despite the slow travel speed of sound waves (compared manned mission took place only 24 days later) that included to the near-instantaneousness of telemetry or radio communi- two spacecraft launched with cosmonauts, but did so without cations). With these acoustic sensors they could pinpoint the means of rescuing the space passengers if a launch failure had launch time, no matter the rocket: “The [Area J vehicle], Proton happened in its ascent to space – these subsequently resulted and Soyuz create vibrations during the firing up sequence and in the first multi-crew, and the first space walk) [168], as well these would then be picked up.” These acoustic sensors would as pick up the subsequent “rumbling of the rocket” as it ascended into the atmosphere. From the acoustic sensor data, Cameron – previous Soviet aviation long-distance-record achievements recalled that it was estimated that the Area J rocket failure had (of the 1930s) that were flown with ANT-series Tupolev de- its beginnings following ignition before it left the launch pad, sign-bureau aircraft whose histories had been characterized and recalled the altitude figure of “eight feet” in the one report with severe developmental problems, as well as large-structure that estimated when the problems began. [168] and sub-component longevity/viability issues. [168, 247]

– there were numerous reports on the early July 1969 launch – furthermore, in a mirror of Soviet efforts, the US Manned attempt, many that were follow-ons to the preliminary find- Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was additionally cited as a space- ing bulletins. Many of these, considering the uniqueness of the craft mission that would have had a crewed component upon space event, numbered in the hundreds of pages. Cameron re- its very first launch to orbit, according to its officially approved lated some of the main points of the reports, which contradict schedule. [168] current Russian histories of the event. As Cameron recounted, the documentation showed that in early July 1969, as it was in Indeed, other US IC agencies (those that were also Department the latter part of the previous month, there were two Area J of Defense-linked) also held unique views on the situation, but rockets on their respective launch pads. “The NSA considered, Cameron did not relate these perceptions in any detail. Cumu- via the SIGINT signatures, that both [rockets] were operation- latively, Cameron recalled that all the US IC agencies concluded ally active.” The reason for two rockets was thought to be that with an estimation that the 3 July 1969 Area J event was most likely “if one failed to reach orbit, the other would be substituted to a manned mission. [168] keep the mission on its time track.” [168] Cameron’s recollections about an anticipated Soviet Apollo 10- – the overall estimated conclusions of the NSA literature on like mission are echoed in some of the current Russian informa-

71 Peter Pesavento tion disclosures regarding the launch schedule of the N-1 Moon landing program rocket. In July 1994, the Russian space periodical Novosti Kosmonautiki (“Cosmonautics News”) published a review piece on the July 1969 launch failure anniversary. [248] In this article, explicit mention is made that there were indeed plans in the launch manifest for a crewed, non-landing mission: COURTESY OLEG SOKOLOV OLEG COURTESY “And what could have been if these launches [February and July 1969] launches had been successful? What would have the first Soviet lunar expedition looked like? And when would it have been possible to see the red flag [planted] on the Moon?… With the respect to the question of ‘When?’ – it gets more complicated. The only thing one can safely say – not until the first half of the 1970s… There were other plans involving first flight of the L-3 manned lunar complex that was the embodiment of the ‘Apollo 10’ expedition. Near the Moon the crew of this complex would test the spacesuits ‘Krechet’ for the LK pilot and ‘Orlan’ for the LOK pilot, while the LK pilot transitioned from the LOK to LK and back. [The crew] would observe the Moon landing and take-off [again] of the uncrewed LK and [re-]dock with it. In the case of such a flight using the [rocket] carrier number 11A52, [it was rocket and Fig. 29 TMKB Soyuz engineer Oleg Sokolov at the mission] 10L…” [248] Reinventing Space Conference, 2014.

These described mission trends accented here are affirmatively linked to the scenario as substantively described by former Sec- 4.6. New Russian disclosures point to hitherto unexpected retary of Defense Melvin Laird in Section 4.2, including an un- data on launch plans and payloads, bolstering segments manned lunar landing by the LK spacecraft. of the US prism of expected events of 1969

As it turns out, Konstantin Lantratov – the author of the Rus- A recently published two-volume set of reminiscences (2015) of a sian space article – revealed to space historian Bart Hendrickx that Russian participant in the Soviet manned lunar program contains the launch schedule (in which the Apollo 10 analogue mission information that may shed light on actual Soviet intent for launch- would have taken place) was based on materials from fellow Nov- es in 1969. The first volume contains a wealth of new details about osti Kosmonavtiki writers Igor Marinin and Sergei Shamsutdinov. the USSR’s space program, and in particular, its manned lunar [249] Furthermore, Lantratov also provided the insight that sub- space program. [251] In an additional wrinkle, this personal rec- sequent to the article appearing, he was allowed to see an official ollection record also indicates possible motivations in the launch N-1 rocket mission flight plan manifest drawn up in January 1970 scheduling of the Soviet Union’s manned lunar landing program (which provides more details than the original 1994 article) and booster. This particular Russian-sourced narrative (which can be was signed by these chiefs of major institutes and space design considered an oral history) also provides information contradict- bureaus: Mikhail Melnikov, Vasiliy Mishin, Mikhail Ryanzanskiy, ing previous Russian disclosures regarding the make-up of the Georgiy Babakin and Yuri Mozzhorin. In that flight plan, it ap- payload of the N-1 5L mission (involved in the launch attempt in pears that there were three Apollo 10-like missions (but to be more early July, 1969). technically accurate, actually three Apollo 9-like missions conducted in lunar orbit) to be executed in succession prior to the ac- 4.6.1 The ecollectionsr of TMKB Soyuz engineer Oleg Sokolov tual Soviet manned lunar landing itself. Interestingly, the taskings of these missions would include attempts at an uncrewed landing Oleg Sokolov (1945-2016), writing under the pseudonym of OM of the lunar lander, autonomous lunar surface research once there, Zamyatin, was (in 1969) a flight test engineer at TMKB Soyuz and a subsequent return to lunar orbit: 10L, 11L and 12L. [250] (Turayevskoye mashinostroitelnoye konstruktorskoye byuro, or “Turayevo Machine Building Design Bureau”) with a technical While many space historians may argue that this particular specialty in the creation, ground testing, and flight testing of ullage piece of evidence doesn’t prove an intent to man-rate the N-1 in and orientation motors that were major components for both the the Summer of 1969, the disclosed schedule for 1970 does closely manned and unmanned lunar exploration programs. [252] Signif- reflect much of the US IC analysis about what the early manned icantly, he was a direct eyewitness to activities at Tyuratam in 1969, missions to selenocentric space would have been had the USSR including the assembly and testing of these components aboard executed them. the LOK and LK spacecraft in the assembly buildings at the Cos- modrome. In plain terms, he worked on the payload that was car- But uncertainty and open questions do remain. What was the ried on board N-1 #5L, that was launched in early July, 1969. Fig. official schedule in 1969? What top-level Soviet government -de 28 depicts the engineer visiting the Reinventing Space Conference cisions – that were made in the Winter and early Spring of 1969 in London in 2014. Due to his centrality to the events of interest, (based on currently unreleased Russian materials) – would man- a series of back-and-forth e-mail discussions with Sokolov took ifest themselves at the Tyuratam Cosmodrome in such a way that place, and extended excerpts of those will be highlighted here. US IC analysts (as well as the top level policy makers who con- sumed their data) were convinced that the 3 July 1969 launch at- According to Sokolov’s published and oral recollections, the tempt was an actively manned mission? Some information is now 5L payload’s components included an LK in full-scale mock-up in hand to begin to address these inquiries – and much of it is via form, as well as a lunar orbiting spacecraft. However, unlike pre- Russian sources. vious Russian disclosures, the system was not the L3S version (the

72 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

Zond circumlunar spacecraft with a maneuvering unit attached to the nose of its descent module) of the orbiting spacecraft. Sokolov IMAGES FROM THE SCRAPBOOK OF N1 mentions that his own “practical acquaintance” with the L3 system ENGINEER VALENTIN LIEBERMAN began on April 5, 1969. [253] As the engineer comments,

“The N1-L3 mission should be, by its programme, the same as the first one [mission 3L, launched in February 1969] but while the first N-1 had carried the simplified L3S Lunar -Or bital Spacecraft (LOK) without a Lunar Cabin (LK) at all, the second L-3 was already in a standard configuration with the completely operational LOK but the installed LK was a full-

scale mock-up.” [253] COLLECTION PETER PESAVENTO

When queried for further details about his recollections about the details of the LOK and LK components aboard the July 1969 mission, Sokolov had this to say about what he remembered, and how his recollection was at odds with published Russian sources:

“As [best] as I can remember, [the] second launch of the N-1 (#5L) was carried out with the LOK that was in a configuration that was very near to the standard one. However, later publications raised certain doubts for me. Indeed if the dwelling compartment [habitable, orbital module] could be installed on that [particular] LOK (while it was absent on the L3S) , this could complicate [the] installation of our DOK [Dvigateli orientat- sii kompleksa, or “engines to orient the complex”] propulsion unit after its separate fueling (I wrote [about] this non-stand- Fig. 30 N1 first stage (in background) and NK-15 (Or NK-33) engines. ard fueling for this launch [in the book]). Probably, my memory let me down in this case… The “Maket” term in regards [for] the LK intended for the N-1’s second launch meant a so-called ‘Technological Mock-up’ that, in accordance with Russian technological routine, had to be assembled of components that were manufactured as standard ones but could not be functioning, or could not be permitted for real [mission] operation[s]. I did not see the LK mock-up before its installation into [the] transitional compartment under the LOK (earlier, this mock-up was standing in the MIKKO [the MIKKO 2 building, a section of the larger assembly building at the Cos- modrome for assembling and testing spacecraft payloads] in its [transport] container. Nevertheless, I knew that this mock- up was not an габаритно-весовой макет [gabaritno-vesovoi maket, or an inert “weight and size mock-up,” usually meaning its appearance was nothing like the intended final version of the component that was being simulated] (dummy) that had to have only external dimensions and mass of [the] simulated vehicle: One day, it was discussed [whether] we would connect the DO LK propulsion mock-up, which was [already] installed on the LK… with [the] electronic network of the Block D for a [better] simulation of the LK presence in [the] composition of the L-3 complex for the N-1 #5L launch (this idea was de- clined, [as it was found that the LK’s internal battery was sufficiently charged, and did not need to be recharged in transit to the Moon by the Block D’s electric power circuit). So, that LK Fig. 31 Side view of the N1’s Block B upper stage. was very similar to a real one by its [appearance] and composition, but it could not run [operate] in any regard.” [254, 255] on, further details were sought from Sokolov in follow-ups. [256, Figs 30 through 33, from a scrapbook kept by OKB-1 engineer 257] Subsequently to this researcher’s interactions with the Russian Valentin Lieberman, who worked on the manned lunar landing engineer, colleague Bart Hendrickx had further discussions with program, depict the grooming of Block D as well as N-1 rocket en- Sokolov about his recollections in regards to the LOK and LK as gines in the MIK building, circa Spring 1969. The additional pho- they were configured for the early July 1969 launch attempt. tograph shows the N-1 5L rocket being transported to the launch pad. This imagery is believed to have been photographed in May According to Sokolov’s memory, he reiterated a description that through June 1969 time frame. seems to indicate that a version of the LOK was indeed on board 5L (although there is uncertainty as to the definitiveness of this decla- Due to the fact that much of what Sokolov recollects is not in ration) , and the LK was not non-functional. Additionally, Sokolov accord with much of the currently accepted Russian historical can- appears to be saying that there had to be something equivalent of a

73 Peter Pesavento

“high-fidelity” test of the manned orbiting spacecraft on N-1 mis- have an orbital module. After all, this launch was originally in- sion 5L because of an anticipated flight of the actual LOK later on tended to test the LOK prior to its first manned mission, for in a subsequent launching (perhaps in a few months time) – that which it had to be in its standard configuration… We (engi- this particular mission “was originally intended” to do such a thing: neers of TMKB Soyuz) did not need to gain access to the interior of the orbital module, but to the propellant lines in its “However, as far as I can recall, it [the LOK on board 5L] did forward section. Through these lines propellant was delivered from the DOK to the so-called ‘coordinate movement engines’ (DKP). There were four of these, each with a thrust of 40 kg. IMAGES FROM THE SCRAPBOOK OF N1 They were mounted in the shape of a cross around the LOK’s ENGINEER VALENTIN LIEBERMAN centre of gravity and were needed during the approach to the LK… The LK mock-up may indeed not have been completely ‘inert.’ After all, it had to be separated from the LOK after having released itself from surrounding shell and later also had to be separated from the Block-D, which was to carry out the initial descent burn. Consequently, the LK at [the very] least had to have some telemetry sensors that would confirm its release from the shell and its separation from the Block-D.” [254]

Interestingly, Sokolov’s proffered details seem to have some partial overlap with Cameron’s recollections of an LK that was detected to be electronically active in some capacity. That the two recollections also have mismatches has to be expected when people are trying to remember the same event (doing so not only from different perspectives, but also via different eyewitness information-gathering avenues) that happened decades before.

