Cosmological Argument
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Cosmological Argument Bruce Reichenbach The cosmological argument is less a particular argument than an argument type. It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally referred to as God. Among these initial claims are that the world came into being, that the world is such that at any future time it could either be or not be (the world is contingent), or that certain beings in the world are causally dependent or contingent. From these facts philosophers infer either deductively or inductively that a first cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists. The cosmological argument is part of classical natural theology, whose goal has been to provide some evidence for the claim that God exists. The argument arises from human curiosity that invokes a barrage of intriguing questions about the universe in which we live. Where did the universe come from? When and how did it all begin? How did the universe develop into its present form? Why is there a universe at all? What is it that makes existence here and now possible? All grow out of the fundamental question which the cosmological argument addresses: Why is there something rather than nothing? At the heart of the argument lies a concern for some complete, ultimate, or best explanation of what exists contingently. In what follows we will first sketch out a very brief history of the argument, note the two fundamental types of deductive cosmological arguments, and then provide a careful analysis of each, first the argument from contingency, then the argument from the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress of causes. In the end we will turn to an inductive version of the cosmological argument. • 1. Historical Overview • 2. Typology of Cosmological Arguments • 3. Argument for a First Sustaining Cause o 3.1 The Deductive Argument from Contingency o 3.2 Objection 1: The Universe Just Is o 3.3 Objection 2: Explaining the Individual Constituents is Sufficient o 3.4 Objection 3: The Causal Principle is Suspect o 3.5 Objection 4: The Conclusion is Contradictory ¡ ¢ £ ¤ • 4. The Cosmological Argument o 4.1 The Causal Principle and Quantum Physics o 4.2 Impossibility of an Actual Infinite? o 4.3 The Big Bang Theory of Cosmic Origins o 4.4 The Big Bang Is Not An Event o 4.5 A Non-finite Universe o 4.6 Personal Explanation • 5. An Inductive Cosmological Argument • Bibliography • Other Internet Resources • Related Entries 1. Historical Overview Although in Western philosophy the earliest formation of a version of the cosmological argument is found ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ¦ § ¢ ¨ £ ¤ ¥ in Plato's , 893-6, the classical argument is firmly rooted in Aristotle's VIII, 4-6) and © ¡ ¢ ¦ § ¢ ¥ ¤ (XII, 1-6). Islamic philosophy enriches the tradition, developing two types of arguments. The ¡ ¢ ¡ ¢ ¦ ¡ Arabic philosophers ( ) developed the atemporal argument from contingency, which is taken up by ¤ ¤ ¡ ¢ ¦ § ¡ ¤ ¤ ¡ ¡ ¦ ¢ ¢ ¤ Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) in his (I,q.2,a.3) and his (I, 13). ¤ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ¦ ¤ ¤ The , theologians who used reason and argumentation to support their revealed Islamic beliefs, developed the temporal version of the argument from the impossibility of an infinite regress, known as the kalām argument. For example, al-Ghāzāli (1058-1111) argued that everything that begins to exist requires a cause of its beginning. The world is composed of temporal phenomena preceded by other temporally ordered phenomena. Since such a series of temporal phenomena cannot continue to infinity, the world must have had a beginning and a cause of its existence, namely, God (Craig 1979, part 1). This § ¢ version of the argument enters the Christian tradition through Bonaventure (1221-74) in his (II Sent. D.1,p.1,a.1,q.2). During the Enlightenment, writers such as G.W.F. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke reaffirmed the cosmological argument. Leibniz (1646-1716) appealed to a strengthened principle of sufficient reason, according to which “no fact can be real or existing and no statement true without a sufficient reason for its being so and © ¡ ¢ not otherwise” ( ¥ , §32). Leibniz uses the principle to argue that the sufficient reason for the “series of things comprehended in the universe of creatures” (§36) must exist outside this series of contingencies and is found in a necessary being that we call God. The principle of sufficient reason is likewise employed by Samuel Clark in his cosmological argument (Rowe 1975, chap. 2). Although the cosmological argument does not figure prominently in Asian philosophy, a very abbreviated £ ¡ ¢ ¤ £ ¡ ¢ ¦ ¥ ¥ version of it, proceeding from dependence, can be found in Udayana's I,4. In general philosophers in the Nyāya tradition argue that since the universe has parts that come into existence at one occasion and