Sokolov’s disclosures indicate that there may indeed have been electronically active sub-components of the LK mock-up on 5L. However, these revelations don’t preclude (and perhaps bolsters the speculation) that there may have been other discussions by other engineering specialists to make further sub-components of the LK mock-up electronically active as well. One particular set of components that this may have possibly been done to are the radar system elements (that Cameron describes as being detected in the telemetry intercepts).

Fig. 32 Engineer working on the N1’s Block G upper stage. Sokolov describes in his published volume hitherto unreport- ed (via a Russian source) scheduling for the USSR’s manned lunar landing program in 1969, and it is not compatible with much of previous Russian disclosures (for example, Chertok’s published reminiscences and those of L-3 payload engineer Vladimir Bu- grov). [ [256, 257] The indicators from Sokolov’s memory seem to point to the notion that had the N-1 5L mission succeeded in its anticipated mission, another spaceflight in the program soon there- after (approximately in August 1969) would have sent a manned expedition to selenocentric space. Furthermore, Sokolov acknowl- edges that this apparent acceleration of the test schedule was due to an effort to mitigate the negative impacts of Apollo 11’s anticipated success. The following extended excerpt provides the new details. “In any case, my general impression from our participation in the ‘race to the Moon’ became not such a reassuring one. Com- paring with motorcycle races, I felt that we, the Soviet space industry, were participating in the race with an overweight motorcycle that our rival [did not have] and although our motorcycle had a more powerful motor, this motor was, firstly, of the power that was insufficient for the motorcycle’s extra weight and, secondly, this motor was insufficiently reliable. Besides, we had started [the race] later then our rival… I understood that we would not win this race; however, we had nevertheless certain chances to finish second with a minimum loss [of political and scientific prestige]. For this purpose, we had to provide [for] the second unmanned launch of the N1-L3 at the nearest time – this would give us an opportunity to prepare a follow-up mission, a manned over-fly of the Moon although without Fig. 33 N1 being transported to the launch pad. landing a cosmonaut onto the Moon’s surface, approximately at the same time with the planned landing of U.S. astronauts…

74 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

In order to provide [this] third, manned launch of the N1-L3 might not be enough to press ahead with a manned mission on [within the time frame of] July-August, the second unmanned the third launch. But we were so keen to see the program go N-1 with the operational LOK and LK-mock-up would [have quicker! And such a decision could have been made, because to] be launched not later than in the late May - early July [time there were plenty of adventurists among our leaders.” [254] frame]. Meanwhile, numerous defects and failures of electric devices and instruments were being exposed in a process of the While Sokolov’s disclosures are crucial to the accumulating ev- LOK’s systems preparations during check-ups and simulation idence of what the information streams about Soviet aspirations tests. Fortunately, our propulsion units, both the LOK’s DOK and intent in 1969 tell us, these still cannot be considered defin- and SOZs [Sistema obespecheniya zapuska, or “system to en- itive. Hopefully other Russian participants in the Soviet manned sure ignition”] of both the upper stages did not show any defects lunar program will come forward and add their own about what and their preparation was being carried out in accordance with they remember. In this way, space historians will be able to gain the schedule. Since this schedule was being implemented in the greater clarity into what Soviet Central Committee authorities (as planned terms of its stages while a general schedule of the L-3’s well as State Commission members who made the final decision head unit was being permanently behind the planned terms (I of allowing space missions to proceed) may have intended during did not know how the N-1’s schedule was being realized, but I the Summer of 1969, as ultimately the launch schedule plans were could suppose that serious delays took place there as well), a under their final decision-making authority. But this researcher certain free time appeared for our team every week.” [258] will note that Sokolov’s mentioned plans for a manned mission about the Moon in the Summer of 1969 dovetails into the US IC (The only way for the Russians to capture political preemption narrative (currently undergoing disclosure) that has been consist- and prestige from a manned circumluar flight in the July/August ently stated as so. 1969 time frame was for the Americans to have their own actual Moon landing mission not take place until much later in the year. 4.6.2 “Apollo 7 launch plans”: Soviet perceptions of the In section 4.6.2, an uncovered late 1960s document survival about American Moon landing timetable, and its potentiality as the US Apollo program schedule – produced by the Soviets – will significant driver of the Area J launch schedule discuss exactly that expectation.) Sokolov’s recollective comment that he saw a set of TsKBEM cor- In an effort to ascertain whether this new information about the respondence in late 1968 (that discussed that if the 5L mission fluidity of the N-1 schedule in 1969 was solely Sokolov’s own view- was successful, the very next mission would have cosmonauts on point, or whether this information may have been based on some- board) begs the following questions: What did Soviet space policy thing more, this researcher put the issue to the Russian engineer. makers know about the US timetable for project Apollo? And, what Sokolov responded thusly: was the Soviet viewpoint as to what was reasonable expectations for dates of particular achievement benchmarks? Indeed, it may “The event, which took place within a frame of the N1-L3 probe reasonable to conclude that there may have been a confluence gram fulfillment in 1969 and later, was described by me from of decisions (both engineering-wise, as well as policy-wise) in late a point of view of [an] ordinary technical participant; the in- 1968 that may have had direct impacts on what was to take place in formation of further plans of launches was based [by] me on 1969. A potential puzzle piece addressing these questions may have rumors [heard] and discussions with my colleagues; however, been uncovered. I was [additionally] lucky to hear sometimes disputes and conversations of our managers [at the time in 1969 that provided In 2006, contacts in Russia provided to this researcher a booklet insights into the launch schedule]. Later, already in the [1990s], (issued in early October 1968) that contained data on what USSR I correlated this old information, which remained in my mem- space experts expected to be the US manned program schedule ory, with the just-published information from [the space] en- through the end of 1969. [261, 262] Entitled “Apollo 7 launch plans,” terprises-developers, selected those versions of our hypotheses the publication (see Fig. 34) was part of an on-going series dealing that were found to be most near to the real plans and inserted with anticipated US space missions, focusing on American prepa- them into the book – since we had not known the real plans in 1969!” [259]

In further elucidations with colleague Bart Hendrickx and this author, Sokolov added that:

“Nobody told us about N-1 launch plans at the time (we were too low in rank), but in late 1968 I had the opportunity to leaf

through a file with correspondence of our department (secret, COLLECTION PETER PESAVENTO of course) and I stumbled [up]on a letter from TsKBEM con- taining a preliminary launch schedule for the N-1/L-3 complex. [260]… I remember it said that after two unmanned launches, in case they were successful, the third launch could be manned, with the aim of placing the vehicle into lunar orbit. This would not simply be a repeat of an L-1 mission, which could not place itself into orbit, but would test one of the vital aspects of the manned lunar landing mission (namely lunar orbit insertion). Of course, when I started thinking about our short-term pros- pects after the first launch failure, I realized that these preliminary plans (if they were indeed approved as I saw them, because this was not an official document, but simply a letter) had already been disrupted and that even a successful second launch Fig. 34 The cover of the Soviet briefing booklet ‘Apollo 7 Launch Plans’.

75 Peter Pesavento rations and employed technologies – in this case, for the upcoming in the American program. This information that concludes the Apollo 7 spaceflight. Much of the data contained in this document booklet may have been a supportive source for the TsKBEM letter is highly technical in nature and meticulously presented, and it that Sokolov remembers seeing in his company’s files. What is de- seems that much of the information was not available via NASA lineated as a reasonable timetable for US benchmarks might have public relations releases. This may indicate that the USSR’s clandes- contributed to an environment that possibly allowed a “window of tine services may have provided some of this data. For instance, in opportunity” for prospective plans of a Soviet manned selenocen- the section that deals with the command-management-control of tric mission in August 1969, as Sokolov’s TsKBEM letter described. the Apollo 7 mission: The table at the back of the document is entitled “Plans of Fur- “Management of the flight of the space ship ‘Apollo 7,’ as well ther Piloted Flights within the Boundaries of the ‘Apollo’ Program.” as all ships of the ‘Apollo’ series, is going to be carried out by [265] The graphic lists anticipated missions for Apollos 8 through the Control Center in Houston (USA, state of Texas). The com- 12, and associated information that the Soviet analysts knew or ex- mand-tracking complex for the ‘Apollo’ ships include 16 ground trapolated as of early October 1968 about American intent. (Indeed, stations located between 40 degrees N. Lat. and 40 degrees S. only two crews – of Apollos 8 and 9 – were known to the Russians Lat [itude]. with an additional five ship-borne stations, and also as of early October 1968. The follow-ons were “not yet appointed.” eight station-equipped airplanes. For station communication [265]) These prognostications are important and noteworthy be- with the Control Center, the commercial satellite ‘Intelsat 2’ cause they no doubt were factors in the USSR’s own manned lunar will be used in particular. At launching, three ship-borne track- landing testing-and-development-timetable plans for 1969 – since ing stations, and all airplane and ground stations will be work- there was an on-going competition. So the details being imparted ing. Four ground stations are intended for tracking the space here are a window into the Russians’ policy decision-making pro- ship ‘Apollo’ following its outbound trajectory for the Moon. cesses. Since at launching ‘Apollo 7’ will not be transitioning to such a trajectory, these four stations will be used only for trial testing It is evident from reading the entries (see Fig. 34) that Soviet en- of equipment and personnel, and apparently the ground station gineers were expecting a slowly expanding and low-risk American near Madrid will not be used as the ‘Apollo 7’ will not practi- test program for the Apollo effort. cally enter into its visibility range. This station too may only be testing equipment, and training of personnel, as similarly will One comment appearing in the booklet establishes that the So- be the plane-borne platforms which basically are intended for viet engineers recognized that if Apollo 7 was successful in com- tracking the ‘Apollo’ ship in its transition from geocentric orbits pleting all aspects of its mission, then the manned circumlunar step on a flight trajectory to the Moon. The tracking stations meant could be next for the Americans: for ‘Apollo 7’ basically indicate that they all will be working in the centimetric range, which has been specially created for the “…Even if the [entire] flight takes place according to schedule, ‘Apollo’ program. As in auxiliary usage, the meter and decime- the assessment of operations of the on-board systems of the ter ranges had been used previously and created for within the ship will be completed no earlier than the beginning of Novem- confines of the ‘Mercury’ and ‘Gemini’ programs… The search ber, 1968. On the basis of this estimation, the decisions on fol- and rescue component for ‘Apollo 7’ includes 14 ships and the lowing up issues following the launching of (‘Apollo VIII’) will aircraft carrier ‘Essex’ that has 49 aircraft. The aggregate num- be made. If ‘Apollo VII’ will successfully complete its mission, ber of personnel to be involved is about 7200 persons…” [263] then most probably [this success] will provide ‘Apollo VIII’ with [the grounds] for the conclusion of its mission with a pi- In the description of the command module itself, the Russians loted spaceship in selenocentric orbit.” [266] paid close attention to its component construction, as well as its radio-frequency ranges for the anticipated communications: Apollo 8 was viewed by the Russians to have had three potential variant missions: “…the shell of the crew compartment is made of laminar panels honeycombed with stainless steel (between two sheets of stain- “1. The last stage of the rocket carrier is deduced [to have] a low less steel) and supplied with heat-shielding surfaces made from geocentric orbit close to circular. The space ship is separated cellular fiberglass with a packing medium of an ablative sub- and remains in this orbit, [while] the last stage and its engine stance (phenolic-epoxy resin). The thickness of the surface is docks again for the working of the simulation of the ‘Apollo’ up to 63 mm (on the bottom part)… The shell of the impellent ships on a trajectory towards the Moon. compartment is also made of laminar materials (constructed of aluminum alloy honeycomb between two sheets of aluminum The ship is deduced for an elliptic geocentric orbit with an apo- alloy)… The radio-engineering equipment includes combining gee height of several thousand kilometers. [several elements with] the transceiver (reception frequency 2106.4 Megahertz, transmission frequency 2287.5 Megahertz), The ship is deduced for selenocentric orbit.” [267] FM – sending (2272.5 Megahertz), and also combining of [lower-frequency bands with] the transmit (296.8 Megahertz), At the time of the issuance of this booklet, Apollo 10 was viewed and the receiver (259.7 Megahertz) with the transceiver (243 as an augmentation of the Apollo 9 mission (with “the regular basic Megahertz and 10.006 Megahertz). Such on-board means of block and lunar cabin”), with the added expectation that “the space centimetric range work during orbital flight provides voice ship is deduced to be an elliptic geocentric orbit with an apogee of communication, transfer telemetering information, trajectory 6000 kilometers.” [266] measurements, as well as telecast and reception of set points and commands…” [264] Following the circumlunar mission of Apollo 8 in the graphic, the very next manned mission to selenocentric space would have Of germane import to Sokolov’s reminiscences concerning the been Apollo 11, as projected by Russian engineers. And according TsKBEM correspondence, are the materials at the end of the docu- to the “Flight Scheme” of Apollo 11, this mission had two “variant” ment that detail a “forward outlook” for the upcoming 12 months outcomes: “The termination of the mission in selenocentric orbit

76 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3 without landing,” or “The regular scheme of the flight with landing said that, if everything goes well, it will be possible for Rus- cosmonauts on the Moon.” [266] sia to send a man or men to the Moon before the end of this year or early in 1970… He said he was confident that pieces of Apollo 12 appears to be considered by the Russians as to have rocks picked on the surface of the Moon by Soviet cosmonauts been the first completely expected mission to land astronauts upon would be put on display in the Soviet pavilion during the Japan the Moon (and even at this time of October 1968, it was under- World Exposition in Osaka in 1970 (Expo ’70)… This was the stood that Apollo 12 was slated for late in 1969 at the earliest). The first indication of any concrete lunar project being pushed by “Mission Scheme” states “The regular scheme of flight with land- the Soviet Union… Leonov met the Japanese newsmen at the ing cosmonauts upon the Moon ( [if] this has not been carried out home of a Soviet space cartoonist in Moscow Sunday night… with Apollo 11’s launching.)” [268] Interestingly, the Russian word Leonov appeared in military uniform but he responded to “essliy” (meaning “if”) has been handwritten in inside the paren- questions in a very friendly manner. In the meeting he indi- thetical phrasing. cated that, unlike the Apollo project which sends spaceships directly from Earth to the Moon, the Soviet Moon project con- For community analysts specializing in the Soviet space activi- sists of assembling a space station in orbit around the Earth. ties during the 1960s, the effort to sleuth out intentions was a major A lunar probe would be launched from the space station, he impetus of intelligence analysis. The “Apollo 7 Launch Plans” book- said… On Sunday Leonov also said the Soviet military had no let is an excellent example of a document that discloses some of direct part in the country’s space development program except the inner workings of the Soviet spaceflight establishment, and that for cooperation in launching, tracking and recovering space- additionally provides key elements that would help lay the ground- ships… He added that the Soviet Science Academy handled all work for decision-making on a competitive launch schedule for the plans for the Soviet space exploration program, and that its ex- USSR’s manned lunar landing program rocket with the American ecution was entrusted to a special national commission.” [271] Apollo. Of special note is that one month prior to the launch attempt A key information acquisition avenue for US IC analysts at Area J, a key member of the Soviet lunar training cadre talked (both during the Space Race, as well as currently) is OSINT – or, with Western journalists; additionally, Leonov mentioned that the “Open Source INTelligence.” This specific and important intelli- Russian plan to send cosmonauts to the Moon’s surface involved gence-gathering component helps to bridge together many of the more than one rocket, and that it was likely to happen before the other intelligence data streams, and is intended to aid in the efforts end of 1969, “if everything went well.” This last comment parallels of forewarning. [269] For space historians, the ability to locate OSI- favorably Sokolov’s oral recollection of seeing the TsKBEM letter NT items from key time frames of the Space Race helps illuminate with the Soviet manned lunar schedule aiming for late 1969. why the US and Russian prisms have, in significant ways, arrived at such diverging conclusions as to what took place in July, 1969. But questions, again, remain. If Leonov’s comments were accurately reflecting what he was aware of at the time, what other rock- 4.7 Contemporaneous media reports of the anticipated et could be involved in such a mission, outside of the N-1? This mission, and its aftermath meeting with the Japanese reporters was not an informal affair, as Leonov was in military uniform. Interviews with cosmonauts at For some time, the question of whether there existed contempo- this time had to be officially approved prior to taking place, that rary media reportage (from June/July 1969) about either the prepa- usually included “minders” as well as language translators. rations for, or the attempted launch itself of, the USSR’s manned lunar landing project rocket reached mostly inconclusive results, Was this Leonov interview noted in the Soviet press? In a spe- especially when North American-centric sources were examined cial space report filed by Evert Clark that was dated June 19, 1969, by this researcher. (The exception was an interview with Charles the answer to this question is apparently no: “The Soviet press ig- Sheldon II in a US military newspaper from late June 1969, high- nored Leonov’s prediction to the Japanese – perhaps because it was lighted in another Space Chronicle article [270]). However, assid- in error; perhaps because it is not yet time for official press organs uous research efforts on the part of space-historian colleagues has to state official Russian plans…” [272] achieved further progress with materials located in west Europe- an-based newspaper journalism (from Germany and the UK), as Subsequently, the next two reports that have been uncovered well as a news story from the Japanese wire service agency Kyodo were published on July 6, 1969. Both appeared in dailies – one in in Tokyo. But the found materials still remain very few in number. Germany, and the other in the UK. In an article (entitled “Moscow full or rumors: Moon landing before the USA?” [273]) that ap- Chronologically, the first major hint of Russian aspirations to peared in Welt am Sonntag (“World on Sunday”) rumors in Mos- put cosmonauts on the lunar surface in the near term of 1969 came cow are discussed in this excerpt: about when several Japanese news reporters visiting Moscow had conversations with cosmonaut Alexei Leonov. The date of this re- “The speculation about a possibly forthcoming Soviet flight to portage is June 2, 1969. This news service wire report was picked the Moon did not fall silent on the weekend, either. There is, up by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and was however – as UPI [United Press International] reports from published the same day. [271] What follows are some major ex- Moscow – no official Soviet statement on this. But no denial, cerpts from this article. either. Theoretically, the ‘Moon launch window’ is still open for the Soviets until Tuesday [July 8, 1969]. A Soviet journal- “Moscow, June 2, KYODO – By Isao Hara, Kyodo Staff Cor- ist, who is an expert in spaceflight affairs, confirmed at a US respondent – The Soviet Union is planning a manned flight embassy’s reception in Moscow [that took place on July 4, to the Moon similar to the Apollo lunar landing being pre- 1969] that there were plans for a Moon landing even before the pared by the US next month, a Soviet cosmonaut revealed here Americans. Cosmonaut Beregvoi [who attended the embassy Sunday… Alexei Leonov, the first man in the world to walk in soiree] refused to give any comment.” [273] space in 1965, explained the Soviet lunar project to a group of Japanese science reporters now visiting Moscow… Leonov The rest of the article (not excerpted here) makes clear that

77 Peter Pesavento the “Moon landing” hinted at is believed to be one that involved the Moon before us or at least at the same time. Probably some cosmonauts, and not an unmanned soil sample return effort. A kind of failure has led to the delay.’” [276] follow-on article from July 13 makes this more clear, which will be highlighted further on in this section. In regards to the identification of the “Soviet space journalist,” it is likely that the person in question was Victor Louis. During The other July 6 report appeared in the LondonDaily Telegraph the 1960s through the 1980s, one of the major conduits for news (under the titling of “Russian Moon Failure” and datelined Wash- and “exclusives” on USSR events (including the space program) ington, DC [274]) and appeared on the front page of that issue. Of for most Western journalists residing in Moscow was KGB agent/ special interest is the direct mention of two explosions. journalist Victor Louis. Louis’ main role for the KGB was to place news stories in Western periodicals that would reflect the aims “Russia’s desperate attempt to beat America to the Moon has of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee ended in a last minute failure, according to American space (showing the USSR in an advantageous light), and also apparently experts in Washington… Two explosions at the Russian space- provide personal as well as professional information to his superi- port of Baikonur on Friday last at which some engineers lost ors about Western journalists posted to Moscow. [277, 278] (Louis their lives are the last and tragic consequences of what is here was a legitimate Moscow correspondent for several newspapers in described as ‘hurried and light-hearted’ efforts to correct pre- the UK, including the London Evening News.) vious failures.” [274] Louis was behind many “scoops” – for example, in the political sphere, such newsworthy items as Khrushchev’s ouster; the immi- The rest of the article discusses Soviet aspirations to send robot- nent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the late 1969 story ic spacecraft to the lunar surface, and the Apollo 11 preparations. that the USSR was seriously thinking about attacking China’s nuclear infrastructure – accurately reflecting the Kremlin’s thoughts When the Daily Telegraph article was shown to Ed Cameron, he at the time; and the reassignment of Marshal Ogarkov. Louis also immediately noted that the “two explosions” were an indicator of placed articles in the Western media to discredit the memoirs of ACOUSTINT-acquired information, and that the first of these sig- Stalin’s daughter Svetlana, and also – after the Chernobyl accident natures was probably due to the initial start-up of the Area J vehi- – had publicized alleged statements by Andrei Sakharov that im- cle’s rocket engines (the Soviet lunar-landing super booster “would plied he was supportive of the Soviet handling of the accident and have the loudest rumble of any Soviet rocket up to that point”), critical of the Western reaction to it. [279-281] and then the subsequent second explosion signature would have In regards to space-related matters, Louis directly provided de- been when the rocket fell back down on the launch pad. [275] tails such as these: The foreshadowing of the original intentions of the Soyuz 1/2 4.7.1 The ysteryM of Soviet Journalist Victor Louis: “Used in mission; what the circumstances were leading to Gagarin’s plane Various Unofficial Ways by the Soviet Government” crash; as well as details of the tragic descent and touchdown of the Soyuz 11 mission. Louis also often provided indirect information The next and final article is again from the German daily Welt for nearly every manned-related space shot prior to launching that am Sonntag, and appeared in the July 13, 1969 issue. [276] The showed up in Western media wire stories filed from Moscow. Be- slug line states reportage from both Moscow and Cape Kennedy. cause Louis was on such good terms with all of the US journalists Entitled “Moscow’s missed opportunity: The ‘lunar launch win- based in Moscow, whenever there were State functions at the USA’s dow’ closed for the Russians,” mentions once again the Soviet Soviet embassy there (which always had US journalists attend), he space journalist, and quotes Wernher von Braun. The following is no doubt was invited to come along. a translation from the German. As German space researcher Ulrich Brocks commented, “…the “‘We have missed the last opportunity of getting ahead of the information Victor Louis leaked to the Western media proves to be Americans up there!’ This was the bitter comment of a Soviet most accurate and reliable… All in all, I think that he was well-in- spaceflight journalist, who one week before (Welt am Sonntag formed, and if he wanted to be trusted by Western journalists he reported it) had confirmed plans for a Soviet manned Moon could only be successful by leaking accurate information to them. landing before the Americans in an unofficial conversation… Where he got his knowledge from and to what purpose he used it is Last Tuesday the Moon launch window for the Soviet Union another question. It was the Cold War era.” [282] closed – with the exception of a small slit. Wednesday evening this slit was no longer extant, either – and thus no chance, ei- It is likely (and a reasonable conclusion) that Victor Louis’ com- ther, for a Soviet victory in the race to the Moon landing. For ments were integrated into the US intelligence information mosa- now the ‘lunar launch window’ is open over Cape Kennedy… ic about Soviet aspirations for its manned lunar landing program Officially it had at no time been confirmed in Moscow that during the Summer of 1969, and was a factor in the influencing one was ‘in the finish.’ But the ‘Cordon sanitaire’ was not tight of perceptions of top US policy makers (including Melvin Laird) enough despite all security measures. A few details leaked out about the intent of events as they unfolded. However, such corrob- first into a small circle of experts, then also in the public. And orating materials – explicitly citing Louis in this regard – have not these details showed a picture of feverish activity which had yet turned up in the troves of recently released declassified doc- only one goal: To get ahead of the Americans, as once with uments about Soviet manned lunar efforts. But it may be only a the first satellite and the first manned spacecraft… There has matter of time. been a mishap! That is the opinion prevailing in Moscow. If one bears in mind that just the technical equipment for the On the other hand, there is proof that at least some of Louis’ Moon landing comprises more than nine million components, Soviet space reportage had been included by US IC analysts in each of which has to function for itself and all of which have their intelligence product for reading by the President. An exam- to function among each other, there is the possibility of such ple of this has been uncovered in the August 2016 PDB releases a mishap in every minute… What one hears in Moscow only from the Richard Nixon administration. A news item in the July in private conversation is what Wernher von Braun said in all 3, 1971 PDB (about the deaths of the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts) ex- openness: ‘We have clues to it that the Soviets wanted to be on plicitly cites Victor Louis as a reliable source, and alludes to his