not another, it must have a cause. We could admit an infinite regress of causes if we had evidence for such, but lacking such evidence, God must exist as the non-dependent cause. Many of the objections to the argument contend that God is an inappropriate cause because of God's nature. For example, since God is immobile and has no body, he cannot properly be said to cause anything. The Naiyāyikas reply that God could assume a body at certain times, and in any case, God need not create in the same way humans do (Potter, 100-7). The cosmological argument came under serious assault in the 18 th century, first by David Hume and then by Immanuel Kant. Hume attacks both the view of causation presupposed in the argument (that causation is an objective, productive relation that holds between two things) and the Causal Principle — every contingent being has a cause of its being — that lies at the heart of the argument. Kant contends that the cosmological argument, in identifying the necessary being, relies on the ontological argument, which in turn is suspect. We will return to these criticisms below. Both theists and non-theists in the last part of the 20 th century generally have shown a healthy skepticism about the argument. Alvin Plantinga (1967, chap. 1) concludes “that this piece of natural theology is ineffective.” Richard Gale contends, in Kantian fashion, that since the conclusion of all versions of the cosmological argument invokes an impossibility, no cosmological arguments can provide examples of sound reasoning (1991, ch. 7). Similarly, Michael Martin reasons that no current version of the cosmological argument is sound (1990, ch. 4), as do John Mackie (ch. 5) and Quentin Smith (Craig and Smith, 1993). Yet dissenting voices can be heard. William Lane Craig defends the kalām argument, and Richard Swinburne, though rejecting deductive versions of the cosmological argument, proposes an inductive argument which is part of a larger cumulative case for God's existence. “There is quite a chance that if there is a God he will make something of the finitude and complexity of a universe. It is very unlikely that a universe would exist uncaused, but rather more likely that God would exist uncaused. The existence of the universe…can be made comprehensible if we suppose that it is brought about by God” (1979, 131-2). Thus, contemporary philosophers continue to contribute detailed arguments on both sides of the debate. 2. Typology of Cosmological Arguments Craig distinguishes three types of cosmological arguments. The first, advocated by Aquinas, is based on the impossiblity of an essentially ordered infinite regress. The second, which he terms the kalām argument, holds that an infinite temporal regress is impossible because an actual infinite is impossible. The third, espoused by Leibniz and Clarke, is founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Craig 1980, 282). Another way of distinguishing between versions of the argument is in terms of the relevance of time. In the first and third versions, consideration of the essential ordering of the causes or sufficient reasons proceeds independent of temporal concerns. The relationship between cause and effect is treated as logical, not temporal. Put in more contemporary terms, one is after the best explanation for what exists. In the kalām version, however, the temporal ordering of the causal sequence in central. The distinction between these types of argument is important because the objections raised against one version might not be relevant to the other versions. So, for example, a critique of the principle of sufficient reason, which one finds developed in William Rowe or Richard Gale, might not be telling against the Thomistic or kalām versions of the argument. 3. Argument for a First Sustaining Cause Thomas Aquinas held that among the things whose existence needs explanation are contingent beings, which depend for their existence upon other beings. Richard Taylor (1992, 99-108) and others argue that the universe (meaning everything that ever existed), as contingent, needs explanation. Arguing that the term “universe” refers to an abstract entity or set, William Rowe rephrases the issue, “Why does that set (the universe) have the members that it does rather than some other members or none at all?” (Rowe 1975, 136). That is, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (Smart, in Haldane and Smart, 36). The response of the cosmological argument is that what is contingent exists because of a necessary being. 3.1 The Deductive Argument from Contingency The cosmological argument begins with a fact about experience, namely, that something exists. We might sketch out the argument as follows. 1. A contingent being exists (a contingent being is such that if it exists, it can not-exist) 2. This contingent being has a cause or explanation [1] of its existence. 3. The cause or explanation of its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.