78 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

Kremlin connections: 1970s. Other document families, however, appear to have been lost to time, and searches conducted under MDR rules have turned up “A report yesterday by Victor Louis, the Soviet-born Moscow nothing – these include W14/Vista conference reports on Soviet correspondent for a London newspaper, indicates that the space (NSA), as well as US Army Intelligence/Missile Command’s cosmonauts died from a lack of oxygen because they had not quarterly series “Sino-Soviet Bloc Missiles and Space Technology” properly sealed the hatch on the capsule. Louis has provided (US Army Intelligence and Security Command). accurate information in the past on some Soviet events and is used in various unofficial ways by the Soviet government. The The prospect of a new Presidential administration coming to amount of technical detail in his report suggests that his infor- Washington DC has effects throughout the US government, in- mation came from knowledgeable Soviet officials.” [283] cluding on the declassification efforts by ISCAP, who do their work “in the name of the President.” [285] In this researcher’s ex- Indeed, reportage content from journalists has been included perience, the most documents ever released by ISCAP (since per- within “information matrices” by US intelligence source conduits sonally starting the MDR appeal process in 2000) have been under as a regular operating procedure, and a number of such intelligence the Barack Obama administration auspices by far. In the earlier documents stating so have been previously released, and highlight- George W. Bush administration, less than twenty documents were ed by this researcher. [284] released by ISCAP during those eight years; during the Obama Presidency, literally hundreds of documents were successfully 5.0 Conclusion: the state of “the State of the Art” processed and released via the MDR declassification protocols. And this wide-spectrum disclosure regime included the benchmark release of the first PDB excerpt (that had been appealed to Currently, this researcher has roughly 100 MDR appeal cases ISCAP in the year 2000). These release trends seem to mirror each awaiting declassification with ISCAP, totaling over 600 docu- Presidential administration’s attitude towards declassification, and ments. Some of these appeals are now over six years old that are in transparency in government operations. ISCAP’s “to do” queue. Overall, the documents (not yet processed for public release) can be characterized as representing some of Time will tell what influences that Obama’s successor will have the most important (and sensitive) reports that US IC agencies on ISCAP’s declassification efforts. produced on Soviet space activities. Indeed, when these materials eventually appear in the public realm, there is no doubt that 6.0 Acknowledgements further adjustments will need to be made as to what is generally accepted as having happened in the Soviet space program. A project such as this has numerous persons who were instrumen- Awaiting declassification include TEBACs and RUGMs that tal to its success, that were willing to provide help and track down NSA has refused on its own to declassify, and some space historians documentation and archives, and contributed in key ways to this suspect that these are among key elements of the “crown jewels” of paper’s ultimate completion. Besides those noted in the text, refer- US IC interpretation during the Cold War. Others materials in- ences and figure captions, the following are also thanked: Jennifer clude National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet space (several edi- Cuddeback, Regina Greenwell, Debra Steidel Wall, Bill Carpenter, tions of which hitherto have not been released), as well as “Space Meredith Wagner, Grujica Ivanovich, M. Martynov, Jay Bosanko, Event Reports” that were issued by the CIA during the 1960s and Michael Ravnitzky, and others who wish to remain anonymous.

APPENDIX A The Nixon and Ford PDBs: uncovering further surprise pieces of the space race mosaic

In late August 2016, the US Central Intelligence Agency released the Nixon and Ford PDBs are relatively devoid of illustrative and over 2,400 President’s Daily Brief reports (PDBs) from the Nixon graphic materials; indeed, no overhead photoreconnaissance sat- and Ford administrations – dating from late January 1969 through ellite photographs have been located among the textual content mid January 1977. In preliminary searches of the database of these of the PDBs in release. Nevertheless, some of the information in materials that the agency put on the World Wide Web, over 35 these PDBs provides new revelations and insights about the Soviet PDBs included mention of Soviet space program events that de- space program. Some highlighted exemplars follow. classification analysts had deemed suitable for release.[1] The subject matter in-the-main encompasses manned Salyut space station Hitherto unknown preparations for a manned space mission, program activities (such as launch attempts and crew swap-outs), August 1969. In the August 7, 1969 edition of the PDB, US IC an- crewed Earth orbital missions, some lunar and planetary report- alysts noted that the “Soviet space center appears to be in the late age (Venus and Mars), scrutiny of the Proton rocket launch-at- stages of preparation for a manned flight and for a lunar mission. tempt chronology, as well as materials about the Area J vehicle Since these preparations overlap, Soviet intentions are not clear. as that sub rosa program progressed over time. Mentions of Rus- We think it most likely, however, that the two operations are sep- sian military space operations (such as reconnaissance satellite or arate: there will be an unmanned Moon shot a manned shot in ASAT projects) did not survive the censor’s scrutiny, and subse- Earth orbit.”[2] As readers may surmise, the alluded-to lunar mis- quent removal. sion was Zond 7, that was launched on the same day as the PDB was issued. The manned Earth-orbital mission remains a surprise In sharp distinction from the LBJ PDB documents in release, unknown, and unidentified. There are no extant follow-on PDBs

79 Peter Pesavento that discuss the detected manned mission preparations. cal fire aboard Salyut during the Soyuz 11 mission possibly damaged the spacecraft; however, this was not serious enough However, there may be some currently available informa- at the time to terminate the operation. Some system aboard tion that possibly could shed some light on this unusual report. Salyut may have failed recently, or the Soviets may have final- Post-Soviet Russian disclosures[3] do state that cosmonauts Alexei ly completed experiments carried on the station. The Soviets Leonov and Oleg Makarov of the circumlunar training group en- also may have discovered something in their investigation of gaged in on-the-pad exercises involving the Zond 7 spacecraft-- the Soyuz 11 incident which caused them to end the Salyut most likely ingress and egress, pad escape, and spacecraft commu- operation.”[9] nications tests. Additionally, the confluence of both a Soyuz and a Zond undergoing launch preparations at the same time harkens The estimations that US IC analysts came up with for the inten- back to the planned “podsadka” planned version of the circumlu- tional de-orbiting of Salyut 1 perhaps reflects a lack of informa- nar mission, where the two spacecraft would rendezvous in Earth tion on why the de-orbiting was ordered. According to post-Soviet orbit, and exchange two of the Soyuz passengers to the Zond Russian disclosures, Salyut 1 was running low on attitude control spacecraft for its subsequent trip to selenocentric space.[4] This gas during the longer-than-planned gestation for the Soyuz space- postulated interpretation of intent via the materials of the PDB is craft re-design (in the wake of the Soyuz 11 re-entry tragedy), and plausible – indeed, the “podsadka” scenario of transferring crew a decision was made to terminate the mission.[10] was planned to be tested out between Soyuzes 7 and 8 in October Hitherto unknown launch attempt of the Area J vehicle can- 1969, so the time frame is well within bounds.[5] celled in September 1972, detected by US IC operations. The No- vember 18, 1972 PDB includes an entry detailing activities that US IC analysts identify Area J rocket as the ‘J-Bird,’ and de- lead to the conclusion that the Russians were preparing to launch scribe missions perceived executable by the vehicle. The May 7, the Area J vehicle (which would eventually happen November 1970 edition of the PDB has a discussion about activities at Area 26). The PDB has a short review of the conduct of the program, J at Tyuratam, and delineates the perceived missions and capabil- including an estimate on when the Soviet manned lunar landing ities of the rocket. program would first achieve its goals. That short review included surprise material about a previously unknown launch attempt of “…the Soviets are still working on their largest space boost- the super rocket. “Development of the J-vehicle, vital to the Sovi- er – assembled on one of the pads at Complex J and there- ets’ manned lunar program, has not gone well. The only two pre- fore dubbed ‘the J-Bird’ by US observers of Soviet rocketry…. vious tests in July 1969 and in June 1971 resulted in early in-flight The Soviets would have to use two J-Birds to put a man on the failures. The launch of the current booster was originally expected Moon – a rendezvous would be necessary. Thus, both launch in September, but was called off at the last minute. We do not now pads at Complex J would be needed. Interplanetary probes and expect the Soviets to try their first manned lunar landing until the circumlunar missions can be handled by one J-Bird, which late 1970s.”[11] could also be used to orbit a permanent space station weighing 100 to 150 tons. An unmanned lunar landing and return mis- --Astute forewarning indicators point to Salyut 5’s intended sion could also be launched.”[6] purpose, prior to its launching. The June 19, 1976 edition of the PDB discusses the preparations, intent and function of Salyut 5, The US IC assessment that it would require two Area J rock- which would be launched into orbit just three days later. Accord- ets to fulfill a manned lunar landing is echoed in Boris Chertok’s ing to the US IC’s assessment, “The Soviets apparently are prepar- Moon Race volume, where he describes a mid-April 1971 discus- ing to launch a military version of the Salyut space station, Salyut sion with Soviet guidance expert Nikolai Pilyugin about “switch- 5, possibly early next week… Salyut 5 is likely to function as an ing over to a dual-launch scenario” due to the N-1’s payload inade- operational intelligence collector and as a test vehicle for various quacies in its ability to fulfill the expected lunar mission profile.[7] experimental systems…. Salyut 5 probably will be manned initially by a two-man crew for about 90 days…. A Soyuz spacecraft Communications intercepts reveal that the US IC contempora- probably will be launched within two weeks to carry cosmonauts neously knew that the Soyuz 11 crew watched the June 1971 Area to the space station.”[12] J rocket launching. The June 28, 1971 edition of the PDB explicitly links the attempted launching of the Area J rocket (June 27) with These CIA assessments about the upcoming Salyut mission the Soyuz 11 crew on board the Salyut 1 space station. “There is no would be borne out in actuality, indicating excellent informa- known connection between the J-vehicle launch attempt and the tion acquisition conduits, including HUMINT (people inside current Soyuz 11-Salyut mission, although the cosmonauts were in- the program, particular types of communications intercepts) and structed to observe the [unplanned] failure. Soviet ground control SIGINT (the ability to identify telemetry characteristics confirm- told the cosmonauts to look out the window for a fire like a high ing a non-civilian version of the space station as it was under- magnitude star.”[8] This reportage also indicates that, when neces- going pre-flight tests in the assembly hall at the Cosmodrome). sary, US IC analysts could process incoming data rapidly for top US Subsequently, Soyuz 21 was indeed launched approximately two policy makers to digest – in this case, less than 24 hours later. weeks afterward, and the time of station occupation was about 48 days. Post-Soviet Russian disclosures confirmed that Salyut 5 was US IC assesses why the Soviets decided to actively de-orbit a military oriented spacecraft mission, and that the cosmonauts’ Salyut 1, pointing to one possibility: The electrical fire that took stay was cut short due to atmospheric contamination aboard the place during the Soyuz 11 mission. In the October 13, 1971 edition station.[13] of the PDB, CIA analysts proffer reasons as to why the Russians decided to purposefully de-orbit Salyut 1, after several times in In short, during the 1970s, the top policy maker and elected raising its orbit to help preserve the station for anticipated future official in the United States was kept well informed about Soviet crews: space activities. Additionally, based on the fact that PDBs were tai- lor made to the interests and topic leanings of the targeted reader, “There are several possible reasons why the Soviets decided it appears that both Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford to destroy the $250 million-dollar space station. The electri- had more than a passing interest in the Russian space program.

80 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

APPENDIX B New, unexpected details of Soviet space activities revealed from declassified August 1969 documents

The declassification of new intelligence documents focused on the intended to land. Soviet space program is an on-going feature of current space history research. Subsequent to the submission of the main text of this “Zond 7, the unmanned Soviet spacecraft launched from paper, further declassified materials were released by NSA and CIA. Tyuratam on 7 August, continued on the Earth-bound phase of Among these expected documents, from August 1969, was NSA its flight as of the 12th… Computations based on the pre-mid SIGINT Summary serial coverage, with all six documents focused course track data of 9 August yield an Earth re-entry time of ap- on Russian operations surrounding the Zond 7 circumlunar mis- proximately 1756Z[ulu] on the 14th; the re-entry point is esti- sion.[1-6] Additionally, a President’s Daily Brief (PDB) document mated to be 43.7 degrees South Latitude, 67.5 degrees East Lon- from early August 1969 contains a comparison graphic about the gitude. Recent deployment of various aircraft associated with early July 1969 Area J launch failure that depicts overhead satellite previous ESV [earth satellite vehicle] recovery operations and photography, including close-look imagery taken by a GAMBIT-3 the transmission of hourly weather reports by the Soviet Space reconnaissance orbiter.[7] Vehicle Recovery Ships Taman and Baskunchak provide confirmation of the Zond 7 re-entry date. [sentence redacted]”[4] The released NSA information highlights a broad-based aware- ness of many preparatory actions on the part of the Soviets that These two NSA reports about Soviet Zond 7 operations were necessary to occur prior to an actual space mission—in other demonstrate the care taken by NSA analysts to accurately record words, a number of forewarning “tip offs.” These encompassed the and analyze the incoming data from space events as those were activiation and testing of the Crimea deep-space tracking network, taking place—in basically real time. The meticulousness of these Russian naval and naval-air communications links, and hourly assessments is, by necessity, indispensible when “surprise” mate- weather reports by Soviet Space Vehicle Recovery Ships during the rial becomes declassified. In this happenstance, the documenta- return phase of a circumlunar spacecraft from the vicinity of the tion features hitherto unknown preparations for a manned space Moon. Indeed, the recorded trends were seen on earlier missions, shot that was happening at the same time as Zond 7 operations and allowed US IC analysts to accurately forecast Russian inten- in August 1969. tions for policy makers. As mentioned in the other side-bar article “The Nixon and Ford In the August 2, 1969 edition of the NSA SIGINT Summary, a PDBs: Uncovering Further Surprise Pieces of the Space Race Mo- report (entitled “Probable lunar mission from Tyuratam planned saic,” an early August 1969 President’s Daily Brief mentions in pass- for early August”) describes the build-up of mission operations for ing that there appeared to be two manned-related space missions a lunar space shot. Interestingly, the data acquired involves a great underway at the same time. The August 7, 1969 NSA SIGINT Sum- deal of COMINT intercepts. mary report (entitled “Soviet preparations for lunar operation”) provides further corroboratory details. “Activity by various Soviet space related entities suggests that preparations are underway for a major lunar mision involving “Preparations which were first noted on 29 July for a major So- an unmanned, but man-related recoverable spacecraft. Com- viet lunar flight—manned or man-related—continue to be re- munications activity [about seven words redacted] reminiscent flected in SIGINT. [Due to the fact that SIGINT is mentioned, of previous deep space preparatory activity was noted on 30 this means that both telemetry and communications intercepts and 31 July. Commencing the 29th, the Soviet Naval and Naval are involved.] The actual launch may take place between 7 and Air communications links, previously used to support TU-95 10 August. Those Soviet Naval/Naval Air communications (BEAR) recovery aircraft operations over the Indian Ocean, which provide support for the TU-95 (BEAR) recovery aircraft have been noted active. These preparations indicate that the flights over the Indian Ocean have been active sporadically forthcoming mission will be another in the series previously through at least the 3d [third]. Communications testing activi- attempted on 22 February which was cancelled, and on 3 July ty [two lines redacted] continued through the 5th. On the same which failed. [Additional sentence redacted.].”[1] date, the Soviet Space Event Support Ships (SSESS) Morzhovets and Kegostrov, on stations in the South Atlantic, conducted a Although not explicitly delineated, the mention of the two communications practice injection support operation. This Area J launch dates seems to indicate that the payload telemetry consisted of [three word phrase redacted] messages of the type intercepts garnered from these preparations for the Zond 7 launch observed prior to the Zond 5 and Zond 6 circumlunar missions were very similar to those acquired from the two Area J launch and the SL-12 [Proton rocket] in-flight failure on 20 January. vehicles—suggesting that the space vehicles aboard all three rock- The recent deployment of the Soviet Missile Range Instrumen- ets probably had very similar guidance and control systems. (An tation Ships (SMRIS) in the Pacific along the 52-degree Earth equally likely factor is that there was a super booster vehicle on trace suggests that a Soviet manned launch is pending, and if launch pad J2 during this time frame,[8] and that there were co- related to the aforementioned preparations could indicate that ordinated SIGINT/COMINT intercepts of preparatory activities the forthcoming circumlunar flight will be manned. [two fur- between the Soyuz, the Proton/Zond, as well as the Area J rocket.) ther lines redacted].”[2]

Soviet preparatory activities occurred not only at the beginning As mentioned in sections 2.7 as well as 4.5.1 of the main article, of a space mission, but also at the end to help achieve a success- ships that are “along the 52-degree Earth trace” are a solid indicator ful mission conclusion—and these were also monitored by US IC that a manned space mission is in the offing—these ships are there units in the region. The August 14, 1969 issue of the NSA SIGINT to recover a spacecraft in the event of a launch abort. Indeed, Fig. Summary (entitled “Status of Zond 7; Forecast of re-entry date”) 15 in the main text actually shows that such ships were at this po- highlights communications intercepts as well as NSA computa- sition for the Soyuz 4 and 5 space event in January 1969, just seven tional analysis as to when, and where the Zond 7 spacecraft was months previous. Furthermore, having two spacecraft operations

81 Peter Pesavento taking place simultaneously – when one is aimed at a selenocentric month before at Tyuratam.[7] The graphic, entitled “Largest Soviet space mission--suggests that the “podsadka” two-spacecraft mis- Booster Explodes at Complex J,” compares two photographs, one sion was contemplated, where there would have been a rendezvous taken in June 1969, the other in August 1969. While the quality of in Earth orbit and a partial transfer of crew. This scenario can be the reproduction isn’t the best, careful examination of the pictures argued to be of a higher likelihood, considering that the alternative reveals a great deal of information. explanation of attempting to manage two distinctly separate, un- related crew-linked space missions concurrently would have been The former photograph depicts a resolvable all-white Area J unprecedented for this time frame. rocket on its launch pad (with the inter-staging areas of the vehicle easily discerned) on the J-2 launch pad; the latter picture shows the Curiously, the follow-up NSA SIGINT Summary reports re- aftermath of the early July 1969 explosion at the J-1 launch pad. leased to date make no further mention of this dual mission launch The seemingly all-white rocket, along with its appearance on the activity. Future declassified documentation may shed additional J-2 launch pad, suggests that this was the 1M1 training exercise ve- light on this event. Despite this current lack, a short intelligence hicle. That the rocket and its separate stages can be seen on this note in the CIA’s August 15, 1969 edition of the Central Intelligence “before” photograph indicates a close-look satellite, most likely of Bulletin declares “The flight of Zond 7 appears to have been a full- the GAMBIT-3 series. Indeed, the latter “after” photograph is also scale rehearsal for a manned circumlunar flight which could come likely sourced to GAMBIT, as the service tower’s internal structural as early as next month.”[9] This cryptic sentence--with the mention support elements can be seen, which the medium-resolution CO- of a “full-scale rehearsal”--makes a great deal of sense if coupled RONA satellite could not resolve. with the new revelations that the Soviet circumlunar mission, as executed in mid-1969, would have involved a crewed Soyuz and an Interestingly, the aftermath image shows that one lightning ar- unmanned Proton rocket. rest tower completely gone, while the other lightning arrest tower is only partially extant, with the upper third of it missing. That the In closing, mention can be made of a newly released graphic comparison photograph was provided for President Nixon’s view- illustration (Fig.1B) about the Area J launch vehicle and its July 3, ing tells the space historian how important this Tyuratam launch 1969 failure. In the August 15, 1969 issue of the PDB, this graphic failure event was to both the US IC, as well as the USA’s top policy accompanies a heavily redacted mention about what took place the maker. US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY US CENTRAL

Fig. 1B Comparison satellite photography graphic from August 15, 1969 PDB showing Area J in June 1969 before the launch accident that happened there in early July 1969, and a subsequent photograph taken of the accident area in August 1969. The ability to resolve fine details indicates that both photographs are likely taken by a GAMBIT 3 close-look photoreconnaissance spacecraft. The June 1969 photograph shows an all-white Area J vehicle sitting on launch pad J-2. This appears to be the training exercise model of the rocket, which was high fidelity copy in all ways except in its weight category of a flight-ready version. The lower caption in the June 1969 picture says “Second pad undergoing checkout with launch vehicle in place. It appears to have been unharmed by the 3 July explosion.” Statistical data includes service tower height of 445 feet, and the lightning arrest towers heights at 600 feet. The original classification of the two images was “Top Secret Ruff,” indicating the information was acquired via overhead satellite photoreconnaissance.

82 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

APPENDIX C Declassified documents confirm OTH radar monitoring of Tyuratam, and reveal CIA expectations of December 1968 Soviet crewed circumlunar timetable

Since the original article submission of late August 2016, more It is noteworthy to point out that the CIA’s disclosures on information has come to light on two aspects highlighted in the EARTHLING included the significant mention of detecting very main text—over-the-horizon radar systems, and new insights into low-altitude rocket activity, as well as allusions to possible activi- the CIA’s expectations for a Soviet manned circumlunar mission ties directly on the ground—“detections not reported by any other in December 1968, and the effects of that anticipation on US space source.” policy. In September 1965, the government of Turkey closed the CIA’s Tyuratam: Over-the-Horizon Radar Target EARTHLING installation, an action precipitated largely due to the resultant political difficulties with an elected civilian administra- Section 4.4.2 highlighted data that indicated that over-the-hori- tion, which at this time held less favorable views of the CIA, as zon radar (OTH radar) may have been used to monitor space and well as of the USA’s overall foreign policy than the previous mili- rocketry launches from the Tyuratam Cosmodrome via a location tary-led government.[4] in Turkey. A recently declassified and released article from the Spring 1969 issue of Studies in Intelligence explicitly confirms this There was to have been a follow-on OTH radar system placed in hypothesis.[1] Entitled “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Turkey that would have been a marked improvement on EARTH- Radars,” this overview of the development of OTH radar systems LING (but would use the pulse-Doppler method to detect radar provides details of the monitoring both Russian and Chinese signals from moving objects). This system, code-named COBRA launch efforts. MIST, was to have been introduced in 1965, possibly also intended for Diyarbakir. But the Turkish government blocked the installa- In March 1961, the first OTH radar system was deployed at tion.[5] Ultimately, COBRA MIST was installed on the east coast Diyarbakir, Turkey, and was given the designator EARTHLING. of the UK, near Orford Ness, Suffolk (its construction lasting from The installation (according to CIA disclosures) was put in place mid-1967 through early 1972), and operated until mid-1973, after without prior testing (such as with a prototype inside the USA), which it was shut down for system under-performance due to sev- emphasizing the importance placed by the CIA on this technolo- eral unresolved technical issues.[5,6] gy despite its nascent condition. As a result, it can be reasonably concluded that a great deal of trial-and-error testing subsequently COBRA MIST had a frequency range of 6 to 40 MHz, with a occurred on site.[2] The article delineates the following details: peak power of 3.5 Megawatts—a vast improvement over the CIA’s EARTHLING project.[7] COBRA MIST was expected to “track… “[It] was what [was] called a monostatic-pulse radar which aircraft in flight over the western part of the Soviet Union and the operated over a frequency range of 6 [to] 26 MHz [Megahertz] Warsaw Pact countries and… missile launches from the North- and had peak power of 200 kilowatts. From the outset it was ern Fleet Missile Test Center at Plesetsk.”[8] Missile launches from evident that it had to be able to compensate for variabilities of Plesetsk could be detected at ranges of 2,000 nautical miles away the ionosphere. The system was therefore designed to be tuned with this radar, via the one-hop ionospheric propagation phenom- instantaneously to any frequency in the above-mentioned enon. band…. EARTHLING was designed primarily to detect ICBM or Earth satellite vehicle launches from the Tyuratam missile Indeed, in one successful experiment labeled “315A,”--for complex. The engines of such missiles continue to burn until aircraft R&D [research and development] intelligence--COBRA they reach an altitude well above 100 kilometers [60 miles], MIST was able to observe (in a specific, targeted manner) aircraft thereby creating an enhanced radar cross section which can flights “at the Ramenskoye [outside of Moscow] and Vladimirov- be 3 to 5 times larger than the actual radar cross section of the ka [southwestern Russia along the Volga, south of Kapustin Yar] body of the missile. This effect is caused by excess electrons Flight Test Centers.”[9] As technology historians are aware, the generated by the ionization process of the missile exhaust. Vladimirovka Flight Center was involved in the USSR’s develop- These electrons remain unattached because of the rarified -at ment testing of manned spaceplanes in the early 1970s. mosphere at these altitudes. IRBMs [Intermediate-Range Bal- listic Missiles], MRBMs [Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles] OTH radar systems monitoring Tyuratam activities continued and ABMs [Anti-Ballistic Missiles] usually burn out below to be built and operated by the USA into the late 1960s, but appar- 100 kilometers and such enhancements are not frequent in ently not in Turkey (possible candidate nations include Iran and firings of such missiles. Radar sensitivity requirements for de- Cyprus). An EARTHLING follow-on (that used a bi-static, con- tection of such firings are therefore much more stringent than tinuous-wave system where the transmitter and receiver needed for larger vehicles…. Research and development to improve to be located a considerable distance apart for it to work) was “tar- EARTHLING’s performance continued into 1964. In June of geted against missile activity at the Tyuratam and and Kapustin that year it was felt that the system had reached operational Yar test complexes in the Soviet Union.”[10] This radar provided readiness for employment against the enhanced missile targets “…doppler [speed] and duration-of-flight data, but not range data mentioned above. To September 1965, EARTHLING detected [how far]…during the Summer months the probability that it… 65 missiles launched from Tyuratam. This was 82 percent of detect[ed] missiles [was] diminished appreciably because of irreg- the total number known to have been launched when EARTH- ularities in the ionosphere.” Additionally, even with its advantage LING was on the air. There also were a few detections not of technical simplicity over other OTH radars, “its inability to pro- reported by any other source. These could have been aborts vide refined range data foreclose[d] its use to obtain the oblique which line-of-sight collection systems could not have picked sounder [more stable] information so important for continuous up.”[3] reliable operation.”[10]

83 Peter Pesavento

With the information now in hand, it may be reasonably con- It should be noted here that this comment by Duckett here was cluded that the location of the aforementioned “bi-static radar” of a much more robust proclamation of expectation than even OTH system was at Akritori, Cyprus, where there was an OTH what was described in the PDB of November 2, 1968—that radar jointly operated by the USA and UK at the time. This OTH had been couched in more circumspect language (highlighted system was called SUGAR TREE, and worked via exploiting “a in Section 3.2.3). transmitter of opportunity”—in this case, “hitchiking” upon the USSR’s international broadcast transmitter (for Radio Moscow) – November 25, 1968: “ADD/S&T [Assistant Deputy Direc- to detect the missile launches from Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam. tor] advised that there are tentative indications of Soviet space [11] Because Radio Moscow had targeted broadcasts to most of support ships being deployed in such a manner as to rule the world (at many frequencies in the short wave band) at nearly out the possibility of an early December Soviet circumlunar all times of the day, this happenstance provided SUGAR TREE the launch.”[15] This assessment that Soviet plans were not to send ability to successfully do its monitoring. cosmonauts early in the month of December 1968 echo this own researcher’s conclusions detailed in Section 3.2.3.1 of the With CIA’s new information disclosures in hand, this research- main text. Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet tracking ship er believes that the data revealed in the Studies in Intelligence ar- flotillas were indeed being deployed meant that a circumlunar ticle explicitly points to an OTH radar complex—whether located launch was going to happen sometime in December 1968. in Turkey, Iran, or Cyprus—that monitored the USSR’s N-1 launch preparations in both February and July 1969. Such RADINT data Unexpectedly, the available issues of L.K. White’s “Memoranda gathered via OTH systems (whether reliably interpreted or not by for the Record” for 29 November, as well as for the 2, 6, 12, 16, US analysts) is reflected in the NSA’s SIGINT Summary, Spot as 17, 19, 24, 26, and 30 December 1968 make no mention of Soviet well as CIA “Space Event” and USAF FTD reports discussed in circumlunar activities in those portions that were declassified and the main text. released. However, with the late November, and nearly all of the December reportage documentation (excepting the 24 December “…the Chances of a Soviet Manned Circumlunar Flight in report), large paragraph-sized blocks were redacted, and it is pos- December are High” sible that more information about Soviet crewed lunar space plans are contained in at least some of these. Those redacted paragraphs In mid-January 2017, the US Central Intelligence Agency success- await a future historian’s declassification request. fully engineered Internet access to its entire CREST (CIA Records Search Tool) declassified documentation system, as a reaction to a “Smoking Gun” document confirms intelligence about Soviet lawsuit against the agency seeking public Internet access. Prior to manned lunar intentions influenced Apollo 8 Schedule: “… this, access was limited to a set of slaved computer-terminal nodes is a result of the direct intelligence support that FMSAC has tied to a CD-ROM array at the United States National Archives provided to NASA” (NARA) in College Park, Maryland.[12] Nearly 13 million pages can now be viewed on the Web. A significant number of these doc- For quite some time, there had been widespread speculation that uments were processed for Internet access in November and De- foreknowledge of the Soviet Union’s manned circumlunar aspi- cember 2016 by CIA analysts in anticipation of their wide-scope rations (provided by the US IC units) had a potent and decisive availability in the upcoming new year—this despite that most of effect on deliberations of the timetable and aim of NASA’s Apollo the documents were originally declassified many years before. 8 mission. This speculation can now be confirmed as fact. In an “Agency and Organizational Community Survey” of FMSAC (For- Among these documents, several reports provide hitherto un- eign Missiles & Space Analysis Center) dated to circa September known insights into both what CIA analysts expected to happen in 12, 1968, an overview of capabilities and achievements of FMSAC the Soviet manned circumlunar program, as well as a key, explicit reveals the following disclosures: disclosure in regards to its linked effect on the Apollo program’s scheduling, particularly for Apollo 8. “In the missile field, for instance, FMSAC has taken a preem- inent position in the definition of the strategic threat posed In the released trove of declassified CIA documents are a series by the new family of Soviet solid fueled strategic missiles, the (from the late 1960s) of “Memorandum for the Record” reports of FOBS [Fractional Orbital Bombardment System], and most near-daily morning meetings between the Director of CIA and all of recently in the analysis of Soviet MRV [Multiple Reentry Ve- his deputy directors (DDs) for the various intelligence directorates. hicle] tests. In the space area, FMSAC has the exclusive lead These meetings covered world events (as well as day-to-day oper- over all elements of the intelligence community and on an al- ations) and the deputy directors’ interpretive conclusions of same. most daily basis provides direct intelligence support, including These reports were recorded by the CIA’s Executive Director-Comp- many personal briefings, to the senior officials of NASA, the troller L.K. White. Of special note are those materials dealing with National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Presidential the USSR’s circumlunar program that were commented upon by the Science Advisory Council. The likelihood that the US will con- DD/S&T (Deputy Director/Science & Technology Directorate, Carl duct a manned circumlunar flight with the Apollo-8 vehicle E. Duckett) in the time frame of November 1968. These comments in December is a result of the direct intelligence support that reflected the interior assessments at CIA at the time. FMSAC has provided to NASA on present and future Soviet plans in space.”[16] – November 15, 1968: “DD/S&T reported that we now suspect there may be animal life aboard Zond-6, since the Soviets in- As these above-mentioned declassified documentation selec- dicated that worms, flies and turtles were aboard Zond-5. This tions make clear, the CREST on-line declassified documents re- tends to confirm the notion that the Soviets are indeed racing pository (as well as publicly accessible technical histories via the to be first with a manned circumlunar flight.”[13] Web) provides both current and future space historians access to important puzzle pieces that await discovery and emplacement in – November 18, 1968: “DD/S&T opined that the chances of a the reconstituted wall of accurate 20th century space exploration Soviet manned circumlunar flight in December are high.”[14] history.

84 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

Additional notes from the author

NOTE 1 In late December 2017, the Presidential Materials Divi- first declassified American hint that an SL-12 circumlunar launch sion of the US National Archives released to this researcher Soviet was planned for December, 1968. space materials found in the 27 June 1969 issue of the CIA’s Cen- tral Intelligence Bulletin that had been located at the Lyndon John- NOTE 2 In late November 2017, the US National Reconnaissance son Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. An interesting “Notes” Office released a tranche of materials about US SIGINT satellite section divulged potentially new information about Soviet lunar constellations from the 1960s and 1970s. In one key document, missions by the USSR between November 1968 and late June 1969. a 22 June 1976 “SIGINT Chronology” memorandum, there is While mentioning preparations for “a major Soviet space launch… confirmation of the existence (and within the appropriate time planned for early July,” the “Note” went on to discuss that “Since the frames) of the SAVANT satellite series mentioned by Ed Camer- successful flight of Zond 6 in November 1968, the Soviets have at- on. However, the chronology does have redactions in key sections tempted at least two lunar operations [emphasis added]. One failed that prevent confirmation of an actual satellite number. However, as a result of an SL-12 booster malfunction [the January 20, 1969 based on what is released, Cameron’s recollection of a SAVANT launch failure] and the other was canceled prior to launch. The SL- with the numeral “34” may have been a mis-remembrance, as 12 failure of 14 June may have been another lunar attempt.” Since the SAVANT identifiers that are now extant are roman numerals, the overall information of the “Note” focuses on SL-12 missions, it such as “I” and “II.” An additional NRO memorandum entitled may be reasonable to conclude that the cancelled lunar launch may “Quarterly Program Review” from 31 March 1971 further con- have also been an SL-12 mission. However, there are no cancelled firms the NSA analyst’s claims that SAVANT was for “Soviet type lunar launches between November 1968 and late June 1969 in the [two words redacted] collection.” The phrase “missile telemetry” accepted Russian historical canon. Interestingly, this may be the fits well in the redaction spacing.

References (main article)

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Pesavento P. “The Ghosts of Tyuratam: Wright-Patterson, the ‘SL-X,’ rocket N-1 as rival for Saturn-5: Explosion stops race to the Moon.”) and What the US Intelligence Community Knew During the Moon Flug Revue pp. 40-44, December 1993. Race.” Space Chronicle 65 (JBIS Supplement 2): 71-90, 2012. 221. Stone M.L. and Banner G.P. “Radars for the detection and tracking 200. Warrell E.S. Op. cit., 46 pages. of ballistic missiles, satellites, and planets.” Lincoln Laboratory 201. Ibid., pp. 6, 7. Journal 12(2):217-220, 2000. 202. US Air Force, Foreign Technology Divison. [Title redacted.] ST- 222. Personal communications with confidential radar engineering CS-16-13-73, 22 December 1972. Op. cit., p. 5. source, May 2016. 203. Ibid., pp. 5, 24. 223. Zabetakis S.G and Peterson J.P. “The Diyarbakir radar.” Studies in 204. Vick C.P. “The Soviet Super Boosters—Part 2.” Spaceflight 16(3): 94- Intelligence 8(4): 41-7, Autumn 1967. (Released by CIA in 1996; 104, 1974. accessible on the Web at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/ ; 205. US Air Force, North American Air Defense Command. “Special accessed June 23, 2016.) Index Issue, 1 July--31 December 1969.” NORAD Weekly Intelligence 224. General Electric. (No title, but radar experience and capabilities, Review, 1 January 1970. pp. 1-11. (Declassified by USAF Pentagon at and contracts won.) [Excerpt.] Circa 1972. 7 pages. Major Johnson the request of the author, released 2016.) papers, GE History Museum, Schenectady, New York. (Courtesy 206. Brandwein D.S. “Central Intelligence Agency: Memorandum for Chris Hunter) the Record. Subject: Telephone conversation with Dr. Werhner von 225. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence: “Special Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center.” 25 Spetember 1968. 2 Report, The Soviet space program ten years after Sputnik 1.” Weekly pages. (Declassified by CIA/US Department of State, released 2009. Review, 6 October 1967. Op. cit., 10 pages. Available via the CREST facility at College Park, Maryland) 226. Zak A. Personal communication with the author, May 16, 2016. 207. Ibid., p. 2. 227. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence: “Special 208. “Periscope: Countdown for Biggest Rocket Yet.” Newsweek February Report, The Soviet space program ten years after Sputnick 1.” Op. 24, 1969. p. 28. cit., p. 8. 209. National Security Agency. “Revised Launch Date for Soviet 228. US Air Force, Northern American Air Defense Command. “Missile circumlunar operation.” NSA SIGINT Summary, 36-69, 15 February range firing log.” NORAD Weekly Intelligence Review, 12/66, 25 1969. p. 2. (Original classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt March 1966. p. 6. (Declassified by ISCAP at the request of the declassified by NSA at the request of the author, released 2016.) author, released 2015.) 210. National Security Agency. [Space-related materials redacted, but on 229. US Army Intelligence. “Army Missile Command: Sino-Soviet Proton launch failure.] NSA SIGINT Summary, 42-69, 19 February Bloc Missile and Space Technology.” MS-5-65, May 1965. p. D-30. 1969. p. 5. (Original classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt (Accessible via the CREST facility at College Park, Maryland) declassified by NSA at the request of the author, released 2016.) (Declassified by CIA, released 2005.) 211. Siddiqi AA. Op. cit., pp. 74-75. 230. Siddiqi AA. Op. cit., pp. 77-78. 212. National Security Agency. “Major Soviet space event cancelled.” 231. National Security Agency. “Soviet probable lunar mission fails.” NSA SIGINT Summary, 44-69, 21 February 1969. p. 5. (Original NSA SIGINT Summary, 142-69, 16 June 1969. p. 4. (Original classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at

87 Peter Pesavento

the request of the author, 2016.) Ryazan, Babakin, and Mozzhorin. ‘The general scheme of the 232. Pesavento P. “Excavating for America’s secret knowledge of the [manned] lunar expedition.’” (K. Lantratov, via Bart Hendrickx; Soviet space program.” Griffith Observer 76(1):2-19, 2012. courtesy Bart Hendrickx) 233. Pesavento P. “The Ghosts of Tyuratam...”Op. cit., 65 (JBIS 251. Zamyatin OM. My Stremlis’ k nebu (kniga pervaya) [“We were Supplement 2): 85-6, 2012. reaching for the skies (book one)”] (Moscow, Alkor publishers, 2015) 511 pages. 234. National Security Agency. “Probably Soviet circumlunar mision planned for early July.” NSA SIGINT Summary, 152-69, 27 June 252. Sokolov O. Personal communication with the author, August 1969. p. 6. (Original classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt 8, 2016. According to Sokolov, “During my work in the ‘Soyuz’ declassified by NSA at the request of the author, 2016.) TMKB in 1968-1971, after my graduation [at] the Moscow Aviation Institute as engineer on [liquid-propellant] propulsion units, I 235. Central Intelligence Agency. “Directorate of Science & Technology: was a[n] engineer on flight tests (officially, this position was called Space Event Report. J-Vehicle Failure – 3 July 1969.” FMSAC- ‘an engineer on operation,’ from considerations of secrecy) of III SER/69-13, 26 August 1969. 10 pages. (Original Classification: “Top [third] class (a second rank from below in the classification) in Secret [several codewords and an additional phrasing redacted the enterprise’s Flight Test Department; in this rank, I had not underneath; codewords include “Umbra,” “Zarf,” “Ruff,” and perhaps permanent subordinates but one [to] two technicians [whom] could “No Foreign Dissemination.”]”) (Declassified by ISCAP at the be subordinated [to] me temporar[il]y, for a time of some charged request of the author, released 2015.) work implementation. The work in this rank was ended in 1971 236. Ibid., p. 1. when I transfered to Design Department for a rank of engineer- 237. Central Intelligence Agency. “Largest Soviet Booster Explodes designer of II category (the ‘category’ was an analogue of the ‘class’ at Complex J.” Central Intelligence Bulletin pp. 1-3. (Original term but for non-operation specialists).” Classification: “Top Secret Ruff [two codewords redacted, but likely 253. Zamyatin OM. Op.cit., p. 170. “Zarf” and “Umbra”]. Handle via Talent-Keyhole-COMINT Control 254. Sokolov O. Personal communication with Bart Hendrickx, June 4, Systems Jointly.”) (Declassified by CIA at the request of the author, 2016. (courtesy Bart Hendrickx) released 2016.) 255. Sokolov O. Personal communication with the author, June 1, 2016. 238. Ibid., p. 2. 256. Chertok B. Op. cit., pp. 220-223. This 3 June 1969 meeting in Vasiliy 239. Pesavento P. “Excavating for America’s Secret Knowledge of the Mishin’s office covered missions 5L through 7L, and acording to Soviet Space Program.” Op. cit., p. 15. Chertok’s recollections that were published in Moon Race, not 240. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Science & Technology. once were any of these missions mentioned to be anticipated to be “J-Vehicle Failure—3 July 1969. FMSAC/CIA.” Scientific Intelligence crewed. However, as with all recollections, there are different kinds Digest OSI-SD-KH/69-10, October 1969. pp. 1; 14-15. (Original of “truth,” and historians have to expect such a clashing of data. classification: “Top Secret [multiple codewords redacted— Chertok’s information is derived from high-level office-meetings perhaps four codewords, including “Zarf,” “Ruff,” and “Umbra”]”) “truth”; Sokolov’s data are derived from assembly building/shop (Declassified by CIA at the request of the author, released 2016.) floor “truth.” How to weight these presents a current conundrum. 241. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 257. Bugrov V. Personal communication with Bart Hendrickx, June 10, 242. General Electric. “Analysis of Pre-launch and Launch Phases of 2016. Bugrov reaffirms the position (as held by Chertok) that the First TT-05 Vehicle.” SAO/GE SR 71DC-43SE, 08 September 1971. 5L payload included an L1S spacecraft on board (basically an L-1 10 pages. (Original classification: “Top Secret [codeword redacted, spacecraft with a DOK module attached, without an orbital module), mostly likely “Umbra”], Handle via Talent-Keyhole Control System and not an LOK as Sokolov remembers. (courtesy Bart Hendrickx) Only.”) (Declassified by NASIC at the request of the author, released 258. Zamyatin OM. Op. cit., pp. 181-2. 2011.) 259. Sokolov O. Personal communication with the author, June 1, 2016. 243. National Security Agency. “Possible cancellation of Soviet lunar 260. Sokolov O. Personal communication with the author, June 15, 2016. mission from Tyuratam, 03 July 1969.” Spot Report [identifier Sokolov further stated in regards to the TsKBEM letter he found in partially illegible, but includes “3276-69.”], 03 July 1969. One page. the file that “…as I remember, a single-page reference document (Original classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Declassified by NSA in which dates of launches were shown very approximately, for at the request of the author, released 2016.) instance, ‘Konets 1968 goda’ = ‘Late 1968.’ Due to this nature of the 244. National Security Agency. [Heavily redacted two-page report, letter, it had a ‘Secret’ classification but not ‘Top Secret’ as in the case no title or identifiers, follow-up to 03 July 1969 Spot Report. if it contained more exact dates. Frankly speaking, the information, Declassified by NSA at the request of the author, released 2014.] which was contained in this letter, did not just correspond to real 245. National Security Agency. “Possible cancellation or early in-flight capabilities on these launches carrying out but I considered it failure of Soviet lunar mission from Tyuratam on 3 July 1969.” NSA to be near to a reality since I liked very much to see a landing of SIGINT Summary, 159-69, 5 July 1969. p. 2. (Original classification: cosmonaut onto the Moon as soon as possible!” “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at the request of 261. Kosmicheskiy korabliy “Apollo 7”: Planniy zapuska [“Cosmic the author, 2016.) Spaceship ‘Apollo VII’: Launch Plans.”] 16 pages. Booklet. (Hand 246. Cameron E.N. Interviews and personal communications with the notations in black ink, with some data, such as launch time, written author, Op.cit. in.) [Early] October 1968. 247. Gunston B. The Encyclopedia of Russian Aircraft: 1875-1995. 262. Sokolov O. Personal communcation with the author, June 22, 2016. (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International, 1995) pp. 398-400. According to Sokolov, “These documents pursued [the] goal to 248. Lantratov K. “Yubeliy: ‘Pochivshie’ lunnie planiy.” [“Anniversary: inform technical employees of the Soviet space industry on [the] ‘Deceased’ lunar plans.”] Novosti Kosmonautiki [“Cosmonautics process of [the] most advanced programs development in the USA. News”] 14: 60-61, 2-15 July, 1994. (Similar documents were being issued on space programs of other foreign countries as well.) These information documents were 249. Hendrickx B. Personal communication with the author, May 5, 2016. being edited by the TsNIIMash (NII-88) Institute’s Department 250. “Inventory 7537, signed in January 1970 by Melinkov, Mishin, of Scientific-Technological Information (ONTI by the Russian

88 Lifting the Veil, Part 2: Further declassification disclosures – part 3

acronym). They all had a stamp ‘Для служебного пользования’ foreign correspondents community also.” Additionally, “Journalists (‘For Official Use’), [the] lowest degree of classification (apparently, treated Victor like any other source in Moscow, namely pumping this stamp[ing] was torn away [from the copy that you have]).” him at functions and dinner parties. His phone number was known 263. Kosmicheskiy korabliy “Apollo 7”: Planniy zapuska. Op. cit., pp. 10-11. and some telephoned him occasionally.” Daniloff also provided the comments that Victor Louis was viewed as truthful. Western 264. Ibid., pp. 5; 7. reporters would view the information from Victor--since it had KGB 265. Ibid., pp. 15-16. connections--as more factual and more authorized than if it wasn’t 266. Ibid., p. 14. coming from KGB-connected Soviet journalism persons.) 267. Ibid., p. 15. 279. Triumph and tragedy of Soyuz 11.” TIME magazine, July 12, 1971. 268. Ibid., p. 16. (Can be accessed on the Web at http://content.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,903011,00.html ; Accessed June 11, 2016.) 269. Lowenthal MM. “OSINT: The State of the Art, the Artless State.” Studies in Intelligence 61-6, 2001. 280. Karweina G. Wettlauf zum Mond. (“Race to the Moon.”) (Cologne, Gemany: Kiepnheuer & Witsch, 1969) p. 153. “In the West the 270. Pesavento P. “The Ghosts of Tyuratam…”Op. cit., p. 85. first manned flight of the new Soviet space ship is now expected 271. Central Intelligence Agency. “USSR Scientific Affairs: Leonov daily. People even believe to know already which tasks it is to fulfill, announces lunar flight plans.” Foreign Broadcast Information Service. for in Moscow rumors are spread again by semi-official sources, Section III, p. D-3. 2 June 1969. One page. above all by the KGB confidant Victor Louis, who despite his Soviet 272. Clark E. “re: Special space report—Soviet Union 6/19/69 [“To: nationality is accredited to a London evening paper as a foreign Diamond, Alexander, science”]” June 19, 1969. p. 5. Evert Clark correspondent in Moscow. This Louis confides to his Western papers, “Special space report drafts, 1969.” Box 5, folder 18. colleagues in early April that they can expect a new great feat of 273. “Moskau voller Geruchte: Mondlandung vor USA?” (“Moscow full Soviet cosmonautics in the next days: The first docking of two of rumors: Moon landing before USA?”) (News service of Welt manned space ships.” (Excerpt and its translation courtesy Ulrich am Sonntag. Datelined 5 July, Moscow/Cape Kennedy/New York) Brocks.) (Translation courtesy Ulrich Brocks.) 281. Bassow W. The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting on Russia from the 274. Michaelis A. “Russian Moon failure.” Sunday Telegraph July 6, 1969. Revolution to Glasnost (New York: William Morrow, 1988) pp. 252-3. p. 1. (courtesy Charles Vick) 282. Brocks U. Personal communication with the author, 30 August 2005. 275. Cameron EN. Personal communication with the author, July 31, 283. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “USSR: The 2004. Soyuz 11 cosmonauts apparently died of asphyxiation…” 3 July 1971. 276. “Moskaus verpabste Chance: Das ‘Mondfester’ fur Russen p. 2. (Original classification: “Top Secret: For the President Only.”) geschlossen.” (“Moscow’s missed opportunity: The ‘lunar launch (Declassified by CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at window’ closed for the Russians.”) (News service of Welt am https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/presidents- Sonntag. Datelined 12 July, Moscow/Cape Kennedy) (Translation daily-brief-1969-1977; accessed 24 August 2016.) courtesy Ulrich Brocks.) This report’s date rules out any connection 284. Pesavento P. “Lifting the veil: What US intelligence knew in the to Luna 15, and explicitly ties the July 5 news item with a crewed 1960s about the Soviet space program.” Op. cit., pp. 67-73. The mission. OSINT included comments by cosmonauts Leonov and Komarov 277. Markish D. “Victor Louis: Questions without answers.” Lehaim 125 to reporters during their travels, as well as actual journalists (5673-9), September 2002. (Article courtesy Dima Payson.) themselves—one from the Italian newspaper Corriere della Serra, the other a Warsaw-based scientist who was known to produce TV 278. Daniloff N. Personal communications with the author, 4 June and and radio broadcasts popularizing astronomy and space exploration 14 July 2006. (According to former Moscow UPI correspondent for domestic Polish audiences. and Shapiro colleague Nicholas Daniloff, “Victor Louis was well known in the foreign community in Moscow, and especially in the 285. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

References (Appendix A)

1 This database can be accessed at this URL link: https://www.cia.gov/ latest photography from a satellite over Tyuratam shows…” 7 May library/readingroom/collection/presidents-daily-brief-1969-1977. 1970. pp. 4, 5. (Original classification: “Top Secret: For the President 2. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “Soviet Only.”) (Declassified by CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web Affairs: The Soviet space center…” 7 August 1969. p. 2. (Original at the above URL link; accessed 24 August 2016.) classification: “Top Secret: For the President Only.”) (Declassified by 7. Chertok B. Rockets and People. Volume IV: The Moon Race. [English CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at the above URL link; translation edition, AA Siddiqi editor] (Washington, DC: NASA/US accessed 24 August 2016.) Government Printing Office, 2011) p. 318. 3. Semenov Yu. P, ed. Raketno-Kosmicheskaya Korporatisiya Energia 8. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “USSR: The Imeni SP Koroleva. 1946-1996. (“Rocket-Space Corporation Energia Soviets’ space program suffered a major setback…” 28 June 1971. named after SP Korolev. 1946-1996.”) (Moscow: RKK Enrgia, 1996) p. 1. (Original classification: “Top Secret: For the President Only.”) p. 246. (Declassified by CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at the 4. Pesavento P. and Vick CP. “The Moon Race ‘End Game’: A New above URL link; accessed 24 August 2016.) Assessment of Soviet Crewed Lunar Aspirations. Part Two.” Quest: 9. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “USSR: The the history of spaceflight qrtrly 11(2):33-7, 2004. Salyut space station launched last April…” 13 October 1971. p. 5. Syromyatnikov VS. 100 Stories about docking and other Adventures 3. (Original classification: “Top Secret: For the President Only.”) in Space and on Earth. Volume 1: Twenty Years Back. (Moscow: (Declassified by CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at the Universitet Kniga, 2005). p. 247. above URL link; accessed 24 August 2016.) 6. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “USSR: The 10. Chertok B. Op. cit., p. 405.

89 Peter Pesavento

11. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “USSR: The is likely to function as an operational…” 19 June 1976. p. 5. (Original Soviets are again preparing…” 18 November 1972. p. 2. (Original classification: “Top Secret: For the President Only.”) (Declassified by classification: “Top Secret: For the President Only.”) (Declassified by CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at the above URL link; CIA, released 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at the above URL link; accessed 24 August 2016.) accessed 24 August 2016.) 13. Wikipedia. “Salyut 5.” (Accessible on the Web at https:// 12. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “Notes: Salyut 5 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salyut_5; accessed 25 August 2016.)

References (Appendix B)

1. National Security Agency. “Probable lunar mission from Tyuratam Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at the request of the planned for early August.” NSA SIGINT Summary, 183-69, 11 June author, released 2016.) 1969. p. 3. (Original classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt 7. Central Intelligence Agency. President’s Daily Brief. “Soviet Affairs: declassified by NSA at the request of the author, released 2016.) [redacted materials at the beginning of the initial paragraph, but 2. National Security Agency. “Soviet preparations for lunar operation.” on launch failure at Area J in early July, 1969]” 15 August 1969. p. NSA SIGINT Summary, 187-69, 11 June 1969. p. 5. (Original 2. [Additionally, graphic on preceding unpaginated page, entitled classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at “Largest Booster Explodes at Area J.”] (Original classification: “Top the request of the author, released 2016.) Secret: For the President Only.”) (Declassified by CIA, released 3. National Security Agency. “Soviets launch Zond 7.” NSA SIGINT 2016.) (Accessible on the Web at https://www.cia.gov/library/ Summary, 189-69, 11 June 1969. p. 3. (Original classification: “Top readingroom/collection/presidents-daily-brief-1969-1977; accessed Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at the request of the 1 September 2016.) author, released 2016.) 8. Central Intelligence Agency, Natinal Photographic Interpretation 4. National Security Agency. “Status of Zond 7; Forecast of re-entry Center. “Activity at Tyuratam MTC and Plesetsk MSC, July- date.” NSA SIGINT Summary, 193-69, 11 June 1969. p. 8. (Original December 1969. Strategic SSM & Space Facilities, USSR. February classification: “Top Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at 1970.” 19 pages. [Mention of launch vehicle on pad J2 in August the request of the author, released 2016.) 1969 mentioned on pages 1, 7, and 19.] (Accessible on the Web at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/ ; accessed 5 February 2017.) 5. National Security Agency. “Zond 7 recovery activity.” NSA SIGINT Summary, 194-69, 11 June 1969. p. 6. (Original classification: “Top 9. Central Intelligence Agency. “Notes. USSR: Zond 7 was recovered in Secret Umbra”) (Excerpt declassified by NSA at the request of the the USSR yesterday…” Central Intelligence Bulletin 15 August 1969. author, released 2016.) p. 8. (Original classification: “Top Secret Ruff [codeword redacted, likely “Umbra”], Handle via Talent-Keyhole-Comint Control 6. National Security Agency. “Zond 7 returns to Earth.” NSA SIGINT Systems Jointly.”) (Declassified by ISCAP at the request of the author, Summary, 195-69, 11 June 1969. p. 8. (Original classification: “Top released 2010.)

References (Appendix C)

1. Garofalo N.R. “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars.” 12. Brown J.P. “The CIA’s declassified database is now online.” Studies in Intelligence 13(2): 53-61, Spring 1969. (Declassified by the (Muckrock.com, web blog, 17 January 2017.) https://www. CIA at the request of the author, released 2017.) muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/jan/17/cias-declassified- 2. Ibid., p. 53. database-now-online/ (Accessed 20 January 2017.) 3. Ibid., pp. 54-5. 13. White L.K. “Memorandum for the Record: Morning Meeting of 15 November 1968.” 2 p. (Released by CIA in 2016; accessible on the 4. Ibid., p. 55. Web at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/; accessed 19 January 5. Klotz J. and Goudie D. “Documentation on the Cobra Mist (AN/ 2017.) FPS-95) Over-the-horizon radar.” http://www.cufon.org/cufon/ 14. White L.K. “Memorandum for the Record: Morning Meeting of 18 cobramst.htm. (Accessed 17 March 2017.) November 1968.” 2 p. (Released by CIA in 2016; accessible on the 6. Fowle E.N., Key E.L., Millar R.I. et. al. “The Enigma of the AN/ Web at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/; accessed 19 January FPS-95 OTH Radar.” Journal of Defense Research (Winter 1978 2017.) issue). p. 301. (Accessible on the Web at https://web.archive.org/ 15. White L.K. “Memorandum for the Record: Morning Meeting of 25 web/20100528053916/http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading_ November 1968.” 2 p. (Released by CIA in 2016; accessible on the room/480.pdf; accessed 17 March 2017.) Web at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/; accessed 19 January 7. Ibid., p. 293. 2017.) 8. Ibid., p. 297. 16. Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum. “Subject: The Foreign 9. Ibid., p. 299. Missile and Space Analysis Center. Reference: Memorandum to 10. Garofalo NR. Op. cit., p. 58. DD/S&T from D/DCI/NIPE; Subject: Agency and Community Organizational Survey, Dated 12 September 1968 (DD/S&T 11. Sing C.Z. “Passive Multistatic Detection of Maritime Targets Using 35335/68, ER 68-3943/4).” 7 p. (Released by CIA in 2016; accessible Opportunistic Radars.” (Thesis.) (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate on the Web at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/; accessed 19 School, March 2004) p. 3. (Accessible on the Web at http://www.dtic. January 2017.) mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a474069.pdf; accessed 19 March 2017.)

90 DIARY FORTHCOMING LECTURES & MEETINGS OF THE BIS

THE SPACE AGE: A GLOBAL REVOLUTION 19 June 2018, all day VENUE: The Exhibition Centre, Liverpool As the age of commercial space travel dawns, leaders and innovators from across the global space industry are gathering at the International Business Festival 2018 to discuss the sectors emerging challenges and opportunities. The BIS is in partnership with the Northern Space Consortium to present a specially invited panel of key organisations and individuals. BLOCKBUSTERS FROM SPACE? 27 June 2018, 7pm VENUE: BIS, 27-29 South Lambeth Road, London SW8 1SZ Earth-i launched its first prototype satellite in January this year. Mr. Xu Teo, Client Services at Earth-I, will be touching on Earth-i’s exciting plans to launch further satellites, again built by Surrey Satellite Technology, into the Vivid-i Constellation – the world’s first satellite constellation that will deliver near real-time Ultra High Definition, full colour video and still images from space. This is in addition to the 3 other satellite constellations with which Earth-i is already working. MOON, MARS AND BEYOND 17 July 2018, 7 pm VENUE: The Royal Institution, 21 Albermarle Street, London, W1S 4BS Where should humans inhabit next? Apollo Astronaut Al Worden and BIS Council Members, Dr Stuart Eves and Prof Chris Welch will argue their case for settling on the Moon, Mars or travelling beyond. Who will win your vote? 73RD ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 28 July 2018, 1 pm VENUE: Royal Gunpowder Mills, Beaulieu Drive, Waltham Abbey, Essex, EN9 1JY Admission to the AGM is open to Fellows only but all Members are welcome to join the discussion after the formalities conclude around 1.15 pm. Please advise in advance if you wish to attend (attendance to this part of the afternoon is free). The AGM will be followed by the BIS Summer Get-together at the same venue; tickets are £20 and are on sale now on our website. Council nomination forms are obtainable from the Executive Secretary or from the the BIS website.These must be completed and returned not later than 12 noon on 4 May 2017. If the number of nominations exceeds the number of vacancies, election will be by postal ballot. Voting papers will then be prepared and circulated to all Corporate Members. EXOMARS TALKS 13 September 2018, 7pm VENUE: BIS, 27/29 South Lambeth Road, London SW8 1SZ The joint European-Russian ExoMars Rover is due for launch in 2020 following its assembly by Airbus in Stevenage. Paul Meacham, Lead Systems Engineer at Airbus presents the current status of the ExoMars mission. BIS PRESTIGE LECTURE – WALLY FUNK AND SUE NELSON 16 October 2018, 6pm VENUE: BIS, 27/29 South Lambeth Road, Vauxhall, London, SW8 1SZ Join us for an evening with Wally Funk and Sue Nelson. Wally Funk (born 1 February 1939) is an American aviator and Goodwill Ambassador. Funk was one of the Mercury 13. Sue Nelson currently co-produces/presents the award-winning Space Boffins podcast. Doors open at 6 pm for drinks and canapés (included in the price) and the lecture starts at 7 pm, with a Q&A session at 8pm. Doors close at 9 pm. Entrance fee Members £20, Non-members £30. Pre-booking is essential as seating is limited, and early booking on the BIS website is advised.

91 SPACE CHRONICLE A BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY PUBLICATION

Vol. 71 No.2 2018

LIFTING THE VEIL, PART 2: Further declassification disclosures reveal what US Intelligence knew about the Soviet space program during the Space Race - part 3* Peter Pesavento

CHEVALINE MEMOIRS Fun and games at AWRE Foulness John Harlow